

THESIS

WHITENESS, ANGER, AND ANTI-RACIST PEDAGOGY: TOWARD A RACED
THEORY OF EMOTION

Submitted by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

WHITENESS, ANGER, AND ANTI-RACIST PEDAGOGY: TOWARD A RACED THEORY OF EMOTION

This thesis examines the political and rhetorical functions of white racial anger in the anti-racist first-year composition course. Elizabeth Spelman poses a generative question: "[w]hy has anger been appropriated by and for dominant group or beings when in so many other ways emotions are thought to be the province of subordinate groups?" (264). Further, this thesis questions why the anger of white men has become so common and persuasive in and through racial discourses? To address these questions and to explore pedagogical strategies to address white racial anger in the anti-racist composition classroom, this thesis seeks to investigate and build upon the connections and overlaps (or gaps) between anti-racist pedagogy and critical emotion studies.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
1: Review of Literature: Toward a Raced Theory of Emotion	7
2: "Don't Judge Me:" Whiteness, Anger, and the Rhetoric of Civility	24
3: Stickiness, Undeserving "Others," and the Objects of White Racial Anger	54
Conclusion	80
Works Cited	97

Introduction

My fear of anger taught me nothing. Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing also.

-Audre Lorde (*Sister Outsider* 124).

White rage is acceptable, can be both expressed and condoned, but black rage has no place and everyone knows it.

-bell hooks (*Killing Rage* 15).

Philosopher Allison Jaggar has identified emotional hegemony as the process through which dominant groups delimit appropriate, and, conversely, inappropriate emotional constitutions. As emotion is closely connected with cognition and judgment, emotional hegemony further impacts which emotional economies have epistemic potential. In most cases, for example, the public expression of anger represents a breach of civility and proper behavior. We are taught to avoid anger in public, and we are often outcast if we express anger at the wrong objects. It is not a coincidence, then, that women and people of color have been identified as being *overly* angry. However, as I have worked with this project, I constantly returned to one question: Why, if emotion rules clearly label anger as inappropriate, do whites, and especially white men, express it with such vigor against claims of racism, sexism, etc? That is why, following bell hooks' knowing statement, are the public utterances of anger by white men persuasive in political, and especially racial discourses, when the anger of women and people of color is deemed inappropriate?

The answer must lie somewhere in the subversive potential of anger. Black Power and Feminist groups have used it to intervene in white supremacy and patriarchy. Malcolm X used his rage to *move* people of color into action but also to make whites uncomfortable with a segregated and deeply racist society. As Audre Lorde points out in "Uses of Anger," "[a]nger is loaded with information and energy" (127). Further, hooks recalls that through confronting her own rage against racism and "witnessing the way it moved [her] to grow and change," she "understood intimately that it had the potential not only to destroy but also to construct" (16). hooks goes on to explain "rage to be a necessary aspect of resistance struggle" (16). Yes, the question of the disparate public sanctioning of anger must lie in its subversive potential.

As both a student and teacher at a largely white, middle-class university, I have often witnessed the expression of anger against anti-racist, feminist, and multi-cultural classroom materials, readings, conversations, and perspectives. Far too often, this anger shuts down class discussion, and worse, it works to silence oppositional views. As a teacher, I have been made uncomfortable by the expression of this anger, and due to this ensuing fear I have often failed to take it up as a pedagogical opportunity. One such occasion was in a first-year composition course, when a succession of students expressed anger towards Gloria Anzaldúa's "How to Tame a Wild Tongue." In an attempt to maintain order, I redirected discussion to another aspect of Anzaldúa's article. My choice is understandable; however, I am still left with the question of why the expression of anger by whites is rhetorically effective in silencing opposition, and opposing anger.

Really this question is one of power. Sara Ahmed asks a similarly important question: "Why are relations of power so intractable and enduring, even in the face of

collective forms of resistance?" (12). Of course, Ahmed has already posited the answer. It has to do with emotional hegemony, with the interconnectivity of emotion and reason. The answer also has to do with the rhetorical function of emotions. Anger, as expressed by the dominant group, works powerfully to silence counter-discourse. Strangely, this anger is not always marked as such. From this insight, I am fascinated by the opportunities that lie in addressing this anger. That is, what pedagogical opportunities may arise if teachers take student anger as a serious object of study, and seek to negotiate that anger, rather than manage it—via avoidance—in the way I had? Would this allow for a more thorough interrogation of the dominant discourses that this anger protects? Would this stop the rhetorical silencing of counter-discourse, and those whose views do not mesh with the dominant stories we tell?

These are the questions I will seek to address in this thesis. Following the important work done by many scholars, I will argue that anti-racist pedagogy has not sufficiently considered the emotional realm, and further, that critically negotiating student anger may allow us to capitalize on the subversive power of that anger while minimizing its silencing effects. Through this work I hope to offer pedagogical implications to further challenge white supremacy, and to help reclaim the territory of emotions.

Due to the constraints of space, I will focus primarily on white student anger, or more precisely on the connection between whiteness and racial anger, rather than on the additional objects—the emotional constitutions of teachers, and that of the texts assigned to the class to examine—of this anger's circulation. I will, however, consider how student anger works rhetorically to situate whiteness with "innocence" and post-racial

ideals, while working to silence the oppositional claims of racism, which often may be accompanied by the expression of anger.

This partial focus necessarily means that this project is incomplete. For example, with more time and space, I might investigate how the emotional constitutions and expressions of teachers impact and affect the circulation of white racial anger. For example, Michalinos Zembylas' ethnographic work has examined "the complexities of 'emotional rules' in teaching and explor[es] the role of emotional practices through which 'teacher identity' is constituted" (936). Similarly, in "Class Affects, Classroom Affections: Working through the paradoxes of Strategic Empathy," Julie Lindquist investigates "how teachers might perform emotional engagements that students find authentic and valuable within scenes of literacy instruction" (188). In examining the emotional constitutions and expressions of teachers, we might better understand and address the emotional labor performed by both student and instructor. Further, as I will discuss in Chapter Three, we might theorize how teachers can perform emotional engagements which promote discomfort and dissensus rather than affective communities surrounding "good" feelings of interracial unity.

From the specific context of students' emotional constitutions and expressions, then, I will investigate the performative, discursive, and rhetorical functions of white racial anger, as encountered in the first-year composition course which practices anti-racist pedagogy. The following questions will structure this investigation:

- If race functions, indeed, at least in part rhetorically, how does a performance of emotional rules mark a body as white, and, how does this performance align whiteness with innocence and post-racial ideals?

I am fascinated by what anger *does* in and through racist discourses. Specifically, I plan to investigate how white racial anger functions through the sticking of signs to other signs, objects and bodies. For example, during conversations of race-conscious remedies, I will consider how student anger functions by sticking signs of cultural deficiency to bodies of color, thereby reproducing the "innocence" of whiteness.

- In this way, I wonder, what is at stake in putting forth a *raced* theory of affect and emotion? How does white racial anger function in and through racist discourses?

Lastly, working toward change is at the heart of this project. Following the work of Jennifer Siebel Trainor and others, I will argue that anti-racist pedagogies have relied too heavily upon privilege-as-property metaphors, and on rational investigations of whiteness. Further, following Dale Jabobs and Laura Micciche, we might better consider how the persuasive character of emotions enable and disable change (2). While many scholars have considered the reactive implementations of liberal calls for tolerance and racial sensitivity, less attention has been given to the political problems of empathy. When emotions such as anger are discussed, they are typically labeled as a mere disruption of rational deliberation, or as a danger of the critical classroom. Instead, I believe we need to undertake more nuanced discussions of the political and rhetorical functions of emotions such as anger.

- I wonder, then, what new insights might be gained by supplementing anti-racist composition pedagogies with a critical framework to negotiate white racial anger? That is, what new opportunities might be developed by addressing, rather than managing, white students' anger toward anti-racist material?

To best address these questions and to examine how racial performance and emotional guidelines are at work in the everyday, and further, how emotional hegemony functions, I will offer personal examples and narrative illustrations. Of course, such narratives are open to multiple and conflicting interpretations, and my account represents just one such interpretation. With that in mind, I have aimed to always contextualize these narratives in the hope that readers will talk back to, challenge, or supplement them. In this way, I hope to merely open new lines of discussion surrounding emotion, and anger specifically, in the anti-racist composition classroom.

Chapter 1: Review of Literature: Toward a Raced Theory of Emotion

Critical race theory (CRT) developed out of critical legal studies in the 1970's because "although critical legal studies constituted a full-fledged challenge to the legal system's complicity in perpetuating regimes of domination and subordination, it failed, in the eyes of some, to provide an adequate account of how race is a central component of those systems" (Olson 210-1). Further, many legal scholars began to believe that the gains of the civil rights era had stalled, or worse, had been reversed. CRT has since proliferated in legal studies as well as in disciplines across the academy. At its core, all CRT applications and projects "[question] the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law" (Delgado and Stefancic 3).

One of the most important insights of CRT has been that racism is "ordinary, not aberrational," and, then, that colorblind remedies are insufficient in redressing racism (Delgado and Stefancic 7). Indeed, CRT argues "that race very much matters, that far from being the genesis of racism, race consciousness is an important analytical tool that allows us to examine social and legal relations in contemporary society" (Olson 211). In rejecting liberal conceptions of law and justice, CRT adheres to racial realism which posits that racial "attitudes follow, explain, and rationalize what is taking place in the material sector" (Delgado and Stefancic 20). Adrienne Dixson and Celia Rousseau take up this material critique in explaining that "CRT goes beyond race and racism as a

product of skin color and phenotype to analyze how ways of being, knowledge construction, power, and opportunity are constructed along and conflated with race" (48).

Given this theoretical background, a major tenet of CRT is to provide space for the voices of people of color, which may disrupt dominant racial conceptions. Part of this project is revisionist history, which "reexamines America's historical record, replacing comforting majoritarian interpretations of events with ones that square more accurately with minorities' experiences" (Delgado and Stefancic 20). Connected here is the revision of whiteness as "normative, maybe even a kind of property" (Delgado and Stefancic 78). Gloria Landson-Billings and William Tate IV argue that this "intersection of race and property creates an analytic tool through which we can understand social (and consequently, school) inequity" (12). This analytic framework, then, is directly connected to calls for redress of past and continuing racial injustice. Dixson and Rousseau point to how "CRT mandates that social activism should be part of any CRT project" (48).

This activism and critique of dominant racial ideologies has manifested in CRT's application in education. Beyond offering the analytic lens of the intersection of race and property, CRT has also provided a framework through which to evaluate dominant pedagogy. Landson-Billings and Tate argue that multicultural reforms have failed to create "radically new paradigms which ensure justice" but instead "are routinely 'sucked back into the system'" (25). They continue to argue that "critical race theory in education, like its precedent in legal scholarship, is a radical critique of both the status quo and the purported reforms" (25).

Critical educators have similarly taken up this critique of liberalism, or multiculturalism, both of which may fail to intervene in the dominant racial order. Peter McLaren explains that the popular "call for diversity has been little more than Enlightenment rhetoric" ("Rage" 49). McLaren goes further to argue that multiculturalism "has resulted from a formulaic search for equality and the political lading of the long-brewing 'melting-pot,' [and] has produced an aversion to rather than respect for difference" (195). Central to multicultural pedagogy is colorblind ideology, which is the "problematic conflation of race and racism that reinforces inequalities, hierarchies, and racial divisions while insisting that race does not matter" (Bell et. al. 337). In *Signs of Struggle: The Rhetorical Politics of Difference*, Thomas West further argues that "multicultural rhetoric emphasizes accommodating diversity rather than examining how differences have been historically constituted, thereby often preserving ingrained beliefs and practices concerning cultural difference" (8).

Similar to CRT's call to investigate and transform "the relationship among race, racism, and power" (Delgado and Stefancic 2), these cogent indictments of multiculturalism illustrate how difference has all too often been theorized without attention to power. Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues this point in "On Race and Voice: Challenges for Liberal Education in the 1990's." It is worth quoting Mohanty here at length:

The central issue, then, is not one of merely *acknowledging* difference; rather, the more difficult question concerns the kind of difference that is acknowledged and engaged. Difference seen as benign variation (diversity), for instance, rather than as conflict, struggle, or the threat of

disruption, bypasses power as well as history to suggest a harmonious, empty pluralism. (146)

Mohanty goes on to point to how this "empty pluralism," with its focus on diversity, "results in a depoliticization and dehistoricization of the idea of culture and makes possible the implicit management of race in the name of cooperation and harmony" (154). Present here is a clear critique of the way multicultural education is a framework which allows for the dominant racial order to continue through the erasure of power and conflict.

It is from this line of analysis that many critical, feminist, and anti-racist educators have designed pedagogies which focus both on identifying and transforming hegemonic structures. In "Higher Learning: Composition's Racialized Reflection," Keith Gilyard provides a clear differentiation between multiculturalism and anti-racism:

Although challenges to racism and exclusion launched the multicultural movement, the rhetoric and aims of that movement are not necessarily coterminous with the rhetoric and aims of, say, anti-racism. While the former often gestures toward a formulaic polycultural curriculum, the latter insists on unflinching criticism of racist domination and its impact on education, including composition curricula. (47)

Central to this "unflinching criticism," is anti-racism's focus on power and conflict that is missing from much of the literature on multicultural pedagogy. Analyzing the language and goals of contact zone pedagogy, for example, clearly illustrates the difference between multiculturalism and critical and anti-racist pedagogies. Mary Louise Pratt defined contact zones "as social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each

other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power" (34). Patricia Bizzell later called for English studies to be organized "in terms of historically defined contact zones, moments when different groups within society contend for the power to interpret what is going on" (483).

Attention to the intersections of power and race is central to Gary Olson's call that educators become familiar with CRT to better meet the demands of a shifting student population. Importantly, Olson argues that CRT would lead us to "understand that our institutions are not simply reflective of racial inequity but are constitutive of the inequity" (216). Critical and anti-racist pedagogies, then, mark a clear move away from mere representation toward a necessary discussion of power. Amanda Lewis notes how "*race* as a set of identities, discourse practices, cultural forms, and ideological manifestations would not exist without racism" (625). This focus on racism and power is often left out of multicultural pedagogy which has been shown to run the risk of dehistoricizing and romanticizing difference. As Catherine Prendergast notes in "Race: The Absent Presence in Composition Studies," "if race has been an absent presence [in our composition scholarship], racism has been an absent *absence*" (36). Prendergast further argues that this lack of focus on race and racism has left us "with no means to confront the racialized atmosphere of the university and no way to account for the impact of the persistence of prejudice on writers and texts" ("Race" 36).

Race, Racism, and the Construction of Whiteness

An important aspect of this focus on race, racism, and power has been to undertake an investigation of whiteness. Gilyard calls for more attention to race and

racism, but notes that "in most classrooms [. . .] race simply inscribes another othering discourse. It is an unproblematic marker of the non-white, the other" (51). Gilyard instead encourages white educators and students to investigate their own racial constructions as "this is precisely the move that has to occur repeatedly if the liberatory curriculum is to be realized to its greatest possibility" (48). Since the early 1990's, Whiteness Studies has become an increasingly popular area of research under the important work done by Howard Winant, Michael Omi, Mike Hill, *Race Traitor* magazine, the "New Abolitionists," and others.

Despite this recent influx of research on whiteness, Prendergast makes a compelling case for further research into the intersections of whiteness, property, and literacy in *Literacy and Racial Justice: The Politics of Learning After Brown v Board of Education*. Building from CRT readings of *Brown v. Board of Education*, Prendergast argues that while the landmark case attempted to end legal segregation, it had the ominous effect of establishing, or furthering, the "notion that literacy belongs to Whites" (5). She further argues that this ideology of literacy as white property largely developed in "response to perceived threats to White property interests" (7). Robyn Wiegman also notes this pattern in her argument that "the language of civil rights is mobilized to protect whiteness, which is cast not only as a minority identity but as one injured by the denial of public representation" due to multicultural projects ("Whiteness" 116). Wiegman further notes that "seldom has whiteness been so widely represented as attuned to racial equality and justice while so aggressively solidifying its advantage" ("Whiteness" 121). The work of Gilyard, Prendergast, and Wiegman illustrates the clear need for more analysis into the workings of whiteness, literacy, and power.

As Prendergast and Wiegman argue, multicultural rhetoric is often complicit in furthering the material and ideological interests of whiteness. This has happened, in part, because as Lewis notes, "[h]egemonic whiteness [...] successfully manage[s] to occupy the empty space of 'normality' in our culture" (634). Lewis, then, posits the importance of investigating whiteness not merely to understand whites' racial attitudes, but in order to understand whites as racial actors situated in a racial hierarchy (624). Acknowledging the material and ideological importance of Whiteness, Henry Giroux, in "Radical Politics and the Pedagogy of Whiteness," calls for educators to consider "how students might critically mediate the complex relations between 'whiteness' and racism, not by having them repudiate their 'whiteness,' but by grappling with its racist legacy and its potential to be rearticulated in oppositional framework and transformative lens" (296). This scholarly work marks a shift in composition studies that aims to critically take on racism, and by doing so, hopes to create the space necessary to rearticulate an anti-racist white subjectivity.

Part of the project of investigating the hegemonic functioning of whiteness and racism has been to vigilantly historicize race and racism. That is, scholars have noted the need to acknowledge both the shifting nature of race and racism, as well as that race is a socially situated category. As is evident in the criticisms of multiculturalism, colorblind ideology has become the dominant racial ideology in the United States, especially when talking about whiteness. Racial ideology can be defined "as the broad racial frameworks, or 'grids,' that racial groups use to make sense of the world, to decide what is right or wrong, true or false, important or unimportant" (Bonilla-Silva et al 556). Lewis expands this definition to better account for the material aspect of racial ideologies, when she

notes that for an ideology to become hegemonic, it must naturalize and legitimize certain interests (632). For example, Lewis notes how racial ideologies, such as colorblind ideology, "make sense of racial gaps in earnings, wealth, and health such that whites do not see any connection between their gain and others' loss" (633). In this way, "racial ideologies are always produced and rearticulated in relation to material circumstances" (Lewis 633).

In *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the U.S.*, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva describes how colorblind ideology "explains contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of non-racial dynamics" (2). Interestingly, colorblind ideology once was a central tenet of the civil rights movement, but was appropriated beginning in the 1970's by conservative forces to undermine the gains of the movement (Hitchcock 58). This appropriation of colorblind ideology has gone beyond reversing these gains by asserting that "racial equity has been achieved," thus, "rendering demands for further redress unnecessary, and even evidence of 'reverse racism'" (Bell et. al. 336). What is clear here is that colorblind ideology has been appropriated by conservative forces to offer a "post-racial" conception of racial relations, and in doing so has masked the material interest of whiteness in maintaining the current racial hierarchy.

This is evident in Gail Griffin's observation that many white, liberal students prefer "integrationist" readings of texts from authors of color because "this takes 'integration' as a way to forgiveness, a way out of guilt, and a way to avoid white particularity" (6). That is, "*whiteness*, as metaphor, as racial consciousness and as social practice, is grounded in notions of forgetfulness, erasure, denial, and transcendent, all-

subsuming 'freedom' or entitlement" (Griffin 4). Such a reading works to secure white subjectivities as "good," denying the complicity of a "post-racial" whiteness in ongoing inequality. In this way, unequal outcomes have come to be perceived as resulting from non-racial factors. Lewis cogently argues that the ensuing "assumption of white innocence is perhaps as powerful and possibly as corrosive as the parallel assumption of black criminality" (636). This dominant racial atmosphere underscores the need, as articulated by Gilyard, Giroux, Lewis, Prendergast and others, for anti-racist projects to include an investigation and interrogation of whiteness.

The Absence of Emotions in Critical/Anti-Racist Pedagogy

Despite these important and noteworthy contributions to critical theory, many scholars have begun to express concern about the potential of critical pedagogy, such as the anti-racist pedagogies I have briefly outlined, for the way they rely solely on rationality at the expense of the emotional and affective realms. In "Going Postal: Pedagogic Violence and the Schooling of Emotion," Lynn Worsham importantly argues that "critical pedagogy fails to be sufficiently critical; it does not carefully consider, through a subtly articulated discourse of emotion, how students have been taught to name their affective lives, how they might begin the process of renaming and rephrasing" those lives (235). Worsham goes further to claim that "our most urgent political and pedagogical task remains the fundamental reeducation of emotion" which "cannot succeed by mapping a new regime of meaning onto an old way of feeling" (216).

In *Feeling Power: Emotion and Education*, Megan Boler similarly makes a call for greater emphasis on the workings of emotion. Boler analyzes McLaren and Colin

Lankshear's *Critical Literacy: Politics, Praxis, and the Postmodern*, which she finds to be representative of much critical theory, to illustrate how the "lack of attention to emotions as a site of ideological control reflects a vastly undertheorized dimension of power and subjectivity" (128). West emphasizes how this lack of attention to emotion is particularly problematic in pedagogies which focus on conflict and dissensus. West argues that these classrooms, "precisely because of emotional ties and affective investments—do not always follow the proscriptions of reasoned and civil discourse," and "that engagement cannot always be understood in terms of prevailing rationalities and intelligibilities" ("Rhetoric" 42).

Building off these important insights, Jennifer Siebel Trainor has recently investigated the way anti-racist pedagogies, as informed by CRT and property metaphors, have similarly failed to consider the emotional. Being one of the first to address race, pedagogy, and emotion, Trainor argues in *Rethinking Racism: Emotion, Persuasion, and Literacy Education in an All-White High School* that racism

does not necessarily arise from a need or desire to protect white privilege, from ignorance of oppression, or from a lack of exposure to difference. As long as the origins of racism are seen in these terms, curricular and pedagogical responses aimed at ameliorating racism—everything from multicultural exposure to difference to critical interrogations of whiteness and privilege—will be ineffective. (3)

Instead, she seeks to emphasize the working of emotion within institutional practices. Many critical theorists have previously acknowledged the workings of emotion and affect, such as Giroux who notes that "central to any pedagogical approach to race and

the politics of 'whiteness' is the recognition that race is a set of attitudes, values, lived experiences, and *affective* identifications" (emphasis added, "Radical" 294). However, as Trainor rightly notes, critical and anti-racist pedagogues have failed to adequately consider these affective identifications as valuable areas of research and education. Trainor takes this analysis further when she argues that we should "understand racist discourses as a series of 'emotioned' beliefs that are not necessarily about race per se" (3).

While these important contributions call on critical and anti-racist pedagogues to more closely examine emotion and affect, they also serve as a critique of the pervasive property metaphors that are central to anti-racist pedagogies. The plausibility of this critique is evident in readings of Cheryl Harris's "Whiteness as Property" and Peggy McIntosh's "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack." Harris's groundbreaking article explains how the law has constructed whiteness as a type of property and goes on to identify four property functions of whiteness. Harris's work has been influential in CRT and anti-racist pedagogies' generation of the lens to view literacy through the intersection of race and property. Similarly, McIntosh offers a list of the ways she has been privileged as a result of being white. She importantly explains how these privileges often operate invisibly as we are trained to view racism only as individual acts. While both Harris and McIntosh offer valuable insights, both address whiteness as property, as static privilege which whites rationally cash in on and aim to protect through racism.

Following Trainor's argument, we might argue that these important contributions rely solely upon the rational (re)production and utilization of racial privilege and property. That is, the pedagogical implications of these works have been to attempt to

get white students to recognize and renounce the way they have been racially privileged. As Trainor argues, "the metaphor as privilege as property [. . .] sometimes obscures the ways in which privilege is purchased, negotiated, sometimes rejected, and most importantly, emotionally experienced" (130). For instance, McIntosh argues that privilege often operates invisibly as it is normalized by the myth of meritocracy. However, what is missing here is an account of how students are emotionally invested in and connected to such discourses. Worsham offers that pedagogy, both in terms of educational practice and the larger process of enculturation, "binds each individual to a complex and often contradictory affective relation to the world" (126). Without consideration of these affective processes, pedagogies which seek to intervene in racist discourses may often be unsuccessful.

At first glance, it may not be surprising that emotion has been so largely undertheorized. Worsham explains how dominant "pedagogy mystifies emotion as a natural category and masks its role in a system of power relations that associates emotion with the irrational, the physical, the particular, the private, and the feminine" (127). Jaggar situates this negative account of emotions as a result of reason being contrasted from emotion in the western philosophical tradition (115). Further, Jaggar importantly notes that it was not until the seventeenth century that emotions were labeled as the "passions" which "emphasized that emotions happened to or were imposed upon an individual, something she suffered rather than something she did" (116). This account is in line with more recent positivist accounts of emotion, which Elizabeth Spelman has called the "Dumb View," as emotions "were not seen as being *about* anything" (Jaggar 119). Cognitivist theories of emotion have more fully accounted for how emotions are

related to judgments, however, in doing so, cognitivist accounts have maintained "an artificial split between emotion and thought" which continue to prioritize the rational over the emotional (Jaggar 120).

It is surprising, however, that emotion has not been more fully engaged in education considering the growing field of critical emotion studies. In *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Sara Ahmed offers a spatial and relational conception of emotion that moves beyond the problems of interiority, and the limitations of mere social construction. Ahmed's model of the sociality of emotions suggests that "emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside from an outside in the first place" (10). Ahmed further theorizes that emotions are relational and "involve (re)actions or relations of 'towardness' or 'awayness' in relation to such objects" (8). Boler similarly offers a conception of emotions as "reflect[ing] linguistically-embedded cultural values and rules and are thus a site of power and resistance" (6). These nuanced investigations of emotion, which move beyond primordial conceptions of interiority, have helped generate the crucial insights of critical emotion studies.

As alluded to in Boler's discussion of values and rules, a central feature of critical emotion studies has been its attention to power, hegemony, and resistance. As a field, it takes up what Jaggar has called "emotional hegemony," or how "we absorb the standards and values of our society in the very process of learning the language of emotion" (130). Further, by "forming our emotional constitution in particular ways, our society helps to ensure its own convictions" (130). One of the ways in which this happens, as Boler argues, is the creation and limitation of what emotional expressions are appropriate or,

conversely, inappropriate in any given society. However, Jaggar notes that this emotional hegemony is not total and that there is space for "outlaw emotions" which are politically subversive (131).

Building from this body of work, Boler calls for further study into "how emotions are a site of social control" (3). Boler also notes how our emotions "'embody' and 'act out' relations of power" (3-4). The emphasis on the performative element of emotions, how we *do* emotions, marks a clear distinction from positivist, and even cognitivist, conceptions of emotion. Stemming from this more nuanced theorization, Boler argues that emotions "are a primary medium through which we learn to internalize ideologies as commonsense truths" (32). West similarly argues "that people are motivated to act socially and politically because of their affective conditions and investments" ("Rhetoric" 54). These arguments reclaim emotions from the natural and private, and make a strong case for the political and rhetorical dynamics of emotion.

Noting the politics of emotions, Worsham argues "that if our commitment is to real individual and social change [. . .] then the work of decolonization must occur at the affective level" (122). West also argues that "[e]ffecting new ways of feeling, not just thinking, is one of the more fundamental ways of countering regimes of colonization and violence" (81). This underscores the need to better account for the workings of emotion within critical and anti-racist pedagogies. This idea is not new, as Boler explains that "feminist pedagogy recognized that the transformation of consciousness requires attention to this intersection of emotional experiences, theories, and analysis of social institutions" (117). However, as argued by Boler, Trainor, West, Worsham, and others, emotion remains largely undertheorized in educational discourse.

Whiteness, Anger, and a Raced Theory of Emotion

In this thesis, I will investigate the working of a single emotion of anger, and specifically, how white racial anger in the anti-racist composition classroom functions to (re)produce colorblind or "post-racial" white identities, thereby disallowing white students from taking up anti-racist subjectivities. West emphasizes the need for this study when he claims that "the social and political dimensions of anger remain largely undertheorized as they relate to issues of social difference, conflict, and learning" ("Rhetoric" 42). Building off Jaggar's conception of emotional hegemony, West has also argued that dominant pedagogy mandates that black anger and women's anger "must be put down, dismissed and/or individualized because they do not reproduce dominant pedagogical relations" (75). In "Anger and American Work: A Twentieth-Century Turning Point," Peter Stearns argues that new developments in the industrial economy led to strict and explicit standards on the public expression of anger in the 1920's (128). As anger control has become a central component of dominant pedagogy, West argues that anger "needs to be examined for its role in these conservative capacities" as I will argue is the case of white racial anger, "as well as its transgressive" capacities (84-5).

Focusing on white racial anger will require close attention to its functions in an era dominated by colorblind ideologies and assumptions. That is, a primary question I will be investigating in Chapter Two is how white racial anger is different from, or similar to, potential outlaw emotions such as black and feminist anger. To do this, I will be largely be working from Boler's differentiation between Aristotle's moral anger, and defensive anger which "can be interpreted as a protection of beliefs, [and] a protection of

one's precarious sense of identity" (191). Whereas moral anger is expressed against injustice, defensive anger can be viewed "more as a defense of one's investment in the values of the dominant culture" and as "the protection of precarious identities" (191).

While I will largely work from Boler's conception of defensive anger, I will seek to complicate this distinction between moral and defensive anger. Boler herself acknowledges the unclear line between the two, and such an investigation may illuminate how whiteness has been able to selectively take up universal and, conversely, particular racial positions in order to preserve its privilege and racial dominance. This slide between the universal and particular subject position, under colorblind ideologies, may allow for the expression of white racial anger to perform the "innocence" of whiteness in racial discourses, and more problematic, position whites as the victims of reverse-racism. Further, this slide then posits the expression of white racial anger as quite moral, in that it is against violations of colorblind ideology.

In Chapter Three, I will offer a re-reading of the important work Trainor has done in her ethnographic study. While I am in debt to Trainor's study and insights, I will seek to examine exactly what anger *does* in racial and racist discourses. Specifically, building upon Ahmed's theorization that emotion works by sticking signs to other signs, objects, and bodies, I will consider how white racial anger circulates as a sticking mechanism. This will be central to examining how and why white racial anger becomes persuasive and effective in and through racist discourses.

I will also consider how white racial anger works to reify a "we," an affective community which prompts non-racist whites to feel "good" about race and racism. Following Chapter Two, white racial anger does this by silencing the oppositional anger

and claims that might disrupt such a community, as well as by calling to discourses of rationality and civility. More troubling, I will investigate how such dominant ways of feeling, or dominant affective communities, require heavy emotional labor from people of color in order to participate in the community, or to protect themselves from the community's backlash.

In the conclusion, I hope to supplement the important developments in anti-racist pedagogy with insights from critical emotions studies and from the previous chapters of this thesis. As I am invested in anti-racist pedagogy, I am fascinated by the new pedagogical practices which may arise. Specifically, I wonder what the anti-racist composition classroom which investigates students' affective connections to racial discourses might look like. Lastly, I will explore what pedagogical and political potential lies in the critical negotiation, rather than management, of white racial anger. In the end, I hope to shed new light on the complex and shifting dynamics of student racism, and to reinvigorate anti-racist composition pedagogy through the lens of critical emotion studies.

Chapter 2: "Don't Judge Me:" Whiteness, Anger, and the Rhetoric of Civility

It is in the cracks and fissures of performative whiteness that we begin the dismantling of whiteness as norm.

-Gwendolyn Audrey Foster (2-3)

[H]ow does one counter a performance that is effective *despite* its poor fit with the truth?

-David Wellman (326)

Why has anger been appropriated by and for dominant group or beings when in so many other ways emotions are thought to be the province of subordinate groups?

-Elizabeth V. Spelman (264).

Taken together, the above epigraphs identify, press against, and challenge the tensions and contradictions in which this chapter is situated. Foster and Wellman illuminate and call for resistance against the performances of whiteness which work to conceal its material history and complicity in maintaining a racial hierarchy. Spelman, in her powerful article "Anger and Insubordination," poses the question which structures much of this thesis. In this chapter, then, I consider how performances of whiteness entail a performance of emotional rules and guidelines, and then, how white racial anger works rhetorically to silence oppositional anger—often from people of color—in effect to reestablish white privilege and authority. Really, the question I seek to answer is why certain forms and expressions of anger are taken up and become persuasive in public contexts, while others are labeled as inappropriate, bitter, or as a breach of civil discourse.

In order to address this question, I will work from Lindquist's discussion of the public dimension of persuasion which examines "how ideas get taken up, changed, and incorporated into social groups, recursively, over time" (Trainor 29). I will also argue, as West does, that rhetoric includes "the strategic display and restraint of emotions for social and political ends" (*Signs* 72). Such a conception of rhetoric allows us to examine how white racial anger, as so common in the anti-racist classroom or on Fox News and other cable news networks, becomes persuasive. This also means that I am less interested in individual expressions of racism, and instead, hope to examine how anger operates rhetorically in the very construction of racial group identities and in the maintenance of an unequal racial hierarchy. In this way, I hope to investigate how emotional dynamics affect "how the boundaries of racial categories are negotiated, challenged, and/or reinforced in daily life" (Lewis, "What Group" 625).

First, however, it is necessary to discuss what exactly racial performance entails, and more specifically, how whiteness brings itself into being through performative acts. This move away from considering race as a biological category is represented in Omi and Winant's call that theorizing race "must recognize the importance of historical context and contingency in the framing of racial categories and the social construction of racially defined experiences" (7). In composition studies, Gilyard has similarly noted that more attention is needed into how race is, at least partially, a rhetorical construction ("Preface" ix; "Higher Learning" 47). Ellen Cushman has also argued for "alternative forms of reading [that] allow us to move beyond the quick categorization of race from skin color alone" (393). In short, racial categories are not stable, fixed, biological categories but are brought into being, and become meaningful, in social and historical contexts.

Despite the abundance of scholarship that has unsettled the essentialist view of race, there remain questions about what it means to *do* race. Vershawn Ashanti Young has recently put forth a framework of "the sociolinguistics of racial performance," building off the work of Mary Rhodes Hoover and E. Patrick Johnson, which suggests "the simultaneous study and staging of racialized language habits in social contexts" (3). In short, Young argues that one of the ways in which we do race is through the strategic use of language. In this chapter, working from performative frameworks and critical emotion studies, I will seek to add to this important scholarship that when we *do* race, we also *do* emotion. Or more precisely, bodies do emotional rules and guidelines, and in the process, become situated racially.

Doing Race, Doing Emotion

Judith Butler's revision of Foucault in *Gender Trouble* puts forth an active conception of the body and, in the process, revives performative studies. Butler argues that "the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled by the regulatory process of gender coherence," meaning that gender is performative, "producing the identity it is purported to be" (*Gender Trouble* 33). Importantly, Butler offers that "gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed" (*Gender Trouble* 33). Following these insights, Wiegman theorizes that "the powerful materiality of race is structured by our historically shifting understandings of perception and cultural representation" (10). Similar to Butler, Wiegman claims that "to cite the body as inevitable locus of 'being,' depends on a series of bodily fictions assumed to unproblematically reflect the natural meanings of the flesh"

(21). This work allows us to consider how race, like gender, is not a fixed entity but one that comes to be read as natural as the result of, to use Butler's terminology, the repetition of a corporeal style.

We can already see how certain emotional constitutions are read as being natural, or intrinsic to certain bodies. Ahmed has identified how "whilst thought and reason are identified with the masculine and western subject, emotions and bodies are associated with femininity and racial others" (170). Not only does such a reading privilege certain bodies, but it also "works to conceal the emotional and embodied aspects of thought and reason" (170). There certainly are contradictions to this narrative, as we will see in the case of Aristotelian anger, but by and large, we read the emotionality of certain bodies as negative; as weakness. This naturalized process of reading bodies is present in Catherine Lutz's identification of how "women, more than men, may speak of [emotion] control," which references the dominant view of emotions as natural and often irrational ("Engendered Emotion" 75). Control, here, is not to say that emotions are repressed, but that similar to Foucault's analysis of Victorian discourses on sexuality, biomedical models delimit "healthy" and "unhealthy" emotional expressions ("Engendered Emotion" 72). As Lutz correctly argues, the rhetoric of emotion control, as put forth by many women, is an attempt to counteract "the denigration of themselves through an association with emotion" ("Engendered Emotion" 75).

Such a habit of reading certain bodies as emotional, and then at risk because of that emotion, is commonplace. Consider how President Barack Obama has gone to great lengths to remain calm, always focusing on collaboration rather than conflict. I wonder if white male candidates and elected officials feel the same need to exhibit what Peter

Stearns has called the "American cool?" Similarly, we can recall how then Supreme Court nominee Judge Sonia Sotomayor shied away from her proclamation that as a Latina she would be better suited to judge certain cases than would a white man. During her confirmation hearings in July of 2009, she also made a point to disagree with the President's claim that empathy was central to being a good judge. I imagine that Sotomayor knew that she would be risking her career to acknowledge any affinity for emotion within a space which is supposed to be reserved for rationality.

How has it occurred, then, over and through history, that emotionality has been read as "a characteristic of some bodies and not others?" (Ahmed 4). Although this is a large question, critical emotion studies offer some insights. Trainor has identified three main characteristics of the critical study of emotion: emotions are not distinct from reason (cognition); emotions are not private but are socially constructed and experienced; emotions represent a "deeply embedded site of social control" (22). We can consider, then, emotion not as something intrinsic to certain bodies, or as natural phenomena which are repressed, but as central to the functioning of ideology and hegemony.

Returning to the performative framework offered by Butler and Wiegman may help clarify. Speaking of gender rules, Butler argues that the "subject is not *determined* by the rules through which it is generated because signification is *not a founding act*, but *rather a regulated process of repetition* that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects" (185). In this way, language or discourse "is productive, constitutive, one might even argue *performative*, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to any and all signification" (30). We can similarly consider emotions as discursive, or how

discourses on emotion constitute emotion and emotional expressions (Abu-Lughod and Lutz "Introduction," Zembylas). Lila Abu-Lughod and Lutz argue that

we should view emotional discourse as a form of social action that creates effects in the world, effects that are read in a culturally informed way by the audience for emotion talk. Emotion can be said to be *created in*, rather than shaped by, speech in the sense that it is postulated as an entity in language where its meanings to social actors is also elaborated.

("Introduction" 12)

We can see, then, how emotions are not exclusively internal states but are discursive practices that participate in the constitution of the body. When we consider the recommendation for emotional restraint on white middle-class emotion culture, it becomes clear how acting out emotion rules is central to generating the white racialized body.

In this way, we might consider how various gender, race, and class relations also carry certain recommended emotional rules or guidelines. Stearns has identified what he calls feeling rules, or "the recommended norms by which people are supposed to shape their emotional expressions and react to the expressions of others" (2). Stearns argues that white middle-class emotion culture underwent a significant shift in the latter half of the twentieth century to focus heavily on restraint (1). However, this analysis does not offer how such rules are taken up, or how certain bodies come to be read as rational or, conversely, emotional. Further, a focus on rules may allow that emotions are primordial and something that bodies selectively express or control. Instead, we might view these emotional guidelines as integral to the operation of power. That is, emotional discourses

are productive and bodies bring them into being, and give them credence through performative acts.

The performance of emotional guidelines is linked to discourses of civility, and then to what bodies are "fit" to participate in public venues. West has cogently argued that civility "must be considered critically as a form of rhetorical othering because civility is not just about manners and etiquette but can also be about squelching difference by delineating normative criteria for inclusion and interaction" (*Signs* 108). West claims, then, that "those with the power to institute their ways with language can use civility, among other things, to restrict forceful arguments and/or alternative perspectives by outlining normative criteria for interaction and politics" (*Signs* 109). We might consider, then, how the performance of emotional guidelines marks bodies of the dominant group as rational, as civil.

The rhetorical violence of civility became all too clear to me at a family event this past summer. At a cookout, where alcohol made it so that many of us spoke more candidly than we traditionally would, I shared with a few of my aunts a moment from a graduate workshop months earlier which had continued to bother me. A guest speaker from a nearby university had come to share his work and to share his research methodologies with graduate students who were beginning to conduct more sophisticated research of our own. The speaker shared his affinity for Socrates before offering that he didn't love Socrates in all ways. The slight passed over my head, but the malicious meaning was made clear when he was asked to clarify by a member of the audience who identifies as queer. It became evident that while made in jest, the comment was a homophobic remark belittling Socrates' sexuality. I shared with my family how offensive

I found this comment. However, more than the homophobic remark, it was my families' response which sticks with me now. They agreed that the joke was in bad taste, but what they found offensive was the queer audience member who asked him to clarify the meaning, as s/he certainly suspected the homophobic undertones. It seems that the hateful remark is regrettable *yet* allowed in a professional setting, while any response or criticism of it is out of place. Simply put, the queer speaker marked an unacceptable breach of civility. Following West, civility indeed is a form of rhetorical othering.

Such an example allows us to consider the close relationship between emotions, civility, and identity performance. My white middle-class family had marshaled discourses of civility, including politeness and "appropriate" emotional expression, to secure their own right to participate in public deliberation, while enforcing the rules of participation to exclude others. Further, they rejected the expression of anger, which carries a judgment of the homophobic remark and speaker, present in the audience member's critique. It is clear, then, how anger often becomes labeled as inappropriate and as a breach of civility. It is unsettling, however, that while the angry component of the critique is outlawed, my family was able to express righteous anger, thereby passing judgment, on the audience member. Further, it is clear that the queerness of the speaker directly influenced how my family read and took up the anger. How is it, then, that certain expressions of anger become righteous and persuasive, while others are marked as irrational and inappropriate? It seems that by acting out discourses of civility, and its accompanying emotional guidelines, bodies become civil, and then inhabit a relative position of power, or belonging, that allows them to reject the anger of others.

It is not surprising, then, that the anger expressed by white bodies, which becomes salient through the acting out of discourses on emotions and civility, works to solidify white political power. A racially charged incident on my campus may further illuminate the relationship between the emotional expectations of whiteness and power. In February of 2010, I attended an open mic event on campus held for students and faculty to publicly discuss and organize resistance against a campus event that was generated on Facebook. An event page had been created by a white student asking fans to dress up as "Indians" for an upcoming school basketball game (the rival teams' mascot was the Cowboys). While the request seemed to be misguided rather than malicious, it created a series of responses on the Facebook page asking for the event to be cancelled, claiming that it stereotyped and demeaned native cultures. If the original call for students to dress as "Indians" was subtle enough, the backlash against those who opposed the event was disturbing. Students began to comment that they were tired of political correctness, that in fact they were honoring "Indians" as warriors, that it was all in fun, and worst, that native cultures deserved to be annihilated.

The next day at the open mic, a group of fifty or so students and faculty gathered to speak about the issue. Many students of color spoke about how this was offensive to all minority groups, and that the university was not a place where they felt safe or appreciated. Tears and outrage were common across the speakers and the crowd alike. About an hour in, a well intentioned young white male professor stood up to talk. He similarly condemned the event as racist, but he urged "us" all to not respond with anger. Calmly, he said that we could not fight fire with fire, but that we must rise above it, and instead, that we ought to respond with love. As he stepped down, a young student, an

African American woman, took her turn at the mic. She expressed that she agreed with the prior speaker that we need to return love rather than anger, but that this event was not aberrational, that she had come to expect this type of racial animosity on the campus. For her, it was an option between anger or giving up hope.

Observing this event and the various emotional responses was illuminating for me. I was taken aback by the white man who said that the group, comprised of many people of color, should not be angry. Indeed, he received a tepid response from the crowd, but many still shook their heads in agreement. I don't mean to indict this man, for he presented himself as a compassionate ally, which was in stark contrast with many of the comments on Facebook or of the dismissive comments made by many students as they passed by the group on their way to class. Yet, this man's call for calmness, for understanding, has striking similarity to the racist comments made on the Facebook page. Much of the backlash focused on people of color being too sensitive. It seems that from their privileged position they wanted to tell the offended how they ought to feel. I heard traces of this reasoning in the professor's talk: yes this is regrettable, but we shouldn't be angry or hateful. It occurred to me that, yet again, a white man was exercising his authority to delimit the appropriate emotional response. It seems that excessive hurt and anger are not appropriate. At least not against whites.

This example clearly illustrates the complexities of the current emotional standards. In fact, this moment provides insight into how bodies act out emotional rules within racial discourses. The white man's speech matches as well as delimits appropriate, if not idealist, emotions for civil discourse—love and understanding—while many of the voices of color breached this civil discourse by expressing anger and frustration. Indeed,

their expression of negative emotions which are often labeled as inappropriate, was the impetus for his speech. We can begin to see, then, how when repeated across time, emotionality seems to become a natural aspect of certain bodies. That is, performing emotional guidelines works to mark bodies in such a way that allows them to fit with societal expectations concerning public deliberation. Rational disposition, or the "appropriate" expression of emotions, come to be qualities of certain bodies through their enactment of these discourses in public contexts. Further, the man's favoring of love and understanding illustrates how the current emotion culture does not condone full restraint but, rather, delimits appropriate and inappropriate emotional constitutions and expressions.

What neither of these narratives account for, however, is why the expression of anger from whites in racial contexts is often condoned and sanctioned. That is, why was the anger expressed against the people of color who named the racism taken up and how did it become persuasive in the university setting? In fact, while we hear explicit discourse on how the offended group should emotionally respond to racism, the critique of the "Indian" event centered on content rather than its emotional constitution. The question then becomes, why is the anger of people of color, or the anger that accompanies the critique of racism labeled as inappropriate, while the anger present in the backlash goes unmarked as such? We might consider how this operates in a more familiar context. The feminist and black power movements were often discredited as militant, extreme, bitter, or dangerous. This is in direct opposition to how the anger that operated powerfully within the conservative backlash was labeled as rational deliberation—a fulfillment of colorblind ideals or a return to normalcy—or as righteous

and just anger on behalf of the white men who had been victimized by affirmative action programs and political correctness. Returning to Spelman's quote included in the epigraph to this chapter, when women and people of color have been systematically labeled as emotional, why has white racial anger become so persuasive and effective in solidifying white ideological and material advantage?

Everywhere and Nowhere: Shifting Performance(s) of Whiteness and the Morality of Anger

In July of 2009, the Senate hearings over the first Latina Supreme Court appointee, Judge Sotomayor, put the shifting, complex, and pernicious elements of whiteness on full display. GOP Senator Sessions grilled Sotomayor on her ability, as a Latina, to remain objective in interpreting the law. Sessions quizzed, "Aren't you saying there that you expect background and—and heritage to influence your decision-making?" Sessions continued to express how troubled he was by this lack of impartiality. The comments made by Sessions, other senators, and countless pundits appealed to the mythical objectivity of white men, who operating from the "universal" racial and gendered position, are not lead astray by race or gender. Wiegman, then, accurately describes how "the asymmetry of the classical episteme where the rationalization of observation underwrote the European's claim to a universal, normative position and the specificity of race was increasingly elided with 'black'" (28).

However, it was not only Sotomayor's racial and gender particularity that troubled the Republican Senators. Senator Lindsey Graham expressed irritation at what he perceived to be a double standard working against his own white racial particularity.

Graham condescendingly cautioned Sotomayor to "appreciate the world we live in," as she was likely to be approved for the Supreme Court despite her earlier proclamation that she was a "wise Latina." Sessions lamented that she was fortunate, even privileged, because certainly no white male would get away with such a comment. Two complementary observations are worth noting here. First, in contrast with Sessions' appeal to the universal racial position that whiteness represents—the unraced and unmarked position—Graham articulated a particular, even victimized whiteness which is under attack by the gains of the civil rights movement. Second, and certainly related, is how this articulation of a particular whiteness gives credence to claims of reverse racism. In fact, many Senators and right-wing pundits expressed their belief that Sotomayor was indeed racist against whites (we can see, here, the problematic conflation of race with racism).

The ability of whiteness to take up both the universal/invisible, as well as the particular/raced location, as represented in the responses to Sotomayor's appointment, raises concerns over the way whiteness studies has sought to interrogate the racial construction of whiteness. As Wiegman argues, "[i]n assigning the power of white racial supremacy to its invisibility and hence universality, [we] underplay the contradictory formation of white racial power that has enabled its historical elasticity and contemporary transformations" ("Whiteness" 118). Wiegman further states that in assuming that whiteness' power derives from its universal status, "we have failed to interpret the tension between particularity and universality that characterizes not simply the legal discourse of race [. . .] but also the changing contours of white power and privilege" ("Whiteness" 117).

In many ways it seems essential to unveil the universal, unmarked category of whiteness, for as Lewis notes, hegemonic whiteness "occup[ies] the dominant position in a particular racial formation that successfully manage[s] to occupy the empty space of 'normality' in our culture" ("What Group" 634). Following Wiegman, however, this mode of analysis risks underestimating the complexity of white racial formation. That is, what Lewis' claim misses is how white particularity, and especially a victimized whiteness, has been deployed to maintain white power and privilege, as well as a notion of whiteness as aligned with innocence. Acknowledging the multiple, often conflicting, performances of whiteness may also have effect for how we consider white racial anger. bell hooks offers a valuable starting point to consider this anger:

Often [white students'] rage erupts because they believe that all ways of looking that highlight difference and subvert the liberal conviction that is the assertion of universal subjectivity (we are all just people) that will make racism disappear. They have a deep emotional investment in the myth of "sameness" even as their actions reflect the primacy of whiteness as a sign informing who they are and how they think. ("Representing" 167-8)

I have witnessed this type of anger in my own composition classrooms which seek to investigate the rhetoric of racism. Many students object to the course topic before they have even had time to identify the type of materials we will be investigating. That is, they object to the introduction of race, a divisive category, into the classroom. We might read this, as Trainor does, not as a desire to protect their racial privilege but as reflecting their emotional investment in colorblind ideologies.

However, such an analysis, while useful and important, does not account for the multiple, shifting, and conflicting performances of whiteness. That is, can we assume that the anger of white students expressed towards a breach of colorblind individualism is the same as the anger of a white student who feels like they have been victimized by civil rights legislation? In hooks' quote, we read the white racial anger as stemming from the effort to make visible the normative position of whiteness. It is the very move to particularize whiteness that causes discomfort, and, then, anger. However, does this apply to the white students who feel victimized by affirmative action, or who express anger at the perceived privileging of an "undeserving" or "lazy" other? Since we cannot consider anger as an always already, can we assume that anger functions in the same way in both cases? Or, possibly more pressing, how is white racial anger similar or dissimilar to people of colors' anger toward racism?

Boler offers a framework within which to address these questions in her differentiation between Aristotle's moral anger and defensive anger. In the second book of *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines anger as "a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own" (qtd. in Konstan 100). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that anyone "who does not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people, is a dolt" (qtd. in Spelman 263). These excerpts on Aristotle's view of anger highlight the morality of that anger. That is, anger includes a reading of, or perception that one has been wronged. In fact, if one does not respond with anger at the right times, then, under Aristotle's logic,

one is not fit to participate in civil society. As David Konstan argues, "[a]nger is just the desire to restore the state of affairs prior to the insult" (112).

We can begin to see why Aristotle's moral anger may not apply to white racial anger, as whites are often privileged on the basis of their race. As a result of this seemingly poor fit, Boler theorizes defensive anger which "can be interpreted as a protection of beliefs, a protection of one's precarious sense of identity" (191). Such a conception of anger might better explain why white students often respond with anger towards anti-racist materials which represent a challenge to their beliefs and identities. In this way, whites may deploy anger to protect these beliefs and identities, rather than as an attempt to fix a perceived wrong. This makes sense when we consider it in terms of hooks' identification of how investigating difference unsettles many white students' investment in "sameness" and universality. That is, discussing race and racism is a breach of colorblind ideology causing white students to respond with anger in order to protect their system of beliefs and identities.

However, I would like to complicate the seamless differentiation between moral and defensive anger. Boler herself notes, after all, that such a distinction is fraught with thorns and potential traps. What happens, for instance, when we view white racial anger as not necessarily originating from a challenge to belief, but as an attack on the validity of one's subjectivity, or as the wrongful taking of what one deserves? Certainly the distinction is not always clear, but I am proposing that we should not always read white racial anger as originating from a fear of acknowledging one's racial particularity, but that anger often arises from the bodies' inhabitation of that particularity.

If the distinction, or lack thereof, between moral and defensive anger seems trivial, the pedagogical implications may not be. For example, if we read white student's anger as arising from a perceived breach of colorblind discourse, that is, as a result of exposure to difference, we might assume that once students learn to see whiteness as raced, that this anger might subside. In this way, the cause (exposure) might also be the solution to reducing anger and thereby encouraging diversity and sensitivity. However, this does not hold up if the anger arises from the body's inhabitation of a particular whiteness which has all too often been perceived as a victimized position. For as Victor Villanueva has noted, the "only apparent generalized acknowledgement of racism as structural comes by way of the perception of a reverse discrimination" (651). Such a reading of white racial anger, one that may close the gap between moral and defensive anger, serves to indict many of the strategies put forth by multicultural and even anti-racist pedagogies. This is especially the case in classrooms which seek to investigate the formation and functioning of a hegemonic whiteness. I think many educators, myself included, feel that a small but important victory is won if we can encourage students to see and identify whiteness as raced.

Indeed, there are far too many students who don't see whites as having race, evident in the beginning stories I ask my first year students to write about their first memory of race. In my class, made up mostly white students, a common response is that since they grew up in the suburbs, race was never an issue. That is, their first memories often occurred late in adolescence when they met a student of color at their school. In the over one hundred beginning stories I have read this past year, not once has a white student talked about whiteness or their own racial formation. An even more common

response is that they had been taught at a young age not to see difference, that they were trained to see the person and not their race.

Still, early in the semester much of this race-blindness begins to wilt while more troubling narratives come forward. That is, anger and resentment about perceived affirmative action hires are voiced. Worse, when confronted with statistics on the inequality within education and jobs, some white students will offer that the problem does not lie within the system, but within black culture (interesting how signs of laziness or welfare dependency seem to stick to black bodies more than to others). Inevitably, a few students will respond that they disliked Gloria Anzaldúa's "How to Tame a Wild Tongue" because she hates whites. In line with Boler's defensive anger, we might read this anger or resistance as arising from a breach of colorblind ideology. Indeed, our students of all colors and backgrounds are deeply invested in these individualist discourses. Following Trainor, such a reading promises to lead to more effective pedagogies than does the assumption that white students are acting out of a rational desire to protect their privilege.

However, we might also note that much of this anger arises from a white particularity. A rather intelligent white student of mine articulated in conference that he wanted to write an argument against affirmative action admission programs since his adopted sister, who was Latina, was given admission to a good state university, and according to this student, she was not fit for college. The narrative presented is not only that affirmative action does not reward an individual's hard work, but that students perceive such programs to unilaterally favor people of color, always at the expense of more deserving whites. Such a critique could not be offered from a universal unraced

position, but is a speech act that gains its persuasive force by appealing to a particular and victimized whiteness. In this way, encouraging white students to see their own whiteness as raced overlooks the way in which whites can deploy various, competing forms of that whiteness. Similarly, then, anger which arises against objects such as affirmative action programs and its benefactors should not be viewed only as resulting from an attack on individualist and colorblind beliefs and identities. Rather, these performances gain power through the slide to inhabiting the particular racial position.

The water gets further muddied when we investigate whose anger is publicly taken up, whose is labeled as inappropriate, and finally, who gets to decide what anger is appropriate or not. This is not a new question, but one which Aristotle took up in his theorizing of anger. Spelman rightly identifies how when Aristotle said man should express moral anger when appropriate that "he meant man (in fact, only certain men—for example, not men who were slaves), not woman" (263). In the following section, I will more fully address why some anger is given ear and becomes persuasive, while other expressions are labeled as inappropriate, irrational, and are, then, silenced. First, however, we might consider that if white racial anger is indeed a form of moral anger—and, then, similar to the anger of people of color toward racism—whether it can be discussed as what Jaggar calls an outlaw emotion. Jaggar notes that "the hegemony that our society exercises over people's emotional constitution is not total," and that when certain emotions are "shared and validated by others" they may become outlaw emotions" which "may be politically (because epistemologically) subversive" (131). As Spelman and others note, anger held by women and people of color may often function as outlaw emotions because they serve to threaten social hierarchies and the relations of power

which maintain them. Ahmed similarly has argued that anger is a form of against-ness (174), and that anger can be productive in that it "is not simply defined in relationship to the past, but as an opening up to the future" (175).

As I have been arguing that white racial anger functions similarly to the anger of people of color in racial discourses, it would be logical to claim that this anger also holds subversive potential. However, I would like to argue instead that this white racial anger is reactive rather than subversive. That is, the expression of this anger, and the process through which it gets publically taken up, serves to reproduce and protect the hegemonic function of whiteness and the current racial hierarchy. At best, this anger functions to protect colorblind discourses which have served to label racial inequality as the result of non-racial factors. At worst, this anger functions violently to silence the anger, perspectives, and counter-discourse of people of color which might challenge our dominant narratives. In this way, white racial anger can be viewed not as an opening up to a different future, but as being *against* that future.

For example, let's return to the white racial anger expressed against those who identified the "Indian" event as racist and racially insensitive. On the Facebook event page, we might read the most hateful content as including the expression of anger—anger against political correctness, and/or against people of color and white allies as being overly sensitive—which works to silence the anger and claims of the objectors. In this way, the white racial anger acts to solidify white advantage by establishing whose voice was valued and, then, whose anger was appropriate. Of course, this serves reactive ends in that the event coordinators and supporters didn't have to admit their complicity in stereotyping and demeaning native cultures, and their anger worked rhetorically to

protect themselves, and the innocence of their shared identities, from critique. In this way, white racial anger, as I have identified it here, works to reestablish and protect our dominant narratives on race while silencing—by invalidating—any potential counter narratives.

To do so, white racial anger may appeal to the very irrationality of emotion, as is the case in the labeling of the objections to the "Indian" event as overly sensitive. Peter Lyman explains how the "labeling of the speech of subordinates as 'emotional' and 'unstable' [. . .] is a linguistic justification for *interpreting* anger as symptom, and a refusal to hear that which threatens the legitimacy of one's domination" (67). In this way, the very emotional character of the utterance discredits the claim of racism. I have been arguing that through a performance of emotional rules, whiteness becomes, over time, to be read as rational at the expense of "emotional" others. This may begin to answer the Spelman's question I opened this chapter with. That is, why, if emotionality is read as intrinsic to the bodies of women and people of color, have white men so successfully appropriated the constitution and expression of anger? As I will argue in the following section, white racial anger has worked to delimit the objects of judgment, and those who have the very authority to judge, and in doing so, has been able to reestablish the innocence of whiteness, both in its universal and particular forms.

Anger, Judgment, and the Innocence of Whiteness

One of the joys of working on a project concerned with racism, social justice, and whiteness is that everyone has advice or a cautionary tale to offer. Unfortunately, this also results in people feeling free to explain how I am misguided, wrong, or even hateful

toward whites. Recently my mother asked if she might read some of my work, and I obliged, sending her a seminar paper I had just completed. A few days later I received an email from my her, containing mostly good natured questions for clarity. However, toward the end of the email, my mother offered that she was concerned that I expected too much from America, that I expected it to work for a justice that no other country had achieved. She told me that "we," being whites and Americans, are just not that bad. I wanted to write back in bold letters stating what should be obvious: being for racial justice doesn't entail being against whites. However, I have made such a retort to many people on many occasions, and never has it calmed their fears or reduced their anger. It seems that the issue is not so much about my perspective, but, rather, it has to do with the close relationship between whiteness and innocence.

We can see how innocence comes to stick to whiteness when we consider disparate student reactions to a pedagogy which seeks to promote a benign diversity compared to those which promote anti-racist ends. Gail Griffin has identified how many white, liberal students prefer "integrationist" readings of multicultural texts because such a reading "takes 'integration' as a way to forgiveness, a way out of guilt, and a way to avoid white particularity" (6). Lewis also powerfully notes how the assumption of white innocence, as allowed for by "integrationist" readings, "is perhaps as powerful and possibly as corrosive as the parallel assumption of black criminality" ("What Group" 636). Sarita Srivastava, reflecting on her ethnographic work with various Canadian feminist organizations, similarly argues that "the defensive, angry, tearful, and emphatic responses to anti-racist challenges may be traced in part to the struggle to maintain a good, innocent, and egalitarian moral identity" (44).

In this way, it is possible to read many of the angry responses to anti-racist material as originating from a desire to protect the presumed innocence of whiteness—an innocence which is made possible through whiteness' occupation of the universal and normative position. However, I'd again like to complicate the assumption, as Wiegman does, that the power of whiteness derives from this universal, rather than particular, position. For, as Griffin argues, "integrationist" readings avoid focusing on black particularity, and then, the opposing white particularity. I wonder, however, if innocence is not also working powerfully in claims of reverse racism that develop from the particularity of whiteness. For example, if we consider how legal discourse often denigrates the victims of identity based crimes, we can see how the vague quality of innocence operates. Both legal and popular discourses tend to blame the victims of sexual harassment and abuse. That is, it is common that perpetrators offer that the victim *asked for it*. A woman may be blamed for the crime committed against her based on her clothing, demeanor, or sexual history. Similarly, perpetrators of hate crimes against LBGT individuals often claim that they were overcome by rage because the victim had made a sexual advance.

It seems that the *lack of* "innocence" of the victim translates to the perceived "innocence" of the perpetrator, or at the very least, the justifiability of his/her crime. We might also consider how this operates in terms of racial politics. Claims of reverse racism often gain credence by referring to an "undeserving" person of color who is wrongly privileged by civil rights legislation. That is, through a process of reading laziness, criminality, and immorality into the bodies of people of color, a white particularity becomes attached to innocence. Whiteness then justifies its claims of

reverse racism by referring to the *lack of* innocence of people of color. According to this logic, racial inequality is the result of the failure of people of color, and whiteness has, then, been wrongly held culpable for "their" failures.

What I hope this analysis illustrates is that an easy reading of white innocence as arising from its universal position is, at best, limited. Such a reading does not adequately consider how a process of attaching innocence to whiteness is accompanied by a secondary process of marking the failures of "others" to live up to national ideals. If anger, then, arises *both* from a desire to maintain the innocence of whites in racial inequality as allowed by colorblind ideology *and* from the denigrating readings of people of color, we can see how anger necessarily contains a rhetoric of judgment. That is, anger works rhetorically to decide who can be judged, and for what indiscretions one can be judged for.

After all, the claim that anger involves a judgment is not a new one. William Fortenbaugh has noted how Aristotle's conception of anger depends on systems of belief, and, then, "that angry men are necessarily enraged at someone or other" (14). W.V. Harris explains that since anger entails a judgment of the object of one's anger, to be angry "is to put oneself in the position of judge, which for a woman in a patriarchal society means to be insubordinate" (138). Spelman, then, examines what anger means in terms of the expresser or judge:

To be angry at him is to make myself, at least on this occasion, his judge—to have, and to express, a standard against which I assess his conduct. If he is in other ways regarded as my superior, when I get angry I at least on that occasion am regarding him as no less than my equal. So

my anger is in such a case an act of insubordination: I am acting as if I
have as much right to judge him as he assumes he has to judge me. (266)

This rhetoric of judgment, as expressed so clearly by Spelman, begins to address why some expressions of anger are deemed appropriate while others are dismissed. Spelman continues to explain that since people in dominant positions desire to keep their power, "expressions of anger by people in subordinate positions are much more likely to bring on violent reactions than expressions of other emotions" (271). In this way, the anger of women and people of color poses a threat to our dominant narratives, and then, the anger of the dominant works to silence or invalidate the anger of the original speaker.

Similarly, Brenda Silver has identified how "the anger of the original speaker evok[es] the anger of the person who attempts to silence the upstart through an act of linguistic fiat" which signifies "a move to establish or reestablish authority" (340). In this way, anger is not merely political commentary on a perceived breach of colorblind ideologies, but is a rhetorical act designed to maintain the connection between whiteness and innocence by delimiting who holds the authority to judge. Of course, those in power desire, consciously or not, to maintain the authority to pass judgment while shielding themselves from any judgment. It is for this very reason that the anger of people of color is so unilaterally discredited while white racial anger is far more likely to become persuasive and effective. That is, white racial anger appeals to myths of white innocence, to the lack thereof of people of color, and seamlessly meshes with dominant power relations.

Let me offer an example to illustrate what I mean by the rhetoric of judgment, and how this is present, yet possibly different, in anger arising from both white universality

and white particularity. The example again comes from my first-year composition course where we seek to investigate the rhetoric of racism. This class was particularly resistant to our conversations of racism. Some of this may be attributed to that eighteen of the nineteen students appeared to be white, and most grew up in relatively wealthy suburbs of a large Midwestern city in the state. There was also a handful of students whose dress and speech marked them differently—three or four students in this particular class came from rural ranching communities north of the university, and they often wore cowboy boots and straight blue jeans that clashed with the easy California style of the new millennium. While the class was almost completely white, there was a level of class diversity which allowed for different interpretations of racial events. That is, while many of the suburban students expressed discomfort with talking about race, or anger against certain claims, many of the rural working class students' personal experience denied the existence of white privilege. That is, their working class backgrounds, in many ways understandably, complicated any notion of white privilege.

In this class I provided readings and classroom materials that seek to challenge and confront our dominant narratives about race, while inviting students to bring in their own experiences and outside materials to complement or challenge these counter-narratives. In this particular semester, two of the readings I assigned were anti-racist journalist Tim Wise's "Of National Lies and Racial Amnesia," read in the second week of the semester, and Anzaldúa's "How to Tame a Wild Tongue," which we read about a month in. Both articles work to challenge our dominant narratives of white innocence and the value of integration and "sameness."

While anger was a common response to both articles, they were received quite differently. That is, students were more likely to dismiss Anzaldúa as angry and unreasonable. Yet while they disliked the overtly angry tone present in Wise, they were more receptive to it. It seems that since Wise is a white male from the south, his anger is less judgmental. Or, rather, his privileged subject position grants him the authority to pass judgment. On the day we discussed Wise's article, students began to voice their discomfort and anger not with Wise's claims, but with the anger that accompanied these claims. A usually reserved student, a woman from a rural community, blurted out that she'd like to know Wise's racial identity. I opened this question up to the class, and many students pointed that they had determined, through textual cues, that he is, indeed, white. The anger that had started to build in the class dissipated just as quickly. Now, the students didn't seem to accept his claims any easier, even as they noted they were in many cases valid. They did, however, lessen their objections to his tone and anger. That is, his anger toward whites and racism was viewed as more acceptable than what they perceived to be Anzaldúa's anger. I find it fascinating that the reception of racial anger so heavily depended on the identity of the expresser. Could it be, that Wise as a white man, posed less of a threat than that of a woman of color? Or, rather, were my white students more comfortable with being judged by a white person rather than a person of color?

It is possible to see in this example how my white student's anger may have arisen from the disruption of their universal racial position, or from a perceived attack on their investment in "sameness." After all, what really angered them about Anzaldúa's article was that she seemed to be asking for inclusion and recognition and yet, through her anger, denied whites the possibility to feel with her (a poor reading of Anzaldúa, and I

admit, one that I failed to adequately address with my students). So, in this instance, anger results from the impossibility of a feeling of "sameness" and unity. However, their relative receptiveness to Wise's anger might challenge such a reading, or at least, the totality of this reading of white racial anger. It seems that since Wise was white, that his anger did not disrupt this feeling of "sameness," at least not to an equal degree. That is, white particularity worked to justify the expression of anger.

This example, then, illustrates the tension between universality and particularity, but also offers that the expression of anger also *works on* the content of an utterance within racial discourses. Recalling my student's critique of Anzaldúa, it was her anger that denied them a feeling of "sameness." That is, as Sue Campbell argues, dominant individuals and groups are able to rationalize their refusal to hear claims of racism "through a critique of the mode of expression" (51). Campbell recalls how at an academic conference, a white woman asked Audre Lorde to "[t]ell me how you feel but don't say it too harshly or I cannot hear you" (qtd. in Campbell 51). Campbell explains that the "interpreter may, as Lorde's critic does, defend her withdrawal by suggesting that the same feelings could be framed in quite a different manner, that Lorde could express anger while doing nothing harsh, and that it is a reasonable condition of the interpreter's continued participation" (51). This critique is reminiscent of how the defenders of the "Indian" event on my campus attempted to exert their authority to explain how the offended ought to feel.

However, this critique of Lorde also illustrates how labeling the speaker as bitter, or by responding with anger works

to block the strategy of anger by both shifting attention away from the blameworthy behavior to the mode of expressing blame and by shifting the responsibility from the people who could do something about the blameworthy behavior to the expresser herself, who is now meant to account for *her* behavior. (Campbell 51)

This narrative allows us to see the rhetoric of civility and judgment, as implicit in the expression of anger, at work. Lorde's critic highlights and condemns not Lorde's claims, but the anger that accompanies them. By doing so, as Campbell argues, the critic is able to *silence*, by rejecting, Lorde's anger which disrupts any feeling of "sameness," but also the innocence of whiteness. As Campbell notes, such a rhetorical move is not meant to challenge, but to silence (51). In silencing Lorde's anger, by labeling it as inappropriate and thereby refusing to hear it, the critic also shifts the object of judgment from herself and the identified racism, to Lorde's expression.

Now, we can also see how this "linguistic fiat" operates in two complimentary ways. First, we might consider, again, how it is not Lorde's identification of racism that is objectionable, but the anger which accompanies it. Second, it is not that anger is never appropriate, for I imagine, Lorde's critic wouldn't object, at least not as forcibly, to Lorde expressing this anger in a private setting with friends or family. However, at an academic conference, this anger becomes divisive, hurtful, and grounds for the critic to remove herself from the discussion. In this case, the critic held the power, by virtue of race but also because she didn't have to listen, and, then, was able to call upon discourses of civility to silence and reject Lorde's discussion of racism.

Working the Cracks of Performative Whiteness

Similar to Jaggar's claim that emotional hegemony is not total, neither are the performances of whiteness. That is, Butler points out that the "subject is not *determined* by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act" (*Gender Troubles* 185). Butler continues to argue that the "critical task is [. . .] to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them" (*Gender Troubles* 188). Further, she identifies subversion as possible in "*working the weakness in the norm*" or "a matter of inhibiting the practices of its rearticulation" (237).

Following this chapter, might the weakness of performative whiteness be its ultimate inability to conceal its selective inhabitance of the universal and particular racial locations? This necessarily entails that subversion cannot be the admittance of whiteness as raced. Further, in what ways might we take up emotional performances as part of this project? In the following chapters I will examine more closely the circulation of white racial anger and attempt to illustrate pedagogical opportunities to rearticulate whiteness in the first-year composition course.

Chapter 3: Stickiness, Undeserving "Others," and the Objects of White Racial Anger

One hundred years later another kind of minstrel show is being staged. Instead of Aunt Jemimas, Uncle Toms, and city slicker dandies, a new cast of equally outrageous characters have been constructed: quota queens, unqualified beneficiaries of preferential treatment, reverse discrimination victims, and angry white men. Instead of applying greasepaint, the performers in this minstrel show hide behind clever linguistic constructions. Rather than speaking in dialect, they talk the language of "fairness," "color-blindness," and "meritocracy." While the content has changed, this modern minstrel show provides another stage for constructing and expressing white (especially heterosexual male) identity. And like its earlier incarnation, the new minstrelsy assures white men who they are not: not unqualified recipients of unfair advantage, not responsible for past racial injustices, not beneficiaries of government assistance. (Wellman 313)

How does government and welfare dependency come to be read as intrinsic to certain bodies and not others? That is, in remaking the minstrel shows of the early twentieth century, how are white men able to mobilize the language of fairness and meritocracy to mark bodies of color as in breach of such values? As Wellman argues, discourses of affirmative action enable "Americans to fashion a new set of social selves; to construct whiteness and masculinity as *not*-affirmative action, or as the *opposite* of affirmative action" (324). We can begin to see how fairness and colorblindness get stuck together through repeated utterances, masking continuing racial inequalities. We can further identify how signs of failure under colorblind ideals become attached to bodies of color. This is not a novel claim, for as Lewis argues, ideologies of racial superiority have not vanished, but instead are "expressed less in terms of innate

characteristics and more in terms of 'cultural' attributes, manifested often through the use of code words such as 'urban,' 'inner-city,' 'welfare,' and 'crime'" (*Race* 63).

What is a worthy investigation, however, is to examine how these signs become meaningful in and through racial discourses. Ahmed argues that "signs become sticky through repetition; if a word is used in a certain way, again and again, then that 'use' *becomes* intrinsic" (91). That is, through a process of repetition, similar to that of racial performance, signs come to stick to other signs and objects *as if* they were intrinsic to them. Stickiness as argued by Ahmed, "involves a form of relationality, or a 'with-ness,' in which the elements that are 'with' get bound together" (91). We can begin to offer, then, that welfare dependency, laziness, and undeserving-ness come to stick to bodies of color more forcibly and with higher occurrence due to the very repetition of their utterance. We can say that a sign which is sticky is "an effect of a history of articulation, which allows the sign to accumulate value" (Ahmed 92). For example, through a process of repetition, following President Reagan, it is no longer necessary to identify "welfare queens" as black single mothers—the sign of wrongful dependency has come to stick to such bodies.

However, what is it that sticks? Ahmed argues that objects themselves are not sticky, but that they can become sticky through "an effect of surfacing, *as an effect of the histories of contact between bodies, objects, and signs*" (90). We might also consider how emotion, and anger specifically, is bound up with this stickiness. We can notice how the very reference to "welfare queens," or of unfair advantage under affirmative action programs, often results in expressions of anger from the dominant group. This anger, however, does not lie in the subject (white men), nor in the object (people of

color, welfare recipients, race-conscious policy), but "is produced as an effect of its circulation" (Ahmed 45). That is, it is the objects of white racial anger which circulate—through a process of repetition, signs of dependency and reverse discrimination circulate, stick to other signs, objects, and bodies, which are then read and judged as in violation of colorblind and meritocratic values—resulting in the expression of anger.

In this way, as Wiegman has argued, the language of civil rights, including colorblindness, works to protect whiteness and its material advantages ("Whiteness" 116). In economies of difference, welfare dependency and violations of colorblindness get stuck to bodies of color and race-conscious remedies, thereby reproducing the relative innocence of whiteness. Or, rather, this economy of difference works to reproduce white bodies as in alignment with colorblind ideals—as "good" citizens. The workings of emotion, then, are central to how bodies take up, consent to, or conversely resist racist discourses. Trainor, one of the first to investigate the connections between race, affect, and pedagogy, has argued that instead of viewing racism as arising from a rational desire to protect one's privilege, we should "understand racist discourses as a series of 'emotional' beliefs that are not necessarily about race per se" (3).

Importantly, Trainor has argued that students learn these emotional rules through explicit and implicit lessons in school (21). Trainor also notes how schools "provide 'race disciplining'; that is, they teach the emotional frames within which racist discourses become persuasive" (25). In this way, Trainor has importantly supplemented the identification of how schools work as racializing institutions, as put forth by Lewis and others, with the framework of critical emotion studies. However, as I will argue in

this chapter, while Trainor acknowledges that racial discourses are also emotioned discourses, she doesn't unpack what it is that emotions *do* in racial discourses. That is, how do these emotioned rules contribute to the construction of racial identities and the drawing of the color line, or more closely, how do the breaches of these rules come to stick to certain objects and bodies rather than others? This analysis is not necessarily a critique of Trainor's work. Rather, Trainor has provided so much depth and detail through her ethnographic study, that I believe it calls for continued discussion. Notably, Trainor has explored how emotional hegemony is functioning in the everyday, and for this, I am indebted to her work.

Following these questions, I will examine how emotions, and anger specifically, circulate and become persuasive in racial contexts. It will be important to note not that discourses are indeed emotioned, but to inquire into what emotions *do*. For example, by not accounting for how signs of dependency, laziness, etc., get stuck on bodies of color and certain objects—claims of racism or race-conscious remedies—we risk portraying such bodies and objects as the origins of white racial anger. That is, it's the very failure of certain bodies to live up to social ideals which causes a judgment resulting in the expression of white racial anger. Let's again consider the symbolic and political function of the "welfare queen." In assuming that white racial anger is simply targeted at "undeserving" welfare recipients, we fail to consider how this anger circulates to create the boundaries and distinctions between communities. Through its circulation, anger participates in a construction of a "we" that is inherently different from and opposed to a subjugated "them." Further, this circulation situates this "we" as in accordance with colorblind, individualist, and meritocratic values.

We can begin to consider, then, how this circulation works to delimit racial possibilities and block change. As I will argue, one effect of this circulation is that it moves white bodies in such a way that they cannot inhabit anti-racist positions, or hear anti-racist claims. In this way, if we do not adequately consider the function and circulation of emotion, our pedagogical responses to racist discourses in the classroom promises to be ineffective. To more closely examine this circulation I will investigate how the violations of these emotioned rules come to stick to certain bodies and objects rather than others, highlighting the history of articulation and contact which makes such a process possible. I hope, then, to offer a raced theory of emotion by re-reading narratives from Trainor's ethnographic study, and in doing so, to examine the racialized production of anger in the anti-racist classroom.

The Economy of Anger and Whiteness

In *Rethinking Racism: Emotion, Persuasion, and Literacy Education in an All-White High School*, Trainor offers a critique of both critical race theory and anti-racist education when she argues that racism

does not necessarily arise from a need or desire to protect white privilege, from ignorance of oppression, or from a lack of exposure to difference. As long as the origins of racism are seen in these terms, curricular and pedagogical responses aimed at ameliorating racism—everything from multicultural exposure to difference to critical interrogations of whiteness—will be ineffective. Rather, I suggest instead that we

understand racist discourses as a series of 'emotional' beliefs that are not necessarily about race per se. (3)

Trainor began to consider the emotional dynamics of racism when she and the teacher she worked with, Elizabeth, were discussing their students' essays about Maya Angelou's *I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings*. Looking over the essays, Elizabeth admitted that she wouldn't have noticed the racism implicit in the students' work if Trainor wasn't there to point it out. Elizabeth continues, "[i]t's not that I don't think they're racist, don't get me wrong, or that it doesn't need to be addressed in these essays, but [. . .] what I mostly notice is that the tone and the critiques of Angelou are exactly the same as the critiques of Nordan and Salinger a few weeks ago" (78). From this insight, Trainor begins to consider how racist discourses aren't about "race per se," but, instead, that learned emotional rules are applied in racial discourses metaphorically. That is, according to Trainor, the students' hostility toward Angelou did not necessarily stem from racist beliefs, but were informed by emotional rules of individualism—Angelou, similar to Holden Caulfield, did not take responsibility for her own actions, and instead, "whined" about her condition—which were learned in school.

Complicating the central assumptions of critical race theory and anti-racist pedagogies, Trainor has argued that instead of viewing racism as arising from a rational desire to protect one's privilege, we should "understand racist discourses as a series of 'emotional' beliefs that are not necessarily about race per se" (3). In identifying how white students are emotionally *invested in* discourses of individualism, which promote colorblind and meritocratic values, Trainor offers cogent critiques of both critical race theory and anti-racist education, as well as their applications. That is, since racist

comments do not necessarily originate in beliefs about race, but were emotioned positions, "curricular and pedagogical responses aimed at ameliorating racism—everything from multicultural exposure to difference to critical interrogations of whiteness—will be ineffective" (Trainor 3). Following Trainor, common and commendable calls to make whiteness and privilege visible may fail to intervene in racist discourses if we do not more fully consider how student's are emotionally *tied to* and *invested in* these discourses.

Interestingly, Trainor also argues that students' racist comments and views often developed out of a desire for community and racial harmony. Since students were emotionally invested in individualist and colorblind discourses, claims of racism or race-conscious arguments interrupted their feelings of equality and of community. For example, Trainor notes that for many of the white students in her study, such as Laura and Michelle, claims of racism, or the failure to acknowledge that most whites aren't racist, interrupted their feelings of community and disabled change. As I will argue later in this chapter, Michelle and Laura's comments not only complicate privilege as property metaphors, but also place the burden of interracial community on people of color, asking them to undertake emotional labor—through the transference or channeling of anger and counter-discourse—in order to maintain "good" feelings of community and unity.

In this way, Trainor has made a significant contribution to critical race studies, anti-racist pedagogies, and critical emotion studies. I wonder, however: if these emotioned responses are, indeed, not simply about race, how did they come to be persuasive within racist discourses? Drawing from Marxism, Ahmed has argued

emotions accumulate value through their circulation, and that the objects of emotion—individualism, or Angelou, who students believed to be in violation of individualist discourses—only seem to have affective value through "an erasure of [the emotions'] histories, as histories of production and labour" (11). As I have been arguing, reading the emotioned responses in racial discourses as not about race and racism is only possible through such an erasure. That is, we need to more fully consider how emotions work to stick signs to bodies, and, then, how this stickiness allows emotions to circulate and become persuasive.

Let's consider how this is operating in an example from Trainor's ethnographic study. Reflecting on a conversation she had with a white student named Laura, Trainor highlights the role individualism and personal responsibility—emotioned rules learned in school—played in Laura's seemingly racist comments. The conversation began with Trainor asking Laura to revisit comments she had made a few days earlier about how her father admonishes the valuing of laziness and welfare dependency of "certain cultures" (99). Trainor asked Laura if, instead of labeling certain cultures as lazy, we might instead consider the social factors that impede a community's opportunities, well being, etc. (99). Dodging the question, Laura asserted that "you can't blame your problems on other people," and continues to offer J.D. Salinger's white character, Holden Caulfield, as evidence (99-100). Importantly, Trainor notes how it would be limited to view Laura's avoidance of the topic of race as an attempt to protect her racial privilege or her whiteness. Instead, Trainor highlights Laura's reference to personal responsibility, again, an emotioned rule that was taught and enforced in school. Indeed, Trainor notes

that "Laura judged [Caulfield] as harshly as, if not more harshly than, she did Angelou" (100).

While Laura refers to the same social values in her critique of both Holden Caulfield and "certain cultures," I want to resist de-racializing this discourse or her comments. Returning to Wellman's narrative of the contemporary minstrel show, we can see how signs of laziness and welfare dependency tend to adhere to bodies of color far more often and strongly than to white bodies. So while Holden may be in violation of individualist discourses, his body is not marked as such. That is, the signs of laziness and dependency may adhere to white bodies, but not because of their race, and as a result, these signs can become unstuck. In the case of the "welfare queen," the signs continue to stick despite the identification of institutional and structural racism.

I have witnessed this sticking in my own student's discussions of race, and my failure to consider the emotional dynamics at work kept me from persuading students to view race and racism differently. For example, this past semester I have asked students in two different courses to consider evidence of structural inequalities and theorize the causes of such inequalities. In the first instance, at the beginning of the semester I had my first-year composition course, comprised of almost twenty students, all but two of who were marked as white, read a brief article discussing how the economic recession is not colorblind. Notably, this article reports that the unemployment rates among African Americans was higher pre-recession than the national unemployment rate at the height of the recession. To my delight, students expressed surprise and even disgust that such a reality still existed in 2010. However, as we moved in a full class discussion to consider the causes of this inequality, students offered that cultural differences were to blame.

That is, a few students offered softly—it seemed that early in the semester they were fearful of being labeled as racist—that African American culture may just not value education and hard work to the same degree as "American" culture.

The second instance was in "Race and Literacy," an upper-division course for mostly junior and senior English majors. Out of forty students enrolled in the class, only four of five students identified as a person of color or biracial. I was team-teaching this course with a fellow graduate student and a tenured professor from the department, but on this day, over a month into the semester, I led discussion, asking students to consider and discuss statistics published by the state's board of education about racial inequality in high school graduation rates and academic performance. Indeed, the statistics were staggering. However, students again referred to cultural deficiencies to explain the unequal outcomes—communities of color didn't value education; the numbers were skewed by illegal immigrants. Following Trainor, we might notice that emotioned discourses of individualism and meritocracy informed my students' readings and arguments. Further, we might consider how these arguments worked to protect and reproduce affective communities of unity and the accompanying feelings of equality. It is clear that rational projects of making privilege visible without giving sufficient attention to the working of emotion promises to return, at best, mixed results.

However, what is most interesting in these examples is how signs of deficiency stuck to bodies of color and for many students satisfactorily explained unequal outcomes on non-racial factors (although, following Bonilla-Silva and others, I would argue that "cultural" is the politically correct term to discuss the short comings of racial groups). It seems that while individual whites, such as Holden Caulfield, may be read as in

violation of social values, such signs stick and circulate with bodies of color (it is important to note here that working class whites do not always have the same racial privilege as middle and upper class whites). Similar to the instance with Laura, my students were able to call upon dominant narratives to explain away racial inequality without explicitly referencing race. That is, through a history of articulation, as in the case of "welfare queens," it is not necessary to highlight race, but through a process of repetition, certain signs come be racialized and stand in for racial utterances.

We might also consider how emotions circulate through the sticking signs to other bodies, objects and signs in these examples. If emotions operate relationally—in between bodies and objects, bodies and bodies, etc—they also circulate through this process of sticking. In my classes, white racial anger may circulate by sticking to signs of deficiency, thereby absolving white culpability in racial inequality. In this way, white racial anger circulated to reconnect students to meritocratic values. While Trainor identifies how racist utterances are imbued with emotioned rules and discourses, such as individualism, she does not offer how bodies are connected to such discourses. If the goal of anti-racist pedagogy is to effect change in racial beliefs and politics, then we must consider the circulation and effects of emotion within racial contexts. Let's consider Ashley's response to reading Angelou:

Ashley: This book [. . .] is like, oh you should feel sorry for us. And it's never going to be ok. But now they can go to school, and they aren't denied opportunities all the time. It's illegal now to deny them. So what more do they want? And [Angelou is] like, it's never going to be ok, and I don't agree. It's illegal. Black people want us go get down on our knees. That's what I think. And

I think [they] are trying to say white people are never going to be good enough, and we're better than you because of the past. The message I get from this book is it's white people's fault. It's like, oh I'm going to whine about this, and talk about everything that happened to me. It's race. She wants white people on their knees.
(Trainor 96)

Trainor again identifies how discourses of individualism inform Ashley's response—Angelou blames whites—and in doing so, violates Ashley's feeling of equality or sameness (96). This reading of Ashley's response to Angelou's claim of racism is important for how it accounts for how students are emotionally invested in certain social values and positions.

What is missing, as I have been arguing, is how emotion is working to connect Ashley to these discourses and what the effects of its circulation are. Drawing from Ahmed, we might consider how emotions are working between bodies and objects to connect Ashley to such discourses. Ahmed identifies how "[a]ffect does not reside in an object or sign, but is an effect of the circulation between objects and signs" (45). In this way, the body is not the origin of emotion, but is "simply one nodal point in the economy" (46). For instance, we can see how Ashley feels Angelou is blaming whites for her condition, and further, how the process of being blamed slides into anger. Ashley, then, is angry that Angelou blames whites rather than taking responsibility for herself. We can recall from our discussion in Chapter Two that anger entails being against something. In this case, Ashley is against race-conscious claims which posit racial and structural, rather than individual, causes of inequality.

However, we might also consider how anger is circulating in Ashley's response to *move* her into alignment with individualist and multicultural ideals, while marking Angelou as in failure of these ideals—as "other." In this way, Ashley's anger is working rhetorically to shift the object of judgment from whites (and then herself) back to Angelou, whose own anger represents a breach of civil discourse. Ashley was not alone in this objection. Trainor notes that another student, Jacob, was sympathetic to Angelou's experiences with racism, "but took issue with her tone" (77). We can again see how anger works rhetorically to delimit the objects of judgment, and then, who can judge and be judged. However, we might also consider how anger circulated to reproduce the white student's identities as "good," "innocent," and as in alignment with individualist ideals. This necessarily means that anger worked to move the white students *away from* Angelou and her critique. That is, the "innocent" and "good" white subjectivities are reproduced by marking whites as different than "others." Not only is the case of racial "others" (Angelou), but Trainor cogently notes that middle and upper class students deployed non-racist subjectivities to differentiate themselves from working class whites.

We might consider how stickiness aids this move in two important ways. First, we have already seen how signs of laziness, dependency, and lack of personal responsibility become stuck to other signs, objects, and bodies. In this case, Angelou's blackness marks her as in violation of individualist discourses. As signs of violation stick to black bodies, anger is able to circulate here to re-stick these signs to Angelou, thereby invalidating her critique, and then move white bodies away from Angelou, away from her critique, and into alignment with the very discourses and ideals that Angelou fails. However, as we can see most clearly in Jacob's objection, signs of anger and irrationality

also stick to bodies of color. Without accounting for how emotions circulate we risk allowing this sticking to continue. That is, the unmarked circulation of anger works to naturalize and, then, depoliticize, black anger. It is this stickiness, this naturalization of black anger that allows whites, and often students of color, to so easily reject claims of racism.

I'd like to more clearly reflect on how the performance of white racial anger participates in this process of sticking signs to other signs, objects, and bodies. Donna Strickland and Ilene Crawford have identified how racial identities have been "historically premised in part on the perceived character of morality of white people in contrast to racialized Others" (71). If we consider performance as that which opens up the future "precisely [through] the process of repeating past conventions, as to repeat something is always to open up the (structural) possibility that one will repeat something with a difference" (Ahmed 93), we might theorize how white racial anger repeats such a process of sticking. That is, the performance of white racial anger contributes to the resignification of white innocence in relation to denigrated others. Following Ahmed, these signs are repeated in such a way that allows for difference, in that white innocence is no longer based on biological or racial superiority, but through sticking signs of failure—laziness, dependency, criminality, emotional violence—to bodies of color.

Anger plays a leading role in this process of sticking, for as Srivastava notes, it "may be traced in part to the struggle to maintain a good, innocent, and egalitarian moral identity" (44). Srivastava argues that the angry responses from white Canadian feminists to "anti-racist challenges rest on attempts to recuperate a just feminist identity and community" (45). Anger, then, may function as a sticking mechanism in that its

performance resignifies the innocence of whiteness through a complimentary process of denigrating bodies of color. We would be wise to consider, then, as Trainor does, whiteness not as static property, but as a "dynamic, emotioned, and rhetorical process" (128). In this way, white racial anger carries out the work of sticking signs to bodies, thereby reproducing and utilizing the privileges associated with whiteness.

If anger works to "bind" signs to other signs, objects, and bodies, it may also form "blockages" which inhibit signs "from moving or acquiring new value" (Ahmed 92). The naturalizing of black anger, then, causes a blockage which inhibits anger from utilizing its subversive potential, its energy, by sticking it to signs of irrationality. Let's recall Ashley's statement that "[b]lack people want [whites] to get down on our knees" (96). We can see, then, that it is not only Angelou's perceived violation of individualist discourse, but her "irrational" anger that undermines her identification of racism. In erasing, or failing to consider the history of production and the circulation of white racial anger, we fail to consider how black anger comes to be naturalized and marked as irrational. Attempting to rationally identify racial privilege or inequality, or even investigating how white bodies are emotionally invested in social values, then, promises to be ineffective in challenging the circulation and effects of white racial anger.

Blocking Change, Feeling the Status Quo

In talking about emotioned performances of whiteness, the rhetorical functions of anger, and anti-racist pedagogy, I have really been talking about change, or the difficulty thereof. In the introduction to *A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition*, Dale Jacobs and Laura Micciche

suggest that emotion also enables and disables change. In particular, we are interested in emotion's capacity to construct a culture of movement in opposition to one of ossification, and in thinking about emotion as a central ingredient in the act of persuasion that has the potential to move our discipline in new directions. (2)

One of the reasons why working for change is so hard is because as Worsham argues, one of the functions of ideology is not only to locate individuals within a social hierarchy, but to organize "their affective relation to those locations" ("Afterword" 162). This necessarily entails that rational project of making privilege visible will often be unsuccessful.

We might again consider the political problems associated with empathy and shame. Lauren Berlant has cogently argued that empathy, or compassion as appropriated by compassionate conservatism, functions to reproduce the power relations between those who feel empathy, and those who are felt for. This operated powerfully in media responses to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Media, government, and charitable organizations flooded our television and computer screens with horrific images of destruction, death, and poverty. The message was to feel for the Haitians, and then to give money to aid in the recovery because "we" are more fortunate than "they." During this media coverage, I witnessed little to no recognition of the legacy of American imperialism (past and present) which inhibits the Haitians' rights to self determination, and which directly undermines the ability to respond to such a natural disaster. Ahmed has also identified how shaming collectivities, let's say whites for slavery and Jim Crow, works to reposition those collectivities as "good." That is, "we" feel shame for past

mistakes, and thereby are reintegrated into a "good" post-racial society. We can see how these collective ways of feeling work to reproduce dominant power relations and impede change through denying an investigation of imperialism and racism, or a reallocation of wealth and power.

It follows that anger against racism and injustice might disrupt the "good" affective communities as constructed through the circulation of empathy and shame. That is, anger is represented as being in direct opposition with the resulting "good" feelings of unity and equality. Anger expressed against past and continuing racism is not only viewed as in violation of individualist and colorblind discourses, but as in violation of the accompanying affective communities. A fascinating project would be to examine how national apologies for slavery—which requires white citizens to feel shame for slavery and empathy for people of color—reproduce those citizens and nation as "good," and then how it inhibits modern claims for redress. Once "we" have felt for "others," "we" again become "good" members of the community, and, then, anger against racism or counter-discourse becomes marked as irrational and as in violation of those colorblind and individualistic ideals. In this way, empathy and shame function in and through racist discourses to delegitimize anger against racism and injustice and to curtail racial change.

It is important, then, to note how white racial anger functions rhetorically to silence or invalidate the anger of people of color, and how this allows for whites to feel "good" about race relations. Supported by discourses of individualism, multiculturalism, civility, and others, whites are able to delimit appropriate and inappropriate emotional expressions in the anti-racist classroom and, then, reproduce dominant ways of feeling. Further, as Jacobs and Micciche note, Jaggar argues that "emotions seen as threatening or

unacceptable to the dominant culture can also be used as a spur for social change" (5). It seems, then, that white racial anger functions to curtail change in two significant ways. First, through a process of performative signification, anger does the work of sticking signs to bodies. Second, white racial anger denies the subversive energy and potential—through silencing or invalidating—of anger which threatens dominant racial hierarchies and ways of feeling.

As I have been arguing, white racial anger also works to curtail change, both in terms of redress for structural racism and in the anti-racist classroom. Let's consider how anger's sticking of signs to bodies inhibits racial justice. Ahmed argues that while "it is possible the signs will be cut off, the resistance to being cut off, in the stickiness of the sign, relates to this historicity of signification" (93). Recall how performances of white racial anger function to re-stick certain signs to bodies of color, and signs of innocence to white bodies. This process of resignification, generates a stickiness of such signs, which adhere to certain bodies, and because of its repetition, resists being cut off. This is one of the reasons why rational projects of identifying privileges, or of offering different realities about racial politics are often ineffective in generating change. These strategies overlook the ways in which emotions bind bodies to certain positions, but also to certain ways of feeling in relation to those positions.

Returning to Ashley's angry response to Angelou, we can see how this is operating persuasively in both cases. Her performance of white racial anger works to stick signs of irrational anger ("[b]lack people want [whites] to get down on our knees") and signs of weakness and dependency (whining about racism) to Angelou (Trainor 96). By repeating past conventions of black inefficacy, Ashley persuasively re-sticks these

signs to Angelou with the effect of naturalizing and depoliticizing her anger, and to attack her character. The performance of this white racial anger also functions to move Ashley away from Angelou's critique, and into alignment with color-blind and meritocratic social ideals. In this instance, we can see how white racial anger works to curtail change, and in doing so, to maintain dominant ways of feeling about race.

As a result, the anti-racist goals of investigating racism and whiteness have been blocked. Following such insights, Wendy Ryden has argued that "critical pedagogy might well pay more attention to the rhetorical and social function of emotions, in particular anger" (85). Strickland and Crawford specifically call educators to make "visible the emotional investments and performances that constitute whiteness" (69). Without such efforts, we may allow white racial anger to circulate unaffected, thereby undermining and inhibiting the goals of anti-racist pedagogies—change and racial justice.

The Violence of Affective Communities, Whiteness, and Emotional Labor

In Chapter Two I argued that white racial anger, along with discourses of civility, works to delimit appropriate and inappropriate emotional expressions. We might consider, then, how the expression of white racial anger towards anti-racist materials and utterances demands students of color to perform emotional labor in order to allow for the continuance of affective communities based on feelings of equality, and to protect themselves from potential backlash. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on how this emotional labor is not performed by repressing anger, but through the transference and channeling of that anger—whether it be against racism, resistance to anti-racist

pedagogies, or otherwise—thereby matching their emotional expressions to "appropriate" conduct as determined both by civility, and white racial anger.

As Trainor argues, it is not only the politics of anti-racism that whites object to, but also its emotional constitution. Speaking of a discussion on an academic listserv in the months following September 11th, Ryden describes how the emotional expression of a counter perspective disrupted the unity of the prevailing affective community: "when [the consensus of feeling grief] was threatened with a political objection, the writer, rather than challenged for his politics, was charged with being 'inappropriate' and 'tactless'" (83). Here, I want to reflect on how ways of feeling come to be a characteristic of bodies or collectivities. In this case—the aftermath of September 11th—how did grief come to be a desirable constitution of American communities, and why other emotional responses were labeled as "inappropriate," or as in violation of the affective community? Further, it is important to consider the emotional labor asked of bodies who do not share those feelings, or do not feel them in the same manner.

Again returning to Trainor's example of Ashley, it is not only the fear of being blamed for racism, the anger of Angelou's critique, or individualist discourses that informed Ashley's response. Rather, Angelou's identification of racism "violated emotioned rules about [. . .] 'feeling equal' or the same" (Trainor 96). This feeling equal, however, does not merely appeal to colorblind and humanist ideologies that posit that we are all the same on the inside, or to post-racial notions of racial equality. If we consider Jacob's empathy towards the racism Angelou experienced, but also his rejection of her angry tone, we can begin to see how this "feeling equal" is also about "equal feelings." That is, Trainor argues that many of the students' racist statements and claims

of reverse racism "were rooted not so much in actual belief about race and racism but rather in students' desire for feelings of community and racial harmony" (93). It seems that non-racist students desired to be a part of an affective community with people of color, a community which was threatened by the negative emotions associated with racism (Angelou's anger, the act of being shamed).

This is evident in Trainor's analysis of the comments made by Laura who believed that "[a]cknowledging racism threatened the possibility of interracial harmony and negated the positive feelings [she] derived from her desire to get along with others" (94). In this conversation, Laura expresses anger at being blamed for racism, and attempts to locate her middle-class whiteness as "good" and "innocent" by identifying racism as individual acts by rural, working class students. As Trainor notes, we can see how middle-class membership is wrapped up with having a non-racist subjectivity. However, also noteworthy is how students like Laura wanted to feel "good" about race and racism. We can again theorize that one of the effects of the circulation of white racial anger is to silence the anger or critiques by people of color who identify racism in order to preserve an affective community which carries positive feelings, and allow for a "good" white subjectivity.

Discourses of civility operate here in powerful ways. Middle-class whites, in relative positions of power, are able to delimit appropriate and inappropriate subject matter, tone, and emotional expressions. White racial anger is also operating here in two significant ways. First, as I have been arguing, to silence or mark the anger of people of color as irrational and inappropriate, thereby undermining critiques that might disrupt or challenge dominant power relations and ways of feeling. Second, we can see how

Laura's anger works to further delegitimize anger against racism by othering working class whites. As Laura says, "[w]e're not all like that"—meaning that only "other," working class whites hold racist beliefs (94). We can see, then, how white racial anger, combined with discourses of civility, work to delimit what issues can be raised, who can raise them, and the appropriate emotional constitution of such statements. More research is needed into the political problems of empathy and shame, both of which may operate to reproduce "good" white subjectivities.

However, here I'd like to more closely examine the effects of affective communities and civility on people and students of color. For example, if we return to Laura's claim that acknowledging racism threatened community and also that people of color needed to acknowledge that all whites weren't racist, we begin to see a trend that is not uncommon in racial discourses. Laura's statement places the burden of interracial community and harmony on people of color. That is, if interracial communities are to feel "good" for whites—free of the tension, shame, and rage characteristic of racial division—people of color must channel their emotions concerning race and racism into "appropriate" expressions. According to Laura, it is not structural or institutional racism that needs to be addressed, or whites who must carry the burden of reconciliation, but instead, people of color are asked to meet certain terms of engagement. That is, when those in power marshal discourses of civility in order to maintain affective communities that deny or silence other emotional constitutions and expressions in the anti-racist classroom, students' of color are asked to perform heavy emotional labor.

In *The Managed Heart: Commercialization and Human Feeling*, Arlie Russell Hochschild identifies emotional labor as that which "requires one to introduce or

suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others" (7), or "to produce an emotional state in another person" (147). In her study, Hochschild analyzes how flight attendants were to remain positive, always be smiling and friendly in order to generate a pleasant flight experience for costumers. We might also consider how significant emotional labor is asked of students of color in the anti-racist classroom. Such a process has important political and pedagogical implications as Brad Peters notes how the tendency of whites to disregard or appropriate the comments of people of color may not only silence these perspectives by also lead to these students' erasure in the classroom (105).

I realized the powerfulness, as well as the invisibility, of emotional labor in a discussion with a bi-racial student from the upper division course, "Race and Literacy," who had stayed after class to apologize for his lack of participation in class discussions. To be cynical, this student was certainly concerned about being down-graded for his lack of participation. While he had not spoken up in class, he was nonetheless regularly present, active in small group discussions, and his written assignments marked him as an intelligent and thoughtful student. On this occasion the student nervously explained that he did not feel comfortable expressing his views on issues of racism in an almost entirely white class comprised of many outspoken students who resisted the course topic and any effort to discuss racial inequality.

It seemed that his fear of speaking up was working on two levels. The first was that although he had a white parent and an Asian-American parent, that he had grown up identifying as an Asian-American, and his experiences as such staunchly conflicted with the views of many of the white students. He explained that he was fearful that if he did

speaking up, he wouldn't be able to contain his anger at some of the student's views. That is, following discourses on civility, he realized that his anger was not welcome in the classroom, especially when this anger clashed with the post-racial feelings of equality, or the anger of white students. He feared that in participating he would come to be in violation of these rules.

However, this fear was also a fear of retribution. That is, he was concerned that if he expressed his views, displayed his anger against racism, he would no longer be a member of the classroom community. Due to his light skin, he felt that he was able to "pass" as white, and if he was honest with the class, they would no longer view him as such. Now, this fear could be marked as stemming from his struggle to negotiate his own racial identity—as he expressed, his experience in college and of "passing" as white had led to struggles over how he should identify, and if he was "allowed" to identify as a person of color given that he could access and utilize certain privileges associated with whiteness. However, I believe such a reading fails to consider the politics associated with racial discourses and the anger that often accompanies it. As he explained, he feared that he would be the target of white backlash, that white students would angrily respond to him, or that he would be silenced and ignored in our classroom community.

Sitting there listening to this student, as a young teacher inexperienced in how to respond to issues of such weight, I was struck by the emotional labor this student was performing. Reflecting upon this moment, I now see how that this emotional labor has exchange value in that it aids in the production and maintenance of a post-racial, affective community of "good" feelings concerning race. Following Hochschild, this student performed emotional labor in order to deny his anger in attempt to not disrupt the "good"

feelings, and also to be accepted as a member of that community. We might also consider how this emotional labor participates in the circulation of white racial anger. As I have been arguing, white racial anger works rhetorically to position white subjectivities as "good" and as in alignment with multicultural ideals, but also to silence or invalidate the anger of people of color. In this example, we can see how the circulation has been effective in silencing such students. What sticks in my mind, however, is not only the political but also the personal costs of this circulation. The emotional labor had been a source of stress and concern for this student who feared to participate in class, and then feared that his grade would suffer as a result.

Interestingly, I would not have noticed this labor if the student had not brought it to my attention. As Hochschild has noted, emotional labor is "seldom recognized, rarely honored, and almost never taken into account by employers as a source of on-the-job stress" (153). Further, in the "Afterword" of a later addition of the book, Hochschild recalls how many flight attendants confided in her that much of their anguish "was linked to the sheer invisibility of [their] emotional labor" (200). Indeed, it seems that critical and anti-racist pedagogies have largely overlooked the emotional labor performed by students of color in our classrooms, especially in largely all-white spaces. When emotional labor is discussed, it tends to be in terms of recognizing the burden placed on the students of color to speak for their race or communities (a heavy burden). What is missing is the invisible and unmarked emotional labor such as that of the student in my course who had to fit his expressions—through silence or through denial of perspective—to maintain or gain access to the dominant affective community. How as teachers, can

we better account for such heavy emotional labor? In terms of this student's concern over his grade, how can we account for the labor being performed in silence?

Relevant to the scope of this chapter, how can we intervene in the circulation of white racial anger to reduce this emotional labor, or to disrupt the affective communities that demand students of colors' silence and civility? That is, how can we create the space for students of color to practice "compositions of difference," or write themselves into academic discourses in such a way that does not require them to labor under consensus and civility? More generally, if emotion is central to how bodies move, or rather, is central to enabling and disabling change—as argued by Worsham, Micciche, Jacobs, and others—how might critical educators intervene in this circulation? That is, if we take anger and other emotional expressions seriously, what political and epistemological possibilities might lie in the intervention in, or negotiation of, white racial anger?

Conclusion: Pedagogical Implications and the Critical Negotiation of White Racial Anger

In response to the "Indians" event that I described in Chapter Two, the University President sent out a university-wide email addressing the issue and introducing the VP for Diversity—a new campus position. The President should be commended for addressing the issue head on, for not attempting to brush it under the carpet, and for unilaterally condemning the event and its supporters. Fortunately, the email offers recognition of Native American students being harassed, a stern denouncement of cultural stereotyping, and an admittance that "a segment of our student population [. . .] has been made to feel less safe and less welcome on our campus because of their ethnic origin."

However, the email also appeals to familiar tropes of diversity, sensitivity, tolerance, and civility, which despite their good intentions, often get redeployed in such a way to support racist positionalities. In fact, as an artifact, we might notice how the email calls upon and reifies the emotioned rules of racial dialogue on campus. The email states that it is time to "elevate this entire discussion to one that is appropriate to a community of higher learning" and that "we are challenged now to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a campus that welcomes and respects all people—where we listen to one another, learn from one another, and resist the temptation to just dismiss or out-shout those with whom we disagree." Finally, the President offers that "[u]nderstanding what racial intolerance is can be the beginning of accepting our own responsibilities in confronting it and the first step toward deepening understanding among all of us who

come from different backgrounds and cultures, but who share a common bond as members of this community." Is it surprising, then, that these well intentioned words and guidelines for interaction get appropriated and reactively applied by the dominant group to delimit discussions about race and racism?

Again, my intent is not to disparage the President, for he certainly did not take the safest path in addressing this issue. In fact, it is probably more common for campus administrators to ignore such a tension, or to handle it behind closed doors with disciplinary action. Still, there is too much resemblance between this email, and the shameless handling of the continuing racism present in the University of California-San Diego's campus newspaper, *The Koala*. In the spring of 2009, furthering a horrid tradition of racism, *The Koala* published an article from a white writer who listed the things, in stereotypical and derogatory manner, he had learned from "black culture." San Diego news stations covered the incident, including a protest held by many students of color on the UCSD campus, which garnered enough attention that the University President attended the protest, and spoke to the students. At one point, in front of a crowd of angry and hurt students of color, the President remarked that she hoped she would be able to shake each of their hands at graduation, and that they could put this issue behind them. A student of color, standing just feet away from the President, quickly and solemnly retorted that these students would never be past this issue.

Now, to be fair, the President's email at my University was far less egregious. Present in both addresses, however, is a desire to restore a racial community centered around "good" feelings. The question becomes, who are these good feelings for, and who is able to participate and belong to such a community? I believe that in both cases, it is

white students, and the white university community which are the target of healing and "moving forward." While the President at my University was much more clear in his disapproval of the racism, he still offered a path towards restoring the racial community by shaming those involved. As Ahmed as argued, shame can function to "reintegrate subjects in their moment of failure to live up to a social ideal" (106). That is, the feeling of shame reconfirms the necessity of the failed ideal, as well as the subject's commitment to that ideal. In this case, shame operates to reintegrate the students who had professed racist beliefs by reproducing the salience of colorblind ideologies and civility, and the students' alignment with these social ideals.

What if, for instance, the President at my University had called for the creation of campus space where students of colors, and even white allies, could voice their pain and anger against the continuing injustice and strife? Or, if rather than identifying sensitivity and historical knowledge as the necessary medicine, had he encouraged all students, faculty, and administrators to, rather than move past the issue, delve in deeper? In fact, in an exploratory email, I proposed to the head of the student organization who helped organize the campus protest, that we might generate an oral histories project where students of color might talk about their journeys, their successes, as well as their pain and concerns with the racialized university atmosphere. I had hoped that we could post these histories on the university website, or even hold a showing for students to attend and discuss.

I never received a response. Now, this may have been because the organization was wary of a project proposed by a white male, lacked resources or, of course, because there was too little time. It also occurred to me, however, that such a project would

almost certainly clash with the emotioned rules of civility and unity which were put forth in the President's email. Or, further, it is possible that this student organization believed that highlighting difference and interrogating racism would worsen the tension and make students of color even less safe. It is clear to me; however, that racial justice will not follow from calls for sensitivity and community without an interrogation of racist discourses.

Returning to Trainor, we could argue that these emotioned rules get metaphorically applied in racial discourses, such as when the well intentioned white professor warned the protestors of the "Indian" event to not respond with anger (see Chapter Two). As I have sought to argue in this thesis, however, these emotioned rules do not merely get applied metaphorically, but that these rules are always already *racialized*, and that they get reinscribed in racial utterances. The President's call for civil and classy (proper for a higher institution of learning) conduct at once is a critique of those who said the protestors were "whining," but also undercuts any attempt to identify and challenge the racism allowed under calls for sensitivity and community. It is from these political realities that I have sought to identify a *raced* theory of affect, focusing specifically on the circulation of white racial anger in the anti-racist composition classroom (see Chapter Three).

If anger, then, operates powerfully and persuasively within the anti-racist classroom to curtail change and reproduce dominant racial hierarchies, anti-racist pedagogies should better consider and address its effects. Trainor argues that "[u]nderstanding, and ultimately changing the emotioned rules that give rise to [the ways of feeling which disallow racial justice] is central to the work of persuading students to

see race and racism differently" (89). To build upon these insights, I will consider the pedagogical implications of addressing the circulation of white racial anger in the first-year composition course which deals with anti-racist materials. Rather than offering a pedagogical model, I am fascinated by the possibilities of the intersection between anti-racism and critical emotion studies, namely, that of an unflinching interrogation of racist discourses with a focus on how these are always emotioned discourses. In this conclusion, then, drawing from Gilyard and Trainor, I will explore how educators might critically negotiate white racial anger—through a process of historicizing emotions and emotional guidelines, and of establishing a working vocabulary of emotion with students—to promote a critical *affective* consciousness.

Gilyard's differentiation between multicultural and anti-racist pedagogies is useful: the former "often gestures toward a formulaic polycultural curriculum, the latter insists on unflinching criticism of racist domination and its impact on education" (47). However, as Trainor and others have argued, anti-racist pedagogies often fail to address students' emotional lives. Without a nuanced discussion of emotion, we can assume that anger in this classroom would be viewed as a disruption of rational discourse, or a risk of the critical classroom—in both instances as something in need of management. I use the inclusive term management to refer to strategies of prompting students to undertake a rational discussion, to always remain civil, or of avoiding the emotional dynamics of racist utterances altogether. As I have sought to demonstrate in this thesis, managing white racial anger in the classroom relegates emotion to a disruption of rational discourse and, then, fails to consider how students are emotionally invested in and moved by racial discourses.

Similarly, while Trainor has taken the important step of noting how students are, indeed, invested in these discourses, our pedagogical responses may still be limited to discussions of beliefs and ideologies as we do not get a sense of how anger connects students to these discourses through its circulation. As I argue in Chapter Three, Trainor does not adequately consider the circulation of anger or how this anger always is, and continually comes to be, racially inscribed. What if, as I have attempted to do in this thesis, we closely examine the intersection of the work of the likes of Gilyard and Trainor? Gilyard cogently argues that composition studies have failed to "comprehend and address the racialized or racially inscribed atmosphere of the university" (47). If we couple this insight with Trainor's argument that learned emotion rules are inscribed in racial discourses, we might begin to formulate a more critical response to white racial anger. That is, emotion rules of civility and rationality are imbricated within racial discourses, and work to serve the interests and material power of the dominant group. The emotional investments and expressions of members of that group, then, are not merely reflective of racial hierarchies, but are also constitutive in the production and maintenance of them.

Again, given the powerful rhetorical and political work emotion does, attempts to manage white racial anger—or to squelch it through interrogations of ideology—promise to be ineffective. Instead, I would like to offer that we might critically negotiate white racial anger in order to disrupt its circulation and make tangible its effects. West and Olson differentiate negotiation—a "utopic Rortian 'conversation' that is supposed to lead [. . .] to a negotiated consensus (150)—from critical negotiation, which "more

consciously evokes its Latin roots: *to create a sense of unease*" (151). In this way, West and Olson remove critical negotiation from the liberal ideal of compromise.

Critical negotiation shares important theoretical assumptions with Boler's pedagogy of discomfort. In both cases, educators encourage students to denaturalize that which they have taken as natural. This is especially important in the realm of the emotional, as emotions are largely considered as primordial and biological. Boler states that "a central focus [of a pedagogy of discomfort] is to recognize how emotions define how and what one chooses to see, and conversely, not to see" (177). Following the work of Worsham, Strickland and Crawford theorize "asking students to think about how their performances of language and emotion locate them as raced, gendered, and classed subjects" (72). A strategy of critical negotiation, then, has "the capability to disarticulate what we thought was ordinary, such as older forms of racial identity, and to rearticulate them along more positive and complex lines" (West and Olson 155).

To consider how this might look in the classroom, let's return to Trainor's instructive example of Ashley's response to Angelou. Realizing how Ashley's anger is operating powerfully to dismiss Angelou's anger and critique as irrational, and to locate Ashley and her white peers as "good" post-racial subjects, we might prompt Ashley and others to more closely examine that anger. That is, we might ask what about Angelou's claim, tone, or emotional expression angers them, or more generally, whether anger is always undesirable and inappropriate? In this way, we may begin to prompt students to historicize and critique the emotioned rules that influence their views on race, and further, lay the groundwork to denaturalize these rules. Educators might also offer an

inquiry into the implications of feeling equal, but also affective communities of "equal feeling."

Such a strategy certainly views anger, and other emotions, as powerful political and rhetorical phenomena, and it is sure to cause discomfort and unease amongst the students. However, if we recall Ahmed's argument that it is not emotions that circulate, but the objects of emotions (11), we might consider more critical ways of addressing white racial anger. That is, what would happen if we invited students to consider the circulation and effects of white racial anger with a focus on how it does the work of sticking signs to bodies and of moving bodies into alignment with social values and ideals? Instead of addressing anger as something we or others have, we might ask what it is that anger does.

Let's recall the classroom moment in my first year composition course when a usually reserved (and resistant) white student demanded that she'd like to know the racial identity of anti-racist journalist Tim Wise (see Chapter Two). In an assigned reading, Wise had offered an angry and strident critique of the media's treatment of the comments made by Rev. Jeremiah Wright. I initially took pleasure and felt smug that the palpable anger in the classroom dissipated as my students discovered that Wise was a white man from the south. If at first I was relieved, later I became fascinated about how the identity of the speaker so thoroughly altered how the angry character of the anti-racist utterance was taken up by white students. However, looking back I realize that I let a potentially powerful opportunity pass without critique or interrogation. What if, instead of managing the student's anger in this way, I had critically negotiated that anger? Since I felt that a

large portion of my almost entirely white class was angry, and because this was one of the first days of the semester, I might have asked the students to write *about* their anger.

This could be done in many ways, and in offering examples of how I might have negotiated my students anger more effectively, I hope to begin, rather than conclude, the discussion. As I argued in Chapter Two, anger contains a rhetoric of judgment, and my students seemed to object to being judged—to being the object of anger—when they believed Wise was a person of color. Since this anger lessened when it was revealed that Wise was white, we can posit that following Spelman, as a member of the dominant group, his anger was not an act of insubordination. What if I had asked my students to consider the element of judgment in their anger toward Wise? That is, if their anger decreased when they realized that Wise was white, did they object less to being judged by a white man rather than a person of color? A simple question I could have posed to the entire class was why they responded unevenly to Wise as a person of color and to Wise as a white man?

A few weeks later in the semester, my students were less receptive to the anger of a woman of color, Gloria Anzaldúa, and while some of this might be due to my poor handling of her text, it is clear that my white students were uncomfortable being judged in this context. If in the first instance, I could have prompted my students to consider the element of judgment in why they felt more comfortable hearing the anger of a white man, in the second, we might investigate the rhetorical function of white racial anger—to silence, or mark as irrational, what was perceived as Anzaldúa's anger. In both cases, critically negotiating white racial anger moves us beyond a sentimental education. That is, the goal is not merely to ask students to share their levels of anger or discomfort with a

text, to *confess* their feelings, but to investigate how their anger is working rhetorically. Importantly, critically negotiating white racial anger entails an interrogation of power.

This approach requires students to historicize racism and its accompanying ideologies, but to also place their emotioned performances in their historical context. This might include historicizing discourses of civility as they operate so powerfully to label anger against racism or injustice as inappropriate and irrational. As a starting point, following Stearns, educators might prompt students to consider how modern notions of civility developed with late capitalism as employers and management needed a compliant work force. Stearns even illustrates how managers in the mid-twentieth century were not subject to the strict guidelines of emotional restraint that their workers were. Using a familiar space of the Greek democracy, following Spelman, we might ask students to consider how discourses on emotion and civility labeled the anger of women, slaves, or non-property owning whites as unacceptable. In this way, we might begin to demystify anger, and students may begin to critically engage their own emotioned performances.

In inquiring into the performances of white racial anger, we prolong the contact between the subject, object, and the competing discourses through which anger circulates. If anger is a form of against-ness, which in the case of my students, works to curtail racial change and race-conscious remedies, it marks a moment of contact between the past and the future. White racial anger works powerfully to close off that future and to naturalize the status quo, as well as the ways of feeling which sustain it. By critically negotiating this anger, bodies are forced to feel this moment of contact, to consider their material circumstances and histories. This contact is sure to cause unease, but as West and Olson

argue, resists "letting social relations get too settled and congealed into 'the way things are'" (161).

Such a pedagogy also requires that, together with our students, we develop a working vocabulary of affect and emotion. In doing so, it is important that we note that this is indeed a working, or shifting, vocabulary. This is not only because our understandings of emotion may increase as the semester passes, but because emotion is never a given, but is always created in relation. We might discuss, then, how anger functions and is experienced differently depending on the relations within which it circulates. Again, anger served different rhetorical functions and circulated with differing intensity depending on whether my students read Wise as white or as a person of color. The sociality of emotions, to use Ahmed's terminology, requires us to produce a shifting and malleable vocabulary that acknowledges the complexity and shifting component of emotion. Establishing such a shared vocabulary might allow educators to prompt their students to critically interrogate their emotional investments and constitutions, rather than denigrating or romanticizing them.

Feeling Unease and Affective (dis)Communities

Prolonging the contact during the circulation of white racial anger may work to denaturalize the effects of this anger, and the bodies' inhabitation of social norms (post-racial discourses of individualism, meritocracy, and colorblindness). The goal is for students to feel the contingencies of their social relations and then rearticulate them in such a way that opens up the future to racial justice, or at the very least, to race-conscious claims. Important work is done even if students only do the latter—if in critically

negotiating the circulation of white racial anger, they open themselves to see the claims that the anger had silenced. This is especially the case in terms of white students learning to hear and acknowledge the anger of people of color as this anger represents energy, grievances, and its object is change (Culley; hooks; Lorde). Further, "[l]earning to hear the anger of others, without blocking the anger through a defense of one's own position is crucial" (Ahmed 178). As discussed in Chapter Three, such an emphasis might work, over time, to reduce the emotional labor undertaken by students of color who fear disrupting the prevailing affective communities.

Hearing the pain and anger of others necessarily means that anti-racism and racial justice might not feel "good" for many whites. That is, the limiting affective communities which function through empathetic identification might dissipate, and in its wake, discomfort and difference will remain. As I write this, I am struck by the remembrance of President Obama's trope of unity in his speech "A More Perfect Union," given in March of 2008 in response to the comments made by Reverend Jeremiah Wright. Obama honestly detailed the differences that divided Americans, but called for us to come together over common goals and ends. Now, I wonder if we might have been better off hearing the collective anger represented by Wright. This is not a claim for nationalism or essentialism, but one that recognizes that the anger of people of color develops from real and continuing racism and oppression.

Learning to hear this anger necessarily means that we might not feel unified, or that we might not be able to rejoice in being "past" racism. But it is not the acknowledgment of difference that divides us—it is racism. Hearing this anger also

means that whites cannot share in the pain that spurs it. Ahmed sums up this position well:

The call of such pain, as a pain that cannot be shared through empathy, is a call not just for action, and a demand for collective politics, as a politics based not on the possibility that we might be reconciled, but on learning to live with the impossibility of reconciliation, or learning that we live with and beside each other, and yet we are not as one. (39)

This represents not only an indictment of empathetic affective communities, but also of civility. As I have argued in this thesis, civility works to delimit what can be addressed, and who has the power to decide. Civility unilaterally reinforces the power and perspectives of the dominant group, and works to ensure the silence of counter-discourse. If anger is a form of against-ness, our pedagogical responses must be against the circulation of white racial anger. That is, we must work toward affective (dis)communities that don't push equal feelings, but feelings of dissonance and difference.

DisComforting Ending

Attempting to end a work of this scope is sure to be fraught with discomfort, fear, and the desire for more time and space. As I write this conclusion, I am uncomfortable with a tension that many readers have certainly noticed by this point. That is, it may seem odd that while I critique tropes of community, I often employ the rhetorical "we" throughout this thesis. Not only does this "we" work to establish a community, but in this case it reinscribes the boundaries of a racialized community—when I use "we" in this thesis, I have been primarily speaking to other white compositionists and anti-racist

instructors. Unfortunately, this is a tension which I cannot adequately resolve, but it is a rhetorical choice that I have allowed to survive revision. In this final section, I'd like to explore the rhetorical functions of this "we," and offer admittedly provisional insights for action and future research regarding the political potentials and problems of this "we," and for an emotioned critical pedagogy.

The first reason I have chosen to primarily write to white instructors in mostly white settings is because too often discussions of race have centered on communities of color. As Gilyard notes, in most classrooms, "'race' simply inscribes another othering discourse," and Gilyard continues to call for whites to focus "the discussion on themselves and how they have been constructed racially" (48). Similarly, Lewis argues that there has been too little research into "how race operates in all-white or almost-all-white settings" and, then, that "it is important to study the construction of whiteness and white racial identities" (12). I find these calls compelling, and they further lend themselves to my situation as a grad student and teacher at a largely white university in the mid-west. Much of my experience as a teacher attempting to implement an anti-racist curriculum in almost entirely white classrooms has informed this thesis.

This leads me to the second reason I have chosen to continue with the racialized and problematic "we"—I have attempted to blend genres in this thesis, and my experience as a white male is integral to my experience in the anti-racist classroom. As I noted in the introduction, I do not have the space here to consider how the emotional expressions and constitutions of the teacher effects white racial anger, or the larger emotional dynamics at work. More research is needed into the emotional constitutions of instructors, but also into how their identities impact the anti-racist classroom as well.

That is, similar to my students' relative acceptance of Wise's anger since he was white, I imagine my experience as an instructor would have been different if I had been, say a woman of color. This is not meant to offer a narrow argument that whites (or men) are better suited to teach issues of race or gender in largely white or male spaces, but to acknowledge that the power associated with my subject position in the classroom certainly affected my (and the students') experience.

With that said, we would do well to give increased attention and research into how this "we" gets employed in the anti-racist classroom. For example, I have come to realize a tension between curricular and pedagogical practices. While the curriculum and inquiries I present to my students are designed to resemble Gilyard's call for an "unflinching critique" of racist discourses, I inadvertently set up affective communities centered upon a unified community. In speaking to my students, I attempt to perform empathy and understanding for their experiences, and I often deploy an unproblematized "we" to represent our classroom. While such methods are important to create a collaborative environment, and to start where the students are, I would be wise to better consider the emotioned dynamics of this community. That is, similar to the email from my university's President, this affective community carries raced and classed emotional guidelines for interaction which often perform hegemonic functions.

How, then, in promoting a collaborative, critical, and humane pedagogy, can educators perform empathy and understanding with their students while also creating an environment that does not promote affective communities which delimit appropriate emotional constitutions and subject matter? Further, as I have argued earlier, we need more research into how teacher identity and emotional constitutions affect classroom

dynamics. If we hope to better address students' affective lives, we would be remiss not to pay closer attention to their emotioned performances in the classroom. One way to do so would be to expand the case studies Bonilla-Silva, Lewis, and David Embrick conducted in which they examine the stories whites and people of color tell about race. This interesting study certainly includes discourses of emotion in that these stories are always emotioned stories, but what if the study was expanded to explicitly investigate the stories people tell about race and emotion? Through these stories we may gain a better understanding of how both whites and people of color view anger in and through racist discourses. Such a study would be valuable because as Abu-Lughod and Lutz have argued, how we talk about emotion is not just reflective of emotional constitutions and guidelines, but it is constitutive of them.

We might also be particularly aware of how our emotional constitutions, and the affective communities and guidelines we promote, ask students of color to conduct emotional labor in largely white settings. As I discuss in Chapter Three, I believe that far more research is needed into the emotional labor that is required of students of color in these spaces. That is, we might better account for, and then lessen, the emotional labor undertaken by students of color. We might also learn, then, to read student's silence or seeming withdrawal from course material in a different light. Since labor always has value, we might consider how we can either reduce or better account for this labor, and, then, put forth a more humane education.

Lastly, I have chosen to talk to white educators at largely white institutions because I believe that race has all too often been labeled as not relevant as a result of racial diversity, or as too controversial, and, then, has gone uninvestigated. In my first-

year composition courses and the upper division "Race and Literacy" course I have team-taught, I have witnessed the staunch resistance that accompanies anti-racism in white settings. I point this out to empathize with other educators, but also to underscore the need for more discussions about race. The type of work needed for racial and social justice cannot be carried out in one semester alone, or by one required course, or even by one department (say the Ethnic or Women's Studies departments). It requires the efforts of many.

As I have argued in this thesis, important work is to done by "mak[ing] emotion a critical category—an occasion for interrogation" (Worsham 163). Indeed, new epistemic and political possibilities may emerge through a nuanced investigation of the emotional dynamics which function in and through racist discourses. Our examinations of discourses of civility, rationality, and racial anger may be particularly productive as anger against racism has the potential to act as what Jaggar has called outlaw emotions. In making our pedagogies more critical—through an investigation of the rhetorics of emotion—we may do the important work of demystifying anger and, then, better challenge and disrupt racism.

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