Mind and world in Kant's Theory of Sensation
Date
2015
Authors
Murski, Jessica, author
Kneller, Jane, advisor
MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member
Clegg, Benjamin, committee member
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Abstract
In examining sensation as Kant presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and understanding the problems exemplified in the debate which has arisen surrounding this topic, it becomes clear that Kant believed the objective world to be a product of the mind. This discussion of sensation follows three main themes: (i) the nature of sensation, (ii) the form of sensation and its contribution in determining the spatial properties of objects and (iii) the role of sensation in achieving object-directed cognition. In the first chapter I will present Kant’s view on sensation as it relates to each of these themes. In the second chapter, I will explore the conflict that seems to arise between the nature of sensation and its form and function in the cognitive process. I examine three proposed solutions to this conflict as they are presented by Rolf George, Lorne Falkenstein, and Apaar Kumar. George presents a constructivist account of sensation, while Falkenstein argues that sensations must be physical events in the body of the perceiver. Kumar provides clear evidence from Kant’s writing that Falkenstein’s position is unavailable to Kant and instead proposes a non-constructivist view of sensation. Understanding these concerns helps to highlight a different requirement of sensation in Kant’s cognitive theory. Finally, in the third chapter I provide evidence that Kant took the spatial form of the objective world to be a product of the human mind rather than something that exists “in itself.” This perspective shows why each of the concerns presented in chapter two are important. However, they arise because of the fundamental misunderstanding that Kant took the spatial properties of the external world to exist in its own right, before or aside from human consciousness. I will show how a correct understanding of the relationship between the mind and the external world in Kant’s theory can resolve the conflicts that seem to arise in his theory of sensation.
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Subject
Kant
perception
spatial properties
object
cognition
sensation