Of mice and Kant: re-examining moral considerability to non-human animals on Kant's cognitive grounds
| dc.contributor.author | Easley, William Eric, author | |
| dc.contributor.author | Rollin, Bernard E., advisor | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kneller, Jane, committee member | |
| dc.contributor.author | Volbrecht, Vicki J., committee member | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-01-03T06:37:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-01-03T06:37:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis, I examine Kant's criterion for moral considerability in light of the intersection between the moral, critical, and epistemic principles Kant commits himself to and evidence of advanced cognitive capacities in non-human animals. As I argue, Kant's denial of crucial cognitive capacities in non-human animals represents a flawed attempt at applying a principle of parsimony which threatens to undermine the transcendental base of his theories. Further, expelling the anachronisms and human exceptionalism Kant fell victim to in his theories reveals a robust sense of ethical duties directly to non-human animals, beyond non-cruelty. In Chapter One, I argue that the basis of moral considerability in Kant's ethics ought to extend directly to non-human animals if they possess sufficient degrees of the three cognitive capacities that comprise dignity and the ability to meaningfully set ends: reason, autonomy, and self-consciousness. In Chapter Two, I examine Kant's cognitive theory and argue that it lacks a developmental account in terms of degrees of these capacities that is crucial to completing Kant's ethical project. In Chapters Three and Four, I develop a model for such an account based upon evidence and theories in the philosophy of mind and the sciences, concluding that many non-human animals do possess advanced cognitive capacities and the we, thus, have moral duties directly to most non-human animals. | |
| dc.format.medium | born digital | |
| dc.format.medium | masters theses | |
| dc.identifier | Easley_colostate_0053N_12487.pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10217/83893 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Colorado State University. Libraries | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | 2000-2019 | |
| dc.rights | Copyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright. | |
| dc.subject | cognition | |
| dc.subject | animal cognition | |
| dc.subject | animals | |
| dc.subject | ethics | |
| dc.subject | Kant | |
| dc.subject | self-consciousness | |
| dc.title | Of mice and Kant: re-examining moral considerability to non-human animals on Kant's cognitive grounds | |
| dc.type | Text | |
| dcterms.rights.dpla | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights (https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/). You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Colorado State University | |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (M.A.) |
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