The phenomenological self: owner and agent, through thick and thin

dc.contributor.authorLenzo, Edward Anthony, author
dc.contributor.authorMacKenzie, Matthew, advisor
dc.contributor.authorMcShane, Katie, committee member
dc.contributor.authorDavalos, Deana, committee member
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-03T06:39:35Z
dc.date.available2007-01-03T06:39:35Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description2014 Summer.
dc.description.abstractThe central work of this thesis is to compare and contrast two phenomenological notions of self: the minimal self, a Husserlian notion articulated by Dan Zahavi, and SESMET, as developed by Galen Strawson. The minimal self conception takes the self to be a kind of diachronically unified owner of experience and agent of action, but takes unification and ownership to entail more than may be justified. Strawson neglects to construe diachronicity appropriately, misconstruing the phenomenological nature of the stream and rejecting agency in toto, but covertly reintroduces agency in a metaphysical guise. Neither conception is an appropriate notion of self, but I propose a "hybrid" account that incorporates appropriately nuanced views of persistence and agency. I conclude by suggesting potential problems for this view, while highlighting its applications. In Chapter 1 I explicate and critique Strawson's SESMET, detailing its insights into the investigation of self and developing concerns with the account. In Chapter 2 I analyze Edmund Husserl's account of internal time-consciousness, which serves as the foundation of Zahavi's minimal self. In Chapter 3 I link this Husserlian framework to the basic sense of self (the feeling of being a self), proceeding by philosophical and psychopathological considerations, clearly define the minimal self, compare it to SESMET, and argue that these notions are prima facie equally legitimate. In Chapter 4 I contrast these notions, focusing on issues raised throughout and the resolutions available for each "self". I reject both notions, but use their respective strengths and weaknesses to propose a promising hybrid view. I then suggest possible faults of this view.
dc.format.mediumborn digital
dc.format.mediummasters theses
dc.identifierLenzo_colostate_0053N_12500.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10217/83986
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherColorado State University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartof2000-2019
dc.rightsCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.
dc.subjectHusserl
dc.subjectmetaphysics
dc.subjectphenomenology
dc.subjectphilosophy of mind
dc.subjectphilosophy of psychopathology
dc.subjectself
dc.titleThe phenomenological self: owner and agent, through thick and thin
dc.typeText
dcterms.rights.dplaThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights (https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/). You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorColorado State University
thesis.degree.levelMasters
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Arts (M.A.)
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Lenzo_colostate_0053N_12500.pdf
Size:
730.98 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description: