Saving the Equal Weight View from itself: a modest approach to strong conciliation
Date
2013
Authors
Lamb, Matthew, author
Kasser, Jeffrey, advisor
Losonsky, Michael, committee member
MacDonald, Bradley, committee member
Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member
Journal Title
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Volume Title
Abstract
The central question of the epistemology disagreement focuses on how, if at all, we should update our belief about p when we find ourselves party to a disagreement about p with someone whom we take to be our epistemic peer. In other words, how should we respond to disagreements with those whom we take to be just as intelligent, informed, free from bias, and likely to get things right in the field p occurs in? One response to this question, the Equal Weight View, holds that in typical cases of peer disagreements one is epistemically required to ascribe equal epistemic weight to each party's opinion and then split the difference between the two parties' respective degrees of belief. However, it is thought that the Equal Weight View faces a problem of being self-defeating, since there appear to be disagreements about the view amongst epistemic peers. Some proponents of the view have attempted to defuse this charge of self-defeat, but, as I will show, these attempts are less than satisfying. The aim of this project is to discuss the Equal Weight View's relation to the charge of self-defeat in hopes of sketching out a solution that is more promising than what has been put forth in the literature so far.
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Subject
disagreement
epistemology
equal weight view
self-defeat