Browsing by Author "MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor"
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Item Open Access A defense of Buddhist virtue ethics(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Hamblin, Jack, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Becker, Christian, committee memberIn Chapter 1, I describe necessary dimensions of Buddhist ethics. I comment on and argue for the inclusion of the four noble truths, meditation, the four immeasurable virtues, and regulating emotion. In Chapter 2, I establish the viability of virtue ethics. I review virtue ethics from an historical perspective, look at and answer a critique of the virtues, and distinguish my version of virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology. In Chapter 3, I defend Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics. I argue that a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhism is the most reasonable of the Western interpretations, that a virtue ethical interpretation is compatible with a non-Western approach, and finally implement the necessary dimensions from the first chapter to put forward a plausible account of Buddhist virtue ethics.Item Open Access Adaptive disembodiment: towards an enactivist theory of body schematic sensorimotor autonomy(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) White, Halie Elizabeth, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Rice, Collin, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee memberThe enactivist approach to embodied cognition relies on a non-reductive biological naturalism that is recursive at higher levels of complexity in living systems. In addressing an account of cognition, I will consider Xabier Barandiaran's objection that biological autonomy properly sets biological norms but under-specifies sensorimotor normativity. Barandiaran suggests the implementation of pluralist autonomy to the meta-pattern of organization in the enactivist agent that becomes recapitulated. By forming an account of sensorimotor autonomy, we can then specify normativity at the sensorimotor (cognitive) level. In consideration of this issue, I will propose the body schema functions to provide sensorimotor autonomy to the embodied subject through motor stability and thus functions to specify normativity at the sensorimotor level. This then allows for what enactivists term 'sense-making' in terms of enacting affordance structures. The position I take within the enactivist frame is thus a pluralist autonomist view on cognition. I go on to consider how this view bears on cognitive case studies often addressed in body schema literature. Drawing primarily from the work of Shaun Gallagher, body schema interacts with and develops body image through primary and secondary intersubjective capacities. I argue that body image is intersubjectively constructed through joint attention, thus invoking considerations of one's social milieu. This consideration shifts the discussion to address how the pluralist autonomist enactivist, through body schema and body image interaction, can account for alterations of the body schema due to distortions in one's body image that result from oppression. This pluralist autonomist enactivist theory provides three benefits for understanding these alterations: (1) enactivism begins with a fundamental postulate that individuals are embedded in a world; (2) in distinguishing between different levels of autonomy, we can thus discuss different forms of normative interaction with the environment; (3) and finally, with differentiated forms of normativity, we can thus differentiate and track different modes of adaptation an embodied subject can take when faced with various sorts of perturbations. I argue that disembodiment can be seen as an adaptation of the body schema in relation to hostile environments where stigma targets the body image. This hostile environment does not allow one's comfortable and normative navigation of the world due to the hypervisibility of the body. I explore this case of adaptive disembodiment through fatphobia and public weight stigma.Item Open Access An escape from anger and other Buddhist contributions to the philosophy of emotions(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016) Murray, Adam, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McLeod, Alexus, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee memberThis paper begins with an examination of several theories of emotion in general—a ‘mixed theory’, an ‘attitudinal theory’, and a Buddhist ‘componential theory.’ I argue that the Buddhist theory has a theoretical advantage over these alternatives insofar as it avoids two ‘thin’ characterizations of emotions that exclude either affective or conative states from the concept. The Buddhist theory of emotions, I claim, has another advantage insofar as it brings practicality to the forefront, connecting our theorizing about emotions with what is most important—developing good character and bringing about the welfare of beings. Chapter 2 proceeds to an in- depth analysis of the emotion of anger in particular, examining several philosophically important accounts—those of Aristotle, Seneca, and the Buddha. I raise problems of definition, highlight some typical and contentious features of anger, and draw from several classical sources to reconstruct a Buddhist account of anger. In the final chapter, I argue that typical anger is not necessary for moral life, addressing myself to arguments from Zac Cogley and Emily McRae. I continue by demonstrating that Buddhism has resources that allow us to both eliminate or largely attenuate anger, and to approach the problems we face without anger; finally, I sketch out exactly how this can be accomplished.Item Open Access Beauty and openness: Kant's aesthetic judgment of taste, Yogācāra, and open presence meditation(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2014) Brelje, Kate, author; Kneller, Jane, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Kiefer, Kathleen, committee memberThis paper provides a comparative analysis of Kant's aesthetic judgment of taste and Open Presence meditation interpreted through a Yogācāra philosophical framework. I begin with an expository analysis of Kant's cognitive and aesthetic judgments, highlighting the presence of attention, form of reflection, and structure of purposeless purposiveness in the judgment. Next, I address the Buddhist idealist Yogācāra philosophical tradition. Through this theoretical lens, I examine Open Presence meditation, with an emphasis on meditative non-dualism, attention, and meditative goals. In the final chapter, I tie together the groundwork laid in the first two chapters into a comparative analysis identifying points of compatibility and contention within the general areas of judgment, attention, purposeless purposiveness, and transformation. Finally, I suggest that, given the results of this analysis, Kant's aesthetic judgment of taste might benefit from being construed as a type of meditation.Item Open Access The complexity of the mind: rejecting modularity on the basis of cognitive penetration and cognitive phenomenology(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Hershberger, Joelle, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member; Rhodes, Matthew, committee memberHistorically, cognitive scientists and philosophers have accepted a theory of the mind known as modularity, whereby individual thought processes are completely separate and insulated from one another—meaning that cognitions have no influence on perceptions. However, the recent literature has seen a resurgence in support of a thesis of cognitive penetration, which suggests that cognitions can and do influence perceptions in a way that would be impossible if the mind were modular in the traditional sense. In addition to calling the idea of modularity into question, cognitive penetrability raises some passing concerns for the objectivity of scientific observation, and certain philosophical distinctions such as that between cognition and perception. Along similar lines, the literature has also seen an increase in the exploration of cognitive phenomenology, which similarly calls into question the distinction between cognition and perception and requires a model of the mind which is less clear-cut than the modular view. As such, it seems that given the evidence, one cannot accept either penetrability or cognitive phenomenology without accepting the other, given that they both rest on a similar view of the mind. In addition to calling into question the literal distinction between cognition and perception (though it may remain intact on a conceptual level), a subsection of cognitive phenomenology, known as evaluative phenomenology (the unique phenomenal character of emotions) similarly makes ambiguous the philosophical distinction between reason and emotion. Breaking this dichotomy, as well, makes the possible epistemic consequences of penetrability pale in comparison to those implied by cognitive phenomenology. While this is not an answer to the issues raised by penetrability, it does contextualize the difficulties in a way which opens the system up to a deeper understanding.Item Open Access The phenomenological self: owner and agent, through thick and thin(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2014) Lenzo, Edward Anthony, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Davalos, Deana, committee memberThe central work of this thesis is to compare and contrast two phenomenological notions of self: the minimal self, a Husserlian notion articulated by Dan Zahavi, and SESMET, as developed by Galen Strawson. The minimal self conception takes the self to be a kind of diachronically unified owner of experience and agent of action, but takes unification and ownership to entail more than may be justified. Strawson neglects to construe diachronicity appropriately, misconstruing the phenomenological nature of the stream and rejecting agency in toto, but covertly reintroduces agency in a metaphysical guise. Neither conception is an appropriate notion of self, but I propose a "hybrid" account that incorporates appropriately nuanced views of persistence and agency. I conclude by suggesting potential problems for this view, while highlighting its applications. In Chapter 1 I explicate and critique Strawson's SESMET, detailing its insights into the investigation of self and developing concerns with the account. In Chapter 2 I analyze Edmund Husserl's account of internal time-consciousness, which serves as the foundation of Zahavi's minimal self. In Chapter 3 I link this Husserlian framework to the basic sense of self (the feeling of being a self), proceeding by philosophical and psychopathological considerations, clearly define the minimal self, compare it to SESMET, and argue that these notions are prima facie equally legitimate. In Chapter 4 I contrast these notions, focusing on issues raised throughout and the resolutions available for each "self". I reject both notions, but use their respective strengths and weaknesses to propose a promising hybrid view. I then suggest possible faults of this view.Item Open Access The pragmatic fulfillment view and evaluations of meaning in life(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Krause, Nicholas, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member; Wong, Cori, committee memberSusan Wolf developed her well-known Fitting Fulfillment View in the hope of avoiding some of the pitfalls of a purely subjective approach to understanding meaning in life. In doing so, Wolf built in an objective criterion for qualifying for a meaningful life. This objective criterion makes it necessary for one to engage in appropriately worthy pursuits if her life is to be considered meaningful. Wolf concedes to the difficulties of filling out the details of a "worthiness condition" for conferring meaning to one's life. It is my hope here to provide a framework that will help clarify Wolf's worthiness condition. Specifically, I will argue that certain readings or strains of American pragmatism can be useful in constructing appropriately worthy or attractive pursuits for increasing meaning in life. I will argue that this approach—the Pragmatic Fulfillment View—will not only elucidate a worthiness condition but will also have the distinct advantages of being both maximally inclusive and practically-oriented toward amplifying meaning in life.Item Open Access The problems of mental causation and pluralist alternatives(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Hoffmann, Stephanie Lee, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member; Richards, Tracy, committee memberThe mental causation literature tends towards certain presuppositions, including the tacit endorsement of physicalism, causal closure, and reductionism. Insofar as justification for these philosophical positions is offered at all, it is typically claimed that they are grounded in actual scientific practice. However, there are good reasons to believe that actual science does not support these philosophical positions. In this work, I consider some reasons to deny physicalism and causal closure, and critically present and evaluate pluralistic alternatives to reductionism. In light of this discussion, the problem of mental causation takes on an interesting and promising new form.Item Open Access Upayā-kauśala as the pragmatic justification of Madhyamaka ethical claims(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Quist, Andrew, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Tucker, Dustin, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee memberMadhyamaka Buddhism is typically characterized as a particularly thoroughgoing form of anti-foundationalism. This leads to difficulties when trying to justify knowledge claims as well as ethical claims, especially in the light of how these claims are handled in mainstream Abhidharma Buddhism. The ethical domain is particularly important for Buddhism since the Buddhist project is fundamentally soteriological. I endeavor to offer a plausible way that truth claims, especially ethical truth claims, can be justified while keeping to Madhyamaka's metaphysical commitments. Specifically, I will argue that a functional-pragmatist approach – I use the term upāya-kauśalya or "skillful means" – is the most promising way that Madhyamaka can situate the normativity of ethical claims.