THESIS

INTRASTATE CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN AID OBSTRUCTION

Submitted by

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ABSTRACT

INTRASTATE CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN AID OBSTRUCTION

This thesis examines one of the causes of humanitarian aid obstructions_ intrastate conflict, attempting to answer the puzzle "Why do some recipient countries obstruct or outrightly reject humanitarian assistance more than others?" Given the human and material costs associated with internal challenges, countries experiencing such are argued to be more favorable in receiving assistance from international aid donors. This line of reasoning leads to the stylized conclusion that countries ravaged by internal crises are more likely to attract humanitarian assistance. However, I observed such assistance when offers were obstructed in many conflict-prone countries, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. This generates an important puzzle. In addressing this puzzle, I focus on intrastate conflict (where at least one of the actors is a government of the state) and how it affects humanitarian aid obstruction and argue that recipient countries undergoing intrastate conflict as more likely to disrupt the operation of humanitarian aid. I also contend that this effect is consistent regardless of the sources of humanitarian assistance. Using a time-series cross-sectional design that covers developing (non-OECD) countries from 1997 to 2023, I find empirical evidence supporting the theoretical arguments.

My conclusion is that intrastate conflict significantly increases the likelihood that humanitarian assistance will be obstructed in the recipient countries just as it can make countries more likely to be considered for such assistance.

Keywords: Donor; Humanitarian Assistance; Humanitarian Aid Obstruction; Intrastate Conflicts

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This thesis is not just an aggregate of my research and writing, it is also a testament of my resilience to push through my graduate studies, and the support of the loving community that stood by me.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late mum, Prof. Grace Kehinde Oso. I know you would be proud of me. Keep chilling with the Angels.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, humanitarian aid has grown to be an important form of foreign assistance in developing countries, particularly those experiencing some sort of internal challenges. For example, according to the Global Humanitarian Assistance data (GHA, 2013), the total humanitarian aid committed by the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 2000 and 2010 has increased from $7 billion to $13.8 billion annually, about 97% increase. In addition to capital inflow, humanitarian assistance brings several benefits to recipient countries, including the provision of vital services and security to internally displaced persons, among others, to noncombatants affected by violence (Duffield, 1997; Wood and Sullivan, 2015).

Put succinctly, humanitarian assistance is the common practice of providing support, relief, and protection activities to victims of disasters, conflicts, and other emergencies based on the need for succor (Madej et al.; Fink and Redaelli, 2010; Belgard and Nachmias, 1997). It is traditionally informed by the desire of the donor to ameliorate the social and welfare conditions of populations in countries undergoing humanitarian emergencies, such as natural hazard events (Stromberg, 2007), including tsunamis, earthquakes, large-scale floods, droughts, and more importantly, violent conflict.

Despite its increase, statistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that there are frequent obstructions in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, leading to the denial of access to the targeted population (Reeves, 2011). In Syria, for example, the United Nations aid convoy was hit in an airstrike, killing aid workers and destroying warehouses that carried aid supplies (Seven,

2024). Similarly, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked humanitarian aid convoys and burned down a factory that produced baby food (Kariuki, 2024; Walsh, 2024).

In Israel, reports show that government authorities reject international aid consisting of oxygen, incubators, and sanitation gear for Palestinians in Gaza (Oxfam, 2024). Also, in Yemen, the government placed a blockade on aid delivery vans, preventing them from reaching the target audience (Plowright, 2023). Thus, while scholars have put considerable effort into studying the socioeconomic and political circumstances guiding several aspects of humanitarian assistance programs (donor decision-making, usage of aid resources, the effectiveness of the programs, as well as their impacts on the targeted population in the recipient countries), we know little about why humanitarian assistance is being obstructed or outrightly rejected by some recipient countries.

In this thesis, I examine the effect of intrastate conflict on humanitarian aid obstruction. While previous studies show that conflict-afflicted countries are considered more favorable to receiving humanitarian assistance, this thesis shows that intrastate conflict, in which at least one of the actors is the government of a state, makes it more likely for humanitarian assistance to be obstructed. Building on the existing argument on the bargaining model of war (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006; Reiter, 2003), actors in conflict situations (both state and non-states) are interested in bargaining for favorable terms, and thus, they are more likely to prevent each other from achieving military or economic strength that could boost each other's bargaining strength. On the one hand, humanitarian assistance represents a form of public goods that may bolster government strength and bolster public support for the government during the crisis. On the other hand, humanitarian assistance may strengthen rebel groups' mobilization capacity and their members,

strengthening to bargain harder. In this situation, actors in conflict situations may have incentives to prevent humanitarian assistance. Figures 1 and 2 below show that countries experiencing intrastate conflict are more likely to obstruct aid compared to those without any form of internal conflict.



Figure 1. Humanitarian Aid Workers Affected in Attacks by Intrastate Conflict



Figure 2. Trends in Aid Workers Affected by Intrastate Conflict

1.1. Research Question

To understand why humanitarian assistance is being obstructed in some recipient countries and not in others, this thesis seeks to address two main questions.

1. Why do countries facing internal challenges obstruct humanitarian aid?
2. What are the effects of intrastate conflict on humanitarian assistance obstruction?

In answering these questions, this study will engage the general literature on foreign assistance, particularly humanitarian aid, as well as the literature on intrastate conflict to understand why actors involved in conflict situations may have incentives to block the operations and activities of humanitarian programs. I argue that while intrastate conflict makes countries more likely to receive humanitarian assistance, it also affects the likelihood that such assistance may be obstructed, disrupted, or outrightly rejected in the recipient countries. I present four broad theoretical

mechanisms for this claim. First, recipient countries may obstruct humanitarian assistance as a starvation of suffering weapons against their adversaries. Second, humanitarian aid may be obstructed due to security concerns and military considerations, as aid workers and organizations are often accused of aligning with one side in a conflict process. Third, humanitarian assistance may be disrupted in a way that will benefit ruling governments and their elites in the recipient countries. Finally, aid may be obstructed due to logistical challenges associated with internal conflict, in that the breakdown in infrastructure associated with conflict may severely provide governments in recipient countries with the ability to place an embargo on external activities, making humanitarian operations nearly impossible in certain regions.

Using panel data from 95 developing countries on a negative binomial model, I found some strong empirical evidence for my theoretical expectation that intrastate conflict significantly increases the likelihood that humanitarian assistance will be obstructed in the recipient countries. This positive effect remains consistent after disaggregating humanitarian assistance by different donor types, suggesting that the source of foreign aid does not necessarily matter. Overall, the empirical findings provide strong backing for the theoretical expectation.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION, AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Key Concepts Relevant to the Research

The whole concept of humanitarian aid cannot be understojod independently without attributing it to its mainframe which is, foreign aid. In this section, I will be discussing concepts such as foreign aid, the types of foreign aid, and examining donor's motivation for giving aid. Additionally, I will be exploring the concepts of humanitarian aid, aid obstruction, and most importantly the relevant literature on humanitarian aid obstruction in civil war.

2.1.a. Foreign Aid and Types of Aid

Following the end of World War II, foreign aid has been one of the foremost development policy tools in international relations, where rich countries render economic and institutional assistance to enhance the development of poor countries (Qian, 2015; Naheed and Rahim, 1993). Foreign aid has also been casually defined as the transfer of money, goods, and services from one nation to another (Morgenthau, 1962; Bindra, 2018). In practice, foreign aid, which is also commonly known as Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Wolf et al. 2013), is generally categorized into humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid. However, Findley (2018) argued that humanitarian aid, which is the focus of this research, is distinct from ODA because it provides immediate assistance in emergencies to conflict-affected areas and refugee crises. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "ODA is said to consist of technical aid, official grants, or loans promoting economic development and Welfare, and having concessional terms, with grant elements of at least 25 percent with the exclusion of grants, loans, and credits for military purposes" while "Official Development Finance consists of non-concessional development lending by multilateral financial institutions and other official flows for development purposes including refinancing loans which have very low grant elements to qualify

as ODA "(Wolf et al. 2013).

Foreign aid can be classified as humanitarian aid if the goal of such aid is aligned with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. While on the other hand, non-humanitarian aid consists of a wide range of aid such as debt relief, administrative costs, scholarships for students from low-income countries to study abroad (Qian, 2015).

Further, scholars of foreign aid have argued about different types of aid using theoretical arguments (Bjomskov,2014). One of the foundational arguments is Morgenthau's (1962) classification where he divided aid into six types: humanitarian aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, subsistence aid, military aid, and foreign aid for economic development. (Bjomskov,2014). Further studies by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) distinguished the types of aid into a more common classification which shows the difference between aid flows from bilateral and multilateral donors. It is worthy of note that one of the ways to politically sterilize aid is to "multilateralism" it (Baldwin, 1969), owing to the assumption that multi-lateral aid is "non-political", "stringless", "more acceptable to recipients", and "insulated from the foreign policies of donor nations" (Baldwin, 1969). If working by this assumption, we would expect that the norm should be that the recipient's country receives aid and neither obstructs nor rejects it.

According to Hattori (2003), three distinct ethical considerations for foreign aid are rooted in liberal traditions. The first justification is the identification of foreign aid as an "imperfect obligation" of developed countries to less developed countries to provide "basic needs." The second justification is identifying foreign aid as a moral response to problems that demand technical expertise, while the final justification is the identification of foreign aid as an embodiment of the ideals of humanitarianism, which will be later discussed in this paper.

The theoretical foundation of foreign aid is one that is also widely contested among

scholars. For instance, Hattori (2001) in his attempt to reconceptualize foreign aid, summarized how different schools of thought have approached foreign aid. The political realists hold the view that foreign aid is a policy tool aimed at influencing the political position of recipient countries who are in a bi-polar struggle, while the school of liberal internationalism views foreign aid as a set of programmed measures curated to improve the socioeconomic quality and political development of recipient countries while the world system theorists are of the view that foreign aid promotes unequal accumulation of capital in the world, also hampering the development path of recipient countries (Hattori, 2001; Hattori, 2003).

Other notable areas where scholars of foreign aid focus their study include foreign aid effectiveness and economic development outcome of aid in developing countries (Dreher et al. 2024; Alesina and Dollar;) donor motives for aid allocation (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Alesina and Dollar,2000; Bomprezzi et al., 2023) the linkage between aid and trade (Wolf et al., 2013; Petterson and Johansson,2013).

2.1.b. Foreign Aid Effectiveness

Much of the early literature on foreign aid effectiveness has been focused on finding the link between aid flow and economic growth in recipient countries (Dreher et al., 2024), when the metric for measuring effectiveness is focused on education, health, and economic development, aid is found to be ineffective (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Findings from these studies have produced nuanced results because authors try to measure different variables to explain the impact of aid on recipient countries, Dreher et al., (2024) argued that when measuring aid effectiveness authors are supposed to focus on the intents or motives of aid donors, with the understanding that if the objectives of donors are met, then we could conclude that the aid given is effective.

For instance, Boone (1996) found that there was no significant improvement in a recipient's country's economic growth after receiving foreign aid. Contrary to this finding, Bearce and Tirone (2010) argued that foreign aid can promote a recipient country's economic growth when the benefit attached to providing the aid is insignificant to the donor government. They arrived at this conclusion after observing the differences in foreign aid allocated during the Cold War era driven by strategic donor interest as opposed to the post-Cold War era, where donors had less strategic interests.

Further studies show that the domestic policy of recipient countries plays a significant role in the effectiveness of aid. Hansen and Tarp (2000) found that the economic growth of recipient countries will be automatically hampered when there is an unfavorable policy environment, this shows an agreement with Burnside and Dollar (2000) who argue that aid is effective when recipient countries have "good fiscal, monetary and trade policies".

However, more recent studies have questioned the conceptualization of aid effectiveness arguing that one of the shortcomings of the literature on aid effectiveness is because of its reliance on a singular metric- economic growth to evaluate aid effectiveness, hence calling for the consideration of other factors such as donor interests (Dreher, 2024).

2.1.c. Motivation for Giving Aid and Donor's Interest

Understanding the motivation of donors when they give aid makes it easier to know why there might be a continuous inflow of aid to recipient countries even when it begins to face certain obstructions. Like Dreher (2024) argued, some aid will still be categorized as effective when it fulfills the interest of the donor.

Extensive literature has shown that the political, economic, and strategic interests of aid Donors far outweigh any development objectives within the context of why countries give aid (Dutta and Williamson,). Alesina and Dollar (2000) explored this dynamic of foreign aid by

observing the pattern of aid allocation and found that foreign aid is fueled by political and strategic considerations from donors and underlying this is the economic and policy performance of recipient countries. Similarly, Bindra (2018) explored the dynamics of donors and recipient relationships, she argued that donors provide just about the right amount of foreign aid, sufficient to make aid recipients filled with gratitude, making the latter sympathetic toward the donor's foreign policy objectives and objectives, thus making the aid effective.

However, Lancaster (2008) argued that foreign aid can be used to achieve mixed goals, and she demonstrated this with an in-depth case study which showed how domestic politics and international pressure can shape how and why donors provide foreign aid. However, Bindra (2018) affirmed that there is often a component of foreign aid misuse both by donors and recipients.

Another motivation for donating aid could also be to serve the commercial interests of donor countries (Dutta and Williamson, Dreher, 2024). This relationship occurs based on a contractual agreement between donor countries and recipient countries. Recipient countries sign an agreement to use benefits from donor resources to buy donor exports (Dreher, 2024; Pettersson and Johansson, 2013). Also, this kind of aid is created to help developing countries get integrated into the global market while getting benefits (Dreher, 2024).

2.1.d. Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid or humanitarian assistance is the widespread practice of providing support, relief, and protection activities to victims of disasters, conflicts, and other emergencies based on the need for succor (Madej et al.; Fink and Redaelli, 2010; Belgard and Nachmias, 1997).

More specifically, humanitarian aid is informed by the orientation of mitigating suffering where and when it occurs, improving the human condition, and responding to sudden and morally compelling crises (Barnett and Weiss, 2008). Humanitarian assistance or humanitarian aid targets individuals distressed by the conflict situations surrounding them (Kubas and Fabus, 2021). This

includes internally displaced persons (Fisher, 2010), civilians starved by belligerents (Fornari, 2022), and stricken populations (Sun,1991).

Barnett (2011) traced the history of humanitarian action to the late 18th and 19th centuries following the First and Second World Wars. He highlighted the distinctive features of humanitarian aid, which are focus on foreign countries, increasing organization and institutionalization, and being connected to something transcendental, be it a religious belief or an international community united by humanity (Gadler, 2013). For example, in December 1978, the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese people caused distress, displacement, and other dire situations that attracted the United Nations humanitarian operation in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 with relief efforts, rehabilitation, and repatriation. Similarly, the United Nations Work and Relief Agency (UNRWA), which is the oldest, most established, and most successful (Nachmias, 1997) international humanitarian operation, was created as a response to the refugee crisis in Afghanistan.

2.2. Historical Conception of Humanitarian Aid

For some scholars of humanitarianism, the modern history of humanitarian action and the provision of humanitarian aid is often traced back to Henry Dunant, a young Swiss Pacifist who witnessed and attempted to help wounded soldiers who were scattered on the battlefield of Solferino. While assisting these soldiers, Henri Dunant advocated for the rights of those suffering from war injuries and this set into motion the idea of international humanitarian action and the institution necessary to actualize it. Some of the precedents set by Henri Dunant were the formation of the Red Cross Society in Geneva in 1864, and seeking approval from sovereign authority for humanitarian intervention (Weiss and Collins, 2000; Polman, 2010).

According to Weiss and Collins (2000), the authenticity of this assumption of the modern history of humanitarian action is based on four cardinal points. First is “the idea of humanitarian

action," the second is the "codification of the idea through Napoleon's proclamation and the Geneva Convention," the third is the" institutionalization of the idea through the creation of Red Cross," and the fourth point is "the will of a powerful sovereign authority to place humanity before narrow self-interest." The latter cardinal point is relevant to this research because we assume that sovereign governments should place priority on the safety and well-being of their citizens when in conflict. However, different cases across time and space have shown governments obstructing effective delivery of humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, some authors argued that the institutionalization of humanitarian assistance such as development aid, although not firmly grounded on any ethical principles (Collier, 2016), can be traced to the end of World War I, which gave rise to humanitarian aid programs from Western countries such as the United States, France and Britain (Collier, 2016; Belgrad and Nachmias, 1997). For example, following the end of World War II, the institutionalization of humanitarian aid became more evident in the United States, and this led to the creation of other institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now known as the World Bank, to provide aid assistance (Williams, 2013; Collier, 2016).

While some authors place emphasis on the western development of humanitarian aid, Weiss and Collins (2000) argued that the west does not have the monopoly of humanitarian ideas, however, "the codification and the institutionalization of humanitarian ideas which enabled its operations" can be largely attributed to the west.

2.3. Humanitarian Aid Obstruction

Plowright (2023) defines aid obstruction as any measures implemented by a state or any authoritative agent (Fisher, 2010) to hinder the provision of lawful humanitarian aid to populations in crisis. These measures can include bureaucratic, economic, judicial, coercive, and informational

obstruction (Plowright, 2023). Prior to the administration or offering of humanitarian aid, aid organizations are initially confronted with the challenge of deciding who to give, what to give, and how to respond to humanitarian crisis (Liesbet, 2016), this position was accurately captured by Farquhar and Schwendimann that the provision of unimpeded humanitarian assistance is one of the foremost challenges to the protection of civilian population during crisis **(**Farquhar, 2016; Schwendimann,2011). Consequently, humanitarian assistance obstruction takes different forms but is often described as a denial of access. However, authors have argued that denial of access can be a form of humanitarian obstruction. Other means of obstructing humanitarian aid range from denial of visas and travel permits for humanitarian aid workers, violence and intimidation, refusal of entry, restricted movement and expulsion (Fischer,2010), halting the supply of essential supplies in entry ports as was the case recently in Sudan, Gaza and Yemen (Walsh, 2023; Oxfam, 2024; Plowright, 2023), reframing aid recipients as threats.

2.4. Forms and Functions of Humanitarian Aid Obstruction

To further identify the tangible nature of humanitarian aid obstruction, Mitchell & Pallister-Wilkins (2023) identified seven expansive definitions which can help in pinpointing when government obstructs the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and I will be adopting these definitions.

2.4.a. Rejection of rights and responsibilities

This form of humanitarian aid obstruction involves reframing the situation in a way that obscures both the rights of individuals or groups to receive aid and the obligations of others to provide it. For example, the unavailability and suppression of necessary data needed to make life-and-death decisions in Darfur (Reeves, 2011) can be categorized as a form of rejection of rights

and responsibilities.

2.4.b. Reframing vulnerable people as threats

States may obstruct humanitarian aid by framing vulnerable populations in crisis as security risks. This strategy suggests that providing aid to these groups could exacerbate the threat they supposedly pose, thereby justifying restrictions or denial of assistance.

2.4.c. Bureaucratic Obstruction

Governments can employ bureaucratic measures to hinder humanitarian operations. Common tactics include denying aid organizations access to affected populations or creating excessively complex registration and application processes. These procedures, often laden with contradictory requirements, make it nearly impossible for organizations to meet the conditions necessary to operate effectively.

2.4.d. Economic Obstruction

Humanitarian operations are heavily dependent on financial resources, making economic tactics an effective means of obstruction. States may withhold funding, impose disproportionately large fines, fees, or taxes, or strategically allocate funds to certain organizations while undercutting others. These actions not only strain the financial capacity of humanitarian actors but also deter donors, who may be reluctant to contribute to organizations burdened by financial penalties.

2.4.e. Judicial and/ or Juridical Obstruction

The criminalization of humanitarian work has become a growing concern. States may arrest, prosecute, or convict humanitarian workers, or use the threat of such actions to deter their efforts. Prolonged legal battles, high court fees, and the risk of imprisonment discourage organizations and individuals from continuing their work in challenging areas.

2.4.f. Coercive Obstruction

The safety of humanitarian workers has increasingly come under threat in recent years. Both intentional and accidental attacks by state actors have resulted in the loss of humanitarian personnel. For instance, the Kunduz Trauma Center run by Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) in Afghanistan was bombed multiple times in 2015 by the U.S. Air Force, killing dozens, despite claims that it was an unintentional strike. Such incidents create fear and disrupt aid delivery.

2.4.g. Misinformation and disinformation

Governments may use misinformation (spreading falsehoods unknowingly) or disinformation (intentionally spreading falsehoods) to undermine humanitarian efforts. This tactic can confuse the public, delegitimize aid organizations, and deter individuals from seeking assistance or supporting these organizations. For example, false narratives about the motives or effectiveness of aid groups can sow distrust, diminishing their impact.

2.5. Review of Relevant Literature/Previous Studies

In recent years, humanitarian assistance has grown to be a core strategy of developed countries in relieving the stress and suffering of civilian populations in countries facing humanitarian challenges. For example, efforts of the international communities in providing humanitarian assistance to civilians in places such as Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Sub-Saharan Africa have been commendable in achieving post-crises recovery (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 2011; Cohen, Kupcu, and Khanna, 2008). Yet, just like humanitarian aid has been growing steadily over the years, its obstruction by the recipient governments has been noticeable and has become a subject of empirical investigation among scholars. Along this line, in trying to understand the determinants of humanitarian aid obstruction, scholars have advanced

various political, economic, as well as external factors incentivizing recipient countries to obstruct aid.

Some studies have suggested that donors' identities could determine whether humanitarian assistance will be obstructed by the recipient countries. More specifically, scholarship indicates that the source of aid significantly influences how recipients perceive and treat aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher, 2024; Alrababa'j et al., 2020). While aid is often framed as humanitarian, it is widely understood that the political and strategic interests of the donor frequently drive its allocation. Recipients are acutely aware of this dynamic and recognize that aid often comes with conditions ((Alrababa'h et al., 2020; Boone, 1996; Bearce and Tirone, 2010; and Harneef, 2001). These conditions can profoundly affect their political and economic systems. For example, the United States of America provides aid to "expand markets for U.S. exports, create opportunities for U.S. businesses, and foster political stable, resilient, and democratic societies" in recipient countries (USAID 2021). Such initiatives often necessitate significant political reforms and economic shifts, creating divisions between those who benefit from aid and those who do not (Tokdemir 2017). As a result, the donor's identity and their underlying motives can have a substantial impact on recipients' lives, making donor identity a crucial factor in how aid is received or even obstructed.

Similarly, others have shown that recipients' perception of the donors could make obstruction of humanitarian aid more likely. This is because recipients' pre-existing perceptions of donors shape their views of aid and its implications for government legitimacy. Donors and recipients often share complex histories of diplomatic, economic, and political interactions, which can range from cooperative to contentious. These past experiences significantly influence how recipient citizens perceive the donor in the present. For example, research by Dietrich and Winter (2015) suggests

that when implementing aid projects, donors frequently use branding strategies to improve their public image in the recipient country. However, knowledge of the donor's identity can be a double-edged sword. While aid from a favored donor may strengthen positive perceptions of government legitimacy, aid from a disliked donor can exacerbate pre-existing negative sentiments (Adelman 2011). This dynamic can also help us understand the kinds of humanitarian assistance that are obstructed and those that are not. Furthermore, it also suggests that donor identity can either reinforce or undermine a recipient government's decision to accept and utilize aid resources.

Humanitarian aid obstruction is often analyzed through other lenses, such as the conditionalities attached to aid by donor agencies (Atmar, 2001) and the pursuit of political support (Meininghaus, 2016). Additionally, some scholars examine the domestic political impact of rejecting aid outright (Dany, 2020; Bearce and Tirone, 2010). However, there has been limited focus on the domestic political considerations that shape the outcome of foreign assistance. For instance, research by Meininghaus (2016) argued that the interaction between formal and informal governance spheres is influenced by contested geographical spaces in conflict zones (Benvenisti and Cohen, 2014). This dynamic is evident in Yemen, where the Houthis have obstructed aid to consolidate their control over territories, leading to retaliatory blockades by the Yemeni government. Similarly, in Syria, the Assad regime has repeatedly obstructed humanitarian intervention. delivery to opposition-held areas, framing humanitarian assistance as a threat to sovereignty and a tool that could bolster rebel forces. Put together, several domestic political factors influence aid obstructions in the recipient countries.

Finally, the last strand of literature on the determinant of aid obstructions focuses on the unintended consequences that humanitarian assistance could generate in the recipient countries. According to this set of studies, recipient governments are more likely to block humanitarian

assistance when they perceive that such is likely to yield unintended consequences in their political setting and governance. For example, research by Narang (2015) shows that humanitarian aid inadvertently prolongs conflict in the recipient countries, suggesting that recipient governments may be more careful in receiving humanitarian aid by assessing whether the benefits of receiving aid outweigh the risks of prolonging civil conflict. To cite one anecdotal example, during the Rwanda conflict in the 1990s, studies show that aid from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) fuels the crisis by empowering the Hutus war criminals to compete with the state. Other studies, such as Weiss and Collins (2000), Wood and Sullivan (2014), and Narang (2014), further show that recipient countries may reject humanitarian assistance because of its potential unintended consequences.

Despite extensive research on the determinants of humanitarian aid obstruction, an important factor that has been overlooked in the literature is the impact of intrastate conflict. More specifically, while countries experiencing internal conflict are considered more favorable to receiving humanitarian aid, it is also possible that the presence of conflict may make aid more likely to be obstructed in the recipient countries. To the best of my knowledge, this is an important aspect in the narrative of determinants of aid obstruction that has been overlooked by existing literature. This study attempts to fill this gap by developing a theoretical argument that shows that intrastate conflict is positively related to the likelihood that aid will be obstructed or outrightly rejected.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

How do intrastate conflicts affect the obstruction of humanitarian assistance? Why might countries experiencing internal conflict have incentives to obstruct or outrightly reject foreign aid? Even though internal conflicts may suggest that these countries may desperately desire humanitarian assistance, there are reasons to believe that the recipient governments may obstruct such assistance. Below, I provide a comprehensive explanation of the causal mechanisms between intrastate conflict and humanitarian aid obstruction, including strategic and political incentives, logistics and institutional challenges, economic incentives and aid manipulation, and security concerns and military considerations.

Beginning with strategic and political incentives, I argue that recipient countries may obstruct humanitarian assistance as a strategy to weaken their adversaries. Typically, in most civil conflicts, where at least one of the actors is a government of a state and the other rebel groups or other non-state actors, each of these actors' exercises control over different spheres or territories within the country (Walter, 2002; Collier and Hoefler, 2004; Duffy, 2010). Under this condition, aid obstruction may be used strategically as a starvation of suffering weapon against their adversaries. To cite one example, during the Syrian Civil War, President Bashar Al-Assad's government employed 'siege warfare' as a tactic to block aid deliveries from the opposition- controlled areas (Power, 2016). As a result, the UN News (2014) reported that the siege warfare affected approximately 240,000 Syrians, facing several challenges, including a shortage of food and medical supplies. Furthermore, actors in conflicts may obstruct aid to prevent their adversaries from gaining legitimacy and control over the population. Since aid may lead to public support, warry

parties may have the incentives to prevent its distributions to ensure that only their supporter benefits from it. For example, as Yosuyashi (2021) shows, the Ethiopian government during the Tigray crisis is accused of blocking aid deliveries to the Tigray region, fearing that its distribution will empower the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF).

Governments and rebel groups may sometimes deny entry or restrict the movement of humanitarian aid organizations attempting to assist distressed civilians. Such actions worsen the suffering of vulnerable populations and complicate relief efforts. For example, following its incursion into Lebanon on July 12, 2006, the Israeli military faced accusations from the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator of severely restricting humanitarian access for over a month, leaving countless civilians without essential aid and protection (Fisher, 2010). In some cases, government obstruction is a direct response to restrictions initially imposed by rebel groups. A notable instance occurred in Yemen when the Houthis blocked relief supplies intended for distribution to affected areas. In retaliation, the official Yemeni government imposed its own obstruction, further limiting the flow of aid and worsening the humanitarian crisis (Plowright, 2023). Such tit-for-tat obstructions create a cycle of deprivation that disproportionately impacts civilians caught in the conflict. Rebel forces, often perceived as the weaker parties in conflicts, face significant challenges in organizing themselves and maintaining control over resources and territories (Wood and Sullivan, 2015; Dany, 2018). However, governments, seeking to reinforce their legitimacy and maintain authority, frequently respond to this perceived weakness with measures aimed at asserting dominance. This can include obstructing humanitarian aid to ensure that rebels do not benefit from external support. By blocking aid, governments aim to weaken their opponents while consolidating their own power, often at the expense of the civilian population's welfare.

Second, humanitarian aid may be obstructed due to security concerns and military considerations. First, actors may prevent aid distribution, fearing that aid resources (food, medical care, or logistics support) will sustain their adversaries. For example, the Nigerian government under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan restricted the operations of humanitarian teams in areas controlled by Boko Haram, worrying that aid benefits would prop up the religious sects (Ayodeji and Iseoluwa, 2021; Ahmed, 2021). Additionally, humanitarian assistance may be restricted by actors in conflict with the knowledge that aid workers and organizations are often accused of aligning with one side in a conflict process. Along this line, actors may have a great incentive to block aid distribution in order to prevent the opponent side from gaining the support of the aid organizations and other concerned actors in the international community. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban militia group attacked the Afghan aid office hours before the arrival of the United States intervention team, viewing them as a collaborator in the conflict process (Aljazeera, 2010).

Moreover, humanitarian aid may be obstructed by the economic incentives of actors or be manipulated outrightly for their economic benefits. As the literature on free resources or unearned income suggests, foreign aid represented a form of free resources and a source of revenue generation in the recipient countries (Wright, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009). This development suggests that aid is fungible and thus may provide incentives for actors, particularly governments, to prevent humanitarian aid from being obstructed unless they can control or manipulate it for their personal consumption and political purposes. Given this situation, aid may either be diverted or manipulated by governments for their benefit against the benefits of their opponents and their supporters. Building on the selectorate theory, foreign aid may serve as labor-

free resources for leaders to provide public or private goods and benefits to their ruling coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow, 2003).

Further, humanitarian assistance may be disrupted in a way that will benefit ruling governments and their elites in the recipient countries. Studies by Kono and Motinola (2012) show that foreign aid is more likely to be diverted by governments to finance their repressive capacity and military apparatuses. To substantiate this argument, humanitarian assistance in Venezuela during the regime of President Nicolas Maduro was manipulated by the government to favor their support rather than allowing it to reach the targeted population. Similarly, during the Somali civil war in the 1990s, warlords seized food aid intended for civilians, integrating it into the war economy and consolidating their power. This diversion of aid undermines its original purpose while exacerbating the conflict.

Finally, intrastate conflicts may lead to humanitarian aid obstruction due to logistics and institutional challenges associated with it. Typically, conflict disrupts infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, and airports) and supply chains that may negatively impact the operations of aid organizations and their workers. Thus, the breakdown in infrastructure associated with conflict may severely provide governments in recipient countries with the incentives to place an embargo on external activities, making humanitarian operations nearly impossible in certain regions. Also, because conflict fragments societies, multiple actors controlling each territory tend to impose their own rules and regulations that could potentially affect aid delivery. In Somalia, for example, different actors involved in Somalia's crises, including the Somalia government, the local warlord, and the Al-Shabaab militant, each imposed different restrictions, leading humanitarian aid organizations and workers to negotiate delivery modalities with each of these actors (Jackson and Aynte, 2013).

In sum, applying the effects of intrastate conflict to humanitarian aid obstruction is quite straightforward. Recipient countries ravaged by internal conflict and other forms of violent conflict are more likely to obstruct humanitarian assistance as part of their strategies to achieve their political interests. They may also obstruct aid due to the logistics and institutional challenges associated with intrastate conflict or out of their desire to manipulate aid for economic advantages. Finally, aid may be obstructed by actors in conflict situations due to their security concerns and military considerations. Due to the theoretical explanation above, I generate the testable hypothesis below.

H1: *Intrastate Conflict is positively related to the probability that humanitarian assistance will be obstructed in recipient countries.*

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

To test the hypotheses stated above, I employed a time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data of the Humanitarian Aid Obstruction and Armed Conflict dataset in 95 developing (i.e., non-OECD) countries, based on data availability. The sample included in this dataset is constructed using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Pettersson and Oberg, 2024). I exclude the developed countries (i.e., OECD) given that the process that explains the inflow of humanitarian aid and other forms of foreign assistance into these countries is different from that of the developing world. Further, the majority of the developed countries are more or less aid donor countries rather than recipients. The unit of analysis is country-year. As the assumed relationship varies over time and space, the focus of my analysis is global rather than regional. Specifically, I included all countries for which data is available from 1997 to 2023. Below, I discussed the dependent and independent variables independent, and control variables included in the empirical analysis.

4.1. Humanitarian Aid Obstruction

The main dependent variable is humanitarian aid obstruction, and it is important to note that existing literature has established different forms of aid obstruction such as rejection of rights and responsibility (Reeves, 2011), reframing vulnerable people as threats, bureaucratic obstruction, economic obstruction, misinformation and disinformation, judicial or judicial obstruction, and coercive obstruction (Mitchell &Pallister-Wilkins, 2023; Plowright, 2023). However, the most effective way to measure aid obstruction is by observing coercive forms of aid obstruction, which mostly involve violence against aid workers. Another reason for choosing this

form of obstruction to determine humanitarian aid obstruction is, first, the availability of data, second, it is a tangible way to measure aid obstruction because it is hard to measure other forms of aid obstruction.

To measure humanitarian aid obstruction, I rely on the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), which measures incidents of violence against aid workers. The Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD, 2025) has multiple indicators of aid obstruction. However, given the focus and theoretical explanation of this study, I use three forms of obstruction incidence: the total case of aid workers kidnapped, wounded, and killed. These are count variables rather than continuous; they contain the number of incidents of attacks against aid workers. Also, given that there are multiple incidents in a given year, I collapse the variable to create a summed version for each year of observation. Furthermore, I employed an additional dependent variable – called, donors' type, whether the United Nations (UN), International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or National Non-Governmental Organization (NNGO). The intuition here is that the source of humanitarian aid has far-reaching implications on how it will be treated, utilized, and accepted in the recipient countries. Overall, while the main model pooled all aid workers and all types of aid, the additional models break this down by donor type.

4.2. Independent Variables

The independent variable is *Intrastate Conflict,* which measures whether there is an armed conflict in a country in a given year. It is coded as 1 if there is a conflict and 0 if otherwise. The data is obtained from the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2024; Davies etal., 2024; Pettersson and Oberg, 2024). The data contains information on the incidence of organized violence within a given country by organized actors, of which at least one is the

government of a state, against another organized actor, or against civilians (which has crossed the 25 battle-related death threshold). The data contains information on different types of conflict, including extra systemic (between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory), interstate (both sides are states), and intrastate (side A is always a government, Side B is always one or more rebel groups. Given the focus of this study, I used the information on conflicts that happened between actors within a state (intrastate conflict) to create the dichotomous dependent variable. Furthermore, while some years contain multiple conflict events, the dependent variable accounts for whether (1) there is an active or ongoing conflict in a year and 0 if otherwise.

Because the nature of issues that are involved in a conflict may have unintended consequences on the different processes of conflicts, including onset, duration, and termination, I control for the effect of types of conflict. Conflict revolving around the composition of government may have a far-reaching implication compared to conflict regarding the control of certain territories. Thus, I employed the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Peterson, 2022), which contains information about armed conflict within a country that resulted from incompatibility that either concerns territory or government and in which at least one of the actors is the government of a state. It is coded 1 if the conflict is about territory (e.g., succession or territorial autonomy, and it is coded 2 if the conflict is about government (e.g., change or control of the central government or its composition. I, thereby record the data whereby 0 represents territorial conflict and 1 represents government.

4.3. Control Variables

I incorporate other socio-economic and political confounders that could affect the relationship between the outcome and key independent variables (Neumayer, 2003; Nieto-Matiz

and Schenoni, 2020; Savun and Tirone, 2011; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2008). To begin with, I controlled a number of economic variables. Research on foreign assistance suggests that the level of foreign aid received by a recipient country and how aid resources are being utilized may be explained by its economic conditions. Thus, I control for a country's wealth or *Economic Development* measured by GDP per capita as economically poor countries are more likely to be desperate for humanitarian aid and other forms of foreign assistance. The variable is log-transformed to address its skewed distribution. Second, I control for *Economic Growth,* measured as an increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as this is also likely to be correlated with intrastate conflict and humanitarian aid obstruction.

Furthermore, I also controlled for the *Natural Resources* endowment of the aid recipient country as a microeconomic factor that affects a country's need for aid. For example, a country's resources and wealth may serve as important factors that suggest to potential donors whether humanitarian aid is desperately needed in times of crisis or not. Data for all three variables are obtained from the World Development Indicator database (World Bank, 2022).

Research suggests that liberal peace may be democratic peace. More specifically, democratic peace scholars argue that democracies are less war-prone, not only than other democracies but also that democracies have mechanisms of peaceful resolution mechanisms for resolving internal domestic conflict, whereas autocracies seem to lack the same degree of constraints and normative mechanisms (Moaz, Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994; Reiter, and Allan, 1998). Regarding foreign assistance, scholars have also found the link between democracy and aid, although less has been done on aid obstruction in this context (Lektzian and Biglaiser (2022). Thus, to control the effect of democracy, I use the Polyarchy index from Coppedge et al., (2019), which is a continuous measure. The data ranges from approximately 0.01 to 0.93 in the dataset.

Another measure of democracy common in the literature is Polity IV score which ranges from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2015). Some scholars also rely on dichotomous measure of the variable using the BMR's Dichotomous Democracy Data (Boix, Miller, and Rosato, 2018). The country-year data is coded 1 if a country is a democracy and 0 if it is a non-democracy.

Furthermore, I controlled the total level of foreign aid received by a country. The intuition behind this is that conflict-ridden states receiving high levels of foreign aid or assistance from multiple donors may have strong incentives to obstruct aid compared to recipient countries that do not have access to a large amount of foreign assistance. Also, during conflict actors may deliberately want to obstruct humanitarian aid that focuses primarily on boosting the capacities of other actors involved in conflict. Thus, following Wright and Winter (2010), I employed Roodman's (2008) Net Aid Transfer (NAT) dataset to capture the effects of the level of foreign aid. I took the nature log of this variable to address the skewed nature of the data. Empirical investigations measure foreign aid using the Net Oversea of Official Development Assistance (ODA). One of the shortcomings of ODA data is that it only captures net payments on loan principal. Whereas Roodman's NAT data not only captures both loan principal and interests but also excludes foreign debt cancellations.

I also controlled for the effect of *Ethnic Fractionalization* in the empirical analysis. Countries that are highly divided along ethnic cleavages and cultural diversity are prone to experience intrastate conflict compared to highly homogenous ones (Fearon, 2003). Further, the very presence of ethnic fractionalization can serve as the basis for warring parties in intrastate conflict to attach ethnic sentiment towards efforts at resolving the conflict, thereby providing reasons for that are highly divided along ethnic cleavages and cultural diversity are prone to

experience aid obstruction. Along this line, some studies have established between ethnic fractionalization and Another measure of democracy common in the literature is Polity IV score which ranges from - 10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Marshall, Gurr, and intrastate conflict compared to highly homogenous ones (Fearon, 2003).

Further, the very presence of ethnic fractionalization can serve as the basis for warring parties in intrastate conflict to attach ethnic sentiment towards efforts at resolving the conflict, thereby providing reasons for aid obstruction. Along this line, some studies have established between ethnic fractionalization and the effective (ineffective) use of foreign aid (for example, see Wright, 2008). Put differently, it is possible that a particular ethnic group may prevent the introduction of humanitarian assistance to weaken the access to resources by the other ethnic group. The data for ethnic fractionalization is obtained from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2025). It is a composite index that captures the extent to which a country is divided along ethnic and cultural diversity.

Additionally, I control for the *Intensity of conflict* as the severity of conflict matters and may provide actors involved with different levels of incentives for obstructing humanitarian aid. For example, conflicts that are less intensified are less likely to lead actors to obstruct aid compared to those that are highly intensified. This data is obtained from the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2024). It is coded as 1 if the intensity of the conflict is minor, leading to battle-related deaths between 25 and 999 in a given year, and 2 if the conflict intensity is war, leading to at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year. Additionally, I include the types of actors (*Actor Type)* that perpetrate aid obstruction activities, whether individuals, unknown or unaffiliated actors, states or non-state actors. This is a categorical variable. I coded this as 0 if the perpetrator of aid obstruction is Unknown, 1 if the actor is an individual, 2 if the actor is a Non-State Actors (e.g., organized

rebel group), and 3 if the actor is a State Actor (e.g., the Government of a state, Police or Paramilitary).

Finally, I controlled for countries' *Regions* of the world that a country belongs to, as some regions may be more prone to conflict than others. Regions that are ridden with intrastate conflicts are more likely to receive an influx of humanitarian aid. It is also possible that these regions may also be more likely to obstruct humanitarian assistance as part of strategies of actors to weaken each other's capability in the process of conflict. The region variable is coded as follows: 1 (Europe), 2 (Latin American and Caribbean), 3 (Middle East), 4 (Asia), and 5 (Africa). In my regression analysis, this variable will be treated as a categorical variable with the 1 (i.e., Europe) as the baseline category, allowing for easy comparison with the other levels of categories in the variable.

4.4. Estimation and Method of Analysis

Given that the outcome variable is a nonnegative event count, using the ordinary least square method (OLS) to model the process underlying aid obstruction in conflict-ridden states can be ineffective, inappropriate, or biased (Long, 1997). Although Poisson regression is more popular in estimating event count, I used Negative Binomial Regression because the former fails to meet the restrictive assumption that the conditional means equals the conditional variance. Following Cameroon and Trivedi (1998), the negative binomial regression helps address the shortcomings of the poison regression as it allows for an overdispersion parameter, thereby allowing the conditional variable to exceed the conditional mean. Thus, I used the negative binomial with clustered robust standard error and country-fixed effect to control for heterogeneity within the country.

For additional tests and robustness checks, Poisson regression models will be run to substantiate the main empirical results. The choice of these models over OLS is informed by the

fact that the count of the number of attacks on aid workers is not sufficiently large and that most of the events are clustered around small values (See Figures 3, 4, and 5) below. Finally, some of the control variables, such as *GDP Per Capita, Foreign Aid, Economic Growth,* and *Natural Resources,* are lagged by one year to address the possibility of simultaneity. See Table A2 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics.

4.5. Addressing Endogeneity

This section addresses the concerns about potential endogeneity problems in the main empirical results. Just as the main empirical results in Table 1 suggest that intrastate conflict can affect the likelihood of aid obstruction _ that is, the relationship may also be endogenous. On the one hand, intrastate conflict can positively affect aid obstruction in aid-receiving countries. On the other hand, the relationship may also be endogenous, wherein countries that receive humanitarian assistance may be conflict-prone states. In other words, there is a possibility that a reversed causality relationship exists between intrastate conflict and aid obstruction, thereby causing inconsistent and biased estimates. To address this problem, instrumental variables will be needed. A good and relevant instrument must meet two conditions. First, it must be a good predictor of the endogenous variable (intrastate conflict). Second, it must theoretically be exogenous and empirically not correlate with the unobserved factors that would explain the dependent variable (i.e., humanitarian obstruction). Therefore, the ideal instrument variables that I used the dummies of *Asia and Africa*. These dummies indicating that these two regions often experience internal conflict make good instruments.

The estimation method used in addressing the endogeneity issue is the two-stage least squares_2SLS (Kenkel, 2016; Angrist & Imbens, 1995; & Wooldridge, 2009). In the first-stage estimations, otherwise known as the reduced equation, I regress the endogenous variables on the

instrument variables (i.e., *Asia and Africa*) and all other exogenous covariates that are correlated with intrastate conflict, using probit regression to obtain the predicted probability of intrastate conflict. In the second stage, the obtained predicted value of intrastate conflict is treated as an exogenous version of the endogenous variables in the outcome equation estimations (humanitarian obstruction) using negative binomial regression. The intuition behind this is to control for the error correlation between the reduced-form and outcome equation residuals.

4.6. Indicators of Humanitarian Aid Obstruction (1997 – 2025)



Figure 3. The Number of Humanitarian Aid Workers Killed between 1997 – 2025



Figure 4. The Number of Humanitarian Aid Workers Kidnapped between 1997 – 2025



Figure 5. The Number of Humanitarian Aid Workers Wounded between 1997 – 2025

CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION, AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This chapter will present the empirical (statistical) analysis of the study based on the data employed in testing the hypotheses and theoretical expectations. Next, I present the interpretation of the different sets of results generated, suggesting whether or not the results provide evidence for our expectation of the relationship between the independent variables (intrastate conflict) and the outcome variable of interests (humanitarian aid obstruction). Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings.

5.1. Analysis And Interpretation of Results

I present the empirical findings of this study on the tables below. I start by presenting the results of the baseline models in Table 1. In Models 1 to 3, I use negative binomial regression with robust standard error to test the effect of intrastate conflict on the different indicators of humanitarian aid obstruction. The effects of internal conflict on aid obstruction are positive and statistically significant at the $P<0.01$ level, across all three models. This provides further backing for our theoretical expectation that countries undergoing internal conflict are more likely to deter the inflow of humanitarian assistance as a strategy to weaken each other actors' mobilization and capacity strength. For additional tests, I use Poisson regression. Accordingly, I also find a similar positive and statistically significant effect of the main predictor on the outcome variables in Models 4 to 6: that is, the results show that internal conflict is positively correlated with aid obstruction in the recipient countries.

Focusing on the substantive effects, I find in Models 1 to 3 that intrastate conflict increases the incident rate ratio of aid workers killed is 9.84 or about 188%, whereas the incident risk of aid workers kidnapped is 3.72 about 403%. Finally, the risk ratio of aid workers wounded is 4.028 or about 551%. Similarly, the results of the Poisson regression in Models 4 to 6 show that when there is internal conflict in recipient countries, the predicted risk of humanitarian aid obstruction increases for each of the indicators (aid workers killed, aid workers kidnapped and aid workers wounded) by around 558%, 358%, and 148%, respectively. The graphs of the predicted risk of humanitarian aid obstruction across the models are presented in Figure 1 for both types of regression analysis. The graphs show that recipient countries ravaged by internal conflicts are more likely to obstruct foreign assistance, compared to those that are not inflicted by internal conflicts.

The finding of our main empirical result indicates that internal conflict in recipient countries substantially increases the probability that humanitarian assistance will be obstructed by either of the warring actors, providing initial support for our theoretical expectation and hypothesis. This is similar to empirical results by Wood and Christopher (2015) that a large commitment to humanitarian assistance is positively correlated with rebel violence attacks. Overall, our main empirical results provide further backing for our expectation of the relationship between internal conflict within countries and the likelihood that humanitarian assistance will be obstructed.

Table 1. The Effect of Intrastate Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Obstruction

	Negative Binomial Regression				Poisson Regression	
Outcome Variable	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model 6
Intrastate Conflict	2.287***	1.315***	1.393***	2.583***	2.350***	1.989***
	(0.312)	(0.467)	(0.278)	(0.297)	(0.382)	(0.221)
Democracy	-3.186***	-2.553***	-2.034***	-2.686***	-1.070*	-2.124***
	(0.513)	(0.966)	(0.532)	(0.494)	(0.641)	(0.562)
GDP Per Capita	-0.132*	-0.402***	-0.007	-0.265***	-0.382***	-0.076
	(0.068)	(0.099)	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.064)
Economic Growth	-0.042***	0.025**	-0.007	-0.036**	-0.003	-0.030**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Fractionalization	1.149***	0.074	1.623***	2.142***	1.792***	1.990***
	(0.411)	(0.520)	(0.410)	(0.473)	(0.651)	(0.427)
Total Foreign Aid	0.262***	0.392***	0.256***	0.209***	0.294***	0.251***
	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Natural Resources	-0.006	0.021	-0.003	-0.016	-0.006	-0.015
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
No of Conflict	0.295	1.263***	0.238	0.034	0.104	-0.168
	(0.193)	(0.330)	(0.176)	(0.111)	(0.125)	(0.117)
Latin America	2.263***	0.002	1.952***	1.867***	-0.146	1.785***
	(0.856)	(0.763)	(0.563)	(0.648)	(0.735)	(0.507)
Middle East	1.682*	-0.421	1.933***	2.501***	0.278	1.976***
	(0.865)	(0.715)	(0.592)	(0.671)	(0.701)	(0.544)
Africa	1.844**	-0.329	1.826***	1.443**	-0.261	1.887***
	(0.801)	(0.782)	(0.519)	(0.594)	(0.700)	(0.481)
Asia	2.088***	-0.485	2.013***	2.635***	0.765	2.390***
	(0.800)	(0.795)	(0.527)	(0.583)	(0.682)	(0.452)
Constant	-2.656**	1.169	-3.754***	-2.076***	-0.119	-3.272***
	(1.036)	(1.255)	(0.753)	(0.759)	(1.002)	(0.728)
Observations	2,041	2,041	2,041	2,041	2,041	2,041

Wald-X^2	482.52	2.89.52	406.70	1026.32	457.02	662.64
Probability Chi-2	0.0000	0.000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo-R^2	0.1626	0.1208	0.1187	0.5334	0.8953	0.4307

Note:The dependent variable uses three indicators: aid workers killed, kidnapped, and wounded. Results of Models 1 to 3 are based on Negative Binomial Regression, while results of Models 4 to 6 are based on Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Among the control variables, we find that *Democracy, GDP Per Capita,* and *Economic Growth* are negative and statistically significant, while *Ethnic Fractionalization* and *Total Foreign Aid*, are positive. All these effects are statistically significant at the *P<0.01* level. We also find that these effects are consistent and uniform across all the regions. This result suggests that at a high level of democracy, a high level of economic development and growth reduces the likelihood that aid will be obstructed. Consistent with Wright (2009), I find that ethnic fractionalization influences how recipient countries treat or utilize foreign assistance. I also find that as the share of foreign aid increases, the probability of obstructing aid increases.



Figure 6. Predicted Risk of Aid Obstruction with 95% Confidence Interval (Table 1, Effect of Intrastate Conflict on Aid Obstruction). Note: The predicted risks of humanitarian aid obstructions are estimated based on the results in Table 1, holding all other variables at their means.

Next, in Table 2, I present the results using the Two-Stage regression analysis that allows us to control for potential endogeneity between intrastate conflict as humanitarian aid obstruction, as countries ravaged by internal crisis are more likely to be considered for humanitarian assistance, at the same time, obstructing humanitarian assistance might lead to internal conflicts. Consistent with the results reported in Table 1, Table 2 shows that the coefficient in the instrumented *Intrastate Conflict* variable is positive and statistically significant across all three models. I also find an endogenous relationship between internal conflict as the first-stage regression shows that the instrumental variables – *Asia and Africa* dummies predict internal conflicts (See Table A1 in the appendix). The *F*-statistics of the reduced equation in the first stage is 60.40*,* so these instruments are above the threshold to satisfy good instruments, as Stock & Yogo (2015) suggested.

Table 2. Two-Stage Regression Analysis

VARIABLES	(Model 7) Aid Workers Killed	(Model 8) Aid Workers Kidnapped	(Model 9) Aid Workers Wounded
Intrastate Conflict	4.377***	3.480**	2.854**
	(1.331)	(1.478)	(1.117)
Democracy	3.826**	2.879	2.932*
	(1.816)	(2.063)	(1.530)
GDP Per Capita	-1.581***	-1.296***	-0.908***
	(0.421)	(0.472)	(0.350)
Economic Growth	0.059**	0.085**	0.044*
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.394	0.454	0.405
	(0.555)	(0.701)	(0.504)
Foreign Aid	-0.224**	-0.145	-0.097
	(0.107)	(0.123)	(0.090)
Natural Resources	-0.031**	-0.018	-0.018
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Number of Internal Conflict	0.771***	0.995***	0.596***
	(0.085)	(0.117)	(0.081)
Region			
Latin America and Caribbean	1.971***	2.409***	1.620***
	(0.740)	(0.851)	(0.607)
Middle East	0.802	0.951	0.839
	(0.683)	(0.785)	(0.579)
Africa	-0.596*	-0.433	-0.201
	(0.358)	(0.424)	(0.297)
Asia	-	-	-
Constant	12.739***	8.596**	6.115*
	(3.788)	(4.289)	(3.179)
Observations	2,041	2,041	2,041
Number of Country	91	91	91

Note**:** The result of this table is reported using a two-stage regression analysis with instrumental variables.

Given that humanitarian assistance to recipient countries comes from different sources, I

also test the hypotheses using different donor types, showing whether aid from certain donors is more likely to be obstructed than others. This result is presented in Table 3, using negative binomial regression. Similar to the results in Tables 1 and 2, the results show that internal conflict increases the likelihood of aid obstruction for all categories of donors whether from the United Nations (UN), International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or National Non-Governmental Organization (NNGO). This effect is statistically significant at point ($P<0.01$), level across all the model specifications. The graph of the predicted risks of obstructing aid for each of these categories of aid donors is presented in Figure 2. The findings suggest that intrastate conflict substantially increases the risks of aid obstruction. Also, some of the controls perform similarly as in Table 1 and 2 in the main empirical result for example, *Democracy* and *GDP Per Capita* are negatively related to the likelihood of obstructing humanitarian assistance. Overall, this result provides further backing for the main results above, suggesting the effect of intrastate conflict on aid obstruction is the main regardless of the category or source of foreign assistance.

Table 3. The Effect of Intrastate Conflict on Aid Donors' Staff Attacks (Negative Binomial Regression)

	(Model 10)	(Model 11)	(Model 12)	(Model13)	(Model14)
Dependent Variables	UN	INGO	ICRC	NRCS_IFRC	NNGO
Intrastate Conflict	2.114***	1.552***	2.629***	1.687***	1.866***
	(0.362)	(0.297)	(0.440)	(0.522)	(0.594)
Democracy	-2.361***	-2.678***	0.332	-2.930***	-1.180
	(0.612)	(0.575)	(1.247)	(0.827)	(1.462)
GDP Per Capita	-0.052	-0.131*	-0.484***	0.054	-0.317***
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.111)
Economic Growth	-0.037*	-0.002	-0.107***	0.019*	-0.025
	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.071**	0.969**	0.964	0.947	2.781***
	(0.458)	(0.425)	(0.780)	(0.765)	(0.856)
Total Foreign Aid	0.294***	0.261***	0.262***	0.113*	0.413***
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.100)	(0.066)	(0.051)
Natural Resources	0.010	0.003	0.007	0.008	-0.019*
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.011)
N0 of Intratste Conflict	0.027	0.308	0.176	0.622**	1.001***
	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.202)	(0.274)	(0.308)
Latin America/Carribean	1.587**	0.669	-2.299*	4.618***	15.080**
	(0.685)	(0.688)	(1.259)	(0.879)	(0.778)
Middle East	1.313*	0.352	-0.939	3.773***	15.457**
	(0.689)	(0.700)	(0.998)	(0.770)	(0.453)
Africa	1.642**	0.661	-0.690	3.346***	14.482**
	(0.648)	(0.708)	(1.025)	(0.841)	(0.485)
Asia	1.449**	0.926	-0.283	2.845***	15.138**
	(0.634)	(0.690)	(0.970)	(0.824)	(0.381)
Constant	-3.754***	-0.823	-0.634	-7.098***	-17.304**
	(0.959)	(1.011)	(1.607)	(1.453)	(1.109)
Observations	2,041	2,041	2,041	2,041	2,041
Wald-X2	337.07	484.19	252.33	200.28	2941.08
Probability Chi-Square	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo-R^2	0.1554	0.110	0.1640	0.0998	0.1777

Note**:** The dependent variable focus on aid workers attacks by donor type (i.e., UN, INGO, ICRC, NRCS_IFRC, NNGI**)** Models are based on Negative Binomial Regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.05, * p<0.

Figure 7



Figure 7. Predicted Risk of aid workers attacked by donor type, with 95% Confidence Interval

Given that the dataset used for this study has a cross-sectional and longitudinal nature, I also test the hypotheses using both Fixed-Effects and Random Effect negative binomial regression and reports the results in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. Similar to our previous findings discussed above, the country fixed-effect models shows that the coefficient of *Interstate Conflict* variable is positive and statistically significant at the $P<0.01$ level. The random models in Table 5 also reveals that the coefficient of *Interstate Conflict* variable is positive and also significant at the $P< 0.01$ level across all the model specification of the outcome variables. The graph of the predicted risk (not reported) is similar to that of our main empirical results. This result suggests that having controlled for unobserved and time-invariant factors that may bias the results, our findings still remain the same, thereby substantiating the validity of the results.

Table 4: Intrastate Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Obstruction (Country-Fixed Effect)

	Negative Binomial Regression		
Dependent Variables	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17
Intrastate Conflict	0.967***	1.036***	0.550**
	(0.239)	(0.342)	(0.229)
Democracy	-1.255*	-0.835	-0.151
	(0.710)	(0.885)	(0.570)
GDP Per Capita	-0.343***	-0.185	-0.017
	(0.090)	(0.113)	(0.080)
Economic Growth	-0.028***	0.018	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.801	0.679	0.638
	(0.696)	(0.845)	(0.677)
Total Foreign Aid	0.111***	0.102***	0.107***
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Natural Resources	0.009	0.010	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Number of Internal Conflict	0.366***	0.534***	0.370***
	(0.131)	(0.180)	(0.127)
Region	3.346**	4.007***	2.193
Latin America & Carribean			
	(1.442)	(1.362)	(1.485)
Middle East	1.242	1.728	0.156
	(1.301)	(1.155)	(1.342)
Africa	1.927	1.747	0.389
	(1.313)	(1.113)	(1.341)
Asia	2.825**	2.234**	0.539
	(1.304)	(1.125)	(1.338)
Constant	-1.327	-3.914***	-2.753*
	(1.454)	(1.413)	(1.521)
Observations	1,310	835	1,540
Wald-X^2	189.36	99.86	109.99
Log-Likelihood	-845.86	-565.96	-1026.22

Note: Results are based on Negative Binomial Regression, with country-fixed effect.

Table 5: Intrastate Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Obstruction (Random Effect)

	Negative Binomial Regression		
Dependent Variable	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Intrastate Conflict	1.267***	1.350***	0.671***
	(0.239)	(0.343)	(0.221)
Democracy	-1.812***	-1.347*	-0.725
	(0.602)	(0.783)	(0.501)
GDP Per Capita	-0.226***	-0.214**	-0.043
	(0.077)	(0.096)	(0.065)
Economic Growth	-0.029***	0.018	-0.013
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.417	0.294	0.415
	(0.544)	(0.682)	(0.497)
Total Foreign Aid	0.118***	0.120***	0.122***
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Natural Resources	0.004	0.012	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Number of Internal Conflicts	0.297**	0.533***	0.329***
	(0.128)	(0.172)	(0.122)
Region			
Latin America and Carribean	2.006***	2.289***	1.649***
	(0.717)	(0.827)	(0.599)
Middle East	0.885	1.007	0.876
	(0.666)	(0.774)	(0.574)
Africa	1.661**	1.374*	1.245**
	(0.661)	(0.728)	(0.568)
Asia	2.137***	1.599**	1.417**
	(0.658)	(0.742)	(0.562)
Constant	-1.628*	-3.032***	-3.009***
	(0.898)	(1.041)	(0.791)
Observations	2,041	2,041	2,041
Number of Country	91	91	91
Wald-X^2	233.15	122.96	146.74
Log-Likelihood	-1098.99	-771.56	-1310.32

Note: The dependent variable (i.e., Humanitarian Aid Obstruction) is measured using three indicators aid workers killed, kidnapped, and wounded. Results are based on Negative Binomial Regression, with random-fixed effect.

5.2. Robustness Checks

In this section, I present the robustness test of the main empirical findings. In re-estimate the empirical results using an alternative measure – total foreign assistance received. The results of this alternative measure reveal the same patterns seen previously. The coefficient of the *Interstate Conflict* is positive and significant using both negative binomial and poisson regression. Also, the control variables perform similarly to what we have in previous tables. The empirical findings of the robustness assessment further substantiate the main empirical findings.

Additionally, the graph of the predicted risk of aid obstruction reported in Figure 3 reveals similar patterns that recipient countries experiencing internal conflict are more likely to obstruct humanitarian assistance compared to those that are not experiencing any conflict of such.

Table 6: Intrastate Conflict and Foreign Aid (Robustness Check)

Dependent Variable	(1) Model 21	(2) Model 22
Intrastate Conflict	0.538***	0.746***
	(0.171)	(0.141)
Democracy	0.363	0.466
	(0.392)	(0.513)
GDP Per Capital	0.505***	0.664***
	(0.092)	(0.087)
Economic Growth	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ethnic Fractionalization		1.169
		(2.731)
Natural Resources	0.015**	0.039***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Number of Internal Conflict	0.013	-0.051
	(0.115)	(0.070)
Region		2.980
Latin America and Carribean		
		(1.849)
Middle East		3.697**
		(1.714)
Africa		3.432*
		(1.955)
Asia		4.335**
		(1.711)
Constant	-4.386***	
	(0.813)	
Observations	2,041	2,041
R-squared	0.033	
Number of Country	91	91

Note: The dependent variable is total foreign aid received. Result of Model 21 is based on Negative Binomial Regression, while the result for Model 22 is based on Poisson Regression Standard errors in parentheses.



Figure 8. Marginal Effect of Intrastate Conflict on Foreign Aid

5.3. Discussion Of Findings

Humanitarian assistance is a form of aid provided to ameliorate the human costs of war or conflict in the forms of material relief, emergency food aid, and relief coordination and support service to vulnerable affected populations in conflict-afflicted states (Banatvala and Zwi, 2013). In recent decades, different types of donors, including governments of states, international organizations, and agencies have committed about $14 billion in humanitarian assistance to help victims of violent conflict and natural disasters. Yet, statistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that humanitarian assistance is being obstructed in many conflict-afflicted countries.

Humanitarian aid obstruction manifests in many forms including killing, kidnapping, and violent attacks against aid workers from aid organizations, agencies, and aid communities in general.

Problematically, despite the occurrence of aid obstruction in conflict-prone states, it has not been thoroughly examined in the extant literature. More specifically, few studies have investigated whether or not internal conflicts affect humanitarian aid obstructions in the recipient countries. This thesis undertakes a first-cut approach to examining the relationship between intrastate conflict and aid obstruction. Using novel, recently released data that captures various indicators of humanitarian aid obstruction across time and countries, I provide robust empirical evidence that internal conflict increases the likelihood that humanitarian aid will be obstructed. Further, the results show that the effects of intrastate conflict on aid obstructions are consistent even when accounting for different types of aid donors, suggesting that this finding is not confined to the source of humanitarian assistance.

Though the findings that internal conflict increases the risk of humanitarian aid obstruction is concerning, particularly as it seems to thwart the efforts of the donor and the effectiveness of the aid programs, it is substantially important and should have policy implications for the international aid community in general in determining their strategies in responding to violent conflicts and channeling aid resources accordingly. Put differently, while aid organizations and agencies are often willing to ameliorate the conditions of the affected population in conflict-ravaging countries, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that donors may need to develop effective strategies in determining where aid resources goes, and which types of conflict-prone state receive humanitarian assistance and to what degree of aid commitment should be made. For example, greater coordination and effective monitoring among donors, aid organizations, states, and international institutions may be effective in channeling aid resources to the targeted populations.

While the empirical results of this thesis provide backing for the hypothesis tested and the theoretical expectations, I note that factors I have not explicitly considered herein might affect this relationship. For example, it is possible that the types of actors involved in a conflict, whether states, non-state actors, or rebel groups may condition the relationship between internal conflict and humanitarian aid obstruction. However, due to the unavailability of data, I could not incorporate this important factor in the empirical analysis. It is also possible that certain types of conflict, whether territorial or governmental conflict, may moderate the relationship between these two. In future attempts, I hope to examine the conditional effects of these factors, assuming the availability of data.

Finally, this thesis contributes to the extant literature, particularly research on humanitarian assistance while conflict-prone states are usually considered to be in dire need of foreign assistance, there is yet another factor that is yet to be investigated in the literature – the possibility that actors in some countries facing an internal crisis may have incentives to obstruct humanitarian assistance even when offered.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Under what conditions do countries obstruct humanitarian assistance? How does interstate conflict affect the likelihood of humanitarian aid obstruction in recipient countries? Aid obstruction in needy countries, particularly for those experiencing internal challenges, is an interesting puzzle both in the theoretical and empirical sense. In recent years, more than one-third of humanitarian obstruction has taken place in countries undergoing some sort of internal conflict. Some countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen among others, which are constantly ravaged by intrastate conflict, have witnessed several incidences of aid obstruction and attacks on foreign aid workers.

Scholars within the foreign assistance studies and international aid community are generally concerned with obstruction issues. Further, given the humongous resources committed by the aid donor, both bilateral and multilateral, it is assumed that targeted countries will warmly receive foreign assistance to improve the socio-economic and welfare conditions of the targeted population, particularly the affected civilians. However, anecdotal and statistical evidence suggests that recipient countries considered for humanitarian assistance often obstruct, or outrightly reject such assistance. Focusing on the domestic socio-political factors, recent empirical studies suggest that countries affected by internal conflicts are more likely to be considered for humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, we persistently observe a very high obstruction of aid in many recipient countries around the world.

The effect of intrastate conflict on humanitarian aid obstruction is the central question that this thesis examines. In this thesis, I argue that while countries experiencing intrastate conflicts are more likely to be considered for humanitarian assistance as part of strategies for post-conflict

plans, these countries have a greater political incentive to obstruct such aid as parts of strategy by the warring actors to limit economic resources that could potentially strengthen the other party to fight harder. This is an important question and puzzle that is yet to be comprehensively examined in literature. This is the gap in the extant foreign assistance literature that is examined by this study.

In the thesis, I posit that intrastate conflict positively affects the likelihood of humanitarian aid obstruction for several reasons. First, recipient countries may obstruct humanitarian assistance as part of their strategy to weaken their adversary's mobilization capacity. Given that most civil conflicts typically involve different actors where at least one of them is a government of a state and the other rebel groups or other non-state actors that take control of some part of the country's territory, obstructing may be used strategically as a starvation of suffering weapon against their adversaries. Second, humanitarian assistance may be obstructed due to security concerns and military considerations. For example, worrying actors in a conflict may prevent foreign aid distribution out of the fear that aid resources (food, medical care, or logistics support) will sustain their adversaries. Third, humanitarian aid may be obstructed by the economic incentives of actors or be manipulated outrightly for their economic benefits. This development suggests that aid is fungible and thus may provide incentives for actors, particularly governments, to prevent humanitarian aid from being obstructed unless they can control or manipulate it for their personal consumption and political purposes.

Given this situation, governments may either divert or manipulate aid for their benefit against the benefits of their opponents and supporters. Finally, intrastate conflicts may lead to humanitarian aid obstruction due to logistics and institutional challenges associated with it. Thus, the breakdown in infrastructure facilities associated with conflict may severely provide governments in recipient countries with the incentives to place an embargo on external activities,

making humanitarian assistance operations nearly impossible in certain regions.

The empirical findings of this study indicate that intrastate conflict is positively correlated with the likelihood of humanitarian aid obstruction. In other words, recipient countries experiencing internal conflict are more prone to obstruct humanitarian assistance when it is offered, compared to those without such internal conflict. This outcome is largely attributed to the strategic incentives of the actors involved in the conflict. Furthermore, these findings demonstrate that the effects of intrastate conflicts remain consistent even after disaggregating humanitarian assistance by different donor types. This suggests that the source of foreign assistance does not influence the obstruction of humanitarian aid.

Overall, the empirical results of this paper help explain why humanitarian assistance may be obstructed in some recipient countries, it is not disrupted in others. These findings have several important implications for recipient countries and the international aid community in general and future research.

This study implies that foreign aid donors and aid workers attempting to improve socio-economic and welfare conditions in recipient countries should be forward-looking in their assessment of the risk of violent conflict as well as the potential causality and attack that aid workers may be subjected to. In other words, when deciding the kind of countries to be considered for humanitarian assistance, the aid community should take cognizance of the potential threats that are associated with sending aid resources and workers to those countries. This will provide some insights into the overall environment and climate that are available for foreign aid activities to operate.

Additionally, this study advances the extant research on the relationship between intrastate conflict and humanitarian aid by showing that not only are conflict-prone states more favorable to

be considered for humanitarian assistance, but they are also more likely to obstruct such assistance even when offered because actors in conflict situations have varieties of incentives to deter aid activities from operating.

Finally, I would like to briefly talk about my future research agenda based on this project. In the future, I intend to extend this research project by examining the effect of different types of intrastate conflict, whether territorial or government-related conflict. The effects of different types of conflict have been extensively researched on different international political economic issues, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid in general. However, there is a dearth of research that specifically investigates this with respect to humanitarian aid obstruction. I believe that this is an important area that deserves further scholarly investigation.

Appendix A

Table AI: First Stage of Internal Conflict

Estimator	Probit
Endogenous Variable	Internal Conflict
Asia Dummy	0.509***
	(0.091)
Africa Dummy	0.528***
	(0.076)
Democracy	-1.292***
	(0.168)
GDP Per Capita	0.304***
	(0.022)
Economic Growth	-0.021***
	(0.006)
Foreign Aid	0.077***
	(0.017)
Natural Resources	0.010***
	(0.003)
Constant	-3.162***
	(0.217)
Observations	2,088
Wald-test	371.25
Probability Chi-Square	0.0000
Pseudo R^2	0.1642

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Aid Workers Killed	2041	.758	3.756	0	56
Aid Workers Kidnapped	2041	.578	3.678	0	75
Total Aid Workers Wounded	2041	.729	3.483	0	53
UN Aid Workers Attacked	2041	.369	2.294	0	46
INGO Aid Workers Attacked	2041	.979	4.703	0	88
INRCS-IFRC Aid Workers Attacked	2041	.155	1.221	0	28
ICRC Aid Workers Attacked	2041	.069	.52	0	9
NNGO Aid Workers Attacked	2041	.458	3.92	0	88
Internal Conflict	2041	.29	.454	0	1
Democracy	2041	.437	.209	.014	.914
GDP Per Capita (*logged)*	2041	8.846	1.673	5.19	13.781
Economic Growth	2041	2.384	5.39	-47.9	96.956
Ethnic Fractionalization	2041	.548	.251	039	1
Foreign Aid	2041	.544	1.818	0	8.967
resources	2041	9.297	11.188	.001	66.06
Number of Internal Conflict	2041	.41	.788	0	6
Region					
Europe	2041	.101	.302	0	1
Latin America and Caribbean	2041	.178	.382	0	1
Middle East	2041	.145	.352	0	1
Africa	2041	.41	.492	0	1
Asia	2041	.166	.372	0	1



Figure 9. Trends in Aid Workers Kidnapped by Intrastate Conflict (Dummy)



Figure 10. Trends in Aid Workers Killed by Intrastate Conflict (Dummy)



Figure 11. Trends in Aid Workers Wounded by Intrastate Conflict (Wounded)

Appendix B

List of Countries Used

Afghanistan	Chad	Guyana
Algeria	Chile	Haiti
Angola	Colombia	Honduras
Argentina	Congo	India
Armenia	DR Congo	Indonesia
Azerbaijan	Dominican Republic	Iran
Bangladesh	Ecuador	Iraq
Benin	Egypt	Israel
Bolivia	El Salvador	Ivory Coast
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Eritrea	Jordan
Botswana	Ethiopia	Kenya
Burkina Faso	Fiji	Kosovo
Burundi	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan
Cambodia	Guatemala	Lao

Cameroon	Guiness	Lebanon
Central African Republic	Guinea Bissau	Lesotho
Liiberia	Palestine	Swaziland
Libya	Papua New Guinea	Syria
Madagascar	Peru	Tajikistan
Malawi	Philippines	Tanzania
Mali	Poland	Thailand
Mauritania	Russia	Tunisia
Mauritius	Rwanda	Turkey
Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Uganda
Mozambique	Senegal	Ukraine
Myanmar	Serbia	Uruguay
Namibia	Sierra Leone	Venezuela
Nepal	Somalia	Vietnam
Nicaragua	South Africa	Yemen
Niger	South Sudan	Zambia
Nigeria	Sri Lanka	Zimbabwe
Pakistan	Sudan	

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