The Impacts of AI Art on Aesthetic Value

Abstract

Defining art has been an ever-evolving challenge within the philosophy of art literature. When a definition seems to be adequate, a new artform arises and that definition becomes deficient. As a result, the philosophy of art seems unable to keep up with the art world and its developments. Nevertheless, there is an allure to determining what it is that makes something art that continues to propel the project further. What we minimally appear to agree on is that art is an artifact that was intentionally made or transformed by a human. Furthermore, we can see through examining history, there has been some minimal continuity. In other words, the intentional, skillful aspect of art has persisted through radical changes in style and medium. Ultimately, I will not commit myself to any particular ontological theory. Rather, I will shift the focus to aesthetic values, arguing that AI art changes what we think is valuable about art but does not change what is valuable about art. More specifically, allowing AI to be art would change what we judge to be valuable about art, such that these judgements would likely then be less correct, insofar as we would often miss and fail to appropriately respond to one or more of the three values I argue art in fact has. In chapter one, I will outline a number of ways in which individuals have attempted to define art. Furthermore, I will show problems that each theory faces. Following this, I will assert that, to address AI art, what we ought to look at is aesthetic value. Aesthetic value is able to point us towards what is valuable about art and what it is that we value about art. Building on this, chapter two will focus on three values in particular: the value of the artistic process, the artist, and the art object. I will examine each of these and argue that AI art denigrates how we regard these values– the values themselves are not denigrated, but rather how we value them. Additionally, in this chapter, I will discuss aesthetic judgements. Specifically, I explore what it is that occurs when we make aesthetic judgments about art; moreover, I argue that there are judgements that are better than others. That is, aesthetic judgements are not purely subjective. Lastly, in chapter three, I address three potential objections to my argument. First, my conception of art is too stringent. Similarly, my conception of value is too stringent. And finally, I express an uncharitable attitude towards the human artist in the case of AI art. Ultimately, I will both show how these objections do not negate my argument and that AI art is something that we should consider as a threat to how we regard art’s aesthetic value.