Browsing by Author "Losonsky, Michael, committee member"

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Open Access
Informing rational choice theory through case studies of loss-aversion
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2011) Rakowski, Peter, author; Sarenac, Darko, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Kroll, Stephan, committee member
The problem this thesis addresses is that there are two disparate general notions of a 'rational decision' and neither notion is satisfactory as the basis for a rational choice theory that can improve our lives by improving our decision-making. One is too strict, labeling too many decisions irrational, while the other is too permissive, allowing decisions to be called rational when they should not be. I attempt to outline a better version of rationality, which I call global rationality, by examining the problems with the common notions in the context of a discussion of the well-documented phenomenon of loss-aversion in decision-making. While looking at case studies of loss-aversion, I argue for two main distinguishing features of my global rationality: it should respect an internalist view so that the rigid requirements of the standard rational choice theory will often not apply (while maintaining limits regarding which consistency requirements can be disregarded), and it should respect emotional utilities--the negative or positive emotions that accompany a decision should factor into the utility calculus (with important qualifications). I conclude with suggestions as to how the skeletal global rationality I've outlined can be filled-out in the future, in the process also offering some insights into the dynamic nature of rationality itself.
Open Access
Moral error theory
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Gustafson, Matt, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Chong, Edwin, committee member
J.L. Mackie historically has been considered the primary defender of moral error theory. The position he defends is one of many metaethical positions an individual might hold. Moral error theory’s central thesis is that all moral claims are false or neither true nor false because of moral discourse’s commitment to some problematic thesis. Moral error theory has not always been taken seriously however. Many have responded to Mackie’s moral error theory, but they often do so in a cursory manner. Moral error theory would seem to be a historical curiosity, but not a position often adopted. In modern presentations and critiques of moral error theory the discussion often seems to be one-sided. The error theorist does not always consider the weaknesses of what he considers the best presentation of his position, and the critic does not always fully appreciate the appeal of, or fully engage with the strongest presentations of moral error theory. Often error theorists and critics of moral error theory recognize that moral error theory could be developed in a variety of manners, but limit their discussions to moral error theories which closely relate to Mackie’s original presentation of moral error theory. By developing an understanding of Mackie’s original position and new variations on his position we can see what motivates individuals to develop error theories related in some manner to Mackie’s error theory. We can also see the limits of moral error theories which build off Mackie’s error theory however. In particular, I will examine the moral error theory of Jonas Olson. Olson identifies moral discourse’s commitment to irreducible normativity as especially problematic. Identifying the limits and difficulties which plague error theories such as Olson’s should lead us to consider other manners in which one can develop moral error theories. In the end, I propose that one might be able to establish something like a moral error theory by arguing that moral beliefs are unjustified. Moral beliefs, it will be argued, are unjustified because they ultimately issue from an evolutionary source which is unreliable. Because those beliefs are unjustified, I claim that we are in error if we continue to hold those beliefs. While such a position has often been called moral skepticism, I argue that it can be seen as a sort of moral error theory.
Open Access
Morality and reasons to act
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Gavronsky, Joseph, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Martin, Kelly, committee member
The main goal of this thesis is to shed some light on the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act, through a defense of rational egoism. Rational egoism holds that an agent's reasons to act are grounded by his self-interest, which is conceived as something different from, and not relativized to, his desires. In other words, for a rational egoist, an agent is rational if he does what is, in fact, good for him. I develop a version of rational egoism, and then argue that my version of rational egoism is at least as viable as, if not preferable to, other theories about the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. I claim that rational egoism provides a uniquely compelling account of the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. The rational egoism that I endorse treads a sort of theoretical middle ground between its most compelling competitor theories, capturing their theoretical merits and yet avoiding the problems that they are vulnerable to. One of rational egoism's most compelling competitor theories holds that it is morality itself that necessarily provides agents with reasons to act. This theory, known as intrinsic moral rationalism, and advanced by Russ Shafer-Landau, is most compelling for its compatibility with moral convention, but is troubled in that it seems to confer upon morality a mysterious force that allows it to impose upon agents. I will argue that my rational egoism is also compatible with moral convention, and yet not mysterious in the troubling way that intrinsic moral rationalism is. The other of rational egoism's most compelling competitor theories, which I refer to as the desire-satisfaction view, holds that it is an agent's desires, in some sense, that necessarily provide agents with reasons to act. In its most basic form, the desire-satisfaction view holds that it is an agent's actual desires that necessarily provide him with reasons to act. More sophisticated versions of the desire-satisfaction view, like Bernard Williams' view, for example, hold that an agent's desires, qualified in some way, necessarily provide him with reasons to act. The desire satisfaction view, in general, is most compelling for the prominence it gives desires, yet troubled by its commitment to the proposition that even an agent's desires for things that are cruel, self-destructive, or meaningless, nonetheless provide the agent with reasons to act. And although Williams' view and other sophisticated versions of the desire-satisfaction view may be able to get out of this commitment, it would take too much unmotivated theoretical machinery for them to do so. I will argue that my rational egoism also gives due regard to desires, yet avoids the troubling commitment of the desire-satisfaction view, and does so without appeal to any unmotivated theoretical machinery. My rational egoism is not, itself, necessarily committed to one particular view regarding the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. However, I strongly suspect that if rational egoism is true, then there is always, or almost always, a reason to do the moral thing. On one normative moral theory, namely moral egoism, morality just requires agents to do that which is in their self-interest. If moral egoism is true, and there are indeed grounds for believing that it is, and rational egoism is true, then there will always be a reason to do the moral thing. But even if moral egoism is not true, I argue that there are solid grounds for believing that morality usually indicates that agents should do that which is in their self-interest. In this case, if rational egoism is true, there will usually be a reason to do the moral thing.
Open Access
Saving the Equal Weight View from itself: a modest approach to strong conciliation
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2013) Lamb, Matthew, author; Kasser, Jeffrey, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; MacDonald, Bradley, committee member; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member
The central question of the epistemology disagreement focuses on how, if at all, we should update our belief about p when we find ourselves party to a disagreement about p with someone whom we take to be our epistemic peer. In other words, how should we respond to disagreements with those whom we take to be just as intelligent, informed, free from bias, and likely to get things right in the field p occurs in? One response to this question, the Equal Weight View, holds that in typical cases of peer disagreements one is epistemically required to ascribe equal epistemic weight to each party's opinion and then split the difference between the two parties' respective degrees of belief. However, it is thought that the Equal Weight View faces a problem of being self-defeating, since there appear to be disagreements about the view amongst epistemic peers. Some proponents of the view have attempted to defuse this charge of self-defeat, but, as I will show, these attempts are less than satisfying. The aim of this project is to discuss the Equal Weight View's relation to the charge of self-defeat in hopes of sketching out a solution that is more promising than what has been put forth in the literature so far.
Open Access
The self, subjectivity, and impetus for Latino self-transformation in the writings of Kierkegaard
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2010) Alvarez, Daniel Isaac, author; Kneller, Jane, 1954-, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Valdez, Norberto, 1947-, committee member
The following thesis will explore the relationship between the conceptions of the self and subjectivity in writings of 19th century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Kierkegaard's conception of the self will take Sickness Unto Death (1849) as the focal point, while Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity will be explored in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). First, I will discuss three aspects of Kierkegaard's dialectical self: the irresolute self, the resolute self, and the religious dependent self. Second, after these aspects of the self are discussed, I turn my attention to Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity. The discussion on subjectivity will explore four perspectives of subjectivity: objective and subjective thinking, subjectivity and indirect communication, subjectivity as inwardness, existence, and passion, and lastly subjectivity and truth. Third, I discuss David T. Abalos' theory of transformation in The Latino Male: A Radical Redefinition (2002). My discussion of Abalos' theory of transformation will focus on the Three Acts of the Core Drama of Life in its application to Latino male self-transformation. My aim is to take Kierkegaard's remarks on the self and subjectivity and apply them to Abalos' theory of Latino male self-transformation. I attempt to demonstrate that Kierkegaard's remarks on these issues can inform and aid in the conversation of the contemporary problem of Latino male self-transformation. Thus, I argue that Kierkegaard's remarks on the self and subjectivity are not only invaluable to this contemporary problem, but can provide impetus for Latino male self-transformation.
Open Access
Virtual morality: the moral status of virtual actions
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Wojak, Roland, author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Volbrecht, Vicki, committee member
In this thesis, I examine virtual actions and the relationship between them and morality. Increasingly, people are using computer generated virtual mediums for relaxation, work, and socialization. Virtual worlds are one form that virtual mediums can take and are becoming more popular than ever before. These worlds are often characterized by an increased sense of freedom, where people can do things that they could not or would not do in the real world. The problem is that as more people interact within virtual worlds, these interactions are often characterized by negative or harmful behavior in one form or another, and while most people recognize this as a problem, it is unclear whether or not virtual actions can even be classified as morally wrong. I argue that virtual actions are the proper subjects of moral consideration and that, in some cases, they are morally wrong. In order to achieve this, I rely heavily on empirical findings from psychology and from several philosophical theories concerning consciousness and the nature of the self in relation to virtual worlds. By making clear how closely people are connected to the virtual world and showing the real world consequences that are a direct result from virtual actions, I hope to show that virtual actions can and should be morally judged in the same way that actions in the real world are judged.
Open Access
Williams on external reasons
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2010) Viney, Marcus Wayne, author; Tropman, Beth, advisor; Rhodes, Matthew, committee member; Losonsky, Michael, committee member
Bernard Williams has argued for the controversial thesis that there are no external reasons for action. External reasons are desire-independent reasons for action, i.e. reasons whose existence does not depend on the desires of an agent. The thrust of Williams' argument is that an agent's reasons for action must always depend on his or her desires. The overall purpose of this thesis is to clarify and critically examine Williams' argument against external reasons. In chapter 1 I formalize and explain Williams' argument step-by-step. In addition to this I confront one prominent objection to the argument's validity, which alleges that it contains an equivocation on the term "reason." I argue that this objection fails and that Williams' argument is valid. In chapter 2 I turn to the soundness of Williams' argument and examine the truth of the premises one by one. In doing this I attempt to uncover important assumptions that underlie Williams' reasoning. I confront several objections to the premises, but I argue that none of them succeed in blocking Williams' conclusion. In the final chapter I consider the wider issues facing Williams' argument. First I confront three objections which allege that Williams' conclusion has certain unacceptable consequences. I draw from Williams' work to exonerate his argument on all three counts. Second I discuss two ways the critic might grant the soundness of Williams' argument, but neutralize the impact of his conclusion. While I defend Williams' argument on nearly every point, my primary aim is not to offer a definitive case for the argument. Rather my aim is simply to show that Williams' argument is stronger than some critics might suppose and that it is worthy of further consideration.