Browsing by Author "McShane, Katie, committee member"
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Item Open Access A defense of Buddhist virtue ethics(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Hamblin, Jack, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Becker, Christian, committee memberIn Chapter 1, I describe necessary dimensions of Buddhist ethics. I comment on and argue for the inclusion of the four noble truths, meditation, the four immeasurable virtues, and regulating emotion. In Chapter 2, I establish the viability of virtue ethics. I review virtue ethics from an historical perspective, look at and answer a critique of the virtues, and distinguish my version of virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology. In Chapter 3, I defend Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics. I argue that a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhism is the most reasonable of the Western interpretations, that a virtue ethical interpretation is compatible with a non-Western approach, and finally implement the necessary dimensions from the first chapter to put forward a plausible account of Buddhist virtue ethics.Item Open Access A metaphysical answer to the appropriateness question in aesthetics(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2021) LaRose, Gabriella, author; Romagni, Domenica, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Hughes, Kit, committee memberThe aim of this project is to give a new, descriptive answer to the appropriateness question in aesthetics. The appropriateness question asks how is it appropriate for ethical value to affect aesthetic value in aesthetic cases? I give a two-step argument for a metaphysical relationship between ethical content and aesthetic experience which is conditional on ethical content being aesthetically relevant and narrative being present. I argue that there is an inherence relationship between ethical content and narrative, where the former inheres in the latter. This relation holds in virtue of the mutual dependence between ethical content and narrative. I then use Noel Carroll's content approach to aesthetic experience to argue aesthetic experience supervenes on narrative content. This supervenient relationship captures the emergence of aesthetic experience while retaining the spirit of Carroll's discussion of aesthetic experience. Ultimately, I argue that because narrative is a feature of aesthetic experience and further because ethical content is a feature of narrative, there is a metaphysical relationship between ethical content and aesthetic experience. Simply, when a narrative exists (even an imagined narrative) and moral content is present, then a metaphysical relationship will exist between ethical content and aesthetic experience.Item Open Access A sophisticated logic of enhancement: a disability-sensitive, welfare-maximizing stance in philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2024) Law, David Benjamin, author; Gorin, Moti, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee memberJulain Savulescu and Guy Kahane have developed a compelling yet controversial set of arguments that provide a theoretical and action-guiding grounding for the fields of medicine and procreative ethics. In medicine, they argue that medicine should do much more than merely treat patients; instead, it should "enhance" them to enjoy the greatest possible welfare. They argue that enhancement is justified by the same moral principles that justify treating patients in a medical setting. Similarly, in procreative ethics, they contend that when pre-natal selection is available, a similar welfare-maximizing principle should inform what children we should bring into existence. They argue that the "most advantaged child" among those that could be selected ought to be selected. There is something deeply compelling about these arguments but also deeply concerning; we should, of course, want the greatest welfare for ourselves, others, and our children, but we should also worry that accomplishing these ends via medicine and procreative selection may be using inappropriate means, relay implicit prejudices, or even constitute a kind of eugenics. In this thesis, I interrogate Savulescu and Kahane's arguments for the logic of enhancement and argue that a compelling and largely cohesive view emerges that has significant implications for the philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics. The view is, however, imperfect. Several adjustments and compromises must be made to make the view fully cohesive and to accommodate the highly compelling arguments made by disability rights theorists. In suggesting these adjustments and compromises, I ultimately defend the logic of enhancement from its most potent objections and contend that it is a highly illuminating view for ethical and theoretical work in the philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics.Item Open Access Climate justice and feasibility(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2021) Hunter, Taylor, author; Shockley, Ken, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Carolan, Michael, committee memberThe primary motivation for this Thesis is to understand whether it is in fact feasible for rich countries, like the United States, to fulfill their humanitarian obligations through an international climate treaty. And if this is infeasible, why? Alongside this motivation, is a motivation to bring to light another important dimension to climate justice that is often lost within the scale and the urgency of climate change, namely the misrecognition of Indigenous peoples. My task in Chapter One is to explain how Eric Posner's and David Weisbach's employment of the political feasibility constraint of International Paretianism functions in international climate policy discourse. I work to show how climate policy outcomes solely constrained by International Paretianism will predictably violate basic humanitarian constraints. Posner and Weisbach defend a Two-Track Approach to climate policy, where the ends of justice are best achieved though policy means independent of a climate treaty. Their view entails that climate policies should not be designed with regard to constraints of justice. Rather than satisfy constraints of justice, a climate treaty need only satisfy the political feasibility constraint of International Paretianism. I work to show the policy outcomes that follow from the feasibility constraint of International Paretianism, which are morally unacceptable because they violate basic humanitarian obligations. Posner and Weisbach justify these moral costs by appealing to what is and what is not politically feasible, per International Paretianism. I will work investigate the legitimacy of this feasibility constraint in Chapter Two. My task in Chapter Two is to investigate the political legitimacy of International Paretianism. I begin by clarifying how feasibility constraints function in normative theorizing and I defend what I consider to be an appropriate function for International Paretianism. There are two general functions that feasibility constraints can serve in policy decision making. Hard feasibility constraints function to rule out policy outcomes that are in principle impossible due to invariant conditions, while soft feasibility function inform our practical deliberations about what we can do given our contingent circumstances. Soft constraints allow us to acknowledge that there are limits on what we can realistically accomplish, while also acknowledging that we can work to change these limits. In this Chapter, I will argue that we should not make the mistake of using International Paretianism as a hard constraint. I will argue that it is conceptually possible for states to act for reasons other than the common interest of their citizenry. As such, International Paretianism is a soft feasibility constraint. I conclude with an analysis of why it is that International Paretianism is a soft feasibility constraint for the United States. My task Chapter Three is to present one possible way that institutions can govern themselves towards an interdependent collective continuance, and to identify a soft feasibility constraint that is relevant to the ability of US federal agencies to integrating such institutional capacities. Indigenous people have an epistemic advantage on how to respond to climate change, and in an ameliorative way. Yet, they are not procedurally or culturally recognized for their knowledge. I consider this to be a constraint on our ability to appropriately respond to climate change. In this Chapter, I will present the way in which the Potawatomi Nation, members of the Anishinaabe Intellectual Tradition, have and continue to interdependently govern themselves toward collective continuance. I will argue that Indigenous peoples in fact have an epistemic advantage in this particular subject matter, which is due to a long history of colonially-induced ecological displacement and relocation. I will conclude by identifying and defending what I believe to be a 'soft' cultural feasibility constraint on the ability of federal agencies to work in reciprocal relations of knowledge exchange with Indigenous peoples at the procedural level of climate policy decision-making. The normative upshots of this Thesis are that (1) the citizens of the United States have a responsibility to change their government institutions such that they can be responsive to humanitarian constraints, as well as ecological limits. And (2) one way in which this responsibility may be realized is through members of the United States correcting for an identity prejudice that would preempt the United States government from instituting reciprocal relations of knowledge exchange with Indigenous people.Item Open Access Donald Davidson: meaning, triangulation, and convention(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Thompson, Jesse Arlis, author; Losonsky, Michael, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Trembath, Paul, committee memberThis thesis examines a narrow portion of Donald Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, specifically his theory of utterance meaning put forward in the essay "The Second Person". In light of certain counterexamples I first attempt to adjust Davidson's theory, guided by a comment that suggests Davidson's awareness of the problem. When no satisfactory means of amending Davidson's proposal is found, I turn to the alternative proposals rejected by Davidson in the hopes of finding motivation to continue pursuing Davidson's arguments. The second chapter is devoted to Davidson's rejection of what I call the "subjectivist" position. I contend that while Davidson provides a strong argument against subjectivism, that argument entails further complications that Davidson fails to resolve. Since an adequate rejection of a position should involve an alternative that reduces or eliminates difficulties rather than simply transforms them, I conclude that Davidson has failed to motivate his move away from subjectivism. The third chapter is a discussion of Davidson's arguments against what I call "conventionalism". Here I show that while Davidson argues convincingly against a particular role that conventions might play, he does not motivate a move away from a broader understanding of conventionalism. At best, Davidson's arguments show that the conventionalist position should be amended, but not that it should be rejected. The result is that Davidson's theory enjoys a rather deflated place among theories of utterance meaning. The alternatives, while suffering from their own defects, are no more problematic than Davidson's theory. Consequently, we ought to consider each of these theories possible solutions to the problem of utterance meaning.Item Open Access Ethical dilemmas in college campus victim advocacy(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Woods, Kathryn Scott, author; Bubar, Roe, advisor; Tungate, Sue, committee member; Opsal, Tara, committee member; Cespedes, Karina, committee member; McShane, Katie, committee memberThis dissertation examines ethical dilemmas in college campus victim advocacy. Dilemmas were identified by experts in the field of college campus victim advocacy. A Grounded Theory approach was used to identify categories of dilemmas, and interviews were conducted with experts in the field. Ultimately, dilemmas were identified that led to participants experiencing significant institutional trauma. These dilemmas related, not to working with individual survivors, but rather to working within broken systems and navigating complicated relationships with other professionals. Participants’ own and survivors’ identities were also explored, and ultimately also related back to systems and the “bad” professionals working within them. Based on these findings, implications for future research are discussed.Item Open Access Exploitation of power and the exclusion of other knowers(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2019) Hannum, Dane Shade Brusuelas, author; Shockley, Ken, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; DeMirjyn, Maricela, committee memberI argue that the relatively dominant political cultural and economic order of a given period produces, as a structural feature, relatively dominant epistemic frameworks that exclude certain methods of knowing. These methods of knowledge production are often represented by particular groups of knowers, and I argue that their exclusion is the result of the exploitation of an unjust power differential. The exclusion of particular forms of knowledge production and their representative groups is a problem with both epistemic and moral import. In my first chapter, I focus on presenting the claim that scientific inquiry and the production of knowledge is never neutral and is always embedded within a set of political and cultural conditions. I provide examples of cases in which the influence of relatively dominant groups on frameworks for knowledge has resulted in unjust exclusion of certain knowers, and modes of knowledge production. In my second chapter I focus on the connection between specific groups of knowers and specific methods of knowledge production. In particular, I focus on practice-based knowledge possessed by politically or culturally marginalized groups as forms of knowledge which have often been excluded from the dominant framework. I argue that when particular groups of knowers are excluded this is a problem with both epistemic and ethical import. In my third and final chapter, I identify the unjust exploitation of power differentials as the cause of both the epistemic and ethical issue of exclusion.Item Open Access Invasive species management: an animal ethics perspective(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Tuminello, Joseph A., author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Archibeque, Shawn, committee memberIn the scholarly literature on invasive species management, there exists a tendency to neglect the moral relevance of sentience when determining best possible management strategies regarding sentient members of invasive species. In addition, there is also a negative bias against invasive species, where such species are viewed as inherently "bad." Because of this negative bias, many wildlife managers, conservation biologists, and ecologists share the default view that invasive species are nuisances and must be gotten rid of, using the most cost-effective and efficient means possible. The neglect or omission of sentience within the literature often carries over into the implementation of invasive species management techniques, where sentient members of invasive species are often not treated as humanely as possible. In this thesis, I defend Bernard Rollin's animal ethic, where sentient beings are those capable of having interests, and which are also capable of self-valuation, which is necessary for possessing intrinsic value (on Rollin's view). Because such beings are capable of having interests which can be fulfilled or thwarted, they are objects of moral concern on this view. While I defend Rollin's view, any moral theory which considers sentience morally relevant at all will be compatible with the majority of my arguments regarding our treatment of sentient members of invasive species. If sentience is a morally relevant criterion, I argue that it continues to be so even when sentient beings are members of species which are considered to be "invasive." This claim is strongly supported by the large-scale vagueness and disagreement over terms such as "invasive," "native," and "exotic" within the literature. Because sentience is a morally relevant criterion when determining best possible management practices regarding invasive species, members of such species should be treated as humanely and in accordance with their respective telos as much as possible. Typically, this will entail prioritizing nonlethal and preventive methods of control over lethal methods. However, even when lethal control is deemed to be the best possible type of management strategy in a given situation, it should be implemented as humanely as possible. In addition to arguing for sentience as a morally relevant criterion when determining best possible management strategies regarding invasive species, I also argue that the negative bias against invasive species as inherently "bad" is ultimately unfounded. I support this claim by providing evidence of a variety of potential negative, positive, and neutral aspects of invasive species. Because invasive species are not inherently "bad" or "good," I argue that our attitudes toward and management of members of such species should be developed on a case-by-case basis. It is also important that the assessment of invasive species on a case-by-case basis be combined with the moral relevance of sentience. The bias against invasive species may serve to perpetuate the omission of sentience as a morally relevant criterion of invasive species management. The omission of sentience may also perpetuate the negative bias against invasive species. Understanding the moral relevance of sentience may help to diminish the negative bias against invasive species, and vice versa. After considering and responding to several objections to my arguments, I provide an overview of different sorts of lethal, nonlethal, and preventive methods of invasive species management, and discuss how each of these can be implemented in a more humane fashion, in order to present ways in which my arguments and view can be successfully applied in a variety of real-world scenarios.Item Open Access Proliferative etiological functions in biological systems(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Davis, John, author; Kasser, Jeff, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Callahan, Gerald, committee memberThis work will examine functional conceptions in biology, and argue that problems arise when etiological accounts of function are applied to traits contained within a biological system. In the first chapter, prominent analyses of functional language will be examined, with a special interest paid to etiological analyses of biological functions. The second chapter will pose a problem for these etiological analyses that arises out of an aspect of functional traits in biological contexts: functional traits are often nested within containing systems, and etiological analyses of function seem to ascribe the functions of the parts of systems to those systems themselves. There is thus a proliferation of functions at a systemic level as the functions of the components contained within a system are ascribed to the systems that contain them. Furthermore, this proliferation seems to ascribe contradictory functions to systems, and makes more confusing the distinction between the “functions in” a system and the “functions of” a system. The final chapter will examine three possible solutions to this problem: one solution will attempt to prevent the ascription of functions to systems by carefully interpreting what it means to “cause” a system, one will attempt to ground functions in actual influences entities have on their own replication and proliferation, and the final one will reframe the etiological analyses of functions as a specific sort of explanatory project in line with dispositional analyses.Item Open Access Respect for patient autonomy in veterinary medicine: a relational approach(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2017) Reyes-Illg, Gwendolen, author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Callahan, Gerald, committee memberThis thesis considers the prospects for including respect for patient autonomy as a value in veterinary medical ethics. Chapter One considers why philosophers have traditionally denied autonomy to animals and why this is problematic; I also present contemporary accounts of animal ethics that recognize animals' capacity for and exercise of autonomy (or something similar, such as agency) as morally important. In Chapter Two, I review veterinary medical ethics today, finding that respect for patient autonomy is undiscussed or rejected outright as irrelevant. Extrapolating mainstream medical ethics' account of autonomy to veterinary medicine upholds this conclusion, as it would count all patients as "never-competent" and consider determining their autonomous choices impossible; thus welfare alone would be relevant. Chapter Three begins, in Part I, by describing the ways we routinely override patient autonomy in veterinary practice, both in terms of which interventions are selected and how care is delivered. I also show that some trends in the field suggest a nascent, implicit respect for patient autonomy. Part II of Chapter Three presents feminist criticisms of the mainstream approach to patient autonomy. I argue that the relational approach to autonomy advocated by such critics can be meaningfully applied in the veterinary realm. I advance an approach that conceives respect for patient autonomy in diachronic and dialogic terms, taking the patient as the foremost locus of respect. In Chapter Four, I turn to issues of practical implementation, such as interpreting what constitutes an animal's values and concerns, and assessing the effect of positive reinforcement training on autonomy. The Conclusion offers areas for future research while refuting the objection that a simpler, expanded welfare-based approach would yield the same substantive recommendations as my account.Item Open Access The phenomenological self: owner and agent, through thick and thin(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2014) Lenzo, Edward Anthony, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Davalos, Deana, committee memberThe central work of this thesis is to compare and contrast two phenomenological notions of self: the minimal self, a Husserlian notion articulated by Dan Zahavi, and SESMET, as developed by Galen Strawson. The minimal self conception takes the self to be a kind of diachronically unified owner of experience and agent of action, but takes unification and ownership to entail more than may be justified. Strawson neglects to construe diachronicity appropriately, misconstruing the phenomenological nature of the stream and rejecting agency in toto, but covertly reintroduces agency in a metaphysical guise. Neither conception is an appropriate notion of self, but I propose a "hybrid" account that incorporates appropriately nuanced views of persistence and agency. I conclude by suggesting potential problems for this view, while highlighting its applications. In Chapter 1 I explicate and critique Strawson's SESMET, detailing its insights into the investigation of self and developing concerns with the account. In Chapter 2 I analyze Edmund Husserl's account of internal time-consciousness, which serves as the foundation of Zahavi's minimal self. In Chapter 3 I link this Husserlian framework to the basic sense of self (the feeling of being a self), proceeding by philosophical and psychopathological considerations, clearly define the minimal self, compare it to SESMET, and argue that these notions are prima facie equally legitimate. In Chapter 4 I contrast these notions, focusing on issues raised throughout and the resolutions available for each "self". I reject both notions, but use their respective strengths and weaknesses to propose a promising hybrid view. I then suggest possible faults of this view.Item Restricted The tender organs(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) Janecek, Carolyn Eugenia, author; Dungy, Camille T., advisor; Cooperman, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee memberThe Tender Organs is an ecopoetic coming-of-age narrative that explores embodiment and inheritance. Taking on hybrid forms, these poems reach beyond the binaries of male and female, human and animal, history and present, visibility and invisibility. Each section situates itself in a different time of the speaker's life: grappling with puberty and cultural miscommunication as a dual citizen; grieving one's friend and mentor; investigating the medicalizing, patriarchal gaze of U.S. healthcare; and finally, exploring the possibilities of rapture and relationships outside of the societal binaries.Item Open Access Valuing water: a normative analysis of prior appropriation(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2014) Elbot, Morgan Bradfield, author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Rollin, Bernard, committee member; McShane, Katie, committee member; Callahan, Gerald, committee memberThis thesis aims to provide a normative evaluation of the Western U.S. water law of prior appropriation through a contextual analysis of water value pluralism. The first chapter begins with a preliminary account of the major justificatory arguments made in defense of prior appropriation, followed by two critiques that undermine some proposed advantages of the water policy. The purpose of this analysis is to elucidate the normative claims that underlie many of the arguments within this debate but which fail to be made explicit. It becomes clear that these normative claims assume a utilitarian criterion for resource distribution, according to which water is primarily viewed as an economic good with a monetary value. The second chapter challenges the legitimacy of this assumption by introducing non-monetary water values, with attention to the particular social and cultural contexts in which they emerge. Through a review of four economic proxies, these non-monetary water values are shown to be incommensurable with monetary valuations. Finally, the third chapter offers a theoretical framework for the incorporation of non-monetary water values into resource distribution decisions. From this normative analysis, it is concluded that a necessary condition for achieving just resource distribution decisions is for prior appropriation to incorporate value pluralism by recognizing the legitimacy of non-monetary water values.