A Kantian Intuitionism: Integrating Kantian Moral Philosophy into an Intuitionist Framework

Abstract

In this thesis, I claim that Rossian intuitionism and Kantian moral philosophy are notonly compatible, but complementary. Intuitionism, as I understand it, is the view that it is possible to know some moral truths non-inferentially; these moral truths are accessed without explicit or implicit inference from premises. Rossian intuitionism, a brand of intuitionism inspired by the views of W. D. Ross, is also committed to an irreducible plurality of self-evident moral duties. On the other hand, a core component of Kantian moral philosophy is that all moral duties center around a single moral principle: the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has various formulations, but I focus on the Formula of Humanity. Taken at face value, intuitionism and Kantianism seem to be at odds with one another. I will address what I take to be the two primary tensions between these views in Chapter 1. First, one might worry that Kantian monism—the commitment to a single guiding moral principle— and intuitionistic pluralism—the view that there is a plurality of irreducible moral duties—are fundamentally incompatible. Second, there is a potential metaethical incongruity between intuitionistic moral realism and Kantian constructivism. Rossian intuitionism is committed to moral realism, the metaethical view claiming that moral truths are mind-independent and “out there” to be discovered. While intuitionism is traditionally viewed as moral realist, there is debate over whether Kantianism is better understood as realist or constructivist. On a Kantian constructivist view, moral truths are generated from the standpoint of practical reason and are thus mind-dependent. In Chapter 2, I aim to resolve these tensions and, building on and clarifying the work of Robert Audi, argue that intuitionism and Kantianism are compatible. I first seek to resolve the apparent metaethical inconsistency between these views by arguing that Kantianism is best understood through a realist lens. I then consider the tension between Kantian monism and intuitionistic pluralism, arguing that we may preserve pluralism and reject monism. I argue that there is an irreducible plurality of moral duties and that the categorical imperative can be used to generate the Rossian duties. The Rossian duties may be derivable from the categorical imperative without being reducible to it. Further, while the Rossian duties are indeed self-evident and therefore do not require additional proof, they may nonetheless be provable. After presenting these arguments, I consider objections to my view and clarify my position in my third chapter. In my view, the individual problems that Kantianism and intuitionism face are resolved when the views are merged. Intuitionism, taken alone, lacks a unifying moral theory as its basis; incorporating Kantianism into an intuitionist framework dissolves this problem by grounding the Rossian duties in the categorical imperative. In contrast, Kantianism can be seen as too abstract and far-removed from moral practice. Partnering with intuitionism alleviates this worry; insofar as intuitionism allows for specific moral truths to present themselves to us almost immediately, we are no longer forced to explain how abstract moral principles are connected to everyday moral decision-making. In merging these two frameworks, my hope is to utilize intuitionism to soften the abstract, distant nature of Kantianism and to utilize the categorical imperative to unify and ground the Rossian duties