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On designing large, secure and resilient networked systems

dc.contributor.authorMulamba Kadimbadimba, Dieudonné, author
dc.contributor.authorRay, Indrajit, advisor
dc.contributor.authorRay, Indrakshi, committee member
dc.contributor.authorMcConnell, Ross, committee member
dc.contributor.authorVijayasarathy, Leo, committee member
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-10T14:35:47Z
dc.date.available2019-09-10T14:35:47Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractDefending large networked systems against rapidly evolving cyber attacks is challenging. This is because of several factors. First, cyber defenders are always fighting an asymmetric warfare: While the attacker needs to find just a single security vulnerability that is unprotected to launch an attack, the defender needs to identify and protect against all possible avenues of attacks to the system. Various types of cost factors, such as, but not limited to, costs related to identifying and installing defenses, costs related to security management, costs related to manpower training and development, costs related to system availability, etc., make this asymmetric warfare even challenging. Second, newer and newer cyber threats are always emerging - the so called zero-day attacks. It is not possible for a cyber defender to defend against an attack for which defenses are yet unknown. In this work, we investigate the problem of designing large and complex networks that are secure and resilient. There are two specific aspects of the problem that we look into. First is the problem of detecting anomalous activities in the network. While this problem has been variously investigated, we address the problem differently. We posit that anomalous activities are the result of mal-actors interacting with non mal-actors, and such anomalous activities are reflected in changes to the topological structure (in a mathematical sense) of the network. We formulate this problem as that of Sybil detection in networks. For our experimentation and hypothesis testing we instantiate the problem as that of Sybil detection in on-line social networks (OSNs). Sybil attacks involve one or more attackers creating and introducing several mal-actors (fake identities in on-line social networks), called Sybils, into a complex network. Depending on the nature of the network system, the goal of the mal-actors can be to unlawfully access data, to forge another user's identity and activity, or to influence and disrupt the normal behavior of the system. The second aspect that we look into is that of building resiliency in a large network that consists of several machines that collectively provide a single service to the outside world. Such networks are particularly vulnerable to Sybil attacks. While our Sybil detection algorithms achieve very high levels of accuracy, they cannot guarantee that all Sybils will be detected. Thus, to protect against such "residual" Sybils (that is, those that remain potentially undetected and continue to attack the network services), we propose a novel Moving Target Defense (MTD) paradigm to build resilient networks. The core idea is that for large enterprise level networks, the survivability of the network's mission is more important than the security of one or more of the servers. We develop protocols to re-locate services from server to server in a random way such that before an attacker has an opportunity to target a specific server and disrupt it’s services, the services will migrate to another non-malicious server. The continuity of the service of the large network is thus sustained. We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed protocols using theoretical analysis, simulations, and experimentation. For the Sybil detection problem we use both synthetic and real-world data sets. We evaluate the algorithms for accuracy of Sybil detection. For the moving target defense protocols we implement a proof-of-concept in the context of access control as a service, and run several large scale simulations. The proof-of- concept demonstrates the effectiveness of the MTD paradigm. We evaluate the computation and communication complexity of the protocols as we scale up to larger and larger networks.
dc.format.mediumborn digital
dc.format.mediumdoctoral dissertations
dc.identifierMulambaKadimbadimba_colostate_0053A_15544.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10217/197321
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherColorado State University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartof2000-2019
dc.rightsCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.
dc.subjectmoving target defense
dc.subjectsecure networks
dc.subjectSybil detection
dc.subjectonline social network
dc.subjectcomplex networks
dc.subjectsocial network analysis
dc.titleOn designing large, secure and resilient networked systems
dc.typeText
dcterms.rights.dplaThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights (https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/). You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).
thesis.degree.disciplineComputer Science
thesis.degree.grantorColorado State University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

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