Intrastate conflict and humanitarian aid obstruction

Abstract

This thesis examines one of the causes of humanitarian aid obstructions – intrastate conflict, attempting to answer the puzzle "Why do some recipient countries obstruct or outrightly reject humanitarian assistance more than others?" Given the human and material costs associated with internal challenges, countries experiencing such are argued to be more favorable in receiving assistance from international aid donors. This line of reasoning leads to the stylized conclusion that countries ravaged by internal crises are more likely to attract humanitarian assistance. However, I observed such assistance when offers were obstructed in many conflict-prone countries, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. This generates an important puzzle. In addressing this puzzle, I focus on intrastate conflict (where at least one of the actors is a government of the state) and how it affects humanitarian aid obstruction and argue that recipient countries undergoing intrastate conflict as more likely to disrupt the operation of humanitarian aid. I also contend that this effect is consistent regardless of the sources of humanitarian assistance. Using a time-series cross-sectional design that covers developing (non-OECD) countries from 1997 to 2023, I find empirical evidence supporting the theoretical arguments. My conclusion is that intrastate conflict significantly increases the likelihood that humanitarian assistance will be obstructed in the recipient countries, just as it can make countries more likely to be considered for such assistance.