Department of Philosophy

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https://hdl.handle.net/10217/100483

These digital collections contain theses, dissertations, and faculty publications from the Department of Philosophy. Also included is a collection of works by Rolston Holmes III, a philosopher who is a University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State University, known for his contributions to environmental ethics and the relationship between science and religion.

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Now showing 1 - 20 of 594

Open Access
A chronicle: Prof. Holmes Rolston, III, 2003 Templeton Prize Laureate
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2003) Small, Barbara, author; John Templeton Foundation, publisher
New York Press Conference, March 19, 2004, United Nations Church Center -- Presentation of Holmes Rolston by Jack Templeton and Rolston response -- London, Buckingham Palace, May 7, 2003, Prince Philip presents the prize to Rolston -- Rolston press statement and John Polkinghorne response -- Templeton Prize judges and previous laureates.
Open Access
A defense of Buddhist virtue ethics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Hamblin, Jack, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Becker, Christian, committee member
In Chapter 1, I describe necessary dimensions of Buddhist ethics. I comment on and argue for the inclusion of the four noble truths, meditation, the four immeasurable virtues, and regulating emotion. In Chapter 2, I establish the viability of virtue ethics. I review virtue ethics from an historical perspective, look at and answer a critique of the virtues, and distinguish my version of virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology. In Chapter 3, I defend Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics. I argue that a virtue ethical interpretation of Buddhism is the most reasonable of the Western interpretations, that a virtue ethical interpretation is compatible with a non-Western approach, and finally implement the necessary dimensions from the first chapter to put forward a plausible account of Buddhist virtue ethics.
Open Access
A defense of emotions in evolutionary epistemology
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) Van, Minh-Tu, author; Rice, Collin, advisor; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member
Current literature in evolutionary epistemology places a kind of epistemic 'rationality', guided by evolution, as the primary consideration or rationale that directs whether and how we acquire knowledge. Foundational works by the likes of Donald Campbell, Konrad Lorenz, and Sir Karl Popper paved the grounds of evolutionary epistemology by prioritizing natural selection's role within theories of knowledge. By recognizing and understanding the significance of humans' niche within the biological world, it better informs us of the aims of evolutionary epistemology. My thesis aims to incorporate emotions in the understanding and development of evolutionary epistemology. My arguments stem from the idea that emotions are an innate and biological response that have an epistemically significant evolutionary history while also concurrently conferring epistemic advantages. With much of the current discussion focused on evolutionary 'rationality' sans emotion, there is much left to be desired in evolutionary epistemology: I believe evolutionary epistemology is missing an evaluation and incorporation of our emotional systems that shape and influence epistemic aims. While evolutionary epistemologists allude to emotions' significance and relevance through other causal mechanisms, there is little discussion of how emotions explicitly affect and interact with our epistemic processes. The overall aim of my thesis is to stress the epistemic contribution that emotions would have to the current developments within evolutionary epistemology and its fittingness within the scope of evolutionary epistemology's aims as currently construed. I first summarize evolutionary epistemology using the works of Campbell, Lorenz, and Popper and explicate what evolutionary 'rationality' entails. Then, I explore some epistemic roles emotions play within important features extrapolated from an evolutionary 'rationality': epistemic fallibility and epistemic creativity. I argue that evolutionary epistemology benefits from an investigation and application of emotions to these features because their role reinforces the same aims that evolutionary epistemology strive to achieve. To wrap things up, I lay out implications and future directions of accepting my defense. I ultimately contend that a more serious consideration of emotions within evolutionary epistemology would only elucidate a fuller comprehension of our naturalized knowledge; not only will we learn more about what human knowledge is construed as, but we will also learn more about how the construction of knowledge, for and by evolved humans, ought to be produced.
Open Access
A forest ethic and multivalue forest management: the integrity of forests and of foresters are bound together
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1991) Coufal, James E., author; Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author; Society of American Foresters, publisher
The Society of American Foresters (SAF) has long had an ethic of using forests to benefit society. Now many foresters, prompted by Aldo Leopold and his land ethic, are wondering if SAF does not need a forest ethic, respecting the integrity of natural systems, to complement its ethic for society. Forests are communities as well as commodities. Forest management ought to expand from an ethical of multiple use to one of protecting multiple values found in forests.
Open Access
A gallery of the Templeton Laureates from 1973-2018, including Holmes Rolston
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2018) Templeton Foundation, photographer
Poster featuring the Templeton Laureates from 1973-2018.
Open Access
A hinge point of history
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2010) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author; Trinity University Press, publisher
We live at a change of epochs. We enter a new era: the Anthropocene. From this point on, culture more than nature is the principal determinant of Earth's future. We are passing into a century when this will be increasingly obvious and this puts us at a hinge point of history. For some this is cause for congratulation, the fulfillment of our destiny as a species. For others this is cause for concern. We worried throughout much of the past century that humans would destroy themselves in interhuman conflict. The worry for the next century is that if our present heading is uncorrected, humans may ruin their planet and themselves along with it. Paradoxes and challenges confront and confound us in this new era. Although we congratulate ourselves on our powers, perhaps humans are not well equipped to manage the sorts of global-level problems we face. And yet, this wonderland Earth is a planet with promise. If we are to realize the abundant life for all time, both policy and ethics must enlarge the scope of concern.
Open Access
A managed Earth and the end of nature?
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1999) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author; JAI Press, publisher
Humans increasingly see themselves as the planetary mangers. Perhaps nature is at an end? Natural history has been overtaken by human engineering. Others seek a revised account by which human activity is, or should be, natural. The ideal of nature, absent humans, ought to be replaced with an ideal in which the human presence is also natural. A postmodern claim is that nature always wears for us a human face. But nature neither is, or ought to be, ended. Humans belong on Earth, but nature ought also be an end in itself.
Open Access
A metaphysical answer to the appropriateness question in aesthetics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2021) LaRose, Gabriella, author; Romagni, Domenica, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Hughes, Kit, committee member
The aim of this project is to give a new, descriptive answer to the appropriateness question in aesthetics. The appropriateness question asks how is it appropriate for ethical value to affect aesthetic value in aesthetic cases? I give a two-step argument for a metaphysical relationship between ethical content and aesthetic experience which is conditional on ethical content being aesthetically relevant and narrative being present. I argue that there is an inherence relationship between ethical content and narrative, where the former inheres in the latter. This relation holds in virtue of the mutual dependence between ethical content and narrative. I then use Noel Carroll's content approach to aesthetic experience to argue aesthetic experience supervenes on narrative content. This supervenient relationship captures the emergence of aesthetic experience while retaining the spirit of Carroll's discussion of aesthetic experience. Ultimately, I argue that because narrative is a feature of aesthetic experience and further because ethical content is a feature of narrative, there is a metaphysical relationship between ethical content and aesthetic experience. Simply, when a narrative exists (even an imagined narrative) and moral content is present, then a metaphysical relationship will exist between ethical content and aesthetic experience.
Open Access
A natural deduction relevance logic
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1977) Johnson, Fred (Frederick A.), author; Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sceinces, publisher
Open Access
A new environmental ethics: the next millennium for life on Earth - 1st edition (2012) and 2nd edition (2020)
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2020) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author
The First Edition guaranteed "to put you in your place." Beyond that, the Second Edition asks whether you want to live a "denatured life on a denatured planet."
Open Access
A philosopher gone wild (Karnos)
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1993) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author; Oxford University Press, publisher
Rolston found that, loving wisdom, he had to quarrel with Socrates, taking a natural turn. Indeed he found that he had to quarrel with the three disciplines he most loved: science, philosophy, and theology. None of them appropriately valued nature, which he had learned to love from the cradle in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia and continuing as he became in his early adult years a naturalist in the Southern Appalachians. He became increasingly convinced of the intrinsic values in nature and equally dismayed by environmental degradation there. That led him to become a founder of environmental ethics. No one can really become a philosopher, loving wisdom, without caring for these sources in which we live, move, and have our being, the community of life on Earth.
Open Access
A philosopher gone wild: CSU professor makes peace between God and science — and wins the world's most generous prize
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2003-04) Campbell, Greg, interviewer and author; Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, interviewee
Dr. Holmes Rolston is interviewed by Greg Campbell in April 2003. Dr. Holmes Rolston will receive the Templeton Prize, valued at more than $1 million, on May 7 in London's Buckingham Palace from Prince Philip. He will use the money to endow a chair in his name at his alma mater, Davidson College in North Carolina, in the fields of science and religion. His studies in philosophy of science, in evolutionary and ecosystem science, and as an accomplished biologist have made Rolston the leading voice for protecting biodiversity — not only out of respect for nature, but also due to religious obligation. He already has carved on his future tombstone this epitaph: "Philosopher Gone Wild." That's his life well-lived.
Open Access
A rationally-rooted responsibility toward nonhuman animals
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2020) Webber, Matthew J., author; Rollin, Bernard, advisor; Gorin, Moti, committee member; Edwards-Callaway, Lily, committee member
How should humans treat nonhuman animals? One answer to this question arises from the belief that humans are superior to nonhuman animals, thereby giving humans a right to treat nonhuman animals however humans desire. In this paper, I argue that, while perhaps not superior in all categories, humans can be understood as rationally superior to nonhuman animals. To do this, I rely on Immanuel Kant's definition of practical rationality as the ability for an individual to set for oneself one's own ends or telos. Granting this type of rational superiority to humans, I argue that being rationally superior does not entail that humans have a right to treat nonhuman animals however humans desire, but that humans are limited by certain natural teleological factors. These teleological factors may be general to all animal life—both human and nonhuman as characterized in the Kantian notion of tierheit—or specific to each species and embodied by individuals of a species. Nonhuman animals deserve to be treated accordingly, and treating a nonhuman animal in a manner contrary to the embodied telos not only violates their telos, but is itself unreasonable, irrational, and immoral. I conclude by demonstrating what responsible treatment of nonhuman animals would look like when rooted in human rationality, as well as the motivation behind such morally responsible actions.
Open Access
A remarkably free man
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2016-09-04) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, speaker; First Presbyterian Church, producer
Sermon at First Presbyterian Church, Fort Collins, September 4, 2016. Humans cherish freedom. Americans live in "the land of the free and the home of the brave." College students, on leaving home, are free to do their thing. Many who consider themselves uninterested in religion are keenly interested in being free. Jesus, as recounted in the gospels, is a remarkably free man. Though a Galilean peasant, he moved freely among high and lower levels of social status, quick to be forthright and to cut to the quick in criticism. He revised and transformed both Hebrew and Greek thought, founded a great world faith, and is worshipped by billions of persons. He challenged Herod and the Roman tyranny of his day, also the Hebrew Scriptures and religious authorities. He was little concerned for his own physical needs, health, welfare, or security, though showing great compassion for others in need. He went to his death, afraid, a prisoner, yet freely, under the authority of his divine calling. His followers have in him a model for more genuine human freedom.
Open Access
A sophisticated logic of enhancement: a disability-sensitive, welfare-maximizing stance in philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2024) Law, David Benjamin, author; Gorin, Moti, advisor; McShane, Katie, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee member
Julain Savulescu and Guy Kahane have developed a compelling yet controversial set of arguments that provide a theoretical and action-guiding grounding for the fields of medicine and procreative ethics. In medicine, they argue that medicine should do much more than merely treat patients; instead, it should "enhance" them to enjoy the greatest possible welfare. They argue that enhancement is justified by the same moral principles that justify treating patients in a medical setting. Similarly, in procreative ethics, they contend that when pre-natal selection is available, a similar welfare-maximizing principle should inform what children we should bring into existence. They argue that the "most advantaged child" among those that could be selected ought to be selected. There is something deeply compelling about these arguments but also deeply concerning; we should, of course, want the greatest welfare for ourselves, others, and our children, but we should also worry that accomplishing these ends via medicine and procreative selection may be using inappropriate means, relay implicit prejudices, or even constitute a kind of eugenics. In this thesis, I interrogate Savulescu and Kahane's arguments for the logic of enhancement and argue that a compelling and largely cohesive view emerges that has significant implications for the philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics. The view is, however, imperfect. Several adjustments and compromises must be made to make the view fully cohesive and to accommodate the highly compelling arguments made by disability rights theorists. In suggesting these adjustments and compromises, I ultimately defend the logic of enhancement from its most potent objections and contend that it is a highly illuminating view for ethical and theoretical work in the philosophy of medicine and procreative ethics.
Open Access
A three-valued interpretation for a relevance logic
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1976-09) Johnson, Fred (Frederick A.), author; Department of Philosophical Studies, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, publisher
In this paper an entailment relation which holds between certain propositions of the propositional calculus will be defined both syntactically and semantically. Some theorems about this relation will show why one could not follow Lewis to prove that a contradiction entails, for the notion of entailment discussed below, every proposition.
Open Access
A very confusing problem: interpreting Keynesian weight
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2022) Brekel, Josh, author; Kasser, Jeff, advisor; Shockley, Kenneth, committee member; Prytherch, Ben, committee member
Initially outlined by John Maynard Keynes in 1921, Keynesian weight is a measure intended to characterize evidence independently of probability. As a concept that is often immersed in confusion, Keynesian weight requires thorough philosophical explication prior to any sort of legitimate use in decision-making, legal proceedings, or scientific inquiry. In this thesis, I attempt to explicate Keynesian weight by arguing in favor of Jochen Runde's relative interpretation of Keynesian weight. The aim of Chapter 1 is to introduce the basic idea of Keynesian weight. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that Keynes's initial analysis of Keynesian weight creates an interpretative puzzle—two viable interpretations of Keynesian weight exist. Chapter 3 aims to solve the interpretative puzzle by consideration of how the interpretations of Keynesian weight respond to I.J. Good's criticism of Keynesian weight. Ultimately, I argue that Good's criticism demonstrates that the best interpretation of Keynesian weight is the relative interpretation.
Open Access
Adaptive disembodiment: towards an enactivist theory of body schematic sensorimotor autonomy
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) White, Halie Elizabeth, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Rice, Collin, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member
The enactivist approach to embodied cognition relies on a non-reductive biological naturalism that is recursive at higher levels of complexity in living systems. In addressing an account of cognition, I will consider Xabier Barandiaran's objection that biological autonomy properly sets biological norms but under-specifies sensorimotor normativity. Barandiaran suggests the implementation of pluralist autonomy to the meta-pattern of organization in the enactivist agent that becomes recapitulated. By forming an account of sensorimotor autonomy, we can then specify normativity at the sensorimotor (cognitive) level. In consideration of this issue, I will propose the body schema functions to provide sensorimotor autonomy to the embodied subject through motor stability and thus functions to specify normativity at the sensorimotor level. This then allows for what enactivists term 'sense-making' in terms of enacting affordance structures. The position I take within the enactivist frame is thus a pluralist autonomist view on cognition. I go on to consider how this view bears on cognitive case studies often addressed in body schema literature. Drawing primarily from the work of Shaun Gallagher, body schema interacts with and develops body image through primary and secondary intersubjective capacities. I argue that body image is intersubjectively constructed through joint attention, thus invoking considerations of one's social milieu. This consideration shifts the discussion to address how the pluralist autonomist enactivist, through body schema and body image interaction, can account for alterations of the body schema due to distortions in one's body image that result from oppression. This pluralist autonomist enactivist theory provides three benefits for understanding these alterations: (1) enactivism begins with a fundamental postulate that individuals are embedded in a world; (2) in distinguishing between different levels of autonomy, we can thus discuss different forms of normative interaction with the environment; (3) and finally, with differentiated forms of normativity, we can thus differentiate and track different modes of adaptation an embodied subject can take when faced with various sorts of perturbations. I argue that disembodiment can be seen as an adaptation of the body schema in relation to hostile environments where stigma targets the body image. This hostile environment does not allow one's comfortable and normative navigation of the world due to the hypervisibility of the body. I explore this case of adaptive disembodiment through fatphobia and public weight stigma.
Open Access
Aesthetic experience in forests
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 1998) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author; Wiley-Blackwell (Firm), publisher
Forests are aesthetically challenging because of the sense of deep time, experiencing an archetype of creation. Forests are both perennial and dynamic. Appropriate aesthetic encounter requires knowledge of scientific natural history, necessary though not sufficient for intense, multisensory, participatory engagement when persons, immersed in forests, live their aesthetic experiences. Forests, although naturalized, are experienced as sublime, evoking the sense of the sacred. Aesthetic appreciation in forests radically differs from that appropriate for artworks.
Open Access
Aesthetics in the swamps
(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2000) Rolston, Holmes, 1932-, author; Johns Hopkins University Press, publisher
Wetlands are misunderstood landscapes, typically experienced negatively as swamps, sloughs, and mires. Understanding wetlands ecology, knowledge of specialized flora there, their unusual adaptations, and their diversity can enrich aesthetic appreciation of these landscapes. Aesthetic experiences include a sense of the primeval, admiration for ingenious and odd solutions to the challenges of wetlands living, of life persisting in the midst of its perpetual perishing.

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