Williams, Stephen G., authorArchie, Andre, advisorMacKenzie, Mattthew, committee memberChong, Edwin, committee member2018-09-102018-09-102018https://hdl.handle.net/10217/191367Skepticism as a philosophical school of thought is best embodied by Greek Pyrrhonism and Indian Madhyamaka. Between these two schools, however, Pyrrhonism is bogged down on issues that Madhyamaka is not. For Greek Pyrrhonism, scholarship revolves around the issue that skeptics cannot have beliefs, and yet this is something they believe. For Indian Madhyamaka, scholarship points towards a skeptical position that is consistently paradoxical. This paper will first explore the discussion on Sextus Empiricus' Pyrrhonism as established by Michael Frede, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes. From there, a closer look at Aristotle, Anselm, and Immanuel Kant will show that paradoxes are more common in philosophy than normally acknowledged. An in-depth discussion of Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva's Madhyamaka skepticism using interpretations from Jay Garfield and Graham Priest will illustrate how paradoxes at the limits of thought can correctly capture skepticism. Using the understanding of Madhyamaka, the debate on Pyrrhonism and beliefs will be shown to be correctly paradoxical. Finally, the paper will conclude that skepticism itself not only paradoxical, but an impressive and valuable philosophical position.born digitalmasters thesesengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.MadhyamakaPyrrhonianskepticismparadoxPyrrhonismBuddhismText