Emergent groups and disaster subculture: a university's response to the July 28, 1997 flood

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to determine what factors aided or hindered Colorado State University's (CSU) attempts to stabilize and restore the campus to a more normal state. Bureaucratic organizations may adapt to community emergencies in one of three ways: 1) with their normal structure, 2) planned modification of their structure, or 3) unplanned modification of their structure. Communities that are frequently impacted by natural disasters often develop planned modification of their normal structure to deal with emergencies. These organizations have developed a disaster subculture. Sometimes, however, communities and their organizations need to find a new modified structure that adequately prepares them to cope with a natural disaster. They must develop a completely new structure and pattern of operations to address the new demands. A new task and decision-making structure emerges out of the previous formal structure. Decision-making responsibilities are reallocated and new task groups emerge within the organization. Although the University had a few rudiments of a disaster subculture, it was not sufficiently developed to adequately address the demands placed on it by the flood. It did not have a very realistic perception of the threat from a flood of this magnitude. Nor did it have an organizational memory of previous flooding. CSU's existing formal structure was totally inadequate to cope with the increased demands. It did not have disaster plans that could be made operational. The University de-bureaucratized. In the void, new relationships and groups emerged within the organization. Lack of adequate coordination of activities and communications were major problems in the recovery stage of this flood.