Browsing by Author "Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor"

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Open Access
Constructivism and the phenomenology of moral deliberation
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2017) Ponzo, Alexander, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Gorin, Moti, committee member; Cleary, Anne, committee member
In this thesis I claim that constructivism is an attractive positon when it comes to explaining the nature of moral facts. The central tenet of constructivism is that moral facts are a function of what actual (or hypothetical) people think. According to constructivism, if it is true (for example) that murder is morally wrong, it is because some actual (or hypothetical) person or group of people under certain conditions thinks that murder is morally wrong. A primary competitor to constructivism is realism. Realism denies the central tenet of constructivism and instead holds that moral facts are objective; this means that the truth of moral facts does not depend on any person's or group of persons' attitudes regarding the object of moral evaluation. For realists, then, if murder is morally wrong it is not because any (actual or hypothetical) person or group of people thinks that it is wrong; for realists, this fact obtains regardless of what anyone thinks about it. I argue in Chapter One that there is a significant epistemological problem with the claim that moral facts are objective; namely, that it is hard to see how we could have moral knowledge if the truth of moral facts is not a function of what we think. I argue in Chapter Two that constructivism does not share the epistemological problem that realism has. This problem is significant and it should be enough, I submit, to push us into accepting constructivism over realism. While I devote the first chapter (and some of the second) to explaining what constructivism is and how it compares to other competing theories, this is not the only task of this thesis. My other central task is to examine two specific versions of constructivism—namely, the respective theories of Christine Korsgaard and Sharon Street—and find out whether each theory can maintain a plausible phenomenology of moral deliberation. In other words, I am interested in finding out whether each version of constructivism can give a plausible account of what it is like for people to engage in moral deliberation. Since it's possible to study the phenomenology of moral deliberation empirically (or by plausible speculation), we can compare how moral deliberation is actually experienced—or at least how it seems to be experienced—with how it would likely be experienced if the theories in question were true. Ultimately, I argue that the phenomenology of moral deliberation occasioned by Korsgaard's position is more plausible than the one occasioned by Street's because Korsgaard's position does a better job of preserving what we tend to think the experience of moral deliberation is like. A summation of this thesis can be given in the following way: I make a presumptive case for constructivism and, specifically, I argue that Korsgaard's constructivism is more attractive than Street's because, among other things, the phenomenology of moral deliberation occasioned by Korsgaard's position is more plausible than the one occasioned by Street's.
Open Access
Ethical realism and the Darwinian Dilemma
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Rabinowitz, Aaron, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee member
In this thesis, I will examine a recent objection against ethical realism put forth by Sharon Street, a prominent advocate of ethical constructivism. Street's Darwinian Dilemma argues that ethical realism is incompatible with evolutionary psychology and that attempts to reconcile the two theories will result in the unacceptable epistemic conclusion that humans lack ethical knowledge. Street believes that the Darwinian Dilemma provides a strong reason for abandoning ethical realism in favor of ethical constructivism. It is my contention that the ethical realist can successfully defend herself against Street's objection. I will consider several possible responses that are available to the ethical realist for defusing the Darwinian Dilemma, including my preferred response which I believe has largely been neglected in the literature. I will argue that these responses provide the ethical realist with a functional defense against Street's challenge, and that ethical realism therefore remains superior to ethical constructivism.
Open Access
Moral error theory
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Gustafson, Matt, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Chong, Edwin, committee member
J.L. Mackie historically has been considered the primary defender of moral error theory. The position he defends is one of many metaethical positions an individual might hold. Moral error theory’s central thesis is that all moral claims are false or neither true nor false because of moral discourse’s commitment to some problematic thesis. Moral error theory has not always been taken seriously however. Many have responded to Mackie’s moral error theory, but they often do so in a cursory manner. Moral error theory would seem to be a historical curiosity, but not a position often adopted. In modern presentations and critiques of moral error theory the discussion often seems to be one-sided. The error theorist does not always consider the weaknesses of what he considers the best presentation of his position, and the critic does not always fully appreciate the appeal of, or fully engage with the strongest presentations of moral error theory. Often error theorists and critics of moral error theory recognize that moral error theory could be developed in a variety of manners, but limit their discussions to moral error theories which closely relate to Mackie’s original presentation of moral error theory. By developing an understanding of Mackie’s original position and new variations on his position we can see what motivates individuals to develop error theories related in some manner to Mackie’s error theory. We can also see the limits of moral error theories which build off Mackie’s error theory however. In particular, I will examine the moral error theory of Jonas Olson. Olson identifies moral discourse’s commitment to irreducible normativity as especially problematic. Identifying the limits and difficulties which plague error theories such as Olson’s should lead us to consider other manners in which one can develop moral error theories. In the end, I propose that one might be able to establish something like a moral error theory by arguing that moral beliefs are unjustified. Moral beliefs, it will be argued, are unjustified because they ultimately issue from an evolutionary source which is unreliable. Because those beliefs are unjustified, I claim that we are in error if we continue to hold those beliefs. While such a position has often been called moral skepticism, I argue that it can be seen as a sort of moral error theory.
Open Access
"Moral perception": an examination and revision
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Will, Tyler L., author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew D., committee member; Plaisance, Patrick, committee member
In the recent metaethics literature, some theorists have advanced what seems to be a novel moral epistemology or explanation of how it is that agents come to form moral beliefs and acquire moral knowledge. Known to this point simply as “moral perception,” this view claims that it is possible to “perceive” moral facts in much the same way that agents routinely perceive properties such as color, size, or shape. For the moral perceptionist, it is plausible to think that one may “see” when an injustice has been committed or “hear” some immorality in a genuine and robust sense. In this thesis, I consider the coherence and prospects of “moral perception” as a candidate moral epistemology and conclude that it is effectively interchangeable with some more established—if frequently misunderstood—varieties of moral intuitionism. In chapter 1, I take up and examine recent characterizations of moral perception in the literature. As I make clear below, there is no single account of this position, and consequently the first chapter represents an interpretation—admittedly one of many possible—of what has been styled as moral perception. These soundings in the literature are necessarily selective, and I emphasize that moral perception epistemologies seem to be motivated by three core claims. Supporters of moral perception epistemologies seem led to argue that moral properties can be represented in perception, that such cases have distinctive moral phenomenologies, and that an agent’s perception and awareness of such properties is non-inferential. I pursue each of the claims in turn and demonstrate how they may help to give some needed definition to and help to effectively delimit the idea of a moral perception. With the interpretive account of moral perception in hand, chapter 2 assesses the prospects of moral perception epistemologies going forward. My principal argument is that despite its initial promise, moral perception theories may fail to provide a unique account of moral knowledge. By emphasizing the directness, immediacy, and non-inferentiality of moral beliefs, moral perceptionists advance an epistemology that bears important similarities to many articulations of moral intuitionism. I dedicate chapter 2 to explicating these many points of overlap between moral perceptions and intuitions. In view of these many similarities, I contend that the moral perception may in fact be best defended as a particular form of intuitionism. I attempt to make good on this claim by advancing a provisional form of appearance intuitionism which I argue offers a form of moral perception view in all but name.
Open Access
Morality and reasons to act
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Gavronsky, Joseph, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; Martin, Kelly, committee member
The main goal of this thesis is to shed some light on the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act, through a defense of rational egoism. Rational egoism holds that an agent's reasons to act are grounded by his self-interest, which is conceived as something different from, and not relativized to, his desires. In other words, for a rational egoist, an agent is rational if he does what is, in fact, good for him. I develop a version of rational egoism, and then argue that my version of rational egoism is at least as viable as, if not preferable to, other theories about the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. I claim that rational egoism provides a uniquely compelling account of the nature of reasons to act, and the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. The rational egoism that I endorse treads a sort of theoretical middle ground between its most compelling competitor theories, capturing their theoretical merits and yet avoiding the problems that they are vulnerable to. One of rational egoism's most compelling competitor theories holds that it is morality itself that necessarily provides agents with reasons to act. This theory, known as intrinsic moral rationalism, and advanced by Russ Shafer-Landau, is most compelling for its compatibility with moral convention, but is troubled in that it seems to confer upon morality a mysterious force that allows it to impose upon agents. I will argue that my rational egoism is also compatible with moral convention, and yet not mysterious in the troubling way that intrinsic moral rationalism is. The other of rational egoism's most compelling competitor theories, which I refer to as the desire-satisfaction view, holds that it is an agent's desires, in some sense, that necessarily provide agents with reasons to act. In its most basic form, the desire-satisfaction view holds that it is an agent's actual desires that necessarily provide him with reasons to act. More sophisticated versions of the desire-satisfaction view, like Bernard Williams' view, for example, hold that an agent's desires, qualified in some way, necessarily provide him with reasons to act. The desire satisfaction view, in general, is most compelling for the prominence it gives desires, yet troubled by its commitment to the proposition that even an agent's desires for things that are cruel, self-destructive, or meaningless, nonetheless provide the agent with reasons to act. And although Williams' view and other sophisticated versions of the desire-satisfaction view may be able to get out of this commitment, it would take too much unmotivated theoretical machinery for them to do so. I will argue that my rational egoism also gives due regard to desires, yet avoids the troubling commitment of the desire-satisfaction view, and does so without appeal to any unmotivated theoretical machinery. My rational egoism is not, itself, necessarily committed to one particular view regarding the nature of the relationship between morality and reasons to act. However, I strongly suspect that if rational egoism is true, then there is always, or almost always, a reason to do the moral thing. On one normative moral theory, namely moral egoism, morality just requires agents to do that which is in their self-interest. If moral egoism is true, and there are indeed grounds for believing that it is, and rational egoism is true, then there will always be a reason to do the moral thing. But even if moral egoism is not true, I argue that there are solid grounds for believing that morality usually indicates that agents should do that which is in their self-interest. In this case, if rational egoism is true, there will usually be a reason to do the moral thing.