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Theses and Dissertations

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Browsing Theses and Dissertations by Author "Archie, Andre, advisor"

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    Friendship and the role of emotion in Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of eudaimonia
    (Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Lins, Nicole G., author; Archie, Andre, advisor; MacKenzie, Matt, committee member; Plaisance, Patrick, committee member
    Ancient conceptions of virtuous and perfect friendships – specifically in Aristotle and the Stoics (i.e. Cicero, Epictetus, and Seneca) – attempt to describe the proper relations between people, when and why friendships arise, and how we ought to treat our friends. I will argue that the Stoic conception of friendship, when looked at through modern-day psychological research on what is necessary to a good friendship, presents a better model for friendship than Aristotle. This is because the Stoics better capture the positive aspects in friendship through their stance on emotion and how one ought to live in order to live well. When one lives as a Stoic, he is better placed to maintain a stable level of psychological well-being, and he is better able to care for his friends. Aristotle’s conception of friendship falls short because of his claim that friendship is grounded on moral virtue alone, as well as his claim that there are necessary contingent goods to happiness, both of which make his conception of friendship unstable and less preferable. My positive argument for the Stoics having the better conception of friendship rests on psychological research on friendship and well-being, on their ability to capture the plurality for grounds of friendship, and on their own mental stability and attitudes of affection toward others. Because the Stoic conception is supported by empirical evidence and what people actually experience in good friendships, it provides a better model for how one ought to live and act concerning their friends.
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    From Pyrrhonism to Madhyamaka: paradoxical solutions to skeptical problems
    (Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Williams, Stephen G., author; Archie, Andre, advisor; MacKenzie, Mattthew, committee member; Chong, Edwin, committee member
    Skepticism as a philosophical school of thought is best embodied by Greek Pyrrhonism and Indian Madhyamaka. Between these two schools, however, Pyrrhonism is bogged down on issues that Madhyamaka is not. For Greek Pyrrhonism, scholarship revolves around the issue that skeptics cannot have beliefs, and yet this is something they believe. For Indian Madhyamaka, scholarship points towards a skeptical position that is consistently paradoxical. This paper will first explore the discussion on Sextus Empiricus' Pyrrhonism as established by Michael Frede, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes. From there, a closer look at Aristotle, Anselm, and Immanuel Kant will show that paradoxes are more common in philosophy than normally acknowledged. An in-depth discussion of Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva's Madhyamaka skepticism using interpretations from Jay Garfield and Graham Priest will illustrate how paradoxes at the limits of thought can correctly capture skepticism. Using the understanding of Madhyamaka, the debate on Pyrrhonism and beliefs will be shown to be correctly paradoxical. Finally, the paper will conclude that skepticism itself not only paradoxical, but an impressive and valuable philosophical position.