Repository logo

Browsing by Author "Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    A defense of emotions in evolutionary epistemology
    (Colorado State University. Libraries, 2023) Van, Minh-Tu, author; Rice, Collin, advisor; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member; Snodgrass, Jeffrey, committee member
    Current literature in evolutionary epistemology places a kind of epistemic 'rationality', guided by evolution, as the primary consideration or rationale that directs whether and how we acquire knowledge. Foundational works by the likes of Donald Campbell, Konrad Lorenz, and Sir Karl Popper paved the grounds of evolutionary epistemology by prioritizing natural selection's role within theories of knowledge. By recognizing and understanding the significance of humans' niche within the biological world, it better informs us of the aims of evolutionary epistemology. My thesis aims to incorporate emotions in the understanding and development of evolutionary epistemology. My arguments stem from the idea that emotions are an innate and biological response that have an epistemically significant evolutionary history while also concurrently conferring epistemic advantages. With much of the current discussion focused on evolutionary 'rationality' sans emotion, there is much left to be desired in evolutionary epistemology: I believe evolutionary epistemology is missing an evaluation and incorporation of our emotional systems that shape and influence epistemic aims. While evolutionary epistemologists allude to emotions' significance and relevance through other causal mechanisms, there is little discussion of how emotions explicitly affect and interact with our epistemic processes. The overall aim of my thesis is to stress the epistemic contribution that emotions would have to the current developments within evolutionary epistemology and its fittingness within the scope of evolutionary epistemology's aims as currently construed. I first summarize evolutionary epistemology using the works of Campbell, Lorenz, and Popper and explicate what evolutionary 'rationality' entails. Then, I explore some epistemic roles emotions play within important features extrapolated from an evolutionary 'rationality': epistemic fallibility and epistemic creativity. I argue that evolutionary epistemology benefits from an investigation and application of emotions to these features because their role reinforces the same aims that evolutionary epistemology strive to achieve. To wrap things up, I lay out implications and future directions of accepting my defense. I ultimately contend that a more serious consideration of emotions within evolutionary epistemology would only elucidate a fuller comprehension of our naturalized knowledge; not only will we learn more about what human knowledge is construed as, but we will also learn more about how the construction of knowledge, for and by evolved humans, ought to be produced.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Saving the Equal Weight View from itself: a modest approach to strong conciliation
    (Colorado State University. Libraries, 2013) Lamb, Matthew, author; Kasser, Jeffrey, advisor; Losonsky, Michael, committee member; MacDonald, Bradley, committee member; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member
    The central question of the epistemology disagreement focuses on how, if at all, we should update our belief about p when we find ourselves party to a disagreement about p with someone whom we take to be our epistemic peer. In other words, how should we respond to disagreements with those whom we take to be just as intelligent, informed, free from bias, and likely to get things right in the field p occurs in? One response to this question, the Equal Weight View, holds that in typical cases of peer disagreements one is epistemically required to ascribe equal epistemic weight to each party's opinion and then split the difference between the two parties' respective degrees of belief. However, it is thought that the Equal Weight View faces a problem of being self-defeating, since there appear to be disagreements about the view amongst epistemic peers. Some proponents of the view have attempted to defuse this charge of self-defeat, but, as I will show, these attempts are less than satisfying. The aim of this project is to discuss the Equal Weight View's relation to the charge of self-defeat in hopes of sketching out a solution that is more promising than what has been put forth in the literature so far.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    The problems of mental causation and pluralist alternatives
    (Colorado State University. Libraries, 2015) Hoffmann, Stephanie Lee, author; MacKenzie, Matthew, advisor; Kasser, Jeffrey, committee member; Richards, Tracy, committee member
    The mental causation literature tends towards certain presuppositions, including the tacit endorsement of physicalism, causal closure, and reductionism. Insofar as justification for these philosophical positions is offered at all, it is typically claimed that they are grounded in actual scientific practice. However, there are good reasons to believe that actual science does not support these philosophical positions. In this work, I consider some reasons to deny physicalism and causal closure, and critically present and evaluate pluralistic alternatives to reductionism. In light of this discussion, the problem of mental causation takes on an interesting and promising new form.