DISSERTATION

FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE

HOW AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE NEOLIBERAL CAMPUS POLICIES CONTRIBUTE

TO CONSERVATIVE MISTRUST OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SKEPTICISM

TOWARDS RESEARCH ON ANTHROPOGENIC GLOBAL WARMING

Submitted by

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ABSTRACT

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When conservatives believe American universities implement policies that limit their free speech rights and demean their social identities, their support for the institution can decline. Negative partisanship and political polarization push consumption of agreeable media and distrust of antagonistic media, which means conservative media and social media are a major source of information about the contemporary university system for that population. I hypothesize that this is an important variable, among many, in understanding why conservatives reject environmental research on topics such as Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW).

To explain this phenomenon, I begin by reviewing the current research on conservative skepticism of AGW. I add to this literature through a treatment effect experiment I conducted, which reaffirms the findings of others that those on the political right perceive themselves as under threat on campus, which impacts their experiences in the classroom and their views of higher education.

Second, I conduct a critical analysis of higher education as a progressive neoliberal university. I argue that, as a neoliberal institution, the contemporary university tries to operate as a financially successful organization that manages its resources, employees, and students efficiently; and as a progressive institution, it dedicates itself to bringing about social and

political changes, especially through the use Inclusion, Equity, and Diversity (IED) policies, and that these two goals create conflicts with one another.

Third, I use the work of the social theorist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas to diagnose these conflicts as social pathologies, both in terms of material harm to students and faculty, and as generating campus conditions which violate his 'ideal speech community,' which I use as my model of social health. I then look at Habermas's contributions to the disciplines of Discourse Theory and Public Deliberation, and demonstrate how these fields offer pathways to improving campus policies, which could hopefully improve the public perception of the university, and its research as being legitimate in our current hyper-partisan political environment.

Fourth, I use Social and Political Psychology to explain why current approaches to gain the cooperation of conservatives on AGW initiatives are not working, and explain how understanding social identity, particularly partisan social identity, can produce Best Practices that reach people across the political spectrum and encourage deliberation and cooperation.

Finally, I look at various reform proposals to higher education, which aim to achieve IED goals in ways that are also inclusive of conservative and heterodox thinkers, and explain why implementing them would benefit students, faculty, and administrators.

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I would like to thank my friends and family for all of their support, especially The Siam Boyz and all three of my mothers – Kay, Charlotte, and Laura; my wife Nicki for her support throughout career and for giving me Cheyenne, my wonderful daughter who has always been a bright, shining star in my life; my father Paul, sister Stephanie, brother in law Matt, Aunt Lynnie, Uncle Charlie, Aunt Penny, and Uncle Doug, Grandma Bork, and all my cousins, nieces, and nephews; my spiritual and intellectual heroes Jesus, Socrates, and Jürgen Habermas; my Sensei, Altin Papa, and my lawyer and brother from another mother, Robert Ingram; everyone at the AAUP who supported me through my trials and tribulations at the Community College of Aurora, especially Caprice Lawless, Don Eron, Henry Reichman, and Melinda Myrick; and finally, Guns N' Roses / Cool Hand Luke, for inspiring the title of this dissertation.

I would further like to thank all the students whom I have ever taught for their inspiration and renewal of my own curiosity, all of my fellow graduate students for putting up with my constant dissention from the ranks, and basically everyone I've ever known for tolerating my unyielding, stubborn approach to truth, politics, and the good life.

Thanks for taking it all in stride, everyone. I know it wasn't easy.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to all those trying to free the brave and reckless gods within us all.

The rebels, the dreamers, the misfits, the visionaries and philosophers.

To those who defend our freedom to think

and speak and live as we see fit.

To the seekers of Truth,

No matter the cost.

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Prologue – My Story and the Journey of This Project

"*If we don't believe in free expression for people we despise, we don't believe in it at all.*" - Noam Chomsky

"*To suppress free speech is a double wrong. It violates the rights of the hearer as well as those of the speaker.*" - Frederick Douglas

"*The university teacher should, if he is fit for his position, be a person of a fair and judicial mind; he should, in dealing with such subjects, set forth justly, without suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of other investigators and he should, above all, remember that his business is not to provide his students with ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for themselves.*"
- American Association of University Professors, Declaration of Principles, 1915

If environmental problems require cooperation across political and geographic boundaries, and that cooperation requires trust in research universities to provide reliable data, what then happens when a large segment of the population loses its trust in those research universities? According to Inside Higher Ed, between 2015 and 2018, confidence amongst adults in higher education dropped from 57-48% overall, from 56-39% amongst Republicans, from 48-44% amongst Independents, and from 68-62% amongst Democrats (Jaschik 2018b). A 2019 Pew Research Center survey found similar results, reporting that Republican and Republican-leaning respondents who reported saying that colleges had a positive effect on the way things are going in America had fallen from 58% in 2010 to 33% in 2019 (Nietzel 2019).

Support from Democratic party voters is believed to be in decline because of rising tuition costs and possibly the college admissions scandal of 2019 (Jaschik 2018b), whereas conservative support is perceived to be in decline (McCall 2019; Hess and Grant 2018) because of a change in campus culture from free and open inquiry into a place where only opinions which affirm social justice policies are allowed. The same 2019 Pew Research Center survey also found that, "87% of Democrats and Democrat-leaning individuals believe that colleges and

universities are open to a wide range of opinions and viewpoints, double the 44% of Republicans and Republican-leaners who say the same thing" (Nietzel 2019). Overall, less than half of Americans think that colleges are having a positive impact.

There is also a long-standing partisan divide in views on Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW), which according to a 2019 Pew Research Poll continues to persist (Funk and Hefron 2019):

Majorities of Americans say the federal government is not doing enough to protect the climate, environment

% of U.S. adults who think the federal government is doing too little to ...

Protect water quality of lakes, rivers, streams	68%
Protect air quality	67
Reduce effects of global climate change	67
Protect animals and their habitats	62
Protect open lands in national parks and nature preserves	55

% of U.S. adults who think the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of climate change

Democrat/lean Dem	90%
Republican/lean Rep	39
Among Rep/lean Rep — Conservative	24
Moderate/liberal	65
Boomer and older	31
Generation X	41
Millennial and younger	52
Men	34
Women	46

Note: Respondents who said the federal government is doing about the right amount or doing too much and those did not give an answer are not shown.
Source: Survey conducted Oct. 1-13, 2019.
"U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Most in U.S. prioritize renewables over fossil fuels, but there are differences among Republicans

% of U.S. adults who say the more important priority for U.S. energy supply should be ...

	Developing alternative energy	Expanding fossil fuels
U.S. adults	77%	22%
Democrat/lean Dem	90	9
Republican/lean Rep	62	37
Conservative	49	49
Moderate/liberal	82	18
Boomer and older	53	45
Generation X	61	39
Millennial and younger	78	22
Men	58	42
Women	66	32

Note: Full response options were "Developing alternative sources, such as wind, solar and hydrogen technology" and "Expanding exploration and production of oil, coal and natural gas." Respondents who did not give an answer are not shown.
Source: Survey conducted Oct. 1-13, 2019.
"U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy"

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Figure P.1 (left) and Figure P.2 (right). Figure 1.1 shows Pew survey data about climate and environmental protection, by party, age, and sex. Figure 2.2 shows Pew survey data about Americans attitudes towards renewables and fossil fuels, by party, age, and sex.

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I hypothesize that the growing negative public perception of the university system, particularly by conservatives, is an important independent variable which is causing increased mistrust of the empirical environmental research conducted within the university system which needs to be considered and addressed. I conceptualize this problem as a Habermasian social pathology being generated by the combination of university administrations promoting Inclusion, Equity, and Diversity (IED) policies and the neoliberal revenue generating administrative model of higher education. My argument in this dissertation consists of eight chapters combining a wide range of theories across Political Science. The first half consists of four chapters which combine Environmental Politics, Public Administration Theory, and Political Theory to diagnose the pathology generated by the contemporary progressive neoliberal university. The second half consists of four chapters which combine Habermasian Critical Theory, Public Discourse and Public Deliberation Theories, and Social and Political Psychology to develop a treatment plan to restore the reputation of the university, to develop IED policies which respect both diversity of identity and diversity of belief, and to bring conservatives back into the conversations happening on campus in the hopes of encouraging their participation in helping solve environmental collection action problems such as AGW.

This doctoral project began in 2017 with my curiosity as to why belief in AGW among conservatives was so low. I was interested as to why there was such little conservative trust in the people and institutions who were reporting on climate change and so I began a journey to understand that worldview, ontology, and epistemology. I began actively reading and watching conservative media online, spent time with my conservative friends and relatives, joined my local chapter of Turning Point USA at Colorado State University, attended lectures by conservative speakers such as Dennis Prager and Donald Trump Jr., watched endless Trump

rallies to my wife's great annoyance, and even bought myself a MAGA hat and wore it around

my very liberal college town to see how people would treat me. It was a good way to get dirty

looks, but I also made new friends and even had to turn down a date offer from a lovely young

woman in a hardware store. Mostly I just listened and empathized to see the world through their

eyes as best as I was able because I wanted to learn to speak that language so well that I could

pass what Bryan Caplan (2011) calls 'the ideological Turing test' and be accepted as an ingroup

member. My goal was to learn how to engage with them in a way they would positively respond

to in the hopes of encouraging their support of environmental protection and sustainability

projects based on mutual trust and respect.

Along my journey I found that, as universities have shifted their educational mission

from the classical liberal tradition to include more Critical Theory based IED policies on campus

and in the classroom, conservatives have responded by increasingly seeing the universities as

captured institutions bent on social justice indoctrination, rather than a place of learning

dedicated to the creation of new scientific discoveries and technologies, the passing on of

cultural knowledge through the humanities and liberal arts, and the providing job skills training

for future professionals. This is not a new critique, going at least as far back as Allan Bloom's

1987 book 'The Closing of the American Mind,' and it shows no signs of abating. While these

conservative critiques of higher education have been around for a long time, something changed

since 2010 to cause the 25-point drop in support from 58% in 2010 to 33% in 2019 (Nietzel

2019), and spark conservative legislative attempts to gain control over K-12 and higher

education curriculum.[1]

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[1] In fact, while writing this dissertation conservatives became aware of Critical Race Theory and gender theory, and launched campaigns and passed laws to prohibit them from being taught. Proponents of CRT fought back, either directly or by teachers either renaming the program or engaging in practices to keep parents from interfering in their lesson plans for their students. (Cineas 2021, Showalter 2020)

Bolstering these beliefs are a network of right-leaning media organizations that are linked to the larger world of conservative media and social media operations. Organizations such as Campus Reform, The College Fix, Young America's Foundation, and Turning Point USA report from campuses and look for examples of what they perceive to be anti-conservative, anti-America, anti-male, anti-White[2], and anti-capitalism statements made or supported by university faculty and administrators. From there these stories spread out into the wider world of conservative media such as National Review, Newsbusters, Newsmax, OANN, The Federalist, Fox News, The Blaze, Daily Wire, Louder With Crowder, Prager U, Red State, Washington Examiner, Sean Hannity and similar AM radio shows, etc. where they are picked up by blogs and smaller publications and disseminated far and wide.

Popular campus stories that feed this narrative frequently feature males who have been falsely accused of sexual misconduct under Title IX and punished anyways (Moore and Pekgoz 2019; Schow 2020a; Schow 2020b; Taylor 2019; Schow 2020c), the deplatforming of conservative speakers (FIRE 2021), professors and administrators engaging in biased (Abrams 2018) and hostile speech and acts towards conservatives (Anderson 2020; Everett 2020; Cline 2017; Bogues 2018), and classes and events that focus on the perceived demeaning of Whites (Parker 2019a, 2019b; Walter 2020), males (Schow 2019d; Huber 2020; Pappas 2019), American and European culture (Soave 2020; Cole 2015; Swoyer and Richardson 2020), families (Solis 2020; Perry 2020), Christianity (Clark 2015; Larsen 2010; Lee 2021), or capitalism. The last item is interesting because of how much Marxist, Neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist anti-capitalist research is being done on the campuses of institutions which act like profit-maximizing corporations, in terms of how they treat students and faculty.

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[2] With the exception of direct quotes, I will be capitalizing all words relating to race (Black, White, Asian, Latino, etc.), based on the recommendations of Dr. Kwame Anthony Appiah (2020).

Conservative media often ignore that while the majority of deplatforming campaigns go against them, they, too, have often engaged in this practice. Of the 448 deplatforming incidents recorded by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) since 1998, the right was successful in 70 of their 127 attempts (55%), the left was successful in 112 of their 272 attempts (41%), and those attempts listed as politically 'N/A' were successful in 28 of 49 attempts (57%). (FIRE 2021)

When these stories of certain groups being openly attacked, but not being allowed to defend themselves, come out, it creates a perception of outgroup bias and threat against conservatives (especially males), which then triggers Social Identity Threat responses. There is research showing that males who perceive bias against them respond with status legitimizing beliefs, which produce a range of anti-cooperative behaviors (Wilkins et al. 2018), as well as Social and Political Psychological research on how threat perception operates as a powerful driver of increased salience of ingroup social identity.

This is happening on campuses at the same time as social media companies have increasingly been censoring, deplatforming, banning, shadow banning, and demonetizing conservatives on popular social media apps like Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Youtube, Instagram, etc. A June 2018 Pew poll found that, "72% of the public thinks it likely that social media platforms actively censor political views that those companies find objectionable," (Smith 2018) which was highly correlated with political attitudes:

Roughly seven-in-ten Americans think it likely that social media platforms censor political viewpoints

% of U.S. adults who think it is _____ that social media sites intentionally censor political viewpoints they find objectionable

	NET Not likely	Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	NET Likely
Total	26	8%	19%	37%	35%	72%
Rep/Lean Rep	14	4	9	32	54	85
Dem/Lean Dem	36	9	27	42	20	62

Note: Respondents who did not give an answer are not shown.
Source: Survey conducted May 29-June 11, 2018.
"Public Attitudes Toward Technology Companies"

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Figure P.3. Pew survey data on views regarding censorship on social media platforms.

Further, both of these phenomena are occurring in a hyper-partisan environment where trust in traditional media is hitting an all-time low.

As Axios reports (Salmon 2021):

- **56% of Americans** agree with the statement that "Journalists and reporters are purposely trying to mislead people by saying things they know are false or gross exaggerations."
- **58% think** that "most news organizations are more concerned with supporting an ideology or political position than with informing the public."
- **When Edelman re-polled Americans** after the election, the figures had deteriorated even further, with 57% of Democrats trusting the media and only 18% of Republicans.

Percentage of Americans who trust traditional media

2012 to 2021

Figure P.4. Axios survey data on American trust in traditional media from 2012 to 2021.
    Pew has made similar findings on political polarization in their polling on media trust

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(Jurkotwitz et al. 2020):

Ideology adds another layer to party-line divides of most trusted and distrusted news sources

% who <u>trust</u> each news source for political and election news (top five shown)

Democrat/Lean Dem						Republican/Lean Rep		
LIBERAL		MODERATE/ CONSERVATIVE		MODERATE/ LIBERAL		**CONSERVATIVE**	
CNN	70%	CNN	65%	Fox News	51%	Fox News	75%
New York Times	66	ABC News	63	ABC News	47	Hannity (radio)	43
PBS	66	NBC News	61	CBS News	42	Limbaugh (radio)	38
NPR	63	CBS News	60	NBC News	41	ABC News	24
NBC News	61	PBS	48	CNN	36	CBS News	23

% who <u>distrust</u> each news source for political and election news (top five shown)

Democrat/Lean Dem						Republican/Lean Rep		
LIBERAL		MODERATE/ CONSERVATIVE		MODERATE/ LIBERAL		**CONSERVATIVE**	
Fox News	77%	Fox News	48%	CNN	43%	CNN	67%
Limbaugh (radio)	55	Limbaugh (radio)	34	MSNBC	32	MSNBC	57
Breitbart	53	Hannity (radio)	28	HuffPost	30	New York Times	50
Hannity (radio)	50	Breitbart	22	BuzzFeed	29	NBC News	50
NY Post	27	BuzzFeed	20	Fox News	29	CBS News	48

Note: Order of outlets does not necessarily indicate statistically significant differences.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Oct. 29-Nov. 11, 2019.
"U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided"
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure P.5. Pew survey data on partisan trust and distrust of various news sources, by political ideology.

While I do not have the space to explore the entire phenomena of how traditional and social media policies impact perception of outgroup threat amongst conservatives, it is worth mentioning because should my research show that campus IED policies produce a lack of trust in university generated environmental research, there is a probable psychological positive feedback loop between perception of censorship on campus and perception of censorship, bias, and dishonesty in traditional and social media amongst conservatives.

It is a matter of open empirical debate whether the relationship between political polarization and distrust in higher education is the result of causation (either way), or whether all elements combine to create a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop, but what is clear is that the reputation of American colleges and universities as fair, objective, and impartial institutions,

while never perfect, is in severe decline relative to other periods, and that there is no comparable source of objective information to inform our political debates over environmental policy.

Criticism of the erosion of free speech on campus is not limited to the political right. Liberal professors and nonpartisan groups such as FIRE and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) have expressed their concerns about how these policies are harming faculty and destroying the ability of professors to do research. I myself lost my first career as an Adjunct Instructor of Philosophy because I protested the Community College of Aurora's IED-based 'Gateway To Success' policy which sought to bolster retention and graduation rates of women and minorities by mandating easier classes.

Specifically, this policy required:

1) Mandated 20% reduction in Course Content

2) Out of a normal twice per week course, we had to set aside 5 classes to work on Writing Assignment Scaffolding, to work with students to develop their English skills to write their single argumentative essay

3) We were only allowed to assign either 2 3-4 page papers, or 1 6-8 page paper, for which the above scaffolding required us to commit 5 class periods to helping students write.

4) The above writing assignment(s) had to count for 40% of the student's course grade.

5) We had to use a standard rubric that was given to us to grade the writing assignment.

6) We had to aspire to make as much as possible of our classes cover material not created by white males. The original goal we were given was 30% women and minorities.

7) We were required to do small group work every other class period.

As others attested during the investigation, our employment was conditioned on making these changes until we reached an 80% pass rate for all student groups as defined

by race and gender. That meant that in order to avoid termination, we had to pass at least 80% of Black females, 80% of Hispanic males, 80% of White females, etc. My protest of this policy, based on fear of harm being caused to the very students it claimed to be helping, led to my being the first Adjunct Instructor be the focus of an AAUP Committee A investigation, which found that I had been fired in violation of my free speech and due process rights.

The resulting media coverage of my firing was also a major driver of curiosity as to why people with different political beliefs see the world so differently, and how partisan media operates to bolster existing partisan beliefs. My story was picked up in conservative media outlets such as The College Fix (2017) who used the title, "Philosophy prof says he was forced to dumb down his class — and fired for complaining about it", while The Blaze network (Blaze TV Staff 2017; Ubranski 2017) ran two stories on me, "Professor is fired for expecting students to learn" and "Professor protests dumbing down course to raise students' grades. Here's what happens to him next." I had never previously paid any attention to conservative media, so this is where I first learned that conservatives had long-standing negative beliefs about higher education, which my story was used to bolster as part of a larger outgroup narrative.

Later as I worked on completing this dissertation, I also came to understand that the strong, emotive language they were using to tell my story is Moral-Emotional Language, which goes beyond making declarative statements about facts, and actually increases the salience of ingroup identity by confirming a particular worldview and sending emotional signals about how the speaker would like their fellow ingroup members to feel about a particular story – disdain and disgust, in my case. This

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psychological effect is present in conservative media coverage of both higher education and environmental politics, and because emotions can diffuse between similar objects it further enforces my hypothesis that the negative partisan feelings towards higher education can, and does, expand to empirical environmental research conducted in the university system.

My story was also covered in the national mainstream and academic press because of my status as adjunct faculty, which is a part-time teaching position that pays poorly, and comes with no job security and little or no benefits. These part-time adjunct and contingent teaching positions have been increasingly popular with college administrators because they are so much cheaper and more convenient. According to AAUP's Director of Tenure, Academic Freedom and Governance Greg Scholtz, these "entirely disposable" part-time faculty signal trouble for the entire profession,

> "Speaking to greater concerns about part-time faculty members and abuses of academic freedom across academe, the committee said that as the proportion of the faculty members employed in adjunct and other contingent positions grows, "the overall academic freedom of America's faculty shrinks. The private business model of academic employment, in which managers exercise complete control over the working conditions and appointment status of those they oversee, is already a reality for the majority of those who teach at U.S. colleges and universities." (Flaherty 2017)

In short, my situation was an example of the worrying trend in higher education of administration treating faculty as a disposable commodity in their pursuit of revenue. Speaking of adjunct and contingent labor, Scholtz went on to say, "If their administrative superiors are not satisfied with their service, for any reason, they simply do not offer them any course assignments for the next academic term, and there's usually nothing the part-timer can do about it" (Flaherty 2017).

This trend towards less security, freedom, pay, and benefits for faculty has a long history. According to Inside Scholar, citing the AAUP, "In 1969, roughly 78 percent of faculty members at colleges and universities in the U.S. held tenure or tenure-track positions," whereas in 2011, "an estimated 56 percent of college professors are part-time or full-time, non-tenure track faculty members. Newer reports reveal that roughly 75 percent of instructors teaching in classrooms today are off the tenure track. On the flip side, full-time or tenure-track professors make up just over 20 percent of faculty at colleges and universities in the U.S" (Wallis 2018). AAUP expects that cases such as mine are going to become increasingly common as more contracted, full-time positions are replaced with part-time adjunct and contingent workers who are more readily disposed of.

As of June 11, 2020, 58 colleges and universities are designated as 'Censured' by the AAUP for violations of academic freedom. While full Committee A investigations are relatively rare, AAUP chapters regularly send letters in defense of faculty members who have been mistreated by their colleges. These violations of academic freedom by college administrators impact professors and instructors across the political spectrum.

Four examples of left-leaning professors being fired in violation of their academic freedom are that of Steven Salaita, Melissa Click, George Ciccariello-Maher, and Ward Churchill. According to a AAUP Committee A report, Steven Salaita had been a tenured associate Professor at Virginia Tech before being offered a job in 2014 as a tenured professor in American Indian studies at the University of Illinois in Champaign/Urbana before Chancellor Phyllis Wise rescinded the job offer upon receiving complaints from alumni and donors which said his tweets regarding Israeli behavior towards Palestinians were offensive and anti-Semitic.

(AAUP 2015) Subsequently Chancellor Wise was forced to resign when it came to light that she had hidden emails pertinent to the case and for her overall handling of the issue.

Another case was that of University of Missouri Communications Professor Melissa Click for her role in helping organize a student protest against racism when she was caught on camera calling for "some muscle" to remove a student videographer from the protest area. (AP 2016) This video was widely seen on the internet and led more than one hundred lawmakers, mostly Republican, to call for her to be fired. As in the Salaita case, the controversy ultimately led to the resignation of university president Tim Wolfe.

One of the more famous examples of an early cancellation of a leftwing professor at the hands of a right-wing outrage mob was that of Bill O'Reilly getting CU-Boulder's Ethnic Studies Professor Ward Churchill fired. The story began one day after the 9-11 terror attacks in 2001 when Dr. Churchill wrote a paper titled 'Some People Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,' which blamed America for the attacks and used the phrase "Little Eichmanns" to describe Twin Tower employees killed in the attacks as deserving to be murdered for their complicity in American foreign policy. This paper would later be completed as a full book in 2003. This prompted severe blowback from conservatives in general, and Bill O'Reilly in particular, who launched a national campaign to oust him from his position. The public pressure created by O'Reilly and his conservative allies sent CU-Boulder into a frenzied hunt to find a reason to fire the tenured professor. He was ultimately denounced by the CU Board of Regents, accused of plagiarism and academic misconduct, and fired. He won his lawsuit for wrongful termination and was awarded a single dollar, a judgement which he unsuccessfully lobbied the US Supreme Court to review.

Finally, George Ciccariello-Maher, a tenured associate professor of politics and global studies at Drexel University, was suspended and forced to resign his position in response to threats over a situation that began with a Dec. 24, 2016 tweet that read, "All I want for Christmas is white genocide." Drexel condemned the initial tweet, but did not fire Dr. Ciccariello-Maher, who continued to write tweets that enraged the right, such as,

- "Some guy in first class gave up his seat for a uniformed soldier. People are thanking him. I'm trying not to vomit or yell about Mosul."

- Regarding the 2017 Las Vegas mass shooting, "To believe that someone who would shoot down 50 people wouldn't circumvent any gun law you pass is the height of delusion." He blamed the shooting on White male entitlement and "Trumpism," further tweeting out, "White people and men are told that they are entitled to everything. This is what happens when they don't get what they want" and, "the narrative of white victimization has been gradually built over the past 40 years."

While certainly not doing much to sway conservatives towards having a favorable view of the American university system, he echoed a very common refrain heard on the right about the prevailing outrage mobs, and what would later be known as 'cancel culture' when he said (words bolded by me for emphasis),

> "Tenure is a crucial buffer against those who would use money to dictate the content of higher education. But in a neoliberal academy, such protections are far from absolute," he wrote. "***We are all a single outrage campaign away from having no rights at all, as my case and many others make clear***. The difference between tenure-track and the untenured adjunct majority -- which has far more to do with luck than merit -- is a difference in degree not in kind." (Jaschik 2018a)

The erosion of due process and academic freedom, along with an ever-expanding university administration, has been an ongoing process that predates these IED policies. However, under the cloak of IED-based justifications, administrators can shield themselves from criticism by labeling any critique of their policies as a form of hate speech towards the communities IED policies are supposed to serve and support (Mac

Donald 2020). The problem for administration is that this shield is normatively thin and obscures administrations themselves as generators of second-level negative effects, such as declining public trust, the student debt crisis, faculty resentment, the generation of conservative agitprop against the academy, and I suspect the rejection of university generated environmental research itself.

This is not to say that representation does not matter or that IED policies themselves are inherently negative or exploitive, but rather that they can become so when used by entrenched institutions, which have complicated or less than entirely pure motives. Nancy Fraser has taken a critical approach to this phenomenon, describing it as progressive neoliberalism, wherein an organization adopts social justice positions and policies of recognition as a deliberate strategy to increase profits, and raise their public prestige within a capitalist system. Thus, the promotion of IED policies within a higher education system that competes for students, government financial support, and corporate partnerships creates a system where there are negative consequences in the form of shielding administration from criticism of the harms happening to students and faculty caused by the system, and the loss of the perception of higher education as being dedicated to serving all of the public.

While there are many drivers of this loss of confidence in the contemporary university, such as accessibility and affordability, that reflect different political and normative approaches to the university system, a major driver of distrust, particularly for those on the political right, is the sense that only leftwing viewpoints are tolerated. Conservative media and social media have been documenting cases of administrations and student governments working to silence conservative voices, engage in campaigns for professors who hold heterodox positions to be fired and silenced, and impose speech codes which make it an offense to not agree with social justice

oriented political statements. While the data from FIRE and the AAUP demonstrate that this is

not uniquely applied against conservatives, it is conservative distrust of higher education and

environmental research that is working against environmental policy consensus, so it is the aim

of this dissertation to explore the theoretical and empirical mechanisms driving this distrust as it

emanates out of the American university system.

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*"Climate change is now more politically polarizing than any other issue in America…The issue has climbed and climbed in importance for the Democratic base since the 2016 presidential election to the point that it's now a top-tier concern…And yet it's dead last for conservative Republicans. The issue has flatlined for them over the past five years. **In the US, your political party is the greatest indicator to your view on climate change – more than race, age or gender.**"* - Anthony Leiserowitz, Director of the Yale program on climate change

*"The unfounded climate alarmism is wasting trillions of dollars, scaring our children and hurting the world's poor. This is immoral. **Climate change is a real challenge and we should fix it. But smartly.**"* – Dr. Bjorn Lomborg, President of the Copenhagen Consensus Center

*"This is exactly what Aztec priests did thousands of years ago. The priests were the original con artists. They knew when an eclipse was coming, and they'd say, 'Unga munga unga bunga!' and the sun would disappear. And the people would say, 'Make it come back, make it come back!' And the priests would say, 'Build me palaces, then! I am God! I am Migumbu!' And that's all Al Gore is doing. He's saying, 'I am Migumbu! Give me millions, give me Nobel prizes! **Carbon dioxide is evil! The polar bears are dying! Give me world government! I WILL RULE YOU!**'* – Alex Jones, Radio Host, Founder of the InfoWars media empire, and America's number one conspiracy theorist

Might contemporary American universities themselves be a source of conservative disbelief in the existence or severity of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW)? Evidence indicates that there is a strong, established link between conservative ideology and disbelief in the existence or severity of AGW, which exists across cultures. We know that the vast majority of university faculty and administrative staff positions in America are dominated by 'the Left', as are scientific organizations (Abrams 2018). We also know that conservative students are more likely to feel like they must hide their true beliefs on campus, and that conservative media, social media, and social networks often caricature contemporary universities as nothing more than circuses full of insane, totalitarian clowns hell bent on indoctrinating students into becoming leftwing activists while bankrupting their parents. Thus, I hypothesize that this perception of the

university system and the experiences of conservative students are important variables

contributing to skepticism about AGW. The literature on conservative skepticism of AGW has

not yet examined this potential cause, and it is the hope of this dissertation to fill that gap in

research.

<u>Defense of a Mixed Methodological Approach</u>

The intellectual arena at the intersection of Psychology, Political Science, and Political

Theory is highly contested. There is an ongoing debate within Political Science between post-

positivist researchers, whose paradigms are rooted in the Enlightenment tradition of Empiricism,

and competing orientations, many of which arise out of Critical Theory and Post Modernism.

While I take a post-positivist empirical approach to understanding conservative skepticism

towards AGW, because that's the most pragmatic way to survey the existing academic literature

on the subject, it is still important to acknowledge the other approaches to research being

conducted within Political Theory and Environmental Politics. Had I approached this topic from

the competing Political Theory schools of Marxism, Neo-Marxism, Eco-Marxism, Eco-

Feminism, Deep Ecology, Critical Race Theory, Critical Gender Theory, Queer Theory,

Intersectionalism, or Post-Colonial Theory I might arrive at significantly different conclusions

regarding the nature of conservative American minds and recommend different proposed

solutions.

A common meta-theory within these theories is Social Constructionism, which in its

strongest form, holds that all meaning and value is socially constructed. Were that true, then the

psyches of American conservatives would simply be a product of socialization processes rooted

in Western practices that maintain hierarchies of race, gender, class, and knowledge. However, I

take a pragmatic position in this paper that argues that Social Constructionism is incomplete

(some things, but not all things, are in fact social constructions) and that there are biological, neurological, and psychological factors at play in producing human thought and behavior. I maintain that none of those three positions are entirely understood, either alone or together, and therefore it is best to approach this topic using all three where appropriate, knowing that epistemological certainty will not, and cannot, be achieved by any individual theory or approach. Further, I would argue that this mixed methodological approach is normatively acceptable because my primary goal is to improve environmental public policy outcomes via increasing public acceptance of empirical scientific data produced in the university system, not to arrive at some kind of final and perfect understanding of the nature of Truth.

The result of this post-positivist empirical approach, which rejects Social Constructionism, is a Three Solar System political model, which metaphorically places all possible political orientations as somewhere on a Left, Middle, and Right spectrum. There are multiple competing worlds within each solar system, but each solar system has generally agreed upon axioms that hold them together.

The Middle Solar System includes those who would prefer to not be dragged into hyper-partisan politics and instead search for common ground, and while they are not the focus of this dissertation, their existence deserves acknowledgement. This includes people who genuinely search for mutual understanding between the Left and Right, an increasingly difficult and rare thing, and the very large segment of society that simply wants to be left alone and left out of politics altogether. According to the Hidden Tribes (2022) model, 15% of the US population identifies as 'Moderates' and another 26% identify as 'Politically Disengaged.' Their model includes 'Traditional' (11%) and 'Passive' (15%) Liberals as part of a larger 'Exhausted Majority' group such that they wind up being a total 67% of the electorate.

According to the Hidden Tribes model, that leaves 25% of the electorate as 'Traditional' or 'Devoted' conservatives. For the purposes of this dissertation, I include all rightwing subgroups as part of a larger Right solar system, even if they have vehement disagreements with one another. This larger grouping includes Christian conservatives, Libertarians, online-subcultures, MAGAs, economic conservatives, rightwing populists, and traditional Republicans. While they may not agree with each other, they at least remain bound by negative partisanship towards the Left solar system.

Similarly, I include traditional Democrats, welfare-capitalists, liberals, Marxists, progressives, communists, and leftwing radicals in the Left solar system, not because they agree with one another (they don't), but again because there is common ground between them and there is a shared negative-partisanship towards those in the Right solar system. One example of commonality within this solar system would be that many academic debates currently happening in academia are occurring within the Left solar system, and within those debates almost all participants would agree that the denizens of Planet MAGA in the Right solar system are, at the very least, "problematic."

Figure 1.1. Rapper Bryson Gray wearing a large MAGA cowboy hat, a choice that many on the Left would find inappropriate or problematic. Image courtesy of the New Yorker (2019)

However, since I am operating within contested territory it is important to understand these debates within Political Theory. Critical Theory is rooted in work of the Frankfurt School which combined the works of Karl Marx, Hegel, and Sigmund Freud. The succeeding fields that arose out of Critical Theory have vastly different goals, epistemologies, ontologies, and research methodologies than positivism and post-positivism Empiricism. The post-positivists search for objective truth within limitations and acknowledgements of self-bias, whereas Critical Theorists search for liberation from socially constructed hierarchal systems such as capitalism, patriarchy, Westernism, and Whiteness. It is worth noting that there are efforts to use post-positivist neuroscience to advance these causes, such as Haas, Baker, and Gonzalez's 2017 article 'Who Can Deviate from the Party Line? Political Ideology Moderates Evaluation of Incongruent Policy Positions in Insula and Anterior Cingulate Cortex' which used functional MRI scans to look at neurological processes involved in evaluating relationships between candidates, positions, and ideology in the hopes of understanding the link between the enactment of social justice policies and the impact of how those policies are discussed.

Within the Critical Theory tradition, the use of Psychology from a Freudian origin has a long and deeply imbedded history including works by Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Fanon, György Lukács, and Theodor Adorno. They rejected the study of the psyche from a positivist perspective and developed numerous competing methodologies to account for the creation or manifestation of psychical forces which are shaped by social forces within social, economic, and political systems, and this became the foundation of further critiques within Critical Race Theory, Critical Gender Theory, and Intersectionality. These fields challenge both the findings of positivism (and later post-positivism) and the methodology as being rooted within socially constructed understandings of reality, which reinforce systems of social oppression.

There are thousands of books and articles written within these traditions, and as such there is too much material to cover here. Should my readers be interested in a comprehensive review of the original Critical Theory literature, I would recommend Martin Jay's (1973) *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-50.*

The history of the study of the human mind, brain, and psyche from Hegel to the present exists as a contested space between the Marxist and Critical Theory traditions on one hand, and the positivism turned post-positivism on the other. Issues up for debate are the essence of the individual apart from socialization, whether humans have an innate nature, the role of the brain and genetics in shaping human behavior, how historical intellectual forces have shaped how and what we study in academia, what the goal of understanding human thinking and behavior should be, the normative and moral concerns of human research, the mind-body problem, the use and misuse of research on marginalized populations, and the role of empirical research in supporting or challenging existing social systems. On a spectrum, the answers to these questions lie between the extremes of hard biological determinism and 'blank slatism'

This is no small controversy, and many academics have had their careers destroyed for arguing for an unpopular position along that spectrum, especially on the biological determinism end. There is too much material to cover from Freud, Hegel, and Marx to the present, so to represent the contemporary Critical Theory side of the debate this dissertation will use Fred Alford's 2020 article 'The Politicization of Neuroscience and The Destruction of Psychology' as a stand in. From there I will address his critique as I move into my defense of taking a post-positivist position.

According to Alford, Political Theorists, particularly those in the Marxist and Critical traditions, have been leery using of empirical, post-positivist research. Two notable scholars

who have broken from this trend are William Connolly (2002) and Brian Massumi (1995, 2002), whose work on incorporating neuroscience into political theory is opposed by Alford. For him, "Political theory is about power relationships among people who live in communities, societies, and nations", and so he is concerned that, "Once the individual is lifted out of society and community, and seen instead as a neuro-physiological system, there is no need or place for political theory" (Alford 2020, 1). Alford charges Connolly and Massumi with using neuroscience to criticize social theorists such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas who center reason, which is largely derived from Kantian and neo-Kantian positions. For Alford, this reinforces the mind-body split, challenges the conceptualization of freedom, and rejects Freud's 'psychical unconscious,' thus creating a superficial subject.

Alford accuses Connolly of 'neurological individualism,' centering development within the individual lens as opposed to the communal one as put forward by British Object Relations Theory. On the completely opposite end of a 'Blank Slate' charge of no innate human nature, this accusation is one of a 'Filled Slate' where people are completely determined, non-free machines responding to the world around them in a mechanical, causal, pre-determined way that precludes the possibility of freedom. Alford bases his critique of Connolly's use of neuroscience on the implications drawn from empirical research:

> In *Neuropolitics*, William Connolly (2002) writes of the narrative gap between experience and explanation, suggesting that the half-second delay between experience and conscious awareness of the experience is not a consequence of trauma, but a normal experience. Connolly's key example is a sixteen-year-old girl treated by a team of neurophysiologists for severe epilepsy. Applying an electric probe to eighty-five separate spots on her left frontal lobe, they eventually hit by chance upon that part of the brain that made her laugh. The more current, the more laughter, so that a slight smile was produced by a low current; robust, contagious laughter by a higher current. Remarkable is that every time she was asked why she was laughing, she always had an explanation that referred to an external stimulus, one which we know to be retrospective. Whether we know it to be simply false is another question, one which Connolly wisely does not address.

When asked why she was laughing when directed to point at the researchers, she says "you guys are just so funny…standing around." When asked to name an object, she said, "the horse is funny," and laughed (Fried et al., 1998, p. 650).

The inference Connolly draws is that "'incomprehensible quantities of unconscious calculation' take place during the half-second delay between the reception of sensory material and the consolidation of perceptions, feelings, and judgments" (2002, p. 82). The internal quotation is from Tor Nørretranders (1998, p. 221), who refers to the "quick, crude reaction time of the amygdala that precedes feeling and consciousness." Nothing else in this example refers to the amygdala, though it turns out to be a major player in this neuropsychic drama. The calculation to which Connolly refers stems from a gap in psychic time that seems to allow people to retroactively, and seemingly quite arbitrarily, attribute explanations for their experiences. Or, as Leslie Paul Thiele (2006, p. 212) puts it in *The Heart of Judgment*, "our conscious judgments are mostly afterthoughts. They bespeak the efforts of a left hemisphere… feigning cognitive control through the narrative fabrication of a self." (Alford 2020, 2-3)

The argument then goes into questions concerning the brain, particularly the amygdala, and whether or not it learns or can be educated, and what that means for autonomy and socialization, and the role and nature of an unconscious mind at play, going back to Freud's theories on the nature of the mind and the role of narratives in creating meaning. Returning to Thiele, Alford asks us to,

1) "Consider another possibility:
that under the influence of neuroscience, Thiele assumes that a "nonverbal narrative document" is a strictly intrapsychic development, whose evolution can be described much as a fetus develops, or as a brain develops. Here lies the source of the neurological individualism of the neuroscientific approach to political theory referred to earlier: the assumption that individual development takes place inside the individual. This assumption follows the individual into adulthood, as Connolly's examples of how one might use everyday techniques to alter one's thinking, discussed shortly, reveal". (Alford 2020, 5)

2) Consider the alternative:
that the child is fundamentally related to others from birth. It is these relationships with others from which our stories flow. The developmental psychiatrist Daniel Stern (1992, p. 65), in a book written for mothers about what their babies might be feeling, puts words to four-and-a-half-month-old Joey's feelings, as Stern imagines them.

"Mother's smile becomes a light breeze that reaches across to touch me. It caresses me." In reaching across to touch him, her smile exerts its natural evocative powers and sets in motion its contagiousness. Her smile triggers a smile in him and breathes a vitality into him. It makes him resonate with the animation she feels and shows. His joy rises. Her smile pulls it out of him."

And finally,

3) "Consider the difference. Joey is animated and develops in relationship to mother, and then others. It is not his brain that develops (though that develops too); it is Joey's self that develops. To be sure, the self, too, is neuronally based, but it is understood not as a fetus develops, but as a person does. Long before humans can talk, we are involved in relationships, and it is from these relationships that narratives are woven. Our first stories are stories about our relationships with people, relationships that have been internalized during our first year. It is these internalized relationships that are the building-blocks of narrative.

The psychoanalyst Hanna Segal, commenting on Jacques Lacan's claim that the unconscious is structured like a language said simply. "I think it's the other way around." Language is structured like the unconscious. There is a lot going on preverbally, parents and bodies and so forth are all symbolized. Eventually the young child verbalizes. For Segal, this reveals that it is language that emerges from the unconscious, not the unconscious modeling itself on language. "When language eventually emerges, it reflects the structure of our basic functions: subject, object, and action" (Quinodoz 2008, p. 73; Segal, 2007, p. 252). Language symbolizes body, and relationships among bodies and body parts, going on to represent more abstract relationships as we develop." (Alford 2020, 6)

Who is right in this debate? Which intellectual tradition best encapsulates the puzzle of how much of our 'slate' is blank or filled, and by what? Do we ultimately have completely free will, influenced free will, or no free will at all? Again, I personally do not have the answers to these questions, other than to look at the 'Nature' arguments about brains as physical-mechanical structures, the 'Nurture' arguments as a series of socially constructed intersubjective meanings and relationships with their own peculiar logics, and to place the debate over free will in the same intellectual mystery box where I keep my conjectures about all of life's unsolvable mysteries. At present we don't know the answers to these riddles, so the best we can do is take a methodologically pluralistic

approach and triangulate on the answer from the various possible approaches and find peace within the epistemological gaps.

This pluralism is justified because the same phenomenon can be viewed through different lenses, and there are different levels of understanding. We are individuals, and we are nodes within relationships, and we are biological beings who use socially constructed ideas to communicate and function in a world full of physical objects which are experienced by minds. Not a single one of those concepts (individuals, relationships, Biology, Social Constructionism, Physics, Epistemology, etc.) are simple or complete.

So here we leave the debate at this juncture, and turn to the work of Social, Political, and Moral Psychology. Not because the matter is resolved, but because my larger project of preserving the perception of legitimacy within higher education requires practical and pragmatic policy proposals, and the empirical research has been conducted within the Enlightenment-based, post-positivist tradition.

<p align="center">Literature Review on Conservative Skepticism on AGW</p>

It should be noted early that skepticism about AGW falls into several distinct worlds. One world would be that of credentialed scholars like Dr. Bjorn Lomborg and Steven Koonin, who acknowledge global warming as a manmade phenomenon, but are skeptical about how it is represented, and the danger of focusing too much on AGW at the expense of other important issues. The people in this world accept AGW as a real phenomenon and are open to being reasoned with about available public policy solutions, and are willing to debate and discuss the issue in an intelligent, reasoned way with other scholars.

A very different world would be that of the conspiracy theorists like Alex Jones, who believe that global warming is part of a malevolent and false narrative meant to further the plans

of a global elite bent on world domination, as part of a larger sinister plot which includes

pedophile blackmail rings, satanic vampires, gay frogs, and interdimensional elves. I imagine

that most scholars have little to no desire to take Mr. Jones seriously, but he has an audience of

two million weekly listeners, four million unique weekly visitors to his InfoWars website, and

the growing academic literature on how conspiratorial thinking spreads within social networks

suggests that his reach goes much, much further than that.

The optimistic side of this is that if the environmental movement can learn to speak to his

audience, then that is a whole world of potential untapped support, and there is reason for

optimism here. In June 2021 Alex Jones began a pro-environment river cleanup campaign called

'SAVE THE FROGS, SAVE HUMANITY' to, "educate the public on the dangers of

Atrazine and other estrogen mimickers to save humanity" (Infowars 2021). This

campaign, while certainly peculiar, shows that the people who engage in conspiracy

Figure 1.2. A very problematic Alex Jones, dressed here as a Gay Frog, encouraging
his listeners to take part in a river cleanup project. Image courtesy of Infowars.

theories do have environmental concerns and are willing to take the threat of pollution seriously, which means common ground and discourse can theoretically be found. If common ground can be found and consensus can be built across the political spectrum, that increases the chances of environmental initiatives succeeding.

Many skeptics, though, are simply everyday conservatives or conservative-leaning moderates with a general distrust of authority, who are influenced by media and their peers, as well as potentially think tanks with a vested interest to discourage public belief in AGW (Oreskes and Conway 2010). They are not inherently against environmental protection, but they do not generally see it as a priority, and worry about the impact of environmental regulations on themselves and their country and economy. In some cases, it is merely a matter of environmental messaging being affected by fatigued participation in political debate within a hyper-partisan environment, as was so eloquently expressed by the conservative satire website The Babylon Bee's article 'Poll Finds Most People Would Rather Be Annihilated By Giant Tidal Wave Than Continue To Be Lectured By Climate Change Activists.'

> "Study participants were given the option of having the earth flooded by massive tidal waves or listening to virtue-signaling, smarmy lectures by environmentalists for the next decade. Over 87% of respondents selected, "Bring on the tidal wave." A few people said they'd rather take the lectures, but after hearing a few minutes of the lectures, quickly changed their minds. Several respondents rushed straight to the ocean, arms outstretched, and asked the sea to take us all.
>
> "Come, sweet death," one man scrawled on the survey response form after hearing just 30 seconds of a Greta Thunberg lecture. "O, sweet release that ends my suffering on this mortal plane! Embrace me in your salty arms, great wave of destiny."" (Babylon Bee 2019)

The validity (or sanity) of these approaches is not explored in this dissertation, other than to note that the research on conservative skepticism draws on many sources, exploring forces

which interact with one another in complex ways, and that conservatives should not be thought of as an ideological monolith. In fact, research suggests that self-identified conservatives are more politically diverse than their leftwing counterparts (Feldman and Johnston 2014; Klein and Stern 2005; Stenner 2009)

The existing academic literature on conservative skepticism of AGW is generally focused on Psychology, language, sociology, social networks, hyper-partisanship, and the sources of mistrust of AGW science. Organizationally, I will connect these approaches by starting at the individual level, then zooming out to the macro-level to look at the effects of hyper-partisanship on motivated reasoning, and then examine social networks and ingroup psychology. Together, these approaches can be combined to build a teleological model of a conservative social system that organizes and interprets political moral-emotional messages to shape political beliefs for conservative ingroup members, which in turn affects attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. This social system gathers informational inputs from a variety of sources, including organizations which have a financial interest in minimizing belief in AGW as well as conspiratorial thinkers who frame AGW science as part of a larger plan to acquire political power through fear. Thus, negative media narratives about higher education and negative conservative student experiences on campus can be conceptualized as narrative inputs into this system.

Building off of the work of Haidt and Joseph (2004) and Haidt and Graham (2007), Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) applied Moral Foundations Theory to understand how differences in moral intuitions produce moral disagreements in the realm of politics. They used five sets of moral intuitions (Harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) and found that liberals favored harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations more strongly than the others whereas conservatives endorsed and used all five

foundations more or less equally. These differences manifested in different assessments and judgements in four studies they ran as part of their larger study of the American political "culture war." They found that,

> "Conservatives, in contrast, have a stronger preference for things that are familiar, stable, and predictable (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; McCrae, 1996). Conservatives—at least, the subset prone to authoritarianism—also show a stronger emotional sensitivity to threats to the social order, which motivates them to limit liberties in defense of that order (Altemeyer, 1996; McCann, 2008; Stenner, 2005)." (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009)

The role of threat in general, especially to the authoritarian subset, is important to our discussion here, because if conservative media is portraying the contemporary university as a threat, and conservative student experiences are legitimating that perception, that means that we should expect to see defensive psychological processes being activated in response, impacting perception of both higher education and AGW. This occurs because people have Partisan Social Identities and are influenced by Partisan Motivated Reasoning, both of which influence how people interpret information through the lens of their political commitments. Partisan Social Identity is a person's sense of who they are based on their membership in a political group, which going back to Tajfel and his colleagues in the late 1970s, is linked to attitudes, behaviors, values, self-conceptions of worth, emotion, group assimilation, intergroup bias for one's own group, and negative evaluations of and prejudice towards outgroups. According to Bolsen et al. (2014), Partisan Motivated Reasoning refers to an individual's goal in the context of forming an attitude and can lead people to oppose policies they would otherwise support due to their partisan identity and ingroup loyalty.

Conservative perception of threat is important to understanding conservative skepticism of AGW, because social identity threat has been linked to both conspiratorial thinking and laypersons' perception of scientists by Nauroth et al. (2017), who found that, "scientists were

perceived as less prototypical, less reputable, and less competent when their research results

imply a threat to participants' social identity compared to a non-threat condition" (Nauroth et al.

2017, 754).

Conservative social identity in the United States is also affected by the 'White Male

Effect.' Studies in America and Europe show that when White males are the dominant group,

they are more likely than other groups to have drastically less fear of environmental threats,

which is thought to occur due to their relative status in these societies and the increased

likelihood of their having individualist and hierarchist, as opposed to egalitarian, worldviews.

While the term implies that this effect is limited to White males, Palmer (2003) has noted similar

low-risk assessment and worldview correlations amongst Asian males, arguing that it should be

renamed the 'low-risk effect.' Although the effect may not be limited to White males, according

to Kahan et al. (2007) its existence has been demonstrated in a multitude of diverse areas,

including environmental pollution, handguns, blood transfusions, and red meat.

McCright and Dunlap (2011a, 2011b) wrote two papers looking at the White male effect

and the intersection of politicization of AGW within a climate of political polarization. They

found:

> "Conservative white males are more likely than other Americans to report climate
> change denial. Conservative white males who self-report understanding global
> warming very well are even more likely. Climate change denial is an example of
> identity-protective cognition, System-justifying tendencies lead to climate change
> denial, Climate change denial increased from 2001 to 2010." (McCright and
> Dunlap, 2011a)

System-justifying tendencies explain a threat response, wherein accepting the existence

and severity of AGW could lead to increased fear of political policy outcomes, such as increased

government intrusion into their lives. This fear is expressed in the "Global warming is a hoax"

literature by conservatives who cite liberal or leftwing authors and politicians who want to use

AGW as a means of getting their preferred policy outcomes, including Naomi Klein (2014), who wrote *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. Climate*, the Eco-Marxists, and progressive Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who has lobbied to pass the 'Green New Deal.' (Bastach 2019)

Identity-protective cognition is the process whereby individuals selectively accept or reject dangers in ways that support their preferred form of social and political organization. Together these processes incentivize conservatives, particularly White male conservatives, to react to AGW with skepticism as a form of social and personal protection. McCright and Dunlap's (2011b) other work explored Gallup data between 2001 and 2010 and found 'significant ideological and partisan polarization' had in fact occurred over AGW, with education and self-reported understanding having a positive impact on liberals/Democrats and either a weaker or a negative impact on conservatives/Republicans. These findings are consistent with AGW skepticism being affected by partisan social identity in a politically polarized environment. Krange et al. (2019) were able to replicate the findings of McCright and Dunlaps' 2011 articles in Norway, showing that this phenomenon is not only occurring in the United States.

Returning to the US, Kelly and Hornsey (2016) also looked at the impact of social identity on attitudes and behaviors towards climate change and the environment. They found an intergroup dimension within environmental challenges based on group conflicts between conservatives and progressives, farmers and scientists, farmers and environmentalists, and communities and big businesses such as mining operations. Intergroup tensions, through social context and group membership, impacted, "attitudes, beliefs, and actions relating to climate change and the environment more broadly" (Kelly and Hornsey 2016, 1). They developed Social

Identity-based approaches and advocated for further empirical work to improve the theoretical approach to encourage positive attitudes and behaviors towards the environment and AGW.

Meanwhile, the role that conspiratorial thinking plays in AGW skepticism has already been studied by Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer (2013) and van der Linden and Sander (2015). Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer's (2013) excellently-titled article, 'NASA Faked the Moon Landing – Therefore, (Climate) Science Is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science' looked at links between endorsement of free-market economics and rejection of leftwing political positions. Endorsement of free-market economics was linked to a rejection of belief in AGW, as well as rejection of HIV being the cause of AIDS, and smoking causing lung cancer. Beyond economics, endorsement of common conspiracy theories, such as the FBI having killed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., also predicted rejection of belief in AGW.

This 'conspiracy-effect' describes the phenomenon where belief in one or more conspiracy theories leads to belief in other conspiratorial theories. Van der Linden and Sander (2015) looked at this conspiracy-effect as conspiratorial beliefs are becoming more widespread in the American public, linking it to a decrease in pro-environmental behavior, a reduction of science acceptance, and a negative influence on pro-social decision making. They noted that conspiratorial beliefs are 'potent', and that exposure to a conspiracy video on AGW led to a significant belief that there is no widespread consensus on AGW, and those who watched it were less likely to sign a petition to help reduce AGW or volunteer for a charity. Thus, this network of beliefs predicts that if someone were to believe in a conspiracy about universities having subversive Marxist agendas, that in turn would predict a rejection of belief in AGW.

Conservative skepticism of AGW isn't limited to conspiratorial thinking. The effect that partisan motivated reasoning plays in motivating rejection of science has been widely studied.

Bolseon et al. (2014) found that partisan motivated reasoning impacts individual perceptions by shaping information through the lens of party commitment, creating competing obligations to both form accurate opinions and to agree with one's political ingroup. Lewandowsky and Oberauer (2016) and Druckman and McGrath (2019) found that when accurate information forces one to disagree with their political ingroup, people tend to disbelieve accurate information, because it threatens their core beliefs and/or worldview, regardless of political orientation. From Alford's (2020) perspective, this threatens one's relationships (even unconscious ones) and thus risks social alienation. Further, increased knowledge increases the polarization of opinions along party lines, but the good news is that tendency can be counteracted when people are given specific knowledge about the mechanisms that produce a certain scientific result.

The idea that ingroup partisan reasoning outweighs individual desires has been challenged by Bayes and Druckman (2021), who argue that this process is more complex than previously acknowledged. According to their review of studies involving partisan motivated reasoning, the mechanics of how and when people choose accuracy or ingroup motivated reasoning needs to be further explored, as it appears that individuals often engage in both types of decision making. Understanding what internal mechanics and external circumstances best produce the desire to form accurate opinions, when opposite of partisan commitments, could be extremely valuable knowledge in encouraging pro-environmental beliefs and behaviors towards solving collective action problems, such as AGW.

Between external stimuli and internal psychological processes are intersubjectively created media that deliver information between ingroup members, which in turn shapes individual beliefs, and forms social meanings and understanding (Nisbet and Feldman 2011,

McCloud et al. 2009). Conversations within the conservative world about AGW occur through social networks that incentivize demonstrations of loyalty to political social identity (Garret 2009a, Garret 2009b). The fact that universities and scientific organizations are populated with people with left of center political identities (from 'moderate leaning liberal' to 'Marxist') gives rise to the perception that these are partisan institutions that are more interested in politics than the pursuit of truth among conservatives. (Jaschick 2017) If increasing belief in the severity of AGW is seen as a political cause of the left, then the rejection of that belief becomes a cause on the right. (Bolsen et al. 2014; Druckman and McGrath 2019; Boyer et al. 2020)

The role of social networks in shaping beliefs, opinions, and actions has likewise been studied. Sinclair (2012) looked at the social dimension of political decision making within social networks and the influences that peers have on each other's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Among her findings was that the expression of political opinion or beliefs within networks encouraged others to adopt the same positions, particularly when their conformity is highly visible. Compared to their leftwing counterparts, conservatives value authority and hierarchy within their ingroups, which means that within networks those individuals recognized as having legitimate authority, and higher social positions should be expected to have stronger influences within conservative social networks.

This presents both a danger and a potential source of increasing agreement and cooperation on AGW. There is a danger because high status conservatives have a strong ability to sway fellow partisans to reject belief in or be skeptical about AGW, but potential because if these same individuals can be persuaded to believe in the importance of addressing AGW dangers and taking pro-environmental stances, they can bring along lower status individuals

because of network dynamics, much more easily and effectively than partisan outsiders (possibly

including STEM faculty at left-leaning universities).

Brady et al. (2017) looked at how political debate played out on online social networks,

examining the role of moral emotions in expanding what they call 'moral contagion.' Moral

contagion is the phenomenon that occurs because people's moods, thoughts, and actions are

shaped by the totality of one's social network of relationships such that ideas and intuitions

spread virally throughout social networks. Using a sample size of 563,312 they observed,

> "that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion
> by a factor of 20% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral
> contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language
> increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and
> less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social
> transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network
> methods for studying morality." (Brady et al. 2017, 7313)

Figure 1.3. "Moral-emotional language predicts the greatest number of retweets.
The graph depicts the number of retweets, at the mean level of continuous and
effects-coded covariates, predicted for a given tweet as a function of moral and
moral-emotional language present in the tweet. Bands reflect 95% CIs. An
increase in moral-emotional language predicted large increases in retweet counts
in the domain of (A) gun control, (B) same-sex marriage, and (C) climate change
after adjusting for the effects of distinctly moral and distinctly emotional language
and covariates." (Brady et al. 2017, 7314)

They argue that,

> "In the domain of morality, the expression of moral emotion in particular may
> drive social contagion. Compared with nonmoral emotions, moral emotions are

those that are most often associated with evaluations of societal norms and are elicited by interests that may go beyond self-interest [e.g., contempt in response to injustices committed in another country]. Importantly, moral emotions may also be tied specifically to behavior that is relevant to morality and politics, including judgments of responsibility and voting." (Brady et al. 2017, 7313)

The explanation for why social contagion of moral emotions occurs includes emotional mimicry, which Hess and Fischer (2013) argue functions as a social regulator within relationships. The implication of this work is that conservative skepticism of AGW is partially rooted in their social network's expressions of emotional moral language, which means that environmental messaging can be shaped with moral-emotional language that produces positive emotional reactions that will then spread throughout their social networks.

Unfortunately, common moral emotions expressed in conservative media regarding higher education are fear, contempt, ridicule, anger, resentment, disgust, and indignation. Taken to the extremes, one also finds hate and paranoia. Rozin et al. (1999) linked contempt, anger, and disgust with moral codes regarding community, autonomy, and divinity. When these emotions are evoked and spread within social communities, they register as threats to the existing social order. Whereas most species react to threats via dyadic relationships within groups, humans, chimps, and bonobos all experience third-party morality where uninvolved individuals react emotionally to both social order violators and those violated, and these reactions have long term effects. Because humans have such wide social networks via media and social media, any sense of social order violation can be emotionally broadcast out to the entire network. This means that any moral-emotional messages about universities being threats to social order will spread and color the conservative social network's perception of higher education itself as a threat, triggering psychological threat responses.

Fortunately, one also finds admiration and thankfulness for academics willing to stand up for freedom of expression, or for taking heterodox political positions in the face of the danger of cancel culture. Those academics who do have a positive, high-status reputation on the right could very well serve as a bridge between AGW STEM scientists and the larger conservative world. One group to consider would be the identity and ideologically diverse members of what Bari Weiss dubbed the 'Intellectual Dark Web', who are respected on the right because of their willingness to fight for academic freedom and free speech. This group includes Professor Camille Paglia, Dr. Jordan Peterson, Dr. Eric Weinstein, Dr. Sam Harris, Dr. Carol Swain, Dr. Heather Heying, Dr. Michael Shermer, Dr. Debra Soh, Dr. Jonathan Haidt, Dr. Glenn Loury, and Dr. John McWhorter. Not only do these figures have academic credentials and the respect of conservatives, but their Intellectual Dark Web social network gives them privileged access to media figures with huge conservative audiences - the very people who I, as an environmentalist, want to reach, in order to bring them into the conversation about AGW and environmental concerns.

One well-studied aspect of these networks is the role of party loyalty, including the link between party loyalty and views on AGW. Borick and Rabe (2010) used state and national surveys to study partisanship's impact on perception of AGW, and found that people's beliefs about AGW were significantly impacted by their partisan beliefs, which shaped their interpretation of their individual experiences, and of weather phenomenon more generally. McCright (2011) found that political orientation can produce a 'moderator effect', where there is a significant partisan split between people who viewed AGW as a negative result of capitalism, and those who defend capitalism from such critiques. He found that people's views on capitalism had significant impact on their views on AGW, a phenomenon he argues is explained

by Information Processing Theory and the 'elite cue hypothesis.' Informational Processing

Theory holds that people learn gradually over time, and seek to understand the mechanics of how

we perceive and interact with information via memory processes, organizational thinking,

attention, and metacognition. The 'elite cue hypothesis' states that rank and file voters have their

views shaped by partisan elites, so when prominent conservative elites cast dispersions on the

existence or severity of AGW, or the scientists and institutions which promote public policies

designed to combat AGW, including contemporary American universities, that rejection and

skepticism is likely to be shared by conservative rank and file voters.

Tranter and Booth (2015) also looked at AGW skepticism across nations and noted that

while education, post-material value orientations, and age are typically good indicators of

environmental beliefs, they were poor predictors when it came to AGW. Instead, they found that

affiliation with conservation political parties, gender, lack of concern about 'the environment',

and having little to no trust in government were consistently larger factors. Hornsey et al. (2016)

found similar results when they looked at 27 variables, using 25 polls, and 171 studies from 56

countries and found that education, sex, subjective knowledge, experience of extreme weathers

had less of an impact than values, ideologies, worldviews, and political orientations. Ehret et al.

(2018) found that partisan endorsement actually increased polarization effects, regardless of

knowledge about or belief in AGW, and Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) found that support for a

free-market economy drives beliefs about AGW and climate scientists, and that active distrust of

climate scientists likewise drives conservatives to continually reinforce their skepticism towards

AGW.

This phenomenon is occurring within a climate of hyper-partisanship which increases

political polarization and amplifies these effects, where views on AGW are now more polarizing

than views on abortion for US voters. Whereas it may have once been hoped that education would produce cooperation, Drummond and Fischhoff (2017) found the exact opposite in their article, 'Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics.'

The situation is thus ripe for inputs that encourage distrust, including those who have both good intentions and those with financial interests in increasing the misperception of scientific consensus on AGW, sometimes referred to as 'Merchants of Doubt.' McCright and Dunlap (2003) looked at how these well-funded organizations managed to defeat the Kyoto Protocols by shaping public perception against AGW as a significant problem, and McCright et al. (2013) connected political orientation to perception of scientific disagreement about AGW, government support to reduce emissions, and AGW itself. They argued that one way to improve cooperative outcomes would be to find a balance between promoting the public perception of there being scientific consensus on AGW but in a way that does not, "trigger or aggravate ideological or partisan divisions" (McCright et al. 2013, 511).

Finally, Ding et al. (2011) looked at how opponents of AGW legislation use public perception of scientific disagreement to their advantage. While there is little scientific disagreement about AGW being real, manmade, significant, and solvable, there is widespread public belief that significant scientific disagreement exists. This belief is consequential and is strongly associated with disbelief in AGW and aversion to AGW policies and legislation.

My Hypothesis in Deductive Argumentative Form

Premise 1: Moral-Emotional Language, within political networks, shapes beliefs, which in turn shapes political behavior.

Premise 2: Discussion about AGW occurs within conservative networks, with Moral-Emotional Language that includes threat messaging, which conservatives are more sensitive to than their liberal counterparts. For those conservatives who do accept AGW as real and manmade, the severity of that threat is weighed against severity of the threat of their political opponents using fear of AGW to justify their preferred public policy outcomes. This in turn provokes psychological defensive strategies, such as dismissing AGW as real, minimizing its risk, or believing that claims are being exaggerated for political purposes, and motivates conservative reasoning to distrust sources of AGW information.

Premise 3: American conservatives have a very negative view of the higher education system, and there exists multiple media which paint the university system in the most negative light possible, using Moral-Emotional Language to present it as a threat to civilization itself. This is occurring in a hyper-partisan environment, where trust in government institutions is in serious decline.

Premise 4: The emotions expressed towards the university system and AGW are both rooted in threat perception, and much of the American public's information about AGW comes from the university system, thus psychologically tying them together as part of a larger phenomenon.

Conclusion: Therefore, it is likely that the conservative view of higher education is an important causal factor contributing to AGW skepticism.

Implications

If particular administrative policy and pedagogical practices can be identified as drivers of AGW skepticism, then there is hope that they can be changed to bring conservatives back into a reasonable AGW conversation, and we can improve AGW policy outcomes across the partisan divide. Specifically, should the prevailing trends against free speech and academic freedom be reversed (Lasson 2018; Chemerinsky and Gillman2017; Whittington 2018), such that students and faculty with conservative or heterodox opinions feel like they can be allowed to participate in campus life once more, then this will restore the public perception of the university as a non-partisan place of learning for all people, psychologically reducing individual threat responses and public skepticism about AGW and encouraging bipartisan public support for AGW legislation.

Roadmap

This dissertation has four parts which are designed to show how campus policies, when reported on by conservative media, generate mistrust and declining perception of the contemporary higher education system as a net positive for society.

Chapter Two continues this Environmental Politics section and is focused on a treatment effect experiment that I ran in the Fall of 2021 to look at the impact of perception of campus administrative politics on student receptivity to environmental information. The experiment was built to look for evidence of what the existing research on AGW skepticism says should be occurring in our student population here at CSU.

In Chapters Three and Four, I use a Public Policy and Public Administration approach to argue that the social forces creating these problems arise from the combination of universities trying to simultaneously exist as both business-oriented neoliberal institutions and drivers of

progressive social change. I explore the nature of progressivism as a commitment to recognition and/or redistribution following the 2003 debate between Fraser and Honneth, and look at the history of IED policies and programs in higher education.

In Chapters Five and Six, I use Habermasian Critical Theory to argue that this progressive neoliberal model generates social pathologies because it produces policies which violate the standards of an 'ideal speech situations' on campus, and propose a new approach rooted in Discourse Theory and Public Deliberation Theory. While I had to use a post-positivist empirical approach here to survey the existing literature, it's within Discourse and Public Deliberation Theory that I have found the best contemporary route to combining Political Theory with empirical work, which as a mixed methodologist is where I believe our field should go in order to foster better cooperation, in order to pragmatically understand and solve problems within Political Science

In Chapters Seven and Eight, I map these critical understandings onto contemporary Social and Political Psychology, primarily Social Identity Theory, to show that these effects are not merely theoretical in nature, but are well documented as measurable psychological phenomena which need to be addressed and taken seriously, if we wish to begin restoring the public perception of the contemporary university as a net public good. By taking empirical information and contemporary Psychology research seriously, we can develop better pragmatic administrative and pedagogical strategies to engage both students and the public across the political spectrum, and thus increase our chances of building broad public support for collective action environmental problems, such as AGW.

Finally, in the epilogue I explore contemporary approaches to balancing diversity of identity with diversity of thought, which could serve as the foundation for a list of proposed Best Practices for university administrators and faculty to better engage students across the political spectrum, and hopefully begin restoring legitimacy to the American university system.

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Chapter Two – Environmental Politics, Part Two: Treatment Effect Experiment and Results

"We've gotten to the point where people don't believe scientists, regardless of what they say, which is frustrating to us all."
-Colorado State University (CSU) Professor Brian Foy, regarding Ivermectin for Covid-19

"CSU is a fair and seemingly bias free institution."
-Survey response from a liberal, strong Democrat

"To be honest, I extremely dislike this school. I am an older student and a veteran. I was under the impression that a college campus was a place where great minds were developed through debate, discussion, and intellectual conversation. Being on this campus has made me realize that this place is just a money grabbing, twitter obsessed, left wing, reddit-communist, black hole. There is no debate, there is only yelling louder than opponent. There is no discussion, there is only crying and being offended. I would compare a college campus to a nursery in a hospital, babies crying at the top of their lungs for attention."
-Survey response from a slightly conservative Libertarian.

Introduction

Partisan motivated reasoning has repeatedly been linked with disbelief in and skepticism towards Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW). Conservative media coverage of universities is frequently negative, campus expression surveys show increased fear in conservative student populations of expressing their true beliefs, and institutional trust in higher education among conservatives is very low and has been decreasing every year in recent years. My hypothesis was that messages about social justice or free speech could impact partisan motivated reasoning among undergraduates towards feelings of safety on campus, perceptions of bias, representation, safety, and AGW skepticism.

This project builds upon the existing research done on perception of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) and partisan motivated reasoning (Bayes and Druckman 2020, Bolsen et al. 2014, Borick and Rabe 2010, Druckman and McGrath 2019, Ehret et al. 2018, Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2016, Krange et al. 2019), as well as faculty partisan affiliation (Cardiff and Klein 2005), public perception of scientific agreement (Ding et al. 2011, McCright

et al. 2013), partisan experiences on campus (Honeycutt and Freberg 2017, Kelly-Woessner and Woessner 2006, Navarro et al. 2009, Stiksma 2021), partisan communication (Huckfeldt 2004, Sinclair 2012), conspiratorial thinking (Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2013), and the role of conservative politics in defeating AGW multinational agreements (McCright and Dunlap 2014).

There is strong evidence for two major claims: 1) Conservative students have different experiences and behave differently on campus than their liberal peers and 2) there is a partisan split over perception of AGW in the larger culture. The first claim is empirically supported by Heterodox Academy's work (Stiksma 2021) and Larson, McNeilly, and Ryan's 2020 report 'Free Expression and Constructive Dialogue at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill', which surveyed 1,087 undergraduate students, and whose findings are similar to those found in Heterodox Academy's Campus Expression Surveys. Larson, McNeilly, and Ryan's (2020) Executive Summary has four items, two of which are positive and two which are negative. The positive news is that:

- Students say that (when politics come up in class) the majority of their UNC professors do try to discuss both sides of political issues and encourage opinions from across the political spectrum.

- Students across the political spectrum want more opportunities to engage with those who think differently.

The negative news is that:

- The current campus climate does not consistently promote free expression and constructive dialogue across the political spectrum.

- Although students across the political spectrum report facing challenges related to free expression, these challenges seem to be more acute for students who identify as conservative. (Larson, McNeilly, and Ryan 2020, 1-2)

The results of my experiment build upon the results of Larson, McNeilly, and Ryan (2020), Honeycutt and Freberg (2017), Kelly-Woessner and Woessner (2006), Navarro et al. (2009), and Stiksma (2021), by showing that the different conservative and liberal undergraduate experiences on campus are influencing receptivity of information related to AGW. Conservative skepticism, and the partisan split on AGW perception, can be traced at least as far back as the 1980 presidential campaign between Carter and Reagan (Alter 2020), and has remained a persistent political reality ever since. (Bayes and Druckman 2021)

Both the leftwing Atlantic (Friedersdorf 2020) and the rightwing Daily Wire (Schowe 2020) publications have reported that conservatives self-censor on campus. Larson, McNeilly, and Ryan's (2020) research found that conservative students were 300 times more likely to self-censor their views. This self-censoring behavior matches the existing research on partisan social identity and threat responses to perceived attacks on social identity. Holmes (2017), building on the work of Holmes (2016) and Petriglieri (2011), lists nine social identity threat responses:

> "Derogation: An individual engages in derogation by criticizing or denouncing the attacker to mitigate the identity threat and discredit the attacker.
>
> Concealment: A concealment threat response occurs when one tries to tone down or hide the threatened identity hoping that the reduced salience of the identity will persuade the attacker to stop the identity threatening behavior.
>
> Positive Distinctiveness: The most proactive of the identity-protection responses, positive distinctiveness, is when an individual attempts to change the attacker's opinion of the threatened identity by arguing the virtues of the identity.
>
> Identity Exit: This is the most challenging threat response to undertake as it requires an individual to discard completely one's affiliation with the threatened identity.
>
> Meaning Change: When using this threat response, threatened individuals cognitively shift their perception of what the identity means to them.
>
> Importance Change: When using this threat response, individuals cognitively shift how important the identity is to them (Petriglieri 2011).

Constructive Action: Constructive action is when an individual attempts to overcome an identity threat by engaging in what he or she perceives to be productive behavior, but does not address the threatened identity directly.

Ignore: Despite the fact that people realize social identity threats occur, our research highlighted systematically that some people choose to ignore them." (Holmes 2017)

The literature on conservative media contains many examples of these kinds of behaviors occurring, both on campus and in the greater public (Rathje et al. 2021, Wojcieszak et al. 2021). Ergo, it seems likely that there could be causal links between partisan social identity, perception of higher education, experiences within higher education, and skepticism and doubt towards AGW.

Experimental Design

This was a limited treatment effect experiment which had n=142 completed responses. My first attempt at university-wide randomly selected departments yielded only n=13 results, so I amended my survey to focus on large, introductory Political Science courses taught by faculty with whom I had a personal relationship, and thus were more willing to help me. This did bias the sample pool to undergraduates who were already interested in politics enough to take a Political Science course, but it was necessary to get statistically significant results.

The background social conditions of the experiment are that, according to College Pulse and FIRE (2021), we are a pretty average school in terms of free speech, with a slightly more conservative student body, probably due to our top-notch agriculture and veterinary medicine programs. They surveyed 37,104 students nationally and 250 from CSU[3] and found:

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[3] How were the students recruited? The initial sample was drawn from College Pulse's American College Student Panel™, which includes more than 500,000 verified undergraduate students at more than 1,500 different two- and four-year colleges and universities in all 50 states. Panel members were recruited by a number of methods to ensure student diversity in the panel population, including web advertising, email campaigns, and partnerships with university-affiliated organizations.

Table 2.01. FIRE's data on Colorado State University's rankings on free speech

Category	Score or rank	Out of
Undergrad Enrollment	23, 804	
U.S. News Ranking	#148	
Admission Rate	81%	
Tuition	$31, 540	
Best Overall	#77	159
Overall Score	59.5	100
Comfort Expressing Ideas	15.7	25
Disruptive Conduct	10	12
Openness	9.3	15
Administrative Support	6	10
Tolerance For Conservative Speakers	8.7	16
Tolerance For Liberal Speakers	9.8	16
Speech Code	Yellow (0)	6

- 35% of students say it is never acceptable to shout down a speaker on campus.
- 77% of students say it is never acceptable to use violent protest to stop a speech on campus.
- 71% of students think it is likely that the administration will defend the speaker's rights in a free speech controversy.
- Students are most uncomfortable publicly disagreeing with a professor about a controversial topic.
- Racial inequality is the topic most frequently identified by students as difficult to have an open and honest conversation about on campus. (FIRE 2021)

I began by collecting demographic information regarding gender, age, year in school, ethnicity, party identification, and political self-identification. Then students were randomly put into 1 of 3 treatment groups: 49 students were given a progressive prompt on Social Justice policies at CSU, 48 students were given a libertarian/conservative prompt on free speech policies at CSU, and 45 students were in the control group and were given a non-political story about CSU's brewery program. The progressive prompt on Social Justice came from CSU's Vice-President of Enrollment and Access's Social Justice Action Team:

> "Enrollment and Access is committed to dismantling systemic racism that is the direct result of white supremacy. The violent anti-black murders that have recently taken the lives of Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, Tony McDade, Nina

Pop, George Floyd, Chris Beaty, Mike Ramos, David McAtee, James Scurlock, Elijah McClain, Rayshard Brooks, and Dion Johnson*, and the legacy of white supremacist violence for over 4 centuries in our country is reprehensible and our collective responsibility to work against.

We have put together two messages below. The first is a message from the Social Justice Action Team to our Black community in Enrollment and Access. The second is a resource guide directed specifically to those of us in Enrollment and Access who identify as white, white-passing, and non-black POC.

From SJAT to Our Black Community:

As non-black and white folx, we cannot begin to fully understand the daily fear, pain, and oppression that is endemic to your experience. Black lives MATTER. We are committed to doing the work of amplifying Black voices while using our privilege to dismantle white supremacy and eliminating systems of racism and inequality at our institution and in our communities. We are committed to listen, to learn, and to act.

To the white, white-passing, and non-black Enrollment and Access Staff:

The expectation is that this division is doing this anti-racist work. We are here as a Social Justice Action Team to do the work along with you. This list of anti-racist resources, media, and suggested action steps was compiled from an ever-growing supply of predominantly black/queer/trans/women authors, influencers, activists, and experts. It is NOT, by any means, a definitive list, AND many folks are asking "where do I start" and "what can I do." Here are some places to start, particularly around anti-racist work and the awareness of how white supremacy manifests itself in the air we breathe and things we can do to dismantle it." (Gardea et al. 2020)

The Free Speech prompt came from CSU's Guide to Academic Freedom in the

Classroom, which reads as follows:

"Colorado State University's guiding principles emphasize that all members of the university community share in the pursuit of knowledge and development of students. The College of Liberal Arts celebrates the central role of free speech in upholding these guiding principles. Colorado State University has official policies around free speech, academic freedom, and campus climate that establish codes of conduct.

Your professor wants you to have the freedom to learn.
The freedom for students to learn, explore, and challenge ideas while building and sharing your own opinions is the foundation of what is called academic freedom.

The freedom to learn. This freedom protects students from unfair treatment by instructors based on the student's opinions and beliefs. It recognizes that student opinions are valuable and should be able to be expressed without fear of retribution by the leader of the class. At the same time, the freedom to learn obligates students to follow class assignments and master course content, even if they disagree with it.

Academic freedom protects your right to your own ideas and views.

Academic freedom protects you when you disagree with your instructor or other students in the context of class discussions and assignments." (Colorado State University 2021)

Finally, there was a third neutral, non-political prompt about CSU's brewing program (Giordano 2020) that served as a control group.

Participants were then given 7 multiple choice questions about their campus experiences and 2 answer boxes to expand upon their responses:

1. On a scale of 1 (not at all safe) - 10 (completely safe), I feel _____ that I can express all of my personal and political beliefs freely on campus without fear of reprisal.

   The following questions had five possible answers and were scored 5=strongly agree, 4=slightly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 2=slightly disagree, 1=strongly disagree

2. People who share my political views are represented in the faculty and administration at CSU.
3. The administration at CSU present me with information that is free from obvious partisan political bias
4. The faculty at CSU respect all political viewpoints, allowing and encouraging students to openly state their real beliefs and opinions.
5. I hide my true political beliefs to avoid unfair treatment by the faculty at CSU.
6. People at CSU who doubt the existence of or threat posed by manmade global warming can express their views without fear of reprisal.
7. People at CSU who do not doubt the existence of or threat posed by manmade global warming can express their views without fear of reprisal.

   The last two questions had dialogue boxes encouraging people to share their experiences.

8. Please tell us about any times, if any, that you were made to feel uncomfortable on campus after expressing your political views in class.
9. When considering your experiences above, what is your view of CSU?

After data was collected the results, participants were placed into 1 of 3 possible categories: Left[4], Middle[5], or Right[6] and regressions and χ^2 tests were conducted through Stata. The distribution was:

Table 2.02. Total numbers of students, by partisanship and treatment prompt.

	Left	Middle	Right
Prompt 1: Progressive	38	0	11
Prompt 2: Free Speech	28	4	16
Prompt 3: Neutral	30	4	11
Total	96	8	38

There were not enough respondents who could not be placed into the Left or Right group to generate statistically significant results, so they are only included in the overall scores reported below.

<u>Results</u>

<u>Question 1 - Safety</u>

Question 1 was, "On a scale of 1 (not at all safe) - 10 (completely safe), I feel _____ that I can express all of my personal and political beliefs freely on campus without fear of reprisal." Question 1 had 142 observations, a mean score of 6.86, a Standard Deviation of 2.5, a Pearson χ^2 score of (18) = 17.61, and a Pr = .0482. Overall respondents who received the Progressive prompt reported an average score of 6.8, those who read the Free Speech prompt had an average score of 7.13, and those who read the Neutral prompt scored 6.64 on average.

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[4] Criteria: Slightly Liberal, Liberal, and Extremely Liberal Political Self-ID OR Self-ID as 'Leftist', 'Socialist', 'Communist', or 'Non-liberal Leftist' – NO Republicans or Libertarians

[5] Criteria: 'Moderate, Middle of the road' Political ID AND 'Independent' and 'Independent' OR ''Weak Republican' and 'Slightly Liberal'' OR ''Moderate' and 'Moderate''' OR ''prefer not to say' and 'haven't thought about it'

[6] Criteria: Slightly or Extremely Conservative political self-ID OR 'moderate' or 'Middle of the Road' or 'Independent' AND 'Strong or Weak Republican' OR 'don't know, haven't thought about it' AND 'Strong or Weak Republican' or 'Libertarian'

Table 2.1a. Total scores for Question 1, by Left and Right, and prompt, with χ^2 and Pr scores.

Left. Pearson χ^2 (16) = 14.99   Pr = 0.53 | Right. Pearson $\chi^2$16) = 17.52   Pr = 0.35

Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total	Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	3
2	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	3	6
3	2	0	1	3	3	1	3	1	5
4	1	1	0	2	4	3	3	1	7
5	5	1	1	7	5	0	2	2	4
6	5	2	3	10	6	0	2	1	3
7	4	4	7	15	7	1	1	1	3
8	7	6	1	14	8	3	2	0	5
9	8	8	9	25	9	0	2	0	2
10	6	6	7	19	10	0	0	0	0
Total	38	28	30	96		11	16	11	38

Respondents on the Left reported feeling safer across all treatment groups, and both Left and Right reported feeling safer after having read the Free Speech prompt as opposed to either the Progressive or Neutral Prompt. Only one person on the Left reported a score of 1 or 2, whereas not a single respondent on the Right reported a score of 10. 86.5% of people on the Left scored 6 or higher, whereas only 13.5% scored 5 or lower. At the same time, 34.2% of the people on the Right scored 6 or higher, whereas 65.8% scored 5 or lower.

Overall, the mean scores of each group were:

Table 2.1b. Average scores for Question 1, by Left and Right, and prompt.

Prompt	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Overall	6.8	7.13	6.64
Left	7.39	8.18	7.83
Right	4.72	5.31	3.45

The regression tables, the data shows that I was only able to reject the null hypothesis for the Free Speech Prompt causing Right respondents to feel safer, with a p-value of .05. In all other cases I failed to reject the null hypothesis.

Table 2.1c. Regression table for Question 1, by Left and Right, and prompt.

	Overall			Left			Right		
Prompt	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient	0.15	0.48	6.64	-0.44	0.35	7.83	1.27	1.86	3.45
(standard error)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.37)	(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.36)	(1)	(0.92)	(0.71)
P-value	0.77	0.36		0.36	0.50		0.21	0.05	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	-0.0079			0.0065			0.0546		

Question 2 - Representation

Question 2 asked, "People who share my political views are represented in the faculty and administration at CSU" (Strongly Agree=5, Slightly Agree=4, Neither Agree Nor Disagree=3, Slightly Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1). Question 2 had 142 responses, a mean score of 3.65, a standard deviation of 1.28, a Pearson χ^2 score of (8) = 6.56, and a Pr of .585. I failed to reject the null hypothesis in all prompts for Question 2:

Table 2.2a. Regression table for Question 2, by Left and Right, and prompt.

	Overall			Left			Right		
Prompt	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient	0.07	-0.1	3.67	0.02	-0.06	4.13	-0.18	0.3	2.45
(standard error)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.02)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.33)
P-value	0.8	0.7		0.93	0.83		0.7	0.46	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	-0.0112			-0.0204			-0.0191		

I observed the same large gulf between Left and Right as the first question, with 77.1% of Left respondents reporting that they 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that they are represented, whereas only 10.4% did not. At the same time 13.2% of Right respondents 'slightly' or

'strongly' agreed that they are represented, whereas 52.6% do not. I analyzed the raw results

using a χ^2 test and got the following results:

Table 2.2b. Total scores for Question 2, by Left and Right, and prompt, with χ^2 and Pr. scores.

Left. Pearson $\chi^2(8) = 1.96$, Pr = 0.98					Right. Pearson $\chi^2(8) = 5.20$, Pr = 0.74				
Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total	Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	1	1	1	3	1	3	1	2	6
2	3	3	1	7	2	4	7	3	14
3	4	3	5	12	3	3	5	5	13
4	11	7	9	27	4	0	1	1	2
5	19	14	14	47	5	1	2	0	3
Total	38	28	30	96		11	16	11	38

Figure 2.2

Question 3 – Perception of Bias

Question 3 asked, "The administration at CSU present me with information that is free

from obvious partisan political bias." (Strongly Agree=5, Slightly Agree=4, Neither Agree Nor

Disagree=3, Slightly Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1) Question 3 had 142 observations, a

mean score of 3.49, a Standard Deviation of 1.17, a Pearson χ^2 score (8) = 8.35, and a Pr of .40.

As in Question 2 I failed to reject the null hypothesis for all prompts.

Table 2.3a. Regression table for Question 3, by Left and Right, and prompt.

	Overall			Left			Right		
Prompt	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient	0.23	-0.22	3.49	0.37	-0.06	3.63	-0.09	0.07	2.82
(standard error)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.56)	(0.51)	(0.39)
P-value	0.35	0.37		0.14	0.82		0.87	0.91	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	0.0109			0.0169			-0.0546		

As was the case in previous questions there was a noticeable gap in scores for perception

of bias in the administration. 67.7% of Left respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that

information is unbiased, while only 13.5% 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagree, and 47.4% of Right

respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that info is unbiased, but 34.2% 'slightly' or

'strongly' disagreed.

Table 2.3b. Total scores for Question 3, by Left and Right, and prompt, with χ2 and Pr. scores.

Left. Pearson χ^2 (8) = 0.83, Pr = 0.21 | Right. Pearson χ^2 (8) = 5.33, Pr = .72

Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total	Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	0	2	0	2	1	1	3	2	6
2	1	4	6	11	2	4	5	3	12
3	8	4	6	18	3	4	1	2	7
4	19	12	11	42	4	1	5	3	9
5	10	6	7	23	5	1	2	1	4
Total	38	28	30	96		11	16	11	38

Question 4 -Viewpoint Diversity

Question 4 asked, "The faculty at CSU respect all political viewpoints, allowing and

encouraging students to openly state their real beliefs and opinions." (Strongly Agree=5, Slightly

Agree=4, Neither Agree Nor Disagree=3, Slightly Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1) Question 4

had 142 observations, a mean score of 3.84, and a Standard Deviation of 1.13, a Pearson χ^2 score

of (8) = 6.24, and a Pr = .621. I failed to reject the null hypothesis for all prompts.

Table 2.4a. Regression table for Question 4, by Left and Right, and prompt.

Prompt	Overall			Left			Right		
	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient (standard error)	-0.07	-0.14	3.91	-0.01	0.12	4.17	-0.64	-0.43	3.63
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.37)
P-value	0.75	0.55		0.97	0.62		0.29	0.38	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	-0.0118			-0.0175			-0.0114		

As was the case in previous questions there was a noticeable gap in scores for perception of respect for all political viewpoints. 83.3% of Left respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that CSU faculty respect all viewpoints and allow expression, while only 6.3% 'slightly' or 'strongly'disagreed. 39.5% of Right respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed, but a relatively larger 31.6% 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagreed.

Table 2.4b. Total scores for Question 4, by Left and Right, and prompt, with χ2and Pr. scores.

Left. Pearson χ2(8) = 4.37, Pr = 0.82					Right. Pearson χ2(8) = 8.66, Pr = 0.37				
Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total	Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
2	3	1	1	5	2	5	4	3	12
3	3	3	4	10	3	2	8	1	11
4	17	11	10	38	4	2	1	3	6
5	15	13	14	42	5	1	2	3	6
Total	38	28	30	96		11	16	11	38

<u>Question 5 – Hide Beliefs</u>

Question 5 asked, "I hide my true political beliefs to avoid unfair treatment by the faculty at CSU." (Strongly Agree=5, Slightly Agree=4, Neither Agree Nor Disagree=3, Slightly Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1) Question 5 had 142 observations, a mean score of 2.23, and a Standard Deviation of 1.36, a Pearson χ^2 score of (8) = 11.88, and a Pr = .157. I was able to reject the null hypothesis in one treatment – Left respondents were more likely to 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagree that they have to hide their true beliefs after having read the Progressive prompt. I failed to reject the null hypothesis in all other cases.

Table 2.5a. Regression table for Question 5, by Left and Right, and prompt.

	Overall			Left			Right		
Prompt	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient	0.49	0.25	1.98	0.53	0.1	1.47	0.55	-0.23	3.55
(standard error)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.2)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.5)	(0.46)	(0.36)
P-value	0.08	0.37		0.04	0.7		0.29	0.62	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	0.0076			0.0338			0.0226		

As was the case in previous questions, there was a noticeable gap in scores for perception of respect for all political viewpoints. 70.8% of Left respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagreed that they have to hide their views, with 59.4% strongly disagreeing and only 10.4% agreed that they have to hide their views. 55.3% of Right respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed they have to hide their views, with 28.9% having 'strongly' agreed and only 18.4% 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagreed.

Table 2.5b. Total scores for Question 5, by Left and Right, and prompt, with χ2and Pr. scores.

	Left. Pearson $\chi 2(8) = 7.45$, Pr = 0.49					Right. Pearson $\chi 2 (8) = 6.58$, Pr = 0.58			
Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total	Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	18	19	20	57	1	0	1	1	2
2	10	4	7	21	2	1	3	1	5
3	3	3	2	8	3	1	6	3	10
4	6	2	1	9	4	5	2	3	10
5	1	0	0	1	5	4	4	3	11
Total	38	28	30	96		11	16	11	38

<u>Question 6 – Expression of doubt towards AGW</u>

Question 6 asked, "People at CSU who doubt the existence of or threat posed by manmade global warming can express their views without fear of reprisal." (Strongly Agree=5, Slightly Agree=4, Neither Agree Nor Disagree=3, Slightly Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1) Question 6 had 142 observations, a mean score of 2.80, a Standard Deviation of 1.13, a Pearson $\chi 2$ score of (8) = 6.98, and a Pr = .540. I failed to reject the null hypothesis for all prompts.

Table 2.6a. Regression table for Question 6, by Left and Right, and prompt.

Prompt	Overall			Left			Right		
	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient (standard error)	0.06	-0.01	2.78	0	-0.22	2.87	0.09	0.24	2.64
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.2)	(0.53)	(0.49)	(0.38)
P-value	0.8	0.98		1	0.44		0.87	0.63	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	-0.0137			-0.0123			-0.0496		

Both Left and Right respondents had similar scores with one another for this question. 46.9% of Left respondents and 50% of Right respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagreed that AGW doubters can express their views, compared to 26% of Left respondents and 28.9% of Right respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that they can.

Table 2.6b. Total scores for Question 6, by Left and Right, and prompt, with $\chi 2$ and Pr. scores.

Left. Pearson $\chi2(8) = 4.37$, Pr = 0.82

Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	4	2	1	7
2	11	14	13	38
3	12	6	8	26
4	8	4	5	17
5	3	2	3	8
Total	38	28	30	96

Right. Pearson $\chi2(8) = 5.23$, Pr = 0.73

Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	3	1	1	5
2	2	7	5	14
3	2	3	3	8
4	3	3	1	7
5	1	2	1	4
	11	16	11	38

<u>Question 7 – Expression of support for belief in AGW</u>

Question 7 asked, "People at CSU who do not doubt the existence of or threat posed by manmade global warming can express their views without fear of reprisal." (Strongly Agree=5, Slightly Agree=4, Neither Agree Nor Disagree=3, Slightly Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1). Question 7 had 142 observations, a mean score of 4.21, a Standard Deviation of 1.10, a Pearson $\chi2$ (8) = 5.20, and a Pr = .52.

Table 2.7a. Regression table for Question 7, by Left and Right, and prompt.

Prompt	Overall			Left			Right		
	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral
Coefficient (standard error)	0.3 (0.21)	0.07 (0.22)	4.09 (0.15)	0.14 (0.25)	0.16 (0.26)	4.2 (0.18)	0.64 (0.47)	0.09 (0.43)	3.91 (0.33)
P-value	0.17	0.79		0.56	0.55		0.18	0.83	
N	142			96			38		
Adjusted R^2	0.0017			-0.0165			0.0074		

Similar to Question 6 both Left and Right respondents had similar scores with one another for this question. 80.2% of Left respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that AGW supporters can speak freely on campus, where only 9.4% 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagreed. 68.4% of Right respondents 'slightly' or 'strongly' agreed that AGW supporters can speak freely on campus, and only 10.5% 'slightly' or 'strongly' disagreed.

Table 2.7b. Total scores for Question 7, by Left and Right, and prompt, with χ^2 and Pr. scores.

Left. Pearson $\chi^2(8) = 4.83$, Pr = 0.57

Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	0	0	0	0
2	4	3	2	9
3	2	2	6	10
4	9	5	6	20
5	23	18	16	57
Total	38	28	30	96

Right. Pearson $\chi^2(8) = 13.80$, Pr = 0.03

Score	Progressive	Free Speech	Neutral	Total
1	0	0	0	0
2	1	3	0	4
3	1	1	6	8
4	0	1	4	5
5	9	6	6	21
	11	16	11	38

Question 8 – Reports of feeling uncomfortable on campus

Questions 8 and 9 were Dialogue Boxes meant for respondents to tell us about times they had been made uncomfortable on campus and how those experiences shaped their perception of CSU. Question 8 read, "Please tell us about any times, if any, that you were made to feel uncomfortable on campus after expressing your political views in class." (Text bolded by me for emphasis).

For those Left respondents who read the Progressive prompt on Social Justice, 23

declined to answer, 14 said N/A or reported never having felt uncomfortable in class, of which 2

referenced an off-campus Christian group which had caused a ruckus on the campus main plaza

outside of class (Bettis and Leibee 2021), and 1 reported feeling uncomfortable hearing about

race, writing, "During class discussions on the topic of being non-white, as someone non-white, I

felt sort of weird or uneasy during the class. Coming from the perspective of a predominantly

white institute."

There were no Middles in the Progressive prompt group, and the Right respondents had 5

which declined to answer, and 6 who made the following remarks (words bolded by me), 4 of

which referenced fear of social penalties, 1 which did not, and 1 of which did not reference fear

directly but stated that they have written papers from a false political viewpoint to receive a

better grade:

1. I do not present my views in class. **It is simply too dangerous**. I am a free speech absolutist, the emails about posters being taken down, regardless of what's on them, frightens me.

2. nothing has made me uncomfortable, I am a libertarian most closely but don't respect a lot of what the government has done and am very rarely vocal about it. A lot of people feel free to speak about what they believe, so long as that fits the general belief. Saying climate change is fake is typically looked down on by most staff and students. **From my experience, no staff has made judgements or would treat anyone differently for expressing opposing views. However, many students will and just the social pressures limit people from speaking out on any issue that may not be "mainstream" or agreed upon.** Nobody is going around saying that minorities shouldn't have rights. Very few people hold this belief and those who do won't say it because of social pressures more so than university intervention or action. A bit extreme of an example but I think it gets my point across. I'm almost certain you already know this but there will likely be a difference in freshman who have not interacted with a lot of staff, and seniors who have interacted with a lot of staff. Sorting results by grade level will likely show an important difference and can possibly hint at how long it takes for students to encounter a politically biased teacher.

3. No personal experiences, **I have written papers expressing the opposite view** that I had because of knowing my professors political beliefs.

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4. I have only been here for a short period of time and have not had the chance to express my beliefs in class but from what I have seen on campus, **you get looked at as a cruel person for being republican and only liberal beliefs are understood and shared around campus**.

5. I have a professor in a POLS class that references President Trump quite often but doesn't come out and directly say his name. **She makes it seem like if you believe differently than her, you have no morals and ethics**.

6. Im only a freshman, but so far I would say **almost all of my professors have very little Bias, and if they do they do not force it on to you.**

Of the 28 Left respondents who read the Free Speech prompt, 10 did not answer, 14 said N/A or reported that they had never felt unsafe, 1 mentioned the off-campus Christian group (Bettis and Leibee 2021), 1 reported not liking being solicited, 1 reported being brushed off in a class discussion, and 1 had a lengthy response about a peer response regarding not wanting to take a Covid-19 vaccine:

> I expressed my unwillingness to take the covid vaccine due to religious as well as medical reasons and had **several other students tell me my views are ludicrous and straight up lies**. I got my information directly from my doctor, who I trust and who has twice saved my grandfathers life. I know my body more than them and their manner of approach was disrespectful. I felt attacked and they also attacked the integrity of someone I trust. **I've since refrained from directly sharing political and personal views because I know leftist students will attack me for not conforming to their ideas.**

There were 4 Middles in the Free Speech group, 1 of whom did not respond, 1 who said that they had not been made uncomfortable, 1 who said that their Women's Studies professor was intolerant of conservative people, and of whom reported not sharing opinions in class that aren't "politically correct."

Of the 16 Right respondents to the Free Speech Prompt 5 did not answer, 4 said that they had not, 5 said that they had not yet gotten in trouble but were expecting to once they did share

their opinions, 1 was off put by anti-Trump bias in 2 courses they were taking, and had a more

lengthy and colorful response:

> Every single day in class and around this campus. Saying anything that goes against the current left wing, social justice warrior ideology is met with pure hostility and infantile temper tantrums. There is no discussion or debate, there is only offended babies who cry when anyone doesn't think like them. Stating objective truth is considered hate speech on this campus.

Of the 30 Left respondents who read the Neutral Prompt, 9 did not answer, 17 said N/A

or reported never having felt uncomfortable, 2 who said often due to personal shyness but not

external forces, 1 was afraid of being labeled a racist in an Ethnic Studies class, and who

reported feeling hostile glares from conservative students when they spoke up in class.

Of the 4 Middle respondents 2 did not answer and the other 2 said that they had not been

made to feel uncomfortable.

Of the 11 Right respondents, 4 did not answer, 1 had not but stayed in quiet out of fear, 1

reported being made to feel uncomfortable by other students, 1 reported that they expected that

other people would be "really upset" when they finally spoke up in class, and 2 said they had not

felt uncomfortable, 2 reported professors making them uncomfortable:

1. Not me personally, but my close friend has a professor who said that republicans are embarrassing and r*pists. I was uncomfortable and frustrated because I am more republican.
2. I was in a class and a kid said something, and the professor literally called him out saying he was wrong. The kid was just saying what he thought, and he wasn't right or wrong. He was just saying his opinion on the topic.

Question 9 – Impact on views of CSU

Question 9 asked, "When considering your experiences above, what is your view of CSU?"

Of the 38 Left respondents who read the Social Justice prompt, 19 did not answer the question, 1

referenced the off-campus Christian story, and 18 had positive views, including 1 whose

response was positive but referenced awkwardness as a non-White student:

1. While it is a college/university where free-thinking is present and can be considered as an educated community/area, it is still a largely white-majority school and at times there can be awkward moments or questionable interactions with people as a non-white person.

   Another response advocated for more inclusion of leftist, as opposed to liberal, ideas:
2. I think they are a good institution that is inclusive of all political ideas, in regards to the Black Lives Matter statements given, it shows a leftist bias which I think is a good thing, but in my classes there has been no clear bias in my education in terms of American partisan lines. This being said I think education in America generally has a very euro-centric capitalist lens associated with it that can often exclude more leftist ideas.

There were no Middle respondents, and of the 11 Right respondents 3 did not answer, 2 positive responses, 1 positive who attributed conservative reluctance to conservative students themselves not liking to share their views, and 5 saying there is a liberal bias - 2 of which attributed it to the culture of higher education in general and not CSU specifically. One such student wrote, "My view is that this is a liberal school but what University isn't these days."

Of the 28 Left respondents who read the Free Speech prompt, 9 did not answer, 14 had positive responses, 1 referred to the off-campus Christian group, 1 wanted more radical leftwing viewpoints represented, 1 noted how conservatives could be uncomfortable, 1 said that "CSU is an "extremely left school"", and 1 said CSU, "talks the talk but doesn't walk the walk" when it comes to liberal values. Many of the positive responses were lengthy and very flattering to CSU.

Of the 4 Middle students who read the Free Speech prompt, 1 did not answer, 1 referenced feeling uncomfortable due to the off-campus Christian group, 1 said that their experience with who they saw as a biased professor was a one-off experience that wasn't representative of CSU as a whole, and 1 felt comfortable expressing their views.

Of the 16 Right respondents who read the Free Speech prompt, 3 did not answer, 4 had positive-only responses, 3 had mixed things to say, 4 had negative things to say or reported feeling that CSU had a liberal bias, and 2 reported not having any experiences to respond to. Some noticeable responses include:

1. I think that there are great staff members and professors at this university who use the policies of academic freedom to advance their students learning and circulate new ideas. However, there are also staff members and professors who abuse the idea of academic freedom that we must learn the material they teach. These professors tend to have students read and learn from obviously biased articles and they often defend obviously biased sources as neutral. It is frustrating to have to practice your writing skills utilizing biased sources handpicked by a professor advancing their own political interests. I think that it's great to hear all political views but some professors advance their political views as learning material and that is not teaching its indoctrination.

2. I feel that CSU is a very liberal campus. Granted, I believe that most college campuses are just as, if not more, liberal than CSU.

3. All faculty members were open to dissenting views; I have no concerns about reprisal. It is clear there is a liberal bias in the faculty as compared to my experiences outside of CSU.

Of the 30 Left respondents who read the Neutral prompt 7 did not respond and 23 had positive responses, including 1 who referenced the off-campus Christian group and 1 who referenced the pay disparity between admin and other employees. Many of the positive responses were lengthy and very flattering to CSU.

Of the 4 Middle respondents who read the Neutral prompt 2 did not answer and 2 had positive responses.

Of the 11 Right respondents who read the Neutral prompt 4 did not answer, 2 had positive responses, 1 had a neutral response, 1 had a mixed response, 2 had negative responses, and 1 simply wrote "swag" for some reason.

Discussion - What to make of this?

The study was designed such that the treatments were the Independent Variable and the responses were the Dependent Variable, and only twice did I get a p-value below .05, which means I was only able to reject the null hypothesis about my treatment primes impacting survey results in two cases – Right students felt safer after having read the Free Speech prompt, and Left students were more inclined to disagree that they hide their true beliefs after reading the Progressive prompt.

The statistical differences emerge when grouping students into Left-Center-Right and comparing averages, and hold across all treatment groups and questions. Center groups were outliers and not reported due to their small sample sizes (n=0, 4, and 4).

Across the 3 treatment groups, the neutral prompt about beer produced the strongest outliers, as compared to the Progressive and Free Speech prompts.

Therefore, my takeaway is that the treatments did comparatively very little, and that people's perceptions were decided prior to them being exposed to the treatment. Given that people self-select media and social media to reflect their partisan biases (Dizikes 2021) within a hyper-partisan political environment, where each side's media contains strong narratives about higher education, it seems like people across the spectrum are primed in different ways for what to expect in college.

For conservatives, that means a strong priming effect that they will be mistreated, and any negative experiences with students, faculty, or administration confirms these fears as real. Many of the Right respondents in first- and second-year students (who missed their first on campus year due to the COVID-19 pandemic) included statements that, while they had not had any negative experiences yet, they were expecting to in the future.

Interestingly, The Left and Right perceptions on permissibility of expressing belief or doubt in AGW research on campus was nearly identical, which means that there is a cross-partisan perception of which beliefs are, and are not, socially acceptable on campus.

Finally, the fact that my findings match the national trends found by Heterodox Academy, Navarro et al. (2009), Larson, Neilly, and Ryan (2020), and others as well all the research on threat responses to partisan social identity, leads me to believe that there is nothing about CSU in particular, or my treatments, that produced the results I found – they are much more a reflection of larger national trends that are simply expressing themselves at the local level, and are more powerful than other independent variables being produced by CSU, its faculty, or its staff. These socio-psychological trends directly impact partisan social identity-based reasoning, which I cover more in depth in Chapters One, Seven, and Eight, but this treatment experiment shows that these beliefs are being expressed here at CSU as a microcosm of the larger higher education system.

If that is true, then that implies that these headwinds are going to continue to produce skepticism and doubt towards all of the environmental research being done here at the university level, and around on the country, on issues like AGW, with major policy implications. However, because the free speech prompt caused all groups to report feeling safer, that means there may be opportunities by faculty and staff to push against these trends via reminding students of their free speech rights and academic freedom, and making pedagogies and policies which support these goals.

For future studies I would like to test the efficacy of all the contemporary proposed solutions to this problem, in order to see which policies have the greatest impact. The epilogue of my dissertation covers these proposals that others have put forward, such as starting off each

class with a reading of the Chicago Statement, or modifying existing IED institutions to expand their projects to include ideological diversity, or developing different approaches to pedagogies regarding difficult subjects, or engaging the people on the right who are telling the tales of conservative campus misfortune - Maybe even something like inviting Stephen Crowder to campus to an event called, "Conservatives are treated fairly on this campus. Change our mind." If possible, I would like to try and implement these different proposals, starting at small scale and moving up, to see what works.

Generalizable?

The results from this treatment effect experiment, which are statistically significant in two cases, are not by themselves enough to generalize to CSU or the greater public. However, they do contribute to the greater literature on the relevant subjects, which together suggest that partisan perception of campus culture is impacting politics, including perception of AGW. My research suggests that this is one important independent variable, among others, in the larger literature on conservative skepticism and doubt towards AGW.

Limitations?

The small sample size, predominantly freshmen and sophomores with less than 2 months of experience on campus (sophomores were not on campus their freshmen year due to covid), who were largely recruited out of Political Science undergraduate courses after our initial attempt to engage the entire university only produced n=13 results, means that this is a very limited study. However, it is a piece of the puzzle that should be considered as confirming evidence in the larger intellectual debate over universities and environmental politics.

Another limitation is that these personal and political beliefs arise from a variety of sources, and are running into rebuke from a variety of sources. Heterodox Academy's work

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suggests that students are most afraid of their peers, as opposed to faculty and administration. I will cover this further in the epilogue, but there are technical ideas out there on how students can submit questions and ideas for discussion without surrendering anonymity. A common theme in studies like mine is that a lot of students across the political spectrum have voiced that they want more dialogue with those they disagree with, but fear retaliation for speaking up, so if we as educators can provide that then there is a chance to offer all students a real educational opportunity. There is hope, as long as there is courage and creativity on our part as educators, to provide these academic spaces for debate over taboo and controversial topics.

One cost-effective way for universities to continue to investigate this phenomenon would be to include these types of questions in their Campus Climate Surveys, and to collect feedback on what would make students more comfortable sharing their opinions. That research could then be used to experiment with different policies to encourage discourse and deliberation, and ultimately lead to a Best Practices list on how to reinvigorate the university and improve its public image.

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Chapter Three – The Progressive Neoliberal University, Part One: Concepts and Definitions

The political universe that Trump upended was highly restrictive. It was built around the opposition between two versions of neoliberalism, distinguished chiefly on the axis of recognition. Granted, one could choose between multiculturalism and ethnonationalism. But one was stuck, either way, with financialization and deindustrialization.
-Nancy Fraser

Most public universities face serious financial difficulty due to the decline in state support. In response, they have significantly raised tuition and adopted an ideology unmoored from any responsibility for the common good. It is crucial to understand how administrators' aggressive push to subordinate every aspect of the university to the needs of capital coincides with the right's targeting of the left on campuses.
-Dana Cloud

This section extensively uses Nancy Fraser's work on progressive neoliberalism as a base model for understanding contemporary higher education. By neoliberalism I mean the capitalism-based, free market approach to politics, which I argue impacts university policy through New Public Management approaches wherein, beginning in the 1980s, government services were reformed to behave more like private corporations and to embrace values like shareholder value, competition, seeing students as customers, providing services, and efficiency, amongst others. By progressivism, I personally mean the total collection of political orientations aimed at reforming society to be either more equal or equitable, via redistributive or recognitive methods, such as Marxism, Neo-Marxism, the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, Feminism, Performative Gender Theory, Critical Race Theory, Critical Gender Theory, New Materialism, etc. The scholars within these schools do not necessarily agree with one another on what 'progressivism' is or should be, and so that word has different definitions when used by different scholars.

I do not take a side on any of these issues (race, class, gender, metaphysics, economic systems, etc.), other than to argue that the attempt within higher education to be both a neoliberal institution, and a vehicle for progressive change, is itself generating unforeseen problems with

macroscale consequences for both progressive causes and the larger social political body of the United States, including public perception of empirical environmental science, and harm against the very people progressive IED policies are supposed to help.

I chose to base my model of higher education on Nancy Fraser's understanding of progressive neoliberalism, because it lays bare the internal tensions between these two disparate worldviews. Her critique is that neoliberal institutions will adopt policies that only appear to promote progressive causes to further their own economic interests. While she acknowledges that these neoliberal institutions have promoted progressive causes, she argues that real reform will not come until progressives reject these institutions and demand fundamental structural changes to our society. According to Fraser,

> "In its U.S. form, progressive neoliberalism is an alliance of mainstream currents of new social movements (feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights), on the one side, and high-end "symbolic" and service-based business sectors (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood), on the other. In this alliance, progressive forces are effectively joined with the forces of cognitive capitalism, especially financialization. However unwittingly, the former lend their charisma to the latter. Ideals like diversity and empowerment, which could, in principle, serve different ends, now gloss policies that have devastated manufacturing and what were once middle-class lives." (Fraser 2017)

For the purposes of this dissertation, the contemporary university is the neoliberal institution operating in a similar fashion to the 'service-based business' sectors mentioned above, albeit with important differences. Unlike corporations which sponsor and promote progressive politics as part of their business strategies, universities are public, or publicly funded private, institutions (Vedder 2018), embedded in webs of public-private partnerships, which are supposed to also provide public benefits. For instance, in 2010 the Board of Governors for Colorado State University decided on the following Mission Statement and Values:

<div align="center">Mission Statement:</div>

Inspired by its land-grant heritage, Colorado State University is committed to excellence, setting the standard for public research universities in teaching, research, service and extension for the benefit of the citizens of Colorado, the United States and the world.

<div align="center">CSU has further adopted the following values:</div>

Be accountable, Promote civic responsibility, Employ a customer focus, Promote freedom of expression, Demonstrate inclusiveness and diversity, Encourage and reward innovation, Act with integrity and mutual respect, Provide opportunity and access, Support excellence in teaching and research.

According to this scheme, the Inclusiveness, Equity, and Diversity programs aimed at providing opportunity and access are progressive goals, which the administration and faculty are encouraged to work towards, while neoliberal economic forces, often generated by public disinvestment, put constraints and pressures on the administration to keep students/customers registering for classes, spending (often borrowed) money, and supporting the college post-graduation as donors.

While administrators in public colleges and universities do not have shareholders like corporations, they must still meet the demands of the public, the state legislature, the federal government, corporate partners, and oversight boards and committees. One of the reasons cited as to why administrators have adopted a more business-like model is decreased investment from government, but according to the National Association of Scholars, "Tuition increases at public universities far exceeded their losses in state funding; in other words, state disinvestment cannot be the sole cause of rising tuition" (NAS 2021). Further, it appears that neoliberal universities

using business-like models, such as utilizing IED policies in order to attract more students as customers, causes a drop in public support for universities, creates incentives for politicians to decrease funding even further, ultimately putting the university system in the middle of a negative feedback loop. To unpack how this process is unfolding, I will break down each piece of the puzzle in this chapter before looking at the genealogy of how these social forces became intertwined.

The Neoliberal University

From a Public Policy and Public Administration perspective, this neoliberal model of higher education can best be understood through the lens of New Public Management (NPM). NPM is a Public Administration approach to public governance that became popular in the 1980s and 1990s, as a way curb costs and develop innovations, by running bureaucracies like private businesses and viewing citizens as customers (Barzelay 2001; Kettl 1993; Lipsky 1980; Knskanen 1971; Osbourne and Gaebler 1992; Savas 2000; Wilson 1989). This is reflected in Colorado State University's values of 'Be accountable' and 'Employ a customer focus.' Many of these private sector-inspired public reforms, both in higher education and throughout government, came about as responses to diminishing investment from local, state, and federal governments, wherein they faced financial pressures to both trim costs and increase revenues in order to remain competitive. NPM is rooted in Public Choice Theory (Buchanan and Tullock 1967; Arrow 1951), and according to Manning (2001) the term NPM,

> "is used to describe a management culture that emphasises the centrality of the citizen or customer, as well as accountability for results. It also suggests structural or organisational choices that promote decentralised control through a variety of alternative service delivery mechanisms, including quasi-markets with public and private service providers competing for resources from policy makers and donors." (Manning 2000)

The use of NPM policies in higher education has been studied in the United States and Europe (Tolofari 2005; Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008; Bleiklie 2018; Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2009, Solhaug 2011). Tolofari (2005) identifies NPM as part of a New Right Ideology that is primarily concerned with marketisation, privatization, managerialism, performance measurement, and accountability. Partially undertaken in response to declining state investment into higher education, this managerial aspect is what drives administrative behavior towards adopting progressive policies for the sake of generating neoliberal results, such as viewing students as customers to be recruited and retained; viewing faculty behavior and research through the lens of Public Relations; and maintaining the university's funding streams as the administration's highest priority.

> "While much of the work on the impact of NPM on higher education focuses on Europe, there links between the two remain relevant for the American higher education system. Tolofari, working from Ferlie et al (1996), Marginson and Considine (2000), and Duke (2002), identifies eight changes NPM has had on higher education:
>
> A new kind of executive power and structural innovations; new methods of devolution; a decline in academic disciplines in governance; expanded periphery; inclusion and social engineering; changes in delivery methods; enhanced flexibility of personnel; and Reputation Management." (Tolofari 2005, 85-86)

This shift has moved power out of the faculty and into the administration who require employee flexibility and cooperation to achieve the university's systemic goals, which impacts both financial and departmental governance. Individual professor and department input thus becomes diminished in pursuit of centralized control by the administration, including the creation and destruction of research centers for the purposes of generating commercially feasible products within public-private partnerships between the universities and outside parties. This creates economic incentives to both lower the cost of labor, including the increase of part-time instructors with no benefits, and to put pressure on departments to either not hire or not retain

faculty who engage in politically controversial research if said research could damage the university's reputation, as such controversies could prove detrimental to a university's bottom line and ability to attract business partners from the private sector.

NPM has always had its critics (Moe 1987) and as far back as 1981 Robert Denhardt was arguing to introduce Habermasian critical theory to the field of Public Administration. His work in the field developed over time until he and Janet Denhardt developed New Public Service in 2001 as an alternative to New Public Management, focusing on Democratic Theory and shifting administrative priorities to conceptualizing people as citizens instead of customers, exploring shared leadership, and developing an ethics of public service. In this model responsibility and power are shared across groups as opposed to top-down decision making and values go beyond financial interests to include the well-being of students, faculty, and other community stakeholders.

NPM has also been criticized on numerous grounds adjacent to my critique of NPM in higher education. Some of these criticisms focus on the reduction of faculty to employees in service of 'academic capitalism' within the 'corporate university' (Seal 2018), negative impacts on students (Saunders 2007), profiteering and the corporatizing of academia (Cannella and Koro-Ljungburg 2017), economic and political colonization of the university (Leal 2019), the increasing rate of mental health problems for students and faculty (Trembath 2018), promoting of rightwing bullying campaigns of leftwing faculty during the Trump presidency and contributing to the reproduction of capitalist society (Cloud 2018), neglect of social responsibilities (Fear 2020), and the creation of precarious working conditions for adjunct labor (Simonton 2018).

NPM explains how the neoliberal framework of how higher education came to mirror

private businesses in terms of management and administration. Like private corporations,

contemporary universities have departments dedicated to Public Relations, Advertising,

Merchandising, Lobbying, Business Relationships, Legal Affairs, Regulatory Compliance,

Marketing, etc. The employees who fill these positions have excellent pay and benefits, and as

these departments have continuously grown, they have consumed more and more of the

university's budget; a phenomenon known as 'administrative bloat.'

Over the last several decades the number of administrators has expanded, tuition has

increased, full-time professors have been replaced with part-time adjuncts, student debt has

increased, and the amount of local, state, and federal regulations colleges must meet has

expanded. According to Caroline Simon of Forbes, as of 2017 college now costs between

"$80,000 and $180,000 for a public or private four-year degree, respectively" (Simon 2017),

leading to $1.3 trillion dollars in student debt. This debt is the result of an explosion in spending

since 1980:

> "During the 1980-1981 school year, public and private institutions spent $20.7
> billion in total on instruction, and $13 billion on academic support, student
> services and institutional support combined, according to data from the National
> Center for Educational Statistics. By the 2014-2015 school year, total
> instructional costs had climbed to $148 billion, while the same grouping of
> administrative expenses had risen to $122.3 billion." (Simon 2017)[7]

Some of this increased spending is the result of regulatory compliance. A 2015 study by

Vanderbilt University found that regulatory compliance comprises 3 to 11% of schools'

nonhospital operating expenses, taking up 4 to 15% of faculty and staff's time. Regardless, this

explosion in spending has largely gone to administration, leaving faculty in the dust. A 2014

Delta Cost Project by Desrochers and Kirshstein found that the number of faculty and staff per

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[7] Prices not adjusted for inflation.

administrator declined roughly 40%, while the cost of tuition increased 160%, and the ratio of full-time faculty to administrators dropped from 2:1 to 1:1 in that same time period.

Things have been going well from the administration's point of view, with ever increasing available employment opportunities, increasing salaries, and increasing power over faculty. "Between 1993 and 2007, the number of full-time administrators per 100 students at America's leading universities grew by 39 percent, while the number of employees engaged in teaching, research or service only grew by 18 percent" (Goldwater Institute 2015). Even during "the economic slump the number of executive, administrative, and managerial employees on university campuses nationwide continued its relentless rise right through the recession, up by a collective 15 percent between 2007 and 2014" (Hechinger 2016). The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2021) gives the following rosy scenario job outlook for Postsecondary Education Administrators between 2018 and 2028:

2020 Median Pay	$97,500 per year / $46.87 per hour
Typical Entry-Level Education	Master's degree
Work Experience in a Related Occupation	Less than 5 years
On-the-job Training	None
Number of Jobs, 2020	178,800
Job Outlook, 2020-30	8% (Faster than average)
Employment Change, 2020-30	13,400

Figure 3.1. Statistics on Postsecondary Education Administrators, from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2021)

This 'administrative bloat' has been the subject of study and criticism, but the theoretical framework and causal inputs are not complete at this time, making a full analysis impossible. Some suspected causes are that accountability policies that require administrative staff and compliance with state and federal regulation (Dorn 2016), that the salaries for college presidents continues to climb (Lewin 2013), the easy availability of expensive loans for students (Hamburger 2019), the intrusion of administration into the classroom and the large number of

PhDs in academia (Staddon 2018), a large influx of unprepared students who frequently drop out

(Vedder 2014), and the use of "hidden fees" to finance various new administrative programs

(Halpert 2012; Wang 2013; Robinson 2014).

Robert Kelchen (2018) defends administrative bloat, arguing that students want more

facilities and services, and many administrators do tasks that faculty don't want to do. In an

exchange with book reviewer Matt Reed (2018), they broke the problem down into an

ontologically complex principal-agent problem matrix, where it is unclear how many principals

and agents there are, and how they are positionally related to one another.

This unclear mission statement about what the university is, and who it is supposed to

serve, is at the heart of an argument by John Staddon of the James G. Martin Center, who

identifies the large number of administrators of IED policies as a source of bloat. He writes,

> "Merit or quotas—or what? A solution had to be found, and the result was a new
> mantra: "diversity." Beginning in the 1990s, the malign result of a fissiparous
> academy and an administration unified chiefly by a desire not to offend was the
> creation of the cleverly misnamed "diversity and inclusion" bureaucracy (the
> "diversity" is only of race and ethnicity, the "inclusion" excludes respectful
> dissent). Harvard currently lists 11 D&I staff members; Duke has 15 and Yale
> (judging by the nine smiling faces pictured on its website) has almost as many.
>
> White men are virtually absent from the roster; women and minorities dominate.
> Evidently, the D&I folk don't feel bound by the strictures they apply to others,
> that they "look like" the population they represent. The growing diversity brigade
> performs functions that are either unnecessary, could be handled by deans, or are
> now actually harmful to the academy.
>
> The D&I folk quickly became involved in teaching—not substantive courses and
> not (usually) teaching of students (the faculty might well object to that)—but
> teaching "diversity and inclusion" indoctrination workshops for faculty. Almost
> every D&I department is involved in these useless activities, which rely not just
> on talk but also on meretricious psychological "tests" and multi-day programs run
> by outside companies. A whole industry stands ready to support the D&I
> religion…
>
> … The only hope for our larger universities is a change in the *zeitgeist*.
> Administrators, faculty, and students must realize that a university is not a

universal comforter and not a "safe space" (except in the literal sense of being crime-free); it is not a *home*, as the Yale student screaming at Professor Nicholas Christakis insisted it must be. It is not a solution to the world's ills. Its mission is not "social justice" but education, knowledge, and truth.

Until the universities return to that realization, things can only get worse." (Staddon 2019)

<u>The Progressive University</u>

Progressives, of course, push back against this view as mostly polemical and grumpy White man-ish, arguing that IED policies are a public good that deserve investment on normative grounds because of the historical mistreatment of women, racial minorities, and LGBTQIAA+ individuals. For them, the type of university that Staddon argues for is one that is based on and built around systems of oppression, which require transformation in order to serve the interests of historically marginalized groups as a means of improving society as a whole. According to these types of arguments, Staddon's university not only glosses over injustices by focusing on "education, knowledge, and truth," but actively subverts non-cis/hetero White males by imposing epistemologies of 'education', 'knowledge', and 'truth' that are built out of, and contribute to, systems of oppression such as patriarchy, White supremacy, cis-heteronormativity, capitalism, and the nuclear family. (Borque 1995; Jackson 2016; St. Vil, St. Vil, and Fairfax 2019)

This has led to the internal tension of Progressive Neoliberalism. These goals of IED policies are at odds with the administrative corporate structure. IED policies are supposed to help students succeed in school and in their careers, but the administrative corporate structure in higher education damages them by frequently forcing them to take on debt. It also damages students' education by forcing faculty to work in an atmosphere of fear of sharing information or ideas that could upset students and cause them to leave the university, taking their tuition dollars with them. This incentivizes college administrators to get rid of professors without due cause to

appease student mobs who can threaten to withhold funds. One example of this happening was was when progressive Biology Professor Bret Weinstein was fired from Evergreen College over his refusal to participate in an IED program where Whites were expected to stay off campus (Weiss 2017).

This limited commitment to social justice by university administrations can be regarded as a form of 'justice on the cheap' and a version of 'woke capitalism' (Khoo 2020; Douthat 2018; Fraser 2017), because it does not require any rearrangement of the basic structures of the institution or society. This is not to say that it has no value in promoting the well-being of underprivileged groups, as these efforts do have material benefits, and the recognition of existing social problems is important, and not merely symbolic. However, the administration's use of IED policies can be a strategic way of covering over its own inequities and exploitive practices against faculty and students, which in turn produce other institutional pathologies.

It can be argued this is analogous to corporations who spend some of their profits helping marginalized communities. For example, British Petroleum's environmental commitment to the Gulf of Mexico after the Event Horizon spill did, in fact, clean up much of the mess it created (British Petroleum 2021), such that it is factually wrong to say that no benefit occurred; however, the goal of these types of programs is ultimately to serve as a Public Relations operations and to benefit the organization. It is not that these policies do not provide aid to damaged communities, but rather that this good is provided as a means of achieving a larger neoliberal goal.

IED policies, even when developed with the best moral intentions, are used by neoliberal universities as part of recruitment strategies that view students as sources of income. Academia has long been home to scholars whose whole lives are spent studying and working to improve the conditions of various marginalized communities, but it is an open empirical question as to

whether administrators adopt IED policies because of the relative strength of faculty research and persuasion, student demand, political and regulatory mandates from state and federal legislation and bureaucracies, adherence to prevailing cultural norms within administrative culture, and/or professional self-interest.

There is a normative question below this level of psychological and regulatory analysis concerned with the conflict between communities meant to directly benefit from IED policies, and the debt imposed on students in order to fulfill them. This question centers on the normative progressive conflict between recognition and redistribution, which is where competing critical theories of class, race, and gender collide and interact.

Progressivism as Recognition and Redistribution

The contemporary concept of recognition within Political Theory can be traced back to Hegel's 'Master and slave' dialectic, whereas redistribution originated in the Marxist analysis of class struggle and exploitation. In 2003, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth debated back and forth in the book 'Redistribution Or Recognition' as to the relative importance of recognition and redistribution to the larger goal of building a more progressive society. At the heart of this debate was the attempt to establish an ontological and epistemological underpinning for social progress programs, which are themselves at the heart of progressive IED policies.

Recognition as a normative concept rooted in psychology goes back to Fanon's 1952 book 'Black Skin, White Masks', where he deployed Hegelian concepts to demonstrate the damaging psychological effects of racism and colonization on the Black psyche. In short, when a person is not sufficiently recognized as a free and equal person because of their identity, it produces negative esteem, which produces negative outcomes for both individuals and the community, and allows for privileged identities to dismiss the personhood and accomplishments

of perceived others. Because identity is created and maintained intersubjectively, recognition has been called a "vital human need" by political theorist Charles Taylor. The exact number and types of recognition are in dispute, but Taylor (1992) suggests three – a "politics of universalism" aimed at recognition of everyone's shared humanity, a "politics of difference", which recognizes uniqueness in cultural and social identities on a group level, and a recognition of concrete individuality, which is rooted in subjectivity and individual difference.

Psychologically, recognition is deeply intertwined with empathy and cognition. Honneth (2005) has argued that recognition is primary to cognition, because childhood development studies have shown that children's cognitive brain development depends on emotional attachment to primary care givers. Struggles for recognition are thus the foundation of progressive political and social movements such as feminism, trans acceptance, and Black liberation movements, which are promoted on-campus via IED policies.

The concept of redistribution comes from the Marxist tradition, and is aimed at a socially just redistribution of society's resources to redress the historical exploitation of workers. When combined with social identities, the theft of labor moves beyond the White proletariat (and often ignores their struggles and injustices) to take into account slavery of African Americans, Asian and Hispanic immigrants, women who traditionally labor in unpaid conditions within the home, and LGBTQIAA+ populations who have been discriminated against in housing and employment.

At the university level redistributive IED policies can manifest as affirmative action plans; preferences in admission; scholarships, resources, and on campus centers that cater specifically to women, racial minorities, and LGBTQIAA+ persons; diversity and bias trainings; preferential hiring practices; academic leniency; and university mission statements.

This debate over the roles and nature of recognition and redistribution are at the heart of

the Fraser-Honneth debate, and what is meant exactly by recognition and redistribution is

complex and disputed intellectual territory. Fraser argues redistribution and recognition can go

together as 'folk paradigms', where different injustices are interwoven with each other, similarly

to Kimberlé Crenshaw's concept of intersectionality (Steinmetz 2020). These folk paradigms are

not mutually co-exclusive, as economic restructuring can occur within 'cultural and symbolic'

changes in perception of social identity, according to Honneth and Fraser (2003, 13). There is

internal struggle between the emphasis of sameness and distinctness between groups and the

practicality of fighting for one cause at the expense of the other, i.e. recognition causing an

identity politics that pits different racial groups of workers against one another, instead of the

capitalistic economic structure, or oppositely a Marxist class analysis that fails to appreciate how

different racial groups have been disproportionately exploited by capitalism, and thus failing to

challenge damaging cultural norms. Using gay men and lesbians as her example of a group that

is damaged by both a lack of recognition and corresponding economic injuries because of their

identity, Fraser writes,

> "When we posit a type of social division located in the middle of the conceptual
> spectrum, we encounter a hybrid form that combines features of the exploited
> class with features of the despised sexuality. I will call such divisions "two-
> dimensional." Rooted at once in the economic structure and the status order of
> society, they involve injustices that are traceable to both. Two-dimensionally
> subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and misrecognition in forms
> where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other, but where both
> are primary and co-original." (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 19)

She extends her concept of two-dimensionality out to all marginalized social groups, as

lack of recognition is always tied to economic exploitation, but argues that there are severe limits

to this two-dimensional folk paradigm, expressed by the following questions:

1) Is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization?

2) Do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, sui generis, normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other?

3) How can we distinguish justified from unjustified claims for recognition?

4) Does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient? (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 27)

In addressing these questions her approach of perspective dualism (Ibid. 63) regards recognition and redistribution as analytical tools that can be used to view either culture or economics. This is different than the recognition approach of Taylor and Honneth, as it makes recognition a matter of justice (Ibid. 28) by identifying how misrecognition contributes to economic exploitation. She argues that a recognition-based approach does less to overcome the financial subordination of capitalism by focusing on psychical damage (Ibid. 30), and that justice requires all people participating as equals. Her perspective dualism combines culturalism and economism (Ibid. 50) by exploring how market position determines and dictates social status (Ibid. 52), such that status and class cannot be reduced to one another (Ibid. 60). This is different from post-structuralist anti-dualism, which argues that culture and economy are too deeply interconnected to separate one from the other. Fraser rejects this as obscuring important differences, and instead argues that we can speak of each distinctly as a separate lens into the interwoven mesh of culture and economics. This economic piece is key for creating space within progressivism, which gets collapsed by IED policies that think they are advancing full justice, when they are advancing only one dimension of it in problematic ways.

Honneth's response agrees with Fraser on the problems and the goal of critical social theory to, "conceptualize the emancipatory movements of the age and prospectively to work towards

realizing their objects" (Ibid. 110). Where he breaks away is in his approach to lay out a single, grounding normative structure on which to further the goals of critical theory,

> "The debate signaled by the juxtaposition of the key terms "recognition" and "redistribution" can therefore not reside at this level of weighing political-moral tasks. Rather, in my view the argument is located on, so to speak, a lower level, where what is at issue is the "philosophical" question: which of the theoretical languages linked to the respective terms is better suited to consistently reconstructing and normatively justifying present-day political demands within the framework of a critical theory of society? Not the superficial ranking of normative goals, but rather their placement in a categorical framework shaped by the far-reaching claims of Critical Theory thus constitutes the core of our discussion. And it is in fact at precisely this point that I depart from Fraser in a decisive and far-reaching respect. Contra her proposal that the normative objectives of critical social theory now be conceived as the product of a synthesis of "material" and "cultural" considerations of justice, I am convinced that the terms of recognition must represent the unified framework for such a project. My thesis is that an attempt to renew the comprehensive claims of Critical Theory under present conditions does better to orient itself by the categorial framework of a sufficiently differentiated theory of recognition, since this establishes a link between the social causes of widespread feelings of injustice and the normative objectives of emancipatory movements." (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 112-113)

There are two critical points in this quote that warrant a closer inspection. First, the concept of 'placement within a categorical framework' could be used by defenders of IED policies, saying that we address issues of class, redistribution, opportunity only by confronting systemic inequalities and discrimination. Second, that 'terms of recognition must represent the unified framework for such a project.' To apply these ideas to the progressive neoliberal university, we can conceptualize the university administration as placing students and faculty into dually conflicting roles. From a progressive viewpoint, students are members of social identity groups that are ranked by privilege wherein IED policies are used to promote the well-being of students with non-privileged identities; but from a neoliberal perspective these same students are also conceptualized as customers and sources of revenue whose tuition and fees finance administrators' salaries. Similarly, from a progressive viewpoint IED policies in hiring

and training faculty can be seen as a source of liberation, as more progressive pedagogies can be taught to students by a more identity diverse teaching force; but from a neoliberal viewpoint, these same teachers are employees who can be financially exploited by administrators to maintain high administrative salaries via reduced faculty wages, benefits, and fewer tenured positions. Further, the neoliberal view of faculty as employees also creates a financial incentive for universities to limit academic freedom and freedom of speech, as the ability to speak and research freely necessarily involves the risk of causing offense, which can in turn cause the university Public Relations problems and damage revenue streams. Progressive neoliberalism necessarily limits recognition because of these dual roles imposed on students and faculty, and exacerbates redistribution problems in ways that enrich administrators, in both money and institutional power.

Returning to 'Redistribution or Recognition?' Honneth also agrees with Fraser in identifying redistribution as the highest priority (Ibid. 112), but ultimately thinks that the language and philosophy of recognition provides the best grounds on which to achieve those ends. Where Fraser posits economic injustice and cultural misrecognition as intertwined forces, Honneth puts misrecognition as the driver of all injustices and argues that the normative philosophical literature of recognition is best suited for enacting societal change.

> "Simply recalling the everyday dimension of moral feelings of injustice makes it clear that – in agreement with much recent research – what is called "injustice" in theoretical language is experienced by those affected as social injury to well-founded claims of recognition (I). Following these preliminary reflections – which might be somewhat pretentiously termed a "phenomenology" of social experiences of injustice – in a second step the category recognition will be differentiated in order to clarify different aspects of socially caused injuries to recognition claims. In this way, I hope to be able to offer evidence for the strong thesis that even distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of social disrespect – or, better said, of unjustified relations of recognition (II)." (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 114)

He further goes on to criticize Fraser as being too wrapped up in contemporary American identity struggles, noting that the political left in Europe is still aligned along class and environmental issues. Further, by focusing on American leftwing identity causes, she also fails to note that there are right wing identity political groups – Christians, Whites, and males. (Ibid. 121) According to Honneth, Fraser's analysis requires too many details to be glossed over. It is,

> "a sociological artifact: first, from the multitude of current social conflicts, only those are picked out that have attracted the attention of the political public sphere as social movements (in the USA) under the official title of "identity politics"; then, tacitly applying a normative criterion, from these identity-political movements precisely those are excluded that pursue aims by the illegitimate means of social exclusion and oppression; and finally, by leaving out historical forerunners, the small group of social movements that remain are stylized into the new key phenomenon of the post-socialist era, to which the normative conceptualization of critical social theory must feel partially bound." (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 124)

To get around this problem, Honneth argues that we have to feel entitled to something in order to call out injustice. He argues that we need to establish a theory outside of recognized, public social movements (Ibid. 125) because, "What is at issue here are the basic concepts to be used to inform us beforehand about the respects in which subject's expectations can be disappointed by society" (Ibid. 126-127). Drawing on the work of Hegel, Todorov, Ignatieff, and Margalit, these theories of recognition provide the best foundation for tackling injustice because,

> "Despite their different methods and aims, their efforts are nevertheless united by the initial premise that the experience of a withdrawal of social recognition – of degradation and disrespect – must be at the center of a meaningful concept of socially caused suffering and injustice." (Honneth and Fraser 2003, 132)

Honneth's approach to recognition is rooted in the historical differentiation of the three spheres of recognition – love, law, and achievement (Ibid. 138). Love is about intimacy, law is about the equality principle in legal relations, and achievement is the standard used to justify social hierarchy, which may be insufficient and in need of reform.

There is a possible 4th possible sphere of recognition, which, "revolves around respect for the cultural particularities of groups or collectivities" (Ibid. 159), because there is a need for social esteem for different cultures (Ibid. 168). In their retorts to one another, Fraser calls this a form of monism, and Honneth responds by saying that Fraser's approach is too decentralized to be effective in establishing change.

Thus, a progressive university, taking into account the work of Fraser, Honneth, Taylor, and others, would have to meet certain goals as a means of transforming society as a whole. It would aim to recognize all individuals and cultures, promote psychological health, affirm people's esteem and communities, equalize privileged and non-privileged identities, embrace a shared common humanity, celebrate individual subjective and cultural differences, work to accept all people, work to transform society to redistribute goods and opportunities fairly to all people, create genuine equal opportunity for achievement, atone for historical wrongs, and place love and empathy as its highest goals.

All that is a fairly tall order.

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Chapter Four – The Progressive Neoliberal University, Part Two: History and Impact

"So I advise everybody, be a little careful when they go along through there — best stay woke, keep their eyes open." – Lead Belly

"Rather than telling the truth about his welcoming campus, DeGioia, like nearly every other college president today, prefers to accuse it of ongoing derelictions of justice. Only the latter course, in today's world, signals his and his institution's social virtue. The bureaucracy required to back up that virtue-signaling comes at considerable cost. Georgetown's annual tuition, room, and board is approximately $72,000 a year, or nearly $300,000 for four years."
- Heather MacDonald

"*We've created a monster and it's turning around to consume us."*
- Former college president Dr. Everett Piper

History of IED Policies on Campus

The first historical current of contemporary university progressivism began with the Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, ran through the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, which combined Marx's work with that of Sigmund Freud, and became widespread on college campuses in the 1960s in the protest movements against racism, sexism, and the war in Viet Nam. Critical Theory scholars, who sought to bring Marx's vision of the future into being in the West, trained students who went on to become professors themselves and generated schools within Political Theory and Sociology such as Critical Race Theory, Critical Gender Theory, Post-Modernism, Post-Structuralism, Feminist Legal Theory, and many, many others.

A second current runs against the Enlightenment's focus on reason and empiricism. Kevin Baldeosingh (2019) has argued that 'woke culture' can be traced back to the Romantic movements of the 18th and 19th century in its rejection of reason as the supreme virtue. Empiricism, as expressed in the form of Positivism, was the dominant model of Political Science research in the field's early days, but came to be challenged by Anti-Positivism, Wilhelm Dilthey's distinction between Geisteswissenschaft (humanities) and Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences), hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Wittgenstein's theories on

language, methodological relativism, and many other forces. Kuhn's 1962 book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' put scientific research within a frame of social construction, wherein research is neither pure, nor done in a value-free context, and Popper's understanding of empirical scientific research as requiring falsifiability had a tremendous impact on the quantitative side of research within Political Science. According to Halfpenny (1982), there are at least a dozen different epistemologies to which the term 'positivism' refers, making the term difficult to use clearly.

While these methodological issues remain unresolved for various reasons, it is sufficient to say that Political Scientists who do quantitative work generally understand themselves as post-positivists, acknowledge the biases and social forces which impact their research, and understand that their data doesn't exist in a social vacuum. The role of the empirical scientist in a democracy is up for debate, where the benefits of public policy being constructed by science is specialized knowledge, but the negative is that science can then come to be perceived as politically biased, and dismissed as technocratic (and thus anti-democratic) by the political side which rejects their policy recommendations. It is my hope that the work of second-generation Critical Theorist Jürgen Habermas can serve as a bridge between these different worlds within Political Science in the university system through the inclusion-based requirements of his ideal speech community, which is the focus of Chapter Five.

The third current is the history of American leftwing social movements outside of academia, which in recent years has come to be known as 'Social Justice' and 'wokeness.' Aja Romano traces the use of the term 'woke', as it applies to awareness of social injustice, back to Marcus Garvey's collection of aphorisms "Wake up Ethiopia! Wake up Africa!" The phrase later turned up in the Huddie Ledbetter (better known as Lead Belly) protest song 'Scottsboro

Boys,' about an incident where nine African American teenagers had been accused of rape by two White women.

The cultural and policy history of IED and Affirmative Action are deeply intertwined. There are two major historical social justice victories that occurred in the middle of the 20th century that became the legal foundation of campus IED policies. First, President Truman officially desegregated the armed forces with Executive Order 9981 in 1948, which outlawed discrimination based on "race, color, religion or natural origin" in the armed services. Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal for any business, private or public, to practice discriminatory hiring (and firing) practices. From the American Association of Access, Equity, and Diversity, here is the full Civil Rights timeline from 1961 through 2011:

1961. President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order (E.O.) 10925 used affirmative action for the first time by instructing federal contractors to take "affirmative action to ensure that applicants are treated equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Created the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.

1964. Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law. This was landmark legislation prohibiting employment discrimination by large employers (over 15 employees), whether or not they have government contracts. Established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

1965. President Lyndon B. Johnson issued E.O. 11246, requiring all government contractors and subcontractors to take affirmative action to expand job opportunities for minorities. Established Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) in the Department of Labor to administer the order.

1967. President Johnson amended E.O. 11246 to include affirmative action for women. Federal contractors now required to make good-faith efforts to expand employment opportunities for women and minorities.

1970. The Labor Department, under President Richard M. Nixon, issued Order No.4, authorizing flexible goals and timetables to correct "underutilization" of minorities by federal contractors.

1971. Order No.4 was revised to include women.

1971. President Nixon issued E.O. 11625, directing federal agencies to develop comprehensive plans and specific program goals for a national Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) contracting program.

1973. The Nixon administration issued "Memorandum-Permissible Goals and Timetables in State and Local Government Employment Practices," distinguishing between proper goals and timetables and impermissible quotas.

1978. The U.S. Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 912 (1978) upheld the use of race as one factor in choosing among qualified applicants for admission. At the same time, it also ruled unlawful the University Medical School's practice of reserving 18 seats in each entering class of 100 for disadvantaged minority students.

1979. President Jimmy Carter issued E.O. 12138, creating a National Women's Business Enterprise Policy and requiring each agency to take affirmative action to support women's business enterprises.

1979. The Supreme Court ruled in United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber, 444 U.S. 889 (1979) that race-conscious affirmative action efforts designed to eliminate a conspicuous racial imbalance in an employer's workforce resulting from past discrimination are permissible if they are temporary and do not violate the rights of Caucasian employees.

1983. President Ronald Reagan issued E.O. 12432, which directed each federal agency with substantial procurement or grant making authority to develop a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) development plan.

1985. Efforts by some in the Reagan administration to repeal Executive Order 11246 were thwarted by defenders of affirmative action, including other Reagan administration officials, members of Congress from both parties, civil rights organizations and corporate leaders.

1986. The Supreme Court in Local 128 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) upheld a judicially-ordered 29% minority "membership admission goal" for a union that had intentionally discriminated against minorities, confirming that courts may order race- conscious relief to correct and prevent future discrimination.

1987. The Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) that a severe under representation of women and minorities justified the use of race or sex as "one factor" in choosing among qualified candidates.

1989. The Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) struck down Richmond's minority contracting program as unconstitutional, requiring that a state or local affirmative action program be supported by a "compelling interest" and be narrowly tailored to ensure that the program furthers that interest.

1994. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 513 U.S. 1012 (1994) the Supreme Court held that a federal affirmative action program remains constitutional when narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest such as remedying discrimination.

1995. President Bill Clinton reviewed all affirmative action guidelines by federal agencies and declared his support for affirmative action programs by announcing the Administration's policy of "Mend it, don't end it."

1995. Senator Robert Dole and Representative Charles Canady introduced the so-called Equal Opportunity Act in Congress. The act would prohibit race- or gender-based affirmative action in all federal programs.

1995. The Regents of the University of California voted to end affirmative action programs at all University of California campuses. Beginning in 1997 for graduate schools and 1998 for undergraduate admissions, officials at the University were no longer allowed to use race, gender, ethnicity or national origin as a factor in admissions decisions.

1995. The bipartisan Glass Ceiling Commission released a report on the endurance of barriers that deny women and minorities access to decision-making positions and issued a recommendation "that corporate America use affirmative action as a tool ensuring that all qualified individuals have equal access and opportunity to compete based on ability and merit."

1996. California's Proposition 209 passed by a narrow margin in the November election. Prop. 209 abolished all public-sector affirmative action programs in the state in employment, education and contracting. Clause (C) of Prop. 209 permits gender discrimination that is "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of public education, employment and contracting.

1996. In Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled against the University of Texas, deciding that its law school's policy of considering race in the admissions process was a violation of the Constitution's equal-protection guarantee. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of the ruling because the program at issue was no longer in use.

1997. Voters in Houston supported affirmative action programs in city contracting and hiring by rejecting an initiative that would banish such efforts. Houston proved that the wording on an initiative is a critical factor in influencing the voters' response. Instead of deceptively focusing attention on "preferential treatment," voters were asked directly if they wanted to "end affirmative action programs." They said no.

1997. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear a challenge to California's Prop. 209. By declining to review the case, the court did not decide the case on its merits but allowed Prop. 209 to go into effect.

1997. The U.S. House Judiciary Committee voted 17-9, on a bipartisan basis, to defeat legislation aimed at dismantling federal affirmative action programs for women and minorities. Representative George Gekas (R-Pa.), who moved to table the bill, said that the bill was "useless and counterproductive. I fear that forcing the issue at this time could jeopardize the daily progress being made in ensuring equality."

1997. Bill Lann Lee was appointed Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights after facing opposition to his confirmation because of his support for affirmative action when he worked for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.

1997. Lawsuits were filed against the University of Michigan and the University of Washington School of Law regarding their use of affirmative action policies in admissions standards.

1997. In response to Hopwood, the Texas legislature passed the Texas Ten Percent Plan, which ensures that the top ten percent of students at all high schools in Texas have guaranteed admission to the University of Texas and Texas A&M system, including the two flagships, UT – Austin and A&M College Station.

1998. Both the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate thwarted attempts to eliminate specific affirmative action programs. Both houses rejected amendments to abolish the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program funded through the Transportation Bill, and the House rejected an attempt to eliminate use of affirmative action in admissions in higher education programs funded through the Higher Education Act.

1998. Ban on use of affirmative action in admissions at the University of California went into effect. UC Berkeley had a 61% drop in admissions of African American, Latino/a and Native American students, and UCLA had a 36% decline.

1998. Voters in Washington passed Initiative 200 banning affirmative action in higher education, public contracting, and hiring.

2000. Many Circuit Courts throughout the country heard cases regarding affirmative action in higher education, including the 5th Circuit in Texas (Hopwood), the 6th Circuit in Michigan (Grutter and Gratz), the 9th Circuit in Washington (Smith), and the 11th Circuit in Georgia (Johnson). The same District Court in Michigan made two different rulings regarding affirmative action in Michigan, with one judge deciding that the undergraduate program was constitutional while another judge found the law school program unconstitutional.

2000. The Florida legislature passed "One Florida" Plan, banning affirmative action. The program also included the Talented 20% Plan that guarantees the top 20% admission to the University of Florida system.

2000. In an effort to promote equal pay, the US Department of Labor promulgated new affirmative action regulations including an Equal Opportunity Survey, which requires federal contractors to report hiring, termination, promotions and compensation data by minority status and gender. This is the first time in history that employers have been required to report information regarding compensation by gender and minority status to the federal equal employment agencies.

2000. The 10th Circuit issued an opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) and ruled that the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise as administered by the Department of Transportation was constitutional because it served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The court also analyzed the constitutionality of the program in use when Adarand first filed suit in 1989 and determined that the previous program was unconstitutional. Adarand then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

2001. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) the Supreme Court dismissed the case as "improvidently granted", thereby leaving undisturbed the 10th Circuit's decision, which upheld the government's revised federal contracting program.

2001. California enacted a new plan allowing the top 12.5% of high school student's admission to the UC system, either for all four years or after two years outside the system, and guaranteeing the top 4% of all high school seniors' admission into the UC system.

2002. The Sixth Circuit handed down its decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) on May 14, 2002, and upheld as constitutional the use of race as one of many factors in making admissions decisions at the University of Michigan's Law School.

2003. The Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. (2003). In Grutter, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of race among other factors in its law school admissions program was constitutional because the program furthered a compelling interest in obtaining "an educational benefit that flows from student body diversity". The Court also found that the law school's program was narrowly tailored; it was flexible, and provided for a "holistic" review of each applicant. In Gratz, the Court rejected the undergraduate admissions program at the College of Literature, Science and the Arts, which granted points based on race and ethnicity and did not provide for a review of each applicant's entire file.

OTHER CIVIL RIGTHS LANDMARKS:

1949: Desegregation of the United States Armed Forces

1954: Brown v. Board of Educ. Of Topeka, Shawnee City., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ended racial segregation in public schools).

1955: Montgomery bus boycott Rosa Parks

1963: Publication of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique and the feminist movement begins.
1964: President Lyndon B. Johnson signs The Civil Rights Act of 1964.
1966: EEOC promulgates regulations that require employers with at least 100 employees or government contractors with 50 employees to fill out the EEO-1 Private Sector Report annually. This report is a snapshot of how many racial and ethnic minorities and women are working in a company. 29 C.F.R § 1602.7.
1969: The Stonewall Riots galvanize the gay rights movement in the U.S.
1973: President Richard M. Nixon signs the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which requires agencies to submit an affirmative action plan to the EEOC for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities.
1990: President George H.W. Bush signs the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
1991: President George H.W. Bush signs the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
1997: Proposition 209 enacted in California which banned all forms of affirmation action "in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."
1998: Washington State enacted Initiative 200, abolishing state affirmative action measures similar to Proposition 209 in California.
2000: Florida bans using race as a factor in college admissions.
2007: Proposal 2 enacted in Michigan banning preferential treatment of minorities in public college admissions, public employment, public education or public contracting.
2008: Ballot measure banning affirmative action by public entities approved in Nebraska, rejected in Colorado.
2009: President George W. Bush signs the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2011: Arizona enacted Proposition 107 banning preferential treatment of minorities in public employment, public education, and public contracting.

These policies intersected with culture through the post-modern and post-structural

emphasis on language to eventually gave rise to 'political correctness,' starting in the late 1960s

and continuing to present day (Kabbany 2019). While often portrayed as a criticism of leftwing

politics, the truth is that the effort to influence language has been exercised across the political

spectrum. In education this focus on language is most pronounced in the editorial decisions

regarding textbooks. According to critic Baldeosingh (2019),

> "Political correctness did far more than just replace words like 'chairman' with 'chairperson'. It was instrumental in dumbing down Western education. In *The Language Police*, historian of education Diane Ravitch traces the deleterious effects of PC on textbook content. Publishers kowtowed to all manner of interest groups, from the religious right to feminists and advocates for multiculturalism. Publishers combined 'left-wing political correctness and right-wing religious fundamentalism', she writes, propounding the left and the right's visions of the ideal society: 'Censors on the right aim to restore an idealised vision of the past, an Arcadia of happy family life… Censors from the left believe in an idealised vision of the future, a utopia in which egalitarianism prevails in all social relations.'"

The late 1960s also saw universities begin to develop policies along these lines. For

example, in 1968 Carnegie Mellon University began its Diversity program, the Carnegie Mellon

Action Project (CMAP), to recruit and retain African American students as part of the School of

Urban and Public Affairs, which later became the H. John Heinz School of Public Policy and Management.

Diversity programs continued to grow and evolve from the 1970s onward and were quickly expanded to women first and LGTBQIAA+ persons later. According to Vaughn (2007),

"While gender diversity education began to emerge during the 1970s and 1980s, diversity education in the United States expanded in the 1990s to focus on barriers to inclusion for other identity groups. Ability difference, ethnic, religious, gay, lesbian, and other worldviews began to appear in education and training."

These programs became more formal and incorporated into the public and private organizations in the 1980s and 90s, taking on corporate forms. For instance, in the early 1990s Carnegie Mellon University's diversity programs had grown to incorporate a neoliberal business focus through its InfoLink program. The,

"program was a unique initiative that linked low-income youth, businesses, public school districts and community revitalization efforts through learning systems that emphasized information technology.

Professional development, networking and support programs were developed for graduate women in the sciences and engineering and for graduate students of color in all disciplines through the Office of the Associate Provost for Academic Projects. Through a variety of offices and departments, the university was highly successful in attracting women to the fields of science and engineering through activities and career workshops for high school sophomore and junior women, parents and guidance counselors." (Vaughn 2007)

This was part of a larger trend in business and higher education in the 1980s and 90s wherein diversity training and social justice efforts became a formal part of the corporate and neoliberal structure. This is because, "Businesses used diversity training in the late 1980s and throughout the 90s to protect against and settle civil rights suits" (Ibid.). The need to keep businesses, military, and colleges in line with civil rights laws and prevent lawsuits gave rise to the credentialed profession of Diversity Officers. It was also during this period that workplace diversity training specialist Lewis Griggs added 'Inclusion' to the world of diversity training,

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with 'Equity' becoming frequently included with 'Inclusion' and 'Diversity' between 2010 and 2020.

While originally designed to promote and support African Americans, the field of those served by Diversity Officers was quickly extended to women, various ethnic and religious groups, and the LGBTQIAA+ community. It was during this time that colleges began mandating diversity courses as requirements for graduation. Two major controversies at this time were concern by African Americans that diversity was being watered down to make room for these other groups (Ibid.), and concern that the traditional content lost to make room for mandatory diversity courses would negatively impact student learning. For instance, English majors at Yale are no longer required to read Shakespeare for their degrees, and that content has since been replaced by works created by non-Whites and non-males, a growing trend in higher education which continues at present. (Ibid.)

Even early on there were conflicts between the progressive and corporate/neoliberal aspects of diversity training as to whether the point was to drive social change, maintain compliance to prevent lawsuits, or generate revenue. Judith Katz, a pioneer in diversity training, was keenly aware of these frictions. According to her,

> "The major change is that diversity is now accepted as a key business driver, rather than diversity for diversity's sake…for some folks, diversity was about compliance (concern about lawsuits) and for others, it was about increasing individual diversity awareness. The confrontational approach to raising individual awareness did not create systems change in the long run. Some individuals became more aware but the very systems, structures, and processes often remained unchanged… many organizations still approach diversity from a compliance perspective but, more and more organizational leaders are going well beyond that. They understand that 'if you are not leveraging diversity, you are not in the game of business today." (Vaughn 2007)

As more and more non-White males were included in various organizations, the next step in promoting social change came in the form of changing the culture of those institutions to steer

away from a White male perspective to create a more inclusive space for others. Judith Katz

argued for these changes and noted the difficulty in creating social change within organization,

noting the following challenges:

- Diversity leaders must contend with organizational leaders who give lip service to the diversity initiative without putting their hearts and souls into it or offer it the necessary resources for success.
- As a result, diversity leaders too often shoulder the full weight of the diversity initiative.
- They can get too buried in the work to be effective.
- They are expected to partner with many different parts of the organization, which contributes to additional stress.
- They work alone and are expected to single-handedly get a very difficult job done.
- They are expected to manage a highly political role while getting their job done and legally protecting the organization.
  The result is that leading the diversity initiative can be a very difficult, demanding, and lonely job from Judith's perspective. (Vaughn 2007)

On campuses, this attempt to change culture to be more welcoming to minorities,

women, and LGBTQIAA+ persons has required an enormous investment of time and

money to support the various centers, offices, and trainings. According to Gardey

(2019), 98 percent of the top 200 universities currently have a diversity officer, and

universities are spending hundreds of millions of dollars on these programs. According

to her,

> "No employees were dedicated to diversity in 2003 at the University of Michigan, for example. Now, 93 people are employed by Michigan's Office of Diversity, Equity & Inclusion, receiving a combined $10.6 million in annual salaries, according to AEI scholar and Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of Michigan Mark Perry. In 2016, the University of Michigan announced an $85 million investment to transform diversity culture on campus, including a $10 million multicultural student center, a new program to help freshmen navigate cultural differences, and outreach programs to recruit more diverse students, faculty, and staff.
>
> The University of Michigan is not unique in its diversity spending. Columbia University has dedicated $185 million to diversity funds since 2005 and American University plans to spend $61 million on diversity in 2019 alone…

…The University of Michigan Office of Diversity, Equity & Inclusion pays 28 diversity officers a salary of more than $100,000 each. The Chief Diversity Officer, Robert Sellers, takes in a salary of roughly $407,000, according to Perry. A network of employees under Sellers hold positions such as "Director, Academic Multicultural Initiatives," "Assistant Vice Provost for Equity, Inclusion, & Academic Affairs," and "Program Manager of Campus and Community Relations."" (Gardey 2019)

University of Michigan Office of Diversity, Equity & Inclusion Organizational Flowchart

Figure 4.1 The University of Michigan's Diversity, Equity & Inclusion organization flowchart, courtesy of Gardey (2019)

<u>Social Pathologies of The Progressive Neoliberal University</u>

A purely progressive university would be one where students are trained in various progressive traditions (i.e., Marxism, Post-Structuralism, Critical Theory, Intersectionality, etc.) to fundamentally alter society towards social justice, by working to modify or eliminate capitalism, cis-heteronormativity and gender essentialism, conservative or fundamentalist expressions of Christianity, and the legacy of European culture. Such a university would be low

cost or free, have minimal administrators, and would support non-traditional living arrangements and lifestyles. The University of California, Berkeley in the 1960s is a good example of a prototypical progressive university.

Unfortunately, the attempt by universities to be both neoliberal, business-like organizations and to serve as vehicles which promote progressive ideologies, has created serious unintended consequences by making members of 'oppressor' groups, defined within oppressor-oppressed social dichotomies, feel unwelcome on campus. Regarding men, The Wall Street Journal noted that in 2021 they only made up 40.5 of college students, as compared to 59.5% of women, continuing a forty-year trend. (Belkin 2021) Overall there are 1.5 million fewer college students than five years ago and men account for 71% of this decline. According to Belkin (2021), this "college gender gap cuts across race, geography, and economic background." Further,

> "white men—once the predominant group on American campuses—no longer hold a statistical edge in enrollment rates, said Mr. Mortenson, of the Pell Institute. Enrollment rates for poor and working-class white men are lower than those of young Black, Latino and Asian men from the same economic backgrounds, according to an analysis of census data by the Pell Institute for the Journal." (Belkin 2021)

White men, particularly conservative White men, are also showing signs of seeing themselves as under threat because of their White identity, a trend that is likely being exacerbated by conservative media broadcasting stories regarding academic critiques of Whiteness. One item that made the news in recent years was a pamphlet published by the National Museum of African American History & Culture on Whiteness and White culture:

TALKING ABOUT RACE | NMAAHC

ASPECTS & ASSUMPTIONS OF **WHITENESS**

& **WHITE CULTURE** IN THE UNITED STATES

White dominant culture, or **whiteness**, refers to the ways white people and their traditions, attitudes and ways of life have been normalized over time and are now considered standard practices in the United States. And since white people still hold most of the institutional power in America, we have all internalized some aspects of white culture — including people of color.

Rugged Individualism
- The individual is the primary unit • Self-reliance
- Independence & autonomy highly valued + rewarded
- Individuals assumed to be in control of their environment, *"You get what you deserve"*

Family Structure
- The nuclear family: father, mother, 2.3 children is the ideal social unit
- Husband is breadwinner and head of household
- Wife is homemaker and subordinate to the husband
- Children should have own rooms, be independent

Emphasis on Scientific Method
- Objective, rational linear thinking
- Cause and effect relationships
- Quantitative emphasis

History
- Based on Northern European immigrants' experience in the United States
- Heavy focus on the British Empire
- The primacy of Western (Greek, Roman) and Judeo-Christian tradition

Protestant Work Ethic
- Hard work is the key to success
- Work before play
- "If you didn't meet your goals, you didn't work hard enough"

Religion
- Christianity is the norm
- Anything other than Judeo – Christian tradition is foreign
- No tolerance for deviation from single god concept

Status, Power & Authority
- Wealth = worth
- Your job is who you are
- Respect authority
- Heavy value on ownership of goods, space, property

Future Orientation
- Plan for future
- Delayed gratification
- Progress is always best
- "Tomorrow will be better"

Time
- Follow rigid time schedules
- Time viewed as a commodity

Aesthetics
- Based on European culture • Steak and potatoes; "bland is best"
- Woman's beauty based on blonde, thin – "Barbie"
- Man's attractiveness based on economic status, power, intellect

Holidays
- Based on Christian religions
- Based on white history & male leaders

Justice
- Based on English common law
- Protect property & entitlements
- Intent counts

Competition
- Be #1
- Win at all costs
- Winner/loser dichotomy
- Action Orientation
- Master and control nature
- Must always "do something" about a situation
- Aggressiveness and Extroversion
- Decision-Making
- Majority rules (when Whites have power)

Communication
- "The King's English" rules
- Written tradition
- Avoid conflict, intimacy
- Don't show emotion
- Don't discuss personal life
- Be polite

NATIONAL MUSEUM of AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY + CULTURE

Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. These images are from a pamphlet released in July 2020 by the National Museum of African American History & Culture on Whiteness and White culture, but were quickly taken down when it became the focus of conservative news media.

This academic focus of 'Whiteness' has also led to the publication of articles such as Donald Moss's (2021) 'On Having Whiteness,' which elicited anger on the political right. His abstract reads (words bolded by me for emphasis),

> "Whiteness is a condition one first acquires and then one *has*—**a malignant, parasitic-like condition to which "white" people have a particular susceptibility**. The condition is foundational, generating characteristic ways of being in one's body, in one's mind, and in one's world. **Parasitic Whiteness** renders its hosts' appetites voracious, insatiable, and perverse. These deformed appetites particularly target nonwhite peoples. Once established, these appetites are nearly impossible to eliminate. Effective treatment consists of a combination of psychic and social-historical interventions. Such interventions can reasonably aim only to reshape Whiteness's infiltrated appetites—to reduce their intensity, redistribute their aims, and occasionally turn those aims toward the work of reparation. When remembered and represented, the ravages wreaked by the chronic condition can function either as warning ("never again") or as temptation ("great again"). Memorialization alone, therefore, is no guarantee against regression. **There is not yet a permanent cure**."

Conservatives, particularly White conservatives, were less than thrilled to be described as parasites in need of a permanent cure. This perceived attitude towards Whiteness has become daily fodder for conservative critique, expressed in both outrage and comedy. Titania McGrath, the satirical creation of comedian Andrew Doyle, has put together a collection of mainstream media articles insinuating that seemingly harmless things are in fact actually 'racist,' including:

> Self-driving cars, coffee, **dinosaurs**, jigsaw puzzles, gardening, seatbelts, Covid, **rocks**, fried chicken, school uniforms, Hawaiian pizza, **Mozart**, National parks, smiling, aliens, beer, mermaids, tomboys, cosmic objects, bras, artificial intelligence, punctuality, hockey, worms, grammar, landscape architecture, **Paw Patrol**, birds, church choirs, orchestras, the royal family, surfing, morris dancing, Enid Blyton, The Smurfs, falling asleep, **dead dogs**, baseball, college admissions tests, all White artists, the song 'Jingle Bells,' interior design, **arithmetic**, avoiding eye contact, robots, Charles Dickens, the White Cliffs of Dover, Thomas the Tank Engine, rock music, tipping, veganism, Dr. Seuss, wine, shoes, **having sex with Black people, not having sex with Black people**, dieting, yoga, country music, Scrabble, **science**, **Western Philosophy**, libraries, dogs, Botany, **sandwiches**, environmental activism, **women**, the Lake District, wives, Fawlty Towers, reaction GIFs, Anglo-Saxons, Toy Story 4, **Mary Poppins**, jogging, classical music, horse racing, trying not to be racist, being nice, pancake syrup, salt, traffic signals, **earthquakes**, the countryside, **the suffragette**

movement, the medal for the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, fish, cycling, breweries, air pollution, **abolishing slavery**, biological sex**, asking "How are you?,"** the Oscars, knitting, hiking, climate change, ice cream, The Golden Girls, soap, toothpaste, **White people speaking, White people not speaking**, Mathematics, front lawns, breakfast cereals, finding Asian men attractive, skincare products, nurses, butter, applause, Band-Aids, Coronavirus, orcs, rice, **Mahatma Gahndi**, cartoon characters, milk, roads, golf, bedrooms, **Jesus**, and chess. (Bolded words chosen by me for emphasis)

More seriously, Schorr's (2020a) research suggests that Critical Race Theory's focus on the negatives of 'Whiteness' is actually making White people more racist. Schorr (2020b) explored the impact that Critical Race Theory-based articles on Whites and Whiteness, looking at articles such as "White Men must be Stopped, the Very Future of Humanity Depends Upon it," "10 Ways White People are More Racist than they Realize," and "21 Things White People Ruined in 2015, Besides Everything" might be having on White people. Schorr's research suggests that the steadily increasing salience of White social identity is due in part to this kind of antagonism towards Whites, saying," Insofar as white identity polarization is a reciprocal process, critical race theory and company likely advance the cause of white nationalism:" (Schorr 2020b)

There are ongoing debates about what racism is, how it operates, and how much influence it has over individuals and structures in society and whether it's increasing and/or shifting how it operates (DeSante and Smith 2020). Two prominent contemporary scholars are Ibram X. Kendi, who is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities at Boston University and who wrote 'How To Be an Antiracist' (2019), and Robin DiAngelo, who wrote 'White Fragility: Why it's so Hard for White People to Talk About Racism' (2018). These are currently two of the best-known books, but IED programs have cultivated a large list of resources in their IED libraries. At Colorado State University in Spring of 2022, our Continuing Education

Resources for Inclusive Excellence has the following selections, including the works of Kendi and Diangelo:

Diversity and Inclusion in Higher Education:

1. Closing the Opportunity Gap: Identity-Conscious Strategies for Retention and Student Success, by Vijay Pendakur and Shaun R. Harper
2. Creating Multicultural Change on Campus, by Raechele L. Pope, Amy L. Reynolds, John A. Mueller, Caryn McTighe Musil
3. Disability in Higher Education: A Social Justice Approach, by Nancy J. Evans, Ellen M. Broido, Kirsten R. Brown, Autumn K. Wilke
4. Diversity's Promise for Higher Education: Making It Work, by Daryl G. Smith
5. Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America's Universities, by Craig Steven Wilder
6. Educating About Religious Diversity and Interfaith Engagement: A Handbook for Student Affairs, by Kathleen M. Goodman, Mary Ellen Giess, and Eboo Patel
7. Ethnicity in College: Advancing Theory and Improving Diversity Practices on Campus, by Anna M. Ortiz and Silvia J. Santos
8. Improving Trans Lives on Campus by Bri Sérráno, Douglas H. Lee, Kari Dockendorf, and D-L Stewart
9. Life of the Mind Interrupted: Essays on Mental Health and Disability in Higher Education, by Katie Rose Guest Pryal
10. No Longer Invisible: Religion in University Education, by Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobesen
11. Straddling Class in the Academy: 26 Stories of Students, Administrators, and Faculty from Poor and Working-Class Backgrounds and Their Compelling Lessons for Higher Education Policy and Practice, by Sonja Ardoin and becky martinez
12. Strategic Diversity Leadership: Activating Change and Transformation in Higher Education, by Dr. Damon A. Williams
13. Trans* in College: Transgender Students' Strategies for Navigating Campus Life and the Institutional Politics of Inclusion, by Z Nicolazzo

Perspectives on Oppression in the U.S. (organized thematically)

1. Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West, by Dee Brown
2. Custer Died For Your Sins, by Vine Deloria, Jr.
3. An Indigenous People's History of the United States, by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz
4. In the Light of Justice: The Rise of Human Rights in Native America and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, by Walter Echo-Hawk
5. Care Work: Dreaming Disability Justice, by Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha
6. A Disability History of the United States, by Kim E. Nielsen
7. Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and Liberation, by Eli Clare
8. A Queer History of the United States, by Michael Bronski

9. Black on Both Sides: A Racial History of Trans Identity, by C. Riley Snorton
10. Transgender History: The Roots of Today's Revolution, by Susan Stryker
11. Between the World and Me, by Ta-Nehisi Coates
12. This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, by Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga
13. Eloquent Rage: A Black Feminist Discovers Her Superpower, by Brittney Cooper
14. The Fire Next Time, by James Baldwin
15. How to Be An AntiRacist, by Ibram X. Kendi
16. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty, by Dorothy Roberts
17. Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present, by Harriet A. Washington
18. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, by Michelle Alexander
19. Sister Outsider, by Audre Lorde
20. So You Want to Talk About Race, by Ijeoma Oluo
21. Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America, by Ibram X. Kendi
22. This Will Be My Undoing: Living at the Intersection of Black, Female, and Feminist in (White) America, by Morgan Jerkins
23. When They Call You A Terrorist: A Black Lives Matter Memoir, by Patrisse Khan-Cullors and Asha Bandele
24. Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria: and Other Conversations about Race, by Beverly Daniel Tatum
25. Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, by Gloria Anzaldúa
26. The Making of Asian America, by Erika Lee
27. Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White, by Frank H. Wu
28. A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America, by Ronald Takaki
29. A People's History of the United States, by Howard Zinn
30. American Islamophobia: Understanding the Roots and Rise of Fear, by Khaled A. Beyfoun
31. How Does it Feel to Be a Problem? Being Young and Arab in America by Moustafa Bayoumi
32. Islamophobia, Race, and Global Politics, by Nazia Kazi
33. Radical Dharma: Talking Race, Love, and Liberation, by Rev. angel Kyodo williams, Lama Rod Owens, Jasmine Syedullah
34. The Body is Not An Apology: The Power of Radical Self-Love, by Sonya Renee Taylor
35. Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny, by Kate Manne
36. Pleasure Activism: The Politics of Feeling Good, by adrienne maree brown
37. Identify and Countering White Supremacy Culture in Food Systems by Duke Sanford World Food Policy Center

Theory and Social Justice Reference Collections:

1. Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, by bell hooks
2. Critical Mentoring: A Practical Guide, by Torie Weiston-Serdan
3. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic
4. Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement, by Kimberlé Crenshaw and Neil Gotanda
5. Decolonizing Methodologies, by Linda Tuhiwai Smith
6. Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction, by Dan Goodley
7. The Disability Studies Reader, by Lennard J. Davis
8. Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds, by adrienne maree brown
9. The Feminist Philosophy Reader, edited by Alison Bailey and Chris Cuomo
10. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, by bell hooks
11. Freedom is a Constant Struggle, by Angela Y. Davis and Frank Barat
12. Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation, by Derald Wing Sue
13. Pedagogy of the Oppressed, by Paulo Freire
14. Privilege, Power, and Difference, by Allan G. Johnson
15. The Racial Contract, by Charles W. Mills
16. Readings for Diversity and Social Justice, by Maurianne Adams (Editor), Warren Blumenfeld (Editor), Carmelita Castaneda (Editor), Heather W. Hackman (Editor), Madeline L. Peters (Editor), Ximena Zuniga (Editor)
17. The Stonewall Reader, edited by The New York Public Library
18. Trans Bodies, Trans Selves: A Resource for the Transgender Community, edited by Laura Erickson Schroth
19. The Transgender Studies Reader 2, by Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura
20. Unapologetic: A Black, Queer, and Feminist Mandate for Radical Movements, by Charlene Carruthers
21. Whistling Vivaldi: How Stereotypes Affect Us and What We Can Do, by Claude Steele

Whiteness and White Privilege

1. Dear White America: Letter to a New Minority, by Tim Wise
2. Me and White Supremacy: Combat Racism, Change the World, and Become a Good Ancestor, by Layla F. Saad
3. Understanding White Privilege: Creating Pathways to Authentic Relationships Across Race, by Frances Kendall
4. Waking Up White and Finding Myself in the Story of Race, by Debby Irving
5. White Fragility: Why It's so Hard for White People to Talk About Racism, by Robin DiAngelo
6. White Like Me: Reflections on Race from a Privileged Son, by Tim Wise
7. White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide, by Carol Anderson (Colorado State University 2022)

Colorado State University itself has its own footnote in the history of this Culture War as its chapter of TPUSA, under the leadership of Isabel Brown, took offense at the university's 'Inclusive Language Guide,' which told employees and students to avoid the following words:

> Addicted/like crack, American/America, basket case, birth defect, the blind/deaf/eye for an eye, cake walk/takes the cake, colored, CP victim/spastic/spaz, crazy/nuts/maniac/lunatic/insane,/deranged/psycho/demented/ depressed/OCD, dumb/mute, dwarf/midget, 'eenie meenie miney moe,' epileptic, Eskimo, Freshman, ghetto/barrio, gyp/gip, handicapped, he or she, 'ladies and gentlemen,' 'Hip hip hooray!,' Hispanic, hold down the fort/defend the fort, homosexual, illegal immigrant/alien, Indian, lame/moron/idiot/stupid, 'long time no see,' man the booth/mankind/manmade, 'you guys,' Policeman, male/female, Mr./Mrs./Ms., 'no can do,' normal person, Oriental, para/quadra-polegic, paddy wagon, peanut gallery, Pow Wow, "preferred" pronouns, rule of thumb, senile/demented, 'sold down the river, starving/broke, straight, grandfather clause, the itis/food coma, thug, transgendered, tribe/spirit animal, uppity, war/go to war/at war/war zone/battle, and wheelchair bound.

Conservatives were particularly incensed that the words 'America/American' were viewed as inherently negative terms that should not be used because they are offensive (Kabbany 2019). CSU Chancellor Tony Frank (2019) responded to the controversy with an op-ed in the Denver Post saying that conservatives had blown this story out of proportion, saying,

> "Do I think CSU did everything right here? No. Do I think a university needs a guide on words and language? No. … Do I think several of the suggestions in the list are just plain silly? Sure. Do I wish there had never been any debate about the use of the word 'America'? Of course — it makes me personally sick because I and everyone I know at our university is proud of our country." (Frank 2019)

Where progressives see the attempt to change language as a necessary step to creating a more just and equitable society, conservatives and other non-progressives see censorship and thought control, responding with indignation, anger, and mockery. This view of leftist campus politics drives conservative media to paint the entire enterprise of higher education as both totalitarian and silly, which I believe is one of the major forces driving down public perception of the legitimacy of the university system.

<u>What Then is the University Actually For?</u>

At the other end of the spectrum of progressive neoliberalism, a purely neoliberal university would be more akin to a trade school or various certificate-granting skills-based programs, without any concern for society's overall well-being. Universities would figure out the cost of teaching students to be able to practice a chosen profession, maximize profits by competing with other universities for student dollars, and the education would be focused solely on producing marketable skills for the student's chosen profession. Where once the traditional role of the university was to produce good citizens, what that means is unclear at this time, as the ontology of what makes a "good" citizen is very different in the classical liberal Enlightenment tradition than it is in the contemporary neoliberal tradition (such as Friedman, Hayek and Gilder), and the Marxist and Critical Theory Traditions.

Regardless, neither a purely progressive university, nor a purely neoliberal university, would be producing the social pathologies that we are currently seeing in the modern university. Returning to the debate between Kelchen (2018) and Reed (2018) from Chapter Three, the genesis of these pathologies lies in the principal-agent matrices, wherein the university plays the role of several principals and several agents simultaneously, continually growing and getting more expensive as it becomes less and less clear what the central purpose of a university is. Are universities supposed to:

1) Prepare students as professionals in a capitalist job market?
2) Prepare students to be good individual citizens in a liberal democratic society?
3) Be a vehicle of reparations for the harm caused by universities themselves (i.e., land grant universities colonizing indigenous lands and harming other marginalized communities)
4) Prepare students to confront systemic biases and power structures as members of social identity groups and focus on efforts aimed at redistribution and recognition (i.e., achieve the progressive goals debated by Honneth and Fraser)?
5) Prepare students to be activists for social justice causes?

6) Be revenue generating enterprise that operate within the public and private spheres of society?
7) Be a revenue generating enterprise that works with foreign and domestic corporations and governments to produce scientific knowledge and technology?
8) Be free and accessible as a means of promoting the well-being of disenfranchised groups?
9) Vehicles for addressing historical power imbalances that benefited Whites, males, cisgendered heterosexuals, and the wealthy?
10) Focused on promoting the wellbeing of America and promoting its history and cultural values?
11) Focused on promoting global citizenship that works against the idea of American exceptionalism?
12) Centered on satisfying the demands of stakeholders?
13) Centered on satisfying the demands of students (and which students)?
14) Produce new scientific knowledge?
15) Dismantle the production of new scientific knowledge as a means of ending White, cishetero, patriarchal dominance?

What the university system is trying to do is all of these things simultaneously, which I posit as the force that is driving the production of social pathologies. On the contemporary American university campus there exists multiple groups of faculty members, administrators, students, and organizations with reach far outside the university, all competing to achieve different goals. Sometimes, and perhaps inevitably, these groups come into direct confrontation with one another, turning the university into the site of a power struggle as different groups, operating with different normative and dramaturgical structures, compete for dominance over the university's policies, employees, purpose, and ultimately, its culture. While these conflicts might be inevitable, that does not mean they cannot be better handled in such a way as to reduce harm to both the parties involved, and the perception of the university overall.

From a Marxist-left perspective, this generates social inequalities because the wealthy can afford to attend private universities, where they make connections with other wealthy students and thus propagate capitalism in a way that is unaffordable to students of other classes, recreating a power-elite structure. From a middle or apolitical perspective (those who are

politically moderate centrists or who do not care about politics), the concern is cost and the appearance of a dysfunctional, circus-like atmosphere on campus. From a conservative-right perspective, there is the perception of the university as an institution that has been captured by progressives, whose goal is to end the American project as envisioned in the Constitution, take away people's rights, turn students against their country, faith, and families, and ultimately bring about democratic socialism, if not outright communism.

These pathologies can bring about other problems in the form of positive feedback loops. First, in terms of power over the student body and professoriate, any policy cloaked in IED language can be defended by accusing anyone who challenges it of promoting hatred towards women and minorities. This tendency is exacerbated by the political orientation of faculty and administration. Second, it allows universities to virtue signal their moral goodness in a way that hides (or takes the place of addressing) systemic injustices. Third, this incentivizes behavior of on campus groups to dominate discourse by accusing ideological opponents of hate speech, crowding out intelligent, nuanced discussion. Finally, it provides a means of activating an angry mob at a moment's notice against a student or professor, which both produces a viable excuse for Chairs and Deans to fire professors and graduate students who they do not like or who are rocking the boat, and a greater overall sense of fear to keep people from challenging the power structure in the first place.

Within this Gordian knot of conflicting missions and values there are researchers and programs who aim to remain out of the fray, solve their internal political issues such as industry capture, and focus on developing solutions to societal problems within STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Medicine) and related fields. At Colorado State University, the focus of our Political Science Department is the environment. Our campus was the very first in the

nation to earn a Platinum STARS rating for our environmental practices and we have pioneered

policies, technologies, and public-private partnerships to develop environmental Best Practices

that have been diffused around the world. We have also had our fair share of news coverage of

campus controversies. Sensationalism in journalism, being what it is, raises the question as to

what degree these social pathologies overshadow all the research and hard work being done at

CSU and at universities around the nation?

     If there is damage being done because of how these social pathologies are reported on by

politically biased media outlets, then we need to get to the root of the problem and address these

issues, such that the image of the university can improve, and the public at large can be engaged

once again on environmental information. To get to that we will need a model of a healthy

speech community, which we can then use to differentiate social health from social pathology on

campus. To examine at what a healthy campus would look like, we now turn our attention to the

work of Jürgen Habermas

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<u>Chapter Five – Habermas, Part One: Social Health and Pathology</u>

"Health is not the mere absence of disease, it is the dynamic expression of life."
- Sri Sri Ravi Shankar

"When you tear out a man's tongue, you are not proving him a liar, you're only telling the world that you fear what he might say."
- Tyrion Lannister, from 'Clash of Kings', in the Game of Thrones series

Before we can correctly assess the social pathology of the progressive neoliberal university, we must first build a model of health for contrast. To do this within the tradition of Critical Theory we will explore the work of *Jürgen Habermas,* primarily Between Facts and Norms (1996) and Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 (1984).[8] Habermas' body of work and contribution to political theory is too enormous to be fully captured here, so instead I will be exploring only those Habermasian concepts that can be employed in developing what a healthier university system would look like. Of critical importance will be his distinction between the Lifeworld and the System, which lays at the heart of the social pathologies besetting higher education.

My goal is to extrapolate from these works the necessary concepts and frameworks for establishing legitimacy, and to build a model of what a healthy, non-pathological university system would look like in terms of pedagogy and shared governance, oriented towards building an ideal speech community for everyone involved with, and impacted by, the university system. This builds upon the works of others who have used Habermas' work to establish new approaches to Public Administration, Discourse Theory, and Public Deliberation. The serious application of Habermas to Public Administration is relatively new and has been offered as a solution to the problems created by the failures of New Public Management, which is at the heart

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[8] I use the abbreviations 'BFN' for between Facts and Norms (1996) and 'TCA' for Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 (1984) throughout this chapter for readability.

of the neoliberal half of the progressive neoliberal university. In contrast, Discourse Theory and

Public Deliberation have generated large volumes of work and matured into becoming their own

fields of study, and are the focus of the next chapter.

I am taking the position that a healthy university culture would look like Habermas'

'ideal speech situation', which is rooted in an intersubjective orientation towards truth and

understanding. In its original form, an ideal speech situation requires that:

> 1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a
> discourse.
> 2a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
> 2b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
> 2c. Everyone is allowed to express their attitudes, desires and needs without any
> hesitation.
> 3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising
> his rights as laid down in (1) and (2) (Habermas 1990)

Later, in response to critics, Habermas would grow this theory of ideal speech situation

into a moral system of 'Discourse Ethics' which could respond to the charge of relativization by

a test of 'performative contradiction' by reutilizing Kant's transcendentalism.

Habermas' dialectical philosophy is rooted in intersubjectivity, from which he builds a

complete system of epistemology, ontology, ethics, politics, sociology, science, and life.

Because Habermas has covered so much ground it would behoove us to start with some

definitions from BFN and TCA, particularly his distinction between the Lifeworld and System as

a way of ontologically capturing the essence of the social pathologies plaguing the university

system. The five foundational definitions I will need to explore to build my argument are

Intersubjectivity, Betweenness, Discourse Theory, Discourse Principle, and Legitimacy.

Intersubjectivity is foundational for Habermas because of the successful attacks made by

philosophers and political theorists on the possibility of objectivity, especially in practical and

social matters. Even Kant's original system distinguished between the phenomenological

appearances of how the world seems to be and the noumenal world of how the world is objectively, something that only a god-like being could ever know. Because we cannot access the objective world, systems of thought must be built on what subjects can agree to amongst themselves. This intersubjective approach is, in its simplest form, rooted in speech wherein we can all, in principle, agree to rules that in turn apply to all subjects.[9]

According to Chambers (2017), the 'Betweenness' of Between Facts and Norms is the space between ideas in which Habermas builds his argument from a neo-Kantian perspective, operating between such dichotomies as, "liberal/republican, rights/democracy, public/private autonomy, natural law theory/legal positivism, reason/will, participant/observer, lifeworld/system, communicative/strategic, morality/ethical life." Habermas' system exists within these dichotomies by drawing out features from both sides and using those concepts to create room for intersubjective agreement, understanding, and meaning by incorporating them into a more complete unity that respects the distinctness of both.

The legacy of Habermas' Discourse Theory is a focal point in the next chapter as it has evolved into an academic subfield in its own right and is a foundational part of the reflective aspect of his Theory of Communicative Action which operates along,

> "a multi-dimensional conception of reason that expresses itself in different forms of cognitive validity: not only in truth claims about the empirical world, but also in rightness claims about the kind of treatment we owe each other as persons, authenticity claims about the good life, technical-pragmatic claims about the means suitable to different goals, and so on." (Bohman and Rehg 2014)

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[9] The literature on intersubjectivity is too vast for even an entire dissertation to cover. A complete account would include, at minimum, phenomenology, existentialism, epistemology, and ontology to approach the topic of how it is possible for minds to understand one another. On top of that there is another literature on how social identities such as race, class, gender, ability, etc. impacts that base process and creates pathologies and oppressions.

This multi-dimensional approach becomes the foundation of building the ideal speech situation mentioned above, wherein subjects can reason and communicate with one another under conditions that allow for complete inclusion in such a way that the process becomes conducive to building and examining the best arguments as a social practice. These arguments are examined within different aspects of reason such as sincerity claims, validity claims, and authenticity claims. Respecting these different aspects of reason generates presuppositions, of which the four most important are:

1.   no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded
2.   participants have equal voice,
3.   they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception, and
4.   there are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse.

Progressive IED policies aim to manifest the first two goals of inclusion and equality from a diverse range of identities. However, they have also been used in ways that have generated violations of the latter two; namely that many people no longer feel free to speak their honest opinion on campus and that there is coercion in the form of cancel culture leading to students being expelled and professors losing their jobs for defending unpopular or offensive positions. According to the CATO Institute, this fear has grew between 2017 and 2020:

Figure 5.1 CATO Institute's 2020 survey data on fear of sharing opinions by political ideology.

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According to the same survey, this fear increases with higher levels of education and affects all groups in terms of political beliefs, class, and social identities,

> "These concerns are also cross-partisan, although more Republicans are worried: 28% of Democrats, 31% of independents, and 38% of Republicans are worried about how their political opinions could impact their career trajectories.
>
> Americans with diverse backgrounds share this concern that their employment could be adversely affected if their political views were discovered: 38% of Hispanic Americans, 22% of African Americans, 31% of White Americans, 35% of men, 27% of women, 36% of households earning less than $20,000 a year, and 33% of households earning more than $100,000 a year agree." (CATO 2020)

The psychological role that this fear plays in the rejection of university-produced environmental research will be explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. For now, it is sufficient to say that the forces generating it are themselves violations of ideal Habermasian speech conditions occurring at universities, crafting IED policies in service of neoliberal goals that fail to take into account the generation of fear for speaking freely, and coercion upheld by the universities themselves. The theories behind these policies may have begun at the universities, but their legislative and policy implementations have since spread out into the wider world and created feedback loops with one another. This is creating conflicts in social media in terms of choosing which voices to boost and which to censor and silence, between legislatures and teachers about what theories of race and gender must or must not be taught from K-Ph.D., and in the greater public sector about what ideas, words, and beliefs are acceptable to express, and which count as 'hate speech.'

A central part of Discourse Theory is the Discourse Principle in which, "A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse" (Bohman and Rehg 2014). The problem of applying this in a

university system is that many people being affected by these administrative policies did not, nor would not, accept these policies except through coercion.

This is important because, within Habermasian theory, it directly impacts the legitimacy of these policies. Legitimacy, within this scheme, means that citizens believe and intuit that the institutions that impact and shape their lives are just, fair, good-natured, and are operating in their best interest, and thus deserving of citizens' loyalty and support. This is an important feature of social order because institutions, such as universities, need to be seen as legitimate to be accepted. Although most reasonable people would agree with the goals of these IED policies in the abstract, their implementation via coercion harms students and faculty, while at the same granting power to the administration, causes serious issues. Legitimacy, for Habermas, requires inclusion and equality from all voices, in a manner that is free from coercion and fear, such that an intersubjective form of collective reasoning as a social practice becomes possible. In their current form IED policies do not meet this threshold, and are thus illegitimate because these policy decisions are made by those with money and power, and are being implemented against the will of those affected by these policies.

When critical views of these policies are censored or silenced, and there are attempts to bring all sorts of harm to dissenting voices, this serves the dual purpose of silencing the critics and sending a message to other would-be dissenters. In our contemporary hyper-partisan environment these voices are not silenced, but are in fact given applause and credence by like-minded partisans on the other side, adding antagonistic dysfunction on both the micro- and macro- level. Occasionally, protesting an IED policy can even lead to a career full of fortune and fame, incentivizing antagonistic behavior, as was the case with CSU's Isabel Brown.

With those preliminaries in mind, we can now turn to the TCA Vol. 2 text itself. The book begins with Chapter V, which focuses on the turn Mead and Durkheim took from 'purposive activity' to 'communicative action,' and the role of linguistics. However, it is in Chapter VI where he discusses the 'System' and the 'Lifeworld,' which is what is most directly beneficial to our discussion of what a healthy university system would look like.

The concept of the Lifeworld can be traced back to Husserl's 1936 book 'The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,'

> "In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together.' We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning... The we-subjectivity... [is] constantly functioning." (Husserl 1936, 108-109)

From there, Alfred Schütz synthesized this phenomenological approach towards consciousness with Max Weber's idea of subjectively meaningful actions. Habermas extended this concept and incorporated a wide array of thinkers from Mead to Durkheim, switching its focus away from consciousness and towards communication. Both, however, are critical elements for Habermas's understanding of how we use discourse to navigate the Lifeworld, which remains active and not static. For him, the Lifeworld operates in the background and is made of intersubjectively understood cultural practices, meanings, accommodations, and other actions and speech actions that are mutually understood, if often implicitly or unconsciously, within a society. However, the Lifeworld interacts with the System of rationalization, bureaucracy, government, capitalist market forces, etc. in which each colonizes, shapes, and influences the other. Each has their own type of rationality, wherein the Lifeworld is governed

by practical rationality and the System is governed by technical rationality. It is from the

interaction between these two worlds, especially Systemic colonization of the Lifeworld, that

social pathologies can be generated in the forms of self-deception, domination, alienation, and

false consciousness.

According to Bohman and Rehg (2014), working from chapters 4 and 6 of TCA, Vol. 1,

the System is defined as,

> "those predefined situations, or modes of coordination, in which the demands of
> communicative action are relaxed in this way, within legally specified limits. The
> prime examples of systemic coordination are markets and bureaucracies. In these
> systemically structured contexts, nonlinguistic media take up the slack in
> coordinating actions, which proceeds on the basis of money and institutional
> power—these media do the talking, as it were, thus relieving actors of the
> demands of strongly communicative action."

And the term Lifeworld,

> "refers to domains of action in which consensual modes of action coordination
> predominate. In fact, the distinction between lifeworld and system is better
> understood as an analytic one that identifies different aspects of social interaction
> and cooperation (1991b). "Lifeworld" then refers to the background resources,
> contexts, and dimensions of social action that enable actors to cooperate on the
> basis of mutual understanding: shared cultural systems of meaning, institutional
> orders that stabilize patterns of action, and personality structures acquired in
> family, church, neighborhood, and school."

The System colonizes the Lifeworld by impacting and shaping it towards its own

interests through using its logics to institutionalize and shape communicative actions

towards the benefit of the system. Bohman and Rehg (2014) explain this relationship,

noting that (words bolded by me for emphasis),

> "The rationalization of the lifeworld in Western modernity went hand-in-hand
> with the growth of systemic mechanisms of coordination already mentioned
> above, in which the demands on fully communicative consensus are relaxed. If
> large and complex modern societies can no longer be integrated solely on the
> basis of shared cultural values and norms, new nonintentional mechanisms of
> coordination must emerge, which take the form of nonlinguistic media of money
> and power. For example, markets coordinate the collective production and

distribution of goods nonintentionally, even if they are grounded in cultural and political institutions such as firms and states. Modernization can become pathological, as when money and power "colonize the lifeworld" and displace communicative forms of solidarity and inhibit the reproduction of the lifeworld *(e.g., when universities become governed by market strategies)*." (Bohman and Rehg 2014)

This produces major social pathologies such as 'juridification' where law dominates more and more of the Lifeworld, wherein people come to be dominated by bureaucracies. According to Habermas, legitimate democratic institutions should be subject to the deliberation of citizens who author the laws which govern them, thus avoiding (or at least softening) this pathology of domination. Like many other elements of Habermasian thought, there is a balance between too much and too little order in establishing healthy political systems.

In terms of the universities, when governed by the market strategies of neoliberalism and guided by NPM strategies, this juridification occurs as a form of social pathological domination of students and faculty in pursuit of the bottom line. Rules are not created in a deliberative fashion, where those affected participated in a meaningful way in their creation, but rather are developed by administrations and forced upon students and faculty for the sake of the university's bottom line. This is the expression of Lifeworld colonization via System logic within higher education.

This is because the university is itself a System, which is trying to accommodate different experiences/inflections within the broader Lifeworld and various lifeworlds via IED policies, and thus it has logics aimed at both progressive political goals and systemic needs within a capitalist, democratic society. This dual process of colonization itself generates social pathologies, one of which is declining trust in the university system.

Part of that story is that the division of labor, which happens at the macrolevel of society as well as the microlevel of the university, generates similar phenomenon. For instance,

"The other problem is the unclarified relation between action theory and systems theory, the question of how these two conceptual strategies, pulled apart after the disintegration of idealist dialectics, can be related to and integrated with one another. The provisional answer advanced in this chapter establishes a connection with the problematic of reification as it arose in the Marxist reception of the Weberian rationalization thesis. Durkheim's theory of the division of labor provides us with a suitable point of departure." (Habermas 1981, 113)

Habermas discusses how Durkheim's division of labor becomes the foundation of his biological model of society, where differentiated groups do specialized tasks separately from one another. Where in the past archaic societies were formed around collective consciousness via normative consensus, in modern societies the life-context is constituted by the division of labor. This division of labor become a system of interconnected, functionally specified domains of action that integrates developed societies.

While Durkheim is looking at society in total, his concept of anomie division of labor applies to the university system as a dysfunction, namely that,

"the dysfunctional character of certain forms of the division of labor by the absence of such normative regulations; there is no tie-in of functionally specified domains of action to morally obligatory norms: "If the division of labor does not produce solidarity in all these cases, it is because the relations of the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of anomie." (Habermas 1981, 117)

This is an important point worth elaborating. Essentially, Durkheim is saying that the division of labor enhances power, but for Habermas this undercuts the source of power – legitimacy from the perspective of the lifeworld – because it undermines solidarity and shared norms.

The university body, considered as an organic form with differentiated organs performing different tasks, is in this state of anomie because one group, administrators, is doing tremendously well, while other organs, namely faculty and students, are facing real hardships. A state of anomie is not necessarily about whether one group is doing better or worse, but whether those groups are integrated within relations of solidarity. A healthy manifestation of this state is

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obviously threatened where "administrative" logics come into conflict with "student" or

"faculty" logics and norms. A system built for solidarity, which was socially healthy and

respectful of the totality of lifeworlds, would be one in which each organ of the body was

together doing well as a total body. However, this model of health is not being achieved because

the administrative organ has evolved to satisfy neoliberal goals at the expense of other groups.

Habermas' discussion of Durkheim's anomie and the division of labor segues into

Mead's concepts of social interactions as a dual way of arriving at conceiving of society as a

totality of subjects making actions that constitute the *lifeworld of a social group.* From the

outside observer's position, this appears as a *system of actions* wherein each action has

functional significance based on its contribution to the overall organic body. The behavior of the

subject in this scheme is understood to be its function within its specific environment where

social action is expressed and understood via semanticized meanings, which are intersubjectively

available to the subject and others within the lifeworld. However,

> "The object domain is changed by this process of semanticization[10], so that the
> ethological model of a self-regulating system, according to which every event or
> state is ascribed a meaning on the basis of its functional significance, is gradually
> replaced by the communication-theoretic model, according to which actors orient
> their actions by their own interpretations. Of course, this latter model of the
> lifeworld would be *adequate* for human societies only if that process of
> semanticization absorbed *all* "natural" meanings—that is, if *all* systemic
> interconnections in which interactions stand were brought into the horizon of the
> lifeworld and thereby into the intuitive knowledge of participants." (Habermas
> 1981, 118)

Habermas uses the work of Durkheim and Mead to build the foundation of his concept of

Lifeworld and System. To get to conceptualizing society as an interacting totality of both, he

incorporates mutual understanding (*yerstandigungsform*) and Lukacs's concept of forms of

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[10] McCrae and Jones (2013) define semantic memory as the general knowledge we accumulate throughout our lives
(facts, ideas, meaning, and concepts) which are shaped by our interactions within culture.

objectivity (*Gegenstdndlichkeitsform),* to explore the problems of reification. This leads him to

the '*Hermeneutic Idealism of Interpretive Sociology.'* This approach is rooted in transcendental

philosophy, and makes use of Husserl and Wittgenstein to develop the concept of life forms and

the life world. This approach is based on intersubjectivity and language as a foundation for

rationality, which is necessary for normative justification of a political system. Specifically,

Habermas describes the performance of a standard speech act as a pragmatic can be applied:

> • to something in the objective world (as the totality of entities about which true
> statements are possible); or
>
> • to something in the social world (as the totality of legitimately regulated
> interpersonal relations); or
>
> • to something in the subjective world (as the totality of experience to which a
> speaker has privileged access and which he can express before a public); such that
> what the speech act refers to appears to the speaker as something objective,
> normative, or subjective. (Habermas 1981, 120)

From there Habermas builds his model of the Lifeworld via intersubjective understanding

rooted in language and shared horizons of knowledge:

Figure 5.2 Habermas's (1981) conception of Subjective, Internal, Objective, Social, and
Lifewords, as linked through language and communication.

This Lifeworld is essentially taken for granted by subjects as ever present in the background. It is accepted unproblematically and not noticed until something draws the subjects' attention to it, and it is generally assumed to be obvious and a matter of common sense. However,

> "The unproblematic character of the lifeworld has to be understood in a radical sense: qua lifeworld it cannot become problematic, it can at most fall apart. The elements of the lifeworld with which we are naively familiar do not have the status of facts or norms or experiences concerning which speakers and hearers could, if necessary, come to some understanding. On the other hand, the elements of an action situation concerning which participants want to reach some consensus by means of their communicative utterances must also be open to question." (Habermas 1981, 130)

This social a priori understanding, via the medium of mutually understood language, is what makes rationality through intersubjectivity possible. The Lifeword is experienced internally by subjects, but it is not a private world. It exists intersubjectively, making it the shared background within which subjects communicate. It is this intersubjectivity that allows for us to exchange meaningful information about our private internal worlds, and to work together to try and figure out what is objectively true, as difficult as that may be. This makes the Lifeworld a priori to shared understanding. Specifically,

> "The lifeworld forms the setting in which situational horizons shift, expand, or contract. It forms a context that, itself boundless, draws boundaries. "The stock of knowledge pertaining to thinking within the lifeworld is to be understood not as a context transparent in its totality, but rather as a totality of what is taken for granted, changing from situation to situation, set into relief at any given time against a background of indeterminacy. This totality is not graspable as such but is co-given in the flow of experience as a certain, familiar ground of every situationally determined interpretation." The lifeworld circumscribes action situations in the manner of a pre-understood context that, however, is not addressed. The lifeworld screened out of the domain of relevance of an action situation stands undecided as a reality that is at once unquestionable and shadowy. It flows into the actual process of reaching understanding not at all, or only very indirectly, and thus it remains indeterminate. It can, of course, be drawn into the wake of a new theme and thereby into the catchment of a changed situation. We

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then encounter it as an intuitively familiar, pre-interpreted reality." (Habermas 1981, 132)

This Lifeworld undergoes reproduction processes to maintain its structural components based on culture, society, and personality. One aspect of these reproductive functions is to reach mutual understanding of actions and signifiers to create shared common meaning, which is at the heart of our ability to build, maintain, and reproduce culture and society. This allows for the establishment of shared norms, critiques, cooperation, and the transmission of knowledge and culture. Habermas diagrams these relationships thusly,

\. Structural \. components Kepro- N. duction processes N.	Culture	Society	Personality
Cultural reproduction	Interpretive schemes fit for consensus ("valid knowledge")	Legitimations	Socialization patterns Educational goals
Social integration	Obligations	Legitimately ordered interpersonal relations	Social memberships
Socialization	Interpretive accomplishments	Motivations for actions that conform to norms	Interactive capabilities ("personal identity")

Figure 5.3. "Contributions of Reproductive Processes to Maintaining the Structural Components of the Lifeworld." (Habermas 1981, 142)

Structural components / Repro-duction processes	Culture	Society	Person
Cultural reproduction	Transmission, critique, acquisition of cultural knowledge	Renewal of knowledge effective for legitimation	Reproduction of knowledge relevant to child rearing, education
Social integration	Immunization of a central stock of value orientations	Coordination of actions via intersubjectively recognized validity claims	Reproduction of patterns of social membership
Socialization	Enculturation	Internalization of values	Formation of identity

Figure 5.4. "Reproductive Functions of Action Oriented to Mutual Understanding." (Habermas 1981, 144)

The other component in this scheme is the System. Whereas the Lifeworld is best understood via its complexity, the System is differentiated via its rationality. Just as the Lifeworld goes through stages and evolutions as societies change, the System itself changes to reflect and accommodate ever increasing complexity. However, these do not occur in a co-mutual beneficial manner between the Lifeworld and System, and in fact as the System grows via rational and ordering processes it can come to impose, change, and colonize the Lifeworld as subjects are required to change thoughts and actions to work within the system. This colonization may work both ways, wherein the Lifeworld can impose certain patterns onto the System, which is to say that not all changes should be understood as colonization.

The progressive neoliberal university is one such System which governs student, faculty, and administrative behavior. This system governs the research, funding, regulatory compliance, facilities, business relationships, laws, policing, public health, and all forms of policy generating and compliance within the university system. IED activists have colonized the System of the university to create policies to achieve their sociopolitical goals, but they have also been colonized in turn by the rules, realities, and responsibilities that come from the authority invested into these institutions by society. It is this colonization contributes to the principal-agent matrix that is generating the various social pathologies we see on campus as administrators try to pursue both progressive and neoliberal goals simultaneously. For neoliberals, this creates additional burdens in terms of tasks which must be completed, whereas for progressives this means being complicit in and compromised by the very system they wish to change.

The application of Habermas' work to Public Administration began in 1981 with Robert Denhardt's article 'Toward a critical theory of public organization.' In 2000 Robert and Janet Denhardt expanded upon this initial concept in their article, 'The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering." This later became published as a book which as of 2015 is in its 4th edition.

New Public Service is an approach to public administration that is meant to be an alternative to New Public Management, just as New Public Management was to Old Public Administration (OPA). In OPA humans are fundamentally viewed as clients, and in NPM they were reconceived as customers, but in NPS the goal was to transform administrative thinking to one that regards human as citizens. This shift away from government as business can be shown in this chart based on their 2000 article:

Table 2. Comparing perspectives: Old public administration, New Public Management, and the New Public Service

	Old public administration	New Public Management	New Public Service
Theoretical foundations	Political theory, naïve social science	Economic theory, positivist social science	Democratic theory
Rationality and models of human behaviour	Administrative rationality, public interest	Technical and economic rationality, self-interest	Strategic rationality, citizen interest
Conception of the public interest	Political, enshrined in law	Aggregation of individual interests	Dialogue about shared values
To whom are civil servants responsive?	Clients and constituents	Customers	Citizens
Role of government	"Rowing", implementation focused on politically defined objectives	"Steering", serving as catalyst to unleash market forces	"Serving", negotiating and brokering interests among citizens
Mechanisms for achieving policy objectives	Administering programmes through government agencies	Creating mechanisms and incentives through private and non-profit agencies	Building coalitions of public, non-profit private agencies
Approach to accountability	Hierarchical - administrators responsible to elected leaders	Market-drive-outcomes result from accumulation of self-interests	Multifaceted-public servants guided by law, values, professional norms and citizen interests
Administrative discretion	Limited discretion granted to public officials	Wide latitude to meet entrepreneurial goals	Discretion needed but constrained and accountable
Assumed organizational structure	Bureaucratic organizations with top-down authority and control of clients	Decentralized public organisations with primary control within agency	Collaborative structures with shared leadership
Assumed motivational basis of public servants	Pay and benefits, civil-service protections	Entrepreneurial spirit, desire to reduce size and functions of government	Public service, desire to contribute to society

Source: Adapted from Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p.554)

Figure 5.5. Comparison chart of Old public administration, New Public Management, and The New Public Service, courtesy of Clueless Political Scientist (2017).

This model, which could be adopted within higher education, has much to offer in terms of tackling the problems besetting the contemporary university. Its focus on democratic participation, dialogue, service, coalition building, tolerance of multiple competing truth claims and narratives via postmodernism, and public service creates both a place of shared ideological space that allows for different political perspectives to be heard, as well as a place for faculty inclusive governance, along with the administration, as a central feature of running the university as an institution meant to help everyone within the system and society overall.

The Habermasian approach to shared governance has also been explored by David McIvor (2020) in 'Administrative Theory & Praxis: Towards a Critical Theory of Collaborative

Governance,' which applies Habermas' social theory to the intersection of bureaucracy and democracy. Building on the work of others, he "reviews relevant elements of Habermas's social theory that illuminate the tension between bureaucracy and democracy in the context of collaborative governance," "surveys literature on collaborative governance and show how it complicates yet also confirms the value of a Habermasian approach," " argues that collaborative governance is best viewed from the perspective of a critical theory attuned to the normative and political stakes of collaborative arrangements and practices," and argues, "that a critical pedagogy should be folded into the training of public managers and administrators" (Ibid., 2).

Applying his work on Habermas' to the contemporary university system, we see parallels between the rationalization of the Lifeworld, the foundation of administrative and economic systems, where traditional forms of social life give way to System logics. Habermas also discussed the role of differentiated systems and desocialization processes, which allow the System to bypass the traditional consensus process of intersubjective agreement. McIvor's work also touches on a theoretical underpinning for the numerous crises facing higher education when he says,

> "The relationship between these sources of power is tensely mediated by the risk that administrative prerogative can be unmasked or criticized as out of step with norms that are discursively generated and re-generated by social actors interested in accountability. In other words, the system has to face the lifeworld in a guise the latter can understand and condone (or, conversely, reject)—even as it simultaneously *manages* the lifeworld via media that are drained of discursive power themselves." (McIvor 2020)

Part of this on campus is the principal-agent matrix previously discussed. However, another part of it is that the contemporary university is operating in an increasingly diverse, and increasingly politically polarized, nation. This is generating a variety of norms, which often are at odds with one another, politically speaking. These

problems compound and interact with one another, producing positive feedback loops to which administrations respond with their go-to tactic of hiring more administrators to handle the problems in a piecemeal approach that tries to appease everyone, or at least keep the money coming in.

Not only does this approach not work, and produce a nightmare in terms of costs for students and working conditions for faculty, but it also actually serves to decrease the sense of public legitimacy as the System takes on a life of its own, detached further and further from the lifeworlds it seeks to dominate via IED policies, as they pertain to control of language and enforced social norms on campus.

This deterioration of legitimacy can itself spawn social pathologies and attempts to establish System dominance over the Lifeworld. The process of differentiation on the part of the System can both represent advances of democratization and generate colonization because,

> "Administrative systems can deflect intensifying legitimation demands through "symbolic use of inquiries" and other means of signaling compliance to democratic norms, while simultaneously refusing to alter structural elements of system operation (1989, 275). Systems can "engineer" a public "for purposes of legitimation," which denies or avoids legitimacy crises rather than resolving them (1989, 276). Habermas thinks this is a limited strategy, since administrative systems cannot go so far as to "create meaning," but symbolic participation or other means of engineering publics can erode "cultural values" and intensify social pathologies such as civic alienation or withdrawal." (McIvor 2020, 7-8)

The conservative critique of the contemporary university is very much centered on this erosion of cultural values, most notably the importance of free speech and thought, and indeed we do see this civic alienation and withdrawal as a direct response. This deterioration in perception of legitimacy, and this sense of the university as an institution which has been colonized and captured by progressives who are aiming for total System domination via IED

policies, creates a situation where it is unclear how any message on any topic is subject to dismissal, including issues of vital importance to the Lifeworld such as environmental and public health concerns.

One contemporary example of how a lack of acceptance of information from elite sources, based on distrust and lack of legitimacy, caused macrolevel effects in the Lifeworld is the rejection of mask mandates during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. Not only did increasing pressure from Public Health organizations, using data partially produced in the university system, not increase mask usage, it actually created a social pressure to reject any mask usage at all via conspiratorial thinking generation and a desire to refuse to do what those in the public health System demanded they do, particularly (but not exclusively) with conservative citizens. The social and political psychological mechanisms of why this occurs will be further explored in Chapters Seven and Eight, but for our theoretical purposes here it is sufficient to show how doubt towards the System, based on lack of perceived legitimacy, can produce macrolevel Lifeworld effects. Further, if this is happening in a scenario in which we can empirically observe the phenomena now, in real time, it raises the question of how much stronger these psychological mechanisms will be when applied to a phenomenon, like AGW, that is expected to occur over a large span of time in the coming decades and centuries.

The answer to this problem, as espoused by the Denhardts and McIvor, lies in Habermasian collaborative governance, as a means of navigating the principal-agent matrix, and restoring legitimacy by including all good faith voices into the project of shaping the university into a System that does not have a pathological relationship with the various lifeworlds which it impacts. Collaborative governance has been defined as the, "processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public

agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public

purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished" (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015, 18).

This is part of the principal-agent matrix problem, but it is also an avenue in which to

address the legitimacy crisis. McIvor makes it clear that this road, while promising, has pitfalls

as well when he says,

> "Nevertheless, counter-trends and even pathologies come to light as well within
> the theory and practices of collaborative governance. First and foremost,
> collaborative processes are often an *add-on* to command-and-control modes of
> governance, not a substitute or replacement for hierarchical, agency-driven policy
> design or implementation. Horizontal models of collaboration have largely been
> "layered on top of the traditional system," and as such they have not radically
> altered the mechanisms by which the most important structural elements of that
> system tend to operate (Kettl 2002, 147). Moreover—and potentially more
> troubling—is that participatory or collaborative efforts take on the *form* of
> dedifferentiation but actually represent means of co-optation or manipulation."
> (McIvor 2020, 13)

> Adding that,

> "At best, these are prefigurative movements for greater collaboration, but at worst
> they are collaborative governance in name only. The illusion of greater
> influence—or "infusion" of public engagement—can be democratically
> counterproductive since it weakens the sense that critical public groups have to
> mount a "siege" against autonomous subsystems in order for communicative
> power of the lifeworld to have a disciplining effect on those systems (Habermas
> 1996, 486). Collaborative governance might be another, and more cunning, form
> of co-optation by partial or symbolic inclusion." (McIvor 2020, 13-14)

To navigate these perils, we next turn our attention to two fields developed out of

Habermas' work: Discourse Theory and Public Deliberation Theory.

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<u>Chapter Six – Habermas, Part Two: A Legacy of Discourse and Deliberation</u>

Normative and empirical inquiry are distinct, and justifiably so. Their methods and agendas diverge, appropriately so. But our understanding of deliberative democracy will fall short until theorists and empiricists take greater steps to bridge this division. Some might say that unless philosophers become political scientists, or unless those who now are political scientists become philosophers, there can be no end to troubles in our discipline; only then will the theory of deliberative democracy see the light of day. – Dennis Thompson

It is my contention that the modern university system is in a state of social pathology because progressive neoliberalism has, for various complex reasons, generated practices and norms which violate Habermas' ideal speech situation. It has done so by promoting IED policies in such a way that these policies, promoted in the name of helping underrepresented social identity groups, are in fact used to maintain and reinforce existing campus power structures that buttress the contemporary university as a perpetually growing, and resource seeking, neoliberal institution. This has harmed free speech, academic freedom, students in the form of debt, faculty in the form of decreasing full-time tenured positions and precaritization of the workforce, and the reputation of the university system as being of net benefit to the country.

To capture this phenomenon, we can use the fields of Discourse Theory and Public Deliberation as a guide to improving the public perception of the value of higher education. Since Habermas, discourse theory has become a field incorporating empirical data, different methodological techniques, and a literature identifying its shortcomings and possible solutions, with useful applications across the social sciences. According to Jacob Torfing (2005),

> "Discourse theory emerged in the late 1970s as an intellectual response to the problematization of mainstream theory in the wake of May 1968, the critique of the structuralist theories of language, culture and society, and the crisis of Marxism in the face of the emerging neoliberal and neoconservative hegemony. Discourse theory did not, however, attempt to provide a new theoretical apparatus, consisting of a set of core assumptions, some clearly defined concepts and taxonomies, and a series of readymade arguments disclosing the mechanisms

of a rapidly changing society. Instead, it offered a new analytical perspective which focused on the rules and meaning that condition the construction of social, political, and cultural identity. The analytical tools, in terms of concepts, arguments, and ideas, were developed in specific theoretical and empirical contexts and their general validity taws limited and conditional upon endless adjustments and reinterpretations. The open, contingent, and theoretically polyvalent character of the new theories of discourse attracted a great number of scholars who, in discourse theory, found an undogmatic framework for exploring new intellectual avenues based on post-structuralist and post-modernist insights." (Torfing 2005, 1)

This 'undogmatic' approach, which has been explored in different ways by different groups of scholars, including Foucault and his epigones, is useful, but has limitations because of its abstractness and openness, which makes for unclear boundaries. Specifically, if everything is fair game, then there is no way to approach it incorrectly, and thus it cannot self-correct itself as a field. This has given rise to several strands within discourse theory, some of which center around critical theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe, and some of which are aimed at incorporating normative theory and empirical science. For the sake of this project, I will do a brief literature review of the field overall before focusing on the intersection of discourse theory with empirical science, which is the research model this dissertation is built upon.

David Howarth (2005) took on this methodological complication, moving beyond the framework of epistemologically and methodologically attacking mainstream approaches to social science, and towards developing articulatory practice. Howarth's approach tackled the problem of how formal-abstract theory intersects with real-concrete events and processes by examining empirical research in discourse theory through a plurality of formal social and political logics. Looking at protest movements in Britain and South Africa, he combined a plurality of formal, social, and political logics to create an articulatory practice that circumvents the traditional problem of applying formal-abstract theory to real world.

Katharina T Paul (2009) similarly tried to add clarification to what discourse theory means, and what it is capable of, by clarifying the central postulates of poststructuralist discourse theory and raising critical methodological issues. She explored a comparative approach to policy analysis by looking at the relationship between discourses and institutional practices, wielding discourse theory as a collection of analytical tools that serve as both a theoretical orientation and a collection of methods.

While discourse theory is still growing as a field while being applied, examined, refined, and heavily debated, it has already proven to have a number of valuable critical applications. According to Martin (2002), the field is an intersection of theories and theorists, covering everyone and everything from Bevir, Laclau, Mouffe, and Gramsci's views on history, Philosophy, foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as they apply to power, conflict, to the creation and evolution of social meanings and identity. Flatschart (2016) argues for a critical realist critical discourse analysis as an alternative to the post-marxist discourse theory, which is rooted in Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek (Torfing 2005).

Gynos, Howarth, Norval, and Speed (2009) examined six approaches to discourse analysis:

1. Political Discourse Theory (PDT) – the idea that the way we speak and write is shaped by social forces that reflect and reify power imbalances which if understood and rectified could lead to a more just world

2. Rhetorical Political Analysis (RPA) - analysis of discourse in political arenas such as party platforms, speeches, debates, and policy proposals

3. The Discourse Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis (DHACDA) – "The Discourse-Historical Approach considers discourse analysis not just to be a method of language analysis, but a multidimensional project incorporating theory, methods, methodology and empirically based research practices that yield concrete social applications." (Reisigl 2017)

4. <u>Interpretive Policy Analysis</u> (IPA) – "Interpretive policy analysis start from the assumption that policies and policy processes do not address 'real' societal problems in a planned, rational and coherent way. Instead interpretive policy analysis rests on the presupposition that the societal issues that are addressed in policymaking have different meanings for different groups of people. The engagement with these situated meanings, and how those meanings – often plural, at times clashing – are enacted, lies at the heart of interpretive policy analysis." (Interpretive Policy Analysis 2021)

5. <u>Discursive Psychology</u> (DP) – "Discursive psychology is a field or subdiscipline of psychology centered on the analysis of language data, especially transcribed talk." (Taylor 2014)

6. <u>Q methodology</u> (QM) – "Q-methodology (also known as Q-sort) is the systematic study of participant viewpoints. Q-methodology is used to investigate the perspectives of participants who represent different stances on an issue, by having participants rank and sort a series of statements" (Better Evaluation 2014)

From these perspectives, IED policies are typically justified from a PDT perspective, wherein the university takes on the role of creating and enforcing rules meant to correct historical injustices against women, racial minorities, and LGBTQIAA+ persons as a means towards creating a more just and equal world. However, because these policies exist within public institutions, wherein the administration has positional power over faculty, staff, and students, the IPA approach yields a more complicated picture where these policies perform both a PDT function and, I argue, serve to mask abusive and exploitative practices which harm the communities they are meant to help.

Carpentier and Cleen (2007) and Simon and Jerit (2007) demonstrated the ability to apply discourse theory in media studies. Where Carpentier and Cleen (2007) look back to the work of Laclau and Mouffe and the role of post-Marxism in analyzing media, Simon and Jerit (2007) explore the role of language in building public support for certain policies. Specifically, they looked at the role of the use of the words 'baby' and 'fetus' in generating public support for or against partial birth abortion, finding that those who consumed media that framed the issue as

being about 'babies' having much less support than those who consumed media that framed the issue as being about 'fetuses.' Further, politicians who supported partial birth abortion used the term 'fetus' much more frequently, whereas those who wanted to ban the practice regularly referred to 'babies.' More importantly, they found that,

> "participants exposed to discourse using both terms converged upon a response independent of the words' relative proportions. In contrast to probabilistic survey response models, these findings support the idea that a kind of public reason can emerge from the interaction of citizens' judgment processes and elite communication" (Simon and Jerit 2007, 254).

The value of this, for my purposes, is to show that the danger of the university being seen as hostile to non-progressive positions and beliefs, is a problem that can be dealt with in a way that both respects free speech and IED policies. The end result of allowing free speech to be once again embraced in higher education could be a 'form of public reason', which will be more widely embraced by those who are not progressive, Marxist, or politically liberal. The university can be reformed in such a way that it achieves better opportunities and outcomes for underprivileged communities, by allowing those with progressive-divergent views to feel invited into the conversation, rather than terrified of the consequences of what could happen to them, personally and professionally, for daring to disagree with the progressives on campus.

Discourse theory has also been shown to be a useful bridge between normative political theory and empirical political science, as this dissertation aims to do. Building on the work of Steiner et al. (2004), Thompson (2008) looked at how theorists and empiricists have begun to become more interested in each other's work and how that collaboration is necessary towards understanding deliberative democracy. He describes the symbiotic relationship as a place where,

> "Empirical inquiry can more effectively influence—and in turn be influenced by—normative theory if both theorists and empiricists proceed with a clearer conception of the elements of deliberation. They can then more productively address two general problems that have not received the attention they deserve:

the conflicts among those elements, and the relationships of the parts of deliberative democracy to its whole." (Thompson 2008, 498)

One of the challenges of incorporating empirical science into deliberative democracy is figuring out if it will play a support, co-equal, or dominant role with normative theory. Here Thompson breaks from Habermas, who he sees as advocating that empirical research be relegated to a helping role, where it poses no risk of becoming disruptive to the project, a move Thompson disagrees with. Specifically, Thompson cites a Habermas (2006) article subtitled 'the impact of normative theory on empirical research,' as his point of divergence.

Thompson sees a better path forward by letting political theorists and empiricists take on the parts of the project that each is best suited for. Specifically, the biggest contribution theorists can make is to keep the other deliberative democracy participants aware of, and up to date on, the state of affairs in the various normative debates within political theory regarding discourse theory and deliberative democracy. These normative debates involve justification, the nature of reason, the conditions required to achieve deliberative democracy (Warren 2007, Cohen 2007, Dryzek 2007), internal contradictions, and the clashing of values within deliberative democracy.

The challenge for empiricists is to make concepts operationalizable, which means having clearly defined terms that can be empirically measured out in the greater world. According to Elstub (2010), this is the challenge of the 'third generation of deliberative democracy.' The first generation was built on the normative assertions of Rawls and Habermas, the second was an attempt to reconcile the two and build practical applications, and now in the third generation the goal is to realize the potential of public deliberation by testing specific hypotheses about specific arrangements within deliberative space. Political theorists and sociologists have a long history of being critical of empirical science in political science on epistemological grounds, and concerns about the potential for reifying power imbalances, going all the way back to Dilthey, Weber, and

Simmel in the nineteenth century. However, Thompson (2008) does a good job cataloguing

instances of empirical science identifying practices and situations that contributed to, or worked

against, the success of deliberative democracy projects around the world. According to

Thompson (2008), future progress requires navigating three problems:

> "The analytic problem, which requires distinguishing the elements of
> deliberation—its concept, standards, and conditions.
>
> The internal conflicts problem, which necessitates recognizing that the conditions
> that promote some values of deliberative democracy may undermine other values,
> including some that deliberative democrats favor.
>
> The structural problem, which calls for moving beyond the study of isolated or
> one-time deliberative experiences and examining the relationship between
> deliberative and non-deliberative practices in the political system as a whole and
> over time." (Thompson 2008, 500)

Mansbridge et al. (2012) describe the contemporary state of deliberation theory and

practice as bridging the world between political theorists and empirical political scientists, where

both approaches have served to develop practices that legitimize democracy and create quality

deliberation that informs both citizens and elected officials. Whereas previous attempts focused

on concentrated studies in legislative bodies and in campaigns, or otherwise looked at small

deliberative initiatives, their approach was to broaden the scope of deliberation theory into a

complete systemic approach that could look at individual institutions, situated within a broader

context, and provide insight into legitimizing the entirety of a politically democratic project.

Addressing these problems and improving communication between affected parties

within higher education is important, because policy decisions made in the democratic

deliberative model can generate increased legitimacy (Licht et al. 2012). The link between

transparency is complicated and the results uncertain, but they found that transparent decisions

made upon the democratic deliberative model generate more legitimacy than ex post facto justification for decisions made behind closed doors.

The proponents of IED policies argue that power imbalances within the system create unfair starting advantages for members of certain social identity groups, namely Caucasians, males, cishetero persons, and the wealthy. Advocates for deliberative democracy have examined these issues, and provided an initial roadmap to work out how a Habermasian ideal speech community could, via public deliberation, operate in such a way that it takes these concerns into account as part of the larger project of building consensus and legitimacy.

Karpowitz et al. (2009) and Karpowitz et al. (2012) examined empirical experiments in deliberation that aim to address these inequities. Karpowitz et. al (2009) looked at deliberative experiments modeled on proportional inclusion of disempowered speakers and discourses, as well as 'enclave deliberation' models, where disenfranchised groups were allowed to discuss and negotiate the issue amongst themselves before engaging the wider forum. They found empirical evidence that supports the enclave approach, as it allows members of disenfranchised groups some of the same benefits (e.g., political knowledge, efficacy, and trust) that more privileged groups traditionally have had more access to. This allows the disenfranchised group the ability to avoid groupthink, polarization, and increases their ability to persuade the larger group of their claims to legitimacy within a deliberative civic body.

Karpowitz et al. (2012) looked at power balances between men and women specifically, and found that procedural decisions can have a profound impact. They found that while in many models of deliberation there was a substantial gender gap in voice and authority, models based on unanimous rule, where there were few women involved or majority rule where many women were involved, caused these gaps to disappear.

Empirical experiments in different deliberative models have sometimes produced conflicting results for psychologists and political scientists. Mercier and Landemore (2010) argue that this is due to a lack of a psychological theory between normative political theory and empirical research. Specifically, they argue that the wide range of results is due to the psychological processes involved in intersubjective reasoning, with individuals succumbing to confirmation bias, especially if they engage in reasoning primarily with like-minded peers. This leads to polarization and a reasoning process oriented towards winning, rather than truth or collaboration. However, individuals reasoning at the collective level, when put in situations that require the production and evaluation of arguments in a social situation where there are many diverse opinions, works against confirmation bias, and leads to improved reasoning.

There has also been scholarship on how to bridge the ideological divide. Arthur Kling (2020) looks at the linguistic-normative foundations of progressivism, conservativism, libertarianism, and MAGA-ism, rooting each in a specific domain of concerns and ingroup and outgroup orientation based on shared linguistic norms and shaped by motivated reasoning. According to Kling, these linguistic norms frame dominant heuristics in ways that make it difficult for people with different politics beliefs to speak in a way that will be positively received by members of other politics groups. Building upon Daniel Kahneman's 2011 Nobel Prize winning book 'Thinking, Fast and Slow', Kling gives us a model of communication based on deliberative, logical 'slow' thinking that allows people to consider issues outside of winning 'us vs. them' contestations. A mark that one is able to consider the issue objectively, via slow thinking, is the 'ideological Turing test', where to pass one must be able to convincingly speak as a believer in another political ideology, such that actual supporters cannot tell that they are merely mimicking.

One arena in which these practices have been implemented to improve public deliberation and open communication is the internet. I discussed the internet in the Prologue and Chapter One, because conservative media frequently features stories of censorship and anti-conservative bias on campus, and on major social media platforms, but the internet is also relevant in this chapter because 1) it is now a source of education (or miseducation) with its own promises and pathologies and 2) its allows both the opportunity for people with different views to openly and honestly deliberate sensitive political issues and learn from one another, as well as opportunities for people to group up with like-minded individuals, radicalize, and go out and attack or colonize other communities, both online and in the real world. Further, it fosters a unique psychological pathology in that it allows one to anonymously insult, threaten, harass, belittle, taunt, and bully others in a way that would likely result in physical violence in the physical world. This behavior triggers defensive psychological measures in its targets, but does not allow them any maneuver other than to walk away or respond with taunts and insults of their own in response.

While potentially extremely dangerous to democracy itself, there are lessons to be learned about public deliberation within this often hostile and counter-productive environment. To paraphrase Wolin, the point of Political Theory is to recognize dangers and imagine possibilities. Cass Sunstein has done a tremendous job categorizing and examining the dangers created by the internet, going back to his 2001 book 'Republic.com.' One thing the internet allows us to do is to tailor our experience to only hear viewpoints that confirm our opinions, and only speak with people who share our own beliefs, generating strong ingroup political identities which reinforce themselves in a positive feedback loop through antagonistic stories and hostile interactions with people who hold different beliefs. At mass scale, this produces a very real

threat to democracy by changing the perception of our fellow citizens, with whom we disagree, into that political enemies who pose an existential threat to nation, families, and self.

The positive side of that is that there are billions (at least) of interactions online between people who disagree, which we can study. That includes some interactions of cooperative deliberation that produce positive results and increased mutual understanding, which we can learn form to build better models of democratic communication. Building on the public deliberation work done by studying online communities by others (Browning 1996, Hacker and Van Dijk 2000, Agren 2001, Becker 2001, Groñlund 2001, and Mahrer and Krimmer 2005), Gonzalez-Bailon, Kaltenbrunner, and Banchs (2010) empirically examined online political discussion networks, and found that online political communities can and do operate under Habermasian deliberation theoretical norms.

> "By discussing politics, people become more acquainted with their own opinions, which can result in a stronger political engagement; and they become more aware of oppositional arguments, which can lead to higher tolerance and even trust in those who hold different views. Empirical research assessing the consequences of networks for political participation is far from conclusive (Mutz, 2002; Klofstad, 2007). But there is emerging consensus that discussion networks unfold mechanisms of social influence that cannot be grasped just by focusing on isolated individuals. Differences arise when estimating the effects of such influence because the evidence suggests that it can actually work in two directions: discussion networks can amplify preferences if individuals interact with like-minded people or they can bring positions closer and build consensus if they span different pools of opinion (Sunstein, 2007)." (Gonzalez-Bailon 2010, 1-2)

Working from Ackerman and Fishkin (2002), they build a typology of political discussion and identify only those networks which show maximum argumentation and maximum representation as falling within the standards of mass deliberation:

max
argumentation

II   I

min   max
representation   representation

III   IV

min
argumentation

Figure 6.1. "Prerequisites of deliberation." (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002)

There have been attempts at building these types of Habermasian communication communities on the internet. As far back as 2003, Heng and Moor were attempting to put Habermas's ideas to work in building deliberative networks to foster online communication and cooperation. They aimed to overcome entrenched power structures, and limited rationality and responsibility, via GRASS (Group Report Authoring Support System), which gave users real time overviews of the positions of all affected stakeholders on a particular issue.

Such a model could be used to transform the university and restore its legitimacy in the public's eye. Proponents of IED policies want to include more voices from underrepresented groups, whereas critics want to include more voices from different political orientations. These models not only promote both groups getting their way, but they also demonstrate that maximum inclusion of both groups is vital to creating a healthy deliberative community.

There are of course going to be difficulties in fostering deliberative communication between the various stakeholders on American campuses. One avenue to address these complications can be found in the literature on game theory and public deliberation. Landa and Meirowitzh (2009) have explored the theoretical and practical challenges of combining these two

political theories towards improving deliberative democratic practices by clarifying norms and applying empirical research.

This is similar to the work done by Carole Pateman, John Dryzek, and Michael Neblo. In 'Participatory Democracy Revisited', Pateman (2012) reviews the theoretical discussion on democracy, looking at cosmopolitan, agonistic, republican, and monitory theories of democracy, concluding that Dryzek was right when he said that, "Deliberative democracy now constitutes the most active area of political theory in its entirety (not just democratic theory)."

Combining deliberation theory, discourse theory, and political psychology, Dryzek and Braithwaite (2000) used Q methodology and value analysis to begin empirically studying deliberative practices. They found that different levels of value commitment, rooted in discursive positions, led to different levels of flexibility when negotiating with people from other positions. They found three empirical results: 1) Participants with different value bases were able to deliberate with one another, such that it led to reflection and positive outcome facilitation, 2) In situations where participants with a value base had their projects frustrated by participants with a different value base, it led to ineffective outcomes, and 3) deliberation was able to bridge idealism and cynicism in scenarios where one group of participants had a value base that was honestly questioned by those who did not share it.

Dryzek (2002) built upon this framework, noting that while deliberative democracy was made to challenge existing democratic institutions, in the following years it had been co-opted by those same institutions. He argued that the true spirit of deliberative democracy was to create a critical theory of democracy that challenges traditions by expanding its scope beyond state and ecological boundaries in creating opportunities for democratization. In his book 'Deliberative Global Politics', Dryzek (2006) applied discourse theory to understanding and attempting to

ameliorate global conflicts ("clash of civilizations," ethnic conflicts, wars between nations and religious groups, and the War on Terror). Contrasting discourse theory with neoconservative and cosmopolitan approaches, he highlighted how studying the discourse of various participants in violent conflicts can open new paths of understanding and reconciliation. In 2007, Dryzek reviewed the empirical work being done in deliberative democracy and democratic theory, examining the limits of sloppy empirical research and reviewing the improvements brought about by careful and systemic evaluation of various deliberative approaches.

Michael Neblo has been writing on public deliberation since at least 2005. His work spans the subfield, covering everything from how linguistic barriers between political philosophers and empirical scientists lead to methodological clashes which generate confusion (2005, 2007, 2015); to how those clashes impact debates on diversity (2009a, 2009b, 2019, 2019, 2020); to democracy, political attitudes, and social affiliations (2010, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2019, 2020); to participation (2010, 2011), potential problems (2011), and proposed improvements (2010, 2012, 2015).

Neblo's work on diversity can help us understand how proponents of IED policies and proponents of free speech can meaningfully work together. In 2009 Neblo published two articles on racial politics, asking if the field is about symbolic racism, ideology, or group conflict. In 'Meaning and Measurement' (2009b), he argued that the debate over which of these three approaches was unresolvable, as they required the ability for researchers to be able to understand a person's subjective motives for supporting or rejecting proposals, a process often made worse by researchers own biases towards subjects and issues. In 'Three-Fifths a Racist: Context and Meaning in the Race Politics Debate' (2009a), he traced this methodological program to what he argued was a false consensus that the causal structure behind racial attitudes was homogenous.

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Taking an etiologically heterogeneous approach, he applied a data-based taxonomy of subjects to draw out the complexity of the basic assumptions of the field. He argued that this approach demonstrated the boundary and nature of where and how each of the three approaches was correct in a limited fashion, and set up future research based on these methodological distinctions between both approaches and sub-sets of subjects.

He returned to his work on diversity in 2019 and 2020, working collaboratively with many other scholars. In 2019 he wrote 'The Incidental Pundit: Who Talks Politics with Whom, and Why?' along with William Minozzi, Hyunjin Song, David Lazer, and Katherine Ognyanova. They looked at two models of political discussion – a 'purposive' model based on people who choose to engage with people they consider both knowledgeable and politically similar to themselves, and an 'incidental' model that says that people discuss politics as part of a regular socialization processes, wherein politics is simply a subject of regular conversation. Their analysis of discussion networks found that the incidental model was more common, whereupon most people had other interests in common, and political discussion was just one conversation amongst many. The implication of this research is that it might be possible to stimulate discussion about environmental issues outside of political echo chambers by engaging communities which are based on non-political interests.

In 2020 Neblo wrote 'Demographics and (Equal?) Voice: Assessing Participation in Online Deliberative Sessions', along with R. Kennedy, A. Sokhey, C. Abernathy, K. Esterling, D. Lazer, A. Lee, & W. Minozzi. They looked at the argument that deliberation could mimic or exacerbate existing inequalities along gender, race, and age. Focusing on online deliberative sessions, they found room for optimism in terms of the ability to design spaces to minimize inequality in deliberative spaces.

To return to the purpose of this dissertation, this work suggests that it is possible to design deliberative spaces that address the needs of IED proponents in such a way that it includes participation by those with differing worldviews, who have often felt left out and marginalized by current university IED policies and programs. To understand how these processes work for the sake of improving participation of all parties, our next section will explore the psychological mechanisms at play that provide challenges and opportunities for improved communication in the spirit of Habermas.

Social and Political Psychology is important because a crucial element of building these deliberative spaces on campus is first building a deliberative space within Political Science for Post-Structuralists, Post-Modernists, Marxists, Feminists, and Critical Theorists (including both Critical Race Theorists and Critical Gender Theorists); and Empirical Post-Positivists to collaborate and agonistically compete in order to build a model of human Psychology, from which to build a better campus environment. Political Theorist Samuel A. Chambers (2001) describes agonism thusly,

> "Agonism implies a deep respect and concern for the other; indeed, the Greek *agon* refers most directly to an athletic contest oriented not merely toward victory or defeat, but emphasizing the importance of the struggle itself—a struggle that cannot exist without the opponent. Victory through forfeit or default, or over an unworthy opponent, comes up short compared to a defeat at the hands of a worthy opponent—a defeat that still brings honor. An agonistic discourse will therefore be one marked not merely by conflict but just as importantly, by mutual admiration..." (Chambers 2001)

This deep respect and concern for the other is important and seemingly all too commonly missing. The post-positivist psychologist Steven Pinker (2002) has argued that the modern academy has settled the nature-nurture debate by simply outlawing any discussion of nature. In 'The Blank Slate,' citing the controversies around Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *The*

Bell Curve, Judith Rich Harris' *The Nurture Assumption,* and Randy Thornhill and Craig

Palmer's *A Natural History of Rape*, Pinker states,

> "When it comes to explaining human thought and behavior, the possibility that heredity plays any role at all still has the power to shock. To acknowledge human nature, many think, is to endorse racism, sexism, war, greed, genocide, nihilism, reactionary politics, and neglect of children and the disadvantaged. Any claim that the mind has an innate organization strikes people not as a hypothesis that might be incorrect but as a thought it is immoral to think." (Pinker 2002, viii)

Whether Pinker or his critics are right about the controversial authors and works he discusses, the administrative decision to respond to controversy with censorship, banning, and deplatforming has created social pathologies that need to be addressed by serious scholars, if the perception of the contemporary university as a net benefit to society is to be restored. These conversations need to be allowed to happen, and the work of Neblo et al. (2020) suggests that when they happen in spaces which are designed for deliberation, they can lead to outcomes that minimize inequality.

In short, any account of institutional or social change has to have, either explicitly or implicitly, an account of human Psychology, which is the focus of the next two chapters. The discourse and deliberation around this topic will be difficult, contentious, dark, and perhaps even dangerous, but it cannot be avoided. I argue that this debate must happen between intellectuals and scholars themselves in the spirit of agonism within a Habermasian ideal speech situation, informed by the theoretical and empirical work of Discourse Theorists and Public Deliberation scholars. As this dissertation has already discussed the contemporary university from a Public Administration lens and a Critical Theory vantage point, the next section will look at the issue from a post-positivist Social and Political Psychological perspective.

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Chapter Seven: Social and Political Psychology, Part One: Tribes and Morals

"Equality is not the empirical claim that all groups of humans are interchangeable; it is the moral principle that individuals should not be judged or constrained by the average properties of their group."
— Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature

"We can accept and understand the red or blue tribal instincts that drive the other half, or we can continue our retreat into ever more blind and vicious combat."
- Robert Haston

"Those open to new experiences are not just hanging Jackson Pollock prints in disorganized bedrooms while listening to techno-pop reinterpretations of Bach by experimental jazz bands. They are also more likely to identify themselves as liberals. High conscientiousness types are not just hanging up patriotic posters in neat and tidy offices while listening to their favorite elevator music. They are also more likely to identify as conservatives. These relationships hold up across time, across societies, and in studies using a wide variety of conceptual and methodological approaches."
- Hibbing, Smith, and Alford, authors of Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, and the Politics of Difference

At the Intersection of Political Theory, Psychology, and Neuroscience

Public deliberation and discourse theory have both evolved in recent decades to intersect with empirical science to produce falsifiable hypotheses on practices that aim to improve democracy and the institutions within it. Eliminating discrimination in a way that respects free speech would be easy, were human beings without essence and purely socially constructed blank slates that could be programmed like androids. Alas, we are flesh and blood, and in order to construct a university system that achieves the status of an ideal speech situation, we must explore the complex psychology of the humans who would inhabit it. Any account of institutional or social change has to have an (at least implicit) account of human psychology.

<u>The Challenge of Doing Political Neuroscience, Genopolitics, and Neuropolitics</u>

There are many challenges to looking at political differences through the lens of neuroscience. Some critiques, such as the Alford's (2020) 'The Politicization of Neuroscience and The Destruction of Psychology', which I covered in Chapter One of this dissertation, critique the use of post-positivist empirical science from a social construction orientation. These critiques reject what they see as 'neurological individualism,' where individuals are studied apart from their social situations. From this perspective, the scientific study of individuals is impossible (or nearly so) without a priori understanding of the various social forces that shape identity. The approach I am taking in this dissertation does not disregard these types of critiques, but rather sets them aside to focus on the biological component in a triangulating nature-nurture-free will scheme for understanding human political behavior.

From a post-positivist empirical perspective, the challenges come in the form of understanding causality in a multivariate system, with social and genetic inputs that combine in complex ways. There is no simple story like, 'Person A has gene X turned on and therefore they vote Democrat, and Person B has gene X turned off and therefore they vote Republican.' Charney and English's (2013) 'Genopolitics and the Science of Genetics,' written in response to Fowler and Dawes' (2008) article 'Two Genes Predict Voter Turnout' and Deppe, Stoltenberg, Smith, and Hibbing's (2013) 'Candidate genes and voter turnout: Further evidence on the role of 5-HTTLPR' lays out the case why a simplistic, reductionist geno- or neuro-political approach by itself does not, and possibly cannot, work.

The controversy in this example centered on the claims of a direct causal link between the MAOA gene and voting behavior, which Fowler and Dawes acknowledged as incorrect, and a follow-up claim of an indirect causal link between 5HTT, church attendance, and voting

behavior, which Charney and English argue was an incorrect conclusion, due to population stratification and omitted variable bias. While the technical arguments over these particular genetic codings are beyond my personal ability to resolve, Charney and English make a larger argument in their article that, "from the standpoints of genetics, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, genopolitics is a fundamentally misguided undertaking" (Charney and English 2013, p. 382).

While acknowledging that genes play a role in influencing behavior, Charney and English (2013) argue that the causal relationship between a single genetic sequence, and a complex behavior like voting, is too complex to be understood as the result of direct causation. Even at the simplest level of explanation, there is gene accessibility to transcription, gene transcription, gene translation, retrotransposons ("jumping genes"), and somatic and germline DNA mutability. (Charney and English 2013, 389-392) Beyond simple genetic mechanics human biology changes in response to environmental and social stimuli, as,

> "Plasticity is built into the neurodynamics of the human brain. There is a good deal of hard scientific evidence from cutting-edge research in neurobiology that macroscopic behaviors (cognitive, emotional, motor, etc.) are emergent phenomena of an underlying neuronal collective characterized by self-organized criticality (Chialvo 2010; Droste, Do, and Gross 2013; Proekt et al. 2012). Emergence refers to the unexpected collective spatiotemporal patterns exhibited by large, complex systems, where "unexpected" indicates our inability (mathematical and otherwise) to derive such emergent patterns from the equations describing the dynamics of the individual parts of the system. Complex systems (such as the brain) are usually large conglomerates of interacting elements, each one exhibiting some sort of nonlinear dynamics (Chialvo 2010)." (Charney and English 2013, 392)

> From there they make several conclusions (Charney and English 2013, 393):

> 1. "If complex behaviors associated with the healthy brain are emergent phenomena of an underlying neuronal collective, then they are not the sort of thing that can be predicted by 1 gene or 10,000 genes. When it comes to such behaviors, genes are the wrong level of analysis. Assuming that we can predict complex behaviors from genes alone (and skip everything between the gene and the appearance of the behavior) is

akin to assuming that we can predict the tides solely by studying the molecular structure of water molecules. Note that the claim here is not that "genes do not affect behavior" any more than the claim that we cannot predict the tides by the structure of water molecules is a claim that the atomic structure of water is irrelevant for the behavior of the tides."

2. "Although gene knock-out studies are a valuable research tool, they are apt to deceive because they in effect result in an artificial monogenic (i.e. /'single gene ")' disorder. Voting- and all other complex human behavior- is not a monogenic disorder, or an oligogenic disorder, or a complex polygenic disorder. Normal human behavior is not a cluster of disorders, nor is it a cluster of distinct "behaviors," each behavior predicted by a gene or set of genes. Rather, behavior is the integrated output of an integrated biological system interacting with a particular environment".

3. "Genopolitics is an exercise in naïve statistics. Genetics, however, is not a subfield of statistics. Genopolitics relies on a naïve conception of the genome uninformed by some basic principles of genetics and by discoveries in molecular genetics over the past 50 years."

Here we have an acknowledgement that the social world impacts both individual behavior and biology, that statements like "gene X causes behavior Y" are oversimplified and inappropriate, and that genes are the wrong level of analysis for understanding certain types of behavior. I think Charney and English (2013) are correct in this matter, and I agree with all of this.

What I am maintaining is that there is a not yet completely understood link between genetics and basic personality (i.e., The Big Five, Briggs-Meyer, Enneagram, etc.)[11], that people with similar personalities tend to politically cluster with one another and form ingroups, that the differences between political ingroups are observable at the group and individual level, and that these differences should be taken seriously by anyone looking to cross partisan lines looking for

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[11] The Big Five Personality traits are sometimes referred to as 'OCEAN': Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. These foundational personality traits are universal (McCrae et al. 2005) and exist as a range of possibilities between two high and low extremes. Briggs-Meyer categorizes personalities along four axes of introversion/Extraversion, Sensing/Intuition, Thinking/Feeling, and Judging/Perceiving. The Enneagram model looks at nine personality types (Idealist, Caregiver, Performer, Creative, Thinker, Loyalist, Adventurer, and Protector) and the relationships between them, both within and between individuals.

cooperation in talking about, or attempting to solve, collective action problems like AGW. Not every question in Political Science requires an answer that incorporates genetics and biology, but if our goal is to give a complete causal account of why people think and behave the way they do, then we're going to have to take brains and bodies seriously.

<div align="center">Social and Political Moral Psychology</div>

My project to utilize Social and Political Psychology to build new Best Practices for college administrators and faculty is largely based on the work of Jonathan Haidt's Moral Psychology and Moral Foundations Theory. Haidt (2012) builds on his anti-rationalistic social intuitionism in 'The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion', and rejects the Cartesian dualism of a separate mind and body, instead examining morality as the result of evolutionary adaptations that operate below the rational mind. He uses the metaphor of a person riding an elephant to symbolize how we make our moral decisions, signifying that we act first (elephant) and justify our decisions ex post facto (rider). Similar to Hume's moral scheme that 'reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions', Haidt too roots morality in emotion, and not reason. He argues that morality developed to bind groups together and exists upon six foundations:

1. Care/Harm: evolved for the protection and care of vulnerable offspring
2. Fairness/Cheating: evolved to encourage sharing and punish cheating
3. Loyalty/Betrayal: evolved to bind people together in social groups and to punish defectors
4. Authority/Subversion: evolved to bind people within a hierarchical social structure within the group
5. Sanctity/Degradation: evolved to protect health by avoiding unsafe foods and encouraging hygienic practices
6. Liberty/Oppression: evolved to balance personal freedom and group loyalty

This approach is rooted in social intuitionism, which opposes the developmental rationalist theories associated with Kohlberg and Piaget, and instead of looking at moral

development occurring in stages, it looks at morality as rooted in cultural concerns.[12] The

understanding of these cultural concerns is based on the work of Richard Schweder and is rooted

in, "three distinct but coherent clusters of moral concerns," (Achweder and Haidt 1993;

Schweder et al. 1997) which are ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity. According to

Haidt and Schweder, these intuitions are the result of evolution, and exist to aid humans in

navigating suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, and purity. As all human beings in social units must

confront these issues, we should expect the psychological roots of our ethics to use the same

moral foundation in unique and different ways, based on our particular cultures and normative

beliefs.

This is similar to what Kling (2020) argued for in 'Three Languages', namely that our

politics, religious beliefs, and social attitudes are based on different emphases on these moral

foundations. For example, socialists are more concerned with equality of outcome, and

conservatives more concerned with maintaining social structure and ensuring that cheaters do not

prosper.[13] Haidt and Graham (2009) used a combination of top-down and bottom-up thinking to

combine McAdams' (1995) Three Level Model of Personality with their own Moral Foundations

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[12] Habermas also relies and builds upon the work of Kohlberg and Piaget. A future research project on social
intuitionism that compares, contrasts, and possibly combines these different perspectives from an empirical and a
critical theory perspective could be very illuminating.

[13] While Personality Theory focuses on individual humans, when writing about an ethos of non-cheating there is
certainly an argument to be made about the role of institutional cheating in fomenting political, economic, and
environmental problems. For instance, multinational corporations often engage in destructive practices that produce
massive profits by unfair means by gaining influence over governments and regulatory agencies through political
connections, which allow to engage in unfair and unethical practices, up to and including political violence against
indigenous populations, human rights abuses, and widespread environmental spoilage.
  This practice is often referred to as 'crony capitalism,' which has been studied extensively, as it is widely
recognized as a source of much mischief and evil. As of the writing of this dissertation, no one has yet linked
personality theory to crony capitalism in a way that would illuminate how and why people do, or do not, categorize
organizations as cheaters. There may be fertile ground here for future research, as economic journalist Neil Irwin
(2014) noted, "If there is one thing that populists on the left and right can agree upon, it is disdain for crony
capitalism. It is a distaste for the cesspool of Washington influence in which big-business lobbyists canoodle with
lawmakers to get their way. It is anger at corporate welfare enriching America's biggest companies at the expense
of the little guy."

Theory. McAdam's three levels are dispositional traits (self as social actor), characteristic

adaptations (self as motivated agent), and narrative identity (self as autobiographical author):

Defining question(s)	Description	Function	Developmental trajectory	Cultural impact	Sample constructs	Sample assessments
Layer 1. Dispositional traits: self as social actor						
What kind of person is a person?	Stable, basic, and most recognisable aspects of psychological individuality	Traits sketch a behavioural outline and shape the style of peoples' action tendencies	Appear early childhood (2–3 yrs) and account for consistency in functioning across situations and time from mid-adolescence	Behavioural constraints and expression of traits via norms and display rules	The Big Five 16 Personality traits Ego resiliency & control	NEO-PI-3 16PF California Personality Inventory California Q-Set
Layer 2. Characteristic adaptations: self as motivated agent						
What do people want and value? What cognitive style do people draw on in efforts to meet social demands? What stages of development have people reached?	Features of individuality that describe personal adaptations to motivational, social-cognitive, and developmental challenges and tasks contextualised in time, place, situation, or social role	Fill in the details of human individuality, and reflect dynamics of personality	Appear mid-late childhood (7–9 yrs) and may change noticeably over the life course	Motivational constraints influencing expectations and investment for behaviour	Motives, goals, projects Values, beliefs Cognitive schemas Ego and psychosocial stages Relational modes Coping strategies Defence mechanisms	Picture Story Exercise Personal Strivings Inventory Coping Orientation to Problems Experienced
Layer 3. Narrative identity: self as autobiographical author						
Who does a person consider oneself to be?	Internalised and evolving self-narratives integrating the past, present, and future giving life a sense of unity, purpose, and meaning	Tell what lives mean in time and culture	Appear in adolescence and emerging adulthood (15–25 yrs); life stories change substantially over time	Narrative constraints providing a menu of stories, metaphors, and images that specify what a good story is and should be	Self-defining memories Nuclear scripts Recurrent themes (agency and communion; power and intimacy)	Self-defining Memory Tasks Life-story Interviews

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Figure 7.1 McAdam's three levels of disposition traits, including description, function,
developmental trajectory, cultural impact, sample constructs, and sample assessments, courtesy
of Coulter et al. (2015).

Level 1 are dispositional traits that reflect a person's general tendencies. Examples of

attempts to characterize these traits would be the Big Five Personality Traits (OCEAN), Briggs-

Meyer, or the Enneagram. Level 2 is made of characteristic adaptations, personal desires,

beliefs, concerns, coping mechanisms, values, goals, etc. These adaptations help individuals by

shaping motivations and directing their efforts. Level 2 characteristics are impacted by Level 1

traits, which can dampen or encourage them, and are much more variable than dispositional

traits. Level 3 is comprised of life stories that give people meaning, unity, and purpose and is

called Narrative Identity. Narrative Identity emanates from stories that, while not necessarily

true, shape behavior, including political behavior such as voting and participation.[14]

Working from McAdam's model and their own Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt,

Graham and Joseph (2009) explored the reasons why people categorize themselves in political

terms. They identify the left-right political spectrum model as a useful construct to describe

Level 2 adaptations that are closely linked to Level 1 traits, but expand upon this to explore

ideology at Level 3 as part of a normative-organizational narrative that provides individual

meaning, and forms ingroups around shared values. They used the Big Five to analyze four

stories representing secular liberals (the liberal progress narrative), libertarians (Ayn Rand's

story), the religious left (The Sojourners), and social conservatives (Reagan's City upon a Hill).

Figure 7.1 This is Figure 1 from Haidt, Graham, and Joseph's (2009) 'Above and below left–
right: Ideological narratives and moral foundations', representing moral foundation patterns in
four clusters. H = Harm; F = Fairness; I = Ingroup; A = Authority; P = Purity.[15]

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[14] There are many political theorists (Alford, Foucault, Butler, Marx, and many others) who do not accept this
schema of the link between personality and narratives. This debate, which I brierfly covered in chapter one, centers
around one camp of post-positivist empiricists who primarily view humans as biological units inside social systems
and political theorists who by and large view our knowledge of the body as being socially constructed and
emmeshed within various systems of power and oppression. The topic is too complex to cover here but deserves
acknowledgement as the material being discussed in this chapter occurs within disputed intellectual territory.
[15] Total sample sizes for each cluster are as follows: 5,946 (Cluster 1), 5,931 (Cluster 2), 6,397 (Cluster 3), 2,688
(Cluster 4). Error bars represent ± 2 S.E. (Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009, 113). These results were statistically
significant (the null hypothesis can be rejected), with weak to moderate Correlation Coefficients reported.

Historically Haidt, Graham, and Joseph (2009) trace this narrative approach to understanding political differences back to Clifford Geertz (1964), who,

> "would have disdained an exclusive focus on aggregate quantitative data, correlation, and data reduction. He urged social scientists to see things "from the native's point of view," and to offer "thick descriptions" of informants' "experience-near" concepts – that is, words and ideas that a person would use naturally and effortlessly when talking about things that matter…a full understanding comes only from moving back and forth between the experience-near and experience-distant perspectives. The challenge, he (Geertz) said, is to combine the two approaches." (Graham, Haidt, and Joseph 2009, 118)

They argue that the value of this narrative approach is that it offers a chance to understand conservatives as subjects in their own right. As most of academia is composed of people on the left (Abrams 2018), there is a natural tendency to study conservatives as an 'other', and to understand their values from a leftwing ingroup perspective. Taking a narrative approach that combines Moral Foundations Theory and McAdams Three Level Model gives researchers a better way to understand populations who have a different political perspective.

> "listening to people telling stories about themselves, how they came to hold their views, and how they understand the story of our society turns research participants briefly from objects into subjects, invites the listener (or researcher) to do some perspective taking, and makes it easier for the listener (or researcher) to entertain hypotheses that go against her own ideological proclivities. We therefore believe that a three-level approach to the study of ideology will produce better science, deeper understanding, and perhaps even more civil politics." (Graham, Haidt, and Joseph, 2009, 118)

Colleges who wish to use deliberation to create an ideal speech situation need to recognize how far apart these narratives are from one another, if they are to build a social space where people, operating within different narratives, can communicate with one another, instead of spaces where people with different views speak past one another. The 'how to' of accomplishing this is complicated and requires self-reflection, but a good place to begin is to recognize that we all play characters within these narratives and what counts as good, bad, or evil

is different enough, such that being a hero in one narrative often times means being a villain in another. This is especially true in a hyper-partisan and polarized environment where increasingly each narrative paints the other side in apocalyptic terms. Practically speaking, one approach would be to imagine oneself in an environment dominated by their political opposites and ask what qualities you would need to see your professors and administrators demonstrate such that, while you would never agree with them, you would perceive them as being fair and compassionate towards you, despite your differences.

At the macrolevel Graham, Haidt, and Joseph (2009, 116-117) identify four such stories as examples of moral political narratives:

The "liberal progress" narrative:
"Once upon a time, the vast majority of human persons suffered in societies and social institutions that were unjust, unhealthy, repressive, and oppressive. These traditional societies were reprehensible because of their deep-rooted inequality, exploitation, and irrational traditionalism... But the noble human aspiration for autonomy, equality, and prosperity struggled mightily against the forces of misery and oppression, and eventually succeeded in establishing modern, liberal, democratic, capitalist, welfare societies. [However,] there is much work to be done to dismantle the powerful vestiges of inequality, exploitation, and repression. This struggle . . . is the one mission truly worth dedicating one's life to achieving."

The Libertarianism narrative (Ayn Rand):
"When I came here from Soviet Russia, I was interested in politics for only one reason—to reach the day when I would not have to be interested in politics. I wanted to secure a society in which I would be free to pursue my own concerns and goals, knowing that the government would not interfere to wreck them, knowing that my life, my work, my future were not at the mercy of the state or of a dictator's whim."

The Religious Left's narrative (Jim Wallis, head of the Sojourners movement):
"The religious and political Right gets the public meaning of religion mostly wrong- preferring to focus only on sexual and cultural issues while ignoring the weightier matters of justice. And the secular Left doesn't seem to get the meaning and promise of faith for politics at all—mistakenly dismissing spirituality as irrelevant to social change. I actually happen to be conservative on issues of personal responsibility, the sacredness of human life, the reality of evil in our

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world, and the critical importance of individual character, parenting, and strong 'family values.' But the popular presentations of religion in our time (especially in the media) almost completely ignore the biblical vision of social justice and, even worse, dismiss such concerns as merely "left wing." It is indeed time to take back our faith."

<u>The Social Conservativism narrative (Ronald Reagan)</u>
"Once upon a time, America was a shining beacon. Then liberals came along and erected an enormous federal bureaucracy that handcuffed the invisible hand of the free market. They subverted our traditional American values and opposed God and faith at every step of the way . . . Instead of requiring that people work for a living, they siphoned money from hardworking Americans and gave it to Cadillac-driving drug addicts and welfare queens. Instead of punishing criminals, they tried to "understand" them. Instead of worrying about the victims of crime, they worried about the rights of criminals. . . . Instead of adhering to traditional American values of family, fidelity, and personal responsibility, they preached promiscuity, premarital sex, and the gay lifestyle ... and they encouraged a feminist agenda that undermined traditional family roles. . . . Instead of projecting strength to those who would do evil around the world, they cut military budgets, disrespected our soldiers in uniform, burned our flag, and chose negotiation and multilateralism. . . . Then Americans decided to take their country back from those who sought to undermine it."

Political Theory itself centers around examination of narratives and the exploration of other possibilities. Marx offers a narrative about capitalism and history, Nietzsche offers one about power, The Frankfurt School another that combines Marx and Freud, and the Post-Modernists reject meta-narratives altogether, although in its contemporary form it offers a new narrative about power, privilege, dominance, and subjugation through thought and language. From a Habermasian perspective the road towards an ideal speech situation would be to create a space where all of these narratives can be shared and discussed, and participants can recognize themselves within them, not as mere 'campfire sharing,' but as a means of Reason working through history by re-creating intersubjective agreement on narratives or doctrines that can continue to orient, and those that cannot.

Psychologically it is difficult to accept narratives that cast oneself as a villain, because we then have to face the fact that others think we have either chosen to be evil, or have been duped

by a false ideology. Acknowledging that others see us as either evil or gullible triggers defense

mechanisms, and so the role of centering my approach around Social and Political Psychology is

based on the idea that by accepting who we are, whoever we are, is shaped by biological and

social forces, which are often beyond our control or perception, we can hopefully be more

compassionate towards our political rivals, and thus more open to hearing them, and in turn

being heard by them. This is similar to what Moore (2016) called a 'politics of mindfulness.' We

do not need to accept this negative judgement of ourselves as final or objective, but we should be

able to at least tell the narratives which cast us in an unfavorable light.

One of the challenges this plethora of narratives creates is that as colleges have embraced

neoliberal progressivism, increasingly only progressives feel safe expressing their narratives and

beliefs, as other political views are labeled as 'hate speech' and those who speak them are

punished harshly.

Staunch Liberals Stand Out as Only Group Who Feels They Can Share their Political Opinions

Agree/Disagree: The political climate these days prevents me from saying things I believe because others might find them offensive.

Agree   Disagree

|	Strong Liberal	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Strong Conservative
Agree	42%	52%	64%	77%	77%
Disagree	58%	48%	36%	23%	23%

CATO INSTITUTE SUMMER 2020 NATIONAL SURVEY

Figure 7.2. CATO Institute's national survey data on perception of ability of people to speak their minds freely, by political ideology, courtesy of Ekins (2020)[16]

[16] Methodology: *The Cato Institute Summer 2020 National Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses online during July 1–6, 2020 from a national sample of 2,000 Americans 18 years of age and older. Restrictions are put in place to ensure that only the people selected and contacted by YouGov are allowed to participate. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 2.36 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence.*

These findings are similar to what North Dakota State University's Sheila and Robert

Challey's Institute for Global Innovation and Growth found in their 2021 'American College

Student Freedom, Progress and Flourishing Survey':

Liberal students are more comfortable expressing themselves on campus; more likely to report faculty or other students for offensive expression.

Percentage of students who said Yes to the following questions:

Figure 7.3. Institute for Global Innovation and Growth's survey results for perception of safety while speaking on campus.[17]

This produces a situation where non-progressives, fearing reprisal, increasingly monitor their speech and only speak freely when in like-minded company, contributing to a widening gulf in communication. This in turn makes positive speech conditions ever more difficult, and decreases the perception of higher education as legitimate or as a net benefit to society.

Harvard psychologist, neuroscientist, and philosopher Joshua Green wrote 'Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them', where he explores how these narratives can be understood on a neurological, moral, and social level as attempts at creating and maintaining social behavior, and mediating conflicts between the individual and the group, as well as between groups. Using Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' metaphor, which has been criticized in recent years as racist (Mildenberger 2019; Southern Poverty Law Center 2021; Taylor 2016), he explains how morality shapes social beliefs, and how the behavior of others is interpreted through these social and psychological lenses. Part of the project of restoring legitimacy to the college system is going to be a recognition of how behavior can be interpreted as morally good through one sociopolitical lens, and morally evil by another, by understanding the psychological and ethical roots of different social value systems.

This has been the source of existing scholarship on Deliberation, such as Gastil and Levine's (2005) 'The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century.' There is a similarity between their work, Haidt's, and Kling's in understanding differences in political perspectives being derived from similar base values, which are then subject to, and shaped by, different priorities.

One way in which these different social and political psychological views operate is by impacting our motivated reasoning. According to Kunda (1990), motivated reasoning produces bias by affecting cognitive processes, wherein we search for support for what we want to believe,

rather than objectively search for truth (a form of confirmation bias). What we want to believe is, of course, shaped and influenced by our sociopolitical worldview, which dictates our moral beliefs, and how we decide who are members of our ingroups. To the degree that conservatives have marked the colleges as hostile outgroups, they are motivated to find reasons to diminish, dismiss, or treat as hostile information with which they disagree.

This approach has been criticized by Tost (2012) and others. People get involved in politics, including conservatives and proponents of IED policies, because they believe that their politics are objectively morally good. For people who want to say that a particular moral system is in fact the correct one, these discussions and lines of inquiry are resisted as a form of either moral nihilism or relativism. Whether or not objective morality exists or whether it is merely a matter of psychological projection or social construction a la Nietzsche or Foucault, this approach does not take a side on this question. Its purpose is to create a space where believers from different ethical systems can meaningfully engage and discuss topics with one another in a way that their opponents will at the very least meaningfully understand. As Tost (2012) says,

> "I see no compelling reason to assume that morality is—let alone should be— whatever comes first, easiest, or even most forcefully to mind (because of our evolutionary heritage or otherwise). In many situations behaving morally may require us to do what is difficult, perhaps even "unnatural" in some sense. Or, as John Stuart Mill put it, "Nature cannot be a proper model for us to imitate. Either it is right that we should kill because nature kills; torture because nature tortures; ruin and devastate because nature does the like; or we ought not to consider what nature does, but what it is good to do.""

This view relies on the Humean is/ought distinction as expressed within the debate over Moral Foundations Theory. Without delving too deep into Philosophy and the nature of what makes actions 'good' or 'right,' it is sufficient to say that just because animals display some behaviors, that does not mean that it is morally permissible for humans to do those same behaviors, and even if some our human drives are entirely natural, that does not give us moral

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permission to act on them. In every human social community those individuals who act only on animalistic impulse, and have no ability to morally restrain themselves, must be outcast, imprisoned, or killed to ensure the safety of everyone else. Like the nature vs. nurture vs. free will debate, it is not the goal of this dissertation to solve this puzzle, but rather to explore what we know of how and why people think and behave as they do, in order to explore avenues to use that knowledge to preserve, and maybe even promote, the perception of legitimacy within higher education.

With these post-positivist empirical models of Psychology and morality in mind, we now look to the group which is the most skeptical of higher education in general and university-generated environmental information in particular – conservatives.

Utilizing Social and Political Psychology to Better Integrate Conservative Students on Campus

To start, they are vastly outnumbered on campus. Not only do many people on the right on campuses feel unsafe speaking and sharing their real beliefs, but among the faculty and administration, there are not many of them to represent their political views at all. According to Samuel J. Abrams (2018), while students have a liberal to conservative ratio of 1.6 to 1 and faculty have a ratio of 6 to 1, administration has a ratio of 12 to 1, with 40% of liberal administrators identifying as far left. Further, Langbert and Stevens (2020) surveyed 12,372 professors in 8 academic departments (4 natural sciences, 4 social sciences, and 2 humanities) at 90 nationally ranked institutions, and failed to find a single department in which liberals were not the majority. In my correspondence with Dr. Langbert, he said that while he was unaware of any conservative majority academic program, he thought that it could be possible in smaller fields like Catholic Theology and Military Science. Given the ongoing encroachment by administration into the classroom and research agendas of faculty, and the economic demands on

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administration, this is definitely contributing to the pressures of the progressive-neoliberal model of higher education explored earlier.

Who are these Conservative strangers in a strange land of collegiate liberalism and Marxism? If there are not many of them on campus to speak for themselves, and those that do attend and work at universities hide their true beliefs, then people in higher education will have to look at the Psychology research to understand them and their worldviews to identify ways for the contemporary university to engage them in productive deliberative discourse.

Going back to Adorno (1950), certain personality traits have been associated with conservative politics. Jost et al. (2003) examined political conservatism as a form of motivated social cognition,' identifying the following traits as driving political conservativism:

> "Authoritarianism; intolerance of ambiguity; having an epistemic and existential need for closure, regulatory focus, and terror management; ideological rationalization of social dominance and system justification, anxiety towards death, dislike of instability, lack of openness to experience, intolerance of uncertainty; a need for order, structure, and closure; fear of threat and loss. "The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat." (Jost, et al. 2003, 339)

This matches the work of Carney, et al. (2008) who found that the differences between liberals and conservatives are relatively stable and originate from individual differences in psychological needs, motives, and orientations toward the world. They, "obtained consistent and converging evidence that personality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open-minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, conventional, and better organized" (Carney et al. 2008, 807).

Gerber et al. (2010) explored beyond this link between personality traits and political attitudes by exploring the possibility that they vary across issue domains and depend on contextual factors that affect the meaning of political stimuli. They found, "clear evidence that Big Five traits affect economic and social attitudes differently, show that the effect of Big Five traits is often as large as that of education or income in predicting ideology, and demonstrate that the relationships between Big Five traits and ideology vary substantially between white and black respondents" (Gerber et al. 2010, 111).

Evidence indicates that these differences are more than skin deep. Atari, Davani, and Dehghani (2020) found that liberal and conservative bodies have different somatosensory reactions to moral violations.


Figure 7.4. Map of somatosensory reactions to moral violation visual cues, by political ideology.

These somatosensory body maps were created by exposing liberals and conservatives to different types of moral violations and measuring the neurological activity in their bodies. The function of the somatosensory system is to, "help humans

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recognize objects, discriminate textures, generate sensory motor feedback and exchange

social cues" (National Institutes of Health 2021). In this system, sensory neurons relay

peripheral sensations (pain, pressure, movement, temperature) from the skin to the brain.

The abstract to this paper reads as follows,

> "It has been proposed that somatosensory reaction to varied social circumstances results in feelings (i.e., conscious emotional experiences). Here, we present two preregistered studies in which we examined the topographical maps of somatosensory reactions associated with violations of different moral concerns. Specifically, participants in Study 1 ($N = 596$) were randomly assigned to respond to scenarios involving various moral violations and were asked to draw key aspects of their subjective somatosensory experience on two 48,954-pixel silhouettes. Our results show that body patterns corresponding to different moral violations are felt in different regions of the body depending on whether individuals are classified as liberals or conservatives. We also investigated how individual differences in moral concerns relate to body maps of moral violations. Finally, we used natural-language processing to predict activation in body parts on the basis of the semantic representation of textual stimuli. We replicated these findings in a nationally representative sample in Study 2 ($N = 300$). Overall, our findings shed light on the complex relationships between moral processes and somatosensory experiences." (Atari, Davani, and Dehghani 2020)

The anatomical and neurobiological differences between left-leaning and right-leaning

thinkers have been studied elsewhere, and this research has led to a growing field of research

across disciplines, as technological improvements in artificial intelligence, neurological

scanning, and other related medical and research technology have evolved. These differences

are not static, and changes do occur at the biological level because of neural plasticity and epi-

genetics where neurological and biological structures, including DNA, are changed over time in

response to environmental stimuli.

Lydia Denworth's 2020 article 'Conservative and Liberal Brains Might Have Some Real

Differences' in Scientific American provides an excellent literature review on all the political

neuroscientific research occurring in different academic disciplines. Referencing a famous 1968

political debate between William F. Buckley and Gore Vidal that quickly deteriorated into

threats, insults, and lawsuits, she found that,

> "On the whole, the research shows, conservatives desire security, predictability
> and authority more than liberals do, and liberals are more comfortable with
> novelty, nuance and complexity. If you had put Buckley and Vidal in a magnetic
> resonance imaging machine and presented them with identical images, you would
> likely have seen differences in their brain, especially in the areas that process
> social and emotional information. The volume of gray matter, or neural cell
> bodies, making up the anterior cingulate cortex, an area that helps detect errors
> and resolve conflicts, tends to be larger in liberals. And the amygdala, which is
> important for regulating emotions and evaluating threats, is larger in
> conservatives." (Denworth 2020)

According to Denworth, these differences make a large impact on perception

based on partisan identity. Kahan et al. (2012) studied the impact of salience of political

identity in shaping perception and policy preferences, and Frenda et al. (2013) conducted

a study on how political beliefs can generate false memories regarding fabricated political

events. The latter found that both liberals and conservatives generate false memories that

reflect badly upon their political opponents, and, "events are more easily implanted in

memory when they are congruent with a person's preexisting attitudes and evaluations, in

part because attitude-congruent false events promote feelings of recognition and

familiarity, which in turn interfere with source attributions" (Frenda et al. 2013, 280).

The Buckley-Gore debate of 1968 is also the starting point for Hibbing, Smith, and

Alford's 2013 book 'Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, and the Biology of Political

Differences' where they begin with recounting that infamous battle,

> "In their most famous exchange, on August 27, 1968, Buckley asserted that Vidal
> was unqualified to say anything at all about politics, calling him "nothing more
> than a literary producer of perverted Hollywood-minded prose." Vidal retorted
> that Buckley "was always to the right, and always in the wrong," and accused him
> of imposing his "rather bloodthirsty neuroses on a political campaign."

> After that the gloves came off.

"Shut up a minute," said Vidal. Buckley did not shut up. Vidal called him a "proto- or crypto- Nazi." Buckley was not happy with that. "Now listen you queer," he said. "Stop calling me a crypto-Nazi or I'll sock you in the goddam face." Buckley went home in a huff and sued Vidal for libel. Vidal went home in a huff and, perhaps miffed that he didn't think of it first, counter-sued Buckley for libel.

Clearly, for some it is deeply rewarding to denounce political adversaries, preferably at high volume." (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013, 5)

Hibbing, Smith, and Alford's goal in their book is very similar to my own in this dissertation. Their argument is an attempt to explore how diverse psychological, physiological, and genetic traits shape personalities and political orientations. Their goal is not to solve the causal riddle of how genes or brains produce behavior, but rather to explain how these differences shape people's subjective experiences and interactions with the world through their partisan identity. Their hope is that if people can learn to see the politics of others and themselves in terms of physical forces, we can move past discussing politics as a form of converting or dominating others into agreeing with us, and be more accepting of our differences as they are at least partially beyond our control. Building on my work in Chapter Six on Discourse Theory and Public Deliberation Theory, the acknowledgement of these differences can be used to develop administrative and pedagogical practices aimed at increasing cross-partisan communication and participation, on campus and in the classroom.

"It turns out that liberals and conservatives have different tastes not just in politics, but in art, humor, food, life accoutrements, and leisure pursuits; they differ in how they collect information, how they think, and how they view other people and events; they have different neural architecture and display distinct brain waves in certain circumstances; they have different personalities and psychological tendencies; they differ in what their autonomic nervous systems are attuned to; they are aroused by and pay attention to different stimuli; and they might even be different genetically. At least at the far ends of the ideological spectrum, liberals and conservatives are emotionally, preferentially, psychologically, and biologically distinct. This account is not just based on casual observation or armchair analysis. Science— both social and biological— is our co-pilot." (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013, 6)

In terms of explaining the causality of the relationships between political views and broader psychology, orientation, and tastes, Hibbing Smith and Alford reject a one-way arrow in either direction, and instead prefer the view that, "bedrock political orientations just naturally mesh with a broader set of orientations, tastes, and preferences because they are all part of the same biologically rooted inner self" (Ibid., 111). Their book covers the research looking at connections between political ideology and all sorts of preferences and behavior. For instance, liberals and conservatives have different preferences in career choices (Ibid., 95); living spaces (Ibid., 95); cars, stocks, and dog breeds (Ibid., 98); food preferences (Ibid., 110); and perceptions of the wealthy and poor (Ibid., 134).

They experience art differently (Ibid., 94-95):

Conservatives are more likely to:	Liberals are more likely to:
favor traditional experiences that are closer to reality and predictable patterns	favor new experiences, the abstract, non-conforming art
prefer their poems to rhyme and fiction that ends with a clear resolution disfavor experimental, arrhythmic verse, amorphous story lines, and ambiguous endings.	write fiction, paint, attend music concerts
	appreciate abstract, complex art
avert their eyes from colorful abstract art to look at realistic landscapes	be involved in artistic activities

They have different value systems. The Schwartz Theory of Basic Values (2012) posits there are ten universal basic values. Value Theory assumes that communities must meet three types of needs in order to survive: biological, social, and group. According to Schwartz, values are, "beliefs linked inextricably to affect, refer to desirable goals that motivate action, transcend specific actions and situations, serve as standards or criteria,

are ordered by importance relative to one another, and the relative importance of multiple

values guides action" (Schwartz 2012, 3-7). Each of the ten values is distinguished from

the others by the type of goal or motivation that it expresses:

1. Self-Direction. Defining goal: independent thought and action--choosing, creating, exploring.
2. Stimulation. Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
3. Hedonism. Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself.
4. Achievement. Defining goal: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
5. Power. Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.
6. Security. Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.
7. Conformity. Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
8. Tradition. Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides.
9. Benevolence. Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the 'ingroup').
10. Universalism. Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.

Visually, it produces the following map:

Figure 7.5. Visual map of Schwarz's theory of basic values, courtesy of
https://www.yourmorals.org/schwartz_graph.jpg.
    According to Hibbing, Smith, and Alford,

"You don't have to stare at the pie too long to notice that the 10 basic values approximate an ideological continuum. On one half are motivational goals that relate at an individual level to novelty, creativity, and freedom to do your own thing, and, at a group level, to taking care not just of your own group but of everyone everywhere. On the other half is a set of values that represent an individual level motivational goals for working hard and getting ahead and, on a group level, to tradition, security, and conformity. These "pie slices," in other words, are not simply expected to correlate with differences in political temperament; they purport to explain why those differences exist. According to values theory, political orientations spring from the different motivational biases that underlie the taxonomy of values. A number of studies find empirical support for this hypothesis. One study, for example, looked at left-right orientations in 20 countries and found universalism and benevolence (the self transcendence pie slice) consistently associated with a left-leaning orientation and conformity and tradition (the conservation pie slice) with a right-leaning orientation. These value dimensions also correlate with Big Five personality traits in the way you would expect, especially on the key factors of openness and conscientiousness." (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013, 109-110)

Differences are also present in how each side visually perceives and processes the world. Looking at studies focused on gaze cues, liberals typically respond quicker to positive images than conservatives, whereas conservatives respond to, and fixate on, negative images more than liberals (Ibid., 125). When asked to put images into categories, conservatives were frequently 'hard categorizers' (something is or it isn't), where liberals were frequently 'soft categorizers' who were more flexible about what counted as what, even when such equivocations put them at odds with the rules of the game. (Ibid., 123) "Conservatives, in short, seem to be more likely to lock their attention on the negative (angry) stimulus and the negative stimulus only" (Ibid., 129).

In a bean-counting game, participants had to separate 'good' beans from 'bad beans.' Conservatives and liberals score equally well in these games, even though each has a very different strategy. Conservatives made decisions more quickly and scored highly, because they were much better at identifying bad beans, but this was balanced out

by the number of mischaracterized good beans. Liberals were more balanced in remembering which beans were which, and continued to acquire new information, even if they disliked what they were finding, or could not remember everything, whereas conservatives quickly made judgements on what was negative or not, and then moved onto other tasks (Ibid., 139-141).

To extrapolate that to this dissertation's focus on perception of campus political culture and disbelief in AGW by conservatives, this suggests that conservative students are more likely to reach the conclusion that the university is hostile to their partisan ingroup quickly, and should they in fact make that judgement, they are unlikely to change that belief easily. Whereas an offended liberal might be more open to seek out more information, be curious, and apply mental energy into 'softly categorizing' experiences into different boxes, offended conservatives are more likely to 'hard categorize' negative experiences with firmer convictions and fixate on survival strategies in response to perceived threat, such as politically mimicking their professors, going silent, hiding their real views, or actively seeking out partisan allies to rebel against left-leaning authorities in the faculty and administration.

Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2013) finish their book with a letter to both liberals and conservatives -

> Liberals:
> "Quit wasting your time spluttering about the ignorance of conservatives or trying to convert any and all of them. As F. Scott Fitzgerald might have put it, "The very conservative are different from you and me." Where you see a titillating curiosity, they see an imminent danger; where you see something potentially edible (with the right mole), they see disgustingly spoiled produce; where you see an excuse to hire a domestic worker, they see unmitigated chaos; where you see intriguing ambiguity, they see debilitating uncertainty. They spend more time than you focusing on negative events— particularly negativity that is tangible and immediate. They see problems that are not there. They "remember"

events and visions that never were. They refrain from seeking new information simply because it might not be information that is helpful or confirming. They are comfortable with revered and long-established sources of authority such as religious orthodoxy and the words of the country's founders.

On the other hand, anything that reeks of human discretion, like modern governments and a broad application of scientific investigation, is suspect. Their first instinct is to assume those in faraway lands have questionable values, do not share our country's interests and goals, and should not be trusted. Conservatives prefer established ways of doing things and have less craving for new experiences— culinary, social, literary, artistic, and travel— than you do.

Their enhanced focus on negative events and situations should not be mistaken for fear. Au contraire! They do not run from the negative. They attend to it, eye it warily, and ponder how best to minimize its influence and impact. They don't like being told what to do, especially by people who are not part of their ingroup, because they don't trust the judgment of other human beings. They think the only hope for mankind is to embed it in hierarchies and rules, to remove individuality and discretion by following inviolate texts and the dictates of the free market that, thanks to Adam Smith's invisible hand, work automatically on the basis of supply and demand. They think rules are good as long as they derive from the proper authorities.

You should not expect them to change, but rather should work with who they are. Try to see the world from their perspective. Work at thinking like conservatives think and experiencing what conservatives experience. Enter their world not by actually going undercover but by attempting to adopt the psychological mindsets that make conservatives conservative. If that is not doing it for you, come to our lab and, for a small fee, we will condition you to attend like a conservative to negative stimuli, looming disorder, and mild ambiguity. You will know you have succeeded when you "dream conservative."" (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013, 249-250)

Conservatives:

"Quit wasting your time spluttering about the ignorance of liberals or trying to convert any and all of them. To paraphrase Fitzgerald, "The very liberal are different from you and me." Where you see an imminent danger, they see a titillating curiosity; where you see disgusting spoiled produce, they see something potentially edible; where you see unmitigated chaos, they see an excuse to hire a domestic worker; where you see debilitating uncertainty, they see intriguing ambiguity. They don't pay nearly as much attention as you do to negative situations and potentialities and, if they do worry at all about the negative, they seem strangely unmoved by the immediate threat of malevolent human beings. Sometimes it seems as though they worry more about climate change and endangered species than terrorism and crime. They are firmly convinced that, despite all evidence to the contrary, humans can change under the right circumstances.

All this makes liberals far more trusting than they have any right to be, but it is important to realize that this is not because they are foolish or lazy but rather

because they are structured in such a way that prevents them from appreciating the obvious dangers swirling about. They seek out new information even without knowing where it might lead and even when that new information might be contradicted by even newer information. None of this particularly bothers them, as they just like the idea of moving from new thing to new thing as though novelty were its own reward. They really believe that government programs and the like will change things for the better and they are suspicious of the tried and true. They are convinced that the traditional approaches created big problems, problems that are remediable by embracing the untried and new. Their first instinct is to assume individuals in faraway lands are trustworthy. Hierarchies, on the other hand, such as those typifying the military, organized religion, and corporations, are objects of their suspicions. They love experiences that might take them off the beaten track. They seem not to look before they leap.

Their eagerness to try new approaches and experiences should not be mistaken for reckless hedonism. On the contrary! Liberals spend a good deal of their time trying to understand other people, even worrying about them. The circumference of their circle of concern extends around the globe and even incorporates nonhuman life forms. They don't seem to consider, let alone mind, the fact that this openness raises the possibility that they could be taken in by evildoers. Because they think the human condition is perfectible, they are always trying new approaches, which usually fail. But this fact seems not to dissuade liberals from turning right around and trying something else. They like to be surprised by their food, their literature, their art, and the places they visit.

Liberals "just don't get it" and you should not expect this to change because for liberals there is nothing to "get." Quit wasting your time explaining to them the dangers of rampant immigration, overseas threats, and moral decay. Nothing you say will lead them to take these matters as seriously as you do. Rather, Liberals "just don't get it" and you should not expect this to change because for liberals there is nothing to "get." Quit wasting your time explaining to them the dangers of rampant immigration, overseas threats, and moral decay. Nothing you say will lead them to take these matters as seriously as you do. Rather, take what you now know about them and work with it. Try to see the world the way they see it. Hold in abeyance your knowledge that threats are real and try not to be bothered by what will initially feel to you as vulnerability and carelessness. Practice not fixating on the negative and work at enjoying new and unexpected experiences. Do this not with the intention of becoming a liberal but with the intention of better understanding them. Work at thinking like liberals think and experiencing what liberals experience. Enter their world not by actually going undercover but by attempting to adopt the psychological mindsets that make liberals liberal. If that is not doing it for you, come to our lab and, for a small fee, we will condition you to attend more than you currently do to positive stimuli rather than threats, looming disorder, and nagging ambiguity. You will know you have succeeded when you "dream liberal."" (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2013, 250-252)

Political-biological research has also been done on the differences between liberals and conservative, noting differences in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the amygdala, and looking at the potential impact of biological factors such as chromosomes, cortisol, testosterone, serotonin, and muscle mass in males – increased muscle mass in poorer males correlates with stronger feelings of support for socialist policies, whereas increased muscle mass in wealthier males correlates with stronger support for Laizze-faire capitalism (Ibid., 169).

The ACC has also been looked at by social justice advocates (Haas et al. 2017) as a source of improving communication about policy, which I discussed in Chapter One when defending post-positivism. These biological differences have also been explored within Social Identity Theory scholarship, which is the focus of the next chapter.

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<u>Chapter Eight: Social and Political Psychology, Part Two: Social Identity and Cooperation</u>

When there are entire disciplines, certainly entire departments, where a student can go through training starting as an undergraduate, through graduate school, then on into her professional career, and maybe even through retirement, without ever encountering a political conservative — that is going to cause serious distortions because of the questions that won't get asked and the prejudices that will be assumed. And it's going to cause the public to believe that the enterprise of academia is not on the level. – Jonathan Rauch, The Constitution of Knowledge

"People are okay in twos and threes. Beyond that, they tend to choose up sides and wear armbands." – George Carlin (probably)

<u>Social Identity Theory</u>

Social Identity Theory (SIT) was developed by Henri Tajfel along with his student John Turner. His understanding of intergroup dynamics and social identity (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979) was an extension of his early work on intergroup relations (Tajfel 1969, 1970). His experiments demonstrated a key number of concepts that others would build on, including the insight that there is no necessary connection between discrimination and social conflict or a history of hostility, and instead, "Apparently the mere fact of division into groups is enough to trigger discriminatory behavior" (Tajfel 1970, 96).

SIT examines two types of identity: that of an individual, existential self-identity, as well as a series of group identities. These group identities create ingroups, which offer both a sense of identity that helps people understand who they are, which impacts their sense of self-esteem, where they feel good about their group identity based on how well or poorly they perceive their ingroups to be doing. The impact of group membership is huge, as it, "can affect how people process information about nearly all categories of stimuli in the social world" (Baumeister and Leary 1995, 504). As people seek to maximize their positive distinctiveness via group association, this leads to the creation and maintenance of boundaries that define the group, which

in turn leads to the perception of others as outgroups, which Tajfel understands to be the causal mechanism behind discrimination.

It takes very little to produce this effect. According to Yuki and Yokota (2009), "humans spontaneously make ''us versus them" categorizations and quickly develop deep emotional attachments to in groups even when membership is based on trivial criteria, such as the flip of a coin." This phenomenon has been repeatedly observed by others. (Brewer 1979; Ostrom and Sedikides 1992) This insight into group dynamics and social identity has had a wide-ranging impact in social psychology on everything from intergroup relations, to how organizations work, to understanding the psychological elements of prejudice and discrimination.

Leonie Huddy (2001) expanded upon this research in 'From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory.' Although SIT addresses, "the kinds of problems of interest to political psychologists, it has had limited impact on political psychology because of social identity theorists' disinclination to examine the sources of social identity in a real world complicated by history and culture" (Huddy 2001, 127). To improve upon the theory, Huddy looks at four issues within the SIT literature: the existence of identity choice, the subjective meaning of identities, gradations in identity strength, and the considerable stability of many social and political identities.

Many SI theorists found that social identities are highly changeable. (Haslam et al. 1992; Hogg et al. 1995) Huddy's work on feminist identity led him to dispute those claims, arguing that identity was not so easily changed. Noting that in the area of partisan and ethnic identities, the SI in such groups showed strong resistance to change over time (Alwin et al. 1992; Converse and Markus 1979; Ethier and Deaux 1994; Sears and Henry 1999).

Looking to the work of anthropologist Frederick Barth (1969, 1981), Huddy explored the difference between belonging to a social category via nominal identity, which is based on a name, and the internalization of that identity via virtual membership, which is based on experiences. Huddy tied this to Lakoff (1987) and Rosch (1978), whose research explored the role of outgroups on group identity formation whereby they signal group boundaries and communicate information about what the group is not in the process of self-categorization. Barth had noted that the meaning of identity was created at its boundaries by social interaction with outgroup members. Huddy expanded upon this idea, noting that, "group identity may be more diffuse and less intense in the absence of a clear outgroup to sharpen the meaning of group membership and identify the kinds of people who lie outside the group boundary" (Huddy 2001, 145).

Sears (Sears 1983; Sears et al. 1994; Sears and Henry 1999) and Citrin (Citrin et al. 1990; Citrin et al. 2000) had explored similar SI issues concerning American SI, concluding that the subjective meaning of being American depended on, "support for the key American values of equality and individualism" (Huddy 2001, 129). Combining this idea with that of Mullin and Hogg (1998), Huddy noted that the variability of support in ideas that mark SI leads to variability in the salience of that SI, and as such these borders should be understood in terms of degrees rather than all-or-nothing propositions. Applying this to sexual SI, "Hogg and Turner (1985) found that increasing the salience of study participants' gender increases the likelihood that they think of themselves in gender stereotypical norms" (Huddy 2001, 14).

Much of the traditional scholarship on SIT used self-reporting, but Scheepers and Derks (2016) used neuroscience to explore SIT processes of categorization, self-group overlap, ingroup bias, and social identity threats to establish SI as a neurological feature of the brain. Van Bavel

and Pereira (2018) also looked at relationships between social identity, the brain, and social media usage. They argue that social identity and group affiliation is tied to the needs of belonging to an ingroup, finding closure, having predictability, and affirming of one's normative values. The echo chambers of social media create positive feedback loops for partisan ingroups to feed each other content, and affirm one another's ingroup biases via moral-emotional language. The psychological needs met by these cognitive processes and expressed through moral-emotional language are oftentimes powerful enough to get members to believe things that are untrue and dismiss the other side's evidence as 'fake news,' whether or not it's true.

<div align="center">Impact of Social Identity Theory on White males</div>

As I discussed in Chapter One, there is a link between lack of environmental concern and the 'White Male' effect, which Palmer (2003) argues should be renamed the 'low risk' effect because it has also been observed in Asian males. For brevity's sake I am going to abbreviate both and use the term 'WM/LRE.'[18] Naming issues aside, this refers to the fact that in countries where White males are the dominant group, they have drastically less fear of environmental threats as compared to other groups, which Kahan et al. (2007) believed to occur due to members of the dominant group holding individualist and hierarchal, as opposed to egalitarian, worldviews. Kahan et al. (2007) argued that this low-risk assessment manifests across diverse phenomena including environmental pollution, handguns, blood transfusions, and red meat.

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[18] This section is based on post-positivist empirical research conducted on White males to explain the WM/LRE. It is certainly the case that a Political Theory oriented approach, particularly one centered around social constructionism, would approach the topic very differently. Academic disciplines and corresponding administrative offices that focus on Gender Studies, Ethnic Studies, Critical Theory, Intersectionality, Inclusion/Equity/Diversity, etc. would understand both Whiteness and maleness from a societal or sociological perspective as opposed to focusing on individual-based Psychology. The volume of literature on Whiteness and males within those fields is too vast to adequately explore here – A Google Scholar search on 10-27-2021 for 'Whiteness' generated ~518,000 results and a separate search for 'maleness' generated 89,500 results. To reiterate what I've stated throughout this dissertation I think the best way to understand social identity is to intersubjectively triangulate from a nature-nurture-free will position.

(Bord and O'Connor 1997; Brody 1984; Davidson and Freudenburg 1996; Flynn et al. 1994; Gutteling and Wiegman 1993; Jones 1998; Mohai and Bryant 1998; Satterfield et al., 2004; Steger and Witt 1989; Stern et al., 1993; Kalof et al., 1999)

While There have not yet been any studies done on the WM/LRE on Covid-19, Alan White (2020) looked at the difficulties of getting young, White males in the United Kingdom to take Covid-19 seriously, noting that the public health experts have been struggling to communicate its dangers to this population.

Kahan et al. (2007) tried to explain the WM/LRE as the result of a type of motivated reasoning known as 'identity-protective cognition', which states that individuals selectively credit and dismiss dangers in support of their cultural identities when such activities that make up those identities are challenged as being harmful. For instance, building on the work of Sullivan et al. (2012), Phillips and Lowery (2015) found that, "when men are told that their group experiences more favorable hiring than do women, men respond by claiming that men as a group are actually discriminated against instead" (Phillips and Lowery 2015, 3). A similar phenomenon occurred in Summer 2021, where conservatives began arguing that Critical Race Theory is 'racism against Whites' (Terrell 2021), and began pushing to remove or ban it in education, state and federal bureaucracies, and the military.

This theory expands on the concept of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) and the Cultural Theory of Risk Perception (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Rayner 1992), which asserts that individuals' perceptions of risk reflect and reinforce their commitments to visions of how society should be organized, which in turn is built upon the relationship between the perceived well-being of the self as being affected by the well-being of the chosen ingroup. Cohen's work (Cohen et al. 2000; Cohen 2003; Cohen et al. 2007) suggests that the beliefs associated with

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belonging to particular groups leads to individuals appraising information in light of the perceived benefit or harm that it presents to ingroup identity and well-being.

If Kahan et al. (2007) are correct about how identity-protective cognition creates the 'White male effect' and alters how SI leads to an increased likelihood of acceptance or rejection of information, that would help explain the phenomena of Whites claiming hardship in response to claims of racial inequity. In exploring the question as to how and why White people deny the existence of racial privilege, they found that even though Whites in general were willing to accept racial inequity on a large scale, they were not willing to accept claims that they as individuals had benefitted from said inequity, instead reacting by telling reinforcing narratives about their own personal struggles and hardships. Goad's 1998 book 'The Redneck Manifesto: How Hillbillies, Hicks, and White Trash Became America's Scapegoats' argues that while rich White people have benefitted from privilege, this is much less the case for lower-class Whites and their families.

Lowery had previously speculated that Whites resist acknowledging racial privilege because of the widespread belief that meritocratic systems and personal virtues determine life outcomes (Knowles and Lowery 2012), which is consistent with the 'White male effect' findings that White males, as well as many Asian males, tend to have individualist, hierarchist, non-egalitarian, worldviews.   According to Knowles, this tendency to resist claims of personal racial privilege can be tied to their reluctance to be personally negatively affected by policies designed to produce equity. (Lowery et al. 2007)

Where Kahan et al. (2007) explored 'identity-protective cognition' as a form of motivated reasoning in the formation of the 'White male effect', Phillips and Lowery (2015) worked on previous research on motivated reasoning that showed that, "Being exposed to

evidence of privilege is an aversive experience that elicits self-protective reactions"

(Branscombe 1998; Leach et al. 2006; Lowery et al. 2007; Rosette and Tost 2013).

If identity-protective cognition is produced in a privileged population as a means of self-preservation, and this effect occurs when members are confronted with claims by a less privileged group within the realm of racial social identity, then we should expect to find a similar effect in males when confronted with claims by females in the realm of sexual social identity.

<u>Gender differences in SIT, threat responses, and Social Dominance Orientation</u>

Work by Yuki and Yokota (2009) and Sugiura et al. (2017) showed that there are gender differences regarding the effect of threat priming on Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). (SDO) is defined as, "the degree to which individuals' desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of inferior groups by superior groups" (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, 48). SDO operates as an individual personality trait that predicts political and social attitudes and is closely linked with a preference for hierarchy and authoritarian beliefs, as well as a negative attitude towards egalitarianism. Sugiura et al. (2017) found that SDO was higher in men than women, that outgroup threat priming enhances social dominance in men, and that outgroup threat priming had no effect on SDO in women.

"Evolutionary psychologists have proposed the adaptive psychological mechanism to intergroup conflict is specific to males" (Sugiura et al. 2017, 262). Specifically, they looked at the "male warrior hypothesis" which assumes that this psychological mechanism adaptation to intergroup conflict is present almost exclusively in males. (McDonald et al. 2012; Tooby and Cosmides 1988; Tooby and Cosmides 2010; Van Vugt et al. 2007)

Tooby and Cosmides (1988, 2010) looked the psychological factors that are triggered by intergroup conflict. In looking to explain this process, "evolutionary psychologists have argued

that males have a psychological mechanism specified for intergroup conflict to promote their fitness by gaining access to disputed reproduction enhancing resources through protection of the ingroup and coalitional aggression" (Sugiura et al. 2017, 262). It is thought that SDO plays a part in this process as one of the psychological factors involved, alongside social identity (Brown et al. 1992; Jackson and Smith 1999). Further, SDO has been found to cause ingroup favoritism when group boundaries became more salient. (Levin and Sidanius 1999; Sidanius et al. 1994)

Yuki and Yakota (2009) note that males have a greater tendency to actively participate in intergroup conflict and competition. Building on the work of Pratto et al. (2006) and Yamagishi and Mifune (2008), they, "found that when groups were comprised entirely of men, male participants showed ingroup bias in cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game even when no reciprocity from ingroup was expected" (Yuki and Yakota, 2009, 271).

This pattern was not observed in females. Their work also builds on the existing literature demonstrating gender differences in conflict response. Benenson (1993) and Lever (1978) found that boys participate in intergroup competition more than girls; Wagner, Flinn, and England (2002) found that male hormonal system are more sensitive to intergroup competition than female hormonal systems; and Wrangham (1999) found that this collective male competition and conflict with outgroups extended beyond humans to other social animals, most notably chimpanzees.

Finally, Yuki and Yakota (2009) use the research of Kurzban and Leary (2001), Buss (1999), Chagnon (1988), Van Vugt et al., (2007) and Tooby and Cosmides (1988) to establish that the 'warrior-male hypothesis', which states that males engage in conflict and intergroup rivalry in order to secure benefits, most chiefly reputation and reproductive access, even at the risk of injury and death. "Consequently, men have acquired a complex coalitional psychology: a

set of domain-specific cognitive systems that are designed to cope with intergroup competition" (Yuki and Yakota 2009, 271).

<u>Gender and Partisan differences in response to reputational threats during #MeToo</u>

The term for this positive reputation is 'face', and similar to the gender differences found in the threat literature, there are noted differences to how men and women respond to reputational threats to face. 'Face' theory has been relatively well studied, and shows that 'face' should be understood as a socially constructed identity people hold about themselves that produces value by highlighting socially valuable attributes. (Brown and Levinson 1987; Goffman 1967; Lochler and Watts 2005; Metts and Cupach 2008; Oetzel and Ting-Toomey 2003)

Chen and Abedin (2014) used face theory and politeness theory to study threats to face in social media and found that both males and females retaliate when faced with rejection and criticism, males were more aggressive in their responses, and that while females demonstrated the same response to rejection and criticism, males showed different reactions to the different types of reputational threat.

Social identity is affected by rejection and criticism because these behaviors threaten the perception of one's value as a relational partner. (Brown and Levinson 1987; Duthler 2006; Leary and Guadagno 2011; Papacharissi 2004; Williams, Forgas, and von Hippel 2005) Building on the work of Brett et al. (2007), Metts and Cupach (2008), and Oetzel et al. (2001), they expected that people threatened with a loss of face would respond with attempts, "to repair face and neutralize the threat through retaliatory aggression" (Chen and Abedin, 2014, 119).

Kahan et al (2007), building on the work of Mackie and Quellar (2000); Clark and Maas (1988); and Mackie, Gstardoconaco, and Skelly (1992), stated that, "Individuals tend to adopt the beliefs common to members of salient "ingroups." They also resist revision of those beliefs

in the face of contrary factual information, particularly when that information originates from "out group" sources, who are likely to be perceived as less knowledgeable and less trustworthy than "in group" ones" (Kahan et al. 2007, 6).

This could explain the difference in polling between how conservatives and liberals viewed the #MeToo phenomenon. According to a Pew Research Center online poll of 6,251 people, conducted between February 26 and March 11 in 2018, a gap emerged in how both groups perceive the #MeToo movement (Graf 2018):

About half say increased focus on sexual harassment has made it harder for men to interact with women at work

% saying the increased focus on sexual harassment and assault has made it ____ for men to know how to interact with women in the workplace

Legend: ■ Harder   ▫ Not much difference   ■ Easier

	Harder	Not much difference	Easier
All adults	51	36	12
Men	55	33	11
Women	47	38	13
Ages 18-29	42	40	16
30-49	47	40	11
50-64	52	35	12
65+	66	25	9
Rep/Lean Rep	64	28	7
Dem/Lean Dem	42	41	16

Among Republicans and Republican leaners

	Harder	Not much difference	Easier
Men	68	26	5
Women	59	31	9

Among Democrats and Democratic leaners

	Harder	Not much difference	Easier
Men	45	38	17
Women	40	44	15

Note: Share of respondents who didn't offer an answer not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 26-March 11, 2018.
"Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo"

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Views of how increased focus on sexual harassment will affect women's opportunities linked to education, party

% saying the increased focus on sexual harassment and assault will lead to ____ for women in the workplace

Legend: ■ More opportunities   ▫ Not much difference   ■ Fewer opportunities

	More opportunities	Not much difference	Fewer opportunities
All adults	28	51	20
Men	28	52	19
Women	28	49	21
HS or less	22	55	22
Some college	25	53	21
Bachelor's+	40	43	17
Rep/Lean Rep	15	58	26
Dem/Lean Dem	39	46	14

Among Democrats and Democratic leaners

	More opportunities	Not much difference	Fewer opportunities
HS or less	29	53	17
Some college	37	48	15
Bachelor's+	52	37	11

Note: Share of respondents who didn't offer an answer not shown. "Some college" includes those with an associate degree and those who attended college but did not obtain a degree.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Feb. 26-March 11, 2018.
"Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figures 8.1 (left) and 8.2 (right). Pew's survey data on perceptions of the #MeToo movement, by age, party, sex, and education.

An earlier poll in January 2018 by Leanin.org found a pronounced sense of threat on the

part of males, prompting them to begin the #MentorHer campaign to call upon males to not

respond to #MeToo by withdrawing their mentoring of females. They found:

1. Almost half of male managers are uncomfortable participating in a common work activity with a woman, such as mentoring, working alone, or socializing together
2. Almost 30% of male managers are uncomfortable working alone with a woman—more than twice as many as before;
3. The number of male managers who are uncomfortable mentoring women has more than tripled from 5% to 16%. This means that 1 in 6 male managers may now hesitate to mentor a woman; and Senior men are 3.5 times more likely to hesitate to have a work dinner with a junior-level woman than with a junior-level man—and 5 times more likely to hesitate to travel for work with a junior-level woman. (Leanin.org)

Separately, the Bucknell Institute for Public Policy did a survey in 2018 between March 26

and 31, and found that a dramatic split of opinion had occurred between liberals and

conservatives on #MeToo:

Impression of #MeToo movement

	Favorable	No opinion	Unfavorable
Overall	41%	38%	21%
Democratic women	71%	25%	4
Democratic men	53%	39%	8%
Republican women	20%	47%	33%
Republican men	20%	36%	45%

Graphic: Chicago Tribune/TNS
Source: Bucknell Institute for Public Policy/YouGov survey, March 26-31 of 1,000 respondents

Figure 8.3. #MeToo survey data, by party and sex, courtesy of Stevens (2018).

American Cultural, Tribal, and Social Identity

Lilliana Mason's 2018 book 'Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity' does a phenomenal job using Social Identity Theory to explain the collapse of American social identities into political identities via hyper-political polarization, demonstrating how this polarization has led to both sides holding negative views of the other. Where previously Americans identified with their racial, religious, cultural, professional, and social circles; voted mix-ticket or for individuals; and viewed political opponents as at least well-meaning; the current trends have produced political social identities which absorb and consume all other social identities, and generate deep distrust and antipathy between groups. Egan (2020) argues that political social identity has become a powerful enough force that it has shifted other social identities (ethnicity, religion, class, and sexuality), via self-categorization and depersonalization, into conformity with social political identity.

This is consistent with the greater corpus of scholarship on political polarization (Abramowitz 2010, 2013, 2015; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2005, 2008; Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Fiorina et al. 2005, 2008; Green et al. 2002; Greenberg 2004; Huddy et al. 2015; Iyengar et al. 2012; Jacobson 2012; Kraushaar 2014; Levendusky 2009; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Mann and Ornstein 2013; Mason 2013, 2015; Rogowski and Sutherland 2015; Theriault 2008), which shows the increasing ideological distance between people based on political beliefs, and the various psychological impacts this has on communication, ingroup formation, outgroup threat perception, and shifting in basic values away from a shared center. This is exacerbated and deeply intertwined with media choices, which further impact how people view themselves and their political opponents (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Levendusky 2013; Mutz 2006, 2007; Prior 2007).

One major effect of this polarization is the rise of 'negative partisanship,' wherein people vote, think, and act more against their perceived political opponents than for their own side. According to Abramowitz and Webster (2016),

> "…since 1992 and especially since 2008, partisan identities have become increasingly associated with racial, cultural and ideological divisions in American society. As a result, growing proportions of strong, weak and leaning party identifiers have come to perceive important differences between the parties and to hold extremely negative opinions of the opposing party. This has led to sharp increases in party loyalty and straight ticket voting across all categories of party identification and to growing consistency between the results of presidential elections and the results of House and Senate elections."

Another major problem generated by this polarization is mistrust of the other side's motives. The first page of a quick DuckDuckGo search for "Global warming is just an excuse for socialism" leads to hundreds of articles from conservative news sites, many of which focus on Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's statement that her Green New Deal plan began as a plan to implement socialism, before being transformed into an environmental policy. The search generates such titles as, "Socialism, Not Climate Change, Is The Real Threat" (Roberts 2019), "'Climate Change': A Leftist Excuse to Redistribute Wealth and Destroy the West" (Bardamu 2019), and "Ocasio-cortez Proves It: Global Warming a Front for Socialist Revolution" (Bolt 2018).

Epistemological claims aside, these articles demonstrate a deep paranoia and distrust of information perceived to be coming from their political opponents. Hofsadter (1964) wrote about the 'paranoid' style of American politics, which remains relevant and influential as political polarization generates deep distrust and conspiratorial thinking. Miller and Saunders (2016) argue that such conspiratorial thinking is commonplace in American politics, acting as a motivated-reasoning process that serves a psychological function to ease the sensations of anxiety, alienation, and powerlessness of those with particular social and political identities.

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Political polarization and heightened political identities are being exacerbated throughout our culture, and make the project of public deliberation increasingly difficult. Jacoby (2014) argues that the empirical evidence for the existence of the 'culture war' is strong and significant, and should be treated as a cogent driver of political beliefs and behavior, as the data makes clear that there is no longer consensus on fundamental political principles. Specifically, he looked for empirical evidence of a 'culture war' by using the survey data in the 2006 'Cooperative Congressional Election Study', where he randomly selected one thousand adults out of the 38,443 possible respondents, and accounted for age, education, religious affiliation, religious commitment, party identification, and ideology. From there he used rank-order questions to measure the relative weight people places on seven values: freedom, equality, economic security, morality, individualism, social order, and patriotism. He then used that data to build a geometric model of individual value choices, concluding,

> "The empirical results create a picture of extreme heterogeneity that contradicts any notion of widespread agreement on a set of fundamental principles. The situation does not merely represent differences of degree; instead, the variability in the value rankings is great enough to represent differences in kind. There are widely distributed, almost diametrically opposing views about which values are important and which are not. It seems reasonable to characterize such sharp differences in feelings about fundamental values as the existence of a culture war." (Jacoby 2014, 767)

Political differences have existed since humans (or possibly our ancestors) first disagreed about what their groups should do, but as we explored in Chapter One, the internet and social media have had a tremendous impact on the salience of political and partisan differences and in- and out-group thinking. Bail et al. (2018) ran an experiment which tried to interrupt the social media 'echo chamber' effect, wherein people with partisan views consume media which agrees with and confirms their beliefs, by having people follow bots with opposite orientations, and in

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their limited experiment they found that while liberals became very slightly more liberal when presented with conservative voices, conservatives became much more staunchly conservative.

This result fits everything else I have covered in this dissertation on conservative distrust of AGW messaging, confirming that it is not just -what- is said about AGW that is important, but rather -who- is saying it, that makes a tremendous amount of difference. The university, as overwhelming left-leaning, is coming across as a hostile outgroup whose messages must be resisted as existentially dangerous to conservative social identity. This perception of threat runs deep, and this partisan gulf has become a breeding ground for dehumanizing speech across the political spectrum. Cassesse (2021) has linked dehumanizing language to greater social distance between people, reduced interpersonal tolerance, moral distance, moral disengagement, negative partisanship, and political polarization.

In short, if the Right believes that the Left sees them as a basket of deplorables, bitterly clinging to their guns and Bibles, then they are not going to trust that the information produced by the Left on AGW is being offered for everyone's mutual benefit. If, on the other hand, people who represent the Left, particularly if they hold institutional power like administrators and faculty on campus, can engage in those practices that are within their power to invite people on the Right into a space of deliberation, where everyone is respected and allowed to speak (i.e., a Habermasian ideal speech situation), that can open the window to dialogue, and hopefully, cooperation where there are mutual interest, including a clean and healthy environment.

Impact on Engendering Conspiratorial Beliefs Towards Environmental Information

Stecula and Merkley (2019) have explored the intersection of politically biased news media, social identity, threat perception, and the impact on perception on climate change. They looked at how media chooses to frame environmental issues can impact public perception and

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encourage, or discourage, political action. While much of the corporate media has framed

climate change in ways friendly to the conservative worldview (i.e., economic CBAs, market

analysis), there is still an offset effect being generated by rightwing mistrust of corporate media

itself. Their work incorporates the use of cultural recognition theory to explain conservative

resistance via social identity,

> "*cultural cognition theory* posits that individual risk perceptions—and the
> acknowledgment of expert consensus—are shaped by their values in ways to
> maintain their group identities (Kahan, 2013). Those with individualistic value
> predispositions are expected to be more skeptical of environmental risks because
> they justify regulation and government intervention (Kahan et al., 2011). Kahan
> and his colleagues highlight several mechanisms of cultural cognition: the
> selective recall of supportive expert opinion, the selective imputation of
> knowledge and trust to sympathetic experts, and the biased search of information
> and assimilation of expert messages. Along a similar line, Campbell and Kay
> (2014) argue that *solution aversion* is key to understanding conservative reticence
> to accept climate science. Policy solutions to combating climate change are
> threatening to the ideological identities of conservatives, which biases the
> perception and interpretation of information from experts. Consequently, they
> find, along with other scholars, that emphasizing market-friendly solutions to
> mitigation can lower conservative resistance to climate science (Campbell and
> Kay, 2014; Dixon et al., 2017)." (Stecula and Merkley 2019, 3)

According to Slothuus and de Vreese (2010), issue framing plays a critical role in

shaping public opinion. People respond strongly to framing that comes from those who share the

same political beliefs as them. Framing can combine with motivated reasoning to convince

people to confirm their own beliefs, whether they are correct or not. It is unsurprising to note

that polarization has increased the politicization of the American public's views towards global

warming, as noted by McCrigth and Dunlap (2011).

This aligns with Saunders' 2017 work on conspiratorial thinking towards AGW as

generated by partisan motivated reasoning. He cites trust as a mitigating force against motivated

reasoning, and lack of trust with rejecting the reality of climate change. Unfortunately, trust is

the very thing in decline regarding the American university system.

Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) understand conspiratorial thinking as the result of cognitive errors combined with informational and reputational influences, and as trust in public institutions wanes, that increases the possibility of increased trust in informational and reputational influences that see environmental problems in conspiratorial terms of being a power grab for the government. Miller et al. (2016) explored conspiratorial thinking on the individual level and found that individuals who believe in conspiracies tend to think via motivated processes, which serve psychological and ideological needs, and this is especially true for those who are both highly knowledgeable about politics and lacking in trust.

Joe Uscinski is a leading expert in conspiratorial thinking and a regular contributor to Newsweek, The Atlantic, The Washington Post, Vox, and Politico. The survey in his 2020 article in The Atlantic on Covid-19 found widespread belief in conspiracy theories across the political spectrum,

> "Almost everyone told us that they believe in one of the 22 conspiracy theories we asked about. In fact, only 9 percent of respondents didn't express some level of agreement with any of the 22. Fifty-four percent believe that the "1 percent" of the wealthiest Americans secretly control the government; 50 percent believe that billionaire Jeffrey Epstein was murdered to conceal his activities; 45 percent believe that the dangers of genetically modified foods are being hidden from the public; and 43 percent believe that an extrajudicial deep state is secretly embedded in our government. Partisan conspiracy theories—those that explicitly accuse members of one party of conspiring—also have strong support. Thirty-seven percent of Americans believe that Trump colluded with Russia to steal the
>
> 2016 election and that Trump is a Russian asset. Twenty-eight percent believe that Hillary Clinton provided Russia with nuclear materials, and 20 percent still believe that Barack Obama faked his citizenship to illegally usurp the presidency." Uscinski 2020)

As I covered in Chapter One, Lewandowski, Oberauer, and Gignac (2013) demonstrated that belief in one conspiracy theory makes it psychologically much easier to believe in others across topics. Regarding Covid-19, two sources of distrust and conspiratorial thinking were that

the 'lab leak theory' went from a bannable offense on social media to being plausible in 2021, and that the initial lockdown was sold to the public as, "two weeks to flatten the curve." Trust, once broken, is hard to regain, and anyone in the university system asking for conservative trust on AGW is going to have to acknowledge this breach. If collective action is to be consented to by conservatives on AGW, it is vital that researchers, professors, and administrators reverse the lack of trust in universities if we want to preserve or, hopefully, increase their legitimacy across the political spectrum.

<div align="center">Additional Benefits of Viewpoint Diversity</div>

Finally, encouraging free speech and viewpoint diversity on campus would do more than work against the perception of environmental research in general, and AGW in particular, as being a partisan, leftwing project in order to bolster cross-partisan cooperation. It could also improve the scholarship on AGW itself.

Duarte et al. (2015) argued that political diversity would improve Social Psychological Science by enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving, and I would argue that these benefits should be expected to hold true across all departments. Building on the work of Tetlock (1994) and Redding (2001) who found that moral-political values led to unjustified conclusions and that the lack of political diversity damaged the validity of the conclusion drawn from Psychology, respectively, Duarte et al. (2015) examined the risks of lack of political diversity within their field as it has grown politically homogenous over the last several decades, noting that,

> "If left unchecked, an academic field can become a cohesive moral community, creating a shared reality (Hardin & Higgins 1996) that subsequently blinds its members to morally or ideologically undesirable hypotheses and unanswered but important scientific questions (Haidt 2012) … Political values can become embedded into research questions in ways that make some constructs unobservable and unmeasurable, thereby invalidating attempts at hypothesis testing (Sniderman & Tetlock 1986; Tetlock 1994; Tetlock & Mitchell 1993).

Values become embedded when value statements or ideological claims are wrongly treated as objective truth, and observed deviation from that truth is treated as error." (Duarte et al. 2015, 4)

Duarte et al. (2015) outline three negative outcomes that arise from the lack of viewpoint diversity: 1) Liberal values and assumptions can become embedded into theory and method, 2) Researchers may concentrate on topics that validate the liberal progress narrative and avoid topics that contest that narrative, and 3) Negative attitudes regarding conservatives can produce a psychological science that mischaracterizes their traits and attributes. Their work directly applies to AGW scholarship and how political assumptions can lead to bad scholarship, using Feygina et al. (2010) as an example:

"3.1.1. Example 1: Denial of environmental realities.
Feygina et al. (2010) sought to explain the "denial of environmental realities" by using system justification theory (Jost & Banaji 1994). In operationalizing such denial, the authors assessed the four constructs listed below, with example items in parentheses:

Construct 1: Denial of the possibility of an ecological crisis. ("If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major environmental catastrophe," reverse scored.)

Construct 2: Denial of limits to growth. ("The Earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them.")

Construct 3: Denial of the need to abide by the constraints of nature. ("Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.")

Construct 4: Denial of the danger of disrupting balance in nature. ("The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.")

The core problem with this research is that it misrepresents those who merely disagree with environmentalist values and slogans as being in "denial." Indeed, the papers that Feygina et al. (2010) cited in support of their "denial" questions never used the terms "deny" or "denial" to describe these measures. Clark et al. (2003) referred to the items as assessing "attitudes," and Dunlap et al. (2000) characterized the items as tapping "primitive beliefs" (p. 439) about the environment." (Duarte et al. 2015, 4)

Duarte et al's (2015) critique of Construct 1 is that Feygina et al. (2010) assumed that their partisan beliefs accurately reflected reality, and thus anyone with a different viewpoint was in 'denial,' and as such they (probably unintentionally) used vague words such as "soon," "major," and "crisis", which could be understood differently by survey takers with different worldviews and epistemologies. Thus, there was no objective reality for others to believe in or be in denial about. Similar problems occur in Construct 2, involving measurement of concepts such as "plenty" and "develop," in Construct 3 with "constraints," "nature," and "control," and in Construct 4 with "balance of nature." The meaning of these terms was obvious to Feygina et al. (2010), but are not shared by people with different political worldviews. Not only do conservatives not share many of their assumptions, but even on the left different groups have different understandings of the terms they use. For instance, Eco-Marxists and Deep Ecologists have fundamentally different views on what 'limits to growth' means than neoliberals who support what has been called 'green capitalism,' (Ponte 2019) where corporations are incentivized to engage in environmental practices and are rewarded with higher ESG (Environmental Social Governance) scores that attract investment.

Feygina et al. (2010) might in the end be correct, and their scholarship could be amended to use more precise and quantifiable definitions using the Thompson (2008) approach I discussed in Chapter Six, which combined Political Theory with post-positivist empirical research, but the larger point that Duarte et al. (2015) are pointing to is that, when a field is completely dominated by a single political worldview, it becomes very easy for outside researchers to miss sloppy language because of shared partisan or ideological assumptions with the authors. The correlate being that, were there more

conservative scholars involved in Social Psychology, there would be a greater chance for these assumptions to be identified and better elucidated, for the purposes of more accurate empirical research about environmental attitudes.

To return to a point I made in Chapter One, there are already credentialed scholars who are respected by conservatives, who could improve public perception of AGW research because of their already established reputation as champions of free speech. Not only could they serve as vehicles for environmental and AGW messages, their critiques and academic skills could be employed to find fault with, and thus improve, the research itself, as in the case above. These are scholars who are eager and willing to do the heavy lifting, as long as the university faculty and administration are willing to protect them in the face of partisan criticism of their heterodox views.

To include them, the challenge must be faced of balancing the needs of people with historically marginalized social identities, which is the domain of IED policies, and protecting free speech and academic freedom of scholars who hold positions that IED scholars and administrators find offensive. How to do this is the subject of the epilogue of this dissertation, but what I hope to have made clear in this dissertation is the very high price of failing to do so in terms of public perception, and thus public policy, on environmental research and AGW.

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Epilogue - New Approaches to Balancing Diversities and Possible Ways Forward

Science is a social process, and we all live amid the social soup of personalities, parties and power. The political dysfunction that holds America hostage also holds science hostage…To restore faith in science, there must be faith in social institutions more broadly, and this requires a political reckoning.
– Jay Kaufman

There is a huge amount of important and serious and honest work being done in American academia. We should not forget that. We sometimes talk as if universities are Maoist struggle sessions. They're not. But there are a few interlocking problems that seem to be getting worse. One of them is the lack of viewpoint diversity. When there are entire disciplines, certainly entire departments, where a student can go through training starting as an undergraduate, through graduate school, then on into her professional career, and maybe even through retirement, without ever encountering a political conservative — that is going to cause serious distortions because of the questions that won't get asked and the prejudices that will be assumed. And it's going to cause the public to believe that the enterprise of academia is not on the level.
– Jonathan Rauch

Diversity and dissent are critical values to instill and uphold, and while many individuals agree in theory, most do not in practice (Nemeth, 2012). Academia cannot allow selective or convenient diversity, inclusivity, and tolerance, and should instead have a vested interest in alleviating all forms of discrimination and protecting the pluralistic tradition within universities. Listening and being exposed to viewpoints that differ from our own frequently makes us more tolerant (Mutz 2006), so a lack of ideological diversity in academia will only serve to reinforce intolerance and discrimination towards ideological out-groups. As scholars attempt to find truth through their research, and as faculty work to instill these truths in the minds of their students, it is imperative that "we start to recognize the courage of minority voices and the value of the open airing of competing views, and that we achieve some clear understanding of the role of trust that allows the passionate interchange to occur" (Nemeth 2012, 24). A good starting place would be with the conservative (or non-liberal) minority in academia.
– Nathan Honeycutt and Laura Freberg

In this last section I want to address what I believe are the two most important questions that my most likely readers (i.e., academics) are likely to pose: "What's in it for me?" and "how can I do this on a practical level?"

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What is in it for faculty as researchers?

The short answers are that inclusion of heterodox positions will improve your research methodology, and that your work will be more likely to be accepted and believed by the public at large.

Returning to Duarte et al. (2015) from Chapter Eight, they argued that political diversity would improve Psychology, partially because conservatives may be more diverse in their political beliefs that liberals, thus offering more possible lines of conceptualizing phenomena of interest. (Feldman and Johnston 2014, Klein and Stern 2005, Stenner 2009) Without viewpoint diversity, Duarte et al. (2015) argue that Psychology as a science faces the following risks:

1. Researchers can fail to recognize their own biases and embedded values in research question formulation and methodology.

2. The resulting language used in research questionnaires can contain biases which damage results.

3. Topics of research chosen reflect partisan narrative preferences, which also means that certain topics of research will be avoided.

4. Group stereotypes about out-groups will be assumed and remain invisible to ingroup members. When conservatives are the out-group being studied by leftwing ingroup members partisan motivated reasoning is likely to imbed stereotypes. "Negative attitudes regarding conservatives can produce a psychological science that mischaracterizes their traits and attributes." (Duarte et al. 2015, 6)

5. Combat confirmation bias, which is widespread in both the general public and the scientific community. (Ioanaddis 2012)

   According to Duarte, et al. (2015)

   "Confirmation bias can become even stronger when people confront questions that trigger moral emotions and concerns about group identity (Haidt 2001; 2012). Further, group-polarization often exacerbates extremism in echo chambers (Lamm & Myers 1978). Indeed, people are far better at identifying the flaws in other people's evidence-gathering than in their own, especially if those other people have dissimilar beliefs (e.g., Mercier & Sperber 2011; Sperber et al. 2010). Although such processes may be beneficial for communities whose goal is social cohesion (e.g., a religious or activist movement), they can be devastating for

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scientific communities by leading to widely accepted claims that reflect the scientific community's blind spots more than they reflect justified scientific conclusions (see, e.g., the three risk points discussed previously).

The peer-review process likely offers much less protection against error when the community of peers is politically homogeneous. Ideally, reviewers should scrutinize and criticize the methods of a paper equally closely regardless of whether or not they approve of the findings. Yet, confirmation biases would lead reviewers to work extra hard to find flaws with papers whose conclusions they dislike, and to be more permissive about methodological issues when they endorse the conclusions. This is exactly what has been found in experimental studies (Abramowitz et al. 1975; Ceci et al. 1985)." (Duarte et al. 2015, 8)

6. Groupthink wherein large groups dominate dissenting members into accepting their reasoning and conclusions.

Stevens et al. (2019) also looked at confirmation bias in scientists, and argued that political beliefs shape perceptions about both empirical evidence, and interpretation of empirical findings, to conform to their pre-existing beliefs about social reality. These partisan biases impact researchers by encouraging them to pursue or avoid certain topics, changing how they approach those topics, and framing the conclusions they draw from their research. Honeycutt and Freberg (2017) also found that the large liberal to conservative ratio in faculty generated more perception of hostility from conservatives, but that both sides engaged in 'ingroup vs. outgroup' behavior, creating a self-reinforcing cycle that contributes to ever-increasing political homogeneity among researchers, which contributes to the confirmation bias problem.

Honeycutt and Freberg (2017) lay out the problem rather eloquently when they write,

"Compared to the general public, faculty members of institutions of higher education are more liberal in their political attitudes (Cardiff and Klein 2005, Gallup 2015). According to Inbar and Lammers (2012), this lack of political diversity should not be of concern "if one believes that conservatives are simply wrong" (p. 502). We wouldn't expect a department of anthropology to hire a professor who believes that dinosaurs and humans were alive at the same time. In other instances, however, dismissing conservative beliefs could lead scholars, particularly in the social sciences, to overlook meaningful research questions or even misinterpret their results (Haidt 2011). Researchers may then fall into "scientific hell," where scientific standards are clouded by political passions

(Tetlock 1994). Research agendas might provide convenient evidence supporting a particular worldview, while simultaneously attacking research that does not conform to this worldview (Funder, 2015). Researchers might fail to converge upon truth in absentia of colleagues who raise questions and frame hypotheses in different ways (Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim, and Tetlock 2015).

Further, political uniformity in academia could lead the public and policy-makers to question the credibility of research. Finally, political uniformity could lead to discrimination against the minority (i.e., conservatives, or non-liberals), thereby uprooting the pluralistic tradition of universities (Redding, 2001)." (Honeycutt and Freberg 2017, 3)

By protecting the free speech and academic freedom of ideological outsiders in higher education, leftwing and liberal researchers are also lessening their own chances of being fired, should a cancel or smear campaign be waged against them. FIRE (2021) found that 3 in 4 smear campaigns currently result in punishment, and that the number of such campaigns has quadrupled since 2015. FIRE is attempting to push back against this trend via the creation of a Faculty Legal Defense Fund and the publication of "Scholars under Fire," which found,

1. Over the past five and a half years, a total of 426 targeting incidents have occurred. Almost three-quarters of them (314 out of 426; 74%) have resulted in some form of sanction.

2. The number of targeting incidents has risen dramatically, from 24 in 2015 to 113 in 2020. As of mid-2021, 61 targeting incidents have already occurred.

3. Scholars were targeted most often for speech involving race (e.g., racial inequality, historic racism, racial slurs, BLM, DEI).

4. In addition to race, targeting incidents tended to involve hot-button issues such as partisanship, gender, and institutional policy.

5. In almost two-thirds (269; 63%) of the incidents, scholars were targeted for expressing a personal view or opinion on a controversial social issue.

6. Half of the targeting incidents have occurred because of a scholar's scientific inquiry (106 incidents; 25%) or teaching practices (107 incidents; 25%).

7. Targeting incidents have occurred most often in the disciplines that are at the core of a liberal arts education: law, political science, English, history, and philosophy.

8. Targeting incidents have come from individuals and groups to the political left of the scholar more often than the political right; these targetings have come more often from those on campus, have been more organized (i.e., the online petitions have considerably more signatures), and have typically been aimed at scholars who are tenured, White, and male.

9. Campuses where the most targeting incidents have occurred tend to also have severely speech-restrictive policies, and are unlikely to have adopted the Chicago Principles[19] guaranteeing the preeminence of free speech.


Figure E.1. FIRE's (2021) data on number of targeting incidents of undergraduate students, scholars, administrators, and graduate students.

Thus, the major benefits for liberal and leftwing faculty and administrators who defend free speech and academic freedom are improved research, improved public belief in the validity of their research, and increased safety to conduct their own research.

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[19] The Chicago Statement is offered in full at the end of this chapter

<u>What is in it for faculty as teachers and public servants?</u>

Presumably, researchers and professors dedicate their entire lives to academia in order to contribute to their society, but within the current atmosphere much of their life's work is simply discarded or rejected because of partisan motivated reasoning. That means that professors are essentially preaching to their choirs and being ignored by everyone else, or even worse, generating conspiratorial thinking and having their work automatically thought of as a malicious lie, such that the opposite belief must be true. This hyper- and negative- partisan environment, which is gaining salience, means that all of our work might in fact be making the problems we care about worse, instead of better.

Jay Kaufman's excellent 2021 article 'Science Alone Can't Heal a Sick Society' does an excellent job looking at how this phenomenon presented itself during COVID concerning the partisan divides over masks, vaccines, school re-openings, and alternative approaches to treatment, such as ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine. He asks,

> "For example, how did the effectiveness of a drug like hydroxychloroquine become a political litmus test, rather than a question for dispassionate clinical study? Nothing is gained when basic scientific and policy questions become ideological footballs to be inflated and tossed around. The United States is the dominant biomedical research entity in the world, and so its flagrant political dysfunction became a global problem. This infused everything that we epidemiologists did with doubt, suspicion and the whiff of partisanship… Rational discourse about the policy question became all but impossible. Every interpretation of evidence became colored by the suspicion that it was in the service of a political allegiance." (Kaufman 2021)

This atmosphere is also impacting our students. I, for one, endured the low pay and abysmal working conditions of being an adjunct faculty member, because I cared about my students and was willing to sacrifice quite a lot for the honor of teaching them. These forces hurt them too.

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The most obvious negative impact of the progressive-neoliberal model of higher education is student debt, which is now on average $29,927 per student upon graduation. (Garber 2021). Along with individual injury in the form of debt, this causes a social class problem for students. Allen Farrington (2019) paints the following picture of higher education:

> "Students are required to enslave themselves economically to the cultural elite as a toll to gain admittance. The vulnerability in the interim is then exploited to manipulate social signalling and behaviour: if you don't play along, your life will be ruined. But since academia is considered a bottleneck for success, those who don't enter the raffle forfeit this leverage and are rewarded with dismal prospects.
>
> The only people really immune from all this are the actual elites, whose children are predominantly upper-class liberal whites. They receive all the same social assurances without giving up any leverage, and price out any remotely similar opportunity for the less fortunate to whom they ceaselessly and guiltily pledge their ostentatious support and solidarity. Higher education has become a transfer of wealth from the future earnings of the aspirational lower and middle classes to a metastasising administrative parasite, which funds the permanence of the cultural elite by wielding its leverage over anybody foolish enough to dissent." (Farrington 2019)

Beyond debt there is also an impact on learning. Rockenbach et al. (2020) did a four-year study with 3,486 students called IDEALS and found that while only 10% of undergraduates felt pressured to change their views, the fear of other students had a chilling effect in the classroom, and lead to an unhealthy political environment. This environment harms conservative students because they feel they must remain silent to stay safe, which my own dissertation study supports, and it harms liberal students because while their conservative counterparts get to hear and examine the arguments against their positions, they are relatively protected from hearing anything which might challenge their own beliefs, limiting their ability to grow academically or to create buttresses for their own positions. This is a form of coddling for leftwing students, which leaves them relatively weaker than their rightwing peers, because they are less frequently required to examine their own positions, whereas conservatives have to always be on guard

while on campus. In any kind of a debate, it is an advantage to know both your own and your opponent's positions and arguments inside and out.

The ability to question partisan dogma and recenter reason would be to the benefit of all students. Students will be more encouraged to develop their own ideas and identities if they see professors challenging dogma, and by encouraging professors and students to entertain more heterodox ideas, we re-open the capacity for creative self-discovery for our students.

One practical idea that I've shared with others, to positive reception, would be for professors to create a channel for students to anonymously ask questions and make challenges. As students are more afraid of their peers than faculty or administration, creating a backdoor for conservative or heterodox students to challenge and ask questions would allow them to participate in class in a way that would be safe from social reprisal. This could include having students email, text, or use class software (Desire2Learn, Canvas, etc.) during class, and having the professor check periodically throughout their lecture when answering student questions and navigating class debates.

Finally, there is evidence that we may be harming our liberal students by giving them a false sense of who conservatives even are or what they believe, further exacerbating hyper-partisanship. A 2019 'More In Common' report found that there is a 'perception gap' between Republicans and Democrats, where each side believes things about what the other believes that are not true. This gap is largest at the partisan extremes, is increased by media consumption, and is actually made worse by education for Democrats:

Figure E.2. Perception gap of partisan misunderstanding of other group's beliefs, courtesy of perceptiongap.us)

<u>What in it for faculty as employees?</u>

As covered extensively in Chapter Three, the profession of the professoriate in terms of pay, benefits, and job security is in a steadily deteriorating state, and the profession of college administrator is in in a steadily increasing state, and these trends has been going on for a long time. One of the many social pathologies generated by the progressive neoliberal model of higher education is the abuse of IED policies, which can and are implemented against faculty, both in terms of academic freedom and in continually deteriorating working conditions. This conflict between faculty and administrators is, and has been, lopsided in favor of administrators.

One of the things that conservatives desperately want is the ability to voice their opinions, and conduct their research on campus, without being accused of hate speech, or facing job loss due to smear and cancel campaigns. By defending free speech and academic freedom for conservative and heterodox thinkers, there is an opportunity, in E.E. Schattschneider's (1960)

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terms, to expand the conflict and reset the game, such that leftwing faculty are not just

continually being ground down by their leftwing administrative opponents.

One concrete measure would be for increased support for pro-faculty legislation, which

will only be possible if leftwing faculty support the free speech and academic freedom of their

rightwing peers. For instance, the Adjunct Faculty Loan Fairness Act of 2019 (Kantrowitz 2020)

only had four supporters, all of whom were Democrats (Senators Durbin, Duckworth, Hirono,

and Booker). This is not surprising given how little regard conservatives currently have for

higher education. Subjectively speaking from everything I have read for this dissertation, if we

could re-open higher education to conservative and heterodox views via free speech and

academic freedom, then I think there is a large opportunity to improve support for our profession

that will never exist as long as conservatives view universities as partisan, hostile institutions

which threaten them and their values.

Currently administrators can continue to justify their policies and salaries via progressive

narratives about social justice, and this trend of power consolidation shows no signs of slowing.

Attempts to disagree with an administrator or policy can potentially lead to charges of hate

speech against a marginalized group, which in turn can lead to administrative punishments,

including dismissal. Regarding Canada's *Race-Conscious Institution,* which implements IED

policies as means of administrative control over the entirety of every university in Canada,

Jonathan Kay writes,

> "Radical ideological manias typically flame out quickly because their
> demonstrated excesses make them unattractive to new recruits. But as *Building a*
> *Race-Conscious Institution* helps demonstrate, anti-racism will be different—as
> its adherents have succeeded in embedding their precepts into the ostensibly
> neutral administrative machinery of the institutions they serve. This, in turn, has
> allowed them to expand their powers, inflate their ranks through control of the
> hiring process, neutralize ideological opponents with threats of investigation, and
> even stigmatize doctrinal criticism as a form of bigotry.

In short, proponents of this ideology have found a way to neutralize the checks and balances that typically govern the intellectual life of a university. Moreover, they've done it in plain sight, while earning six-figure salaries and winning public plaudits for their commitment to social justice." (Kay 2021)

This is a power game and it's rigged for administrators – administrators who hold all the power, have all the money, and enjoy all the support of the Democratic party in the US. I, for one, vote that we do something drastic and offer conservatives protection for their academic freedom in exchange for their support for liberal faculty members freedoms and working conditions, lest we all become adjunctified, Walmart-ized pawns mindlessly reciting power-points at impoverished students, who either already agree with us politically, or regard us as dishonest, partisan hacks.

How can faculty be inclusive of diversity of social identity and diversity of thought?

Duarte et al. (2015) gives 8 recommendations (5 modified from American Psychological Association's 2005 report on promoting diversity of identity):

1. Formulate and adopt an anti-discrimination policy resolution.

2. Implement a "climate study" regarding members 'experiences, comfort/discomfort, and positive/negative attitudes/opinions/policies affecting or about members of politically diverse groups.

3. Expand the Publication and Communications Board's database of conservative, moderate, and libertarian researchers who have expertise to serve as ad hoc reviewers or on editorial boards.

4. Conduct a study of barriers/obstacles that non-liberal students face within training programs, with the intent that these data subsequently be used in establishing formal suggestions for enabling the training of non-liberal students.

5. Each organization should develop strategies to encourage and support research training programs and research conferences to attract, retain, and graduate conservative and other non-liberal doctoral students and early career professionals. Examples might include

dissertation awards, travel funds for presentations and attendance at conferences, and other financial support targeted to graduate students.

Further, they offer advice for faculty on how to encourage conservative students to join their field:

6. Raise consciousness, raise awareness. Professors can acknowledge openly that political homogeneity is a problem in the field, and can state openly that they would like this to change. They can talk about the issue, especially in graduate courses, in faculty meetings about hiring and promotion, at symposia, colloquia, and conferences, and informally among faculty.

7. Welcome feedback from non-liberals. Although conservative students are just as satisfied with their college as are liberal students (indicating no general difference in attitude toward education), they are considerably less satisfied than liberal students with their humanities and social science courses –that is, the courses in which the overwhelmingly left-wing politics of the faculty are most likely to manifest (Woessner & Kelly-Woessner 2009). Liberal professors can make it clear that they are trying to do better, and that they would welcome emails or office visits –or even in-class challenges –from conservative and other non-liberal students. They could preface such a welcome with a discussion of the dangers of groupthink and the benefits for creativity and good thinking of viewpoint diversity.

8. Expand diversity statements. Professors can ask their departments to modify the language on their websites to include political diversity along with other kinds, in all statements encouraging members of under-represented groups to apply for admission. Even if it proves difficult to get programs to make such statements, individual faculty can do so on their personal Web pages. We realize that it may seem ironic to call for diversity initiatives aimed at non-liberals, since liberals have historically carried the banner of diversity as an ideal. However, our recommendations are not logically constrained by conservative doctrine, and we think adding more conservatives, libertarians, and people with less categorical perspectives –or no political identity at all –will strengthen our science. (Duarte et al. 2015, 11-12)

There is good news about including conservatives and other non-progressives in higher

education. A 2006 AAUP survey found that while Conservatives are outnumbered on campus,

they are generally,

"successful, happy, and prosperous. Fewer than 2 percent of faculty (Republican or Democratic) reported being the victims of unfair treatment based on their politics. Only 7 percent of Republican faculty believed that discrimination against those with "right-wing" views was a serious problem on their campus, compared

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with 8 percent of Democratic faculty who expressed concerns about discrimination against those with "left-wing" views. Asked to consider what they would do if given the opportunity to "begin your career again," 91 percent of Democratic faculty and 93 percent of Republican faculty answered that they would "definitely" or "probably" want to be a college professor. Similarly, few right leaning students or administrators claimed to have been the victims of political mistreatment. Like their Democratic counterparts, most were satisfied with their experience in higher education." (Woessner 2012)

Certainly, much has changed since that survey was conducted, but Heterodox Academy's data and similar surveys has found that, while there is some student concern about administration and faculty, which is very much hyped up by conservative media, conservative students are more concerned about their peers. And while Woessner (2012) argues that, "when students perceive a gap between their political views and those of their instructor, students express less interest in the material, are inclined to look less favorably on the course, and tend to offer the instructor a lower course evaluation," this peer-based concern means that there is an opening for faculty and administration to demonstrate empathy for conservative students by finding and developing ways for conservative students to anonymously or privately contribute to class.

Finally, Lerner (2020) recommended the following techniques for engaging conservative students in the field of Social Work, which can be applied to other fields:

1. Use classroom materials from sources with differing viewpoints.

2. Consider the source (teach students to evaluate the quality of the media sources they consume)

3. Underscore the importance of differing political ideologies during social work orientations

4. Create class activities and assignments that challenge students' beliefs

5. Encourage conservative students to write authentically

6. Teach students to ask questions from a place of inquiry. (Lerner 202)

<u>What is in it for administrators as public servants?</u>

One of the main benefits administrators can gain from protecting free speech, academic freedom, and heterodox ideas is that they could improve their own programs, including IED programs. Dobbin and Kalev (2016) wrote in the Harvard Business Review a review of where IED policies did, and did not, work in private equity firms. They found that IED policies can create backlash when they push against people's personal autonomy, which activates bias rather than decreasing it, and that encouraging heterodox viewpoints allows for more options to be considered to improve IED outcomes.

The three most popular interventions make firms less diverse, not more, because managers resist strong-arming. For instance, testing job applicants hurts women and minorities—but not because they perform poorly. Hiring managers don't always test everyone (white men often get a pass) and don't interpret results consistently.

% CHANGE OVER FIVE YEARS IN REPRESENTATION AMONG MANAGERS

Type of program	White		Black		Hispanic		Asian	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Mandatory diversity training				−9.2			−4.5	−5.4
Job tests		−3.8	−10.2	−9.1	−6.7	−8.8		−9.3
Grievance systems		−2.7	−7.3	−4.8		−4.7	−11.3	−4.1

Figure E.3. Results of different IED interventions, by race and sex.[20] (Dobbin and Kaley 2016)

We can see similar backlash occurring towards higher education because of neoliberal IED policies, which is similar to what Dobbin and Kaley explored, such as activated bias resulting in fear, anger, resistance, and animosity towards perceived outgroups. However, when firms approached IED goals using voluntary training, it evoked the opposite response and lead to better results for minorities and women. They found that empowering people through choice both produced better outcomes and reduced overall bias.

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[20] "Gray indicates no statistical certainty. Source: authors' study of 829 midsize and large U.S. firms. The analysis isolated the effects of diversity programs from every else going on in the companies and the economy. From "Why Diversity Programs Fail," by Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev, July-August 2016." (Dobbin and Kaley 2016)

Companies do a better job of increasing diversity when they forgo the control tactics and frame their efforts more positively. The most effective programs spark engagement, increase contact among different groups, or draw on people's strong desire to look good to others.

% CHANGE OVER FIVE YEARS IN REPRESENTATION AMONG MANAGERS

Type of program	White		Black		Hispanic		Asian	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Voluntary training			+13.3		+9.1		+9.3	+12.6
Self-managed teams	-2.8	+5.6	+3.4	+3.9				+3.6
Cross-training	-1.4	+3.0	+2.7	+3.0	-3.9		+6.5	+4.1
College recruitment: women*	-2.0	+10.2	+7.9	+8.7		+10.0	+18.3	+8.6
College recruitment: minorities**			+7.7	+8.9				
Mentoring				+18.0	+9.1	+23.7	+18.0	+24.0
Diversity task forces	-3.3	+11.6	+8.7	+22.7	+12.0	+16.2	+30.2	+24.2
Diversity managers		+7.5	+17.0	+11.1		+18.2	+10.9	+13.6

Figure E.4. Results over five years in representation after different IED strategies implemented, by race and sex.[21] (Dobbin and Kaley 2016).

Heterodox Academy's report, "Diversity is Not Enough: Why Collective Intelligence Requires Both Diversity and Disagreement" (Kudesia 2021), found that disagreement among diverse teams, in terms of both social identity and ideology, made for better outcomes than teams without ideological diversity. They had teams use Agreement, Advocacy, Disagreement, and Random strategies and used meta-analyses to examine the effects of team diversity on decision making speed and accuracy.

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[21] "*College recruitment targeting women turns recruiting managers into diversity champions, so it also helps boost the numbers for black and Asian-American men. **College recruitment targeting minorities often focuses on historically black schools, which lifts the number of African-American men and women. Note – gray indicates no statistical certainty of a program's effect. Source – Authors' study of 829 midsize and large U.S. firms. The analysis isolated the effects of diversity programs from everything else going on in the companies and in the economy. From – "Why Diversity Programs Fail," by Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev, July-August 2016" (Dobbin and Kaley 2016).

Figure E.5. "Speed-accuracy tradeoffs for four information sharing strategies and three different ratios of individual/total information. Green depicts decision-making accuracy and is expressed as the percentage of correctly solved problems. Orange depicts the time needed to reach consensus, expressed in the median number of interactions (based on repeated runs with different hidden profile problems). Agents share information that (a) agrees with the current team consensus, (b) advocates for their own belief about the correct decision alternative, (c) supports a different decision alternative than the last decision alternative that was argued for, or (d) at random." (Kudesia 2021)

Their work yielded four important insights:

1. *Diversity matters*. Regardless of what information-sharing strategy a team used, greater deep-level diversity (where team members held more unique information and less information was held in common) was associated with more accurate decisions reached more rapidly.

2. *Agreement erodes intelligence*. Sharing only information that agrees with other team members is a uniformly poor strategy by every metric. This finding aligns with the general lesson of groupthink: When everybody is thinking the same way, nobody is thinking much at all.

3. *Speed can trade off with accuracy*. The random strategy leads to the most accurate decisions overall because the random sharing of information prompts teams to explore the entire space of available information. But it also has a drastic effect on speed: As the amount of information available increases, random sharing becomes prohibitively time-consuming.

4. *Disagreement optimally balances trade-offs.* The disagreement strategy, in contrast, avoids these stark speed/accuracy trade-offs. Of all strategies, it enhances decision accuracy without becoming prohibitively time-consuming as the amount of information available increases. (Kudesia 2021)

This allowing for disagreement is important, because it also will help stop the bleeding and begin the process of rebuilding the credibility of higher education. Evan Goldstein (2021) interviewed Jonathan Rauch in the Chronicle of Higher Education, and tied this lack of disagreement and viewpoint diversity to the diminished perception of credibility in the universities. Related to lack of viewpoint diversity as a variable are campus-wide fear of students and faculty, such that entire topics are effectively avoided, due to politicization over the pursuit of truth, and a lack of civility over contentious topics, which has been replaced with punishment.

This fear of public reprisal is not only coming from leftwing advocates, as Rauch notes that groups on the political right such as MAGAs (or TPUSA or YAF for that matter) have also learned from their leftwing counterparts on how to effectively engage in information warfare and launch campaigns against their perceived enemies on campus.

> "We need to think about what Trump and MAGA are up to, and what cancel culture is up to, as two varieties of the same thing, which is information warfare. Or epistemic warfare. There are lots of ways to do that. The way we see increasingly used on campuses is social coercion: Find ways to make it very socially painful to be called out. It's not like you're safe if you don't, say, criticize affirmative action. You never know where the land mines are. You never know what might be construed as a microaggression until someone denounces you for it. That's on purpose, and has two effects. One is straightforward chilling. The second is more subtle: It distorts the information environment by spoofing consensus. In a chilled environment, you don't know what people around you really think. It becomes easy to believe that you're the only person with your point of view and that you're isolated." (Goldstein 2021)

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The remedy to these pathologies lies in administration and management having the backbone to protect faculty and students from these kinds of cancellation tactics, as leadership sets the tone, expectations, and values. Rauch believes that the failure of university leadership is directly responsible for the contemporary encroachment by conservative legislatures into professors' curriculum and syllabi via legislation against topics such as Critical Race Theory.

> "I am very unhappy to see politicians barging into campuses and classrooms to dictate what can and cannot be taught. But it's happening partly as a result of the collapse of credibility on campus. A lot of people out there in political land, especially on the right, think that campuses are engaging in indoctrination and teaching fake facts. This is America, it's a populist country, it's a democratic country, and you're going to see political entrepreneurs make hay with this.
>
> One thing we know from history going back to at least the Scopes Trial is that the worst people on the planet to make curriculum choices or write syllabi are politicians. They should never, ever, ever do it. They're terrible at it. But now they're doing it. And my admonition to people in academia is that there's more to come if you don't get more conscientious about making campuses more hospitable to a true diversity of ideas." (Goldstein 2021)

This legislation did not pop out of a vacuum. Conservative media coverage of higher education as a form of backlash is a serious industry, pumping out daily stories meant to enrage conservatives and ridicule faculty and administration on the left, and is itself a significant source of political hyper-partisanship. We can work against this polarization by taking seriously the conservative backlash stories which paint higher education in an unfavorable light. While no one likes being criticized, criticism can lead to growth and improvement if taken seriously instead of being brushed off.

Thus, administration would benefit from protecting free speech and academic freedom in the form of improved IED outcomes, restored credibility of higher education, and lessened risk of encroachment by Republican politicians into the university system.

<u>How can administration be inclusive of diversity of social identity and diversity of thought?</u>

How do we create a college environment that respects diversity of social identity and diversity of thought? As covered in Chapter Four, there already exists expansive infrastructure for Inclusion, Equity, and Diversity programs, trainings, staff, and resources to support people of marginalized identities. Support for ideological diversity could be built within those structures, and is indeed appropriate, as the communities they serve are not ideologically monolithic. There are non-progressives in every social identity group, whether that be women, LGBTQIAA+, BIPOC, etc., and those people deserve to be included and protected within higher education. Within higher education we can look at political diversity as it exists in our students, our faculty, and our administration. Here are three approaches on how this can be achieved: Greg Lukianoff's Ten Principles (2021), Denhardt and Denhardt's New Public Service (2003), and Karith Foster's INVERSITY™ program (Fire Student Network 2021).

First, Greg Lukianoff (2021), writing in The FIRE, offers Ten Principles which could guide administrators on how to include viewpoint diversity within IED institutions on campus[22]:

Principle 1: No compelled speech, thought, or belief.

Principle 2: Respect for individuality, dissent, and the sanctity of conscience.

Principle 3: Teachers & administrators must *demonstrate* epistemic humility.

Principle 4: Foster the broadest possible curiosity, critical thinking skills, and discomfort with certainty.

Principle 5: Foster independence, not moral dependency.

Principle 6: Do not teach children to think in cognitive distortions.

Principle 7: Do not teach the 'Three Great Untruths.'

- The Untruth of Fragility: What doesn't kill you makes you weaker.

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[22] Although originally written for K-12 it applies equally well to the university.

- The Untruth of Emotional Reasoning: Always trust your feelings.
- The Untruth of Us Versus Them: Life is a battle between good and evil people.

Principle 8: Take student mental health *more* seriously.

Principle 9: Resist the temptation to reduce complex students to limiting labels.

Principle 10: If it's broke, fix it. Be willing to form new institutions that empower students and educate them with principles of free, diverse, and pluralistic society.

This list of principles can work with the goals of IED policies as they are rooted around individual empowerment in a way that does not deny that individuals are also members of social identity groups. By looking at people as individuals and members of groups we can examine group power dynamics in a way that does not 'other' people, or reduce them to only their social identity. People are both members of groups and individuals, such that one of the limits of current IED policies and practices is that by only looking at people as members of groups, they explain society only in terms of group differences. By empowering individuals this allows IED policies to explore shared common humanity and bring people together, hopefully making them more cooperative overall instead of amplifying our tribal natures.

Second, to return to New Public Service from Chapter Five, administrators should reconsider the neoliberal model of New Public Management when it comes to how it views faculty and students.

Table 2. Comparing perspectives: Old public administration, New Public Management, and the New Public Service

	Old public administration	New Public Management	New Public Service
Theoretical foundations	Political theory, naïve social science	Economic theory, positivist social science	Democratic theory
Rationality and models of human behaviour	Administrative rationality, public interest	Technical and economic rationality, self-interest	Strategic rationality, citizen interest
Conception of the public interest	Political, enshrined in law	Aggregation of individual interests	Dialogue about shared values
To whom are civil servants responsive?	Clients and constituents	Customers	Citizens
Role of government	"Rowing", implementation focused on politically defined objectives	"Steering", serving as catalyst to unleash market forces	"Serving", negotiating and brokering interests among citizens
Mechanisms for achieving policy objectives	Administering programmes through government agencies	Creating mechanisms and incentives through private and non-profit agencies	Building coalitions of public, non-profit private agencies
Approach to accountability	Hierarchical - administrators responsible to elected leaders	Market-drive-outcomes result from accumulation of self-interests	Multifaceted-public servants guided by law, values, professional norms and citizen interests
Administrative discretion	Limited discretion granted to public officials	Wide latitude to meet entrepreneurial goals	Discretion needed but constrained and accountable
Assumed organizational structure	Bureaucratic organizations with top-down authority and control of clients	Decentralized public organisations with primary control within agency	Collaborative structures with shared leadership
Assumed motivational basis of public servants	Pay and benefits, civil-service protections	Entrepreneurial spirit, desire to reduce size and functions of government	Public service, desire to contribute to society

Source: Adapted from Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p.554)

Figure E.6. Reproduction of Figure 5.5. Comparison chart of Old public administration, New Public Management, and The New Public Service, courtesy of Clueless Political Scientist (2017).

Under New Public Service the university can be reimagined as a place that exists to benefit everyone – administrators, faculty, and students – within a democratic system that sees all members of the university community as citizens engaged in collaborative projects dedicated to public service. IED policies are about collapsing hierarchies and helping marginalized communities succeed, so within New Public Service we can take this a step further and collapse the 'administrator over faculty and students' model to the benefit of everyone, including administrators.

The current system really only benefits administrators at the cost of students and faculty, because of its commitment to business-like New Public Management practices. If the goal of IED policies is to transform society into a more equitable place, where no one has innate

privilege over others because of their social group membership, then administration can demonstrate this commitment to equity by checking their own privilege and committing to do better by the faculty and students on their own campuses. New Public Service is built to move beyond a capitalist, business-like model, and should serve as a guide for how the university can, and should, be reimagined as an inclusive, equitable, and diverse place for all community members.

Third, programs that promote IED goals which include diversity of thought, such as Karith Foster's INVERSITY™ program, should be considered when building training modules for faculty and administration. Her program empowers underprivileged communities in a way that respects individuality and looks for common humanity. She also makes humor and narratives integral to her approach to bring people together such that they want to work together in inclusive, diverse environments where people are not attacked, silenced, othered, or made to feel resentful. According to Foster (2021), INVERSITY™ Stands For:

INtrospection – The examination or observation of one's own mental and emotional processes. In short, understanding YOUR value, YOUR worth, YOUR connection to humanity.

VErify information before you accept it as truth and share it. Verify where someone stands— or who they are—before making an assumption or condemnation about them.

Reason vs Reaction – It's normal to want to react to a perceived threat or uncertainty. Reason allows us to take a step back and analyze the situation, maintain healthy relationships and create new possibilities.

Stop Fear, Start Faith – Fear amplifies what we fear. Faith promotes peace and calm.

Initiate a New Perspective – When we take time to shift our perspectives, it changes everything.

Take Time for Gratitude – Our brains are wired to notice what's wrong and what's missing. When we focus on gratitude, it shifts our perspective and experience.

You are Magical – When we consider the symphony of human creation, you really are magical.

I like this approach because there is nothing in there that is going to trigger a social

identity-based threat response and the corresponding psychological defense mechanisms. It is an

invitation to try something new, and it is presented in a way that is meant to bring people in. Her

program has been endorsed by FIRE, and from her website there are six pillars which expand

upon diversity to center free speech and achieve the goals laid out by IED proponents in a way

that will not cause the pathologies we are seeing in many contemporary approaches:

Pillar 1: Actualization
Actualization means attaining and achieving with effort, skill or courage. Actualization is an
essential component of success. When we work toward achieving self-actualization, we operate
from a place of wholeness and confidence. Personal responsibility reigns supreme and replaces
blame, judgment and emotional paralysis. Actualization paves the way for an empowering
environment of learning, creativity and ideas.

Pillar 2: Awareness
Awareness reveals the unseen. We don't know what we don't know until we are aware.
Awareness casts light on the shadows of negative thoughts, concepts and actions. It illuminates
the pathway for understanding, connection, collaboration and unity and dissolves ignorance,
ambiguity and confusion. From a state of awareness comes discernment, truth and new
perspectives which prompts our reality to change for the better.

Pillar 3: Reception
Reception is an openness to growth and learning. When we are open to receive new
information—whether it's in the form of education, praise or constructive criticism— we gain
knowledge and skill. For example, when a broadcast tower has good reception, the signal is
clear. When we have reception and clarity, we can effectively broadcast the signals of a healthy
corporate culture.

Pillar 4: Courage
 The root of the word courage is cor, which means heart. Operating from heart and courage is
what transforms workplaces rooted in fear into cultures that promote acceptance, benevolence
and harmony. Having courage means boldly showing up as your true self and listening and
operating confidently—not just from the head, but also from the heart.

Pillar 5: Grace
Grace is closely related to "kindness", elegance and gentility. Grace allows for uncomfortable
conversations and moments to pass without permanence. It is a gift that when given to others, it

improves relationships and creates the space for the first 4 pillars to continue working together: Actualization, Awareness, Reception and Courage.

Pillar 6: Energy
Energy is all around us. It permeates and is imprinted people, life forms, objects, physical spaces and locations. Just like in the laws of physics, we have the ability to proactively charge energy from negative to positive. With practice and application, we can channel this energy and create successful workspaces.

The End Result: Conscious Communication
Conscious Communication is the end result of all 6 Pillars of INVERSITY™. When people can speak openly, articulate ideas and listen actively, each person in a conversation, classroom, community and organization is seen and heard. Most importantly, Conscious Communication allows for an intentional exchange of dialogue and ideas that aren't dismissed, but are inclusive of all who are part of the conversation. Conscious Communication demands and commands a brave space, which must be rooted in Actualization, Awareness, Reception, Courage, Grace and Positive Energy.

There is nothing in these pillars that insult, degrade, or attack anyone for their social identity or their deeply held beliefs, which means that it is likely to avoid the social identity-based threat reactions I covered in Chapters Seven and Eight. There is growth, mutual respect, and shared humanity, and so it does not operate by creating an outgroup and placing the blame for the world's problems on them.

This also matches Discourse Theory, Public Deliberation, and Kahneman's (2011) models of fast and slow thinking, which I covered in Chapter Six. Her attempt calls for intentional deliberation, and sets the stage for genuine human engagement across groups. It is consistent with the Habermasian ideal speech situation and respect for the Lifeworld, which I discussed in Chapter Five.

It advances the IED-based progressive goals of the progressive neoliberal university I covered in Chapters Three and Four in a manner that is at least as cost-efficient as current programs (and possibly cheaper), with the bonus of not creating outgroup hostility towards universities.

It shows the same respect of dissident opinions that showed positive correlation in my treatment effect experiment in Chapter Two for my question on sense of safety. Finally, if it can bring people together to discuss IED programs in a way that is inclusive of both diversity of social identity and diversity of thought, that means that there is a chance that it could be utilized as a Best Practice to address the communicative problems I discussed in Chapter One regarding the long-standing difficulty of discussing environmental issues, especially AGW, in a language that they will positively respond to.

That all sounds pretty good to me.

Rock over London,
Rock on Chicago.
Wheaties, Breakfast of Champions!
-Wesley Willis, R.I.P.

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Endnote – The Chicago Statement in Full

Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression

The Committee on Freedom of Expression at the University of Chicago was appointed in July 2014 by President Robert J. Zimmer and Provost Eric D. Isaacs "in light of recent events nationwide that have tested institutional commitments to free and open discourse." The Committee's charge was to draft a statement "articulating the University's overarching commitment to free, robust, and uninhibited debate and deliberation among all members of the University's community."

The Committee has carefully reviewed the University's history, examined events at other institutions, and consulted a broad range of individuals both inside and outside the University. This statement reflects the long-standing and distinctive values of the University of Chicago and affirms the importance of maintaining and, indeed, celebrating those values for the future.

From its very founding, the University of Chicago has dedicated itself to the preservation and celebration of the freedom of expression as an essential element of the University's culture. In 1902, in his address marking the University's decennial, President William Rainey Harper declared that "the principle of complete freedom of speech on all subjects has from the beginning been regarded as fundamental in the University of Chicago" and that "this principle can neither now nor at any future time be called in question."

Thirty years later, a student organization invited William Z. Foster, the Communist Party's candidate for President, to lecture on campus. This triggered a storm of protest from critics both on and off campus. To those who condemned the University for allowing the event, President Robert M. Hutchins responded that "our students . . . should have freedom to discuss any problem that presents itself." He insisted that the "cure" for ideas we oppose "lies through open discussion rather than through inhibition." On a later occasion, Hutchins added that "free inquiry is indispensable to the good life, that universities exist for the sake of such inquiry, [and] that without it they cease to be universities."

In 1968, at another time of great turmoil in universities, President Edward H. Levi, in his inaugural address, celebrated "those virtues which from the beginning and until now have characterized our institution." Central to the values of the University of Chicago, Levi explained, is a profound commitment to "freedom of inquiry." This freedom, he proclaimed, "is our inheritance."

More recently, President Hanna Holborn Gray observed that "education should not be intended to make people comfortable, it is meant to make them think. Universities should be expected to provide the conditions within which hard thought, and therefore strong disagreement, independent judgment, and the questioning of stubborn assumptions, can flourish in an environment of the greatest freedom."

The words of Harper, Hutchins, Levi, and Gray capture both the spirit and the promise of the University of Chicago. Because the University is committed to free and open inquiry in all matters, it guarantees all members of the University community the broadest possible latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge, and learn. Except insofar as limitations on that freedom are necessary to the functioning of the University, the University of Chicago fully respects and supports the freedom of all members of the University community "to discuss any problem that presents itself."

Of course, the ideas of different members of the University community will often and quite naturally conflict. But it is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the University greatly values civility, and although all members of the University community share in the responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community.

The freedom to debate and discuss the merits of competing ideas does not, of course, mean that individuals may say whatever they wish, wherever they wish. The University may restrict expression that violates the law, that falsely defames a specific individual, that constitutes a genuine threat or harassment, that unjustifiably invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests, or that is otherwise directly incompatible with the functioning of the University. In addition, the University may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner of expression to ensure that it does not disrupt the ordinary activities of the University. But these are narrow exceptions to the general principle of freedom of expression, and it is vitally important that these exceptions never be used in a manner that is inconsistent with the University's commitment to a completely free and open discussion of ideas.

In a word, the University's fundamental commitment is to the principle that debate or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed. It is for the individual members of the University community, not for the University as an institution, to make those judgments for themselves, and to act on those judgments not by seeking to suppress speech, but by openly and vigorously contesting the ideas that they oppose. Indeed, fostering the ability of members of the University community to engage in such debate and deliberation in an effective and responsible manner is an essential part of the University's educational mission.

As a corollary to the University's commitment to protect and promote free expression, members of the University community must also act in conformity with the principle of free expression. Although members of the University community are free to criticize and contest the views expressed on campus, and to criticize and contest speakers who are invited to express their views on campus, they may not obstruct or otherwise interfere with the freedom of others to express

views they reject or even loathe. To this end, the University has a solemn responsibility not only to promote a lively and fearless freedom of debate and deliberation, but also to protect that freedom when others attempt to restrict it.

As Robert M. Hutchins observed, without a vibrant commitment to free and open inquiry, a university ceases to be a university. The University of Chicago's long-standing commitment to this principle lies at the very core of our University's greatness. That is our inheritance, and it is our promise to the future.

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