Brekel, Josh, authorKasser, Jeff, advisorShockley, Kenneth, committee memberPrytherch, Ben, committee member2023-01-212023-01-212022https://hdl.handle.net/10217/235951Initially outlined by John Maynard Keynes in 1921, Keynesian weight is a measure intended to characterize evidence independently of probability. As a concept that is often immersed in confusion, Keynesian weight requires thorough philosophical explication prior to any sort of legitimate use in decision-making, legal proceedings, or scientific inquiry. In this thesis, I attempt to explicate Keynesian weight by arguing in favor of Jochen Runde's relative interpretation of Keynesian weight. The aim of Chapter 1 is to introduce the basic idea of Keynesian weight. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that Keynes's initial analysis of Keynesian weight creates an interpretative puzzle—two viable interpretations of Keynesian weight exist. Chapter 3 aims to solve the interpretative puzzle by consideration of how the interpretations of Keynesian weight respond to I.J. Good's criticism of Keynesian weight. Ultimately, I argue that Good's criticism demonstrates that the best interpretation of Keynesian weight is the relative interpretation.born digitalmasters thesesengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.higher-order evidenceprobabilityweight of evidenceKeynesBayesianweight of argumentText