The ethics of care and structural injustice: a feminist-informed critique of personal responsibility

Abstract

People often acknowledge the importance of relationships in life, particularly as it relates to flourishing. The ethics of care is centered around this notion, articulating a conception of flourishing that is constituted by caring relationships. In other words, the ability of individuals to participate in and cultivate caring relationships is central to their ability to flourish. In this project, I use care ethics to argue that there is a structural injustice when society is structured in a way that individuals are severely limited in their ability to develop caring relations. Insofar as individuals are limited in their expression of care, they are not able to flourish to the highest degree. As I develop this point, I critique other ways of addressing this problem. Specifically, I critique a theory of personal responsibility which I argue is conceptually flawed in holding an individualistic and atomistic conception of persons. I will also argue personal responsibility is practically harmful through perpetuating the structural injustice. To combat this structural injustice, I argue we must adopt and develop an account of autonomy that is relational, rather than atomistic or individualistic. With the development of relational autonomy, individuals will be better able to cultivate caring relationships and flourish.