Easley, William Eric, authorRollin, Bernard E., advisorKneller, Jane, committee memberVolbrecht, Vicki J., committee member2007-01-032007-01-032014http://hdl.handle.net/10217/83893In this thesis, I examine Kant's criterion for moral considerability in light of the intersection between the moral, critical, and epistemic principles Kant commits himself to and evidence of advanced cognitive capacities in non-human animals. As I argue, Kant's denial of crucial cognitive capacities in non-human animals represents a flawed attempt at applying a principle of parsimony which threatens to undermine the transcendental base of his theories. Further, expelling the anachronisms and human exceptionalism Kant fell victim to in his theories reveals a robust sense of ethical duties directly to non-human animals, beyond non-cruelty. In Chapter One, I argue that the basis of moral considerability in Kant's ethics ought to extend directly to non-human animals if they possess sufficient degrees of the three cognitive capacities that comprise dignity and the ability to meaningfully set ends: reason, autonomy, and self-consciousness. In Chapter Two, I examine Kant's cognitive theory and argue that it lacks a developmental account in terms of degrees of these capacities that is crucial to completing Kant's ethical project. In Chapters Three and Four, I develop a model for such an account based upon evidence and theories in the philosophy of mind and the sciences, concluding that many non-human animals do possess advanced cognitive capacities and the we, thus, have moral duties directly to most non-human animals.born digitalmasters thesesengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.cognitionanimal cognitionanimalsethicsKantself-consciousnessText