Bramblett, Russell, authorVasudevan, Ramaa, advisorBernasek, Alexandra, committee memberBraunstein, Elissa, committee memberStevis, Dimitris, committee member2018-01-172018-01-172017https://hdl.handle.net/10217/185768Are Sanctions Motivated by Protectionism: This paper attempts to answer the question, "are sanctions the U.S. imposes on foreign countries motivated by trade protectionism"? Using sanctions votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2005-2015 and industry data within a given Congressional District, the empirical analysis indicates that with some types of sanctions bills and certain industries, Representatives' votes may be affected by the prevalence of industries within their district. The Necessary Conditions for Environmental Sanctions: Drawing from current environmental economics literature, this paper looks at the necessary conditions for carbon abatement and models the path to optimal carbon abatement using a country-level welfare-maximization model to illustrate the effects of pollution awareness on consumption optimization. This paper finds that social marketing is necessary for a country to increase its welfare by imposing environmental sanctions. A Time-Series Analysis of U.S. Sanctions Imposed from 1990 to 2015: Using time-series analysis and forecasting, this paper assesses the effects of sanctions using a dataset of U.S. imposed sanctions from 1990-2015. The analysis indicates that, 1. GDP is a good predictor of development assistance after a sanction, 2. export dependence is a good predictor of military expenditures after a sanction, and 3. contrary to previous research, constrained democracies are affected more by sanctions than pure democracies.born digitaldoctoral dissertationsengCopyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.protectionismsanctions votingenvironmental sanctionstrade protectionsanctionsText