

Dissertation

The Absence of Gender Equity in Social Discourse: The Void Where Women's Voice Should Be

Submitted by,
Eileen Connell
Department of Sociology

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado
Summer 2006

UMI Number: 3233333

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3233333

Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY


April 5, 2006

WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE DISSERTATION PREPARED UNDER OUR SUPERVISION BY EILEEN CONNELL ENTITLED THE *ABSENCE OF GENDER EQUITY IN SOCIAL DISCOURSE: THE VOID WHERE WOMEN'S VOICE SHOULD BE*, BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING IN PART REQUIRMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Committee on Graduate Work




Advisor: Patricia Atchison



Committee: Joop Kim



Committee: Lori Peek



Outside Committee: Carol Cantrell



Department Chair: Prabha Unnithan

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE ABSENCE OF GENDER EQUITY IN SOCIAL DISCOURSE: THE VOID WHERE WOMEN'S VOICE SHOULD BE

This research will uncover the historical legacy of standpoint theory by exploring the writings of Harriet Martineau and bringing her application forward to Dorothy Smith's definition of the theory. By analyzing the contemporary symbolic modes of discussion in the discourse of sociology, I will show how the feminist methodology of standpoint theory varies in giving legitimacy to women's voice in social academic publication. I will also delve into the work of alternative contemporary standpoint theorists to compare/contrast the epistemological differences between their insights into standpoint theory and Dorothy Smith's. Using standpoint theory, my personal journey toward finding voice and feminist consciousness will inform the narrative. The final application of this research will be to explore the past 45 years of academic discussion: first in the mainstream journal for sociology, *Social Forces*; and second in the feminist journal, *Signs*. Through this analysis I will uncover the representation, or lack of, women's voice in dominant academic discussion. The importance of this finding is to uncover the need for understanding of both women and men in academic research, which will lend itself to a more equitable field of study.

Eileen Connell
Department of Sociology
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523
Summer 2006

Contents

Introduction.....	3
Language Within Academic Discourse.....	9
Feminist Methodology and Voice.....	10
Feminist Methodology Comparison	
Phenomenology.....	15
Ethnomethodology.....	17
Symbolic Interaction.....	20
Origins of Standpoint Theory	
Harriet Martineau.....	25
Dorothy Smith.....	30
Contemporary Standpoint Theory	
Nancy Hartsock.....	35
Patricia Hill Collins.....	37
Sandra Harding	38
Comparison of Martineau and Smith.....	39
Application of Feminist Voice.....	45
Social Forces Analysis.....	47
Signs Analysis.....	52
Personal Narrative.....	59
Discussion.....	67
Appendix I.....	70
References.....	73

Introduction

Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with the absolute truth.

Simone de Beauvoir (1970)

Women's voice has been silenced through years with the use of objective discourse that disallows women from the scientific field of exploration and academic application. Feminist methodology gives voice and validity to women in the academic realm. The principal task of feminist methodology has been to redress the absence of women in the history of social and political thought. This perspective identifies difference, along with the deconstruction of essentialism, which inhibits alternative insight. This will attempt to legitimate women's voice and women's experience as valid contributions to sociological discourse. Yet, has been argued that feminist methodology may not be a legitimate scientific form of discourse (Roland and Martin 1994, Enslin 1994). This research will explore and argue the need for feminist methodology to reclaim the voice of women, an effort that has far reaching implications for social policy, social values, and academic representation.

This dissertation will first explore the history of feminist methodology through the lens of standpoint theory. Second, it will analyze the use of feminist methods tied to interpretive theories that surround this issue of how women's voice is often discarded and/or co-opted within the discourse of the academic disciplines. I will conclude with showing an analysis of the importance of using situated knowledge through feminist methodologies, and exploring its place among options for finding the female voice within sociological theory. This will be done with a historical comparison of Dorothy Smith's

standpoint theory and derivatives thereof, and the analysis of Harriet Martineau's prescient theoretical and methodological framework. I will analyze the importance of how feminist methodology is located within agency, via the application of standpoint theory, at times using my personal journey to explain finding voice and feminist consciousness.

The manner in which I will analyze the application of voice will be through two major academic journals; the social science journal *Social Forces* and the feminist academic journal, *Signs*. These two journals were chosen due to their accepted scholarship as well as their longevity in academic discourse. The questions arising out of the interpretation of these journals are:

- 1) Has women's voice over time remained subtly silenced?
- 2) Have women acquired the ability to engage in scientific discussion without being marginalized and co-opted through male doctrine?

I also understand that I am venturing into this project carrying a white woman's perspective on these issues. I do not imply that my personal journey should be applicable to all women of all ethnicities. Lugones and Spelman write eloquently regarding this issue within the context of feminist methodology (1983).

Communication and discourse can be roughly defined as "a dynamic, systematic process in which two levels of meanings are created and reflected in human interaction with symbols" (Wood, 1993a). A significant body of literature exists across all social science disciplines, which acknowledges that the power of symbols lies in the kinds of thought and action they enable. Philosopher Ernst Cassirer, in his analysis of human symbolic usage, identifies implications of symbolic ability: symbols aid in the

construction of social definitions, allowing for self-reflection as hypothetical thinking. Symbolic thought also allows people to define, organize, and evaluate both experiences and others (Fishman 1978). The implications of symbolic behavior illuminate ways in which verbal and written communication express cultural views and expectations of women and men. Male generic discourse reduces awareness, and ultimately excludes women.

Many questions regarding women's voice within the academic discipline have arisen, with few answers related to the implications of lost voice. We must first address the basic issue of language and the cultural power that is held within discourse. Have women been historically co-opted into writing in the male voice? The answer is undeniably yes. However, there is a difference between language and voice. It is imperative to first understand the significance of gendered language in historically silencing women within academia.

"The most immediate issue for feminist perspective on the natural sciences is the deeply rooted popular mythology that casts objectivity, reason, and mind as male, and subjectivity, feeling, and nature as female" (Fox Keller 1995:7). This affects language comprehension, views of personal identity, and perceptions of women's presence in various spheres of life (Henley 1989). The English language accentuates dichotomous relationships, thus emphasizing polarized thinking and perpetuating stereotypes. Regardless of how impartial sociological jargon appears, language is not neutral. Related to gender, language expresses cultural devaluations of females and femininity.

Discourse or communication, then, is one of the primary practices that structures society (Wood 1993a). Socially endorsed meanings are communicated through structures

and institutions, which serve to announce, reflect, and perpetuate gendered cultural views. Because gender is a salient issue in society, institutions uphold preferred meanings and encourage individuals to conform to what is collectively endorsed as “appropriate” masculine and feminine behavior. Messages reinforcing cultural views of gender are pervasive and frequently go unchallenged, perpetuating sexist stereotypes and cultural beliefs.

Language not only expresses cultural views of gender but also constitutes gender identities. Because language conveys masculinity and femininity, generalizable differences in how men and women communicate are apparent. Research bears out this expectation by documenting systematic differences in the way women and men typically use language. This research is also applicable to the descriptive analysis of female/male communication styles typically found in sociological discourse. Women generally use communication to establish and maintain relationships. Women’s writing tends to display identifiable features that foster connections, support closeness and understanding, and emphasize equity (Johnson 1996, Aries 1987). Women’s speech more characteristically follows an interactive, inclusive pattern. Women’s language and communication supports inclusion of other ideas, fosters sympathy and comprehension, and tends to ask probing questions for an understanding surrounding the subject of attention (Wood 1993a, Wood 1993b, Inman 1993). Fishman describes female communication as “conversational maintenance work,” with women sustaining conversation and maintaining interaction. Women’s discourse is responsive, personal, and concrete, with more details, personal disclosures, anecdotes, concrete reasoning, and an interpersonal voice (Tannen 1990a, Wood 1993b, Campbell 1973, Hall and Langelier

1988). This analysis of feminine voice is directly symbiotic with the current ideology of femininity, in which the prescription of “appropriate” female behavior became internalized within our culture. Within this patriarchal culture, women’s language is often viewed as gossip, and unimportant. Women do an impressive amount of relationship work through discourse.

Throughout my own journey, thus far, I have encountered a great amount of difficulty in expressing myself, my voice. Coming out of an abusive marriage after eight years, I had created an identity that was absorbed in self-doubt. When I ventured into academics, I was continually challenged in academic discourse and often told I was unable to accomplish the goals that I had set for myself. In the midst of my Masters thesis, I was informed that I was not to use Sociology of Emotions as a theoretical perspective in understanding women’s emotional consequences after domestic violence. Through persistence and legitimizing Sociology of Emotions as a form of recognized discourse, I was able to move forward. As bell hooks states, “It was in that world of woman talk...that was born in me the craving to speak, to have a voice, not just any voice, but one that could be identified as belonging to me” (1989:5).

Masculine communication regards discourse as a means to exert control, preserve independence, and enhance status, and is often seen as an arena for negotiating prestige (Tannen 1990b). Male communication establishes and defends personal status and ideas through challenge and assertion (Derlega and Chaiken 1976, Lewis and McCarthy 1988, Saureer and Eisler 1990). To establish status and value, masculine speech exhibits knowledge, skill, ability, and avoids the disclosure of personal information that might accentuate any weakness or vulnerability. Men speak instrumentally, using language to

accomplish objectives, and express problem-solving efforts focused on garnering information, discovering facts, and suggesting solutions (Bellinger and Gleason 1982). Men's voice is commanding, and expressively assertive (Aries 1987, Eakins and Eakins 1976. Kramarae and Jenkins 1981, Torne and Henley 1975). Male use of language is typically more forceful, direct, authoritative, and less tentative than the female voice (Stewart et al. 1990). Men communicate more abstractly, removed from personal feelings (Schaefer 1982, Treicheler and Kramarae 1983). As a result of this doctrinaire masculinity, men's speech is not highly emotionally responsive, and is devoid of expressed sympathy, understanding, and self-disclosure (Sauer and Eisler 1990). We can see one of the results of such inability to express oneself within the masculine gender, in the high rates of medical and psychological illness that have been historically documented. My ex-husband was unable to communicate. His inability to be expressive had a great impact on his eating habits, smoking, and state of mind. His father, who suffered from the same cultural inability for self-disclosure, imprinted this obsessive behavior. With the observation of the cultural impact of language on relationships, we can see how one becomes indoctrinated into this format within academia.

As any female professor can attest, it becomes an arduous task to disseminate information as a knowledgeable, educated female in front of a class of young college students. Students assume male professors have legitimate authority simply due to our culturally defined values of gender. As a female instructor I often run into difficulties when discussing controversy, however, I have witnessed male instructors who instantly gain legitimacy while discussing similar topics.

Language Within Academic Discourse

The consequence of such a division is not simply the exclusion of women from the practice of science. That exclusion itself is a symptom of a wider and deeper rift between feminine and masculine, subjective and objective, indeed between love and power—a rending of the human fabric that affects all of us, as women and men, as members of a society, and even as scientists (Fox Keller 1995:7).

Since our society has narrowly defined language roles, as such, the language of sociology tends to be apolitical and ‘value-free,’ masking the underlying gendered voice under a “veil of neutrality” (Seybold 1987). It therefore becomes arduous for sociologists to examine the hegemonic subtleties prevalent within literature, as sociology is not a passive discipline, but an active force that legitimates ideologies and social forms.

Given the language patterns in use, what are the implications of the issue of gendered voice within social science research? Language is a carrier of culture, and social research (accepted often as valid, producing social facts) studies and informs this culture. Research accentuating a male bias, however disguised, serves only to perpetuate inequality and undermines women’s voice and de-legitimizes their experience and authority. At the expense of excluding female voice, male normative forms of communication permeate social science research (Smith 1987). With the feminine voice being only marginally represented, the process of conducting research is one of hegemonic social construction. Not only is much of this research imbued with a paternalistic voice, but also the process and choice of research material may be consciously motivated and directed. Ollenburger argues that traditional techniques for doing social research impact “the review of literature, the selection of population and sample, validity issues, and the interpretation of research results” (1998:24). We tend to think of hard science as objective and male, while the softer science would be female;

this analogy implicitly evokes sexist stereotypes of men and women, those we take seriously and those we assume are soft and frivolous.

Sociological research is both a product and a producer of social reality.

“Institutions do indeed ‘result’ from human agency: but they are the outcome of action only in so far as they are also involved recursively as the medium of its production” (Giddens 1979:95). Thus, a greater awareness of gendered voice in research among sociologists is warranted, and a commitment to the development of inclusive practices and even alternative interpretations and methodologies is necessary to transcend hegemonic processes and patriarchal ideologies in the social sciences. We have a history of female exclusion of voice; the result is an ideology that has been constructed and maintained by men (Smith 1982). Women’s experience and agency are synonymous; how can we delineate agency from research?

Feminist Methodology and Voice

Feminist methodology is as vastly distinctive as are other areas of disciplinary thought and practice. One of the difficulties in defining feminist methodology is that use of masculine language within the social sciences causes it to be defined in such a way as to lose its function within the feminist paradigm. Feminist methodology is more than a method; it becomes synonymous with practice and theory, although, due to masculine language, which dominates the discipline, many argue that feminist methodology cannot be comprehensive (Harding 1987, Devault 1996). It remains in flux, which indicates the flexibility of this pedagogy. It is a subjective process, rather than an objective set of procedures (Gorelick 1989, Keller 1980). It does not reduce human beings to social facts, “[F]eminism, building on the interpretive approach in sociology, emphasizes the human

agency and subjectivity of the people studied (Gorelick 1989:460). “We can’t separate the lives from the accounts given of them; the articulation of our experience is part of our experience” (Kourany et al 1999:475).

Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman suggest that the following criteria are important in feminist theory making.

1). The theory or account can be helpful if it enables one to see how parts of one’s life fit together... 2). A useful theory will help one locate oneself concretely in the world... 3). A theory or account not only ought to accurately locate one in the world, but also enable one to think about the extent to which one is responsible for not being in that location... 4). A theory that is useful will provide criteria for change and make suggestions for modes of resistance that don’t merely reflect the situation and values of the theorizer... (1983:482) (application of Lugones and Spelman’s four criteria is on page 57-65).

It is significant to view the commonalities between feminist theory making and feminist methodology, hence the difficulty to separate the two. They explain the necessity of using theory to “enable one to see how parts of one’s life fit together” (1983:482).

Smith echoes Lugones and Spelman’s doctrine of feminist inquiry,

This inquiry into the implications of a sociology for women begins from the discovery of a point of rupture in my/our experience as woman/women within the social forms of consciousness—the culture or ideology of our society—in relation to the world known otherwise, the world directly felt, sensed, responded to, prior to its social expression (Smith 1987:49).

I argue that perhaps the most important commonality would be that theory and methodology begin from one’s individual standpoint of consciousness within the larger ideology. Throughout this narrative I will interject examples of how imposing essentialist categories are merely a reflection of the values of the theorizer, and not an accurate depiction of the standpoint of the subject. Evelyn Fox Keller reiterates Lugones and Spelman in her analysis of the role of traditional science:

Science is the name we give to a set of practices and a body of knowledge delineated by a community, not simply defined by the exigencies of logical proof and experimental verification. Similarly, masculine and feminine are categories defined by a culture, not by biological necessity. Women, men, and science are created, together, out of a complex dynamic of interwoven cognitive, emotional, and social forces. . . . My subject, therefore, is not women per se, or even women and science: it is the making of men, women, and science, or, more precisely, how the making of men and women has affected the making of science (1995:4).

Feminist methodology is a product of the second wave of feminism. Out of the 1960s and 70s a flood of feminist methodologies transpired, all trying to uncover the plight of women who have historically been excluded. It could be argued that feminist methodology came out of women's conscious raising groups, which was also at the heart of the women's movement. This method of conscious raising was a specific mode of inquiry that allowed women to learn from one another (Allen 1973, Combahee River Collective 1982). This became an essential issue for feminist scholars.

Feminist methodology, simply stated, includes gender as a relevant part of the social process, with the acknowledgement of women's experience as being distinctively different from men's (Cook and Fonow 1974, Gorelick 1991, Devault 1996). Placing women at the core of social research, recognizing the role of men in traditional social research, and perceiving gender as essential in the social exchange of the research process are all vital to feminist sociologists. Feminist methodologists also recognize the relationship between the researcher and the research, removing separation between the subject and the object (Smith 1984, Cook and Fonow 1974).

To be more inclusive in our understanding of how current disciplines respond to social research, Patricia Hill Collins argues that "[S]ociological traditions produced by a homogeneous circle of insiders represent a partial perspective on social relations" (1992). This partial knowledge reduces understanding that omits the deeper knowing of the

situated knowledge of women. This drives the need for gender, race, and class to be more inclusive within the construction of social research, in order to tear the hegemonic blanket that pervades the discipline. Dorothy Smith states that sociology currently practiced expresses unreflectively the distortions of a male ruling-class standpoint (Smith 1974, Gorelick 1991). Her argument amends the issue that “[S]ocial research must be done from the standpoint of women...taking the everyday world as problematic” (Smith 1974:45). An underlying argument for feminist methodology is the ability for it to “give voice” to groups of people who have been oppressed within this hegemonic structure (Kasper 1986).

However, Gorelick argues that perhaps feminist methodology does not go far enough. Her argument that feminist methodology is “merely additive” seems to represent a lack of understanding of Smith’s *Standpoint Theory*. It seems her argument recognizes the issue of male normative research. However, Gorelick argues that “giving voice” to women may “remain confined within their perceptions and thus not be able to provide them with much that they do not already know” (1991:463). This statement buys into masculine dominated research that already plagues academia. Feminist methodology is a field of inquiry rooted in feminist activism (Devault 1996). According to Devault,

[f]eminist methodologists do not use or prescribe any single research method; rather, they are united through various efforts to include women’s lives and concerns in accounts of society, to minimize the harms of research and to support changes that will improve women’s status (1996:29).

Research undertaken by feminists is often done with a social action outcome.

Feminist methodology seeks to move beyond mere determinism, to refute essentialism, as

[t]o essentialise is to impute a fundamental, basic, absolutely necessary constitutive quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious community, or nation. It is to posit falsely a timeless continuity, a discreteness or

boundedness in space, and fan organic unity. It is to imply an internal sameness and external difference or otherness (Werbner 1997:228).

A major contribution to the discourse is the rejection of the male language based on dualism, the rejection of labeling or insisting on stringent “qualitative” “quantitative” definitive actions for this form of social research (Sprague and Zimmerman 1993). Feminist methodology is not to be equated with the masculine discipline of quantitative research; it goes further in the inclusion of women’s concerns to provide a fuller account of women within the research (Neilsen 1990). This may be done by applying multiple tools, or collaborating with other researchers, in order to fully grasp the situation. These tools may include sympathetic introspection as partially defined by Cooley, “putting himself into intimate contact with various sorts of persons and allowing them to awake in himself a life similar to their own, which he afterward, to the best of his ability recalls and describes” (1907:677). Blumer builds upon this, suggesting the tools of life histories, case studies, diaries, letters, non-directive interviews and participant observation (Paloma 1979:174). Feminist discourse acknowledges difference as breaking down the generalized categories that forge objectivity into reality. According to Foucault, it is about how we produce difference, and how we know, or what we claim to know is caught up with specific histories and relations of power (1977).

Any attempt to think about social identities is based on an erasure of internal difference and divisions ... How populations are classified and formed into clusters is ultimately a political process. All social identities are heterogeneous since they do not have an essence that can guarantee their homogeneity of social identities... Homogeneity is an effect of articulatory practices, and articulation that rests upon exclusion and not the uncovering of some deep underlying essence (Sayyid 2000:40).

In another example, Susan Greenhalgh and Jiali Li (1995) argued for the combining of demography with ethnography, in an examination of imbalanced sex ratios

that point to generations of “missing girls” in several Chinese villages. This is merely an example of how the flexibility of feminist methodology can move across disciplines and methods. From using the basic understanding of feminist methodology, one can see that the emphasis of feminists is to give voice to those in the margins of academic scholarship that they may bring attention to the identities and voices of their subjects as well.

How does Feminist Methodology move us forward from the constraint of Defining Categories toward Non-generalization?

Feminist methodology can be categorized as an interpretive theory. Its strength in form lies in the ability to allow the actors to define social reality. How is feminist methodology, then, any different from phenomenology, ethnomethodology, or symbolic interaction? How does feminist methodology move us away from the definitive categories of classical positivist theory toward a more generalized form of understanding social reality? Further questioning asks, are feminists simply renaming an already established research form? And does feminist methodology give women an even greater chance to gain access to voice academic discourse, in comparison to mainstream male dominated theory? The following analysis will explore dominant social theories in social discourse, and explore their similarities as well as differences with feminist methodology.

Phenomenology

Husserl introduced the term Phenomenology in 1931, (his book Pure Phenomenology). According to Husserl, “phenomenology is the study of the structures of consciousness that enable consciousness to refer to objects outside itself” (1931). This is what Husserl calls the “phenomenological reduction.” Alternately, Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s critic, asserts that Husserl’s supposition on phenomenology can be taken yet further and applied to “everyday experience” (1975). What Heidegger asserts is the basic

application of consciousness into everyday life. How one attempts this is to “describe what he called the structure of everydayness, or being-in-the-world, which he found to be an interconnected system of equipment, social roles and purposes” (Heidegger 1975). Still Heidegger contends that what one does in the world cannot be reduced to one’s own private experience, simply due to the fact that phenomena are objectified and interconnected. Therefore his objective science is masculine science.

Jean Paul Sartre also addressed the issue of phenomenology, based on Heidegger’s approach, and then turning full circle to Husserl; thereby connecting the issue that phenomenology is the philosophy of consciousness. He essentially agreed with Husserl, but he argues that although consciousness is directed at objects, he rejects that they must be conceived through meaning (Sartre 2001).

The basic definition of phenomenology explains this perspective as describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness, without recourse to theory, deduction, or assumptions from other disciplines such as the natural sciences. So as phenomenology, according to Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, the forerunners in this theoretical perspective point out, a phenomenon is always objectified to give it meaning and application within our consciousness; in the sense of group or object of our attention but subjectively responded to. So then, does this differ from Dorothy Smith’s standpoint theory when she too refers to the understanding of experience within our everydayness and application to consciousness?

Smith describes standpoint theory, such that “in the form of social consciousness... [the] world is directly felt, sensed, responded to prior to social expression...[one] locates that experience in the social relations” (1987:49). As Smith

points out, it is through situated experience in relation to social position that one creates understanding of social life. This differs from Heidegger. Although the world can be seen as being applied to everyday experience, it is done so through objectification of sensory experience. Smith notes that experience is situated in everyday experience, yet it cannot be objectified because experience is relational, depending on where a woman is situated within an oppressive system. Therefore, standpoint theory argues that in order to understand women's experience, it needs to be situated within the larger cultural context—also phenomena are not objectified as in phenomenology. The phenomena cannot be separated from meaning; this would not aid in understanding women's plight within the patriarchal ideological structure. Smith argues that women's experience does not stand in isolation; it is culturally learned, thus negating the theoretical notion of phenomenology. "Inquiry begins in actual experience embedded within the historical forms of that relationship" (1987:50).

It is through this argument we see the strength of standpoint theory in aiding women with academic voice. However, as will be discussed in further detail later, mainstream male dominated discourse historically disallowed this type of inquiry as a valid scientific presence in academia.

Ethnomethodology

In order to understand the nuances of ethnomethodology, the exploration of Harold Garfinkel as an early forerunner in this area is necessary. Ethnomethodology, according to Garfinkel is, "an examination of the methods people commonly use to sustain some kind of consensus about the world and to solve problems characterized by highly irrational features" (Cuzzort 1989:303). Garfinkel studied the "common place" in

which individuals are analyzed through the subjective meaning of their social discourse. His ideology brought about insight into that which many overlook, answers to questions about the everyday where individuals become lost in socially constructed answers.

Some may argue that there is no conceivable difference between ethnomethodology and standpoint theory; although, Smith did derive a great amount of insight from ethnomethodology, she takes it further beyond the analysis of the everyday. According to Wallace and Wolf, in their analysis of Dorothy Smith they reveal that,

Dorothy Smith's work can be depicted as an enlarging and repatterning of sociological inquiry. She has stated that she does not see her work as a totalizing theory" but rather as, " a method of inquiry, always ongoing, opening things up, discovering...and inquiry relevant to the politics and practices of progressive struggle, whether of women or of other oppressed groups..." (1999:290)

Garfinkel's theory puts emphasis on the "accountability" of ones understandings of a social situation. He attempts to "separate individuals momentarily from the social supports that hold them up and give a "natural" quality to the commonplace action" (Cuzzort 1989: 302).

Their study is directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, common sense knowledge of social structure, and practical sociological reasoning analyzable... (Garfinkel, 1967:vii-viii).

Garfinkel suggests that much can be gained from observing those moments when individuals are "pulled free and then have to act relatively independently of whatever constitutes their social nature" (Cuzzort 1989:302).

Smith's standpoint is very similar; however, she differs regarding importance of the social structure as that which presents the oppressed within the position they represent. She proposes "the body never leaves the actual location of the

subject... Women's experience of oppression is grounded in male control, use, domination of our bodies" (Smith 1987:89).

So how does this play out? "[A] large part of ethnomethodology becomes the study of how members build accounts of social action, while doing action" (Attewell 1974:182) According to Garfinkel, we are to do interaction and tell about that interaction which gives it accountability. He argues for the separation of action in order to objectify the subjective. His argument gives insight into the commonplace social act. Smith aligns herself somewhat with this argument, however, deviates when addressing the need to be inclusive of the social factors, which aid in creating the everyday experience.

Smith explains that she was influenced by Karl Marx, George Herbert Mead, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Harold Garfinkel (1987:8-9). However, she would vehemently argue that she is not a symbolic interactionist, phenomenologist, a Marxist sociologist, nor is she an ethnomethodologist. Smith asserts that it is not merely the actual physical realm of what is really known, but also there is a "...structure of the bifurcated consciousness." (1987:89). This bifurcated consciousness refers to the, "...two modes of knowing, experiencing, and acting—one located in the body and in the space that it occupies and moves into, the other passing beyond it" (Smith 1987:82). Smith along with other theorists such as Garfinkel argue that social order is thus illusionary, social life merely appears to be orderly, but in reality it is potentially chaotic.

This inquiry into the implications of a sociology for women begins from the discovery of a point of rupture in my/our experience as woman/women within the social forms of consciousness—the culture or ideology of our society—in relation to the world known otherwise, the world directly felt, sensed, responded to, prior to its social expression. From this starting point, the next step locates that experience in the social relations organizing and determining precisely the disjuncture, that line of fault along which the consciousness of women must emerge. Inquiry does not begin within the conceptual organization or relevances

of the sociological discourse, but in actual experience as embedded in the particular historical forms of social relations that determine experience (Smith 1987:49).

Social order is constructed in the minds of social actors as society confronts the individual as a series of sense impressions and experiences, which they must somehow organize into a coherent pattern. Standpoint theory brings us further than ethnomethodology in interpreting information actually transmitted during interaction, rather than concentrating purely on how interaction was performed. Standpoint allows us to understand how the information was perceived by the actor due to her/his position and the position of those giving the information within society.

Symbolic Interaction

Respect the nature of the empirical world and organize a methodological stance to reflect that respect. This is what I think Symbolic Interaction strives to do.
Blumer 1969:60

According to Blumer, symbolic interactionism would become one of the most effective venues for measuring micro social intercourse. Historically, symbolic interactionism has indeed moved the social sciences further into understanding such issues as roles and behavior modification. “The position of symbolic interactionism is that the worlds that exist for human beings and for their groups are composed of objects and that these objects are the product of symbolic interaction” (Blumer 1969:10).

Blumer opposed traditional science in studying human nature; he argued that many sciences interpret social action, as they seem appropriate with preconceived categories.

Blumer continued that,

...the tenacity of this tradition in the social sciences...who strive to attain knowledge by manufacturing it out of their heads. They start with an array of concepts which, while abstract, are abstruse, and then proceed to erect a system

by drawing out meaning from these concepts. The result is a pompous and formal structure which, however, is as hollow as an empty shell” (1931:531).

This delineation of Blumer’s symbolic interaction from mainstream theory of the time denotes the alignment with the argument of standpoint theory. To further understand Blumer’s stance, it is imperative to delve into his understanding of concepts. Blumer argues that concepts,

...are not items of direct perceptual experience; they have originated as conceptions from direct perceptual experiences which have been puzzling and problematic, they serve to introduce order or intelligibility into such experiences...I regard the concept as a way of conceiving and of having a content which is conceived ...without concepts, activity would be tied to a given perceptual level with scarce opportunity of reaching a higher perceptual plane. Identical problems would be recurrent; there would be, essentially, no methods of gaining control over them. The world would remain constant...(1931:519)

Blumer’s definition of concepts being applied to the social world is inclusive of the actor. He does not align himself with other symbolic interactionists; rather he becomes distanced in the theoretical realm, much like feminist methodologists, for acknowledging the need to maintain cohesion between the actor and the act. Blumer is “anti-positivist, as is feminist methodology, focused on the concept of self, social definitions and interpretations by actors, subject to redefinition and altered action” (Paloma 1979:174-76).

He argues that a concept “always arises as an individual experience, to bridge a gap or insufficiency in perception” (1931:522). Blumer also identifies two different types of concepts, “common-sense” concepts and “scientific” concepts. He argues, that “common sense concepts are sufficient for the crude demands of ordinary experience” (1931:523) and common sense refers to what is sensed, instead of to what is analyzed. These concepts are produced in the nature of stereotypes, their meanings are just taken

for granted, and their character naturally sensed. Different than other symbolic rhetoric, Blumer argues for the updating and realigning scientific concepts, by stating that with the introduction of new experience they must change their meaning. However, he states that “common sense concepts are detached and disparate; scientific concepts show a strain toward consistency” (1931:524).

According to Blumer, a concept serves three functions: first “it introduces a new orientation or point of view; second, it serves as a tool, or as a means of transacting business with one’s environment; and third, it makes possible deductive reasoning and so the anticipation of new experience” (1931:526). Blumer also argues that conception may sensitize perception and yield one a new realm of objects. However, he further expands that, “the most improper usage of the concept in science comes when the concept is set apart from the world of experience, when it is divorced from the perception from which it has arisen and into which it ordinarily ties” (1931:530). This is unarguably in the same tradition as standpoint theory. Harriet Martineau applied this to understanding the social realm by studying those in their natural surrounding through their experiences. This is later echoed by Dorothy Smith in her standpoint theory, which understands the need to have inclusion of the location of the actors within the social realm in order to fully understand their perspectives.

However close Blumer is to standpoint theory, they do diverge at one point,

I have a suspicion that many of those who decry concern with concepts in science do not really wish to stop conception but are opposed to the building-up of conceptual framework or structure. They urge us to cling closely to facts and confine ourselves to separate, specific problems. I know of no notion more out of harmony with the historic experience of science. To follow this program would mean not to have a science. At the best, one would have a series of discrete and separate studies, maintaining no organic connection with one another, fructifying one another only by accident, having but accidental strain toward consistency, and

showing little that progressive accumulation of knowledge that comes with theorization and reorganization of experience...Procedure is opportunistic, knowledge unsystematized, and control uncertain. But this is not the picture of science...I would say that their work and results are unorganized and unsystematic. Unless marshaled and brought to bear on central conceptions or concepts, they would never attain the character of science as we are acquainted with it in historic experience (Blumer 1931: 525-26).

It becomes clear at this point that Blumer and standpoint theorists would differ in their study of social interaction. Blumer argues for conceptual understanding, although there needs to remain an understanding of conceptual structural change, which he sees as group action of the collective of individuals. He remains unwavering in his notion of procedure and the building-up of conceptual frameworks even though these are to be “sensitized” and subject to change. Smith however, differs at this juncture, about the implication of objects, stating that the scientific rhetoric would not be inclusive of women within their own standpoint in this geo-political realm of society. Blumer clearly shows no feminist awareness in his work.

This is where great difficulty emerges for feminist theory. The objectification of social phenomena has historically been part of the male discourse of the sciences. As Blumer states, “an object is anything that can be indicated or referred to” (1969:11). This notion of objectification goes beyond physical phenomena; Blumer notes that Mead also looks at the notion of oneself as an object, “like the other objects, the self object emerges from the process of social interaction in which other people are defining a person to himself” (Blumer 1969:13).

Smith also discusses objectivity in the study of women. Her argument contends that within social research women still remain the objects of study. “Sociologies of sex roles, of gender relations, of women, constitute women as the object of inquiry. ...as

women we become objects to ourselves as subjects... therefore can “look back” as subjects constituted as objects in that relations, and in doing so, we disclose its essential contradiction” (Smith 1987:74). Smith would counter Blumer’s symbolic interaction arguing “by insisting that women be entered into sociology as its subjects, we find that we cannot escape how it transforms us into objects” (1987:74). She concedes that Blumer and Mead’s symbolic interaction have indeed impacted her work; however, she would argue that her application of Standpoint Theory moves women beyond what their theories provide for analysis. Smith argues the methods of thinking, “empirical inquiry, and the practices accomplishing the objectivity and the recognizably sociological features of sociological work organize an object world from the perspective of a determinate position in the society” (74). They organize a determinate relation between those who occupy the positions from which it is known and those who become the objects of its method of knowing.

Society is created through this interweaving of social acts. The action and reaction of individuals develops and changes society. Basically symbolic interaction looks at where and how one is placed within society and one’s reaction to stimuli based on social learning – this differs from Smith’s standpoint. Standpoint theories allow us to look at definition of self within the broader context of the larger ideological structure on self and bifurcated consciousness that women face. Classical symbolic interaction seems then to fall short of defining accurately the social lives of women. Even though, we must give appropriate credit to Blumer for his work in moving mainstream discourse further into understanding action as process rather than a product.

Origins of Standpoint Theory

In the following I will analyze the origins of the application of standpoint theory with the historical perspective of Harriet Martineau. I will then follow with Dorothy Smith's creation of a discourse that allows the standpoint of women to be viewed as valued within academic discourse.

Harriet Martineau

How does standpoint theory measure up to mainstream academic discourse in bringing forth the voice of women? The following will describe the dynamics of standpoint theorist, starting with the earliest practice of Harriet Martineau's methodology. Clarification must be made regarding defining Martineau as a standpoint theorist. Dorothy Smith identified the need for women to apply their voice in academia, with the creation of standpoint theory; however, it was Martineau who practiced this approach to discourse over 140 years before Smith. Martineau was a forerunner in the area of qualitative research for the social sciences as well as feminist theory. Drawing on the theory of Martineau, one needs to be versed in information and knowledge in order to assert an objective inference about a situation (1838). She surmises that in order to understand society or at least a partial segment of it one needs varying input. "[T]o test one people by another is to argue within a very small segment of a circle" (1838:24). Martineau uncovered that which motivated her to analyze social behavior through science. After reading 'Conversations on Political Economy' she argued, "[T]he principles of a whole science might be advantageous. When conveyed in the same way...by being exhibited in their natural workings in selected passages of social life" (1983:138). Evelyn Fox Keller reiterated this in 1995, through her examination of

women's voice in science, when she states, "A feminist perspective on science confronts us with the task of examining the roots, dynamics, and consequences of this interacting network of associations and disjunctions—together constituting what might be called the "science-gender system" (7).

Martineau uncovered and documented the importance of "understanding the context for actions" (1838:26). One simply cannot assume that all actions are universal in their meaning, nor can the researcher assume informed accuracy without understanding the importance of knowing where one is situated within the social action itself. Martineau forged the path for Dorothy Smith and other earlier standpoint theorists, which I will discuss a bit later. Grasping the conceptual importance of culture, gender, and class on one's perspective of a situation is essential in understanding current documented information. Martineau clearly states the effects of socialization "influences to which he (sic) is subjected" (1838:135) on those being studied as essential in correctly clarifying the situated circumstances, which creates the outcome of humanity. While being raised within a culture, one is draped within that identity of values, beliefs, and morals. When analyzing the ideological conception of gender as within a specific culture, the values, morals and beliefs would greatly differ between genders, even under the same dominant political patriarchal ideology. Women being subjugated within dominant ideology would produce differing responses and feelings from men. This would be similar to those women who differ economically, ethnically and politically. All of these elements influence one's belief system, even though they are each products under the same cultural guise.

In order to contemplate the action of social research, Martineau contends that there are specific modes of conduct that must be addressed.

Whatever may be his [*sic*] philosophy of individual character, the reflective observer cannot travel, with his mind awake, without admitting that there can be no question but that national character is formed, or largely influenced, by the gigantic circumstances which, being the product of no individual mind, are directly attributable to the great Moral Governor of the human race (Martineau 1838:50).

Every virtue or vice is the result of a particular circumstance amidst which society exists.

One may not know the origins; however, Martineau would argue that one must understand the historical context in which your subject is the product. This gives the researcher the ability to not prejudge the subjects' norms and values through their own ethnocentric lens, but understand behavior with the larger social structure in which it rests. This line of thought is an essential base for feminist theory,

[f]eminism makes a unique contribution to more traditional studies of science; it encourages the use of expertise that has traditionally belonged to women—not simply as a woman's perspective but as a critical instrument for examining the roots of those dichotomies that isolate this perspective and deny its legitimacy. It seeks to enlarge our understanding of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science through the inclusion not only of women and their actual experience but also of those domains of human experience that have been relegated to women: namely, the personal, the emotional, and the sexual (Fox Keller 1995;9).

The United States was settled using laws based on European sacred and secular values and beliefs of patriarchal indoctrination. This encouraged the subjugation and oppression of women and concurrently placed into power the ideology of patriarchy within the Americas. Therefore, it is essential to take into account the effects of colonialism on social research and on the dismissal of women's genuine voice in discourse.

According to Martineau, one must understand the discourse of a nation in order to begin to understand their values. There is great value in understanding a woman's position within the social structure in order to comprehensively understand the individual. Was it at this time that the origin of the silencing of women within this country began through patriarchal indoctrination? "The Americans have, in the treatment of women, fallen below, not only their own democratic principles, but the practice of some parts of the Old World" (Martineau 2000:291). With many of the European values melding into one nation, this nation building process reinforced already oppressive sanctions on women, while simultaneously creating alternate beliefs and values of oppression.

.... the position of women must be evaluated; that new pursuits will be opened to her, and a wider and stronger discipline be afforded to her powers. It is not so in America; ...The absence of an aristocratic or a sovereign will impels men to find some other will on which to repose their individual weakness and which to employ their human veneration. The will of the majority becomes their refuge and unwritten law (Martineau 1838:48-49).

It is important to understand, according to Martineau, that finding the origins is not merely to place blame; it is to create an understanding of the standpoint of women. If one is to uncover the disappearance of voice within the social construct of society, then she must understand what political and ideological groundwork was in place for such silencing to happen. This was perhaps one of Martineau's most remarkable contributions. She analyzed the Americas for two years while visiting the backcountry and discoursing with individuals regarding their social stature. Her persistent insistence on socially situating the oppressed within this democracy led her to uncovering why women, slaves and children had been silenced. She succeeded in creating a comprehensive documentation of early life in this country. She was dismayed, rather vocally, how in a democracy such as this, there lacked actual evidence of equality. Through Martineau's

research, she uncovered tremendous insight into the plight of women. This doctrine of study was definitely a precursor to contemporary feminist methodology. Therefore we can see how Dorothy Smith's Standpoint Theory, becomes aligned with Harriett Martineau's methodological practice. However, Martineau was 140 years ahead of Dorothy Smith.

Martineau's methods, at first glance, are very representative of the scientific method that the field of sociology has imbued as its mantra since its inception. Formulate a hypothesis, understand the variables, and delve into the historical context of the social issue to be studied, also dispel ethnocentrism. How she differs from mainstream academia is that she focuses intensely on the importance of the interpretation from those being observed. "[T]o test the morals and manners of a nation by a reference to the essentials of human happiness, is to strike at once to the center, and to see things as they are" (1995: 26). However, Martineau delves deeper into a situated understanding of the subject to be researched. She argues that there are no universals among people. To eliminate the essentialism of categories and view social action through difference creates a wider range of insight into the knowledge bank of understanding social action. What defines situations becomes a socially constructed criterion; therefore in order to understand what makes someone happy, moral, or evil will require inquiry within their situated knowledge. She views difference as an important aspect of understanding.

She uncovered the sheer misrepresentation of Democracy less than 100 years after its inception. Martineau argued that the loss of power for women, slaves and children had silenced and inhibited their contribution to the design and implementation of rights for the oppressed. "The traveler every where finds woman [sic] treated as the inferior

party in a compact in which both parties have an equal interest” (Martineau 1995:178). Hers was an early glance at the origins and application of patriarchy within the United States.

All women should inform themselves of the condition of their sex, and of their own position.... [t]he Declaration of Independence bears no relation to half the human race...” (Martineau 2000:307-308). Although, Martineau was a pioneer in standpoint theory, and feminism, she also was often a product of her time. Having to write in male language often inhibited her ability to freely partake in academic discourse. Failure to use male language would have made her even more silent by not being able to publish her insights.

Dorothy Smith

Ideology, according to Smith, is not used in a political aspect, rather “as those ideas and images through which the class that rules the society by virtue of its domination of the means of production orders, organizes, and sanctions the social relations that sustain its domination” (Smith 1982:54).

Dorothy Smith explores women’s ways of knowing, which has been an essential asset to the field of social research. The value of this approach is multifold. In the field of sociology women have been asked to disband the subjective self in order to obtain the objective. “The boundaries of inquiry are thus set within the framework of what is already established” (Smith 1990:16). For the social sciences to be legitimized as a science, then objectivity presides over the conceptual. Women move between two fields of consciousness; “the governing consciousness dominates the primary world of a locally situated consciousness but cannot cancel it; the latter is a subordinated, suppressed,

absent, but absolutely essential ground of the governing consciousness” (Smith1990:19). These dichotomized two worlds in which the locally situated consciousness is suppressed operate to silence women.

During my eight-year marriage, I felt this double consciousness. The subordination of my male dominated home and my feeling of identity were often at odds. I knew that I was merely portraying the submissive obedient wife, however, for survival that was the essential task at the time. When my chance came to work outside the home, I gained insight into other views of my identity. This began my journey to finding voice and myself. When you begin to question this double consciousness as not being your authentic self, one realizes that the journey to self begins with knowledge of identity. My identity at the time was wrapped tightly into my husband’s view of what I should be to portray the “good wife.” With the never ending social messages about “a woman’s place,” it became difficult to address myself as any one other than that which was prescribed by the media, the law, the school, religion, and my husband.

This bifurcated consciousness is at the essence of Smith’s theoretical perspective. It is the inability for women to be complete with a melding of selves that suppresses their academic voice, thus reinforcing patriarchal doctrine of the social sciences. Can women move actively between both worlds and continue to maintain professional voice? According to Smith, it’s the conditions of the social sciences that limit and nullify women’s voice. The “objective” methods and theories based on male ideologies, preset the dialogue for women from the outset of the research. “Our present is given shape by a past...”(Smith 1990:20), and therefore, must be incorporated into our core knowledge for understanding the standpoint of women which is located in the local, actual, and

particular. This has been an obstacle for women to overcome, which is then limiting and negating their individual voice within this research medium.

While I was researching my masters' thesis, I was presented with an issue, as so many women in academia often find to be the case. As stated earlier, I was instructed not to use the theoretical perspective of Sociology of Emotions, with male professors stating that such a perspective is not thought of as rigorously academic enough to fulfill my requirements. I fought this limitation of my voice and was then able to employ such a perspective. I feel as though this insightful perspective assisted my research in such a manner that gave insight into the women and the topic of domestic violence. Currently, the same department who initially denied my access to this perspective is offering a course on Sociology of Emotions.

The issue is to undo the separation of the "sociological constructed world from that of the direct experience" (Smith 1990:22). The argument is that the essential information that emanates from the researcher, that experience, which situated her within that life context, is imperative to bridging the gap between the bifurcated consciousnesses. "The only way of knowing a socially constructed world is knowing it from within" (Smith1990:22). One must be committed to exploring society from within women's experience of it. Rather than objectifying them or explaining their behavior, one then investigates how that society organizes and shapes the everyday world of experience (Smith 1987).

How does this play out in social research? Although I am a social researcher who has experienced domestic violence personally, according to standard sociological methodology, I must analyze society objectively. However, is it possible and should it be

necessary to negate my personal information about violence against women which brought these current issues to the table? The argument from standpoint theory is that prior experience, social oppression of women, and location within the patriarchal structure, all shape and aid in defining the sociologist. To dismiss that for being subjective rather than objective denies the insight and experience of the researcher. Being a woman who has been oppressed within a patriarchal structure that promotes violence against women is part of a knowledge base that must not be ignored. This does not conclude that the research done has no validity. The played experience is part of who I am as the knower, now I will perform as the discoverer. "An alternative sociology must preserve in it the presence, concerns, and experience of the sociologist as knower and discoverer (Smith 1990:23). As Yasmin Gunaratnam points out,

...[i]nterviews are always characterized by relations of race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, sexuality and disability... Yet, the recognition and the relevance of these relations to methodological discussions can vary. They can vary according to how constructions of race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, sexuality and disability are given primacy and meaning in the interview, how they are attended to within the analysis and representation of data, and also according to how they are positioned within the wider social and political context (2003:76).

"It is a standpoint that positions inquiry but has no specific content" (Smith 1990:28). Smith argues, "a feminist sociology must...begin with actual subjects situated as they actually are...an insider's sociology, a sociology of society as it is and must be known by the people who are active in it" (1990:32). So how can the sociologist claim to be objective? The objectivity within the social sciences is "guaranteed by the detachment of the social scientist from particular interests and perspectives" (1990:32). How can we detach and become objective with patriarchal ideology that pervades our cultural beings?

Catherine MacKinnon stated this wonderfully in her very politicized 'personal is political' mantra of the 1960s.

The personal as political is not a simile, not a metaphor, and not an analogy...It means that women's distinctive experience as women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal—private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate—so that what it is to know the politics of woman's situation is to know women's personal lives (1982:34).

Ideology, according to Marx's conceptual definition, names a kind of practice in thinking about society; it is a method. "To think ideologically is to think in a distinctive and describable way" (Smith 1987:36). However, the concepts and ideas are ideological merely in terms of social application. Feminist theorists have argued that this type of patriarchal application denies women's voice. By negating voice our conceptual understanding is not represented within this limiting definition of ideology. We cannot merely separate the actual from the individual and assume its observable concepts as definitive declarations of experience. Our understanding of experience has roots within the system that dictates placement (Smith 1987:38). I do not suggest merely adding women's ideologies to men's; that would be counterintuitive to Smith and Martineau at this point. I merely suggest that women have a very specific standpoint of oppression that must be understood and accounted for in order to comprehensively analyze the reasons for women's loss of voice within this cultural construct.

The objectification of discourse is pervasive in contemporary contextual documentation of social reality. In working on my master's thesis, on the emotional status of women after being subjected to violence within the family, I learned knowledge was to be categorized into concepts and variables of emotional status, before the actual inquiry was in place. This is an example of textual discourse of reality. The reality of the

women in the study did not necessarily fit preconceived categories; however, due to the “scientific” nature of the sociological inquiry, my department required this type of methodology. For example, to categorize women’s emotional states (e.g. anger, sadness, loneliness...) would imply socially constructed feelings that have been documented to be present during a divorce. Asking women if they encountered these feelings would imply that they should have. Rather, the researcher should leave the door open for participants to explain where they feel they are located within their recovery. This becomes imperative for a clear understanding of the process women go through after leaving an abusive situation.

Moving from knowing to knowledge calls attention to the disappearing subject, according to Smith. When a woman becomes the knower of experience, then she has encapsulated knowledge and it is now external (Smith 1987:66). The results of externalizing survivors’ emotional status take away the actor from the action.

Contemporary Standpoint Theory

When analyzing contemporary standpoint theory it becomes imperative to acknowledge Nancy Hartsock, Patricia Hill Collins, and Sandra Harding. These contemporary theorists use Dorothy Smith as a baseline; however, they each contribute to standpoint theory in very distinct ways. In order to fully understand Martineau and Smith one must not ignore the other important contributions to this discourse. Of course this work will in no way completely cover the exceptional contributors to standpoint theory, but I will attempt to highlight the women in the forefront of this discourse. I will argue that Smith’s doctrine is the agenda their research uses, but I will not fail to recognize the importance of other standpoint contributions.

Hartsock discusses the necessary root of Marxian theory in order to grasp standpoint theory. The current issue with this is the limitation of Marxian theory, which looks only monolithically at social inequality. Marx does not have the flexibility to be inclusive of race, gender, and class on a micro level. His theoretical perspective does, however allow us to view on a macro scale the inclusion of the multifaceted intersection of gender and race with social class. Marx and Engels argue similar lines to that of Hartsock,

[a]s individuals express their life so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. (Marx and Engels 1999:42)

Hartsock discusses the importance of understanding that feminist standpoint theory is focused on the sexual division of labor; the primary issue at the heart of inequality is that of capitalism. A tremendous contribution that Hartsock asserts is that consciousness is “historically determined, yet is achieved in a process of struggle and interpretation...a rewriting of self in relation to a new understanding of community, of history of culture” (1998:233). Her contributions cannot be ignored, she too has brought standpoint further in understanding social discourse.

Patricia Hill Collins discusses the fact that standpoint theory addresses group-based experiences over individual ones. “Standpoint theory places less emphasis on individual experiences within socially constructed groups than on the social conditions that construct such groups” (Collins 1997:375). “The notion of standpoint refers to groups having shared histories based on their shared location in relation to power...”(1997:376). Collins’ interpretation of standpoint theory recognizes the fluidity of groups that have become oppressed by social power. She argues that institutional

power can shift and change, hence the fluidity of its construction. However, this does not mean that social inequalities are removed (1997:377). Therefore, if institutional power and oppression does not disappear, then those who are oppressed continue to be oppressed as a group.

Hill Collins does not take out the individuals from the collective, she merely shows understanding of a collective oppression that affects all those within the similar groups, and this would be more inclusive of race, gender and class. As far as her applicability to women's voice, do Black women have the same opportunity to have a voice where institutional discrimination is the norm? This would also be applicable to a White woman of a lower social class; her voice then becomes muffled by social power.

Understanding that the intersection of race, gender, and class in finding voice within social institutions is imperative. Hill Collins states that it is not the physical space that dictates women's standpoint within hierarchal power relations. Two women who work in the same office, one White and one Black may not share the same likelihood of institutional advancement or pay equity. This is due to the fact that Black women suffer more significantly from pay inequity and social advancement with the power structure of our White social hierarchy. Hill Collins addresses the issue of women's voice. She identifies women's voice as a collective, as a means of understanding the effects of social power on the standpoint of the group. It becomes difficult to separate the individual from the group, due to the institutional discrimination that permeates this culture. Therefore if a person is judged by the color of her skin would her voice be recognized as legitimate or does she suffer from the standpoint of group oppression? Hill Collins brings great insight

into the difficulty of separation; she also brings understanding of the standpoint of the collective in finding voice.

The only way to delve into the knowledge of the knower is to know from our “historical and cultural situation” (Smith1990:33). The conclusion of knowing, according to Smith is to have a communal understanding of reality as it is, as it was put forward to the knower and can be applied to the situation. This differs from Harding who requires a master narrative knowledge for knowing. Harding’s work is grounded in women’s common experience, yet her argument weakens when she suggests that men can also comprehend these experiences. Some would argue this as contradictory. Harding suggests that the basic premise is ‘Politics.’ “...[M]any different social and political cultures influence the condition of women’s lives; scientific and political decisions are made in many different places in society, and feminist research activities can find reasonable justifications in all of them” (1993:137). Harding argues for an objective epistemological knowledge (1993), which she uses interchangeably with standpoint theories. This would be a viable argument if Harding’s use of epistemological knowledge is that of *subjective* understanding. One is led to assume that the epistemological knowledge she refers to is governed by fixed *a priori* concepts. These fixed categories, which play into her master narrative, do not align with standpoint theory. Thus, they also cannot be applied equally to men and women as a categorical understanding of social situations. *A priori* knowledge negates Smith, as well as Martineau’s argument in understanding the complex social standpoints of women within the larger structural context. Therefore, to remain epistemologically objective would negate once again women’s voice, by melding her voice within the master narrative.

Comparison of Martineau and Smiths Theoretical/ Methodological Perspectives Discussion

Martineau's writing style is a prime example of Dorothy Smith's doctrine of standpoint theory, although she was limited by the male language conventions required in her time. The following excerpt from Martineau's *How to Observe Morals and Manners* depicts the modes of conduct when employing social research. "His [sic] first general principle is, that the law of nature is the only one by which mankind [sic] at large can be judged. His [sic] second must be, that every prevalent virtue or vice is the result of the particular circumstances amidst which the society exists" (1838:30). By following these two modes of conduct one can see that the second is a direct correlation with standpoint theory. It is important to note the timeframe in which Martineau wrote, wherein the laws of nature and social Darwinist thought abounded, and belief in a universal law (divine or natural) was typical of the time.

According to Smith, a sociology from a women's standpoint in the local actualities of our everyday lives must be put together differently from the traditional and contemporary sociology which uses male objectification. Committed to exploring the society from within women's experience, rather than objectifying them or explaining their behavior, standpoint then would investigate how that socially constructed society organizes and shapes everyday world experience.

Simply stated, Smith argues that we cannot study woman as an object, soon she sees herself as an object to be studied, and there is a need to study within context, within her understanding of her social reality. Working outside the home, having issues with childcare, finances, and partnerships, all play into her reality. Dominant discourse of sociology has moved from the actual to the objective. Mainstream sociology uses pre-

existing theories to give variables social attributes. Feminists have criticized the overriding of women's local experience by the interpretive hegemony of sociology and have sought solutions that preserve the voices and interpretations of women. This male dominated discourse has inhibited women's voice in all spheres of social life.

When exploring the in-depth issues that women have to tend to during the final ending of a domestic violence relationship, it becomes imperative to take into account society's view of her as, for example, a victim, homeless, welfare woman, single mom, divorcee, and the one who was responsible for her broken home. For my own situation, I had very intense conversations with a professor who believed that what women went through at this point in time was no different then what anyone goes through during a divorce. In my research, through persistence and an in-depth knowledge of where my female subjects were located, I was able to successfully show the multitude of issues that women who have experienced domestic violence have to deal with, which are not simply due to divorce in and of itself.

Every element of social life derives its importance from this great consideration. The external conveniences of men, their internal emotions and affections, their social arrangements, graduate in importance precisely in proportion as they affect the general happiness of the section of the race among which they exist (Martineau 1995). Essentially, how do those whom you study understand their reality, from their standpoint-not from prejudged positions? Positions that have been defined and narrated by male-based disciplines aid in reinforcement of this cyclical male narrative. The researcher must understand their location within society. Both Martineau and Smith understand the importance of studying people from one's individual standpoint, or location within each

social reality. They disagree with applying preconceived labels on them before research is conducted.

The observer who sets out with a more philosophical belief, not only escapes the affliction of seeing sin wherever he sees difference, and avoids the suffering of contempt and alienation from his species, but, by being prepared for what he witnesses, and aware of the causes, is free from the agitation of being shocked and alarmed, preserves his calmness, his hope his sympathy; and is thus far better fitted to perceive, understand, and report upon the morals and manners of the people he visits. His more philosophical belief, derived from all fair evidence and just reflection, is, that every man's feelings of right and wrong, instead of being born with him, grow up in him from the influences to which he is subjected. (Martineau 1995:35).

According to Martineau, the researcher must have knowledge of those who are the focus of inquiry. This knowledge encapsulates the social construction that has been put into place for the subject one is studying. This would increase the researcher's ability to report more accurately the interpretation of the subject within their social context, rather than judge the subject by the researcher's morals and values.

It is not enough for the traveler to have an active understanding, equal to an accurate perception of individual facts in themselves; [he] must also be in possession of principles which may serve as a rallying point for his observations, and without which [he] cannot determine their bearings, or be secure of putting a right interpretation upon them (1838:26).

Smith echoes Martineau, suggesting the importance of understanding before investigation, "...committed to exploring the society from within people's experience of it. Rather than objectifying them or explaining their behavior, it would investigate how that society organizes and shapes the everyday world of experience (Martineau 1838:74).

Martineau believed that in order to fully understand the plight of women and slaves within the Americas, she must first understand the essence of Democracy. With this knowledge she found the inconsistencies of the written doctrine and the practiced oppression. Smith also argues the importance of text. She argues that literature reflects

social ranking. Texts, according to Smith, are forms in which power is generated and held in contemporary societies. It is the text, which can give or dismiss women's voice, and it is text which will exhibit how far women have traveled in the scientific field of study over the past 150 years.

Another area of insight is historical discourse. Both Martineau and Smith argue for understanding the written language that indoctrinates a society. Martineau states that in order to understand a country such as America, it becomes more difficult because of the young age of the nation. However, America was built on doctrines taken from other nations. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand that located ideology, which is a critical point of reference. This is an important part of uncovering the oppressive ideology of gender. How have women been denied voice within this country? This can be viewed through history with the negation of women in academics, politics and within the home. Smith also argues that the understanding of oppression must first be understood within the written context of the underlying ideology.

In entering the discourse as practitioners, we enter it as subjects of the kinds of sentences it can properly generate, the assertions it can make. We have learned in our training to proceed from within the conceptual frameworks, the epistemological presuppositions, as well as to find our way around in the organization of camps, school, and factions of the discourse. We have learned to discard our experienced worlds as a source of concerns, information, and understandings of the actualities of the social world and to confine and focus our "insights" within the conceptual frameworks and relevancies given in the discipline (Smith 1989:73).

Martineau believed in uncovering the origins of what people do, by understanding their historical location. Smith also argues the importance of the understanding that the subject is situated in the actualities of living or as she suggests the "everydayness." It becomes imperative for both to not fall into the epistemological objectivities of male-

based science. Research must begin with subjective meaning, variables must not be assigned value by the researcher, and they must be defined in actual experience by women's experience.

Where do they differ? Martineau, although she advocated researching using an interpretative approach of 'standpoint theory' as a means of understanding a society subjectively, also fell victim to male indoctrination of the time. She competed within a strictly male-based occupation of research. This had an impact on her language being very male based, and her ability to expand into a feminist dialogue, which would have given her more power in her voice. Smith, on the other hand, wrote Standpoint theory over a century later, and was able to do so using a feminist voice. This generated more advancement for dialogue within the discourse.

I would argue that Martineau, although she did not use feminist language, did in fact advocate using a methodology that was very feminist based. Her application of discourse enlightened the way for such social academic leaders as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, along with such feminist authors as Smith, Hartsock and Hill Collins. Martineau was in the forefront of her time, a precursor to giving a voice to women in social research.

How do Smith and Martineau add to the discourse?

It is evident that within sociological inquiry women's voice has been marginalized. Does feminist theory aid in the balance of voice? Martineau wrote often using male language, due to the time period of extreme oppression of women. Also, her

methodology book, *How to Observe Morals and Manners*, was originally titled, *Social Theory and Methods*, but she was coerced to change the title in order to receive publication. This is merely one type of co-optation that women historically and continuously have faced. Although her language was male based, she was determined to write in a very feminist methodological form.

American women generally are treated in no degree as equals, but with a kind of superstitious outward observance, which, as they have done nothing to earn it, is false and hurtful. Coexisting with this, there is an extreme difficulty in a woman's obtaining a maintenance, except by the exercise of some rare powers. In a country where women are brought up to be indulged wives, there is no hope, help, or prospect for such as have not money and are not married. (Martineau 1995:181)

Her use of discourse advanced the future of qualitative research, and aided in the development of feminist methodology. Martineau began to give women voice, she often used "I" statements to reinforce her voice. "I feel some doubt about giving any account of the public men of the United States: I do not mean scruples of conscience..." (Martineau 2000:9). This written agenda places women in the forefront and does not simply add women to the mix of social discourse. Feminist methodology gives women visibility in their own right, for their own position, political stance, and voice in the social arena. Although, as stated earlier, Martineau often used male generic language, her application of feminist rhetoric allowed for her voice to be recognized.

Wifely and motherly occupations may be called the sole business of women there [*America*]. If she has not that, she has nothing; the alternative, as I have said, is making an occupation of either religion or dissipation; neither of which is fit to be so used; the one being a state of mind; the other altogether a negation when not taken in alternation with business. (Martineau 2000:301)

Martineau and Smith shed light into women's ability to find voice in social discourse. It has only been a recent phenomenon that Martineau has been mentioned in

social areas of study; however, her grand contribution continues to be overlooked.

Martineau not only gave women a voice, she also addressed such issues as the political economy, slavery, women's rights, the division of labor, democracy and the family long before our dominant academic and political leadership dictated the path of discourse. For example in 1838 Martineau identified the two class system, "This kind of society [*America*] is composed of two classes only; those who have something, and those who have nothing" (44). What would have become of the discipline of sociology if Martineau had been awarded the recognition she rightly deserved? Would women be more equally represented within this "democratic" nation? Would women be more equally represented within the dialogue of academics?

Application of Feminist Voice

In an effort to analyze how women's voice has been represented, misrepresented, and /or not represented within mainstream social science discourse, I have chosen an article from the feminist journal *Signs* each year from its origins to present [1976-2004], along with the sociological academic journal *Social Forces*, from 1960 until 2004. The articles selected represented authorship by women. The reason for selecting women authors is to view the gendered voice within two mainstream scientific fields, one of sociology, and the other of feminism. I suspected that following the development of the second wave feminism; women would represent more forcefully their voices as well as publish in such a manner as to represent a feminist methodology in both representations of academic discourse.

My original "hypothesis" was not substantiated within the mainstream academic journal *Social Forces*. Women generally continue to maintain a voice equivalent to that

of the accepted patriarchal doctrine. There were some anomalies, which I will share with you in this discussion. When analyzing these two journals, the indicators used were: 1) male analytic objectivity, 2) feminist methodology, 3) standpoint theory, 4) female voice, and 5) male voice. Each article was analyzed and placed into applicable categories (see Appendix 1). While doing this analysis I found it difficult at times to declare voice or methods. These “problem categories” were indicated with an –X meaning they were borderline in that category, and perhaps overlapping into others.

It is by now a near truism that there is no such thing as raw data; all data presuppose interpretation. And if an interpretation is to be meaningful—if the data are to be “intelligible” to more than one person—there must be participation in a community of common practices, shared conceptions of the meaning of terms and their relations to “objects” in the real world. In short, in science as elsewhere, interpretation requires the sharing of a common language. (Fox Keller 1995:130)

I will be focusing on ‘order’ rather than ‘law,’ for order is not fixed and rigid, but “enlarges our vision of both nature and science” (Fox Keller 1995:134).

It was difficult to treat “analytically” these journals, due to the nature of this paper, which advocates other more qualitative methods and grounding in historical context. I was careful not to draw this application away from my main goal of standpoint theory evaluation. This type of analysis will have a tendency to distort my efforts at a subjective application of knowledge. However, for a more objective support to aid in understanding the denial of voice in mainstream academics, I have given in to objective analysis, only under the pretext that it enhances my argument. Suggesting the credibility of this more standard method begs attention to the silencing of women in academic discourse.

Social Forces Analysis

It would seem reasonable to assume that women writing in mainstream social science discourse in the 1960s would do so in a quantifiable, objective manner and employing male voice in order to be accepted for publication. In fact this is what I did encounter throughout much of my analysis. In each article from the 1960s the majority of women authors represented their scholarship within a male doctrine. As stated earlier, masculine communication regards discourse as a means to exert control, preserve independence, and enhance status, and is often seen as an arena for negotiating prestige (male doctrine being generally objective and third person). For forty-five years, merely 22% of the women used a feminist voice, following with only 11% who used feminist methodology for their research. As stated previously, we need to keep in mind that women's writing generally tends to display identifiable features that foster connections, support closeness, support understanding and emphasize equity, which is subjective and grounded (Johnson 1996, Aries 1987). This is much of what I looked for in my analysis.

One point to raise at this juncture is that at times I was unable to find a lone female author (a telling fact in itself). Therefore I opted to analyze an article that had a leading female author and a co-male author, the first example of this was in 1966. The article, "Some Characteristics of Students from Poverty Backgrounds Attending Predominantly Negro Colleges in the Deep South" (Gurin and Epps 1966), was a study, which focused on student achievement in college while faced with familial poverty. However, it never mentions the socially situated oppression that is directly linked to their specific social position. They measured success of the individual in college, merely by analyzing the family unit. How can success be measured accurately without

encompassing the ideology of the cultural context at the time? The geo-political context of the Deep South in the 1960s is an essential matrix of information that plays into this research, but was omitted for the sake of objectivity. It is impossible to determine whose voice is impacting which portion of this research. At times it feels as though Patricia Gurin's voice was raised more often during the early analysis of the social disadvantages of their study participants. Edgar Epps, I would argue, would be more in the push towards objectivity of their quantitative analysis. (I would of course come to this assumption due to the ingrained socialization about gender that is evident regarding women, men and science).

This example shows how objective discourse discourages cumulative data to encompass the criteria needed to understand social issues. Maintaining generalized categories also plays into essentialism, which creates culture, rather than examines culture, thus producing data of law rather than data of order.

In 1967, the article, "Analysis of World View in a Mexican Peasant Village: An Illustration," authored by Cynthia Nelson, attempted use of feminist methodology to understand the behavior of the Mexican Village Peasants was evident. She maintained "I" statements, which gave way for her voice to be represented. This is a major tactic of the application of women's voice in social discourse. Although, she attempted to represent female identity, her methodology was very male based, analytically objective. She did quantitative work, which was absent of qualitative insight. She went to great pains to aid the reader in understanding that she was testing and that it is the anthropologists who elicit insight from observed behavior. Her need was to develop a "world view" understanding of this peasant village.

As for the remainder of the 1960s, I came across very few female-authored works that were not centered in male discourse and mainstream quantifiable objective applications. Having an historical grasp of the political climate of the time, it is understandable that academic discourse would be devoid of female subjective application. Male doctrine was mainstream, and continued to maintain that level of dominance.

The requirements of ... correctness in practical judgments and objectivity in theoretical knowledge...belong as it were in their form and their claims of humanity in general, but in their actual historical configurations they are masculine throughout. Supposing that we describe these things, viewed as absolute ideas, by the single word "objective," we then find that in the history of our race the equation objective = masculine is a valid one (Simmel, quoted in Horney 1926:200).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s minimal feminist discourse occurred. During those twenty years women authors were co-opted to publish in male discourse using the application of male language as well as male-based research techniques. Very seldom did I witness an attempt at authentic self within women's research. These results were not surprising. The absence of women's representation altogether, as in 1974 Social Forces (see chart Appendix I), was most distressing. Due to the fact that I am measuring women's voice, 1974 represents an extreme example of the omission of women's voice in discourse.

Out of those twenty years of analyzed articles I uncovered two in the later part of the 1980s, which gave the illusion of being representative of women based research. In 1986 an article was written by Floge and Merrill titled "Tokenism reconsidered: Male Nurses and Female Physicians in a Hospital Setting." This was the first paper to represent women within research in an analysis that does not co-opt women's social

standing or voice. The use of male generic language was also minimal; this accompanied a general application of feminist methodology. Although all of the information and data collection seemed to uncover the aspects of tokenism within the hospital setting, never was there any mention of the larger social implications. In other words, the insight into the hospital setting was very informative. However, it did not expand beyond the hospital walls. The research did not give a grounded analysis of female and male socialization, and did not address the topography of the political agenda of gender in the work place as being a microcosm of the larger patriarchal structure. Those implications would have given insight into why specific gendered roles had more social power within the hospital. This type of feminist perspective would “lead us to ask how ideologies of gender and science inform each other in their mutual construction” (Fox Keller 1995;8).

Again in 1989, we hear the voice of women departing from male-based doctrine. “The Sociology of Work: Where Have the Workers Gone?” written by Ida Harper Simpson, seemed to be a wonderful piece of descriptive female writing and feminist application of analysis. As stated previously, female writing is occasionally first person centered, along with identifiable features that foster connections, support closeness, support understanding and emphasize equity (Johnson 1996, Aries 1987). Harper delves into the historical political issues of social work. She uncovers the sociological meanings given to specific time periods in relation to social workers, although one important issue that she does not deal with is that of gender. Harper ignores the critical importance of social work being a primarily female-based field; gender in itself has implications that would yield alternative results for the direction of social work. “[W]orkers were seen as social actors [*sic*] who created their own cultures and were a force for management to

contend with. Now they are seen as passive objects, pushed and shoved by impersonal macro-level forces ...” (Harper 1988:563). Through this excerpt from Harper, the workers are genderless, however, it is women who dominate the human service field, which would give great insight into the passiveness of the social worker. The impersonal macro-level forces are those who possess the power. Who are the power players in changing the dynamics of social work? And is it due to men’s position of power that the field has moved into the direction it has? I would argue that it becomes inevitable.

In general, I think our research methods have strongly influenced our decisions about which fields to look to and what to take from them. I hope, however, that we will return to the longstanding questions of industrial sociology and try to understand how workers actively go about dealing with forces they can and cannot control and how they experience them (Harper-Simpson 1989:579)

During the following fourteen years, 1990-2004, I again came up with two representations of women using female language as well as the representation of feminist methodology. In no manner am I stating that the analysis of the journal *Social Forces* is complete. The purpose of this analysis was to inquire about women’s advancement within mainstream discourse. Have women come far enough to be represented on an equal footing? As this discussion has concluded thus far, in no way have women been able to represent their voice in mainstream social discourse on an equal standing with their male peers. It has been 168 years since Harriet Martineau wrote *How to Observe Morals and Manners*, which outlined social research using feminist methodology. However, we have yet to employ such a discourse, on an equally accepted regular basis within the social sciences. The long-standing academic journal *Social Forces* is a prime example of the lack of representation of women’s voice in academics. In mainstream academia it is imperative to represent women and women’s issues with equal academic

importance. Social policy, further research, and impending disciplines all depend on equitable representation. If women's voice remains silent in mainstream academics, then we will fail to advance the discipline of sociology any further.

Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society

In reviewing the journal *Signs*, which is a feminist based outlet for academic findings, I would expect to regularly come across women's voice along with feminist methodology representation. *Signs* is the longest standing feminist journal, which currently remains in publication. The first edition of *Signs* came to fruition in 1976. Which indicates the necessary intensity of the women's movement to create an outlet for female concerns to be fully explored.

I analyzed articles, which were representations of each year, again utilizing women-authored discourse. However, I also reviewed a few male submitted pieces to see if the presence of women's voice was due to women authors or also the feminist journal itself. This would be an interesting finding; the avenue of discourse that would allow for intense observation and inclusion of subjectivity may prove to elicit alternative discussion for both women and men equally. That is counter to mainstream academics, which dictates objective male prowess. To my dismay, I found that it was only the women authors who used feminist methodology, and the male authors selected maintained an analytic stance and voice.

Continuing on, in the years between 1976 and 1980, I had found an exciting array of women's voices as well as the application of feminist methodology. I also analyzed two male written articles, which were unequivocally objective and male-based analysis. In her 1976 article "Can We Still Afford Occupational Segregation?" Martha Griffiths

displays a stimulating example of standpoint theory amidst quantifiable and qualitative data. Griffiths places herself within her analysis to give a grounded understanding of her argument. “During my tenure as chairman (sic) ... I held hearings on economic discrimination against women...” (Griffiths 1976:11). This representation is similar to Martineau’s writing. The representation of voice as well as standpoint gives her article a plausible foundation in order to fully comprehend the depth of her argument. Griffith creates a standpoint of understanding where she was located within the issue of economic discrimination against women. She does not simply add women to discourse in trying to gain understanding; she places her voice with this issue to emphasize the need to understand the application of such an oppressive issue for women. She does not deny the historical and political importance of women’s position within society in order to understand occupational segregation.

In contrast, Paul Andrisani’s article “Job Satisfaction Among Working Women” provides imposing insight while being immersed in male language and objective analysis. Andrisani’s argument is applicable in creating an objective understanding of women and work. However, he falls short in grounding his argument in anything other than an outside understanding. His discussion on the intrinsic and extrinsic meaning of work exemplifies the quantifiable objective character of mainstream discourse.

Those who maintain an extrinsic value orientation view work principally in terms of its instrumental character...Those who invest work primarily with intrinsic meaning regard it not as a burden to be borne simply for its instrumental utility but as a central integrating principle of one’s individual social being.
(Andrisani 1978:594)

What becomes worthy of note in his analysis is that women view the interpersonal relationships with co-workers as the variable, which creates the highest level of job

satisfaction reported. Although it can be argued that Andrisani did obtain the objective he was aspiring to achieve, would it not have been more fruitful to engage in an in-depth understanding of job satisfaction if he employed standpoint theory? Or perhaps the addition of situating women's experience would yield more benefits in understanding. It is interesting that women see job satisfaction through interpersonal relations. However, if we do not understand that the reason why is due to women's ascribed status within the colonial cultural venue, we then will be missing a great amount of pertinent information. Andrisani gave a great example of what it means to merely add women to the mix, without melding insight.

During the 1980s, *Signs* depicted an array of feminist thought, from Susan Bordo's critique of Descartes to distribution of wealth and the law from authors like Kristin Bumiller, Joan Acker and Nancy Chodorow.

In the 1990s, Nancy Chodorow enlightened us with "Gender as a Personal and Cultural Construction." Chodorow is a psychoanalytic feminist who posits through feminist doctrine, the claim that "... gender is inevitably personal as well as cultural" (1995:517). It is her successful use of feminist voice rather and also her content that I focus on here. Chodorow explores more fully the issue of subjectivity.

Subjectivity here creates and re-creates, merges and separates fantasy and reality, inner and outer, unconscious and conscious, felt past and felt present, each element in the pair helping to constitute and to give meaning and resonance to the other... The demonstration that we create personal emotional meaning from birth and throughout life suggests that there is only a limited and particular historical sense in which cultural meaning "precedes" individual meanings. (1995:518-21)

This is an important thesis from Chodorow; she delves into the issues of subjectivity and grounds them in historical and political perspective. This is accomplished through feminist methodology while applying feminist voice.

This is also in line with Diana Postlethwaite's "Mothering and Mesmerism in the Life of Harriet Martineau." She writes distinctively as a woman who was not denied voice, and her discourse on Martineau was a wonderful example of feminist methodology. Her in-depth analysis of Martineau's life was very comprehensible allowing for great insight into Martineau's individual strength as a writer, provider and a woman.

I am not conclusively stating that all of the women authors who analyzed in the Journal *Signs* used feminist voice. For example, Joan Acker in her article, "Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution" gave a very insightful historical presentation of the intersection of class, gender and distribution. Expecting to read this article and find feminist methodology to support Patricia Hill Collins doctrine of the importance of the intersection of class, gender, and race, I was not disappointed.

Class and gender discrimination and exploitation are integral to the oppression of women in industrial capitalists societies, and thus, an understanding of the connections between class and gender is essential to the effort to develop a theory of society that addresses the oppression of women and the privilege of men (Acker 1988:473).

However, what was apparent was the use, or lack of, woman's subjective voice in her discourse. Acker uses male discourse, which includes objective conceptual understanding along with a linear analytical pattern of thought. I am not arguing that this type of analysis was not useful; on the contrary, her work had great insight. I am stating

that her conceptual use of language gave the reader an understanding of *male generic language* along with an *abstract view* of the intersection of capitalism and gender.

Perhaps with such a discussion we can reinterpret the history of specific industrial capitalist societies in terms of their gender/class structures, to see more clearly the part that gender takes in structuring relations between classes and promoting compelling systems of belief that justify and perpetuate domination. (Acker 1998:497)

Therefore, even though she published within a feminist journal, I feel that her voice remained silenced within her work. Yet academically accredited is her work, through the lens of feminist methodology, she would fall short.

Evelyn Fox Keller seems to apply the issue of women in academic discourse wonderfully in her research, "Feminism and Science." She gives great insight into the discussion of women's voice in science by asking such questions, as "Is there a conflict between our commitment to feminism and our commitment to science?" (1982:589). She discusses the important contribution of feminist analysis to science.

...The task this implies for a radical feminist critique of science is, then, first a historical one, but finally a transformative one. In the historical effort, feminists can bring a whole new range of sensitivities, leading to an equally new consciousness of the potentialities lying latent in the scientific project. (Fox Keller 1982:602)

Fox Keller does not deny women's voice in science; on the contrary, she concedes the importance of women's ideological perspective to give further insight into the realm of scientific inquiry.

Finally I wish to address Wendy Martyna's article, "Beyond the "He/Man" Approach: The Case for Nonsexist Language." As she insightfully gives voice to both sides of the argument, including the argument that there is a need to maintain sexist language in order to maintain male dominance (this given by Congress people at the

time), is not surprising. Martyna delves into the necessity of inclusive voice in social realms. “Those who oppose generic masculine are conserved with both equal rights and equal words. Nonsexist language would not only reflect a move toward nonsexist ideology; it would also function in itself as one form of social equality” (Martyna 1980:487) The movement to end sexist language began so many years ago, yet we continue to correct and interrupt such actions merely to be chastised by defenders of patriarchy. Language is essential in aiding women in gaining voice; vigilance is our only ally to move society towards equity.

The overwhelming majority of writers were those employing feminists’ voice, as opposed to those found in *Social Forces*. In *Signs*, 50% of the women authors used feminist methodology and 71% portrayed their feminist voice through their writing, as opposed to 10% using a feminist voice in *Social Forces*. The implication of such a finding is profound. Women who do not have the freedom to use their own voice in mainstream social discourse will inevitably be silenced. Also, by ignoring women’s ways of knowing we are failing to represent over half of our population in academic understanding.

So what does an exemplary piece of feminist writing imply? Although it proved difficult to find one piece that would encompass all elements of scholarly feminist methodology, I once again ventured into Dorothy Smith’s work. In her article, *Sociology from Women’s Experience: A Reaffirmation*, Smith delves into the issue of a feminist methodology for sociology,

The very intellectual successes of the women’s movement have created their own contradictions. Though they follow from the powerful discovery of a world split apart—we learned to see, act, and speak from a ground in our experience as women—the intellectual achievements of feminism have woven texts over that

original moment...My project is a sociology that begins in the actualities of women's experience. It builds on that earlier extraordinary moment, unlike anything I've experienced before or since, a giving birth to ourselves—slow, remorseless, painful, and powerful. It attempts to create a method of inquiry beginning from the site of being that we discovered as we learned to center ourselves as speaking, knowing subjects in our experience as women...In exploring our experiences we talked with, wrote to and for, women, beginning with what we shared as women, our sexed bodies. Here was and is the site of women's oppression, whether of violence, of rape, of lack of control over our choices to have children, through our connectedness to our children, or through childbirth and suckling. To declare this is not to formulate essentialism or biological determinism. Women's experience of oppression, whatever its form and focus, was grounded in male control, use, domination of our bodies. No transcendence for us. We were irremediably (as it seemed) defined by our bodies' relevance for and uses to men...I am so bold as to believe that there's something distinctive about the standpoint of women as I've expressed and experienced it, and have tried to build it into a method of sociological inquiry. Its distinction is this: that the standpoint of women situates inquiry in the actualities of people's living, beginning with their experience of living, and understands that inquiry and its product are in and of the same actuality (1992:88-90).

This exemplarily piece of feminist discourse encompasses much of the criteria that I have been discussing thus far. Smith can also be applied to Lugones and Spelman's earlier four criteria for inclusive theoretical construction (see page 4). She argues for our individual voice to be recognized as it is, or is not located within the dominant ideology. Her argument allows us to see that where this critique will take women, by knowing where we are situated and why. We can see how life for women in this cultural discourse begins through ideological oppression. This Smith views as the plight of all women under patriarchy. However, each standpoint is also individual so as to not imply one woman's dominance at the expense of another's. Lugones and Spelman argue against essentialist categories "Categories are quick to congeal, and the experiences of women whose lives do not fit the categories will appear as anomalous when in fact the theory should have grown out of them as much as others from the beginning" (1983:483). They also argue (as does Smith), for the individual voice to be represented. Taking into account each

woman's difference along the lines of race, class, and sexual orientation is as vastly important as the difference between women and men. We must remember that each lived experience is valid and significant. All this must be understood for the final category dealing with resistance and change to be adequately implemented.

Personal Narrative

In the following section I will pursue further my personal narrative. This narrative is an application of standpoint theory, using the theoretical perspectives of Smith and Martineau, while supporting Lugones and Spelman's criteria for feminist theory making. As stated previously in this research Lugones and Spelman's four criteria are as follows:

1). The theory or account can be helpful if it enables one to see how parts of one's life fit together... 2). A useful theory will help one locate oneself concretely in the world...3). A theory or account not only ought to accurately locate one in the world, but also enable one to think about the extent to which one is responsible for not being in that location...4). A theory that is useful will provide criteria for change and make suggestions for modes of resistance that don't merely reflect the situation and values of the theorizer...(1983:482).

Throughout this narrative I have interjected Lugones and Spelman's four criteria in order to understand at which standpoint of my journey we can apply their feminist theory development.

My Personal Journey to Finding Voice

The personal as political is not a simile, not a metaphor, and not an analogy...It means that women's distinctive experience as women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal—private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate—so that what it is to know the politics of woman's situation is to know women's personal lives. (MacKinnon 1982;34)

How does a woman find her voice? Even more specifically, how do I find my voice? Will I know my voice when and if I do find it? Who will define it as my voice; will it be me through some colored lens of patriarchal indoctrination? Will it be my

mother who has passed onto me her only form of knowing, as that of a submissive Christian woman who birthed ten children? Will it be my field of study, which passes along to me the theoretical perspectives of positivist white men that I must commit to memory in order to be a successful academic? I suppose that it could not be one singular entity, for I am a creation of all of these social factors. This journey to finding voice fulfills Lugones and Spelman's first step in theory making, "the theory or account can be helpful if it enables one to see how parts of one's life fit together" (1983:482).

The journey of finding voice has been spectacular. I don't believe that women can realize that they have been silenced until they realize that they could speak. The history of the women's movement is predicated on feminist consciousness. It could be argued that feminist methodology came out of women's conscious raising groups, which was also at the heart of the women's movement. This empirical method of conscious raising was a specific mode of inquiry that allowed women to learn from one another (Allen 1973; Combahee River Collective 1982). But I would also assert that having feminist consciousness and voice might be separate manifestations. If so, do you need to have a voice in order to tap into your feminist consciousness? I don't think I could say "in the summer of 1992... I found my voice." To find my voice did I need to tap into some vein of feminist consciousness? Perhaps. In this essay I want to trace the path to finding my voice.

Growing up the silenced eighth child in a family of ten seems to give you the ability of keen observation. This was the gift that my extremely Italian patriarchal family gave to me. It is important to understand where you came from in order to focus on where you're going. Harriet Martineau uncovered and documented the importance of

“understanding the context for actions” (1838:26). We need to view life in context. Martineau states the effects of socialization “influences to which he (sic) is subjected” (1838:135) on those being studied as essential in correctly clarifying the situated circumstances, which creates the outcome of humanity. To understand that my perceptions and actions derived from an Italian male dominated family is essential in understanding why finding feminist consciousness and voice had been suppressed. Here we have Lugones and Spelman’s second criterion: “a useful theory will help one locate oneself concretely in the world” (1983:482).

Now with the acceptance of myself as a wonderfully colorful mix of interaction with really bizarre people, I began to see how the social dictates influenced my life choices. It would be difficult to contest that women in society today are still groomed to be mothers and wives. At the age of 20 I was pregnant with my first child; by 24 I had three babies. I married at 21, which was not a choice; it was a Catholic mandate. My marriage was to a man who was controlling, abusive, and dominating. But I had three babies and as my mother would state to me, “if your marriage is over, then just put your focus on your children.” Therefore, I remained married for eight years. To understand why I married an abusive man, we merely need to view society’s edict for gender roles. The socially constructed manifestation of masculine and feminine can have dire consequences, one of which is domestic violence. Socially endorsed meanings are communicated through structures and institutions, which serve to announce, reflect, and perpetuate gendered cultural views. Because gender is a salient issue in society, institutions uphold preferred meanings and encourage individuals to conform to what is collectively endorsed as “appropriate” masculine and feminine behavior. Messages

reinforcing cultural views of gender are pervasive and frequently go unchallenged, perpetuating sexist stereotypes and cultural beliefs.

During the time of my marriage I was faced with extreme double consciousness. According to Dorothy Smith, women move between two fields of consciousness; “the governing consciousness dominates the primary world of a locally situated consciousness but cannot cancel it; the latter is a subordinated, suppressed, absent, but absolutely essential ground of the governing consciousness” (1990:19). These dichotomized two worlds in which the locally situated consciousness is suppressed operate to silence women. “A theory or account not only ought to accurately locate one in the world, but also enable one to think about the extent to which one is responsible for not being in that location,” according to Lugones and Spelman’s third criteria for theory making (1983:482). I now see how my inability to view myself in both worlds due to the oppression of domestic violence and suppression of voice affected my standpoint. I was passive, unable to deal with issues of responsibility for my location.

As time passed, my children got slightly older, and I became uneasy about being quiet. It became increasingly difficult to remain silent. The physical isolation had begun to be broken. We needed two incomes, which meant that I needed to go out of the house to work. I soon gained great respect for women who could stay home and be full time mothers, and I think I also gained great jealousy, because there was a joy that came from being a full time mother to my children. The choice to keep my children was mine, and I was determined to raise them. But like so many other women, I needed to venture outside of my isolation and contend with the public working world. When you are in the public, you gain attention. As Smith points out, it is through situated experience in

relation to social position that one creates understanding of social life. This 'standpoint,' according to Smith is, "in the form of social consciousness... [the] world is directly felt, sensed, responded to prior to social expression... [one] locates that experience in the social relations" (1987:49). It is at this point that I would like to clarify why I made the earlier assertion that women's voice and feminist consciousness are separate. The attention that I gained, which awakened my awareness, was a critical part of finding voice. I gained attention as a woman, as a sex, as a gender, but not as a whole person. Many women understand these different types of attention.

In this society, women are verified through male attention, which we can see in the tremendous objectification of women in media, and advertising. It comes down to attention as a woman vs. attention as a person. This type of attention created a type of false belief in myself, which I am not defining as bad, but on the contrary, as necessary. This type of attention, at this point in time, was an essential step in finding my voice. When women are maintained in isolation, even attention from the cat is important. Every element of social life derives its importance from this great consideration. The external conveniences of men, their internal emotions and affections, their social arrangements, graduate in importance precisely in proportion as they affect the general happiness of the section of the race among which they exist (Martineau 1995). This was the beginning of finding an identity that had been previously been defined by my parents, then my husband (we can see this socially through the ceremonial changing of names from my maiden name to married name). With this newly acquired attention, I was exploring different forms of identity for myself, although I understand others were still defining my identity.

I was out in the public world of my little town, being objectified and questioning my identity. My husband and I opened a small sandwich shop. However, it was I who ran this shop and participated in full time mothering at the same time. I began to realize my own ability to be successful. I began to realize that my husband was not a hero, but that I had lived through his identity for so long, I never had a chance to know myself. Now I am beginning to stand back and watch my own abilities at work, while all of the time I am dealing with this bifurcated consciousness. This bifurcated consciousness refers to the, "...two modes of knowing, experiencing, and acting –one located in the body and in the space that it occupies and moves into, the other passing beyond it" (Smith 1987:82).

Okay, so what does a mother of three do when she starts to find out that she has an identity all her own, and yet she still has no voice? To be an active participant in the nurturing of ourselves is not easy. I left my husband, moved out with my three children, and became homeless, a welfare mom, and an abuse survivor, and then a college student. However, it was not at this point that I found my voice. Rather I was only beginning to recover and heal from the extreme social conditioning wrought by family patriarchy and religious values and an abusive marriage. This healing took several years of therapy and tears.

So today have I found my voice? Yes. However, I did need to develop a feminist consciousness in order to do so. We begin our education about being female in this society, being a woman in this time period, and being part of a feminist history, but are we developing awareness. One must be committed to exploring the society from within women's experience of it. "The only way of knowing a socially constructed world is knowing it from within" (Smith1990:22). Rather than objectifying them or explaining

their behavior, one then investigates how that society organizes and shapes the everyday world of experience (Smith 1987). It is that understanding of our situated knowledge that aids in creating a feminist consciousness. Through this standpoint we can see how Lugones and Spelman's fourth criteria to theory making aids in understanding how the application of our standpoint can give us a rich view of our social embeddedness. "A theory that is useful will provide criteria for change and make suggestions for modes of resistance that don't merely reflect the situation and values of the theorizer" (1983:482).

We must understand our location within this structure to know how we are oppressed. I believe that many women may see that they are not situated equally within the structure; however, they may not feel this is an issue. Therefore, they may have situated knowledge without developing a feminist consciousness. If women gain an understanding of self as women, situated within the larger structure, it may not guarantee them feminist consciousness. The connection of women enables awareness. So does finding feminist consciousness guarantee voice? Not necessarily. Having voice comes with risk of reprisal, speaking out comes with risk of loss; however, to not gain voice is a tremendous loss.

Throughout my childhood, I lacked both voice and self-awareness. I felt invisible and powerless. As a young woman, my self-esteem was rock bottom. I had the spoiled identity of someone who feels worthless. This sense of worthlessness was reinforced regularly by my then husband. It was only when I left the isolation of my home to become a worker that I began to feel capable and visible. But I still did not feel really worthwhile. I developed a false sense of identity based on the messages of others. At some level it was not real to me.

When I went to the safe-house with my children, a real shift occurred. My counselors believed in me before I believed in myself. They were very influential in making me believe I could go to college. They helped me in practical ways, too, such as helping me to get financial aid. My sense of self blossomed in school. I started to view myself as more independent, capable. I had higher self-esteem but also greater anger about all the information I had been denied. I learned to convert this anger into energy to pursue my dream.

Today my sense of self is that of a capable, genuine, authentic person. I have the strength to be authentic. Finding voice is essential to that task.

Finding voice is empowering. When I speak, I am able to create a classroom environment in which those I teach can explore ideas and summon courage to find their own voices. When I speak to defend my dissertation, I travel the path to the career credentials, which expand my potential. When I speak to my children, I share wisdom learned from my experiences. When I speak to my husband who has supported my personal journey from silent despair to my new and happy marriage, I am able to give my thanks from a place of equality and respect.

When I speak and write as an academic, I help establish the role modeling which can aid other female academics to learn to speak with clear and authentic voices.

Discussion

In order to accurately assess how far we have come as feminist academics, we must acknowledge where we started. We need to understand the impact of the co-optation of women's voice. Martineau provides great insight into the application of discourse a century before it was defined as standpoint. She, however, did not fully use her voice in order to represent women. Due to the time period of her writing, acceptance and opportunity were not readily available to women. She overcame a tremendous amount of resistance and her application of method continues to be applied today. Martineau was a forerunner in academic feminist discourse; she gave women the information needed to create social change and begin to identify their voice. She had influenced the likes of Marx, Engels, Durkheim and Weber, along with feminist writers such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Margaret Fuller. Her writings have only recently again surfaced as an influential review of sociological understanding. She has surfaced as one of the forerunners of social inquiry in academic texts, and has come into discourse as an essential founder of social research.

In the 1960s Dorothy Smith gave identification to a method of understanding to a large population of our culture. Her ability to move social discourse forward gave way to other feminist authors who continue this social change. Smith also was a forerunner in aiding in the understanding of where we are situated within the larger context of oppression. And to employ that situated knowledge to delve further into exploring the colonialism of women in defining current roles and expectations. Due to feminist theorists of the sixties, alternative insight motivated understanding at a level greater than before. We had an explosion of feminist dialogue, which gave rise to women's solidarity

in finding voice. This dialogue aids in understanding the need to represent the entire population of cultural participants.

Contemporary discourse should be inclusive of both women and men's voices as representing the most effective way to influence social change. If women are silenced in academia, then women are silenced in society. Academic discourse gives voice to morals, values, social policy, political thought, and social change. Through academic discourse we enable representation of all people. By not engaging in feminist methodology, then we will continue to objectify social life, with little regard for the larger cultural context. We will continue to 'band-aid' society, rather than instill insight into social change at more macro levels. Feminist methodologies give social discourse a more subjective depth that has previously been denied. Women were given meaning as defined by men's objective position, not women's experience as representative of larger colonialist ideology that impacted women's roles as objective truths.

As stated previously, Smith argues "a feminist sociology must...begin with actual subjects situated as they actually are...an insider's sociology, a sociology of society as it is and must be known by the people who are active in it" (1990:32). If the collaboration of gender based social sciences melds it would provide tremendous insight and advance mainstream social research. Feminist methodology supports subjectivity, finding voice, knowing location or standpoint, tying theory, method and action together. We would benefit from the fruitfulness of social inquiry, from the standpoint of those being studied, rather than understand through our academic lens of co-opted discourse. Language for women would not be an arbitrary form of academic communication; it would be a path to understanding both women and men on a more equitable field.

Standpoint theory and feminist methodology are inextricably linked. It would be difficult to separate them, and, I would argue, unnecessary to identify them as elements of separate genres. They approach social insight in order to give voice and legitimacy to academic discourse. Although not all feminist methodology uses the approach of standpoint theory, feminist methodology is a grounded theoretical perspective which utilizes the position of women within the larger patriarchal structure to uncover the inequities of women's social standing. It is this, which is at the heart of Martineau's and Smith's academic discourse.

Appendix 1

Theory and Voice in the Journal of *Social Forces* 1960-2004

Year	Social Forces	Male Analytic/ Objective	Feminist Methodology	Standpoint Theory	Female Voice	Male Voice
1960	Snyder, Eloise	X				X
1961	Smith, Verlie	X				X
1962	Aldous, Joan	X				X
1963	Minnis, Mhyra	X				X
1964	Keller, Suzanne; Marisa Zavalloni	X				X
1965	Osmond, Marie	X				X
1966	Gurin, Patricia	X				X
1967	Nelson, Cynthia	X			X	
1968	Vanfossen, Beth	X				X
1969	Meadow, Kathryn	X				X
1970	Simon, Rita; Gail Crotts: Linda Mahn	X			X	
1971	Tudor, Jeannette	X				X
1972	Danet, Brenda; Harriet Hartman	X				X
1973	Haug, Marie	X			X	
1974	No articles published by women only					
1975	Wright, Sonia	X				X
1976	Caditz, Judith	X				X
1977	Kasschau, Patricia	X				X
1978	Wolf, Wendy; Rachel Rosenfeld	X				X
1979	Tuma, Nancy; Maureen Hallinan		X		X	
1980	Stevens, Gillian; Monica Boyd	X				X
1981	Molm, Linda	X				X
1982	Hardy, Melissa	X				X
1983	Verbrugge, Lois	X				X
1984	Mooney-Marini, Margaret	X			-X	
1985	Alexander, Victoria; Peggy Thoits	X				X

Year	Social Forces	Male Analytic/ Objective	Feminist Methodology	Standpoint Theory	Female Voice	Male Voice
1986	Floge, Liliane; Merrill, Deborah		X		-X	
1987	Simpson, Sally	X				X
1988	Blau, Judith	X				X
1989	Harper-Simpson, Ida		X		-X	
1990	Cate-Schaeffer, Nora	X				X
1991	Trent, Katherine; Eve Powell-Griner	X				X
1992	White, Lynn; Agnes Riedmann	X				X
1993	Peterson, Ruth; Lauren Krivo	X				X
1994	Minkoff, Debra	X				X
1995	Thoits, Peggy	X				X
1996	Hallinan, Maureen	X				X
1997	Hughes, Marion	X				X
1998	Pattillo, Mary	X			-X	
1999	Manning, Wendy; Pamela Smock	X				X
2000	Johnson, Cathryn; Rebecca Ford; Joanne Kaufman	X				X
2001	McCammon, Holly		X		X	
2002	Regpeczo, Wendy	X				X
2003	Keister, Lisa	X			-X	
2004	Flippen, Chenoa	X				X

Theory and Voce in the Journal of *Signs* 1976-2004

Year	Signs	Male Analytic/ Objective	Feminist Methodology	Standpoint Theory	Female Voice	Male Voice
1976	Griffiths, Martha			X	-X	
1977	Hertz, Susan	X				X
1978	Bloch, Ruth	X				X
1979	Kamerman, Sheila	X			X	
1980	Martyna, Wendy		X		X	
1981	Haffron, Trudy; Susan Gluck-Mezey	X				X
1982	Fox-Keller, Evelyn		X		X	
1983	Gee, Pauline		X			X
1984	Martin, Elaine		X			X
1985	Higgins, Patricia		X		X	
1986	Bordo, Susan		X		X	
1987	Bumiller, Kristin	X				X
1988	Acker, Joan	X				X
1989	Postlethwaite, Diana		X		X	
1990	Harley, Sharon	X			X	
1991	Stamp, Patricia			X	X	
1992	Nakano-Glenn, Evelyn	-X			X	
1993	Lichman-Jacobs, Janet		X		X	
1994	Fraser, Nancy; Linda Gordon			X	X	
1995	Chodorow, Nancy			X	X	
1996	Tomlinson, Barbara	X				X
1997	Peteet, Julie		X		X	
1998	Projansky, Sarah			X	X	
1999	Benhabib, Seyla	X				X
2000	Sayers, Janet		X		X	
2001	Mayers, Diana		X		X	
2002	Boose, Lynda		X		X	
2003	Mohanty, Chandra		X		X	
2004	McHugh, Kathleen; Vivian Sobchack		X		X	

References:

- Acker, J. (1988). Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution. *Signs* 13,3 Pp. 473-497.
- Allen, P. 1973. Free Space. Kodet, Levine & Rapone (eds.), In *Radical Feminism* Quadrangle, NY: 271-279.
- Andrisani, P. 1978. Job Satisfaction Among Working Women. *Signs*. 3,3 Pp. 588-607.
- Aries, E. 1987. Gender and Communication. In P. Shaver & C. Hendrick (eds.), *Sex and Gender*. Pp. 147-176. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Attwell, P. 1974. Ethnomethodology Since Garfinkel. *Theory and Society*. 179-210
- Bellinger, D.C, & J.B. Gleason 1982. Sex differences in Parental Directives to Young Children. *Sex Roles*, 8, Pp. 1123-1139.
- Blumer, G. 1967. *Society as Symbolic Interaction*
- Blumer, H. 1931. Science Without Concepts. *The American Journal of Sociology*. 36,4. pp.515-33.
- Borodo, S 1986. The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought. *Signs*. 11,3 Pp. 439-456.
- Bumiller, K. 1987. Victims in the Shadow of the Law: a Critique of the Model of Legal Protection. *Signs*. 12,3 Pp. 421-439.
- Campbell, K.K. 1973. The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation: An Oxymoron. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59, Pp. 74-86.
- Chodorow, N. 1995. Gender as a Personal and Cultural Construction." *Signs*. 20,3 Pp. 526-544.
- Cooley, CH. 1907. Social Consciousness. *The American Journal of Sociology*. 675-94
- Cuzzort, R.P. 1989. *Twentieth- Century Social Thought*. Pp 295-323.
- De Beauvoir, S. 1970. *The Second Sex*. New York
- Derlega, V.J, & A.L. Chaiken 1976. Norms affecting Self-Disclosure in Men and Women. *Years. Journal of Health and Social Behavior*. American Sociological Association.

- Eakins, B., & G.Eakins 1976. Verbal Turn Taking and Exchanges in Faculty Dialogue. In B.L. Dubois & I.Crouch (eds.), *Papers in English: IV. Proceedings of the Conference on the Sociology of the Languages of American Women*. Pp. 53-62. San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press.
- Enslin, E. 1994. Beyond Writing: Feminist Practice and the Limitations of Ethnography. *Cultural Anthropology*. 9,4. pp. 537-68.
- Fishman, P.M. 1978. Interaction: The Work Women Do. *Social Problems*, 25, Pp. 397-406.
- Floge, L & D. Merrill. 1986. Tokenism reconsidered: Male Nurse and Female Physicians in a Hospital Setting. *Social Forces*. 64,4 Pp. 925-947.
- Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Trans. A. Sheridan. New York:Vintage
- Fox Keller, E. 1995. *Reflections on Gender and Science*. University Press:London
- 1982. Feminism and Science. *Signs*. 7,3, Pp.589-602.
- Giddens, A. 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. California Press.
- Gorelick, S. 1991. Contradictions of Feminist Methodology. *Gender & Society*. 5, Pp. 459-477.
- Greenhalgh, S. & J. Li. 1995. Engendering reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China: For a Feminist Demography of Reproduction. *Signs*. 20,3, Pp. 601-641.
- Griffiths, M 1976. Can We Still Afford Occupational Segregation? Some Remarks. *Signs* 1,3. Pp. 7-14
- Gunaratnam, Y. (2003). *Researching 'Race' and Ethnicity*. Sage Press
- Gurin, P & E. Epps. 1966. Some Characteristics of Students from Poverty Backgrounds Attending Predominantly Negro colleges in the Deep South. *Social Forces*. 45,1. Pp. 27-40.
- Hall, D., &K. Langellier 1988. Storytelling Strategies in Mother-Daughter Communication. In B. Bate & A. Taylor (eds.), *Women Communicating: Studies of Women's Talk*. Pp. 107-126.
- Harding, S. 1993. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is 'Strong Objectivity'? Alcoff, L. & E. Potter. (eds). *Feminist Epistemologies*. NY: Routledge. Pp. 235-246.

- Harper Simpson, I. 1989. The Sociology of Work: Were Have the Workers Gone? *Social Forces*. 67,3. Pp. 563-581.
- Hartsock, N. 1998. *The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays*. Westview Press.
- Heidegger, M. 1975. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Indiana University Press.
- Hill Collins, P. 1997. "Comment on Hekman's 'Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited': Where's the Power?." *Women in Culture and Society*. V22;2:375
- hooks, b. 1989. *Talking Back; Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black*. South End Press.
- Horney, K. 1926. The Flight From Womanhood. In *Women and Analysis*. Ed. J. Strouse. New York:Dell 1975
- Husserl, E. 1931. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. J.H. Muirhead (ed.), Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. London, Eng: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. New York: The Macmillian Company.
- Johnson, F. 1996. Friendships Among Women: Closeness in Dialogue. In J.T. Wood (ed.), *Gendered Relationships: A Reader*. Pp. 79-94. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.
- Lakoff, R. (1975). *Lange and Woman's Place*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Kasper, A. 1986. Consciousness re-evaluated: Interpretive Theory and Feminist Scholarship. *Sociological Inquiry*. 56, Pp. 30-49.
- Keller, E.F. 1985. *Reflections on Gender and Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kournay, J & J. Sterba, R. Tong. 1999. *Feminist Philosophies: Problems, Theories, and Applications*. 2nd ed. Prentice Hall.
- Kramarea, C. 1983. Language, Gender and Society: Opening a Second Decade of Research. In B. Thorne, C. Kramarae, & N. Henley (eds.) *Language, Gender and Society*. Rowely, Mass: Newbury House, 7-24.
- Kramarae, C. & M. Jenkins. 1981. A Thief in the House: Women and Language. In Dale Spender (ed.), *Men's Studies Modified: The Impact of Feminism on the Academic Disciplines*. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 11-22.
- Lewis, E.T., & P.R. McCarthy 1988. Perceptions of Self-Disclosure as a Function of Gendered Linked Variables. *Sex Roles*, 19, P. 47-56.

- Lugones, M. & E. Spelman. 1983. Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for "Woman's Voice." *The Women's Studies International Forum*. 6,6. pp. 573-581.
- MacKinnon, C. 1982. Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory. *Signs* 7. pp 515-44.
- Martineau, H. (1983)[1877]. *Harriet Martineau's Autobiography*: Vol 1 & 2. Virago Press.
- 1995[1838]. *How to Observe Morals and Manners*. NJ: Transaction Publishers
- 2000 [1838]. *Retrospect of Western Travel*. Library of Congress.
- 2000 [1820-1875]. *Society in America*. ed Seymour Martin Lipset. London:Anchor
- Martyna, W. 1980. Beyond the "He/Man" Approach: The Case for Nonsexist Language. *Signs*. 5,3, Pp. 482-493.
- Marx, K. & F. Engels. 1999. *The German Ideology*. International Publishers Co. Inc. [1947].
- McPhail, C. & C. Rexroat. 1979. Mead vs. Blumer: The Divergent Methodological Perspectives of Social Behaviorism and Symbolic Interactionism. *American Sociological Review*. 44:449-467.
- Neilsen, J.M. 1990. *Feminist Research Methods: Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Nelson, C. 1967. Analysis of World View in a Mexican Peasant Village: An Illustration. 46,1. Pp. 52-61.
- Ollenburger, J.C. 1998. *A Sociology of Women: The Intersection of Patriarchy, Capitalism, and Colonization*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Paloma, M. 1979. *Contemporary Sociological Theory*. New York. Macmillan.
- Postlethwaite, D. 1989. Mothering and Mesmerism in the Life of Harriet Martineau. *Signs*. 14,3. Pp, 583-609.
- Roland Martin, J. 1994. Methodological Essentialism, False Difference, and Other Dangerous Traps. *Signs*. 19,3. pp. 630-57
- Sartre, J.P. 2001. *Jean-Paul Sartre: The Basics*. Brunner Routledge.
- Saureer, M.K. & R.M. Eisler 1990. The Role of Masculine Gender Roles' Stress in Expressivity and Social Support Network Factors. *Sex Roles*, 23, Pp. 262-271.

- Sayyid, S. 2000. Beyond Westphalia: Nations and Diasporas- The Case of the Muslim Umma. In B. Hesse (ed). *Un/settled Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions*. London:Zed Books. Pp.33-50.
- Schaeff, A.W. 1981. *Women's Reality*. St. Paul, MN: Winston Press.
- Seybold, P. 1987. Behind the Veil of Neutrality. In *Recapturing Marxism: An Appraisal of Recent Trends in Sociological Theory*, (ed.) R.F. Levine & J. Lembeke. New York: Praeger.
- Smith, D. 1992. Sociology From Women's Experience: A Reaffirmation. *Sociological Theory*. 10:1, pp.88-98.
- 1990. Women's Experience as a Radical Critique of Sociology, *The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, [1974], pp. 21-24.
- 1987. *The Everyday World As Problematic: A Feminist Sociology*. Boston:Northern University Press.
- Sprague, J. & M. Zimmerman. 1993. Overcoming Dualism: a Feminist Agenda For Sociological Methodology. In *Theory on Gender/Feminism on Theory*. England, P. (ed.). New York: Aldine
- Stewart, L.P., Stewart, A.D., Friendly, S.A., & P.J. Cooper 1990. *Communication Between the Sexes: Sex Differences, and Sex Role Stereotypes*. (2nd ed.). Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick.
- Tannen, D. 1990a. *Gender Differences in Conversational Coherence: Physical Alignment and Topical Cohesion*. In B. Dorval (ed.). *Conversational Organization and its Development*, 38, Pp. 167-206. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Tannen, D 1990b. *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation*. New York: William Morrow.
- Thorne, B.E. & N. Henley 1975. *Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance*. Rowley, Mass: Newbury House.
- Treichler, P.A., & C. Kramarae 1983. Women's Talk in the Ivory Tower. *Communication Quarterly*, 31, Pp. 118-132.
- Wallace, R & A Wolf. 1999. *Contemporary Sociological Theory: Expanding the Classic Tradition*. Prentice Hall:NJ.

- Werbner, P. 1997. *Essentialising Essentialism, Essentialising Silence: Ambivalence and Multiplicity in the Constructions of Racism and Ethnicity*. In P. Werbner and T. Modood (eds). *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism*. London: Zed Books. Pp226-54.
- Wood, J.T. 1993a. Engendered Relationships: Interaction, Caring, Power, and Responsibility in Close Relationships. In S, Duck (ed.), *Processes in Close Relationships: Contexts of Close Relationships*. 3, Pp. 26-54. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Wood, J.T. 1993b. Engendered Identities: Shaping Voice and Mind Through Gender. In D. Vocate (ed.). *Intrapersonal Communication: Different Voices, Different Minds*. Pp. 145-167. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Wood, J.T. & C. Inman 1993. In a Different Mode: Recognizing Male Modes of Closeness. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 21, Pp. 279-295.