Lamb, Matthew, authorKasser, Jeffrey, advisorLosonsky, Michael, committee memberMacDonald, Bradley, committee memberKasser, Jeffrey, committee member2007-01-032007-01-032013http://hdl.handle.net/10217/80258The central question of the epistemology disagreement focuses on how, if at all, we should update our belief about p when we find ourselves party to a disagreement about p with someone whom we take to be our epistemic peer. In other words, how should we respond to disagreements with those whom we take to be just as intelligent, informed, free from bias, and likely to get things right in the field p occurs in? One response to this question, the Equal Weight View, holds that in typical cases of peer disagreements one is epistemically required to ascribe equal epistemic weight to each party's opinion and then split the difference between the two parties' respective degrees of belief. However, it is thought that the Equal Weight View faces a problem of being self-defeating, since there appear to be disagreements about the view amongst epistemic peers. Some proponents of the view have attempted to defuse this charge of self-defeat, but, as I will show, these attempts are less than satisfying. The aim of this project is to discuss the Equal Weight View's relation to the charge of self-defeat in hopes of sketching out a solution that is more promising than what has been put forth in the literature so far.born digitalmasters thesesengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.disagreementepistemologyequal weight viewself-defeatText