Theses and Dissertations

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Open Access
A defense of Buddhist virtue ethics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Hamblin, Jack, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Becker, Christian, committee member
In Chapter 1, I describe necessary dimensions of Buddhist ethics. I comment on and argue for the inclusion of the four noble truths, meditation, the four immeasurable virtues, and regulating emotion. In Chapter 2, I establish the viability of virtue ethics. I review virtue ethics from an historical perspective, look at and answer a critique of the virtues, and distinguish my version of virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology. In Chapter 3, I defend Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics. I argue that a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhism is the most reasonable of the Western interpretations, that a virtue ethical interpretation is compatible with a non-Western approach, and finally implement the necessary dimensions from the first chapter to put forward a plausible account of Buddhist virtue ethics.
Open Access
A defense of emotions in evolutionary epistemology
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) Van, Minh-Tu, author; Rice, Collin, advisor; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member
Current literature in evolutionary epistemology places a kind of epistemic 'rationality', guided by evolution, as the primary consideration or rationale that directs whether and how we acquire knowledge. Foundational works by the likes of Donald Campbell, Konrad Lorenz, and Sir Karl Popper paved the grounds of evolutionary epistemology by prioritizing natural selection's role within theories of knowledge. By recognizing and understanding the significance of humans' niche within the biological world, it better informs us of the aims of evolutionary epistemology. My thesis aims to incorporate emotions in the understanding and development of evolutionary epistemology. My arguments stem from the idea that emotions are an innate and biological response that have an epistemically significant evolutionary history while also concurrently conferring epistemic advantages. With much of the current discussion focused on evolutionary 'rationality' sans emotion, there is much left to be desired in evolutionary epistemology: I believe evolutionary epistemology is missing an evaluation and incorporation of our emotional systems that shape and influence epistemic aims. While evolutionary epistemologists allude to emotions' significance and relevance through other causal mechanisms, there is little discussion of how emotions explicitly affect and interact with our epistemic processes. The overall aim of my thesis is to stress the epistemic contribution that emotions would have to the current developments within evolutionary epistemology and its fittingness within the scope of evolutionary epistemology's aims as currently construed. I first summarize evolutionary epistemology using the works of Campbell, Lorenz, and Popper and explicate what evolutionary 'rationality' entails. Then, I explore some epistemic roles emotions play within important features extrapolated from an evolutionary 'rationality': epistemic fallibility and epistemic creativity. I argue that evolutionary epistemology benefits from an investigation and application of emotions to these features because their role reinforces the same aims that evolutionary epistemology strive to achieve. To wrap things up, I lay out implications and future directions of accepting my defense. I ultimately contend that a more serious consideration of emotions within evolutionary epistemology would only elucidate a fuller comprehension of our naturalized knowledge; not only will we learn more about what human knowledge is construed as, but we will also learn more about how the construction of knowledge, for and by evolved humans, ought to be produced.
Open Access
A metaphysical answer to the appropriateness question in aesthetics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2021) LaRose, Gabriella, author; Romagni, Domenica, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Hughes, Kit, committee member
The aim of this project is to give a new, descriptive answer to the appropriateness question in aesthetics. The appropriateness question asks how is it appropriate for ethical value to affect aesthetic value in aesthetic cases? I give a two-step argument for a metaphysical relationship between ethical content and aesthetic experience which is conditional on ethical content being aesthetically relevant and narrative being present. I argue that there is an inherence relationship between ethical content and narrative, where the former inheres in the latter. This relation holds in virtue of the mutual dependence between ethical content and narrative. I then use Noel Carroll's content approach to aesthetic experience to argue aesthetic experience supervenes on narrative content. This supervenient relationship captures the emergence of aesthetic experience while retaining the spirit of Carroll's discussion of aesthetic experience. Ultimately, I argue that because narrative is a feature of aesthetic experience and further because ethical content is a feature of narrative, there is a metaphysical relationship between ethical content and aesthetic experience. Simply, when a narrative exists (even an imagined narrative) and moral content is present, then a metaphysical relationship will exist between ethical content and aesthetic experience.
Open Access
A rationally-rooted responsibility toward nonhuman animals
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2020) Webber, Matthew J., author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Gorin, Moti, committee member; Edwards-Callaway, Lily, committee member
How should humans treat nonhuman animals? One answer to this question arises from the belief that humans are superior to nonhuman animals, thereby giving humans a right to treat nonhuman animals however humans desire. In this paper, I argue that, while perhaps not superior in all categories, humans can be understood as rationally superior to nonhuman animals. To do this, I rely on Immanuel Kant's definition of practical rationality as the ability for an individual to set for oneself one's own ends or telos. Granting this type of rational superiority to humans, I argue that being rationally superior does not entail that humans have a right to treat nonhuman animals however humans desire, but that humans are limited by certain natural teleological factors. These teleological factors may be general to all animal life—both human and nonhuman as characterized in the Kantian notion of tierheit—or specific to each species and embodied by individuals of a species. Nonhuman animals deserve to be treated accordingly, and treating a nonhuman animal in a manner contrary to the embodied telos not only violates their telos, but is itself unreasonable, irrational, and immoral. I conclude by demonstrating what responsible treatment of nonhuman animals would look like when rooted in human rationality, as well as the motivation behind such morally responsible actions.
Open Access
A sophisticated logic of enhancement: a disability-sensitive, welfare-maximizing stance in philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2024) Law, David Benjamin, author; Gorin, Moti, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee member
Julain Savulescu and Guy Kahane have developed a compelling yet controversial set of arguments that provide a theoretical and action-guiding grounding for the fields of medicine and procreative ethics. In medicine, they argue that medicine should do much more than merely treat patients; instead, it should "enhance" them to enjoy the greatest possible welfare. They argue that enhancement is justified by the same moral principles that justify treating patients in a medical setting. Similarly, in procreative ethics, they contend that when pre-natal selection is available, a similar welfare-maximizing principle should inform what children we should bring into existence. They argue that the "most advantaged child" among those that could be selected ought to be selected. There is something deeply compelling about these arguments but also deeply concerning; we should, of course, want the greatest welfare for ourselves, others, and our children, but we should also worry that accomplishing these ends via medicine and procreative selection may be using inappropriate means, relay implicit prejudices, or even constitute a kind of eugenics. In this thesis, I interrogate Savulescu and Kahane's arguments for the logic of enhancement and argue that a compelling and largely cohesive view emerges that has significant implications for the philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics. The view is, however, imperfect. Several adjustments and compromises must be made to make the view fully cohesive and to accommodate the highly compelling arguments made by disability rights theorists. In suggesting these adjustments and compromises, I ultimately defend the logic of enhancement from its most potent objections and contend that it is a highly illuminating view for ethical and theoretical work in the philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics.
Open Access
A very confusing problem: interpreting Keynesian weight
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2022) Brekel, Josh, author; Kasser, Jeff, advisor; Shockley, Kenneth, committee member; Prytherch, Ben, committee member
Initially outlined by John Maynard Keynes in 1921, Keynesian weight is a measure intended to characterize evidence independently of probability. As a concept that is often immersed in confusion, Keynesian weight requires thorough philosophical explication prior to any sort of legitimate use in decision-making, legal proceedings, or scientific inquiry. In this thesis, I attempt to explicate Keynesian weight by arguing in favor of Jochen Runde's relative interpretation of Keynesian weight. The aim of Chapter 1 is to introduce the basic idea of Keynesian weight. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that Keynes's initial analysis of Keynesian weight creates an interpretative puzzle—two viable interpretations of Keynesian weight exist. Chapter 3 aims to solve the interpretative puzzle by consideration of how the interpretations of Keynesian weight respond to I.J. Good's criticism of Keynesian weight. Ultimately, I argue that Good's criticism demonstrates that the best interpretation of Keynesian weight is the relative interpretation.
Open Access
Adaptive disembodiment: towards an enactivist theory of body schematic sensorimotor autonomy
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) White, Halie Elizabeth, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Rice, Collin, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member
The enactivist approach to embodied cognition relies on a non-reductive biological naturalism that is recursive at higher levels of complexity in living systems. In addressing an account of cognition, I will consider Xabier Barandiaran's objection that biological autonomy properly sets biological norms but under-specifies sensorimotor normativity. Barandiaran suggests the implementation of pluralist autonomy to the meta-pattern of organization in the enactivist agent that becomes recapitulated. By forming an account of sensorimotor autonomy, we can then specify normativity at the sensorimotor (cognitive) level. In consideration of this issue, I will propose the body schema functions to provide sensorimotor autonomy to the embodied subject through motor stability and thus functions to specify normativity at the sensorimotor level. This then allows for what enactivists term 'sense-making' in terms of enacting affordance structures. The position I take within the enactivist frame is thus a pluralist autonomist view on cognition. I go on to consider how this view bears on cognitive case studies often addressed in body schema literature. Drawing primarily from the work of Shaun Gallagher, body schema interacts with and develops body image through primary and secondary intersubjective capacities. I argue that body image is intersubjectively constructed through joint attention, thus invoking considerations of one's social milieu. This consideration shifts the discussion to address how the pluralist autonomist enactivist, through body schema and body image interaction, can account for alterations of the body schema due to distortions in one's body image that result from oppression. This pluralist autonomist enactivist theory provides three benefits for understanding these alterations: (1) enactivism begins with a fundamental postulate that individuals are embedded in a world; (2) in distinguishing between different levels of autonomy, we can thus discuss different forms of normative interaction with the environment; (3) and finally, with differentiated forms of normativity, we can thus differentiate and track different modes of adaptation an embodied subject can take when faced with various sorts of perturbations. I argue that disembodiment can be seen as an adaptation of the body schema in relation to hostile environments where stigma targets the body image. This hostile environment does not allow one's comfortable and normative navigation of the world due to the hypervisibility of the body. I explore this case of adaptive disembodiment through fatphobia and public weight stigma.
Open Access
An escape from anger and other Buddhist contributions to the philosophy of emotions
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Murray, Adam, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McLeod, Alexus, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member
This paper begins with an examination of several theories of emotion in general—a ‘mixed theory’, an ‘attitudinal theory’, and a Buddhist ‘componential theory.’ I argue that the Buddhist theory has a theoretical advantage over these alternatives insofar as it avoids two ‘thin’ characterizations of emotions that exclude either affective or conative states from the concept. The Buddhist theory of emotions, I claim, has another advantage insofar as it brings practicality to the forefront, connecting our theorizing about emotions with what is most important—developing good character and bringing about the welfare of beings. Chapter 2 proceeds to an in- depth analysis of the emotion of anger in particular, examining several philosophically important accounts—those of Aristotle, Seneca, and the Buddha. I raise problems of definition, highlight some typical and contentious features of anger, and draw from several classical sources to reconstruct a Buddhist account of anger. In the final chapter, I argue that typical anger is not necessary for moral life, addressing myself to arguments from Zac Cogley and Emily McRae. I continue by demonstrating that Buddhism has resources that allow us to both eliminate or largely attenuate anger, and to approach the problems we face without anger; finally, I sketch out exactly how this can be accomplished.
Open Access
Are subjectivists and objectivists about well-being theorizing about the same concept?
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) Harris, Blake, author; McShane, Katie, advisor; Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member; Steger, Michael, committee member
There are two main camps that theories of well-being fall under: "subjectivism" and "objectivism". Subjectivists hold that something can only positively affect one's well-being if one has a positive attitude toward it. Objectivists deny this and hold that some things can positively affect one's well-being irrespective of whether one has a positive attitude towards them and can even do so if one has a negative attitude towards them. Both views seem appealing and many theorists in the well-being debate attempt to capture the appeal of both views in the theories they posit. Despite this, only one can be correct; they contradict each other. Yet, neither seems satisfactory on its own since, as I argue, they fail to account for the motivations of the other. Hence, we are left with an impasse between the two that is difficult to resolve. In this thesis, I summarize the main theories of well-being and their objections in chapter one and introduce the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism and the motivations behind each. In chapter two, I summarize several theories that try to account for the motivations of both subjectivism and objectivism, with particular emphasis on "hybrid" theories, and show that they fail at their task. I finish in chapter three by motivating the impasse between subjectivism and objectivism and outlining four possible ways of resolving the impasse. I argue that three of these fail, but that the remaining way is promising. This way holds that subjectivists and objectivists are actually theorizing about two different, but similar concepts.
Open Access
Authenticity and animal welfare: understanding and ameliorating the suffering of dairy cows and their calves
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Teeple, Jennifer Elyse, author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Engle, Terry, committee member; Wailes, William, committee member
As Bernard Rollin discusses throughout his body of work, animals have interests and unique teloi as well as the capacity to feel pain and suffer emotionally. I argue that we must confront the ways in which we contribute to the suffering of dairy cows and their calves in particular, for their lives constitute a paradigmatic denial of an animal’s telos. Martin Heidegger’s notion of everydayness and his concept of authenticity—and especially Charles B. Guignon’s interpretations of them—allow us to understand and come to terms with our own everyday contribution to the reprehensible practices surrounding dairy production. That is, Heidegger’s understanding of Being allows us to see that we are likely contributors to the perpetuation of dairy cow and calf suffering. The concept of authenticity also acts as a tool that allows us insight into describing and prescribing personal commitments that entail the amelioration of these animals’ suffering. The goal is to individually strive to improve animal welfare in the dairy industry, which entails taking responsibility for and altering our actions and choices; otherwise, to avoid doing so is culpable—a notion akin to Nancy Williams’s argument that we are affectively ignorant of our role in animal mistreatment. Finally, utilizing authenticity as a guide also allows us to look to history, idols, and exemplars for moral guidance.
Open Access
Beauty and openness: Kant's aesthetic judgment of taste, Yogācāra, and open presence meditation
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2014) Brelje, Kate, author; Kneller, Jane, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Kiefer, Kathleen, committee member
This paper provides a comparative analysis of Kant's aesthetic judgment of taste and Open Presence meditation interpreted through a Yogācāra philosophical framework. I begin with an expository analysis of Kant's cognitive and aesthetic judgments, highlighting the presence of attention, form of reflection, and structure of purposeless purposiveness in the judgment. Next, I address the Buddhist idealist Yogācāra philosophical tradition. Through this theoretical lens, I examine Open Presence meditation, with an emphasis on meditative non-dualism, attention, and meditative goals. In the final chapter, I tie together the groundwork laid in the first two chapters into a comparative analysis identifying points of compatibility and contention within the general areas of judgment, attention, purposeless purposiveness, and transformation. Finally, I suggest that, given the results of this analysis, Kant's aesthetic judgment of taste might benefit from being construed as a type of meditation.
Open Access
Beauty and the treatment of addiction
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Czyszczewski, Justin, author; Kneller, Jane, advisor; Stallones, Lorann, committee member; Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member
Drug and alcohol addiction are highly destructive, reaping significant damage on society, on addicts, and on their families and friends. The past century has seen a vast increase in the treatment of addiction, but these methods have failure rates of 50% or greater. This work seeks an alternative approach to addiction treatment, using the concept of reflective aesthetic judgment presented by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Judgment. This approach is justified by an examination of the experiences of addicts, working from the problem as it is understood to a possible solution. Because the problem is an inadequacy of willpower, cognitive treatment methods are unlikely to be successful. An aesthetic conception of treatment, which appeals to a common human aesthetic sense for the beautiful, offers a non-cognitive method that is universally communicable. This would appeal to people trapped in the isolated and alienated experience of addiction. The focus is a philosophical understanding of the mechanism of addiction, and identifying some of the necessary conditions for treatment of it. In light of this, suggestions are given for possible components of such treatment, such as art therapy, spiritual practices, and appreciation of nature.
Open Access
By their own standards: a new perspective for the question of moral agency in animals
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2017) Grattan, Douglas, author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Gorin, Moti, committee member; Volbrecht, Vicki, committee member
Much of the history of ethology, philosophy, and psychology has been a sort of tug-of-war between those claiming that animals have certain capacities and others claiming that such science is unverifiable and amounts to anthropomorphizing. While resistance to such positive claims has certainly fallen off over the past few decades, the idea that animals can be moral is one of the last bastions of human uniqueness to which many tenaciously hold. Yet in the light of newer research involving emotion and cognition, such claims against morality in animals become harder to defend. However, even those who do claim that animals can possibly act morally still hold back from making the stronger claim that animals can be held responsible for their behavior. I view such attitudes against morality (or moral agency) in animals and against anthropomorphizing in this case as incorrect for the same reason: combined, they assume that 1) if animals are truly moral, they must be moral in the same ways we are, and 2) if they are moral, then they must be viewed in the same way we view humans and therefore treated as such. In short, both claims involve anthropocentrism and worries of anthropomorphism. This work will be dedicated to showing that this point of view is conceptually flawed and suggesting a new avenue to pursue this line of thought, one that keeps in mind both animal uniqueness-- by invoking the subjective lived experiences of the animals themselves, coupled with what they have reason to know—and, surprisingly, human uniqueness.
Open Access
Climate justice and feasibility
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2021) Hunter, Taylor, author; Shockley, Ken, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Carolan, Michael, committee member
The primary motivation for this Thesis is to understand whether it is in fact feasible for rich countries, like the United States, to fulfill their humanitarian obligations through an international climate treaty. And if this is infeasible, why? Alongside this motivation, is a motivation to bring to light another important dimension to climate justice that is often lost within the scale and the urgency of climate change, namely the misrecognition of Indigenous peoples. My task in Chapter One is to explain how Eric Posner's and David Weisbach's employment of the political feasibility constraint of International Paretianism functions in international climate policy discourse. I work to show how climate policy outcomes solely constrained by International Paretianism will predictably violate basic humanitarian constraints. Posner and Weisbach defend a Two-Track Approach to climate policy, where the ends of justice are best achieved though policy means independent of a climate treaty. Their view entails that climate policies should not be designed with regard to constraints of justice. Rather than satisfy constraints of justice, a climate treaty need only satisfy the political feasibility constraint of International Paretianism. I work to show the policy outcomes that follow from the feasibility constraint of International Paretianism, which are morally unacceptable because they violate basic humanitarian obligations. Posner and Weisbach justify these moral costs by appealing to what is and what is not politically feasible, per International Paretianism. I will work investigate the legitimacy of this feasibility constraint in Chapter Two. My task in Chapter Two is to investigate the political legitimacy of International Paretianism. I begin by clarifying how feasibility constraints function in normative theorizing and I defend what I consider to be an appropriate function for International Paretianism. There are two general functions that feasibility constraints can serve in policy decision making. Hard feasibility constraints function to rule out policy outcomes that are in principle impossible due to invariant conditions, while soft feasibility function inform our practical deliberations about what we can do given our contingent circumstances. Soft constraints allow us to acknowledge that there are limits on what we can realistically accomplish, while also acknowledging that we can work to change these limits. In this Chapter, I will argue that we should not make the mistake of using International Paretianism as a hard constraint. I will argue that it is conceptually possible for states to act for reasons other than the common interest of their citizenry. As such, International Paretianism is a soft feasibility constraint. I conclude with an analysis of why it is that International Paretianism is a soft feasibility constraint for the United States. My task Chapter Three is to present one possible way that institutions can govern themselves towards an interdependent collective continuance, and to identify a soft feasibility constraint that is relevant to the ability of US federal agencies to integrating such institutional capacities. Indigenous people have an epistemic advantage on how to respond to climate change, and in an ameliorative way. Yet, they are not procedurally or culturally recognized for their knowledge. I consider this to be a constraint on our ability to appropriately respond to climate change. In this Chapter, I will present the way in which the Potawatomi Nation, members of the Anishinaabe Intellectual Tradition, have and continue to interdependently govern themselves toward collective continuance. I will argue that Indigenous peoples in fact have an epistemic advantage in this particular subject matter, which is due to a long history of colonially-induced ecological displacement and relocation. I will conclude by identifying and defending what I believe to be a 'soft' cultural feasibility constraint on the ability of federal agencies to work in reciprocal relations of knowledge exchange with Indigenous peoples at the procedural level of climate policy decision-making. The normative upshots of this Thesis are that (1) the citizens of the United States have a responsibility to change their government institutions such that they can be responsive to humanitarian constraints, as well as ecological limits. And (2) one way in which this responsibility may be realized is through members of the United States correcting for an identity prejudice that would preempt the United States government from instituting reciprocal relations of knowledge exchange with Indigenous people.
Open Access
Constructivism and the phenomenology of moral deliberation
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2017) Ponzo, Alexander, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Gorin, Moti, committee member; Cleary, Anne, committee member
In this thesis I claim that constructivism is an attractive positon when it comes to explaining the nature of moral facts. The central tenet of constructivism is that moral facts are a function of what actual (or hypothetical) people think. According to constructivism, if it is true (for example) that murder is morally wrong, it is because some actual (or hypothetical) person or group of people under certain conditions thinks that murder is morally wrong. A primary competitor to constructivism is realism. Realism denies the central tenet of constructivism and instead holds that moral facts are objective; this means that the truth of moral facts does not depend on any person's or group of persons' attitudes regarding the object of moral evaluation. For realists, then, if murder is morally wrong it is not because any (actual or hypothetical) person or group of people thinks that it is wrong; for realists, this fact obtains regardless of what anyone thinks about it. I argue in Chapter One that there is a significant epistemological problem with the claim that moral facts are objective; namely, that it is hard to see how we could have moral knowledge if the truth of moral facts is not a function of what we think. I argue in Chapter Two that constructivism does not share the epistemological problem that realism has. This problem is significant and it should be enough, I submit, to push us into accepting constructivism over realism. While I devote the first chapter (and some of the second) to explaining what constructivism is and how it compares to other competing theories, this is not the only task of this thesis. My other central task is to examine two specific versions of constructivism—namely, the respective theories of Christine Korsgaard and Sharon Street—and find out whether each theory can maintain a plausible phenomenology of moral deliberation. In other words, I am interested in finding out whether each version of constructivism can give a plausible account of what it is like for people to engage in moral deliberation. Since it's possible to study the phenomenology of moral deliberation empirically (or by plausible speculation), we can compare how moral deliberation is actually experienced—or at least how it seems to be experienced—with how it would likely be experienced if the theories in question were true. Ultimately, I argue that the phenomenology of moral deliberation occasioned by Korsgaard's position is more plausible than the one occasioned by Street's because Korsgaard's position does a better job of preserving what we tend to think the experience of moral deliberation is like. A summation of this thesis can be given in the following way: I make a presumptive case for constructivism and, specifically, I argue that Korsgaard's constructivism is more attractive than Street's because, among other things, the phenomenology of moral deliberation occasioned by Korsgaard's position is more plausible than the one occasioned by Street's.
Open Access
David Hume's theory of justice: an examination of the possibility of an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Maimone, Charles L., author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Archie, Andre, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee member
In this work I argue that David Hume's classification of the virtue of justice as artificial is mistaken, and propose that the possibility of the existence of a natural virtue of justice should be taken seriously within Hume's moral framework. In the first chapter of this work, I present Hume's moral theory, with a focus on Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues. In the second chapter, I argue that Hume's certainty concerning the classification of justice as an artificial virtue is mistaken, and offer a positive account of the possibility of a natural origin, and ultimately a natural virtue of justice. In the third chapter I will entertain possible objections Hume might offer to my argumentation, and offer responses accordingly.
Open Access
Davidson and the idiolectic view
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2013) Gumm, Derek, author; Losonsky, Michael, advisor; Kneller, Jane, committee member; Chong, Edwin, committee member
In this thesis, I defend and expand Donald Davidson's view of language and linguistic meaning. I begin by looking at two positions that appreciate the sociality of language and linguistic meaning in two different ways. One view, as exemplified by Michael Dummett, sees the meaning of words as a feature of a language that holds independently of any particular speaker, while the other view, as exemplified by Davidson, sees meaning as depending on particular speakers and interpreters, their intentions, and their interactions. I find a serious tension in the former view and side with the latter, which I dub the idiolectic view of language. In the second chapter, I analyze Davidson's claim that understanding gives life to meaning. Using this analysis as a jumping off point, I outline the primary features of the Davidsonian idiolectic program. Finally, I conclude that the idiolectic features of this position place a special emphasis on the moment at which two people's personal understanding of language overlap and that such an emphasis is best understood in terms of events as particulars. In the third and final chapter, I argue that an ontology that countenances events as particulars is required for the idiolectic view of interpretation to get off the ground. First, I outline some of Davidson's classic arguments in favor of an ontology of events for action sentences and expand them to the case of what I call second-order language sentences, sentences about communication. Next, I discuss the importance of a criterion of event identity and individuation, working from some of Davidson's own arguments. I then extend Davidson's analysis of action sentences to second-order language sentences in order to determine the essential features of the linguistic event-type. Finally, I conclude that some basic notion of a language is required by this idiolectic view despite what Davidson originally thought. However, it is not the notion of a shared language that Dummett originally had in mind.
Open Access
Donald Davidson: meaning, triangulation, and convention
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Thompson, Jesse Arlis, author; Losonsky, Michael, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Trembath, Paul, committee member
This thesis examines a narrow portion of Donald Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, specifically his theory of utterance meaning put forward in the essay "The Second Person". In light of certain counterexamples I first attempt to adjust Davidson's theory, guided by a comment that suggests Davidson's awareness of the problem. When no satisfactory means of amending Davidson's proposal is found, I turn to the alternative proposals rejected by Davidson in the hopes of finding motivation to continue pursuing Davidson's arguments. The second chapter is devoted to Davidson's rejection of what I call the "subjectivist" position. I contend that while Davidson provides a strong argument against subjectivism, that argument entails further complications that Davidson fails to resolve. Since an adequate rejection of a position should involve an alternative that reduces or eliminates difficulties rather than simply transforms them, I conclude that Davidson has failed to motivate his move away from subjectivism. The third chapter is a discussion of Davidson's arguments against what I call "conventionalism". Here I show that while Davidson argues convincingly against a particular role that conventions might play, he does not motivate a move away from a broader understanding of conventionalism. At best, Davidson's arguments show that the conventionalist position should be amended, but not that it should be rejected. The result is that Davidson's theory enjoys a rather deflated place among theories of utterance meaning. The alternatives, while suffering from their own defects, are no more problematic than Davidson's theory. Consequently, we ought to consider each of these theories possible solutions to the problem of utterance meaning.
Open Access
Epistemic citizenship: a new defense of role-based epistemic normativity
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) Kirchner, John J. S., author; Kasser, Jeff, advisor; Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member; MacDonald, Bradley, committee member
One problem facing epistemic deontology is its (apparent) incompatibility with doxastic involuntarism. Intuitively, deontic epistemic evaluations—e.g., blame or reproach for unjustified belief—seem unbefitting if we can't control that which we believe. However, Richard Feldman proposes a solve to this seeming incompatibility, which is a role-based approach to epistemic normativity. When we find ourselves within certain roles, the normativity of performing within one's role appropriately, as one ought, can generate obligations, permissions, duties, etc. If we can rightly conceive of a "believer role," then we can have coherent deontological normativity, even if we, in fact, lack control over our doxastic attitudes. However, Matthew Chrisman advances strong criticisms of the role-based approach, criticisms which I will argue ultimately fail. In response to Chrisman, I will argue that our doxastic role as a believer is akin to our role as political citizens. The upshot of the project will be a revitalized defense of role-based epistemic deontology, and a more apt analogy, i.e., that of epistemic citizen. Chrisman's assertions of the role-based approach's inherent explanatory insufficiencies will be shown to be unfounded once role-normativity itself is understood more precisely.
Open Access
Ethical realism and the Darwinian Dilemma
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Rabinowitz, Aaron, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee member
In this thesis, I will examine a recent objection against ethical realism put forth by Sharon Street, a prominent advocate of ethical constructivism. Street's Darwinian Dilemma argues that ethical realism is incompatible with evolutionary psychology and that attempts to reconcile the two theories will result in the unacceptable epistemic conclusion that humans lack ethical knowledge. Street believes that the Darwinian Dilemma provides a strong reason for abandoning ethical realism in favor of ethical constructivism. It is my contention that the ethical realist can successfully defend herself against Street's objection. I will consider several possible responses that are available to the ethical realist for defusing the Darwinian Dilemma, including my preferred response which I believe has largely been neglected in the literature. I will argue that these responses provide the ethical realist with a functional defense against Street's challenge, and that ethical realism therefore remains superior to ethical constructivism.