The challenges of transnational Palestinian terrorism to the era of détente: 1970-1973
Date
2010
Authors
Swails, Nicholas Earl, author
Citino, Nathan J., advisor
Lindsay, James E., 1957-, committee member
Yasar, Gamze, committee member
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Abstract
United States Diplomatic historians have understood Henry Kissinger as the twentieth century's grandest statesmen. His realism and free reign over U.S. foreign policy during two presidential administrations was drawn from his life experiences and historical understandings of the limits of state power in the postcolonial world. He is understood to be an intellectual who drew his realist worldview from the history of nineteenth century concert of Europe and the grand statesmen of the period. His ability to draw lessons from history allowed him to achieve some of the most important foreign policy victories of the twentieth century. His realism recognized the limits of U.S. power in the Vietnam era, but he fell back on the nineteenth century model of interstate diplomacy as the way forward. However, his realist worldview drew exactly the wrong lessons from history in terms of his ability to address the new problem of Palestinian terrorism. In the postcolonial world, and the Middle East in particular, non-state actors such as the PLO and its militant factions became some of the most important elements in Cold War era diplomacy. The transnational terrorism by Palestinian nationalist organizations in the early-1970s (beginning in September of 1970 and ending in March 1973) challenged the Nixon administration's, and most importantly, Henry Kissinger's pursuit of détente in the region, which was based on détente between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Détente was sought for three reasons: in order to maintain the U.S.-Soviet balance of power in the region, to restrict Soviet influence on radical Arab governments, and to ensure important U.S.-Soviet cooperation in a peace process as outlined in "the Rogers Plan." This thesis argues that President Nixon and Kissinger's response to the terrorism proved unsuccessful because it was rooted in Kissinger's realism of interstate diplomacy and the limits of state power. Understanding how the administration did not (and could not) understand the transnational nature of Palestinian terrorism provides a window into how Kissinger's life experiences and historical knowledge shaped his realist worldview during the era of détente.