Browsing by Author "MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member"
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Item Open Access Ethical realism and the Darwinian Dilemma(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2012) Rabinowitz, Aaron, author; Tropman, Elizabeth, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Hickey, Matthew, committee memberIn this thesis, I will examine a recent objection against ethical realism put forth by Sharon Street, a prominent advocate of ethical constructivism. Street's Darwinian Dilemma argues that ethical realism is incompatible with evolutionary psychology and that attempts to reconcile the two theories will result in the unacceptable epistemic conclusion that humans lack ethical knowledge. Street believes that the Darwinian Dilemma provides a strong reason for abandoning ethical realism in favor of ethical constructivism. It is my contention that the ethical realist can successfully defend herself against Street's objection. I will consider several possible responses that are available to the ethical realist for defusing the Darwinian Dilemma, including my preferred response which I believe has largely been neglected in the literature. I will argue that these responses provide the ethical realist with a functional defense against Street's challenge, and that ethical realism therefore remains superior to ethical constructivism.Item Open Access Hinduism in the Internet Age: a psychological anthropological study of cultural collisions and Rajasthani emerging adults' well-being(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2017) Else, Robert James, author; Snodgrass, Jeffrey G., advisor; Browne, Katherine E., committee member; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee memberAs the world globalizes at an ever quickening pace, it becomes increasingly important to understand the ways in which potentially competing cultural ideas come into contact with one another, alongside the possible repercussions of such interactions. This research looks at a particular example of this in the Indian city of Udaipur, Rajasthan via an ethnographic field study of Hindu university students' views on Hindu religious traditions and what it means to be a "good Hindu" in modern India, as well as how religious ideas intersect with valuations of the internet in a rapidly globalizing nation. A psychological anthropological perspective, and specifically a cognitive anthropological "cultural models" or "mental representations" approach, allows for the identification of culture-specific understandings of Hinduism and the internet, as well as how these understandings interact with one another to both form identity and impact stress and subjective well-being among emerging adults. Relying on both qualitative and quantitative data analysis, the relationship between religiously- and technologically-informed models is found to be either competing, complementary, or independent. While the majority of Hindu university students in Udaipur don't consider these two models to be at odds with one another, this research suggests that for those Hindu university students who consider these models to be competing, there is a statistically significant increase in self-reported stress.Item Open Access Mind and world in Kant's Theory of Sensation(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Murski, Jessica, author; Kneller, Jane, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Clegg, Benjamin, committee memberIn examining sensation as Kant presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and understanding the problems exemplified in the debate which has arisen surrounding this topic, it becomes clear that Kant believed the objective world to be a product of the mind. This discussion of sensation follows three main themes: (i) the nature of sensation, (ii) the form of sensation and its contribution in determining the spatial properties of objects and (iii) the role of sensation in achieving object-directed cognition. In the first chapter I will present Kant’s view on sensation as it relates to each of these themes. In the second chapter, I will explore the conflict that seems to arise between the nature of sensation and its form and function in the cognitive process. I examine three proposed solutions to this conflict as they are presented by Rolf George, Lorne Falkenstein, and Apaar Kumar. George presents a constructivist account of sensation, while Falkenstein argues that sensations must be physical events in the body of the perceiver. Kumar provides clear evidence from Kant’s writing that Falkenstein’s position is unavailable to Kant and instead proposes a non-constructivist view of sensation. Understanding these concerns helps to highlight a different requirement of sensation in Kant’s cognitive theory. Finally, in the third chapter I provide evidence that Kant took the spatial form of the objective world to be a product of the human mind rather than something that exists “in itself.” This perspective shows why each of the concerns presented in chapter two are important. However, they arise because of the fundamental misunderstanding that Kant took the spatial properties of the external world to exist in its own right, before or aside from human consciousness. I will show how a correct understanding of the relationship between the mind and the external world in Kant’s theory can resolve the conflicts that seem to arise in his theory of sensation.Item Open Access Radical enhancement as a moral status de-enhancer(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2020) Gray, Jesse, author; Gorin, Moti, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Rhodes, Matthew, committee memberHuman enhancement has worried many thinkers. Some have focused on the potential harms that may befall us, should we walk the path of enhancement. One such harm may be that enhancements serve to undermine our unique human dignity. I argue that the concept of human dignity is better replaced by that of moral status. Others have worried that radical enhancements—those enhancements that give us abilities greatly outside our species typical functioning will lead to a new moral status. I argue that the sorts of enhancements we are likely to seek, namely direct mental state control, will give us reason to think the enhanced will have a moral status subordinate to our own. Finally, I argue that despite the radically enhanced not existing, we still have obligations to create them. I call this the competing known identity problem. Assuming some persons will exist in the future, we have reasons to create the best versions of these persons.Item Open Access The Confucian self: an inquiry into the social foundations of Kongzi's Analects(Colorado State University. Libraries, 2024) Stahel, Vanessa, author; Harris, Eirik, advisor; MacKenzie, Matthew, committee member; Erickson, Peter, committee memberWithin ancient Chinese philosophy, the Analects of Kongzi is one of the most widely studied texts, having been read, re-read, and drawn upon for centuries. The text can offer worthwhile insights on its own grounds and may also provide a source of relevant discourse for contemporary investigations. The project at hand is an attempt to construct a plausible and consistent interpretation of the Analects, one which illuminates Kongzi's underlying conception of the self. To ground the text on an internally consistent interpretation, we will first look to two fundamental concepts within the text, li and ren. After establishing this groundwork, we will look more closely at Kongzi's conception of the self by examining his account of moral self-cultivation. As it will turn out, Kongzi's conception of the self is deeply relational; moral cultivation can only take place within a society and is performed for the purpose of bringing about the flourishing of both the individual and the community. We will conclude by offering some insights regarding the comparative possibilities between Kongzi's conception of the self and contemporary feminist theories of selfhood.