Theses and Dissertations

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10217/100498

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Open Access
The implications of process metaphysics for Christian mysticism
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1982) Breeding, Marshall M., author; Crosby, Donald A., advisor
This study gives a metaphysical discussion of mystical Christianity, comparing and contrasting the traditional static metaphysics with a metaphysical scheme where process is fundamental. Two Christian mystics, Meister Eckhart and St. John of the Cross, are used to exemplify the pattern of life and traditional metaphysical outlook of Christian mysticism. Alfred North Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme, as presented in his Process and Reality, serves as the process alternative. For all three persons the doctrine of God provides the focus for metaphysical discussion. The principal aim of the metaphysical discussion is to argue that process metaphysics provides a more adequate interpretation for the experiences of the Christian mystics than the static, non-process metaphysics the mystics themselves used. The main characteristic of the mystics' experience which metaphysics must take into account is the intimacy the mystic feels with God. Eckhart interprets the intimacy through an ontological union which occurs on God's transcendent level of existence. St. John suggests that no ontological union occurs but that mystical experience is a volitional transformation. Whitehead's metaphysical categories do not allow for an ontological union but do provide a conception of God and a model of human experience where a very intimate relation is possible between the mystic and God. I argue that Whitehead's view of God as relative, changing, and interacting with the world, more adequately represents what the mystics experience than the view of God as non-relative, static, and metaphysically distinct from the world, which characterizes the theologies of the mystics themselves.
Open Access
Origins of the animal husbandry ethic
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1998) Hedleston, Jo Ann, author; Rollin, Bernard E., advisor; Rolston, Holmes, 1932-2025, committee member; Roberts, P. Elaine, committee member
This thesis gives a historical account of the ethical idea of kindness to animals that is part of the animal husbandry ethic as found in British and American culture. It deals in particular with the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson as the "author", along with Adam Smith, of the American agrarian dream, with special emphasis on the influence of the Christian utilitarian ethic of Francis Hutcheson, a leader of the Scottish Enlightenment in mid-eighteenth century, whose idea of the moral sense influenced both of these men. The modern idea of kindness to animals, or refraining from cruelty to animals, as part of good husbandry, comes from the social humanitarian movement in Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The idea is transformed from the ethic which states that we ought not be cruel to animals because it might in turn lead to cruel treatment of humans into a new ethic which claims we ought to be kind to animals because they are sensitive creatures with a value of their own beyond that of human use. That transformation of the ethic occurs in part as a result of the rise of natural science which gives us a new conception of the anatomical similarities of animals to humans. The discussion about what animals are is highlighted by Descartes' theory of the beast machine in Europe in general and I look at the controversy in detail in England and France especially as the organized church struggles to integrate the new empirical science and the old religion of Christianity. I make the claim that the humanitarian movement which produced the movement for reform in Britain was fueled by the ethical idea of the moral sense which first came to the public's attention through the popular writings of the Earl of Shaftesbury. These ethical ideas of the moral sense were refined and made palatable to ordinary Christians by the work of Francis Hutcheson and other natural theologians of the eighteenth century and written about extensively in the latter part of that century and the early part of the nineteenth in Britain. I survey some relatively unknown (in current scholarship) propagandistic literature of the animal welfare movement in Britain in order to support the claim that it was through a revival of Old Testament texts regarding the kind treatment of animals that the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and others were able to bring about legislative change in England regarding the treatment of domestic animals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I also survey some current theological writings on the subject of Christian duty to animals in order to compare the basic ethical assumptions of both centuries' interpretations of the Biblical texts, and suggest that modern problems in animal welfare might still be addressed by these same Biblically based ethical formulas, enlightened by scientific knowledge about animals.
Open Access
Unbiased ratio estimation for finite populations
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2008) Al-Jararha, Jehad, author; Breidt, F. Jay, advisor
In many sample surveys from finite populations, the value of an auxiliary variable x is available (at least in aggregate form) for the entire finite population, and is correlated with the study variable of interest y. This auxiliary variable can be used to improve the precision of the estimator of the y-total.
Open Access
The measurement and transmission of volatility in financial markets: evidence from metal futures markets
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2009) Khalifa, Ahmed Ali Abdel Alim, author; Jianakoplos, Nancy, advisor; Ramchander, Sanjay, advisor
The measurement and forecasting of asset-price volatility plays a critical role in the study of financial markets. This dissertation verifies the importance of using the integrated volatility using Fourier transformation (IVFT) measure to estimate integrated volatility efficiently. Consequently, studies of volatility that ignore intraday returns series and the IVFT measure are likely to yield misleading conclusions. The IVFT measure and the information provided by high-frequency returns are valuable to a broad range of issues in financial markets. The dissertation provides strong evidence based on the multi-chain Markov switching (MCMS) model of the interdependence, but no comovements between, the three metal markets, which is critical information for portfolio management, derivative pricing and economic policy making. The dissertation makes a comprehensive comparison of three volatility measures: daily absolute returns, cumulative intraday squared returns, and integrated volatility via Fourier transformation (IVFT). The comparisons are made using intraday futures price data for the time period 1999 through 2008 for three metal markets: gold, silver and copper, at four frequency intervals: 1 minute, 2 minutes, 5 minutes and 15 minutes. The forecasted volatility from a GARCH model is used as a baseline to evaluate the performance of the three measures of volatility. The principal findings of the study are: (A) using heteroscedastic root mean square error and loss function criteria, the IVFT measure better fits the GARCH predictions of volatility than either the daily absolute returns or the cumulative intraday squared returns measures. In addition to this, the goodness of fit of the IVFT measure to the GARCH forecast of volatility improves as the time frequency increases from 15 minutes to 1 minute. (B) Using a multi-chain Markov switching model, the study shows a spillover and interdependence between gold futures, silver futures and copper futures, but there is no comovement between the three metal futures markets during the study period. The distinguishing feature of this dissertation is providing evidence of an accurate measure of volatility using the Fourier transformation which is crucial for accurate forecasting of volatility. For risk and portfolio management, the dissertation provides useful results, including the fact that one of the three metal markets is sufficient as a hedge against inflation or reducing risk.
Open Access
For a species moral right to exist: the imperative of an adequate environmental ethics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2009) Staples, Winthrop Roscoe III, author; Cafaro, Philip, 1962-, advisor; Rolston, Holmes, 1932-2025, advisor; Knight, Richard L., committee member
The worsening environmental crisis and the anticipated mass extinction of the world's species require the evolution of an environmental ethics more capable of restraining destructive human actions. Political and business leaders manufacture ever more human need to morally justify, and enable ecosystem liquidation for profit, discouraging human population and consumption stabilization and reduction. The human survival adaptation of moral rights that protects less powerful members of communities by restraining more powerful members, and by doing so benefits both individuals and whole communities, must evolve to meet these challenges. This vital step in human social evolution must build on the recognition that all species have immense intrinsic value, and that like humanity, all species are ongoing entities, superindividuals that have an interest in surviving.
Open Access
The self, subjectivity, and impetus for Latino self-transformation in the writings of Kierkegaard
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2010) Alvarez, Daniel Isaac, author; Kneller, Jane, 1954-, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Valdez, Norberto, 1947-, committee member
The following thesis will explore the relationship between the conceptions of the self and subjectivity in writings of 19th century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Kierkegaard's conception of the self will take Sickness Unto Death (1849) as the focal point, while Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity will be explored in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). First, I will discuss three aspects of Kierkegaard's dialectical self: the irresolute self, the resolute self, and the religious dependent self. Second, after these aspects of the self are discussed, I turn my attention to Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity. The discussion on subjectivity will explore four perspectives of subjectivity: objective and subjective thinking, subjectivity and indirect communication, subjectivity as inwardness, existence, and passion, and lastly subjectivity and truth. Third, I discuss David T. Abalos' theory of transformation in The Latino Male: A Radical Redefinition (2002). My discussion of Abalos' theory of transformation will focus on the Three Acts of the Core Drama of Life in its application to Latino male self-transformation. My aim is to take Kierkegaard's remarks on the self and subjectivity and apply them to Abalos' theory of Latino male self-transformation. I attempt to demonstrate that Kierkegaard's remarks on these issues can inform and aid in the conversation of the contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Thus, I argue that Kierkegaard's remarks on the self and subjectivity are not only invaluable to this contemporary problem, but can provide impetus for Latino male self-transformation.
Open Access
Williams on external reasons
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2010) Viney, Marcus Wayne, author; Tropman, Beth, advisor; Rhodes, Matthew, committee member; Losonsky, Michael, committee member
Bernard Williams has argued for the controversial thesis that there are no external reasons for action. External reasons are desire-independent reasons for action, i.e. reasons whose existence does not depend on the desires of an agent. The thrust of Williams' argument is that an agent's reasons for action must always depend on his or her desires. The overall purpose of this thesis is to clarify and critically examine Williams' argument against external reasons. In chapter 1 I formalize and explain Williams' argument step-by-step. In addition to this I confront one prominent objection to the argument's validity, which alleges that it contains an equivocation on the term "reason." I argue that this objection fails and that Williams' argument is valid. In chapter 2 I turn to the soundness of Williams' argument and examine the truth of the premises one by one. In doing this I attempt to uncover important assumptions that underlie Williams' reasoning. I confront several objections to the premises, but I argue that none of them succeed in blocking Williams' conclusion. In the final chapter I consider the wider issues facing Williams' argument. First I confront three objections which allege that Williams' conclusion has certain unacceptable consequences. I draw from Williams' work to exonerate his argument on all three counts. Second I discuss two ways the critic might grant the soundness of Williams' argument, but neutralize the impact of his conclusion. While I defend Williams' argument on nearly every point, my primary aim is not to offer a definitive case for the argument. Rather my aim is simply to show that Williams' argument is stronger than some critics might suppose and that it is worthy of further consideration.
Open Access
Semantic and global irrealism
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2010) Perry, Jeremiah Alexander Burnette, author; Losonsky, Michael, advisor; Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member; Troup, Lucy, committee member
This thesis is concerned with skepticism about linguistic meaning and the consequences that follow from this view. After clarifying various positions that support skepticism about meaning - broadly classified under the umbrella term semantic irrealism - I weave a common thread through these different characterizations and use that formulation for the remainder of the thesis. In chapter two I examine the premises for the argument that semantic irrealism globalizes to the conclusion that no sentence is substantially true. After evaluating attempts found within the literature to block this inference, I argue that it cannot be blocked in the ways considered. Chapter three is a response to objections that the global irrealist position is both incoherent and unstable. I argue that it is neither and conclude that if semantic irrealism is the case, then this necessarily entails global irrealism.
Open Access
The poverty of protectionism
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Schultz-Bergin, Marcus Ryan, author; Rollin, Bernard E., advisor; Archie, Andre M., committee member; Cutler, Harvey, committee member
Much of the modern debate on the global economy takes the form of two ships passing in the dark. The economics literature on the subject defends liberalized trade on empirical grounds while the philosophical literature defends protectionism on theoretical grounds. I aim to unite the literature, arguing against protectionism and defending liberalized trade both empirically and theoretically in the name of poverty reduction. In chapter 1 I explore two country-specific case studies to get an idea of how trade liberalization benefitted their development and poverty reduction efforts. I also establish a general background for both the economic theory, between protectionism and trade liberalization, as well as the current state of poverty and protectionism in the world. Chapter 2 seeks to expand the case study analysis to analyze three general ways protectionism and trade liberalization interact with poverty reduction efforts. I argue that trade liberalization, as opposed to protectionism, promotes short term gains to national wealth. Additionally, trade liberalization, as opposed to protectionism, promotes sustained growth and poverty reduction. Finally, I argue that trade liberalization contributes to good governance, while protectionism works against it. In the final chapter I will consider a theory of fairness for the global economic system and its implications on three aspects of the global economic order: worker exploitation, protectionism in the developed world and the Fair Trade movement.
Open Access
Informing rational choice theory through case studies of loss-aversion
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Rakowski, Peter, author; Sarenac, Darko, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Kroll, Stephan, committee member
The problem this thesis addresses is that there are two disparate general notions of a 'rational decision' and neither notion is satisfactory as the basis for a rational choice theory that can improve our lives by improving our decision-making. One is too strict, labeling too many decisions irrational, while the other is too permissive, allowing decisions to be called rational when they should not be. I attempt to outline a better version of rationality, which I call global rationality, by examining the problems with the common notions in the context of a discussion of the well-documented phenomenon of loss-aversion in decision-making. While looking at case studies of loss-aversion, I argue for two main distinguishing features of my global rationality: it should respect an internalist view so that the rigid requirements of the standard rational choice theory will often not apply (while maintaining limits regarding which consistency requirements can be disregarded), and it should respect emotional utilities--the negative or positive emotions that accompany a decision should factor into the utility calculus (with important qualifications). I conclude with suggestions as to how the skeletal global rationality I've outlined can be filled-out in the future, in the process also offering some insights into the dynamic nature of rationality itself.
Open Access
Ontological deflationism: plural quantification, mereological collections, and quantifier variance
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Lightfield, Ceth, author; Losonsky, Michael, advisor; Chong, Edwin K. P., committee member; Sarenac, Darko, committee member
One criticism by deflationists about ontology is that ontological debates about composite material objects are merely verbal. That is, there is only apparent disagreement between the debating ontologists. In responding to such a deflationist view, Theodore Sider (2009) has argued that there is genuine disagreement between two ontologists concerning the ontological status of tables. In doing so, Sider has written that, using plural quantification, a mereological nihilist can grant the proposition 'There exist simples arranged tablewise' while denying the proposition 'There exist collections of simples arranged tablewise'. In the first chapter, I argue that Sider's response to the deflationist is unsuccessful for two reasons. The first is that plural quantification is not ontologically innocent. A semantic interpretation of a logical formula involving plural quantification will reveal a problematic locution, namely, 'one of them' where `them' has a collection as its referent. The second concern with Sider's response is that the predicate 'arranged tablewise' is collective rather than distributive. A collection is needed to instantiate a collective predicate; thus, a commitment to simples arranged tablewise entails a commitment to a collection of simples arranged tablewise. In responding to the ontological deflationist, Sider discusses a debate between David Lewis and Peter van Inwagen about the existence of tables where a table is interpreted as a collection of simples arranged tablewise. As part of his discussion, Sider claims that Lewis and van Inwagen agree on what counts as a table. Sider allows that the deflationist may have three candidate interpretations for what counts as a 'table', but none will support the deflationist conclusion. In the second chapter, I address each candidate interpretation: (1) using Composition as Identity - a table is simples arranged tablewise, (2) a table is a set-theoretic collection of simples arranged tablewise, and (3) using Unrestricted Composition - a table is a mereological collection of simples arranged tablewise. I argue against Lewis's argument for Composition as Identity and defend an argument by Sider in support of Unrestricted Composition. Thus, I argue that composition is unrestricted and not ontologically innocent. In doing so, I show that van Inwagen cannot grant 'There exist simples arranged tablewise' and deny the existence of tables. Thus, I show that, independent of plural quantification concerns, Sider is not successful in refuting the deflationist conclusion that the ontologists are equivocating on the word 'table'. Finally, in the third chapter, I address Sider's response to the deflationist claims that the ontologists are equivocating on the quantifier 'there exists'. I look at Sider's presentation of the argument and his response which centers on an appeal to naturalness. Relying on Eli Hirsch's defense of quantifier variance, I show that the deflationist position can be maintained if Sider's appeal to naturalness is rejected. Additionally, I argue that Sider's constructed ideal language, Ontologese, does not allow Sider to avoid the deflationist criticisms. I also address the question of whether or not the deflationist program applies not only to ontological debates, but also to meta-ontological debates. To that end, I evaluate Gerald Marsh's (2010) meta-meta-ontological discussion in which he defends a dilemma for the Hirsch-Sider debate. I argue that Marsh's defense of the dilemma is problematic, and highlight a wider concern I have about meta-meta-ontological debates. I suggest that there is a frame of reference problem and end with the skeptical conclusion that answers at the meta-meta-ontological level are dependent on the language used to frame the debate.
Open Access
Holding agriculture accountable: moral obligations in the dairy industry
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Coley, Christopher Lee, author; Rollin, Bernard E., advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew D., committee member; Wailes, William R., committee member
The present social attitude towards agriculture is in disarray. The average person has developed more robust opinions about the ethical implications of agriculture; yet remains more removed from the actual practice itself than in any other time in history. Meanwhile, the growing popularity of "ethical" foods such as organics, GM-free, etc., show the public's growing concern with food. This tension has introduced several misconceptions and failed judgments about agricultural products, putting greater social and governmental pressures on the industry as a whole. Because of this, it is important for philosophers to consider the ethical obligations of agriculture and its associated responsibilities to incorporate moral values into its future practices. The goal of this thesis is to confront these issues by developing a historical account of the industry and its guiding paradigm, engaging the paradigm's moral instability, and then offering a means of creating adequately pragmatic, yet ethically rigorous solutions.
Restricted
Research on prisoners: an alternative to animal testing
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Abbate, Cheryl Elizabeth, author; Rollin, Bernard E., advisor; Cafaro, Philip, 1962-, committee member; Hogan, Michael, committee member
Members of the biomedical community justify biomedical research on sentient beings by depicting the benign results which are regarded as necessary for scientific and medical progress, which in turn is absolutely necessary for maintaining human health, well being, and life. Rather than take for granted that the burden of biomedical research should rest only on nonhuman animals, I will explore whether or not there is a more appropriate class of sentient beings that we should conduct our biomedical research on. I will argue, based on utilitarian principles, that if we can maximize overall happiness by conducting our research on a different group of beings, then we should opt to conduct our biomedical experiments on these beings. My central proposal is that our decision to experiment on nonhuman animals is not the best alternative available; rather, if we were to experiment on violent criminals, we would increase overall happiness. Since conducting biomedical research on this particular group of prisoners would fulfill the aims of retributive punishment, deter violent crime, and procure optimal scientific results, we would produce the maximal amount of benefits by experimenting on these transgressors. Thus when faced with the choice to experiment on either violent criminals or nonhuman animals, the morally commendable decision would be to perform research on violent criminals.
Open Access
Donald Davidson: meaning, triangulation, and convention
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Thompson, Jesse Arlis, author; Losonsky, Michael, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Trembath, Paul, committee member
This thesis examines a narrow portion of Donald Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, specifically his theory of utterance meaning put forward in the essay "The Second Person". In light of certain counterexamples I first attempt to adjust Davidson's theory, guided by a comment that suggests Davidson's awareness of the problem. When no satisfactory means of amending Davidson's proposal is found, I turn to the alternative proposals rejected by Davidson in the hopes of finding motivation to continue pursuing Davidson's arguments. The second chapter is devoted to Davidson's rejection of what I call the "subjectivist" position. I contend that while Davidson provides a strong argument against subjectivism, that argument entails further complications that Davidson fails to resolve. Since an adequate rejection of a position should involve an alternative that reduces or eliminates difficulties rather than simply transforms them, I conclude that Davidson has failed to motivate his move away from subjectivism. The third chapter is a discussion of Davidson's arguments against what I call "conventionalism". Here I show that while Davidson argues convincingly against a particular role that conventions might play, he does not motivate a move away from a broader understanding of conventionalism. At best, Davidson's arguments show that the conventionalist position should be amended, but not that it should be rejected. The result is that Davidson's theory enjoys a rather deflated place among theories of utterance meaning. The alternatives, while suffering from their own defects, are no more problematic than Davidson's theory. Consequently, we ought to consider each of these theories possible solutions to the problem of utterance meaning.
Open Access
Morality and reasons to act
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Gavronsky, Joseph, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Martin, Kelly, committee member
The main goal of this thesis is to shed some light on the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act, through a defense of rational egoism. Rational egoism holds that an agent's reasons to act are grounded by his self-interest, which is conceived as something different from, and not relativized to, his desires. In other words, for a rational egoist, an agent is rational if he does what is, in fact, good for him. I develop a version of rational egoism, and then argue that my version of rational egoism is at least as viable as, if not preferable to, other theories about the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. I claim that rational egoism provides a uniquely compelling account of the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. The rational egoism that I endorse treads a sort of theoretical middle ground between its most compelling competitor theories, capturing their theoretical merits and yet avoiding the problems that they are vulnerable to. One of rational egoism's most compelling competitor theories holds that it is morality itself that necessarily provides agents with reasons to act. This theory, known as intrinsic moral rationalism, and advanced by Russ Shafer-Landau, is most compelling for its compatibility with moral convention, but is troubled in that it seems to confer upon morality a mysterious force that allows it to impose upon agents. I will argue that my rational egoism is also compatible with moral convention, and yet not mysterious in the troubling way that intrinsic moral rationalism is. The other of rational egoism's most compelling competitor theories, which I refer to as the desire-satisfaction view, holds that it is an agent's desires, in some sense, that necessarily provide agents with reasons to act. In its most basic form, the desire-satisfaction view holds that it is an agent's actual desires that necessarily provide him with reasons to act. More sophisticated versions of the desire-satisfaction view, like Bernard Williams' view, for example, hold that an agent's desires, qualified in some way, necessarily provide him with reasons to act. The desire satisfaction view, in general, is most compelling for the prominence it gives desires, yet troubled by its commitment to the proposition that even an agent's desires for things that are cruel, self-destructive, or meaningless, nonetheless provide the agent with reasons to act. And although Williams' view and other sophisticated versions of the desire-satisfaction view may be able to get out of this commitment, it would take too much unmotivated theoretical machinery for them to do so. I will argue that my rational egoism also gives due regard to desires, yet avoids the troubling commitment of the desire-satisfaction view, and does so without appeal to any unmotivated theoretical machinery. My rational egoism is not, itself, necessarily committed to one particular view regarding the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. However, I strongly suspect that if rational egoism is true, then there is always, or almost always, a reason to do the moral thing. On one normative moral theory, namely moral egoism, morality just requires agents to do that which is in their self-interest. If moral egoism is true, and there are indeed grounds for believing that it is, and rational egoism is true, then there will always be a reason to do the moral thing. But even if moral egoism is not true, I argue that there are solid grounds for believing that morality usually indicates that agents should do that which is in their self-interest. In this case, if rational egoism is true, there will usually be a reason to do the moral thing.
Open Access
Invasive species management: an animal ethics perspective
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Tuminello, Joseph A., author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Archibeque, Shawn, committee member
In the scholarly literature on invasive species management, there exists a tendency to neglect the moral relevance of sentience when determining best possible management strategies regarding sentient members of invasive species. In addition, there is also a negative bias against invasive species, where such species are viewed as inherently "bad." Because of this negative bias, many wildlife managers, conservation biologists, and ecologists share the default view that invasive species are nuisances and must be gotten rid of, using the most cost-effective and efficient means possible. The neglect or omission of sentience within the literature often carries over into the implementation of invasive species management techniques, where sentient members of invasive species are often not treated as humanely as possible. In this thesis, I defend Bernard Rollin's animal ethic, where sentient beings are those capable of having interests, and which are also capable of self-valuation, which is necessary for possessing intrinsic value (on Rollin's view). Because such beings are capable of having interests which can be fulfilled or thwarted, they are objects of moral concern on this view. While I defend Rollin's view, any moral theory which considers sentience morally relevant at all will be compatible with the majority of my arguments regarding our treatment of sentient members of invasive species. If sentience is a morally relevant criterion, I argue that it continues to be so even when sentient beings are members of species which are considered to be "invasive." This claim is strongly supported by the large-scale vagueness and disagreement over terms such as "invasive," "native," and "exotic" within the literature. Because sentience is a morally relevant criterion when determining best possible management practices regarding invasive species, members of such species should be treated as humanely and in accordance with their respective telos as much as possible. Typically, this will entail prioritizing nonlethal and preventive methods of control over lethal methods. However, even when lethal control is deemed to be the best possible type of management strategy in a given situation, it should be implemented as humanely as possible. In addition to arguing for sentience as a morally relevant criterion when determining best possible management strategies regarding invasive species, I also argue that the negative bias against invasive species as inherently "bad" is ultimately unfounded. I support this claim by providing evidence of a variety of potential negative, positive, and neutral aspects of invasive species. Because invasive species are not inherently "bad" or "good," I argue that our attitudes toward and management of members of such species should be developed on a case-by-case basis. It is also important that the assessment of invasive species on a case-by-case basis be combined with the moral relevance of sentience. The bias against invasive species may serve to perpetuate the omission of sentience as a morally relevant criterion of invasive species management. The omission of sentience may also perpetuate the negative bias against invasive species. Understanding the moral relevance of sentience may help to diminish the negative bias against invasive species, and vice versa. After considering and responding to several objections to my arguments, I provide an overview of different sorts of lethal, nonlethal, and preventive methods of invasive species management, and discuss how each of these can be implemented in a more humane fashion, in order to present ways in which my arguments and view can be successfully applied in a variety of real-world scenarios.
Open Access
How does death harm the person who dies?
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Bzdok, Andrew John, author; McShane, Katie, advisor; Cafaro, Philip, committee member; Canetto, Silvia, committee member
The objective of this thesis is to identify the most persuasive justification for the common intuition that death is a harm for the person who dies. This goal is achieved by examining the Deprivation Theory and the Desire Thwarting Theory, which are the two most popular theories that explain how and why death harms the person who dies, and identifying what one must theoretically accept to make each theory tenable. The Desire Thwarting Theory claims that death harms the person who dies when it frustrates certain forward-looking desires, and the Deprivation Theory states that death harms the person who dies when death deprives an individual of certain goods she would have received had she not died. I argue that although the Deprivation Theory provides the most persuasive justification for the intuition that death harms the person who dies, it still requires a number of contestable theoretical commitments to make it defensible. I conclude that the Deprivation Theory provides a convincing justification for the common intuition that death is a harm for the person who dies only if one accepts the following claims: (a) that death can result in a genuine loss of future goods for the person who dies, (b) that the fact that the theory cannot provide a single evaluation of whether death is a harm for the person who dies isn't a problem for the theory, and (c) that we can either identify the time when the person who dies is worse off as a result of her death or defend the claim that the harm of death is a timeless harm.
Open Access
Virtual morality: the moral status of virtual actions
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Wojak, Roland, author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Volbrecht, Vicki, committee member
In this thesis, I examine virtual actions and the relationship between them and morality. Increasingly, people are using computer generated virtual mediums for relaxation, work, and socialization. Virtual worlds are one form that virtual mediums can take and are becoming more popular than ever before. These worlds are often characterized by an increased sense of freedom, where people can do things that they could not or would not do in the real world. The problem is that as more people interact within virtual worlds, these interactions are often characterized by negative or harmful behavior in one form or another, and while most people recognize this as a problem, it is unclear whether or not virtual actions can even be classified as morally wrong. I argue that virtual actions are the proper subjects of moral consideration and that, in some cases, they are morally wrong. In order to achieve this, I rely heavily on empirical findings from psychology and from several philosophical theories concerning consciousness and the nature of the self in relation to virtual worlds. By making clear how closely people are connected to the virtual world and showing the real world consequences that are a direct result from virtual actions, I hope to show that virtual actions can and should be morally judged in the same way that actions in the real world are judged.
Open Access
Ethical realism and the Darwinian Dilemma
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Rabinowitz, Aaron, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee member
In this thesis, I will examine a recent objection against ethical realism put forth by Sharon Street, a prominent advocate of ethical constructivism. Street's Darwinian Dilemma argues that ethical realism is incompatible with evolutionary psychology and that attempts to reconcile the two theories will result in the unacceptable epistemic conclusion that humans lack ethical knowledge. Street believes that the Darwinian Dilemma provides a strong reason for abandoning ethical realism in favor of ethical constructivism. It is my contention that the ethical realist can successfully defend herself against Street's objection. I will consider several possible responses that are available to the ethical realist for defusing the Darwinian Dilemma, including my preferred response which I believe has largely been neglected in the literature. I will argue that these responses provide the ethical realist with a functional defense against Street's challenge, and that ethical realism therefore remains superior to ethical constructivism.
Open Access
The ethical hunter: how to consume animal life
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2013) Flygt, Adrian A., author; Rollin, Bernard E., advisor; Tucker, Dustin, committee member; Callahan, Gerald, committee member
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