Maimone, Charles L., authorRollin, Bernard, advisorArchie, Andre, committee memberHickey, Matthew, committee member2015-08-272015-08-272015http://hdl.handle.net/10217/166971In this work I argue that David Hume's classification of the virtue of justice as artificial is mistaken, and propose that the possibility of the existence of a natural virtue of justice should be taken seriously within Hume's moral framework. In the first chapter of this work, I present Hume's moral theory, with a focus on Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues. In the second chapter, I argue that Hume's certainty concerning the classification of justice as an artificial virtue is mistaken, and offer a positive account of the possibility of a natural origin, and ultimately a natural virtue of justice. In the third chapter I will entertain possible objections Hume might offer to my argumentation, and offer responses accordingly.born digitalmasters thesesengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.HumenaturalartificialpropertyjusticeText