Keyzer, Jonathan, authorLosonsky, Michael, advisorKasser, Jeff, committee memberMacDonald, Brad, committee member2007-01-032007-01-032013http://hdl.handle.net/10217/80253This thesis clarifies the assumption that meaning is normative and defends this assumption from recent criticism by Anandi Hattiangadi and Akeel Bilgrami. Against Hattiangadi, I argue that the paradigmatic examples of moral and semantic obligations are strictly-speaking more like 'limit' hypotheticals in that having an obligation is contingent on some conditions, but these conditions are quite different than that those of the typical examples of means-end hypotheticals. I argue that the conditions relevant to limit hypotheticals are widely-satisfied by constitutive facts about beings with certain rational and linguistic competence like us. The 'limitation' is that being this kind of thing isn't something one chooses, but is a constitutive for what one is. Against Bilgrami, I argue that a meaning intention is a normative state of commitment. Having a meaning intention means that one is prepared to speak and being prepared to speak is something one must live up to by having and maintaining a plan. I argue that part of this plan is to make some minimal effort to be interpretable to others.born digitalmasters thesesengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.meaningKripkelanguagenormativityrule-followingWittgensteinText