The Power of Scientia Intuitiva and the Intellectual Love of God over Akrasia

Abstract

In this thesis, I consider the role of Spinoza’s third kind of cognition, scientia intuitiva and its corresponding affective state, the intellectual love of God, in combating the passions, and more specifically, preventing akrasia. For Spinoza, human servitude consists in one’s vulnerability to experience passions, or ideas and its affective states that are caused by external bodies and force one to undergo things. Despite the attention that the relationship between reason, the passions, and akrasia has received in contemporary scholarship, only relatively recently has more attention been directed towards scientia intuitiva and the passions. I argue that investigating scientia intuitiva and its respective affective state is fundamental, not only in understanding how scientia intuitiva is more powerful than reason and not susceptible to akrasia, but also in understanding the project of the Ethics as a whole; that is, to understand human freedom, blessedness, and human perfection. In chapter one, I explain some of Spinoza’s metaphysical, ontological, epistemic, and ethical commitments. In particular, I discuss Spinoza’s view on substance, God, and modes. I then discuss his axiology, where I argue adequate modal cognition perceives the vertical causal chain, or the ontological relationship modes share with substance and God. Then I discuss Spinoza’s notion of affectivity, particularly the relationship between one’s ideas, both adequate and inadequate, correspond to actions and passions, and the three kinds of cognition; imagination, reason, and scientia intuitiva. The final part of chapter one centers on Spinoza’s unique view of akrasia. In chapter two, I begin by raising some motivation for interpreting scientia intuitiva as not susceptible to akrasia. I then consider a competing interpretation, which becomes my target of ii refutation. After discussing Spinoza’s cartesian influences, I spend the rest of the chapter arguing that scientia intuitiva is not susceptible to akrasia, whereas reason, the second kind of cognition, is. My argument, in contrast to literature which suggests the content of scientia intuitiva is essential yet somehow different than reason, holds that the immediacy of scientia intuitiva is crucial to understanding its power. It is in this immediacy’s conjunction with its content that scientia intuitiva is to be caused by God or substance, and thereby gains an infinite power over the passions, and thereby is not susceptible to akrasia. In the final chapter, I consider some objections to my argument. I also discuss the epistemic feasibility of scientia intuitiva; it turns out that, under my view, scientia intuitiva is much more attainable than other commentators have suggested.