Semantic and global irrealism
Date
2010
Authors
Perry, Jeremiah Alexander Burnette, author
Losonsky, Michael, advisor
Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member
Troup, Lucy, committee member
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with skepticism about linguistic meaning and the consequences that follow from this view. After clarifying various positions that support skepticism about meaning - broadly classified under the umbrella term semantic irrealism - I weave a common thread through these different characterizations and use that formulation for the remainder of the thesis. In chapter two I examine the premises for the argument that semantic irrealism globalizes to the conclusion that no sentence is substantially true. After evaluating attempts found within the literature to block this inference, I argue that it cannot be blocked in the ways considered. Chapter three is a response to objections that the global irrealist position is both incoherent and unstable. I argue that it is neither and conclude that if semantic irrealism is the case, then this necessarily entails global irrealism.
Description
Covers not scanned.
Print version deaccessioned 2022.
Print version deaccessioned 2022.
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Subject
Skepticism
Realism
Semantics (Philosophy)