A defense of emotions in evolutionary epistemology
| dc.contributor.author | Van, Minh-Tu, author | |
| dc.contributor.author | Rice, Collin, advisor | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member | |
| dc.contributor.author | Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-28T10:27:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-08-28T10:27:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Current literature in evolutionary epistemology places a kind of epistemic 'rationality', guided by evolution, as the primary consideration or rationale that directs whether and how we acquire knowledge. Foundational works by the likes of Donald Campbell, Konrad Lorenz, and Sir Karl Popper paved the grounds of evolutionary epistemology by prioritizing natural selection's role within theories of knowledge. By recognizing and understanding the significance of humans' niche within the biological world, it better informs us of the aims of evolutionary epistemology. My thesis aims to incorporate emotions in the understanding and development of evolutionary epistemology. My arguments stem from the idea that emotions are an innate and biological response that have an epistemically significant evolutionary history while also concurrently conferring epistemic advantages. With much of the current discussion focused on evolutionary 'rationality' sans emotion, there is much left to be desired in evolutionary epistemology: I believe evolutionary epistemology is missing an evaluation and incorporation of our emotional systems that shape and influence epistemic aims. While evolutionary epistemologists allude to emotions' significance and relevance through other causal mechanisms, there is little discussion of how emotions explicitly affect and interact with our epistemic processes. The overall aim of my thesis is to stress the epistemic contribution that emotions would have to the current developments within evolutionary epistemology and its fittingness within the scope of evolutionary epistemology's aims as currently construed. I first summarize evolutionary epistemology using the works of Campbell, Lorenz, and Popper and explicate what evolutionary 'rationality' entails. Then, I explore some epistemic roles emotions play within important features extrapolated from an evolutionary 'rationality': epistemic fallibility and epistemic creativity. I argue that evolutionary epistemology benefits from an investigation and application of emotions to these features because their role reinforces the same aims that evolutionary epistemology strive to achieve. To wrap things up, I lay out implications and future directions of accepting my defense. I ultimately contend that a more serious consideration of emotions within evolutionary epistemology would only elucidate a fuller comprehension of our naturalized knowledge; not only will we learn more about what human knowledge is construed as, but we will also learn more about how the construction of knowledge, for and by evolved humans, ought to be produced. | |
| dc.format.medium | born digital | |
| dc.format.medium | masters theses | |
| dc.identifier | Van_colostate_0053N_17848.pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10217/236796 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Colorado State University. Libraries | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | 2020- | |
| dc.rights | Copyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright. | |
| dc.subject | epistemology | |
| dc.subject | evolutionary epistemology | |
| dc.subject | evolutionary | |
| dc.subject | emotions | |
| dc.title | A defense of emotions in evolutionary epistemology | |
| dc.type | Text | |
| dcterms.rights.dpla | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights (https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/). You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Colorado State University | |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (M.A.) |
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