Are subjectivists and objectivists about well-being theorizing about the same concept?
| dc.contributor.author | Harris, Blake, author | |
| dc.contributor.author | McShane, Katie, advisor | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member | |
| dc.contributor.author | Steger, Michael, committee member | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-28T10:27:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-08-28T10:27:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
| dc.description.abstract | There are two main camps that theories of well-being fall under: "subjectivism" and "objectivism". Subjectivists hold that something can only positively affect one's well-being if one has a positive attitude toward it. Objectivists deny this and hold that some things can positively affect one's well-being irrespective of whether one has a positive attitude towards them and can even do so if one has a negative attitude towards them. Both views seem appealing and many theorists in the well-being debate attempt to capture the appeal of both views in the theories they posit. Despite this, only one can be correct; they contradict each other. Yet, neither seems satisfactory on its own since, as I argue, they fail to account for the motivations of the other. Hence, we are left with an impasse between the two that is difficult to resolve. In this thesis, I summarize the main theories of well-being and their objections in chapter one and introduce the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism and the motivations behind each. In chapter two, I summarize several theories that try to account for the motivations of both subjectivism and objectivism, with particular emphasis on "hybrid" theories, and show that they fail at their task. I finish in chapter three by motivating the impasse between subjectivism and objectivism and outlining four possible ways of resolving the impasse. I argue that three of these fail, but that the remaining way is promising. This way holds that subjectivists and objectivists are actually theorizing about two different, but similar concepts. | |
| dc.format.medium | born digital | |
| dc.format.medium | masters theses | |
| dc.identifier | Harris_colostate_0053N_17906.pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10217/236825 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Colorado State University. Libraries | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | 2020- | |
| dc.rights | Copyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright. | |
| dc.subject | objectivism | |
| dc.subject | well-being | |
| dc.subject | subjectivism | |
| dc.subject | normative ethics | |
| dc.title | Are subjectivists and objectivists about well-being theorizing about the same concept? | |
| dc.type | Text | |
| dcterms.rights.dpla | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights (https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/). You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Colorado State University | |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (M.A.) |
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