

DISSERTATION

ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN TRANSBOUNDARY NETWORKED FOREST
GOVERNANCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON THE CROWN OF THE
CONTINENT

Submitted by

Theresa Jedd

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, Colorado

Spring 2015

Doctoral Committee:

Advisor: Michele Betsill

Dimitris Stevis
Stephen Mumme
Antony Cheng

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ABSTRACT

ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN TRANSBOUNDARY NETWORKED FOREST GOVERNANCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON THE CROWN OF THE CONTINENT

Using a social constructivist ontology to examine key debates and areas of inquiry vis-à-vis the democratic nature of transboundary forest governance, this research examines the case of the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, an instance of networked governance. *Part I* builds up to an examination of the movement toward conceptualizing transboundary networked governance, exploring the claim that government has given way to governance, blurring the lines between public and private, and moving beyond its antecedent models—systems theory and complexity, corporatism, state-in-society, new public management and privatization, *inter alia*—to reflect a more complicated and inherently collaborative relationship between state, society, and market-based actors.

The dissertation project, then, investigates several key questions. At a basic level, it asks, what does networked governance look like, and in the case of the Crown Roundtable, how might these arrangements be adaptive given the absence of an overarching forests treaty? Looking deeper into the implications of networked governance, the project then moves to an investigation of the ways that these processes become legitimate modes of governing and how they allow actors to hold each other accountable.

Evidence in the Crown Roundtable suggests that the state is simply one actor among many. In this sea of various players, without the traditional forms of accountability, how do we

ensure that governance retains its democratic qualities? The second part (chapters 4, 5, 6, 7) builds from the initial observations in the first part (chapters 1, 2, and 3) that state boundaries in the Crown of the Continent are transected by landscape identities and norms. It examines the implications for maintaining democracy in governance. Given the lack of institutions (such as the juridical, legal, and electoral channels) available at the domestic level, how can actors be held accountable? What do shifts toward a flattened and fragmented forest governance landscape represent in terms of both the ability of diverse actors to relate to one another and also for the participants to see NG as a worthwhile process to engage? In answering these questions, *Part II* examines whether NG architectures are able to incorporate channels for accountability while simultaneously drawing upon a broad base of participation and maintaining social legitimacy. Finally, the dissertation concludes with thoughts on institutional design. In so doing, it hopefully contributes to an understanding of how to build collaborative networked arrangements that are better able to address transboundary environmental problems.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing this dissertation occasionally felt like a very solitary project. It sometimes required spending evenings and weekends in the computer lab, mornings brushing up on network analysis and with methods textbooks, afternoons running network models, solo road trips and camping, hours on end wearing headphones transcribing interview audio files, and endless days at my desk. During these times it might have been tempting to feel I was doing this on my own. However, I have to say that this is resoundingly not the case. This dissertation was only possible through an incredible network of support.

First off, the fieldwork would not have been possible without support and training from the wonderful people at the Center for Collaborative Conservation, the guidance of my advisor and committee, Courtney Schultz and Dennis Ojima who took me under their wings as a research assistant, or my friends in the political science department. There are many who I would like to thank, and I hope I am able to do so personally as well, but I'll start by listing their names here. Thank you Nikki Detraz, John Hultgren, Dallas Blaney, Chris Nucci, Courtney Hunter, Tommasina Miller, Cat Olukotun, Jamie Way, Greg DiCerbo, Jenna Bloxom, Amy Lewis, and Trina Hoffer. My co-authors and writing partners have been a steady source of support and inspiration; thank you Patrick Bixler, Ch'aska Huayhuaca, Matt Luizza, Kathie Mattor, Heidi Huber-Stearns, Faith Sternlieb, Arren Mendezona, and Tunga Ulambayar.

I would also like to thank the people of the Roundtable community for their generosity in sharing their time and endless wit and wisdom. They met with me at their offices, conversing over meals, in their homes, cafes, and even on busses. There were the expected settings, like a National Park Service office, the walls lined with pictures of stunning mountains and wildlife,

file cabinets overflowing with brochures and memos. There were the entirely unexpected settings, too. Sitting with a community organizer on a couch with her parrot on her shoulder, dog at her feet, hair in curlers and tucked into her housecoat created the kind of candid context that a researcher could only hope for. The time and wisdom that conservationists shared with me not only lent to incredible insight into the workings of networked forest governance, but also made me feel at home. I considered myself a part of the community during my fieldwork. It is my hope that this dissertation gives back in some small way.

Finally, last and most, so much love to my amazing friends and wonderful family, and those who blur the lines between. You stuck with me through the crazy times. Thank you for being there at various points from the beginning, along the way, and at the end of this journey. My gratitude to you all! In so many areas, you encouraged me to climb to new heights. I wouldn't be doing this without you. Your sense of humor, work ethic, strength, dedication, and curiosity about the natural world are constant sources of inspiration. None of it, of course, would have been possible without my loving parents who brought me into this world with a sense of adventure.

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INTRODUCTION

In the face of the failure to achieve a binding treaty at the global level pertaining to the management of forests, two important trends have emerged. Forest management has become more decentralized, coupled with the increasing involvement of civil society. Instead of a single overarching treaty, a collection of forest governance arrangements has emerged. It is an amalgamation of biodiversity-related trade agreements, certification and eco-labeling, non-binding reporting and planning agreements, among others. Here we can identify three distinct governance logics: hierarchies, markets and networks. In recent years, networked arrangements have become particularly prominent. They have been largely overlooked by scholars of global forest governance who have focused on hierarchical arrangements (such as REDD+) and market arrangements (like forest certification schemes). This dissertation project fills this void by focusing on networked forest governance arrangements, presenting a detailed case study of one particular instance.

In its examination of networked governance, the project enhances knowledge both by providing an accurate depiction of the forest governance landscape. The first three chapters are concerned with conceptualizing networked forest governance. Why have networked arrangements become part of the global forest governance landscape and what does this mean in terms of how governance is accomplished? What advantages do they provide over other forms of forest governance?

Chapter one paints a picture of the global forest governance landscape, with an overview of the types of arrangements in place. Global forest governance mechanisms range from carbon finance schemes, community management programs, to national forest plans, and carry-over

from the biodiversity conservation regimes. These arrangements are broad and varied, creating a complicated landscape of arrangements to address issues in forest management. To help make sense of these seemingly disjointed elements, the chapter puts forth a typology. This parses elements of the regime complex into three types: hierarchies, markets, and networked governance.

Chapter two presents the logic of networked governance, showing how it represents a departure from the other two modes of governing. In hierarchical architectures, there is a clear chain of command, and an *a priori* set of rules; relationships are rank-ordered in relation to a central authority. Interactions in markets are based on established systems of exchange where similar units are used as currency to induce behavioral change toward a particular management goal. Transactions are generally conducted on a voluntary basis, and linkages between actors shift with consumption patterns. In networked architectures, by contrast, we see diffuse patterns of authority that overlap public and private spheres, multi-directional flows of information and resources. Furthermore, the sustained linkages between actors are often based on repeated interactions and social capital. As *government* has given way to *governance*, states are no longer the sole players in international relations. In other words, the lines between public and private are blurred. Moving beyond the antecedent models, which include language of “new public management,” privatization, and polycentricism, a networked governance framework reflects a more complex relationship between states, civil society, and market-based actors.

Chapter three provides the case background. The study focuses on the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent (the Crown Roundtable), a transboundary collaborative “network of networks” situated in a forested ecosystem between the United States and Canada. The chapter begins by presenting an overview of the case study design and the methods used for investigating

the research questions. It then situates the Crown of the Continent landscape as a social-ecological system, laying out the physical and human dimensions of the study site. The third portion of the chapter covers the Crown Roundtable: who is involved and what its activities are, concluding with a discussion of how it illustrates the advantages of networked forest governance. At a closer level, the chapter explores how networked forest governance plays out in a particular time and place. It suggests the ways networked governance is flexible and adaptive, two key components to address complexity in forest management.

The following chapters investigate the implications of these shifts for networked forest governance. Its flexibility may be an asset in some regards, in particular being an attractive alternative to a legally binding treaty. However, its open-ended nature may open it up to weaknesses in other areas. For example, I ask, what does the movement toward governance networks represent for the rule-making authority of non-state actors? Is it even possible to have democratically accountable transboundary linkages? How does a governance network come to be accepted as a legitimate arrangement? Chapter four begins by presenting critiques of networked governance, and the ways that informal arrangements can sidestep traditional legal mechanisms for recourse at the international level. It sets up the theoretical background for legitimacy and accountability, paving the way for the analyses in chapters five and six. While existing work highlights the working parts of networked governance (the structure) much less is known about its dimensions (the processes), in particular the ways that it might or might not adhere to the standards we usually associate with democracy. Chapters five and six form the root of the investigation, using the Roundtable case to flesh out what legitimacy and accountability look like in the context of networked governance.

Chapter five explores the dimensions of civic engagement, looking at what draws participants into the process and keeps them engaged. Without a formal, binding obligation what is the basis for accepting the Crown Roundtable? In other words, the chapter asks what the mechanisms and processes are that contribute to its legitimacy. I examine participants' perceptions of the suitability of networked forest governance using transcript data collected from in-depth interviews and participant observation. Ultimately, the narratives show that by building trust, a shared set of norms and a common identity, a transboundary space can come to be accepted as a legitimate arena for deliberative engagement.

Chapter six builds on these findings to examine how these characteristics lend themselves to social ties of accountability. A mixed methods approach is used to tease out the structure and nature of the working relationships in the Roundtable. Social network analysis is used to graphically display the ties between individuals. Qualitative evidence from interviews and participant observation lend deeper insight into the nature of the ties. Three network subtypes are modeled (information-sharing, problem-solving, and influence), showing varying levels of engagement depending on the purpose of the network. The analysis reveals stronger ties in the information sharing network, with an important role for brokers, or connecting individuals who bridge otherwise unconnected communities. Supporting interview data corroborate this role. In sum, the investigation reveals a rich tapestry of engagement, from the community level to the international space. The notion of the 'accountability deficit' is ultimately rejected, through a move toward a civil society that crosses between jurisdictions.

Finally, chapter seven concludes by offering institutional design recommendations for networked arrangements. In managing forests across borders, governance networks provide a longer lasting and potentially more rewarding solution for collaboratively crafting a vision of

conservation and also for implementing it. These sustained linkages create a rich context for collaboration, with shared norms, and common identity, and a sense of trust, creating a deeply textured background for conservation that makes it possible to achieve objectives across the larger landscape scale in an unprecedented scale. Hopefully, the lessons learned in the case study lend toward addressing problems associated with environmental change, contributing back to a body of literature on the broader implications for good governance and the potential for achieving democratic conservation that crosses borders.

CHAPTER ONE: The Global Forest Governance Landscape

1.1 The Global Forest Regime Complex

The world's forests provide many benefits. They are home for much of the planet's biodiversity, hosting plants and animals that make up a rich tapestry of cultural heritage, medicinal uses, and aesthetic beauty. They are home for many species of wildlife as well as for human settlements. Forests are important for hydrologic cycles; healthy forested ecosystems provide clean water, and prevent soil erosion and flooding. Pressing forest conservation challenges surrounding the increasing demand for water, land, and energy resources coupled with socioeconomic pressures related to making a transition from a natural-resource economy to a knowledge- and amenity-based economy pose governance puzzles for managers, conservation practitioners, and landowners (Chambers et al. 2010). Many of these challenges cross jurisdictional boundaries. Maintaining healthy forested ecosystems is important on a planetary scale. What happens in one forest is not just important for the immediate vicinity. The decisions local communities make about forest management have global implications.

Forests have been called the "world's lungs" because they process, or respire, carbon dioxide into breathable oxygenated air. Respiration is important for maintaining air quality, and also for global carbon cycling dynamics. More broadly, forests provide a range of ecosystem services. Forests are increasingly recognized for their role in mitigating climate change. They are important for carbon sequestration but they are also a source of emissions when it comes to land conversion and burning. Forest management has recently risen to a high priority area of concern in the arena of climate governance. Even though it is in our interest to maintain these landscapes and ecosystems, there is no international-level treaty arrangement that spells out the way we

should manage forests. Given the interconnected nature of forests, past attempts have aimed to design global-level forest treaties to govern how forests are used. However, to date, there is no binding global-level treaty regarding forest management.

At the 1992 United Nations Conference for Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, countries were concerned with rapid rates of deforestation related to development. Forests were being cleared, slashed and burned for settlement expansion, agricultural production, and for the extraction of timber resources. The opening of the global economy coupled with rapid economic growth and production meant that the demand for resources in one place could result in rapid change and degradation in a far-removed location. Deforestation was happening at alarming rates in developed countries as they scrambled to meet the needs of global supply chains. Developed and developing countries alike recognized the need to address deforestation at the global level. In fact, the problem of global deforestation may have been one of the most-used calls to environmental action in the early 1990s. As satellite imagery and remote sensing technology became more widely used and available, deforestation became a highly visible problem. Images of denuded landscapes that have been slashed and burned in order to cultivate crops, expand human settlements, and graze cattle were abundant. They motivated many countries to advocate for stronger global-level sustainable forest management.

The Rio Earth Summit was the first time forests had received this level of attention on the global scale. The conference hosted a large amount of growth in multilateral treaties, with over 40% of the multilateral environmental treaties at the time (Sand 2001). Sustainable forest management was a topic of concern on par with other issue areas like wildlife species conservation, whaling, and fisheries protection. The initiatives that emerged at the conference form the basis of the first generation of global forest governance. These early initiatives,

however, were crafted with the aim of creating an overarching forest treaty that would govern major aspects of how forests are managed. In other words, there was a hope at the time that states would agree to a centralized set of arrangements would govern forests. Ultimately, though, states failed to reach a binding agreement to stop deforestation.

The United States initially took the lead in putting forward a global convention, but because there was an overall lack of support, the most that states could agree on was the *Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests*—“The Forest Principles” (Davenport 2005, 105). The failure to reach a global forest convention has been called “the most notorious failure in international agenda-setting” (Sand 2001, 40). The Forest Principles outlined general notions of forest sustainability and highlighted that the ways they are managed are important for the worldwide collective interest, but did not put forward binding commitments. This blend of arrangements is sometimes referred to as a “regime complex” (Glück et al. 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011). It may be helpful here to highlight some of its major elements.

The global forest regime complex progressed from early attempts to create a single overarching framework, to more flexible arrangements. Early arrangements include The United Nations Environment Program’s Strategy on Forests, UN Forum on Forests, UN Forest Principles, National Forest Plans, the Montreal Process Criteria and Indicators, and FAO monitoring. While these mechanisms do not constitute an overarching binding treaty in the sense of having one system of rule-making, they do rely upon clearly set rules and guidelines for oversight. The UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) brought about a newer approach designed to be more flexible, using payments and carbon

banking to incentivize forest conservation (Boyd 2011). A list and brief remarks for other major global forest governance mechanisms is provided in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1 Major components of the global forest governance regime complex.

Mechanism	Remarks
Carbon finance schemes	Decisions made in carbon markets directly affect forest management. In carbon finance schemes, primary and secondary forests can serve as storage "banks" in the global carbon cycle.
Climate regime	Climate regime "dual effectiveness" turns the focus on capturing the benefits of reduced emissions by conserving forested landscapes. A primary example is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) Reducing Emissions through Deforestation and Degradation arrangement (REDD+).
Community management	Local decisions about forests also make up an important component. Sustainable forest management is dependent upon choices made about land management. Since ownership and property rights are often granted at the local level, community management cannot be left out when considering global forest governance.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)	The industry-led movement toward sustainable business practices comprises a large portion of market-driven forest governance. The voluntary choices, for example, that corporations make about sourcing supplies for their manufacturing processes have direct implications for how forests are managed.
Criteria and Indicators (C & I) Processes	C & I reporting initiatives are voluntary, state-led processes aimed at sharing national-level sustainability reports. The information is produced through the collaborative efforts of federal, state, and local agencies; universities and scientific communities; civil society; and private landowners.
FAO Monitoring	The UN Food and Agriculture Organization provides country-specific information on forest cover in technical reports, planning documents, and field manuals. These programs fill gaps where states lack the capacity to generate reports.
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) programs	ITTO standards are designed to cover trade in timber products between consumer and producer countries. Other programs provide financial assistance to relieve trade pressures on tropical countries. Assistance programs are supplemented by technical reporting aimed at holding the woods products industry accountable to guidelines in sustainable forest management.
Labeling programs	The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), and Canadian Standards Association are examples of voluntary non-state, market-driven programs designed to govern the production of goods from forests. Certification schemes guarantee that forests are managed to particular standards, and often provide additional oversight along the production and supply chain.
National Forest Plans	Individual states have drafted national forest plans. These documents take stock of forest resources and plan for future needs.
Private forest ownership	A number of tools are available to private landowners, including conservation easements, management plans, and carbon offsets.
Transboundary Landscape-Scale Conservation	At the large landscape level, collaborative arrangements bring together actors from government, markets & industry, science, and civil society. These arrangements possibly represent the newest tool in the suite of global forest governance mechanisms.
UN Institutions: UN Forum on Forests and the Forest Principles	The UN Forum on Forests is a venue for all UN member states to work toward meeting the commitments set forth in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Chapter 11 of Agenda 21, and the Forest Principles. The Forest Principles refers to a non-legally binding instrument for sustainable forest management set up at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and the Convention on Biodiversity	The World Trade Organization's agreement, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), protects certain elements of knowledge related to genetic resources. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a multilateral treaty protecting ecosystems, species, and genetic diversity, pertains to forests insofar as it covers the sustainable use of these resources.

Many of the governance arrangements listed above involve scaling down from the global level. National forest plans, community management plans, and landscape-scale conservation bring general principles of sustainable forest management to the more local level. This makes it possible to bring in a host of actors to help with monitoring and on-the-ground management actions. It makes quite a bit of sense to scale efforts down. Making decisions about forest resources brings in a wide host of stakeholders; it is a complex undertaking. Forests encompass numerous issue areas as they are home to plants, animals and also communities of people. Local circumstances vary from one location to another, making it difficult to establish one set of guidelines for managing forests in all places. For these and other reasons, decentralized governance has become increasingly attractive. Making decisions at the local level makes it possible to consider the needs in a particular place while empowering the people who live there to be involved in making decisions about their community.

Non-state actors have been called the “custodians” of community interests (Sand 2001). In terms of forest conservation, this rings true. Community management has been a rising trend in recent years. There are numerous examples of success around the world. When considered together, these projects have the ability to make a difference in terms of forest cover at the global level (Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006). Community forest management brings in local actors both in terms of decision-making and distributing the benefits of forest resources (Bixler 2014). Bringing in community-based actors is not just important for forest management. Civil society has been a particularly important component in environmental governance more generally (Berkes 2010). Recent years have witnessed the relocation of authority up, down, and around the state. Moving away from a purely state-centered conceptualization of world politics, James Rosenau (2002) sees governance playing out between actors beyond the state. With multiple

centers of authority, “multi-centric” governance draws attention to the role of non-state actors. In a multi-centric system, transnational civil society is a source of governing authority. Others have referred to this trend as polycentricity (Ostrom 2010), fragmentation (Zelli and van Asselt 2011a), or multi-level governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006). These approaches all highlight the same general trend, that authority is diffused throughout a host of actors. Civil society is connected across borders in a realm of politics that weaves around, above, below, and through the state (Keane 2003; Rosenau 2002).

To bring this phenomenon back to global forest governance, we can see evidence of the importance of civil society in carbon accounting schemes in the climate regime complex. As an example, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD and REDD+) brings in an explicit recognition of the importance of community involvement for forest processes. Originally set up to be implemented by national governments, REDD programs increasingly rely upon community governance. While REDD is a global level undertaking, it leverages national, regional, and local resources. REDD projects are able to reduce emissions that come from deforestation by involving local communities and regions in management projects (Boyd 2011).

The way we view forests has implications for how they are managed. Framing forest resources as nationally owned (or state property) leads to a different set of policies than seeing them as global commons. It can seem like there is an endless array of mechanisms designed to address forest conservation issues. From monitoring guidelines, certification programs, carryover effects from the biodiversity and climate regimes, to measures that private landowners and corporations voluntarily choose to adopt, the wide variation between types is impressive. The regime complex is also very decentralized, meaning there is no single overarching treaty or governing body we can look to for final decisions. The fragmented and overlapping sources of

authority that pop up in place of a single governing body depend to a large degree on non-state actors. The loose nature of the regime complex, coupled with the rise of civil society, paints a complex picture and raises questions about how global forest governance is being accomplished.

In the absence of a formal, legally-binding treaty regarding forest management at the global level, the “evolving forests regime” (Humphreys 1999) has been characterized as “fragmented” (Zelli and van Asselt 2011a), but still serves as a source of order, including spill-over from international legal instruments in other areas,¹ soft international law such as the Forest Principles or Agenda 21. Earlier on, there were some important elements missing: the gaps included full valuation of forest goods and services, addressing the underlying causes of deforestation, and resolving the contentious relationship between trade and the environment (Humphreys 1999). Over time, civil society actors stepped in to address these gaps (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). To make sense of the emergent regime complex, we can look at the plethora of ways global forest governance is being accomplished.

1.2 Using a Logics of Governance Approach in Examining the Forest Regime Complex

Each form of governance involves a host of different actors. It is important to de-couple the actors from the fundamental logics under which they operate. That is to say, the *mode of governing* may tell us more than a survey of the actors involved. If we were to examine the global forest governance landscape only in terms of the actors, we may end up with most arrangements lumped into one category as the majority involve private actors from both markets and civil society as well as government officials. A more analytically fruitful way of parsing out instances of global forest governance, then, is found in looking at their logics.

¹ In the climate regime, this phenomenon is known as “dual effectiveness,” referring to the effect that climate

Scholarship on transnational networks has tended to make a dualistic distinction between traditional and “new” governance, perhaps out of a need to explain the increased involvement of civil society. Distinguishing between purely public governance and hybrid governance on the basis of the actors involved is not particularly useful; it is common to have actors from multiple sectors.² Public-private hybrid modes of governing are becoming the new norm. That is to say, both public and private actors are engaging in global forest governance. An analytical scheme that parses out modes of governing in a more meaningful way is needed, while recognizing a multiplicity of actors will almost always be involved. We should pay closer attention to the logic of the governance architecture, which entails a concern for *where authority is placed, the type of resources exchanged, and the nature of the relationships between actors*.

Major developments in the forests regime following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit highlight a progression from early attempts at hierarchical mechanisms, to the incorporation of private entities and market-based arrangements and ultimately toward networked arrangements that blend elements from each of the former logics but also add a vibrant role for civil society. The following subsections provide richer background into the development of selected arrangements, painting the picture of a regime complex that has evolved over the past twenty years to address the complex social demands placed on forests that are front-and-center, though interwoven with ecological limits and realities.

It may be true that global environmental governance, and especially the global forests regime complex, is characterized by fragmentation. Governance arrangements can be seemingly disjointed, but clear patterns of order can be found when we look closer. We can typologize

² This is also true of global environmental governance, more generally. For a recent overview of a multi-actor approach, see (Newell, Pattberg, and Schroeder 2012).

arrangements in terms of their governing logics. In other words, we can separate them by the way that authority is configured. In the simplest sense, we can arrange them according to how decisions are made and how actors work with one another. Here I present three ways of doing this: (1) separating top-down chain of command arrangements (hierarchies) from (2) transactions based on currency (markets), and (3) those based on diffuse patterns where no single actor holds sway over the others nor are decisions made in a way that is based on the exchange of resources (networks).

Making the tripartite distinction of hierarchies, markets, and networks does two things. First, it recognizes that patterns of authority are fractured, bifurcated, and overlapping at the global level. Second, it also proposes a meaningful way of distinguishing between the patterns of this fragmentation. Countering the assertion that global forest governance is a “non regime” (Pattberg 2005), we can identify a regime complex, even though it may be a fragmented one (Glück et al. 2010). Table 1.2 illustrates the major distinctions between the three patterns of steering with an eye out for showing their basic configuration, their advantages, and the particular challenges they face.

Table 1.2 The Basic Configuration, Advantages, and Challenges for Each of the Three Governance Patterns.

	Hierarchical	Market-based	Networked
<i>Configuration</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Centralized authority -Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities -Rank-ordered relationships -“Decomposability”¹ or separable units function independently -Formalized decision-making rules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Private transactions on an at-will basis -Linkages shift with supply and demand of goods and services (episodic relationships) -Economic valuation placed on exchange of resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Dispersed authority within public and private spheres -Reciprocally shared resources -Multi-directional flows of information -Strong linkages across units
<i>Advantages</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Clear basis of authority to dissolve potential disputes² -Strong linkages within units -Policy objectives can be pursued relatively unhindered 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Efficient -Voluntary -Fungible units of exchange -Cooperation stems from the pursuit of individual gains -Can ease tensions between actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Flexible, adaptive -Can promote rapid learning and innovation -Cooperation results from mutual trust -Well-suited for democratic systems
<i>Challenges</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -All actors do not have equal input -Not always suitable for a democratic system -Requires high levels of institutional capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Exploitative relationships can develop -Requires a stable currency -Capital gains can eclipse policy objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Lack of clear dispute resolution -Managers face difficult objective of balancing objectives with maintaining the network³
<i>Heuristic Device</i>	Ladder	See-saw	Braided rug
Sources: ¹ Simon 1962; ² Polodny and Page 1998; ³ Ansell, Sondorp, and Stevens 2012.			

A governance logic framework allows us to make sense of the plethora of arrangements that have come about across the global forest governance landscape. Following this mode of analysis, forest governance arrangements can be separated into three major categories. We can distinguish between them on the basis of following a hierarchical design, market arrangement, or a pattern of networked governance. Figure 1.1 organizes elements of the forests regime complex according to these three configurations. The following sections address each of these in turn.




Figure 1.1 Overlapping Architectures: The diagram depicts the forests regime complex, placing various mechanisms within the three categories.

1.2.1 Hierarchical Arrangements

In hierarchical architectures, there is a clear chain of command, and a pre-established set of rules. Hierarchical patterns of order are derived from centralized authority, pre-established rules-based interactions, and are generally associated with uneven distributions of power. This means that decisions are made at the top of a chain of command, and are passed down along a rank order. When it is unclear what course of action to take, the final decision rests with the top-ranking official or organization. With regard to distribution of power, hierarchies are designed so that not all actors have equal resources or capabilities, in order to concentrate them in places they are deemed most appropriate (by those in control).

Hierarchical patterns of authority have been described as “near-decomposable,” meaning that units or centers of authority resemble each other (Simon 1962). Units in a hierarchical system have a central command, and a coordinated system of control that places one entity or actor in a primary position as ultimate decider. This often means that ties within groups are stronger than those between separate groups or organizations. To put it another way, a strong sense of internal obligation can keep organizations from collaborating with others (Ansell and Gash 2008). In hierarchical arrangements, authority is organized in a vertical pattern, and the actors tend to be drawn from within a single sector (Hill and Lynn 2005).

Examples from the forests regime complex. While an overarching forestry mechanism may not exist, there are some elements of hierarchy in the global forests regime complex. The United Nations institutions such as the Forum on Forests (UNFF), the Forest Principles, monitoring done by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Strategy on Forests ask states to set guidelines for monitoring and implementation. These mechanisms, while they do not bind states to report to a singular global agency, are still reliant upon a hierarchical pattern of governing. Each of these institutions establishes a central secretariat that states report to, though they still depend on states to maintain control over forest resources. The notion that each state possesses individual sovereignty provides the basis for legal authority for creating and enforcing rules within their political jurisdictions.

First, the Forest Principles call on governments to recognize the importance of forests. The opening language acknowledges that there are differences between forest types, that values ascribed to forests and social interests can vary in each state, but that in all cases, it is important for governments to recognize the contribution of forests. The wording in the preamble reads,

“Forest resources and forest lands should be sustainably managed to meet the social, economic, ecological, cultural, and spiritual needs of present and future generations” (Forest Principles 1992, 2b). The specific mechanisms are not spelled out for ensuring these goals are met. However, there is an emphasis on states to put national policies and strategies in place to strengthen the management and conservation of forests. The Principles leave the specifics to each state to work out.

The UNEP strategy on forests puts forth guidelines for forest monitoring, reporting, and verification. It places specific guidelines for the type of information required, and asks states to report accordingly. While it places requirements on states, it also provides the resources to help them accomplish these goals. It outlines four focal areas: knowledge, vision, enabling conditions, and finance (United Nations Environment Program 2011). The first two components have more to do with designing and carrying out forest management while the second two speak more to the ability of states to implement and complete projects. In other words, the UNEP strategy recognizes that states are individually sovereign units capable of doing their own forest monitoring. However, there is an acknowledgement that in order to do the work, some states may require assistance in the design and use of policy instruments. They may also require help in the form of funding for projects.

National Forest Programs (NFPs) are another example of a hierarchical instrument. NFPs are in place in more than 130 countries (FAO 2014). They vary by country, but generally put forth guidelines for implementing sustainable forest management. They tie specific measures to the implementation of international commitments put forth by international agreements like the Forest Principles or the NLBI, for example (FAO 2014). While they are largely country-specific, there are components of National Forest Programs that sometimes call for multilateral or

bilateral cooperation, especially in the case of donor and recipient countries. Generally speaking, though, NFPs fit with hierarchical elements of the forests regime because they require reporting to a higher up in a chain of command, and are enforced on the individual authority of separate sovereign states.

Critiques of hierarchical arrangements. Hierarchical elements do provide a strong normative framework including principles and policies. However, they are often imbued with little or no legal status, meaning that states can chose to ignore them. This formalized pattern of organization has fallen short in the global forests regime complex for two major reasons. First, an overarching treaty does not exist because state sovereignty has proven an insurmountable obstacle. Second, where there are elements of hierarchy, they tend to (a) be inattentive to the complexities of forest management, ignoring the interconnectedness of ecosystems and the social demands placed upon them; and (b) be ineffective in meeting reporting requirements (Gulbrandsen 2004; Humphreys 2006; Jedd 2012).

An overarching treaty regarding forest management may demand too much of states, binding them to obligatory courses of action to which they are unwilling to commit. It is difficult enough at the national level to find agreement or areas of common ground on land management. Forest management is an area of natural resource governance that is intricately bound up in matters of land use, human settlements, and property ownership. In the United States, for example, the Forest Service faces the challenge of managing lands for multiple uses as well as filling other roles such as fire prevention. With these multiple and sometimes competing goals, it is often difficult for the agency to set overarching management guidelines at the federal level. Instead, in the United States there has been an outgrowth of local initiatives and community management (Bixler 2014; Cheng and Sturtevant 2012). This trend has reverberated around the

world (Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006). When scaled up to the international level, the obstacles related to achieving national management guidelines serve as a fairly clear example of the hurdles facing an overarching treaty. However, there are other explanations for the absence of a forest treaty. Some suggest that there was a lack of willingness to finance the development mechanisms required to implement a forest treaty (Haug and Gupta 2012).

While the first area of critique has more to do with the inability to reach a treaty agreement, the second area pertains to finding shortcomings in the elements of hierarchy that do exist. When they are in place, hierarchical arrangements sometimes fail to deliver on their promises (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). States have simply chosen not to prioritize the reporting process. As it is not legally required that they produce and share information on their forests, reporting agreements often go unfulfilled.

1.2.2 Market Arrangements

Market-based governance has become a prominent alternative to hierarchical arrangements. With regard to forests, governance through market arrangements is based on the ability to shift toward more sustainable practices. In other words, particular goals can be achieved by changing practices based on consumer decisions. Participation in market-based arrangements is voluntary. Individuals and organizations can choose whether they want to take part. Sometimes, they can even negotiate the terms of their participation. Exchange between consumers and producers involves tradable units or currency, meaning that anyone can enter the scheme if they have, or can generate, the capital. The only requisite for participation is having the resources to do so. Decisions are not made in a centralized fashion, and authority is not

centrally located. Because transactions are conducted on a voluntary basis, linkages between actors shift with changing circumstances and consumption patterns.

In terms of feasibility, market-based architectures comprise realistic options that fit well in the global economy. Proponents argue that market-based governance works well because it operates outside the system of the very states that are often unwilling to make binding commitments (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2003; Cashore and Bernstein 2004). Certification programs for voluntary codes of conduct enhance market arrangements. These are flexible mechanisms that allow corporate entities to make changes in their business practices in a more uniform manner. Universal standards provide a backing statement, and can lend a strong sense of oversight that sustainability measures are followed. ISO 140001 is an example of a market-based standards program that allows corporations to voluntarily adhere to a set of practices deemed acceptable by an outside certifying body.

Examples of market-based arrangements in the global forests regime complex. Earlier on in the development of the global forests regime complex, there were some important elements missing. The gaps included full valuation of forest goods and services, addressing the underlying causes of deforestation, and resolving the contentious relationship between trade and the environment (Humphreys 1999). Over time, a suite of new governance mechanisms has emerged to address these gaps. These market mechanisms range from certification schemes for sustainable forest management to carbon markets where forest management objectives can be achieved through the use of tradable carbon units.

First, forest management certification schemes allow consumers to make decisions about the types of practices they will support with their purchasing decisions. Sustainably harvested forest products come labeled. This certification serves as a guarantee that the forests where the

timber was grown were sustainably managed. An example of a certification scheme is the labeling done by the Forests Stewardship Council (FSC). FSC certification has come to be known as the industry standard for sustainably harvested products. The management requirements sometimes go beyond what states call for, working around the state in a fashion that has been branded in its own right, “non-state market-driven governance” (Cashore and Bernstein 2004; Cashore 2002). Where states may not set forth guidelines, certification schemes accomplish their goals through voluntary means. Certification schemes depend upon consumers to make choices, sometimes to pay more for a certified product, to support sustainable management practices.

Second, carbon finance schemes can also have effects on forests. Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions include market arrangements that place monetary values on forest resources. Forests have the potential to store vast amounts of carbon through respiration. The link between carbon finance schemes and forest governance is made through the use of forests as carbon sinks. Carbon markets become instruments of forest governance when they put standards in place for how forests should be managed. Under parts of the REDD+, program, for example, credits are given for managing forests in ways that reduce emissions from deforestation (Phelps, Webb, and Agrawal 2010). More specifically, donor countries offer payments to countries for enhancing carbon stocks by protecting forests (Ibid). Payments for carbon storage can result in the maintenance of forested areas that may otherwise be threatened by development. In this sense, portions of the climate governance regime can have significant “co-benefits,” or unintended beneficial consequences (Brown, Seymour, and Peskett 2008). Carbon market schemes designed to address climate change can have significant effects on forest management when they use targeted approaches to specify how much carbon is being stored (Ostrom 2009).

In particular, expanding forested areas (afforestation and reforestation) has become an increasingly common approach to creating carbon credits (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton, and Yin 2012).

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs are another market mechanism. By quantifying the benefits that are derived from forested ecosystems, PES programs provide incentives to conserve forest resources (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008). PES programs are made up of voluntary transactions where a defined ecosystem service is purchased by a buyer from a provider (Wunder 2005). In the case of forest governance, this usually has to do with land use decisions; for example, owners can receive payments for keeping their land forested. In some ways, PES accomplishes what formal policies do not. They allow for a more direct integration of scientific information with decision-making (Daily et al. 2009). This fits with what the “Coase Theorem” suggests: that property rights can initially be set by the state, but that optimal social outcomes are achieved through bargaining and trading (Muradian et al. 2010). This suggests that formal state regulation may not be the only or best channel for achieving forest outcomes.

Critiques of market-based arrangements. Market arrangements are not without their flaws. First, they have been said to oversimplify forest management. Reducing forest management decisions to basic cost-benefit choices can overlook the intrinsic values of forests that cannot be measured in dollar amounts. Especially with regard to the climate change regime, this can be to the point of transforming trees into units of carbon. Market governance may advance the commodification of forests as tradable resources, viewing forests and the components in them as roughly equivalent despite differences in national context, ownership, or social values in local communities. Critics claim this propagates a notion that forests can be

managed as tradable units that are separable from the communities of people who either depend on natural resources for their livelihoods or call forests home (Humphreys 2006).

On a related note, market schemes may put certain groups at a disadvantage. The fact that poorer communities can be bypassed in these arrangements (Newell 2005) makes them questionable as universal or stand-alone solutions to the gap in hierarchical forest governance. Investigating market governance makes up an important area of inquiry, asking how non-state actors can come to be seen as authoritative governors. Taking this further, we can ask how these processes are legitimated (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010); that is, we can look at whether market-based governance can retain democratic qualities outside of the modes traditionally associated with the state.

A shortcoming of market arrangements is that they may not be all that effective in stopping deforestation. The past has shown that market forces have failed to halt deforestation and often have the opposite effect. The growing demand for timber products, agricultural land, and space for human settlements has resulted in reduced forest cover (Humphreys 2006). The commodification of forests has troubling ethical and practical implications. For example, putting a price on forest resources can detract from their religious or spiritual values, separating resources from the communities in which they are embedded (Liverman 2004). Furthermore, PES arrangements for forests have been shown to be less effective than command and control arrangements (Handberg and Angelsen 2015). As an added challenge, only about ten percent of the world's forests are privately owned, so even if market mechanisms were to work flawlessly, the effect might be small as private owners do not manage that large a portion of the world's forests (Agrawal, Chhatre, and Hardin 2008).

1.2.3 Networked Governance

In networked architectures, we see diffuse patterns of authority that overlap the public and private spheres. Networked governance is fundamentally different from hierarchies and markets because it has multiple centers of authority. It has been called “pluricentric” in contrast to the “multicentric” configuration found in markets or the “unicentric” form found in hierarchy (VanKersbergen and VanWaarden 2004). In this sense, it has become common to refer to a “horizontal” configuration of authority in networked governance. This brings multiple actors onto the same playing field.

In terms of inclusion, networks offer civil society an entrée to decision-making processes that were previously under sole jurisdiction of the state. Because networked arrangements link up non-state actors in a common space, individuals are able to share information and strategies that also allow them to engage in more traditional modes of governing. Networked arrangements prompt states and international organizations to take the concerns of non-state actors seriously. They can be seen as an innovation in the face of the failures of state-led governance (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004).

Networked governance represents a significant shift from “hierarchical control to horizontal coordination” (Kenis and Schneider 1991, 15). This can also be thought of as a lateral pattern of exchange (Powell 1990), implying that authority patterns are flattened. This flattened landscape hosts flows of information and resources. Information and resources flow in multiple and overlapping directions across connections between individuals and organizations. These connections, or linkages, form the basis of the ability to do work under this mode of governance. Linkages between actors are often based on repeated interactions and are enhanced by the social capital that is built up in the process. These sustained linkages create a rich context for

collaboration. In terms of decision-making, these arrangements allow for more equal input from a diversity of interests. Wrapped up in this notion of trust is that it is shared across private and public actors (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006).

Networked governance goes beyond bringing together the public and private sectors in partnerships. It fundamentally retools the configuration of authority, diffusing it over a wide swath of actors and scales, lending flexibility to address challenges where they arise. The diffuse configuration of authority allows for collaborative relationships to blossom. Markets offer the flexibility that comes with bringing diverse actors together, but it is not their strong suit to pursue longer-term goals. Networked governance is fundamentally different from hierarchies because it has multiple centers of authority. Networked governance, then, can be seen as a “middle way,” bringing together diverse actors and interests.

Examples of networked governance in the global forests regime complex. After the Rio Summit, separate groups of states came together to adopt sets of Criteria and Indicators (C & I) for sustainable forest management. The first instance of this type of non-binding international agreements is the Montréal Process. In 1994, Canada drew together eleven other countries³ in order to develop a common mode of evaluating forest sustainability. Under the C & I model, sustainable forestry is defined using seven criteria that range from conserving biological diversity to maintaining and enhancing long-term multiple socio-economic benefits (National Report on Sustainable Forests: 2010, 1-4). There are nine other ongoing C & I processes, with more than 150 states participating alongside NGOs (FAO 2008). While the particular indicators vary based on forest type, the same general goal of reporting on sustainability across seven criteria remains. While it is generally a state-led process, C & I reporting depends upon the

³ The Montréal Process member states are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian Federation, the United States, and Uruguay.

contribution of local groups, international NGOs, universities, and other entities. It is a voluntary process that is driven by the desire to know more about the overall condition of forests rather than creating binding management protocols. In other words, it is about making information available, rather than requiring particular actions.

The International Tropical Timber Trade Organization (ITTO) brought countries together in 1990 to set goals for sustainably managing the world's tropical forests. The ITTO definition of sustainable forest management is built around a steady supply of forest products and services without placing undue strain on future production. The balance here is on meeting the needs of the forest product sector today without compromising these resources in the future. In order to achieve this aim, ITTO programs provide planning for tropical countries to be able to engage in logging that does not deplete entire forests, forest restoration, community management, fire prevention, and reporting on forest conditions (ITTO 2014). An evaluation in the year 2000 found that while the ITTO member countries had made significant advances in forming and adopting policies that further the original aims, there was significantly less progress made in implementing them. Here it has become clear that the aims of the programs cannot be accomplished without the help of NGOs and local user groups.

Place-based transboundary conservation is perhaps the newest example of networked forest governance. Networked governance at the landscape level represents both scaling up and scaling down. It is a move away from the global-level Forest Principles and far-reaching international agreements on sustainability reporting. It involves scaling up in that it asks smaller conservation efforts to gear their work toward the larger landscape level. The Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent (discussed in chapter three) is an example of place-based transboundary conservation operating across the United States-Canadian border. In place since 2010, with more

than one hundred participating organizations from the public and private sectors, the Crown Roundtable has built an impressive foundation for connecting a wide variety of interests in one of the most intact and pristine landscapes in Northern America (McKinney 2011b; Prato and Fagre 2007). As a “network of networks,” the Roundtable traverses various scales. On this landscape, smaller private groups such as the Blackfoot Challenge and the Water Matters Society of Alberta have already brought divergent interests together in their communities, and are now considering how their interests fit within the larger geographical, ecological and political scales.

Critiques of networked governance. Networked governance is flexible in that it does not require participants to adhere to a particular course of action. Also, needs can be addressed at various levels, depending on the particular problem at hand. In this sense, it provides flexibility in participation and scale. These are both important elements for addressing complex challenges in forest governance. However, networked governance has some drawbacks. First, while the voluntary nature of NG can draw in actors who may not otherwise participate in a transboundary process, this may prove too loose. The flexibility of networked governance can sometimes mean that actors will opt out if they feel that requirements become too stringent. It may not necessarily, then, be a strong suit of networked governance to pursue longer-term goals.

The “pluricentricity” in NG hints that there may be some coordination congruent with the pursuit of broader, longer-term goals.⁴ However, because there are multiple centers of authority, it can be difficult to determine who is responsible when things go wrong. It can be unclear which of the various jurisdictional levels is the most appropriate for solving problems. As national, state/provincial, municipal, and private lands make up the varied ownership and management jurisdictions, the need to coordinate across borders is integral to governing at the ecosystem

⁴ Ostrom (1990) suggests that clear constitutional rules, or the guidelines surrounding decision-making processes (rules about rules), are necessary to ensure stability of governance arrangements.

level. While it is true these variegated ownership patterns pose management challenges; “jurisdictional fragmentation” makes for complications in that management at the landscape level requires cross-agency collaboration (Prato and Fagre 2010).

1.3 Concluding Thoughts

Hierarchical mechanisms and market mechanisms are prominent and still-evolving features of the global forest governance landscape; they will continue to be important for the forests regime. However, in the twenty years following the Rio Earth Summit, global forest governance arrangements have become more decentralized. Civil society has played an increasingly central role in carrying out these arrangements. Recognizing the rise of civil society is valuable, but it is also important to look at the patterns of organization in governance arrangements. Given the decentralized nature of the global forests regime complex, it is important that all actors are committed and engaged over the long run. If governance is about understanding the changing role of the state in the movement from hierarchical modes of organization to a “flatter,” informal networks of societal actors (Jordan 2008), this empirical work lends to our understanding of larger trends. As a process, networked governance draws actors in as governors, granting one another the authority to set directions rather than following pre-set guidelines. As we observe shifts away from hierarchically ordered regimes (e.g. ozone depletion) governance may draw closer resemblance to the forestry regime complex, which is disaggregated and relies upon a blend of public and private actors along with a new configuration of authority.

Networked architectures are becoming more common, but they are currently understudied. Perhaps because NG is so broad, diverse, and varied, or because it is relatively

newer, there are a few gaps in our understanding about how it contributes to the larger global forest governance landscape. NG may provide a “third way” around the shortcomings in markets and hierarchies. Their advantages, coupled with the lack of a binding multilateral treaty on the management of forests, make them likely to become critical for the provision of forest governance. With this in mind, the dissertation fills a lacuna in the forest governance scholarship where it has tended to neglect networked governance. The remaining chapters in Part I present a framework for looking at networked forest governance, and lay out the background of the Crown Roundtable case as an instance of it.

CHAPTER TWO: The Promise and Pitfalls of Networked Forest Governance

2.1 Introduction

In the multi-centric international system, networked governance is particularly noteworthy: Rosenau (2000, 229) notes, “While a number of dynamics have contributed to the diminution of state capacities, certainly one of the most important of these has been the shifting balance between hierarchical and network forms of organization, between vertical and horizontal flows of authority.” To understand networked governance, at a basic level, is to acknowledge the importance of civil society actors. As globalization has proceeded, it has become difficult for states to provide solutions for cross-border social and ecological challenges. The chapter presents a framework for understanding the ways that civil society takes part in governance.

Beyond the inclusion of non-state actors, there are shifting dynamics surrounding authority. The networked governance framework acknowledges a fundamentally different logic of interaction, which is rooted in the fragmented nature of authority above and around states. In a globalized world, with no higher authority than the state, various sub-state and non-state actors have risen to the surface to fill functions that states are unable or unwilling to do. As an alternative to legally binding treaties, networked forest governance arrangements are informal and participation is voluntary. In the provision of forest governance, these networked arrangements provide a degree of flexibility that allows arrangements to adapt to the complexity inherent in forest management.

To conceptualize networked forest governance, the chapter first presents a definition of networks. Not all networks govern; networks as structures are different from the activity of networked governance. These discussions are then situated in the context of forest governance. I offer a definition of networked forest governance in the transnational context. The following

section covers how various literatures in political science have discussed precursor trends to networked governance, showing a progression in the literature from the inclusion of advocacy groups to seeing civil society as a vibrant component of governance. I then introduce the ontological assumptions of the study with an emphasis on the fit of a networked governance framework with a social constructivist approach.

The chapter concludes with an examination of the promise and pitfalls of networked forest governance. The promise lies in its potential to fill the gaps and shortcomings left by traditional governance arrangements. When we look at networked forest governance as an approach to managing complex social-ecological systems, we see that its flexibility lends to its overall adaptiveness. However, the same features that make it flexible and adaptive may complicate the democratic quality of the governance arrangements. The conclusion highlights complications specifically related to accountability and legitimacy.

2.2 Conceptualizing Networked Forest Governance

Networks are arrangements of connected entities. They consist of positions, or nodes, and links, also called ties. Nodes are the basic units or parts of the network, and the ties are the connections between them (Knoke and Yang 2008; Thorelli 1986). The network is a useful concept across disciplines: from thinking about living organisms on Earth as a large genetic network to the individual-level nervous system, or the World Wide Web with its pages linked to others (Barabasi and Albert 1999). Network research studies these entities and their linkages; for example, we might ask the number of constituent parts or how closely they are connected. Looking deeper, we can critically examine the broader network structure, composition, and how it functions.

In the social sciences, a network can be defined as a “set of actors connected by a set of ties” (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Parker 2007, 116). More specifically in political science, networks refer to “two or more organizations involved in long-term relationships” (Thorelli 1986, 37). When we are looking at patterns of human organization, then, the components of networks are people and their relationships. Here, the nodes and links are individuals or organizations and the ways they are connected. Graphic displays are useful to show how people and communities are linked together. Surveys, interviews, and document analysis can be used to collect information about how actors are connected, with what frequency and for what purpose (Cross et al. 2009).⁵

2.2.1 Not all Networks Govern: Distinguishing Networks from Networked Governance

In pulling together public and private resources in a way that can mediate competing ecological needs with social demands (Connolly et al. 2014), networked governance is a mode of social steering in its own right. Steering in networks can be done through engaging in deliberative processes, setting common goals, and working toward outcomes. However, some networks are not designed or equipped to take on these tasks. For this reason, we can say that not all networks govern. We can think about the two as being a noun-verb pair, where “network” describes an entity and “networked governance” refers to a process.

Looking at networks solely as structures fits with a reductionist ontology that views phenomena in terms of their constituent parts. However, under a networked governance

⁵ Additionally, an emerging field of research generates the pattern of a network without surveys, solely based on communications and travel data (Lazer et al. 2009). The data left behind by our digital footprint, such as phone calls, emails, smart badge keys to workplace buildings, and even bus and train passes, provide information on the linkages between individuals and organizations and can be used to show larger network patterns.

framework we are more interested in the qualities of these relationships.⁶ To borrow from the realm of computing, networks might represent the hardware while networked governance (NG) is more akin to the coding that forms the basis for how software programs work. Another metaphor is a highway system. The basic network is the configuration of the roads. NG goes beyond the road network to look at the vehicles traveling on it. An NG approach would ask who has access, what types of vehicles they are driving, where people can go, and what entrances and/or exits are or are not available. In other words, the NG framework pays attention to the underlying interactions that are taking place and the way that authority is configured.

Networked governance can be defined as “multiple actors, often spanning sectors and scale, working together to influence the creation, implementation, and monitoring of public policies” (Koliba, Meek, and Zia 2010, 85). It is generally made up of informal arrangements: various stakeholders are linked together in a way that is collaborative rather than hierarchical. In the Crown Roundtable, which is presented in more detail in chapter three, a variety of actors come together from the public and private sector to create and set goals for conservation on the landscape. These goals are carried out in on-the-ground projects funded by the Roundtable, in the work done by individual organizations, and by the members that return to their agencies. In this way, the Roundtable engages in governance activities.

Networked governance represents more than the arrangement or configuration of actors. A governance network is defined as “a more or less formal association whose members retain their independence of action while agreeing to work together on common enterprises that produce collective goods” (Ansell, Sondorp, and Stevens 2012). This notion can be scaled up beyond the domestic level. A global governance network is “a network whose members come

⁶ The networked governance framework does not fit with a reductionist view of the world because it is interested in more than the working parts, to consider the logic of how they fit together and function over time.

from (but do not necessarily represent) different nations or are themselves transnational institutions” (Ansell, Sondorp, and Stevens 2012). Here we add the component of working across borders, but still with the acknowledgement that governance, or steering, is taking place. Table 2.1 separates the concept of networks from networked governance, highlighting some of the differences and illustrating that not all networks are designed to govern.

Table 2.1 Parsing the Differences between Networks and Networked Governance.

	Networks	Networked Governance
<i>Ontological units</i>	Organizational structure, individuals or groups as fundamental units	Logic of order, ordering principles
<i>Focus of inquiry; modes of investigating</i>	Structure; Ties between entities, accountability patterns	Process and pattern; Basis of legitimacy, potential to be democratically accountable, “good governance”
<i>Key axioms/postulates</i>	Organizations can accomplish more when they work together; the whole is greater than the sum of its parts	Spheres of authority; multiple and overlapping centers of authority create complex, interdependent webs
<i>Research methods</i>	Organizational mapping, quantitative survey, social network analysis	Qualitative interviews, focus groups, participant observation, social network analysis

Despite its built-in flexibility, networked governance requires a certain degree of coordination and planning. It is more than the constellation of actors in a network. Governance involves “authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and coordination” (Rhodes 1996, 653). Networked governance by definition implies that some sort of steering or control is taking place (Kooiman 2003; Peters and Pierre 1998). In other words, it is not enough for a network to simply exist on its own. Its participants must be actively engaged in the process of vision setting, shaping behaviors, and accomplishing goals. Networked governance can be viewed along “a continuum of systems of governing in which state and non-state actors can play numerous roles and are differently empowered to influence decision-making, yet seek to steer the

policy-making process at both the strategic and operational levels” (Bulkeley 2005; Klenk et al. 2013, 162).

The type of steering in NG is different than in other forms of governance. Formal arrangements, or binding treaties at the international level, are not the only sources of order (Fierke 2010; Onuf 2013; Onuf and Klink 1989; Risse 2004; Rosenau 2002). Membership in governance networks spans beyond political officials. Non-state entities, formerly conceived of as “the governed,” can become governors themselves (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). In tandem with the recognition of the importance of non-state actors is the acknowledgement that information, norms, identities, and discourse constitute rules of behavior. These multiple forms of authority, as much as the actors themselves,⁷ matter a great deal (Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley 2009). NG is not simply a constellation of actors, but the spaces in which they interact and the patterns of their relationships.

2.2.2 Networked Forest Governance

Norms, identities, and the configuration of authority are important components in terms of forest management, making NG a suitable framework for evaluating elements of the forest governance regime that are often overlooked. Borrowing elements from the broader literature on networked governance, we can define networked forest governance. Networked forest governance is built upon the lateral linkages across a multiplicity of actors—state agencies, NGOs, citizen advocacy groups, and national governments, among others—that hinge on norms of trust and a shared purpose and identity, for the purpose of making decisions or informing

⁷ Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley (2009) point out that when typologizing governance, a focus on actors is not conducive, due to the blurring of public and private lines. For example, “state” actors, when we look closer, are not always entirely ‘public’ in nature, as private actors weave their way into state activities.

decision-making procedures. Transnational forest governance is inherently multi-level and focuses on the “nexus” approach to resource conservation, linking multiple ecosystem components into one mode of governance. In other words, networked forest governance is concerned with more than trees; it also addresses broader land use concerns, water quantity and quality, extractive energy practices, and patterns of agricultural production (Hoff et al. 2012).

2.3 Networked Governance in Political Science

Discussions in political science have built toward networked governance in various ways. While it most clearly emerged as a focus in international relations in the early 1990s with the rise of constructivism, the theoretical roots of the networked governance approach can be found in other literatures in political science. Precursor approaches embraced the complexity in policy formation. They proposed the state does not stand apart from civil society; non-state groups play an important role in governance. Scholars of comparative politics, for example, used the language of corporatism to show how interest groups become governing agents by linking up with the state to design and implement policy (Schattschneider 1975). Systems-based approaches attempted to integrate interest groups into the policy process, without making society an external variable. In more recent comparative politics scholarship, the state-in-society approach, articulated by Joel Migdal acknowledges its debt to earlier scholars’ willingness to embrace complexity and pushes us closer toward the networked governance framework with its references to public-private ties and even transboundary linkages. The blurring of the line between the public and the private is noteworthy, as it is in this space that new mechanisms (e.g. social relationships) are built. Migdal (2003, 6) asserts that social relationships create “a strong relational glue” that binds civil groups together with the state.

Other literatures also consider the ways public and private actors are linked. NG is addressed in policy and public administration work. Kooiman (2003, 105) mentions the following approaches: competitive pluralism, state corporatism, group sub-government, corporate pluralism, iron triangles, sector corporatism, issue networks, and policy communities. These precursor approaches share skepticism of rational choice, suggesting that statism, structuralism, and neorealism do not embrace the contingent and contextual nature of social and political interactions. In the pursuit of parsimony, these older approaches render analyses incapable of accurately depicting outcomes, without providing space for a concern or capacity to change them.

Under the rubric of “new” governance,⁸ the state has been split into “a collection of inter-organizational networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate” (Rhodes 1996, 57). These models reflect the shift away from a singular notion of bureaucracy, hierarchically organized with a centralized system of rule, toward multi-actor, decentralized modes of governing. NG goes a step beyond recognizing multiple actors in the provision of global governance to recommend a shift away from central rule in “favor of local actors” (Kooiman 2003, 105). In the domestic policy literature, as is in global governance, multi-actor governance tends to operate in tandem with decentralization.

The roots of the NG framework are also found in public organization theory. One of the earlier concepts is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) set out by Paul Sabatier (1988). Under this framework, civil society and the state come together in coalitions to pursue governance goals (McGuire 2006). Coalitions have been important in forest management in the United States and Canada. The ACF highlights the importance of strategically engaging the state.

⁸ The public administration literature refers to these various concepts in the New Public Management model.

Activist groups cannot achieve their policy aims without being careful about the messaging they use or the demands they make of public officials. For example, the Quincy Library Group in California was initially successful in framing its goals on fire control (S. Pralle 2006), but ultimately failed because it codified too strictly what was supposed to be a localized collaborative process (Davis and King 2000). In British Columbia, by contrast, activist groups were more successful in slowing timber overharvest because they built a coalition from a broad base of sectors spanning local, regional, and international governance levels (S. Pralle 2006). ACF brings attention to how civil groups can significantly affect management decisions.

An NG framework builds from here, going further in its attention to patterns of authority. Beyond seeing the state as a target for activists' strategies, NG pays attention to the configuration of authority, particularly with regard to the changing nature of the relationship between state and society. Instead of coalitions acting upon agencies or elected officials, in a NG scheme, they are equal players in visioning and goal setting. There is a wide range of configurations in the ways authority is shared between public and private actors (Moore and Koontz 2003).

Just as collaborative governance at the state and local level can link up jurisdictions that would not be otherwise required to work together, international multi-level governance can link up sub-state actors in the absence of a binding treaty or agreement (e.g. forest certification schemes). Joachim Blatter (2003, 519) calls this a "more collaborative relationship between the state and civil society." Likewise, Migdal, though he does not explicitly refer to networks, implies that the state is inseparable from society. To parse out some of these similarities and differences, Table 2.2 on the next page offers a list of related literatures, their primary observations and/or assumptions, disciplinary homes, major foci, and key studies.

Table 2.2 Literatures that Overlap with Networked Governance.

Literature	Primary observation and/or assumption	Disciplinary home	Major focus for evaluation	Key studies
<i>New public management</i>	Contractors & private providers are increasingly providing public services.	Public administration	Service provision, Cost efficiency	Hood (1995); Osborne and Gaebler (1992); Rhodes (1996); Salamon (2002)
<i>Collaboration/ Collaborative governance</i>	Decisions are not made by agencies alone nor should they be.	Public administration & policy	Multiple fronts: ecological outcomes, social cohesion, and political representativeness	Ansell and Gash (2008); Cheng and Sturtevant (2012); Koontz (2004); O’Leary, Bingham, and Gerard (2006)
<i>Transnational networked governance</i>	Increasingly complex and transnationally interconnected webs are replacing the notion of unitary states acting in isolation.	International relations; Global governance	Good governance, deliberative nature, democratic quality	Bäckstrand (2006); Börzel and Risse (2002); Kahler (2009); Rosenau (2002); Slaughter (1997, 2001)
<i>Co-management, or Adaptive co-management</i>	Local, state, and federal agencies should consult with private organizations and the public on land management issues.	Natural resource policy	Environmental outcomes and social well-being	Armitage et al. (2009); Berkes, Colding, and Folke (2003); Carlsson and Berkes (2005)
<i>Polycentricity</i>	The state is not the sole provider of public goods; concurrently, there is no ideal level of governance.	Public administration (Institutional dynamics)	Regional governance, functional outcomes, urban dynamics	(Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Elinor Ostrom 2010)
<i>Public-private partnerships</i>	Both public and private actors are needed to adequately address environmental problems; it is “wrong and unhelpful” to parse public and private governance as separable (Pattberg and Stripple 2008, 372).	Global governance	Survey governance architectures, map key sites of hybrid authority	(Börzel and Risse 2002; Glasbergen, Biermann, and Mol 2007; Glasbergen 2007)

In the 1990s, discussions of the interconnectedness between the state, society, and interest groups shifted to more specifically refer to network organization. For “new governance” and organizational theory, NG meant: a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safe-guard exchanges. These contracts are *socially*, but not legally, binding (Jones et al. 1997, 914). In this literature, NG tends to represent rule-making relationships outside the aegis of the state.

The precursor approaches carefully consider the overlap of the public and private sector in meeting social needs. Social-ecological systems approaches also have a focus on both the public and private interest, but also bring in ecological concerns. The various strands share a desire to embrace the messiness, or complexity, inherent in the challenges behind steering. This is especially true when it comes to making decisions about ecological systems.

2.4 Ontological Assumptions

A networked governance approach fits with constructivist approaches to international relations. Constructivists tend to consider the role of individual choice; bound up in this are the perceptions that people hold about the choices they make. This basic assumption about the world and how choices are made is a fundamental component of NG. We can separate approaches based upon those that take structures as driving features of politics from those that more closely consider agency and individual choice. An NG approach is structural to the extent that it pays attention to patterns or configurations of authority. However, it pays closer attention to the agency that individuals and groups exercise in making choices about their interactions and relationships. Instead of seeing actors as similar units, reducible to a set of pre-determined interests, NG sees individuals as uniquely part of and enmeshed within their social context.

The constructivist ontology, or its assumptions about the world and the units it comprises, is fundamentally social. That is, individuals and states cannot be separated from the context within which they are situated. Individuals understand their surroundings in terms of how they relate to the people and processes around them. There are a couple of important components for consideration here: (1) a recognition that individuals are the fundamental units of world affairs and (2) individuals' behavior is shaped by the identities, norms, and ideas they hold and finally (3) that these ideational elements are products of interactions between actors (they are “co-

constituted”) and do not exist independently of them (Onuf 2013; Onuf and Klink 1989; Wendt 1995).

Individuals shape transnational spaces just as much, and perhaps more so, than states (Fierke 2010). Furthermore, if we disaggregate states, we see that they are comprised of many sub-units: legislatures, agencies, and courts. These sub-state units have an effect on governance. Unpacking these units further we see that individuals’ behaviors and perceptions shape organizational outcomes, whether public or private (or on the border somewhere in between). One of the most significant turns in international relations theory was the recognition that individuals matter, even at the international level. States are not the solid, impermeable units of international affairs. The oversimplification and reductionism inherent in realist-rationalist storylines cuts a story short, implying states will not agree to environmental cooperation because it would limit the pursuit of their own interests (Fearon and Wendt 2002). However, this has not been the case in forest governance (Humphreys 2009). Sub-state and non-state entities form networks to share information and resources, ultimately binding together in a way that results in meaningful change.

A relational ontology eschews the notion that material interests drive international interactions. If states were only concerned about their material interests, many developments in the 20th century may not have come about (Hopf 1998). We would likely not have seen the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, or the creation of the International Criminal Court, to name a few examples. Ideational forces impart a lasting impact on international politics: ideas about what constitutes what is acceptable, moral, or desirable for a group’s well-being and ideas about how a group perceives its place shape decisions.

Ideational forces that shape norms and identity are not created in a vacuum; they are often contingent on others' perceptions of what is right and wrong. Ontologically, constructivism challenges the rationalist focus on individuals (humans and/or states) as self-interested, survival-seeking, and imbued with a set of preferences from the start. In that sense, politics is “a world of our making” (Onuf and Klink 1989). Furthermore, “It is not that actors are totally free to choose their circumstances, but rather that they make choices in the process of interacting with others and, as a result, bring historically, culturally, and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being” (Fierke 2010, 180).

For these reasons, we can say that an NG approach, first and foremost, sees interactions between individuals as fundamental units. Individuals, rather than states, are the important actors in world affairs. Beyond this, the approach acknowledges that individuals' behaviors are shaped by the identities, norms, and ideas they hold. Last, the framework is consistent with the view that these ideational elements come out of interactions that actors have with each other and do not exist independently of them. All of this hinges on a fundamental worldview that individuals and ideas matter.

2.5 The Promise of Networked Forest Governance: Flexibility and Adaptiveness to Address Complexity

Flexible and adaptive arrangements are part of developing a more effective response to global forest degradation.⁹ This is where the promise of networked governance lies. Governance

⁹ Environmental problems often cross national borders, so it is a logical progression that governance arrangements would also cross borders. As shown in chapter one, the interplay amongst institutions designed to address other environmental issues adds to the complexity in the forests regime complex. Fortunately, governance arrangements have changed dramatically in the past twenty years and continue to co-evolve (O'Neill et al. 2013). Ideally, these flexible arrangements allow for more responsive governance that adjusts to changing needs and conditions.

networks for Huppe, Creech, and Knoblauch (2012) are a part of a trend toward a new type of governance altogether. “Transition governance” represents a fundamental shift toward multi-actor, multi-sector arrangements that are designed to address complex problems (Loorbach, Frantzeskaki, and Thissen 2011). This shift means that multiple actors are included, with multiples types of knowledge, across many scales (Berkes et al. 2003; Lebel et al. 2006)

Before even considering competing social demands and changing ecological conditions, forest management is complex on its own. Consistent with a social-ecological systems approach, an NG analysis differs from one that would study a social or ecological system alone (Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 2005). It considers many broader land use concerns beyond timber extraction, such as the protection of wildlife, water quality, aquatic species, spiritual values, non-timber products, and even energy development, among others. The social demands and pressures placed on forest managers and users are often tied to a wide variety of other issue areas.

In addition to the complexity inherent in forest management, there are other factors to consider. Rather than developing detailed knowledge of the smaller parts, a social-ecological systems approach seeks to improve our understanding of the dynamics of the larger system (Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 2005). First, as with other social-ecological systems, forests are tied to and affected by multiple social systems (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). The social demands placed on a system from these various sources may complement each other, they may compete, or they may conflict. Governance, then, needs to address the complexity that stems from social systems. This is the first impact identified in the upper left portion of Figure 2.1.

Second, complexity also implicates ongoing change and uncertainty (Armitage et al. 2009). Ecosystems change continually and the conditions under which certain elements can thrive may shift significantly, especially under a changing climate. Also, our knowledge about

ecological conditions is subject to a degree of uncertainty. With regard to our knowledge of ecosystems, new information can lead to change, action, and learning (Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). Coupling these components of complexity, change (in the ecological systems) and uncertainty (in our knowledge about them) has been referred to as “interlocking complexity” (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004). This is the second impact identified in the lower left portion of Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1. Flexibility in Networked Governance is an Adaptive Response to the Complexity Inherent in Forest Management.

The complexity inherent in forest management, coupled with competing social demands and the new knowledge emerging about ecosystems calls for adaptive systems of governance. Networked arrangements are well-suited to address complexity in transnational forest management. Scholars have called for multi-level governance solutions that work across organizational and ecological levels (Andonova and Mitchell 2010), multiple and diverse actor types (Biermann et al. 2010), and iterative processes (Falkner et al. 2010; Nilsson and Persson

2012). In similar language, Gupta et al. (2010) state that the “unstructured” nature of problems embedded in social-ecological systems requires a variety of actors, discourses, and solutions.

In global forest management, I argue that systems are adaptive to the extent that they are flexible. Networked forest governance is promising in being able to adjust and respond to changes.¹⁰ Its sources of flexibility are found in being able to adjust to changing needs, through decentralized authority, and also in being able to respond to multiple demands by empowering civil society actors to fill gaps left by states. Civil society plays a key role in providing information and generating the knowledge required for policy learning. In order to reach the full potential of civic engagement, governance networks need to move away from stricter rules and negotiated power relationships toward open patterns of communication (Castells 2008). In its flexibility, networked governance provides the space for creativity (Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 2005). The ability to adjust to changing conditions and needs is a key component in adaptive governance (Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 2008; Gupta et al. 2010).

To the degree that NG is flexible, then, it is adaptive. Flexibility entails adjusting to social needs and changing ecological conditions (or our new knowledge about them). The capacity to adjust involves responding to a need as it is recognized. In other words, knowledge is shifted into an actionable response (Lebel et al. 2006). Responsiveness is enhanced with civic engagement in governing social-ecological systems (Connolly et al. 2014). In the forest context, civil society fills governance gaps left by states, suggesting that more direct public involvement is required (Cashore and Bernstein 2004; Klenk et al. 2013). The connection between flexibility and adaptiveness is rooted in an arrangement’s ability to respond to changing social demands and ecological needs and adjust accordingly.

¹⁰ In fact, some suggest NG may be the only way to deal with the tensions related to the dynamics of globalization (Kooiman 2003; Marsh and Smith 2000).

The NG, social-ecological systems, and adaptive governance literatures share much in common, including a focus on learning, or being “reflexive” (Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 2008; Dryzek 2014). Though there are slight variations, learning is generally defined in the adaptive governance literature as sharing experiences, reflecting upon them, and changing management practices to be more effective (Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 2008). Being able to learn in the context of uncertainty is what allows systems to adapt (Gunderson and Holling 2001). In considerations of networked governance, the notion of reflexivity closely mirrors learning. Reflexivity implies that there is a process of self-examination looking at the consequences of various courses of action (Dryzek 2012). Linking the NG and social-ecological systems literatures allows us to see the governance network as a complex social-ecological system capable of making adjustments.

This suggests that the informal nature of networks provides a good backdrop for the type of adjustments that are required to facilitate learning processes (Pahl-Wostl 2009). Bringing in civil society is integral, because it introduces contesting and competing discourses that prompt reflection (Dryzek 2012). Flexible networked processes accommodate the inherent value in new ideas, and in trying new practices. A certain degree of experimentation and failure allows a process to adjust management practices toward success. Learning-by-doing has been recognized as a valuable component of governance for sustainability (Loorbach 2007). Reflexivity, or learning, then, is an important benefit of the flexibility built into NG as it allows for adjusting and learning from mistakes, ideally repeating successes and avoiding failures.

Opening up the arena of actors not only introduces new ideas, but also allows for faster response to problems. Devolving authority to the local level has been shown to result in the creation of self-help networks at the local level, where local users can respond more quickly to

needs (Dupuits 2014). Decentralization and the devolution of authority go hand-in-hand, linking forest users more directly in with decision-making processes (Berkes 2010; Monditoka 2011). New actors from civil society often step in to fill in for the formal oversight role of the state.

Being a part of a governing network can be attractive to individuals and organizations for many reasons. By pooling resources, governance networks are appealing because they allow actors to achieve more together than they can alone. They also allow actors to pursue their goals without binding them to specific set of actions. Their flexibility offers a voluntary basis for participation. Even when they are not required to participate, smaller, local-level community groups often recognize they can accomplish more when they are linked together (Agrawal et al. 2008; Dupuits 2014; Monditoka 2011). A major advantage of working together is the ability to respond to changing conditions. Responsiveness has received recent attention as an integral component of flexibility (Connolly et al. 2014). The promise of networked governance lies in its ability to pull from various sectors, drawing on the strengths of the public and private sectors. To a large extent, the involvement of civil society has bolstered the ability of governance arrangements to fill the gaps left by a lack of international binding agreement surrounding the management of forest resources.

Placing forest governance in the transnational context is a complex undertaking that involves bringing in many actors across multiple sectors. When groups link up across borders in transboundary forest conservation arrangements, they create multiple centers of authority. As part of the collaborative process, decisionmaking authority is shared between state, federal agencies, other landowners, and private groups. These arrangements are generally seen as flexible and adaptive. Spreading authority between sectors and across scales is a promising development in environmental governance (Berkes et al. 2003; Ostrom 2010).

2.6 The Pitfalls of Networked Forest Governance

While networked forest governance is generally viewed as a promising development, there are some areas of concern. For some, the inclusion of civil society is seen in instrumental terms, insofar as it is a vehicle to achieve multi-lateral agreements or to put pressure on states to cooperate in formal treaty arrangements where they may not have done so before (Bernauer, Bohmelt, and Koubi 2013). If we view it this way, NG is not a permanent solution. Others worry that a more insidious plot is playing out, that drawing upon private actors leads to closed-door, clubbish behavior that shuts out traditional forms of political oversight, threatening the potential for democratic governance (Falk 2005; Slaughter 2004).

Going in either direction, scaling governance up or down changes the location of decision-making, and also who makes the decisions and whom they affect. First, considering the global-to-local implications, when institutions designed to address global problems are scaled back to the local level, it can become unclear how local resource users can or will respond to a consideration of broader needs. In forest governance, there have been many calls for more direct participation, particularly of local communities (Bixler and Taylor 2012; Pagdee et al. 2006). However, it is not always clear that local communities are equipped to consider needs beyond their own jurisdictions. For example, they may be susceptible to the whims of market influences when it comes to selling forest products (McCarthy 2005) or converting lands toward shifting production needs (Lambin, Geist, and Lepers 2003), rather than taking into account dynamic landscape-level concerns that happen on a larger scale (Dramstad and Fjellstad 2011).

Going in the other direction, it is also important to ask whom the affected public is when scaling governance up. There has been a call for considering the local-to-global implications of governance arrangements, calling for populations in disparate geographies to be responsive to

one another (Mason 2005). Others consider whether arrangements that cross borders can be considered democratic. John Dryzek (1999, 30) poses the question, "...globalization means that important issues increasingly elude the control of nation-states. Can democracy follow this migration of issues, problems, strategies, and solutions into transnational society?" In other words, if problems cross borders is it also possible that transboundary governance can adequately respond? Is there a unified population, to begin with, that recognizes itself as tied together? Additionally, this line of inquiry also asks whether it is possible to achieve broad participation across borders.

In addressing complicated challenges related to forest management, governance arrangements can become quite complex. While the primary challenge might pertain to dealing with the natural resource issues involved in forest management, secondary challenges related to governance emerge. The arrangements we design to address complexity in the natural world become quite cumbersome themselves. Questions surrounding the rule-making authority of non-state actors in NG, have arisen in the past decade as a 'second-generation' of theoretical investigation (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Now that it is widely recognized that partnerships between public and private actors are an important part of governance, we are moving toward a more critical evaluation of their potential to be part of a fully functioning democracy.

2.6.1 Critiquing Legitimacy in Networked Governance

Legitimacy is defined as "the acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community" (Bernstein 2004, 142). A system of governance becomes legitimate when authority is perceived as appropriate. That is to say, an arrangement is accepted by those affected because it is seen as "right" or a good fit or when it is "accepted by members of society" (Gupta et al.

2010). The two components, acceptance and validity, bring together elements of what is and what should be. The notion builds from a baseline examination of whether a system of rule is accepted toward looking at whether it *should be* accepted and the basis for its acceptance.

To date, legitimacy in global environmental governance has been challenged when it does not include non-state actors. Habermas (2008) explains that technical problems can be addressed in systems of coordinating, information exchange, consultation and control across borders. However, when it comes to fully engaging in transnational governance of complex environmental problems, the nation-state lags behind. International processes can fail to achieve legitimacy because they are made up of states, rather than individuals, as members. In other words, they do not engage citizens at the global level, and governments have failed to respond to the challenges of globalization (Bernstein 2004; Zürn 2004).

However, in decentralized networked forest governance, a new set of critiques comes into play. Legitimacy in networked forest governance can be complicated by a mismatch of social and ecological scales. This can place limits on its problem-solving effectiveness (Börzel and Risse 2002). The validity of a set of rules is dependent on a correct fit between the ecological problems and social solutions designed to address them. Networked forest governance retains individual jurisdictions. When local institutions evade the enforcement of formal rights guaranteed at higher levels of government, their legitimacy can be called into question on the basis of broader-level larger landscape scale concerns (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). While social actors in civil society do link up across borders, at the end of the day, the arrangements are not legally binding across the entire landscape. When scales do not match up, a governance network faces challenges when it lacks the problem-solving capacity to address the problem scale (Bäckstrand 2006a; Gupta et al. 2010).

Beyond limitations in problem-solving capacity, past work in decentralized systems has demonstrated challenges related to opt-out. Between actions taken at the local and federal levels, there is the broader problem of venue-shopping and other strategic behaviors (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Pralle 2003). Any party can leave the network. As a result, legitimacy is also called into question when a process is not representative and inclusive of multiple stakeholders (Bäckstrand 2006a). Private actors at the sub-state level are not held to the same standards as state actors and their participation is voluntary. Voluntary compliance is an important component of a process' legitimacy (Paavola 2007). Therefore, legitimacy can be problematic when affected communities opt out of an arrangement because they do not accept it as an appropriate form of governance. Finally, because networked forest governance relies on informal forms of accountability, participants may call an arrangement's authority into question when rules are not monitored or enforced (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). However, as shown in the analysis in chapter six, the legitimacy challenge is a false problem. Opt-out is not an obstacle because participants genuinely want to be involved in the Roundtable. Furthermore, its rule-making authority is not called into question because the governed are drawn into the Roundtable as governors and participants, co-creating the rules along the way. This is discussed more in chapter four.

2.6.2 Critiquing Accountability in Networked Governance

Accountability relates to an arrangement's ability to connect those making decisions to those who are affected by the decisions. The sanctions for aberrant behavior can vary from formal to informal. On the more legalistic end of the spectrum, accountability is defined as a legal obligation to respect the interests of those affected by decisions (Considine 2002). On the

other end of the spectrum, in informal arrangements it is viewed as the ability to opt-out or exit an on a voluntary basis (Hirschman 1970). In a formal setting, it is about redress and compensation when a wrong is incurred; at the informal end, it is more about social rewards. In any case, accountability is a two-way construct that relates the responsiveness of governors to the expression of demands from the governed.

In networked governance, political jurisdictions remain intact. The logic implies individual organizations, agencies, and private landowners retain ultimate decision-making control. When authority is decentralized, how can the affected populations hold others responsible for harm? If environmental degradation in one location is caused by entities in another political jurisdiction, how can these negative effects be remediated without higher oversight?

In the context of forest governance, control is located at smaller scales with individuals as members of governance networks. In these instances, civil society often makes decisions about how forests are managed. By filling gaps left by states, non-state actors, including civil society and market-based actors alike, have carved themselves a niche as an authoritative source of governance (Bernstein 2004; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2003). These non-state actors often operate at the more local level, drawing authority downward (Agrawal et al. 2008; Monditoka 2011). In forest governance, non-state actors tend to be associated with informal behaviors, often forming protest coalitions to express their disapproval of existing institutions (Reinecke et al. 2014). Shifting the focus of global forest governance away from treaties and legal agreements toward local community based control tends to go hand in hand with being more informal and less codified. Governance networks have “political

independence” apart from regulation and formal planning processes and their members are not overseen by their agencies or constituencies (Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 2005).

There are some potential drawbacks from separating a governance process from formal mechanisms for oversight. When considering accountability, two related and interlinked dimensions of NG are important: decentralization and the involvement of non-state actors. In NG, accountability is complicated because the scale of the problem can be detached from its solution. The problem, originating from the ecological system, may bound a larger area while the solution, stemming from the linked social system, may be confined to a smaller area. In NG, political jurisdictions remain intact. Borders are not removed. In fact, the process of working around formal political channels can reify these borders, as they continue to operate in a separate arena. If the mechanisms for oversight are informal, civil society continues to operate outside and around the state.

Drawing localized actors into governance is not a value-free process. In a decentralized global forest regime complex, linkages between civil society and other actors are central to the governing process. In forest management, in particular, it is possible for local actors to become focused on their own concerns to the extent they may not take outside interests into full consideration (Monditoka 2011). When authority is drawn downward, it is uncertain whether local actors are able to link up their decisions with concerns outside their communities. In other words, NG leaves communities and sub-jurisdictions open to make their own decisions apart from larger audiences.

2.7 Concluding Thoughts

Sustainable development is “not a destination, but a dynamic process of adaptation, learning, and action” (United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability 2012). As such, governance practices have shifted accordingly. Networked forest governance is an emergent pattern to address the challenges of sustainability.¹¹ Faced with problems of forest degradation, resulting from destructive patterns of human organization, the challenge is to develop a collective vision rather than reifying our differences. Patterns of human organization can alter and destroy the planet, but can also reorganize and rectify the damage. Is NG the “middle way” out when neither market based actions or government regulations will suffice?

As a process, NG is flexible. It does not impose particular endpoints or outcomes. Rather, it considers a variety of interests and is based on an inclusive process. As a form of organization that brings together a variety of actors, it fundamentally restructures the relationship between the “governed” and the “governors” (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). This is a complicated undertaking. For some, the inclusion of civil society is only seen in instrumental terms, insofar as it is a vehicle to achieve multi-lateral agreements or to put pressure on states to cooperate in formal treaty arrangements where they may not have done so before (Bernauer, Bohmelt, and Koubi 2013). Some worry that a more insidious plot is playing out, that NG leads to closed-door, club behavior that shuts out the potential for democratic governance (Falk 2005; Slaughter 2004).

For others, these challenges are not insurmountable; NG is an ideal governing solution because it combines the “voluntary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the

¹¹ Thomas Lovejoy (2012) claims, “Patterns of organization are the fundamental building blocks of life, not air or water.”

financial muscle and interest of businesses and the enforcement and rule-making power and coordination and capacity-building skills of states and international organizations” (Huppé, Creech, and Knoblauch 2012, 2). Others echo this optimism that bringing non-governmental actors and informal rule-making together can be an appropriate and effective mode of governing (Bäckstrand 2006b; Cashore and Bernstein 2004; Streck 2002).

In sum, the components of NG that make it flexible and adaptive may complicate the democratic quality of the governance arrangements, particularly when it comes to the rule-making authority of non-state actors. These challenges are real and should be considered carefully, but do not negate the possibility that NG can be democratic. The following chapter presents the case of the Crown Roundtable and its development. This history provides context and an introduction into an instance of NG. Chapter four expands upon the puzzles related to legitimacy and accountability in governance, exploring the theoretical background of each concept in turn.

CHAPTER THREE: The Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent- A Case of Networked Forest Governance

3.1 Introduction

A major challenge in environmental governance stems from the mismatch between the interconnectedness of ecological problems and the fragmentation of institutions to address them. Siloed institutional arrangements are not well suited to address complex challenges related to sustainability. Some of the problems in sustainable forest management today include combating deforestation, contamination of waterways as a result of mining operations, lack of wilderness designation for wildlife habitat connectivity and growing pressures related to energy development. These concerns cross national borders, and require comprehensive approaches that stitch many jurisdictions together.

The chapter introduces the case of Crown of the Continent and its governance network, the Crown Roundtable. It details the social-ecological system, the background on the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, including prior conservation efforts, and the basic layout of the landscape on which it is located. Having a case background helps us move from theories of networked governance to examining the specific challenges of accountability and legitimacy in networked governance. The chapter sets up the backdrop for the analyses presented in chapters five and six.

First, the following section presents the research questions, covers the study design, the merits of a case study approach for addressing the research questions, and the reasons for selecting the Crown Roundtable case. Next, the methods section provides a general overview for how the data were collected and analyzed for the project. More specific information regarding methods is presented in chapters five and six for each of the analytical concepts.

In the fourth section, the Crown of the Continent landscape is introduced as a social-ecological system, with foci on the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park and Biosphere Reserve and the political and organizational context for building the Crown Roundtable initiative. In the next sections, I examine the Crown Roundtable in more detail, looking at why it was created, its membership and activities. I conclude with a discussion of how the case illustrates the advantages of networked governance for sustainable forest management.

3.2 Case Study Research Design

The study contributes to our current knowledge about global forest governance by focusing on an emerging suite of mechanisms designed to address the lack of an overarching treaty. As shown in chapter one, networked arrangements are under-studied. This research focuses on networked forest governance for multiple reasons. To begin, it advances our understanding of how networked forest governance arrangements fill gaps left by an absence of a hierarchical, legally binding treaty regarding forest management. Furthermore, it enhances our knowledge of whether and how networked forest governance can maintain democratic qualities of accountability and legitimacy, two components that are sometimes lacking in the market-based arrangements that have cropped up in the absence of a treaty.

The project investigates several sets of questions. Specifically, what are the ways in which actors hold each other accountable in the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent (the Crown Roundtable) social network? Subsequently, how has the process come to be accepted as a legitimate mode of governing? The analysis helps us better understand how networked forest governance can be a viable and democratic alternative to a legally binding treaty regarding forest management.

3.2.1 A Case Study Approach to Studying Networked Forest Governance

The case study approach fits the questions and also the type of evidence available; it is a realistic approach with particular advantages. To begin, the case study method is well suited to explore the research questions, as it allows for induction and theory building. Accountability is somewhat tenuous in the transboundary context, so network analysis can help highlight some of the social linkages that stand in place of legal agreements. On the other hand, it is important to consider more nuanced features of these interactions that network data cannot accommodate. The investigation of legitimacy, in particular, lends itself to qualitative methods that are more attentive to context, space, time, and can be situated with a unique sense of place.

Additionally, since not much is known about networked architectures, in terms of how they operate or their implications,¹² the case study approach is realistic. It is not possible to conduct a large-*n* statistical analysis, as it would require a large population of existing cases and a body of theory. Given the lack of attention to the dimensions of networked forest governance and the small number of instances, an inductive, qualitative case-study approach is fitting. The relevant dimensions of the case study approach are highlighted in Table 3.1 below.

¹² Chapter one argues that little attention has been directed toward networked architectures in global forest governance.

Table 3.1 The Dimensions of the Case Study Approach.

Dimensions of the Case Study	Reasoning
<i>Advantages</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Suits the types of research question -Allows for induction and theory building -Provides a high degree of conceptual validity
<i>Limitations: A Realistic Approach</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Networked forest governance is under-studied -Large-<i>n</i> study is not possible -Fills a gap where there is little consideration of the governance implications in existing work
<i>Type of Case Study: Building Block</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Inductive: moves from facts to theory -Makes contingent (rather than overarching) generalizations -Lends to institutional design recommendations

Case study research is advantageous when a high level of conceptual validity is required (George and Bennett 2005). Accurate description sometimes requires very particular language, to the point where it describes only one instance of a phenomenon. In these cases, there is a high degree of validity, but a lower degree of generalizability. This approach is useful when it is difficult to find universal definitions of the concepts under examination. A focus on accountability, for example, can vary quite a bit. Sometimes accountability refers to monitoring, justification of actions/decisions, and punishment for non-compliance (Schedler 1999); other times it refers to moral and legal responsibilities (Mason 2005). Some have called it the “continual correction of mistakes” (Scholte 2004) or “answerability” (Mason 2005). Determining what accountability means in terms of transnational NG requires a more nuanced consideration than can be built into a single variable. Legitimacy is also a contested concept. In some instances, it refers to the acceptance of authority (an empirical component) and in other instances it is used in reference to the justification of such authority (the normative component) (Bernstein 2004). The case study allows for an investigation of these competing or overlapping definitions.

Furthermore, it is a realistic approach. A suitable global-level dataset does not exist on networked forest governance, nor would it be desirable, as much of the contextual richness would be lost pertaining to the connections between individuals and their perceptions. Along

these lines, Blatter and Haverland (2012, 6) point out, “Case studies are superior to large-*n* studies in helping the researcher to understand the perceptions and motivations of important actors and to trace the processes by which these cognitive factors form and change.” This is particularly true for examining context-dependent, theoretically rich, and sometimes contested concepts like accountability and legitimacy.

Case studies have the ability to lend to theory development, both in terms of hypothesis testing, and also in discovering new trends. The case study is more exploratory in nature for a couple of reasons: more knowledge is needed about how networked governance structures actually play out in practice, and it is also important to consider the potential pitfalls. Existing research on networked forest governance tends to focus on its benefits (flexibility and adaptiveness), without critically examining potential flaws or challenges. For example, past studies have shown that decentralized forest governance benefits from increased linkages between different governance actors (Andersson 2004), or that multi-spatial interactions have a positive impact on forest outcomes (Ros-Tonen, Hombergh, and Zoomers 2007), but more work is needed to examine the potential for these arrangements to meet certain standards of democratic governance. The investigation presents novel insights into the inner workings of networked forest processes.

The case study approach goes beyond “hypothesis testing,” or confirming or discrediting existing theory, and moves toward induction. Induction allows for generating insights on a newer phenomenon not covered by existing theory. The single case study carefully considers the dynamics within a single setting (Eisenhardt 1989). Starting from observations, the qualitative case study approach moves toward making “contingent” generalizations rather than running experiments based on existing knowledge (Bendassolli 2013). Contingent generalizations are

tentative statements about how an overarching phenomenon might take place, based on observation of a particular instance (George and Bennett 2005). The project does not add to a dataset or sample that is already in existence. In this sense, the approach is in line with the view that cases are more important “for their value in clarifying previously obscure theoretical relationships than for providing an additional observation” (McKeown 2004). From case studies, it is possible to draw conclusions about a particular class or subtype of instances (Berg 2004). The “building block” case study design is part of a newer generation of qualitative research that differs from earlier case study models sometimes referred to as disciplined configurative cases, theory testing cases, or plausibility probes (Eckstein 2000; George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1971). These earlier case methods share a focus on uncovering underlying patterns of causality, but it would be problematic in the instance of networked forest governance to use this narrow focus.

There is general agreement that, especially over the past twenty years, the multi-layered blend of public and private governance is a staying trend. It is not particularly relevant at this point to look at why networked governance architectures have emerged. Instead, it is more pressing to consider what the trending shift toward networked arrangements means for the provision of forest governance. The “building block” case study method allows for a better understanding of the implications of the move toward networked governance. George and Bennett (2005, 76) explain, “‘Building Block’ studies of particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose. These studies can be component parts of larger contingent generalizations and typological theories.” Because the case study at hand is a building block for a new way of understanding forest governance, it is not being leveraged to reveal causal patterns. “Contingent generalizations” are a

strong suit of case studies furthering theoretical development by starting from observations (George and Bennett 2005). In this sense, the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent case is a building block to better understand the dimensions of networked forest governance.

3.2.2 A Case Study on the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent

The case selection criteria in qualitative research differ from those in statistical research. When looking at phenomena with large numbers of examples it is possible to run statistical models, with the aim of determining overarching trends. As an alternative method, case studies allow researchers to look at new and emerging trends with fewer instances (Bennett and Elman 2006). Choosing a case from a smaller pool presents certain challenges. The population of existing cases is a limiting factor from the outset (Eisenhardt 1989).

The selection process for this project began with a consideration of sites where transboundary forest conservation is taking place. Coupled with increasing cross-border interactions, the rise in protected area designation provides an avenue to represent conservation discourses in a tangible way. The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites program recognizes world-class locations with cultural and ecological significance. Many of them cross state borders, and some of them cover forested landscapes. Table 3.2 highlights where the transboundary forested World Heritage Sites are located, their size, and whether there is a conservation network in place. From the list of World Heritage Sites, those that crossed international boundaries, protected natural (rather than cultural) resources, and forested ecosystems were selected.¹³ This initial survey of sites reveals that while some conservation networks are in place, the Crown Roundtable is the only instance

¹³ There are currently 1007 World Heritage Sites. 197 are classified as “Natural Properties,” 13 of them are transboundary, and 9 of them protect forested ecosystems.

of networked governance arrangement. Recalling from the previous chapter, networked governance goes beyond merely having a network in place.

Table 3.2 Forested UNESCO Transboundary Natural Heritage Sites.

Site	Countries	Forest type(s)	Size	Independent Conservation Network or Networked Governance Arrangement in Place?
<i>Bialowieża Forest</i>	Poland, Belarus	Primary forest including both conifers and broadleaved trees	141,885 hectares	Not current. Temporary Bialowieża Forest - Ecological Network Pilot Project was formerly in place for 18 months ending in 2006.
<i>Sangha Trinational</i>	Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo	Humid tropical forest ecosystems	750,000 ha	Not current. Sangha River Conservation Network (by Yale University Council on African Studies) was in place in 2003.
<i>Kluane / Wrangell-St. Elias / Glacier Bay / Tatshenshini-Alsek</i>	United States, Canada	Coastal coniferous and northern coniferous biomes	9,839,121 ha	No. International Union for Conservation of Nature maintains information distribution efforts.
<i>Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park</i>	United States, Canada	subalpine boreal forest, montane forest, aspen parkland	457,614 ha	Yes. The Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent has been in place since 2010.
<i>Talamanca Range-La Amistad Reserves / La Amistad National Park</i>	Costa Rica, Panama	Tropical rainforests	570,045 ha	Not at this time. The Darwin Initiative network was formed in 2006 and concluded in 2011; the archives are held at a local museum. ¹⁴ The Nature Conservancy hosts a network for tourism development, species protection, and payments for ecosystem services.
<i>Mount Nimba Strict Nature Reserve</i>	Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, Mount Nimba	Dense mountainous forests	18,000 ha	Not at this time. Fauna and Flora International and U.S. Agency for International Development co-sponsored a study to examine collaborative relationships between agencies, NGOs, and others involved in conservation. ¹⁵
<i>Primeval Beech Forests of the Carpathians and the Ancient Beech Forests of Germany</i>	Germany, Slovakia, Ukraine	High mountain mixed beech forests	62,403 ha	Not currently, but there is a need. The Centre for Biological Diversity hosted a trinational working group to determine the state of the beech forests in 2011. ¹⁶
<i>Monte San Giorgio</i>	Italy, Switzerland	Mountainous forest	3,207 ha	Somewhat. An association of museums (which lobbied for the WHS designation) has been in place since 2001. ¹⁷

¹⁴ More information on the Darwin Initiative is available at: <http://www.inbio.ac.cr/pila-darwin/>

¹⁵ "Cross-sectoral partnerships for conservation, sustainable management and improved livelihoods at the Nimba Biosphere Reserve, Republic of Guinea." Report available at: www.fauna-flora.org.

¹⁶ More information is available in a presentation at: <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ecr/cbwecr-2014-06/other/cbwecr-2014-06-presentation-01-en.pdf>.

¹⁷ More information available at <http://www.montesangiorgio.org/en/Organizzazione.html>

In thinking about its potential contribution, it was also important to anticipate the reliability of the case in the context of the theoretical framework. In other words, thinking about the implications of the study's findings, required considering how the case speaks back to the theory on networked governance. The Crown Roundtable provides a reliable background to investigate how networked governance arrangements may be adaptive in the face of the complexity inherent in forest management. Situated on a landscape that is home to the first international peace park, the Crown Roundtable is a unique case of networked forest governance. Out of 1,007 World Heritage Sites,¹⁸ 96 are classified as forested (Patry, Bassett, and Leclercq 2005). Eight of these sites cross national borders. Worldwide, the Crown Roundtable is one of only a few instances of transboundary forest conservation. Furthermore, in the context of transboundary forest conservation sites with networked arrangements in place, it stands apart in scope and scale.

3.3 Methods

In order to more closely connect with and examine the Roundtable case, the first phase of fieldwork involved travelling to Fernie, British Columbia for the 3rd annual Crown Roundtable Conference in September 2012. I also spent two weeks conducting interviews with various agency representatives, foundation members, tribal leaders, and civil society organizations. Preliminarily, an interview list was based on purposive sampling (Jackson, Lee, and Sommers 2004; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998) from the Crown Roundtable's leadership team. These individuals represented tribes, state-level natural resource agencies, U.S. Forest Service, a manager's partnership, an education consortium, a geo-tourism council, and various private

¹⁸ A list of the sites and a map is available at: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/>.

conservation organizations. Connecting with people in leadership roles led to a snowball sampling of those in less-visible roles or those who may have weaker ties with the network (Granovetter 1973). This sampling strategy has also been called chain sampling because each individual has the potential to connect the researcher with new interviewees (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Research on other instances of forest governance has shown that connecting with those in less visible roles can help uncover new information that might not show up in a sampling of those who are in regular contact with each other (Jackson, Lee, and Sommers 2004).

Mixed methods, or “eclectic” qualitative approaches are well suited for investigating networked governance because they allow researchers to go beyond looking at networks as structures toward seeing them more akin to actors (Kahler 2009). Figure 3.1 below depicts the modes of analysis and the broader conceptual aims for each of the data collection strategies. Investigating accountability was done with surveys. The concept hinges on the relationships between individuals in the network; therefore, the social network survey is best situated to gather the data to examine these questions. On the other hand, because legitimacy has more to do with the perceived “fit” of governance and the moral right to make rules, it is difficult to access without additional qualitative data. Here, the information gleaned from semi-structured, longer interviews was integral. Participant observation was also important. Being involved in the Roundtable breakout sessions helped me investigate this concept.




Figure 3.1 Data Collection Strategy and Corresponding Modes of Analysis.

3.3.1 Interviews and Participant Observation

For examining questions surrounding legitimacy, I used interviews and participant observation to gather information on perceptions related to acceptance, participation and identity. In the aim of understanding the social constitution of the network, the interviews were centered on how actors understand their involvement with the process and their relationships with other conservation practitioners. The questions were also meant to give interviewees the chance to speak to how they understand their role vis-à-vis the larger landscape and other organizations. In particular, because legitimacy depends on the perceived appropriateness of a particular set of rules, it was important to speak candidly with conservation practitioners. The open-ended nature of questions in semi-structured interviews gives the opportunity to identify new ways of seeing and understanding (Cohen and Crabtree 2006). The informal nature of the interviews made it possible to uncover perceptions and attitudes that are not gauged in the network survey.

Interviews focused on the following themes:

- How do individuals and organizations navigate the complexities of transboundary and multi-level governance? What are the roles of the various sectors: government, market, and civil society? How do these roles link actors up across the landscape? Ultimately, do these linkages seem to result in a move toward achieving accountability?¹⁹
- Has a common landscape-level identity coalesced around the Crown ecosystem and if so, how? What factors play a part in the selection of appropriate conservation scale, and is there a relationship between scale and identity? If an actor only identifies with a small watershed or forest ecosystem, is there still potential for “scaling up” in order to collaborate with other units?

The questions above provide a sample of some of the elements addressed in both my semi-structured interviews and through participation in the Roundtable processes. The fact that the Roundtable brings together many divergent interests was both a challenge and an opportunity. It made it more complicated to craft a single interview schedule. Participant observation provided a way to triangulate the parts of the themes that did not lend themselves easily to interviews.

Participant observation was conducted at the third annual conference held in Fernie, British Columbia in September 2012. As a research method, it requires immersion as a participant in the “social world” of study (Marshall and Rossman 2010). I registered as an attendee and signed up for all of the events including panel presentations, breakout discussion sessions, field visits, and social gatherings. Additionally, I provided a benefactor sponsorship through my Center for Collaborative Conservation fieldwork grant. The Roundtable sessions were opportunities to take part in discussions about ongoing issues, ask questions, and observe presentations and dialogue. The conference organizers were interested in sharing the project with participants and put time on the agenda for me to introduce the network survey and to talk about the broader aims of the research. This paved the way for hallway conversations where participants shared their experiences, asked about the Center for Collaborative Conservation, the research, or the specifics of the social network survey.

¹⁹ The survey questionnaire, written and online, was designed to create a visual representation of accountability patterns, but the interviews add an additional layer of qualitative information on accountability.

The longer, in-depth interviews, field note voice memoranda, and portions of audio recordings from Roundtable panels and breakout sessions were transcribed. This produced 105 pages of transcripts (about 52,000 words) from more than 25 hours of audio files. These materials were analyzed using Microsoft Office and QSR NVivo software. Coding involved setting up categories that point to participants' understandings of their roles; the pervasive norms in the network; and how the identities of participants, their organizations, and the larger network have evolved across the landscape. More detailed description of the narrative analysis is presented in chapter six.

3.3.2 Survey Questionnaire

The survey portion of the research was conducted at the fourth annual Roundtable meeting in a paper form with a follow-up online survey. Surveys and questionnaires are widely accepted methods for gathering network data; they allow researchers to access information on relationships and connections without an imposing time commitment from individuals (Scott and Carrington 2011).

At the 2012 Annual Conference for the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, a survey questionnaire was distributed in the registration packet. Twenty-one surveys were returned during the conference, and a follow-up online survey resulted in 14 additional responses.

Table 3.3 A Selection of Prompts from the SNA Survey Questionnaire.

Prompt	Response Choices
Please indicate how long your organization has been involved in the Crown of the Continent Roundtable:	-First year -Two years -Three years -More than three years
What natural resources do you manage, use, or aim to conserve? Check all that apply.	-Forests: wildlife habitat -Forests: timber production -Forests: fuels reduction/fire management -Forests: carbon sequestration -Forests: other -Agricultural land use: ranching -Agricultural land use: crop production -Agricultural land use: carbon sequestration -Agricultural land use: other -Wildlife: game management -Wildlife: biodiversity conservation -Wildlife: protection of trust species -Wildlife: other -Aquatic species and habitat: water quality -Aquatic species and habitat: protection of trust species -Watershed conservation -Mining -Oil extraction -Recreation and tourism -Protection of Native American cultural resources -Ecosystem restoration -Ecosystem services -Wilderness preservation -Climate change or other landscape stressors -Multiple use management -Other
Please list four individuals you are most likely to contact when you need help with a resource management problem and indicate how frequently you communicate by placing a number next to the individual's name.	(1) More than once per week (2) Weekly (3) Monthly (4) Less than once per month Examples: Bob Jones, 3 Sharon Smith, 1

The survey asked for information regarding relationships and frequency of contact between conservation practitioners from the public and private sectors on the Crown landscape. A sample of the survey questions is listed in Table 3.3. The survey was approved by the University's Institutional Review Board in the fall of 2012 and subsequently renewed for another year in the summer of 2013.

3.4 The Crown of the Continent as a Social-Ecological System

The Crown of the Continent ecosystem extends over a 16,873 square mile area through Northwestern Montana, Southeastern British Columbia and Southwestern Alberta. It is home to the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, tribal lands, and designated wilderness areas (Prato and Fagre 2010). National, state/provincial, municipal, and private lands make up the varied ownership and management jurisdictions. Public lands comprise 83% of the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem. The landscape is managed for multiple uses, including recreation, biodiversity, water supply, timber extraction, and fish and wildlife habitat.

Situated in the transition zone between continental and maritime climatic zones, forest cover types include Pacific interior rainforests and Boreal forests (Bay et al. 2010). Other ecotypes are alpine tundra and prairie savanna (*Ibid*). There are high levels of biodiversity, including 1200 species of vascular plants, more than 300 bird species, and 65 mammal species (Legault 2011). The landscape is home to a diverse host of wildlife, including a full complement of native carnivores. Carnivore species include grizzly bears, lynx, marten, wolverine, and wolves (Weaver 2001). Prey species include moose, elk, and white-tailed deer (*Ibid*). The transboundary Flathead River basin is especially key for providing high-quality, lower-elevation riparian habitat for these predator and prey species, as well as aquatic life (Hauer and Sexton 2013). Figure 3.2 shows the boundaries of the landscape with park designation in green and an inset of where the landscape lies in the larger region.




Figure 3.2 The Boundaries of the Crown of the Continent Landscape.

The ecological context is favorable for conservation because the Crown of the Continent is home to one of the world’s most intact ecosystems. In addition to hosting diverse wildlife, measures of forest health indicate highly functioning ecosystems. While deforestation continues apace in the surrounding areas, forest cover within the Crown is plentiful. Figure 3.2 depicts forest cover, with the red patches indicating a net loss from the year 2000 to 2012. The patch of land where there is no red coincides with the Crown boundaries.




Figure 3.3 Forest extent change from 2000-2012 (Hansen et al. 2013).

3.4.1 The Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park and Biosphere Reserve

Waterton-Glacier was the world's first international peace park, established in 1932. Along a peaceful border, the space was set aside as a symbol of peace rather than an area designated to reduce conflict (Tanner et al. 2007). Borders are intended to maintain order, but they can also cause social conflict when they separate communities and natural systems. Transboundary protected areas can decrease these tensions. International peace parks are protected areas with a legal framework for protecting transboundary ecosystems. They promote adaptive management and better ecological outcomes. Especially when they involve local communities, transboundary protected areas have been shown to promote better conservation outcomes (Agrawal 2000). Their benefits go beyond protecting ecosystems. They have been shown to reduce conflict (Ali 2014). By fostering and sustaining interactions across borders, they increase cooperation (Brock 1991).

The Waterton-Glacier Biosphere Reserve, which is part of the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Man and Biosphere Program, is designed to achieve a sustainable balance between conserving biological diversity, promoting

economic development, and maintaining cultural values (Waterton Biosphere Reserve 2012). UNESCO recognizes that while the term ‘reserve’ indicates that it is “a special area recognized for balancing conservation with sustainable use,” the land is not completely exempt from human impacts (*Ibid*). In other words, communities are not prohibited from using biosphere reserve spaces for resource development or other non-extractive purposes. There are three designation zones: core, buffer, and transition which delineate *core* legally protected areas (whether they are publicly or privately owned), from contiguous *buffer zone* areas that are appropriate for forest and vegetation management, experimental research, and even agriculture and ranching. Transition zones are also called “areas of cooperation” in that they comprise the larger area where people live and work.²⁰

3.4.2 The Political Context

The political context is a bit more varied. Constitutionally, the two federal systems have some important differences. According to a political scientist who has lived and worked in both the US and Canada,²¹ in Canada “good government is a constitutional value,” hinting that the Canadian constitution predisposes it to a larger degree than the U.S., toward communitarian governance. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986) noted that Canadians tend to be more collectively oriented than Americans; additional value differences include Canadians being more law-abiding, more elitist, and more particularistic (more group oriented). For Lipset, these differences spring from the founding of the United States, which was largely shaped by the American

²⁰ In its own interpretation of the Biosphere zoning, the Waterton Biosphere Reserve Association offers that transition zones are where “the local communities, conservation agencies, scientists, civil associations, cultural groups, businesses, and other stakeholders agree to work together to manage and use the area...in a way that will benefit the people who live there” (Waterton Biosphere Reserve 2012).

²¹ Michael Hawes, director of the Canadian Fulbright Program also points to there being no private universities, and that health care is publicly provided to all as further evidence of the differences between the US and Canada.

Revolution and the accompanying attitudes expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Classically liberal Lockean notions of the self as a worthy individual are woven throughout American founding documents.

Alternately, in the Canadian context, Lipset claimed there is more of an emphasis on conservatism, in the European sense, that emphasizes the principles of *noblesse oblige*, or the notion that those in positions of power are obligated to serve their country. For Americans, this seemed too similar to British colonial rule by royalty. The differences, then, suggest a higher degree of public critique for authority in the U.S., which in turn means that comparatively, Canada may have developed into a stronger state in terms of providing for domestic welfare. The language in the Canadian Constitution seems to support this notion that public policy is less about public choice and is more in line with European models, which focus less on individual rights and roles (Lipset 1986). This fits with the communitarian philosophies of Taylor, Hegel, and others, in its recognition that individuals are embedded in and defined by their communities.


Interview data reveal a few insights on the differences between the United States and Canada. Elaborating on frustrations surrounding what she saw as the BC government's economic capture by American interests, a small-scale community organization member told me, "The Canadian political environment is not as progressive as you might think." She was particularly referring to frustration with the provincial government's lack of support for setting aside park designation in the Glacier-Waterton complex that would protect wildlife corridors. This is in line with another interviewee, an Albertan provincial who remarked, "the government of Alberta has not set down and said yes we will help you with the transboundary regional plan and we will formally cooperate with Montana and BC in developing that plan." From the local level to the provincial level, there was some agreement that the political context can shift. Another

interviewee said that, “the political process is so much different in Canada than it is in the United States and Canadian politicians respond so much differently to pressure than American politicians do.” These sentiments seem to indicate that overly general claims about Canada having a more communitarian environment, or one that fosters cooperation within larger political units, might simply not be true today.²²

3.4.3 The Organizational Context and Prior Conservation Initiatives

The Roundtable is not the first transboundary conservation initiative on the Crown landscape. To understand how the Roundtable came about, it is useful to look at the conservation efforts that came before. Some of them have come and gone, but the membership overlaps. A few of the same people I met who were involved with transboundary efforts in the 1980s are still involved today. As organizations have come and gone, many of the people involved in conservation have remained. While the Roundtable may be made up of some of the same individuals who were members of previous initiatives, the organizational itself is quite unique. The Crown Roundtable is special in that it is a network of organizations that already function as smaller networks themselves. Figure 3.4 below highlights some of the sub-regional initiatives that are involved in the Roundtable.

²² In fact, decades after Lipset’s general claims about Canadian political culture, empirical research based on environmental outcomes rather than attitudes showed that the U.S. regulatory model allowed the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)—led by states who are competing with one another at some level—produced higher regulatory standards.



**Figure 3.4 Sub-Regional Initiatives in the Crown Roundtable
(Courtesy of the Crown Managers Partnership).**

The membership on the Roundtable leadership team is also reflective of the tendency to draw from a variety of high-functioning networks. Because the Roundtable brings together smaller groups and sub-regional networks, it is worth looking at the longer and varied history of some of these initiatives.

To situate the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, it is helpful to understand the progression in governance initiatives across the landscape. The Crown region, much like others, reflected trends in the 1990s related to ecosystem management, which recast environmental issues in social, economic and political terms (Clark 1993; Grumbine 1997; Pedynowski 2003). The rise of the ecosystem management model corresponds with the emergence of initiatives in the Crown region. Ecosystem management approaches tied in with the international peace park movement in that it built in a consideration of bridging management approaches for a wide set of issue areas across mixed political jurisdictions (Stefanik 2009). As technocratic resource management fell out of favor in the region and elsewhere, Crown-wide bioregional initiatives

began to crop up across the landscape. There are a number of them worth mentioning. In some ways they share similarities with the Roundtable, and in other ways they are different.

The first major Crown-wide initiative is a forum led by educators to inform a general audience about the bioregion. Since 1994, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education Consortium (COCEEC) has worked on landscape-wide concerns in the public education system to increase awareness about issues. According to one interviewee,

COCEEC is mostly about education. I used to go to their board meetings pretty regularly for a while, for about a year or two and it's great. They've really been able to get the concept, the Crown of the Continent, into the curriculum, and it really elevated conservation education within public education, which is great.

It is largely an informational forum, linking outdoor educators with NGO leaders, agency representatives and the general public. It took on projects from lesson plan development to offering a mini-grant program for funding citizen science and restoration projects. One of its more well-known products is a borderless bioregion map, designed to highlight the connectedness of the landscape. The map, pictured below in Figure 3.5, is a mosaic woven together from satellite images; these images depict mountain ranges, lakes, and other natural features without the clutter of jurisdictional fragmentation.




Figure 3.5 Bioregional Borderless Map, Courtesy of COCEEC.²³

While the map above indicates that the eco-region is fairly contiguous, and many regard it as “ecologically cohesive” (Darrow et al 1990; Stanford and Ellis 2002), there are indeed many jurisdictional boundaries super-imposed upon the landscape. In fact, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem includes at least seventeen public lands jurisdictions amongst two federal governments, two provinces (Canada), one state (U.S.), and the tribal entities on both sides (Pedykowski 2003). Table 3.4 below lists some of the other major Crown-wide initiatives, with brief comments on their founding, purpose, and current membership.

²³ Available online at: <http://www.crownofthecontinent.org/products-projects/>

**Table 3.4 Crown of the Continent Ecosystem (COCE)
Landscape-Level Collaboratives, Networks, and Initiatives**

Name, year founded	Founding partners	Purpose	Current membership
Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education Consortium (COCEEC), 1994	Educators, NGOs, and agency representatives	Raise local, regional, and global awareness about the Crown ecosystem; “foster concern and voluntary action;” create and provide curriculum materials	Educators, Federal and state agencies, NGOs (conservation groups, foundations, etc)
University of Montana/University of Calgary Transboundary Program, 1999	Faculty and students from the Environmental Studies Program at the University of Montana; Environmental Design at the University of Calgary; Miistakis Institute at the University of Calgary	Provides support through the Henry P. Kendall program for research, also fosters “the knowledge and skills necessary to manage environmental issues across domestic and international boundaries” (through an intensive course that includes a field component).	Graduate students and faculty from Canada and the United States
Crown Managers Partnership, 2001	Roughly 20 land management agencies in Montana, British Columbia, and Alberta	Created as an inter-agency forum and voluntary partnership to “build common awareness of Crown interests and issues, shape relationships, and identify collaborative and complementary tasks that various participating jurisdictions can pursue.”	Staffed by the Miistakis Institute in Calgary
Crown of the Continent Geotourism Council, 2007	National Geographic Society and National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA)	Promote tourism—educational, information-sharing network. Provides information about the Crown of the Continent region for visitors and residents “to understand, appreciate, and help preserve its geographic character, including historical, cultural and environmental heritage.”	+ 50 regional conservation, business and tribal organizations, local communities and government agencies
Roundtable on Crown of the Continent, 2008	The Center for Natural Resources and Environment Policy (CNREP) at The University of Montana and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy	“Provide a multi-stakeholder forum to exchange ideas, build relationships, identify shared values and interests, and facilitate working relationships. In addition to organizing periodic forums and workshops, CNREP and LILP will convene an annual conference beginning in 2010, and has taken the first steps to convene policy leaders representing the major jurisdictions within the Crown of the Continent to create a national pilot project on how to implement large landscape conservation.”	Tribal, business, NGO, and agency representatives
Crown of the Continent Conservation Initiative, 2009	ConserveMontana.org	-“articulate and advance a long-term conservation vision for the Crown...while supporting sustainable and vibrant regional communities.” -Achieve “comprehensive and collaborative conservation strategies in four key areas: climate science, policy framework, communication/outreach, and capacity building. Climate change is the overarching them of the CCCI.”	steering committee of 15 organizations in the U.S. and Canada

3.4 The Crown Roundtable

Cross border flows of natural resources necessitate an integrated management response. There are no obvious ecological markers of the border between the US and Canada and very few indicators that there is a political separation, even though it is the world's longest between two countries (Stefanik 2009). The interconnectedness of the Crown landscape lends itself well to a phrase invoked at the beginning of the Roundtable meeting: "Where no border can be seen, no border should exist." The Roundtable was created explicitly with the goal of more closely connecting people and organizations across the already very connected landscape. Various pressures and intensifying concerns include barriers for migratory wildlife, increasing recreational use, and international conflicts over resource industry activities in the Crown of the Continent landscape (Pedykowski 2003) contributed to the need for ecosystem-wide, large-landscape scale cooperation.

The Crown Roundtable was formed to facilitate working relationships between individuals, groups, and organizations to match the interconnectedness of the landscape. The goal of the Roundtable is to build a community around pressing conservation issues in the region. It is a "network of networks" that links individuals and organizations across borders. Two major contributing factors led to its creation: a recognition that there were already groups and individuals working on cross-border conservation issues and a desire of public land managers to engage in outreach with tribes and non-governmental groups.

Agency representatives had formed their own group, the Crown Manager's Partnership, in 2001. The Manager's Partnership is a self-proclaimed "coalition of the willing"²⁴ that brought

²⁴ This is how a National Parks Service representative referred to the Roundtable during an interview. A coalition of the willing in other contexts has been described as an alternative approach when others have "deadlocked." A

together individuals from various agencies including U.S. National Parks Service; Alberta Tourism, Parks, and Recreation; the University of Montana; the University of Calgary; Flathead Lake Biological Station; U.S. Fish and Wildlife; and the U.S. Forest Service. However, several years later, some of the members of the leadership team recognized the need to bring in civil society.

Crown Roundtable activities first began in 2006 as a survey project at the University of Montana's Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy where graduate students created an inventory of formal and informal conservation initiatives in the Crown region (Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent 2014). In 2007, the Crown Manager's Partnership (CMP), recognizing a need to reach out to conservation groups, recreation organizations, and citizens at large, commissioned a communications plan for building and improving these working relationships. The report outlines pressing issues in the region, existing collaborative work, and opportunities for improving collaboration (*Communication Strategy for the Crown Managers Partnership* 2007).

Later in 2007, in a separate event, the Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy at the University of Montana and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy brought together more than one hundred participants in Whitefish, Montana, to identify common conservation issues. After this initial gathering, smaller groups of recognized regional leaders met to explore the idea of connecting existing efforts in a roundtable format. During this exploratory phase, these leaders met in Kalispell, Montana and in field visits with Tribes and First Nations in Pincher Creek, Alberta. The Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy (CNREP) led the process of bringing individuals and organizations together. The CNREP provided the

coalition of the willing can include any and all entities who want to make progress from the municipal to the federal levels, including public and private actors (Hale 2010).

institutional home base for the effort, with staff and a committed group of graduate students. In the initial phases, the group created a website, along with a regional map and GIS data layers.

In 2010, the Center for Large Landscape Conservation was invited to co-direct the Roundtable. The first annual conference was held in Waterton, Alberta. From the inception, the Roundtable's creators identified the idea of serving as a "laboratory" for transboundary cooperation and using social networks to work toward conservation goals. Today, the Roundtable brings together over 100 actors from government agencies, NGOs, tribal groups, and place-based partnerships and spans eight regional initiatives aimed at various aspects of transboundary conservation, education, and geotourism.

In many ways, it is a "network of networks," designed to "test new forms of governance." Individuals, representing their particular agency or organization, are encouraged to attend conferences (there have been five so far, in 2010 through 2014) and workshops in order to "think regionally, but to act at whatever scale makes sense" ("Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent" 2011). This flexibility allows members of public agencies to participate without overstepping boundaries related to their own agencies' missions and mandates.

Because the Roundtable grew out of academia, it had the potential from the start to be innovative. Universities are increasingly acting as catalysts for landscape scale conservation initiatives. They are well-suited to do the work because it requires a high level of coordination and integration across many scientific disciplines (Levitt and Woodley 2014). Built by people who study collaborative governance, in some ways it was pre-disposed to be successful, as it could benefit from the lessons learned from landscape scale collaboration in other areas. However, in other ways, the Roundtable was created with very specific interests in mind. While governance networks do not typically have compulsory power to compel actors to take any one

particular course of action (Barnett and Duvall 2005), setting up the Roundtable required bringing in outside funders including philanthropic donors who may have their own agendas (Himmelstein 1997). The initial grants came from the Kresge Foundation, the Center for Large Landscape Conservation, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. These private foundations invest in philanthropic and conservation efforts across the U.S. and are based in other locations and states. For example, the Kresge Foundation is located in Detroit and generally focuses on urban development projects and the Lincoln Institute is based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. While they may have self-stated non-profit missions, these organizations must still answer to their donors at the end of the day. It is important to be cognizant of who the initial members and donors were and why they became involved.

3.4.1 The Membership of the Crown Roundtable

The Roundtable's membership is varied and diverse. It includes representatives from tribal and first nation communities, local businesses, tourist organizations, universities, industry, and others. Members became involved in the Roundtable for a variety of reasons. An individual who worked for the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) played a big part in the creation of the Roundtable. He told me that he felt it was important to participate in transboundary initiatives because they foster the relationships and sense of trust that are necessary to achieve conservation objectives across borders. For him, it was important to work beyond the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park into the broader Crown landscape. For others, being a part of the Roundtable offered the change to link up their grass-roots conservation efforts with other towns, offering the chance to learn about best management practices for conservation programs like bear awareness. Still others (agency representatives, for example)

found it helpful to join the Roundtable to tap into reporting and citizen science initiatives around aquatic invasive species like the zebra mussel. Just as the reasons to become involved are diverse, so are the members.

Whether looking at the general membership list in the spring of 2012 or the list of participants in the fall 2012 annual conference, it is clear that the Roundtable draws heavily on civil society membership. As tables 3.5 and 3.6 show below, civil society organizations form the largest portion of the membership at about 40%.

Table 3.5 Crown Roundtable Conference Participants by Organization Type, Separated out by U.S. and Canada.

US National NGO	15
US Regional NGO	9
US Local NGO	6
US General Public	7
US Educational Institution	17
US Tribal	3
US Economic Development, Private Business	7
US Federal Public Agency	2
US State Public Agency	2
US Local Public Agency	0
Canada National NGO	4
Canada Regional NGO	10
Canada Local NGO	0
Canada General Public	5
Canada Educational Institution	5
Canada Tribal	4
Canada Economic Development, Private Business	6
Canada Federal Public Agency	0
Canada Provincial Public Agency	7
Canada Local Public Agency	4

Table 3.6 Crown Roundtable 2012 Conference Participants by Organizational Type.

NGO	44
General Public	12
Educational	22
Tribal	7
Economic Development	13
Public Agency	15

Similarly, the membership on the Roundtable leadership team is reflective of the tendency to draw from a variety of organizations. The leadership board includes individuals from the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, the Crown of the Continent Conservation Initiative, the Blood Tribe, the U.S. Forest Service Region 1, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education Consortium, the Crown Managers Partnership, Alberta Environment, the Crown of the Continent Geotourism Council, East Kootenay Conservation Program, Blackfoot Challenge, Northwest Connections, Water Matters, and the two co-directors.²⁵ Notably absent is a representative from the B.C. provincial government. Table 3.7 outlines some of the member organizations of the leadership board and lists the resources they conserve.

Table 3.7 Names of Selected Roundtable Leadership Board Member Organizations and Natural Resources Conserved.

Organization Name & Type	Natural Resources
USFS - Flathead NF <i>Federal agency</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat, timber production, fuels reduction/fire management, carbon sequestration and other forest uses
Sun River Watershed Group <i>Regional non-profit</i>	Forests for fuels reduction/fire management and other; Agriculture for ranching and other; Wildlife; aquatic species and habitat, water quality and water quantity; Watershed conservation; Ecosystem restoration; Ecosystem services; Climate change and other landscape stressors
Crown Managers Partnership <i>International non-profit</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; forests for other uses; agricultural land use/ranching; agricultural land use/ crop production; land use/carbon sequestration; other agricultural land use; wildlife game management; wildlife biodiversity conservation; wildlife protection of trust species; other wildlife conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quantity and quality; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed conservation; mining; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; protection of Native American cultural resources; ecosystem restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; climate change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management
MT Department of Natural	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for

²⁵ The list reflects leadership team membership as of September 2012.

Resources and Conservation <i>State agency</i>	fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; agricultural land use/ranching; agricultural land use/ crop production; other agricultural land use; wildlife protection of trust species; other wildlife conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quantity; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed conservation; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; protection of Native American cultural resources; ecosystem restoration; ecosystem services; climate change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management
The Crown of the Continent Geotourism Council <i>Tourism development organization</i>	Forests (general); wildlife (general); watershed conservation; recreation and tourism; protection of Native American cultural resources; multiple use management
The Wilderness Society <i>National nongovernmental organization</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for fuels reduction/fire management; wildlife biodiversity conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quality; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed conservation; recreation and tourism; ecosystem restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; climate change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management
Water Matters Society of Alberta <i>Citizen conservation group</i>	Aquatic species and habitat water quantity and quality; watershed conservation; ecosystem services
Alberta Southwest <i>Economic development and tourism organization</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; agricultural land use/ranching; agricultural land use/ crop production; wildlife biodiversity conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quantity; watershed conservation; recreation and tourism; other
Alberta Tourism, Parks and Recreation <i>Provincial parks management agency</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for fuels reduction/fire management; wildlife game management; wildlife biodiversity conservation; wildlife protection of trust species; aquatic species and habitat water quality; protection of aquatic trust species; recreation and tourism; protection of Native American cultural resources; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation
Swan Ecosystem Center <i>Community based non-profit organization</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; forests for other uses; wildlife biodiversity conservation; wildlife protection of trust species; other wildlife conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quantity and quality; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed conservation; recreation and tourism; ecosystem restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; climate change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management
Headwaters Montana <i>Non-profit conservation organization</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; wildlife game management; wildlife biodiversity conservation; wildlife protection of trust species; aquatic species and habitat water quantity and quality; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed conservation; mining; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; protection of Native American cultural resources; ecosystem restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; climate change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management
East Kootenay Citizens Concerned about Coalbed Methane (CCCMB) <i>Private citizen research group</i>	Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; other agricultural land use; wildlife biodiversity conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quality; watershed conservation; mining; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; wilderness preservation; climate change or other landscape stressors

The absence of a representative from the B.C. provincial government is worth noting. During the 2012 Roundtable, the province held a conference for municipal leaders, which seemed to pull would-be participants from attending the conference that year. However, in looking back at past attendee lists, the B.C. Ministry of Environment did not attend. While attendance lists confirmed the absence of representatives from B.C. provincial agencies, they do not explain why the provincial government was hesitant to participate in the Roundtable. Referring to interview data, a more complete explanation emerged. Piecing together details from what a retired mining geologist volunteering for a B.C. town museum, a U.S. Parks Service official, and the directors of two Montana-based and one British Columbia-based conservation organizations told me, an explanation surfaced. Transboundary processes in the 1980s had left the province bitter about the potential to develop mines.²⁶ The provincial government seemed to view binational cooperation as a threat to coal development. Its absence, then, was not a coincidence, but a strategic demonstration of power; and perhaps an effort to avoid placing restrictions on current and future mining operations in the portion of the Crown landscape that falls within its borders. In the absence of B.C., then, the members of the leadership board represent public and private groups from Montana and Alberta.

3.4.2 The Activities of the Crown Roundtable

The Roundtable's activities are wide and diverse. It ranges from being a forum for policy dialogue, hosting workshops, forums and annual conferences, to providing funding for project

²⁶ As one interviewee mentioned regarding B.C.'s involvement in the transboundary International Joint Commission process, the promise of coal development was a strong pull. In his words, "Yet here was British Columbia saying, screw those goddamn Americans—excuse my French—screw those Americans, we got two billion dollars worth of coal in the Flathead. Nobody lives there and we want to develop the coal."

implementation. The annual conference is the major undertaking, but in recent years the Roundtable has taken part in on-the-ground work by financing projects through the Adaptive Management Initiative and sponsoring internships and fellowships. These activities lend to the aim of “connecting people to sustain and enhance culture, community, and conservation in the Crown of the Continent” (Crown Roundtable 2012).

Initially created as an open space for building and maintaining connections between individuals and organizations, the Roundtable fosters policy dialogue, knowledge transfer, and innovation. The main venue is the annual conference, but the relationships formed continue beyond. The conference provides some structured time, as well as times that allow participants to interact in a more open format. At the conference, panel presentations offer updates on current issues. For example, at the 2012 Roundtable, topics varied from payments for ecosystem services, economic development, tourism, forest ecology, water management, and energy resources (Crown Roundtable 2012). In less structured time, “hot topics” breakout sessions give brief slots for participants to share their concerns, and collaboratively identify solutions.

Field visits are also an important part of the annual conference, creating shared experiences for learning and sharing management practices. Site visits to local old-growth forests, nature preserves, aquatic restoration sites, and tribal lands are opportunities to learn new management approaches. Traveling to and from the field sites, hiking the trails together, and standing in the same streams brings participants together in shared experiences. These strengthen bonds, creating stronger relationships that continue beyond the conference.

The Roundtable facilitates the transfer of knowledge and ultimately lends to learning between participants. This learning carries over and back into home organizations and agencies, affecting daily management practices. For example, shared information about aquatic invasive

species has led to changes in the ways personal watercraft are washed after and before entering lakes and waterways. Shifts and changes in preferences and behavior happen in sometimes more subtle ways. For example, one participant mentioned that the issues might be different from one community to another, but said that “in all projects there are similar contexts that we will absolutely be learning from and going to each other to solve, around issues that come up as we go.” The Roundtable events offer the chance for people to meet with one another and follow up from one year to the next.

In addition to hosting conferences, the Roundtable also sponsors project implementation. In 2012, the Roundtable launched the Adaptive Management Initiative (AMI). The AMI provides funding for projects ranging from raising public awareness for building wildlife corridors across highways, to looking at the impacts of climate change on native trout species and Whitebark Pine, to building collaborative capacity for climate adaptation between indigenous communities and non-governmental organizations. Sponsorship of these working projects is possible in part through external grants, including from the Kresge Foundation.

3.4.3 The Advantages of Networked Governance for Sustainable Forest Management: The Crown Roundtable as an Example

There are multiple barriers to transboundary forest conservation in the Crown of the Continent landscape: a lack of information about ecological trends on the landscape, a lack of capacity for individuals and organizations, lack of a coordinated conservation strategy, inappropriate policy tools, and a lack of financial investments for conservation (McKinney, Scarlett, and Kemmis 2010). A new approach to governance was needed to facilitate adaptiveness in the face of these challenges.

As discussed in chapter two, networked governance is adaptive because it draws upon multiple actors, multiple sectors, operates at multiple scales, and draws upon multiple types of knowledge. The Crown Roundtable case demonstrates these advantageous features of networked forest governance, particularly in being flexible. The Crown Roundtable has an unstructured, and open format allowing the process to adjust to changing social needs and ecological conditions. These adjustments allow for learning. Social learning is essential for setting goals, negotiating how to achieve them, and putting plans into action (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010). Membership in the Roundtable is voluntary, commitments are non-binding, civil society groups are brought into the decision-making process but agencies do not formally give up authority.

Adaptive governance points to some of the same features identified in the networked governance literature. Networked governance facilitates multiple types of learning (Pahl-Wostl 2009). Being able to respond to multiple, overlapping, and sometimes competing demands are the first steps toward reflexivity (Dryzek 2014). The Roundtable creates a forum where diverse needs and concerns are voiced (Kemmis and McKinney 2011). The Roundtable also organizes responses to the needs of various users on the landscape. The Crown Roundtable demonstrates adaptiveness in networked governance because it deals with overlapping forest-related ecological systems or issue-areas simultaneously, operating under what has been called the “nexus perspective” (Hoff 2011; Nilsson and Persson 2012). Bringing together multiple issue areas, the Crown Roundtable works at the nexus of forest management on public lands and private lands, management of agricultural production, water resources management, and national and international parks management, among others.

Networked processes, with their decentralized nature, challenge conventional notions of power in international relations (Kahler 2009), empowering new actors to come to the table. In

the case of the Crown of the Continent ecosystem, this has historically been a beneficial process, allowing larger groups to draw upon the experience of smaller, more local groups (Pedynowski 2003). Returning to the definition of networked governance in chapter two, it involves lateral linkages across a multiplicity of actors (state agencies, NGOs, citizen advocacy groups, and national governments, among others) that hinge on norms of trust and a shared purpose and identity, for the purpose of making decisions or informing decision-making procedures. The learning that happens at the Roundtable is an important part of the second component, informing decision-making procedures. To learn and inform, some creativity and innovation is necessary. Experimentation in new modes of governance is one of the design features of the Roundtable. In larger studies of networked governance, innovation has been listed as a positive benefit (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004).

In the Crown Roundtable, new ideas are incorporated in presentations and breakout sessions. These allow participants to learn from each other and draw upon diverse expertise (Bäckstrand 2008), they expand beyond a single organization's vision (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004). Drawing upon a diverse pool of expertise is advantageous (Bäckstrand 2008). Networked collective action boosts capacity, allowing organizations to do more together than they can do alone (Kahler 2009). They improve problem-solving abilities by pooling public and private resources (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004). Collaborative arrangements allow for an overall more effective response (O'Leary, Bingham, and Gerard 2006; Wyborn and Bixler 2013), and also a quicker response (Bäckstrand 2008).

Finally, the Crown Roundtable could be considered adaptive because it operates at multiple scales. Networked governance at the landscape level represents both scaling up and scaling down. In terms of global forest governance, it represents moving away from the global-

level UN Forum on Forests’ “Forest Principles” and far-reaching international agreements on sustainability reporting, but it also represents a shift for smaller conservation efforts toward thinking at the larger landscape level. In the case of the Crown ecosystem, for example, smaller private groups such as the Blackfoot Challenge and the Water Matters Society of Alberta, which have already worked hard to unite divergent interests in their locales, and are already functioning networks, must now think about how their interests fit within the even larger geographical, ecological and political scales. If the Crown Roundtable is functioning as it was designed—to “test new forms of governance”—then we should see that landscape-level conservation provides a viable channel to “think regionally, but to act at whatever scale makes sense” (Crown 2011). This innovative solution could provide a way out of a global cycle of deforestation and resource depletion by uniting diverse actors and interests around a common identity—a shared landscape.

3.5 Concluding Thoughts

The mixed methods case study provides an in-depth look at an instance of networked forest governance. This approach offers the chance to explore the inner workings of the process, comparing observation to theory along the way. Its decentralized structure, informal nature, and mix of actors across multiple scales are unparalleled. In its first years, it has brought together an impressive array of actors including more than one hundred organizations, agencies, businesses, and concerned citizen groups.

The conscientious institutional design is consistent with the principles of networked forest governance outlined in chapter two. It is informal, voluntary, reflexive, and relies on a deliberative model of participation. Its informal nature and flexibility are adaptive in the face of complexity in forest management.

However, it is important to ask whether it has lived up to its potential. The informal nature of networked arrangements can mean that they are lacking in particular dimensions associated with democratic governance. The chapters in Part II examine these questions. Chapter four presents a theoretical background on two major principles of democratic theory: legitimacy and accountability. From there, I pose questions about the possible drawbacks to networked forest governance. Chapters five and six present the empirical investigation of legitimacy and accountability in the Crown Roundtable case. Chapter seven concludes with design recommendations for improving networked forest governance processes.

CHAPTER FOUR: Legitimacy and Accountability in Networked Governance

4.1 Introduction

Global problems and the governance solutions designed to address them, particularly in forest management, are complex. The threats of deforestation and ecological degradation, coupled with increasing pressures related to resource demands, implicate a need for more effective governance. Formal and legally binding treaty arrangements could possibly ease disparities in forest management approaches between the U.S. and Canada (Howlett and Rayner 2006). However, it is not clear when it comes to governing the commons, that centralized or top-down approaches are the most appropriate (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2010). Environmental problems are complex and do not often fit neatly within jurisdictional boundaries, making governmental entities ill-suited to address them on their own (Carlsson and Sandström 2008).

Networked governance was heralded as “the blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st century” (Slaughter, 1997). Indeed, as chapter two demonstrates, there is a lot of promise in networked governance; it is adaptive, flexible, and inclusive. However, it is important to ask whether it has lived up to its potential. The informal nature of networked arrangements can mean that they are lacking in particular dimensions associated with democratic governance.

This chapter explores and examines these possible shortcomings. It begins by defining the concept of legitimacy and then moves into a discussion of why it matters in networked governance. The chapter then traverses toward some general critiques of legitimacy in NG, and presents ways of overcoming these shortcomings. The research questions for chapter five pertaining to legitimacy follow. The second half follows the same path exploring accountability: beginning with a definition, exploring why NG has been critiqued for having an “accountability

deficit.” The chapter then presents some ways to overcome the accountability deficit, and lays out the questions explored in the Crown Roundtable case. The end of the chapter covers research questions for accountability in the Crown case. Examples from the Crown Roundtable are woven throughout, paving the way for the empirical investigations of each concept in chapters five and six.

4.2 Legitimacy in Networked Governance

Authority is fundamentally different from power. In fact, many political scientists distinguish authority from power on the basis of legitimacy, which sets authority apart from power because it usually involves voluntary changes in behavior brought about through acceptance by the governed (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Bernstein 2004). The state’s authority is traditionally accepted because it holds a monopoly on the use of physical force over a population in a given territory (Weber 1946). Authority is centralized in hierarchical arrangements and participation is drawn from within political units (Easton 1957). Participation occurs in an ordered setting with pre-determined rules about who can take part, and in what role. These are usually established in a set of legal codes or formal guidelines (Ku 2014).

Because it is wrapped up in the control of material resources, ultimately, the legitimacy of hierarchical arrangements is tied to the state. As Dryzek (2010, 199) puts it, “The imagery here is of a state with no rivals when it comes to exercising legitimate authority over the people within its jurisdiction, with the authorization of that people—and nobody else.” That is to say, the state is usually the entity best positioned to maintain the level of control that engenders this type of legitimacy. In systems of governance where rules are clearly delineated, legitimacy can

be conferred through the control of material resources, through a rule-making process, or through the provision of public goods (Krasner 1999; Sandler 2004; Weber 1946).

Legitimacy is the basis for establishing a governing entity’s authority; it is a process of turning absolute power into a morally based ‘right’ to govern. This means that authority must be earned, and as Ku (2014, 37) puts it, “Authority today, whether international or domestic, public or private, is no longer a given, but must be earned with an increased emphasis on performance as a basis for legitimacy.” It is a major benchmark in maintaining the democratic quality in any system of governance and it is an inherently social process. As Christian Reus-Smit (2007) puts it, “...when we say that an institution is rightful, and hence legitimate, we are saying that its norms, rules, and principles are socially endorsed.” To understand the alternative bases for establishing legitimacy outside formal representation and legal frameworks, it may be helpful to consider how authority is legitimated in hierarchies and markets, and ultimately, networked governance. Table 4.1 below presents the authority pattern for each of the three modes of governance as well as the bases for participation and acceptance. Here participation and acceptance are the common elements: they are the building blocks without which legitimacy cannot be conferred. However, there is some variation between the three types of governance.

Table 4.1 Bases of authority, participation and acceptance in hierarchies, markets, and networked governance.

	Authority pattern	Participation	Acceptance
<i>Hierarchies</i>	-Command and control -Centralized authority	-Non-voluntary -Rule-making and elections housed within political jurisdictions	-Control of material resources -Formal rules -Substantive
<i>Markets</i>	-At-will exchange	-Voluntary -Buying, selling, and trading units of currency, goods, or services	-Stable exchange rates -State-backed currency -Standards-based
<i>Networked Governance</i>	-Horizontal -Collaborative exchange	-Voluntary -Communication, attendance, exchange of resources	-Social capital: deliberative qualities of trust, shared identity, and common norms

These differences in the way authority is granted necessitate a shift in the way legitimacy is defined in NG. In forest management, the case of the snowy owl in California exemplifies the importance of working toward process based sociological legitimacy, rather than outcomes or standards. The problem of deforestation and habitat loss is fairly straightforward. Decreasing forest cover impedes wildlife corridor connectivity patterns, and might indicate a need for a logging ban in some instances. This was the case of the snowy owl in California during the 1990s. The endangered species was experiencing habitat decline due to decreasing forest coverage, as some argued. Logging bans were met with heavy industry backlash, however, insofar as logging operations and mills perceived the substance of the claim (that logging was decreasing owl habitat) to be in direct contradiction with their economic well-being. Whether the science created an ecological basis for a reduction in logging was irrelevant. Policies banning logging would always be deemed illegitimate. Substance and reason, as shown, do not always form a clear basis for legitimacy. As Smith and Brassett (2008, 72) articulate, “Legitimate political decisions should not be made exclusively on the basis of an aggregation of preferences, or strategic compromises between competing interests, but on the basis of public reasons.” Public reasoning and the deliberative process, rather than scientific facts alone, form the substance of legitimacy in NG. The definition of legitimacy, then, depends to a large extent upon perceptions of authority.

For some, by its very nature, legitimacy is inherently set apart from coercion or self-interested behavior; instead it is the belief that an institution should exist because it is *believed* to have the right to rule (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Hurrell (2005, 16) claims that a sense of legitimacy is “distinguishable from purely self-interested or instrumental behaviour on the one hand, and from straightforward imposed or coercive rule on the other.” This implies that there is

some other basis—a third way outside of hierarchies and markets— that the governed accept rules because they perceive governors as authoritative in crafting an institutional arrangement, rather than any allegiance to the institutional framework itself. This is a helpful way to begin to think about legitimacy in the context of NG, which does not rely upon coercion or inducement.

4.2.1 Defining Legitimacy

Political authority is granted in networked governance by sharing information, knowledge, and values (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004). Consistent with a constructivist understanding of transnational politics, environmental governance should garner support to the extent that it prioritizes inclusion, shared identity, common norms, and trust—rather than the extent to which it is directly linked with changes in behavior or ecological outcomes.

Legitimacy, according to this perspective, is a construct associated with governance-by-doing. NG works toward process-based social goals rather than the narrow pursuit of particular outcomes (Paavola 2007). In this sense, NG relies upon a sociological, rather than a standards-based view, of legitimacy.

In managing global forests, it becomes clear that governance mechanisms must rely upon an alternate source of authority, as states have been historically reticent to sign onto binding international treaties. Through alternate channels, processes outside the state can become legitimate avenues for governance. Bodansky (1999) claims that legitimacy is simply the justification of authority. The justification for authority varies, though, across governance arrangements and today, especially in market and networked arrangements, builds upon elements outside the state and apart from the use of force. Power becomes authority, then, through the

process of legitimation (Bernstein 2011). This is often closely linked with accepting the rule-making authority of non-state actors.

This process is inherently social. That is, power becomes authority when it is *perceived* to be legitimate. It is, according to Bernstein (2011, 20), the “glue that links authority and power.” Legitimacy, when conferred upon the governors by those whom they govern, creates a basis for authority. Authority is sometimes fleeting, as coercion and inducements are often not within the scope of global governance arrangements (Hurd 2007). Once a population accepts power, it confers legitimacy. Legitimacy, then, is about the *acceptance of a system of governance*. Other principles commonly associated are responsiveness, fairness, transparency, and accountability (Bernstein 2011; Gupta and Mason 2014).

Legitimacy, broadly defined, is “stakeholder acceptance” (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). It denotes the fairness, correctness, or rightfulness of power relations. It makes the difference between people accepting or rejecting “the rules of the game” (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). Stakeholder acceptance can apply to different areas: the decision-making power itself, the procedure of decision making, or what is decided (Scharpf 2009).

Simply put, legitimation as a process moves away from a pure focus on the standards, participation, and consensus associated with a normative notion of legitimacy toward an emphasis on perceptions, acceptance, and deliberation (Bernstein 2004). Critiques of legitimacy have quite a bit to do with how authority is granted to non-state actors. It centers on questions related to (unelected) non-state actors being granted decision-making authority.

4.2.2 Specific Critiques of Legitimacy in Networked Governance

Legitimacy can be complicated because NG extends over jurisdictions and levels, and includes many types of actors (Bäckstrand 2006a). No clear singular governed population, or *demos*, exists. Stitching together multiple communities into a process brings together differing goals and expectations. These different communities' interpretations and expectations can introduce controversy, making it difficult to reach consensus (van Buuren et al. 2014). This complicates the notion of a social contract where the state acts as arbiter between parties; instead groups and organizations work directly together (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). This open-endedness can leave things somewhat uncertain. However, to accommodate multiple perspectives, it is adaptive for networked arrangements to be flexible.

Flexibility in NG can take on multiple forms; it can be a part of decision making, policy interpretation, or resource deployment (Lau 2014). Flexibility in decision-making implies a quicker and more efficient response to new opportunities (*Ibid*). Flexibility in policy interpretation refers to the ability to adjust to external pressures depending on the viability of a chosen response. Finally, flexibility in resource deployment implies that a blend of public and private resources can be used to achieve policy goals (*Ibid*).

While more work has been done looking at the relationship between these forms of flexibility and accountability, there are significant gaps pertaining to our understanding of what flexibility means for legitimacy. Recent investigations of NG have made explicit calls to look at the relationship between flexibility and legitimacy (Connelly 2011; Lau 2014; Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014).

Realists tend to eschew the question altogether whether transboundary networked governance can be legitimate if for no other reason than it is simply not interesting from the

perspective of high politics, or under the aegis of state-based security concerns that tend to dominate their investigation of world politics. Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, sometimes dismiss the possibility for democratizing global governance, resigning that legitimacy is elusive without the backdrop of formal legal mechanisms. Keohane (2003, 133), for example, claims,

Since there is no global government, global governance involves strategic interactions among entities that are not arranged in formal hierarchies. Since there is no global constitution, the entities that wield power and make rules are often not authorized to do so by general agreement. Therefore their actions are often not regarded as legitimate by those who are affected by them.

This perspective offers little to work with for those interested in landscape-scale environmental governance. Transboundary arrangements are not legally equipped or authorized to make decisions, under this perspective, and therefore cannot be considered appropriate avenues for decision-making.

Traditional electoral models focus on the free and fair elections of representatives at the state and federal level are warranted in pointing to the importance of open elections and the added legitimacy that representative democracy brings. In terms of a full deliberative democratic system of governance, these formal processes have some shortcomings. First, the electoral cycle imposes a certain shortsightedness focused on immediate policy items. Held and Hervey (2009, 5) refer to this problem as “short-termism,” noting that

The short duration of electoral cycles ensures that politicians are concerned with their own re-election, which may compromise hard policy decisions that require a great deal of political capital. It is extremely difficult for governments to impose large-scale changes on an electorate whose votes they depend on, in order to tackle a problem whose impact will only be felt by future generations.

For the limitations imposed by the electoral cycle and population numbers at the transboundary scale, it is both undesirable and simply not feasible to have elected officials be the sole

decisionmakers at the landscape scale. In terms of accepting a political order at the international level, this means that we are moving away from a notion that elections make a policy process legitimate. In fact, Habermas might respond that representation is the wrong focus at the multi- or international level; he (2010, 285) notes,

The legitimizing power of democratically elected governments who send their officials as delegates to international organizations is held to be quite sufficient for international agreements, even if there is no public discussion of the relevant issue in the countries in question. On this reading, the unequal distribution of voting power and influence within the GEMs [global economic multilaterals] is not a serious problem, because democratic representation is simply the wrong model.

Under this perspective, since it is not possible to balance votes by economic might, population size, or otherwise, it seems fruitless to pin legitimacy onto representation. But what does this mean for legitimacy? What are the alternative channels for legitimizing transboundary governance?

4.2.3 Ways to Overcome the Legitimacy Challenge in Networked Governance

How can a process of legitimation take place that will make it possible for NG arrangements to come to be seen as authoritative? Here the deliberative quality of the process becomes important in addition to developing social ties. As presented in section 4.2.2, legitimacy in NG is conferred on a sociological basis. Sociological legitimacy examines how the governed perceive a set of rules, an institution, or a governance arrangement (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013). In this sense, it is akin to an inductive approach to research. Investigating a question without making explicit claims about what effects may be observed or setting hypotheses to prove or disprove, a sociological notion of legitimacy explicitly acknowledges the importance of the relationship between decision-makers and those affected by the decisions. In other words, acceptance of authority is conferred through a mutual

process between the governed and the governors. Understanding how this process takes place is key to understanding how NG is legitimated.

In networked governance, it is particularly significant that the governed population overlaps with the governors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). In this sense, NG often puts the ‘decision-takers’ into the role of ‘decision-makers.’ Here, perceptions matter all the more, because the governed must feel empowered to participate in the process, actively setting policy directions and co-creating rules with others.

Hierarchical systems of governance are accepted out of a sense of obligation that is based upon avoiding negative repercussions. The consequences of not following the rules are strong enough to deter inaction. The basis of acceptance in traditional forms of governing are based on punishment or redress (March and Olsen 1998). Individuals and organizations accept and abide by rules in hierarchies almost by default, out of a sense of obligation toward institutions and not other individuals. There is a built-in notion that the repercussions for not following the rules will be strong. The control of resources or use of physical force has been used historically to legitimate domestic rule (Baldwin 2002). However, it is increasingly untenable at the international level to rely upon force or imposition for coercion.

Rather than coercion, we now see states cooperate with one another and participate in intergovernmental institutions on a voluntary and mutual basis (Ku 2014). Unilateral claims to legitimacy are particularly troublesome. Lynch (2006, 184) claims, “Since legitimacy can only be achieved through an open dialogue among all affected actors, no single actor can alone define its terms.” In the case of the Crown Roundtable this has been true. One participant put it this way, “This is what it takes a long time to work together to be able to collaboratively or collectively achieve goals or objectives for small tasks or large tasks across an ecosystem of this

size.” Interviewees emphasized the open-ended nature of the process, mentioning that participants voluntarily came together to identify goals, without pre-conceived ideas of how to achieve them. This can require a considerable amount of time.

A population deems a system of rule appropriate when it meets particular standards. In this sense, the right to rule must be justified. At the international level this could be done by having a certain number of actors be involved, or requiring that they be drawn from particular sectors. Beyond this, others suggest meetings should take place in rotating host states (Bernstein 2011). This has been true for the Crown Roundtable. It has been hosted in alternating locations between the U.S. and Canada. An interviewee described this process of connecting communities in the following way,

“...we needed people there who were in touch with government who were in touch with government and had a relationship with government: bureaucrats as well as ministers in order to be persuasive and also to build constituencies down there because that’s the population/demographic center of the province and then we needed a local group in the Southeast Kootenays, you know, Fernie, Sparwood, Cranbrook, in order to legitimize and build support for all those goals down there.”

Having a mix of private and public actors as stakeholders is a strength of NG. As non-state actors come to be seen as authoritative governors, the process may be seen as increasingly more legitimate. Chapter five explores how the governed are drawn into the governing process, suggesting they are more likely to accept decisions because they are directly involved in making them. That is to say, as those affected by decisions are increasingly brought into the decision-making process, it is likely to become more legitimate. Including public officials from the start and keeping them committed is also important (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). At the base level, an array of actors should be brought in, to the extent that it is possible. Though a wide diversity of participants is desirable, alone, it is not enough.

Legitimation occurs when acceptance is based on trust and social capital. Both of these take time, and they are built through repeated interactions. It is not enough to simply “add civil society,” like water, to the mix. Bringing more actors into a process neither ensures that they represent diverse interests nor that they will engage each other in a trusting way that builds a common identity or shared norms. In other words, for authority to be perceived as legitimate in NG, broad participation is not enough—though it is certainly important. Rather, the governed accepts a system of rules because they are an active part of the rule-making process: the governed are simultaneously governing (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). Participation is not based on adherence to pre-determined standards, elections and political jurisdictions or even economic resources, but on the creation and approval of the rules themselves. The basis of participation is a key component—it should be deliberative (van Buuren et al. 2014). Active deliberation and open debate are important. Deliberation is a process of engaging one another in a way that is considerate of divergent perspectives (Stevenson and Dryzek 2012).

Thus, I contend that *legitimacy in NG is brought about over time through a deliberative process that builds trust and social capital in the form of a common identity and shared norms.* The graphic below, Figure 4.1, illustrates the intermediary role that deliberative qualities play in establishing legitimacy.




Figure 4.1 Depicting Legitimacy Based on the Deliberative Qualities of Participation.

Conferring legitimacy in NG is not a one-time endeavor, but an ongoing process of creative discovery. Seeing this continual process of self-reflection in the Crown Roundtable, I was reminded of a Naessian “deep ecological philosophy,” or a commitment to repeatedly revisiting needs and how to adjust a process to meet them (Naess 1987). This ongoing reflection brings an awareness of one’s needs and where it is possible to make adjustments.²⁷ In the case of the Crown Roundtable, recognizing various needs and being able to voice them lends a strong sense of empowerment. The Roundtable’s designers recognized the need to move away from an “expert-driven” model of governance toward the inclusion of citizens, professionals, and communities (McKinney 2011a). The Crown Roundtable is designed with the collaborative mindset, keeping that in an uncertain world, all decisions are inherently contingent and that governance is not about finding the best solution but the best way of proceeding (McKinney 2011a).

²⁷ For Arne Naess, this continual reflection ultimately results in self-realization. Self-realization is about achieving one’s highest potential but acknowledging needs and weaknesses. I was curious in the investigation of the Crown Roundtable whether this could be scaled up to the organizational level.

The ability to engage in self-examination is an inherent strength of NG. In the Anthropocene, it is the “first virtue” of political institutions (Dryzek 2014). Ongoing deliberative efforts to examine and reframe the process are critical (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). Bringing people into the process humanizes rules by making them contingent and flexible. When rules are open to interpretation, stakeholders feel empowered. In the Crown Roundtable, this is particularly true. One interviewee put it this way,

We have issues. We are a very large landscape and we are carved up into many jurisdictions and this represents the heart of the problem. This is what it takes a long time to work together to be able to collaboratively or collectively achieve goals or objectives for small tasks or large tasks across an ecosystem of this size with this many boundaries drawn into it.

Legitimacy is conditional, it needs to be challenged and continually re-evaluated. It requires commitment and reflection. As the process comes to be viewed as legitimate, it can also become more accountable. The governance network is a sphere of engagement, or an arena for political interactions to take place, but not a commitment to any substantive or procedural policy goals.

4.2.4 Key Research Questions for the Crown Roundtable Case Pertaining to Legitimacy

How, without the types of backing conferred through general elections, the outright control of security resources, centralized administrative bodies, or even the inducements found in economic arrangements, are networked arrangements legitimated? That is to say, how is authority conferred upon these alternate arrangements? This is really to ask how NG processes come to be accepted and why the governed agree to participate in and abide by their guidelines. More specifically, it is an examination of the process through which actors in civil society become authoritative and a consideration of how the social ties between them are formed and strengthened.

Embracing contingencies and perceptions, we see that the moral validity of procedures becomes more important than the rules (Risse 2004). In other words, shared perceptions about rules lend to their acceptance more than the content of the rules themselves. Buchanan and Keohane (2006, 405) claim “an institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely *believed* to have the right to rule.” When an actor sees a rule as legitimate, she complies out of an internal sense of obligation, derived from a set of morals (Hurd 1999). The point of inquiry is how these norms, morals, or ideas about what constitutes appropriate rule, come about. Sociological legitimacy not only recognizes that actors abide by a logic of appropriateness, but asks how actors come to accept new logics—in this sense it more than the study of modes of steering, but investigating the mechanisms behind them (Risse 2004). It becomes particularly important to understand how it is that new forms of governance come to be seen as authoritative. This process is investigated by looking at the perceptions of participants.

The literature suggests that the presence of previous collaborative processes can lend to legitimacy of NG. Previous institutional structures and collaborative initiatives contribute by building trust in new co-management initiatives (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). As shown in chapter three, there is a range of initiatives from which the Crown Roundtable builds. A key question is what sort of institutional background has been built by prior conservation initiatives? Related to this, how can trust be created in the process? How might NG tie together competing perspectives from disparate communities with shared norms? Finally, is it possible to create a single common identity in a transboundary landscape? These questions are investigated in chapter five. The next section turns to an examination of accountability and the questions that underpin the analysis in chapter six.

4.3 Accountability in Networked Governance

Given the patchwork of governance arrangements in the transnational context, it is sometimes difficult to establish the body of individuals and/or organizations that should participate in international processes. Grant and Keohane (2005) point out that there are numerous “global publics” and that is difficult, if not impossible, to have a democratic system of governance at the global level. How do we determine the appropriate political audience for certain international or global processes? For example, are consumers of Apple’s electronic products eligible to have a voice when it comes to China’s involvement in mining operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Or do populations vulnerable to sea level rise have a right to be involved in land use decisions in Amazonian forests that sequester rising greenhouse gasses? As these hypothetical questions suggest, establishing accountability at the global level is complicated by the intricacies of determining which populations are affected, let alone justified in or capable of holding other actors responsible for their actions. Here it becomes easy to see how translating accountability up from the domestic level to the global level becomes problematic.

At the international level, accountability is often achieved through private mechanisms (Newell 2008). Market transactions allow consumers to make choices about whether to support certain companies based on their business practices. Corporate social responsibility is another avenue for establishing accountability. When transnational companies self-regulate, it is usually based on what they perceive as their audience’s sense of what constitutes acceptable behavior. Carbon trading schemes constitute yet another market avenue for holding entities accountable at the global level. Emitters, under carbon finance schemes, are able to purchase credits (or the right to emit) at an agreed-upon price. The goal is to reduce emissions by holding higher emitters

responsible through required payments, or ultimately, by an overall set limit on total allowable emissions.

Networked governance, however, depends on non-monetized relationships between individuals. While agencies and organizations may not be able to make formal ties and connections, individuals can (Rudeen 2013). As one public administration scholar put it, “we need a richer vocabulary for the kinds of conscious, normatively-grounded (and fragile) forms of obligation” found in networked governance (Moore 2013). The project fills this gap by putting forward a framework for studying these connections, increasing our understanding of the democratic quality of networked governance.

4.3.1 Defining Accountability

In a democratic system of governance, holding entities accountable implies that there is (a) some identifiable group, a governed population (‘decision takers’), that is justified in holding their governors (‘decision makers’) responsible for their actions and (b) that there are clear mechanisms for doing so. Succinctly put, accountability is equal to answerability and redress (Mason 2005). It is the notion that the governed can make demands of governors and that there are channels for rectifying wrongs when they do occur.

In order to establish accountability, the relationship between governors and their constituencies must have a quality Mason (2005) calls answerability, which relates to the ability of the governed to articulate their claims to governors. Answerability is about keeping actors committed to the process and to one another. For Grant and Keohane (2005), this means that “some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they

determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” It implicates a basic level of responsiveness (Bovens 2007) between governors and the governed (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). In looking further at the dimensions of answerability, Mashaw (2006, 117) is concerned with who is held answerable “to whom, about what, through what processes, by what standards and with what effect.” Going even further, Philp (2009) suggests normative dimensions that include holding behavior to an ethical standard, rather than another entity.

There are a number of reasons why a particular group would claim it is justified to hold others to a particular set of standards, even if they are not legally codified. Keohane (2003) names three such instances. Explicit authorization can take place where one group openly states it will abide by another’s demands. Demands can also be made in line with the basis of financial support such as a tax base. Finally, actors can claim justification for holding one another to account is in having shared exposure and impacts from harm. This reasoning fits best in the case of a transboundary ecosystem. In the instance of shared exposure, cosmopolitans like David Held rely upon Rawlsian logic. Under this line of thinking, those whose actions result in a particular shared impact should be held responsible. Ecosystems cross borders, so shared impacts, by default, implicate a variety of actors across the landscape.

4.3.2 The Accountability Deficit: Critiques of Accountability in Networked Governance

In the domestic setting, citizens hold government accountable through elections and ballot measures. Accountability, then, under this aegis is about public oversight and the ability to ask political authority to answer particular demands. Under this model, as Michael Mason (2005,

ix) puts it, “citizens become clients and public officials become managers.”²⁸ International relations scholars have recognized, perhaps more so than those who study domestic politics, that at the heart of the “‘the politics of accountability’ is a struggle over who should be accepted as a principal” (Behn 2001; Keohane 2003, 142). At the international level, not only do we have a moving target, but one that changes size and shape. In other words, the affected population is defined depending on the issue at hand.

Traditional, hierarchical patterns of governing associated with top-down flows of authority and clear assignment of blame offer more direct avenues for sanctioning violations. For example, it is possible to “vote out” those in elected positions, or pursue legal violations through judicial avenues. Accountability, at the domestic level, often entails using the courts to enforce legal institutions. This process allows affected individuals and groups to register their complaints and be compensated for their damages. Judicial bodies, though, at the international level are plagued with problems related to opt-out and the barrier of state sovereignty.

In contrast, NG blurs the lines between governors and the governed. It not only brings in a mix of different actors, but also fundamentally changes the way they work together. An informal, flexible, and open-ended setting replaces rules and prescribed procedures. Some have pointed to a tradeoff between flexibility and accountability – suggesting that as processes are more flexible (subject to fewer obligations), they struggle with accountability in the eyes of the public (Lau 2014). Depending on the degree of flexibility, it is possible that NG may be more or less accountable. For example, when private resources are put toward projects, implementation may depend less upon the direct efforts of public officials, placing more impetus on civil society to monitor outcomes (Lau 2014; Newman 2004). Under this line of thinking, some type of

²⁸ This fits with what principal-agent theory suggests, insofar as public officials, whether they are directly elected or employed within a public agency, are beholden to the general public.

authority is needed in order to monitor and account for deviation from standards. Newell (2006) asserts that achieving redress hinges on the ability of the affected group to wield power over the wrongdoer. However, in the NG setting these components are complicated because there is no clear set of rules, mode of arbitration, an established mode of punishment, or even a clear distinction between those who make the rules (the rule-makers) and those who abide by them (the rule-takers).

For Robert Dahl, democratic accountability depends on elections and a homogenous population base. Though Dahl acknowledges the need to address problems at the international level, the benefits of engaging a smaller political unit are more attractive. He articulates a frustration with the ability of citizens to appropriately hold their governments accountable for foreign policy decisions, and uses this despair as the basis to refute the claim that citizens of disparate countries can ever control the decisions made in an international process. Under this outmoded and unrealistic notion of electoral accountability, there is good reason to fear that transnational NG is not democratic.

If we were to embrace the naysayer's argument that international processes can be accountable, it seems unlikely that we can adequately address transboundary environmental problems because there is no way to hold decisionmakers accountable (there are no elections at the global level) and the population is too large and too heterogeneous. Competing identities and divergent interests would prevent the possibility of ever reaching consensus. Furthermore, with a pessimistic outlook on human nature, Robert Dahl (2010, 428) claims,

Beyond the boundaries of one's own intimate attachments, altruism is uncommon, and as a steady state among many people it is too feeble to be counted on. In sum, among a large group of persons with varied and conflicting ends, goals, interests, and purposes, unanimity is unattainable, disagreement on the best policy is to be expected, and civic virtue is too weak a force to override individual and group interests.

It is difficult to achieve consensus within a large population, and different communities' interpretations of problems can make it difficult to reach agreement about solutions (van Buuren et al. 2014). Indeed there are echoes of realist pessimism at the possibility and potential for cross-border collaboration in forest management (Humphreys 2006). With what we know about the global forest governance regime complex, this realist argument holds at the surface level insofar as treaty-level binding arrangements pertaining to sustainable forest management have not materialized.

While formal arrangements between states may have formed the bulk of international relations in the past, today's fluid borders and enhanced economic and social flows implicate a much broader base of participation, one that includes civil society. Fifty years ago, international interactions widely took place in the realm of interstate negotiations and formal international organization; this meant that responsibility for oversight rested with states (Scholte 2011). States, then, as members of international organizations (IOs), were responsible for ensuring their citizens' needs were met and that IOs served the general interest of the international community (*Ibid*).

At the end of the Cold War, open borders and rising flows of people and capital facilitated the formation of new political ties. States were no longer the sole arbiters of these flows as people and organizations began to directly engage one another. Coupled with decentralization of authority at the international level, and the decreasing prominence of state-based regulatory authority in international interaction, a growing concern emerged that these cross-border social and economic flows were taking place in a cloaked fashion, without the watchful eye of states. In essence, removing states as central and sole actors of international relations poked a hole in the democratic potential of interstate affairs for those who saw states as

the only actors capable of administering the subcomponents of accountability (Scholte 2011).

Networked processes are built upon social connections that rely on informal ties.

Participation is open to land managers, conservationists, and citizens alike. Once public officials step outside their formal roles, they are not bound by the same electoral and legal procedures that govern their actions when they are working within their agencies. The informal nature allows for creativity but also means that rules for participation are often vague or unstated. This means that it can be unclear how or when participants can address problems when they arise.

4.3.3 Ways to Overcome the Accountability Deficit

However, the diffusion of authority beyond states does not necessarily lead to a lack of accountability. Social ties between non-state actors can fill the gaps left by official oversight of states. The horizontal and decentralized configuration of authority can make for better outcomes and richer community engagement. Coinciding with the rise in popularity of constructivist approaches to studying international relations in the early 1990s, the notion of a ‘global civil society’ emerged (Keane 2003). A civil society capable of spanning borders provided the answer to concerns about decreased accountability. “Global citizens” are more capable in forming direct relationships with global regulatory arrangements than are national citizens, whose actions are mediated by states (Scholte 2011).

There is a fundamentally different basis for accountability in NG. The ways that actors relate to one another, based on rewards rather than punishments, form the basis of holding one another to account. In other words, accountability comes from social characteristics rather than legal rules or codes (Bovens 2007). By pulling the governed centrally within the governing process, NG in the transnational context empowers people as global citizens capable of

oversight. In a realm previously dominated by states, individuals and sub-state actors are able to sit as equals in transnational NG. Therefore, if people, as empowered global citizens, form the backbone of NG processes, it follows that accountability is drawn from the patterns and traits inherent in social relationships and processes.

In networked forest governance, there is a shared sense of responsibility for environmental degradation. This fits with a cosmopolitan approach, which sees humans as members of a broader population than the home country they may happen to reside in (Held 2003). To conceive of transnational NG processes as accountable, it is important to make the analytical move toward seeing a transnational public. The concept of a transnational public encompasses the notion that despite drawing from disparate populations and varying interests, there is a glue that holds a group of individuals and organizations (both public and private) together across sovereign state borders. This notion has been called a global civil society, transnational civil society, and even a transnational *demos* (Bruhl 2001).

As the line is blurred between governors and the governed, we see the formation of ties between actors become the avenues for answerability and redress. These partnerships are “self-organizing and coordinating alliances” (Glasbergen, Biermann, and Mol 2007, 2). More precisely, they are “collaborative arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market, and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical process through which these actors strive for a sustainability goal” (*Ibid*). Public private partnerships improve communication between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ (Börzel and Risse 2002), which is especially important when the lines are blurred between governors and the governed from the start.

Partnerships, or relational ties, formed within the transnational public become the avenues for holding not only others within the realm accountable, but corporate and state

interests as well. Dryzek (2010) and Eckersley (2004) illustrate this in terms of making international organizations and states more deliberatively democratic, and Clapp (2005) does this in looking at the political economy of transnational corporations. Reconfiguring our views of the affected public up to the international level (Mason 2005), it becomes possible to identify the mechanisms for accountability.

Two-way responsiveness between governors and the governed is a central component of answerability in the NG setting. It is particularly central because the lines between the decision-makers and ‘decision-takers’ are blurred. DeLeon and Varda (2009, 60) state, “collaborative policy networks are characterized by discursive properties, specifically reciprocity, representation, equality, participatory decision making, and collaborative leadership.” This focus on a responsive process is consistent with going beyond defining accountability in terms of a one-way relationship between principals and agents. In a principal-agent relationship, agents generally answer to principals through formal mechanisms such as elections or economic payments.

The Crown Roundtable, as a networked governance arrangement, is touted as a viable alternative for a formal treaty between the United States and Canada. While the global governance literature points to problems with informal arrangements, it is not always clear that this is as much of a problem as it is made out to be.²⁹ While these types of informal networks can fill a gap in governance, they are also susceptible to the critique of operating outside of traditional channels of accountability, including electoral representation or political appointments (Bäckstrand 2006; Behn 2001; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Slaughter 2001). Participation rules are often left open, meaning that anyone can join. This open set of rules can also mean that

²⁹ Chapter three introduces the notion of an ‘accountability deficit,’ which finds flaw in NG related to the lack of procedures and standards found in a hierarchical setting, or ledgers and currency as found in market arrangements.

participation is limited to those who either choose to take part or have the time and resources to do so. For some, this suggests that networked governance operates behind the public arena in a gray area where rules are set in an ad hoc fashion and participants come and go as they choose, without binding obligations to one another. The net result of this flexibility, under this line of thinking, is that actors can simply choose to leave the arrangement if it is not working to their liking.

As we move into the transnational space, it may not be feasible to pin answerability and responsiveness on elections, nor is it desirable to link social processes or ecological outcomes solely to financial transactions. Rather, a sense of democratic accountability is fostered through the personal connections and bonds within the space of a transnational public (Eberly 2008). A civic culture is what creates the “democratic ethos” at the transnational level.

4.3.4 Key Research Questions for the Crown Roundtable Case Pertaining to Accountability

In Chapter 5, I address three key areas of inquiry in the case of the Crown Roundtable, based on what the literature suggests about alternative accountabilities in transnational civil society. For one, the project asks, are individuals bound and committed to each other because of their social relationships? If networked governance is to reach its full potential we would expect a vibrant set of ties between individuals. However, little is known about the configuration of these ties. The project fills a gap in asking, what do these linkages look like across borders? Applying social network analysis is a novel approach to the problem (Jedd and Bixler 2015; Prell 2011). I look at the features that may have a higher propensity to keep participants engaged.

Additionally, I investigate the shared sense of responsibility and obligation, which is drawn from a civic ethos, friendship, and sense of reward rather than a fear of legal retribution.

Specifically, I ask whether participation is based on rewards rather than redress. Evidence in chapters five and six supports the proposition that participants stay engaged more out of a sense of seeking positive consequences rather than avoiding negative repercussions. Finally, because some participants are state and provincial officials, I ask, do networked arrangements tap into more traditional forms of governance? In other words, do networks create a layered set of accountabilities where public officials are held responsive to citizen demands? These questions form the basis for the empirical analysis presented in chapter six.

4.4 Concluding Thoughts

Human activities are so fundamentally altering the planet that geologists now routinely call this new stage the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002).³⁰ Some argue the Anthropocene began in the late 18th century, the point at which polar ice cores reveal that trapped air began to show a growing global concentration of greenhouse gasses carbon dioxide and methane (Ibid). Going even further back, others suggest that the beginning of agricultural cultivation and settlements are more apropos for marking the era of human influence.

Whether we use ice caps or agricultural markers as indicators, it is clear that we have fundamentally altered both the atmosphere and the Earth's layers. Plastic deposits, gravels and sands left behind from mining, drilling and other extractive activities are clearly linked with processes that exist within the bounds of human control, reinforcing the notion that we are in a stage of history where human activity is fundamentally changing the planet.

³⁰ Earth scientists generally agree that humans are changing the Earth's atmosphere but there is some disagreement about the level of impact humans have on its sediment patterns and the very composition of Earth's layers. For these reasons there is a debate about whether we are truly in an era defined entirely by human impact and, if so, when this era began and what to name the period (Zalasiewicz et al. 2011).

Even in a place as pristine as the Crown of the Continent, home to some of the planet's most intact forested ecosystems, there is evidence of intervention in the form of human settlements and resource extraction. The historical record shows that the first inhabitants of the Crown landscape, the ancestors of the Blackfeet, Kainaiwa, Ktunaxa, Salish and Kootenai peoples, used fire to restore lands, built trails and roads, and constructed camps and villages. Fossil records tell a story of bison hunts that involved running herds over cliffs; these records intersect with evidence of trapping and exploring by early European settlers. Today animal trapping and hunting continues, along with forestry, recreation, ranching, mining, as well as oil and gas exploration.

If human activities have been the cause of environmental degradation, it makes sense that people would form the basis for solutions. Governance networks provide a way to do this. Directly involving civil society creates pathways for new ways to hold each other and the state accountable. However, the components of governance are contingent; that is to say, they are not conferred all at once. It is important that they be continually revisited and renewed. In networked environmental governance, this is particularly true. As Adger et al. (2003, 1099) put it, "Legitimacy can be gained and compromised through the process of making environmental decisions." Conscientiously evaluating how this process takes place will ultimately help with institution design. Here I conscientiously choose the term legitimation because it implicates an ongoing process.

Spanning from the family table to global governance regimes, across all levels of organization, there are mechanisms in place to ensure that rules are followed and standards are adhered to. These mechanisms ensure that outcomes are achieved, both in the sense of on-the-ground results and in terms of following rules in governance arrangements. Accountability, then,

applies to both outcomes in the natural world as well as following through on commitments we have to each other. Environmental problems often stem from resource misuse or overuse, which results more from underlying social conditions rather than any inherent qualities of the natural world. The social pressures placed on the environment suggest that it is important we understand clearly how actors respond not only to changing ecological conditions, but also to one another. In this sense, accountability in environmental governance, by necessity, is wrapped up in social relations.

As Paul Harris (2013) suggests, putting people at the center of governance is a solution for the lack of accountability from state institutions and arrangements. This lesson has been true in other issue areas as well. Keck and Sikkink (1999) and Sikkink (2005) note that in human rights, other forms of accountability are needed. For human rights violations, the propagation of international norms—stemming from both advocacy coalitions and UN Universal Declaration of Human rights, though to a lesser degree—is what was needed to push domestic institutions toward embracing and codifying human rights law. Keck and Sikkink found states reticent to rectify violations on their own until transnational advocacy networks placed pressure on them. These networks achieved their goals by sharing information across borders (Keck and Sikkink 1999). This “boomerang effect” from transnational advocacy efforts can be, though it has not been extensively, applied to other issue areas. In this sense, solutions originating in civil society may have an incredibly empowering effect. The following chapters investigate these notions in the Crown case.

CHAPTER FIVE: Legitimacy in the Crown Roundtable

“If you don’t meet the needs of the interests at the table, they will leave the table.”
- Roundtable participant

5.1 Introduction

The Crown Roundtable, to the extent that it has become a site of governing authority, represents a new generation of sustainable forest management that is equipped with flexibility and adaptiveness that are not intrinsic to hierarchical arrangements. Furthermore, it has the potential to be more inclusive than market mechanisms in drawing a broader base of participation. In a British Columbia case study Rossiter (2007) explains the “old” basis for legitimacy in (top-down) forest management was based largely upon sustained yield. Land and forest managers, however, are shifting to a “new” legitimacy, or one that is based upon shared authority in (bottom-up) collaborative arrangements. This significant shift in forest governance explains why the Roundtable has emerged as a viable governance alternative but also suggests that those managers and stakeholders who still see legitimacy as conferred through top-down management will likely pose objections to participating (Rossiter 2007). If managers still adhere to this old discourse, that managing forests for sustained yield is the sole jurisdiction of the state, it is difficult to see the incentives for participation in the landscape-wide transboundary Roundtable. In this chapter I argue there is an alternative basis: the perceptions of the governed form the basis of the justification for authority in the NG process.

At the outset of the project, I wanted to make sure that I was not making the assumption that simply adding civil society to the mix would lead to acceptance of an NG process. Others have shown that it is not necessarily the case that bringing in a wide variety of actors and drawing from a large pool of participants will lead to improved public perceptions of governance

(Steel and Weber 2003). So I wanted to avoid assuming that simply bringing in civil society would automatically lead to an increase in legitimacy. Likewise, I avoid assuming that deliberation is a threshold. The investigation presented in this chapter, then, builds from the assumption that legitimation is a deliberative processes. That is to say, the *basis* of participation matters more than the numbers at the table. From there, it investigates the mechanisms behind legitimation.

Achieving a level of participation that is entirely inclusive and comprehensive is admittedly problematic. In the Crown landscape, for example, there are 4.4 million people living in the province of British Columbia, just over four million in the province of Alberta, and slightly more than one million in the state of Montana. Pooling input from all individuals within the political jurisdictions covered by the landscape, let alone the natural resource organizations, is a monumental task at this scale. Rather than focusing on the numbers of participation, it is *how* actors interact that determines whether the process is seen as legitimate. As discussed in chapter 4, qualities pertaining to social capital and the quality of participation, rather than the quantity, matter more for governance.

The chapter first introduces how legitimacy is conferred in various governance arrangements, highlighting the bases for participation and acceptance. I then explore types of legitimacy with the aim of situating acceptance and participation in NG as a sociological process set apart from normative standards. Without the basis of acceptance found in hierarchical settings (the formal backing of the state) or the basis of acceptance found in market arrangements (stable exchange rates and a state-backed currency), it is important to ask how networked processes come to be accepted as appropriate sites for governance. I argue that legitimacy is conferred through a sociological process rather than a set of *a priori* standards. This supports constructivist

claims that the governed accept authority when it is seen to result from a deliberative process. That is to say, participants accept the rules because they are actively creating them.

The chapter presents empirical material supporting the altered basis of legitimacy in NG, using narratives that illustrate each of the three major components of social capital that have built acceptance of the Roundtable as a legitimate mode of governing a transboundary landscape. Because it is constructed as a deliberative space, participants accept the Crown Roundtable across jurisdictions. Participants ultimately confer legitimacy on the Roundtable through a deliberative process as they come to trust each other, share a common identity, and accept a set of norms. In essence, these three components are the mechanisms for legitimating the process. In the next section, I present the methods for investigating how they were brought about.

5.2 Qualitative Methods

I use the case of the Crown Roundtable to illustrate the sociological basis of legitimation in networked governance. The narratives that emerged from my time in the field provide a rich contextual backdrop. I conceive of narratives as the storylines behind, or building blocks for, larger discourses, relying on Hajer's (1997, 44) notion that discourse is “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning is given physical and social realities.” In order to investigate the mechanisms behind the process of legitimation, I looked for narratives or storylines that would indicate how participants began to accept the Roundtable as a site of authority.

The point of inquiry here is to understand the process of legitimation in networked governance arrangements. The overarching research question, then, is based upon investigating

how a process comes to be rather than examining variance between events (Maxwell 2005). That is to say, the analysis does not correlate events to one another, nor does it use input or output variables to predict outcomes. While variance questions are often best answered with quantitative analyses that correlate variables in the aim of finding a causal relationship, process questions are well-suited for qualitative analyses (Ibid). The investigation does not focus on differences and their explanation, vis-à-vis asking questions related to *whether* or to *what degree* the Roundtable is accepted. Instead, the analysis reveals meaning and context, asking *how* networked arrangements are accepted by participants. The data for this chapter are interview transcripts, field notes, written material from participant observation, as well as Roundtable and conference publications such as pamphlets, maps, and reports. Here I briefly describe the data collection phase, the subsequent analysis, and finally touch upon how I selected the narratives that I ultimately use to illustrate the claims.

5.2.1 Interviews

As a socially-conferred quality of governance, legitimacy depends largely upon the *perceptions* of the governed. In both political science and sociology, there is some disagreement on the best ways to measure this “inherently abstract concept” (Raines 2003, 57). Raines (2003) uses a normative definition of legitimacy and focuses on standards of justice and fairness. For a standards-based approach, it is appropriate to use surveys and short interviews prompting participants to respond to statements about fairness, particularly as it relates to participation. In this study, however, my focus on the sociological aspects of legitimacy required longer, more in-depth, partially open-ended interviews (some as long as two hours). In the semi-structured interviews, I had a few scripted questions pertaining to perceptions of the Roundtable process,

but found the most revealing responses in following up when interviewees discussed particular problems or issues they had dealt with in the past.³¹

In the fall of 2012, I spent several weeks travelling around the region, beginning in Kalispell, Montana and traversing in a roughly counter-clockwise pattern between communities in Montana, the Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park, the province of Alberta, and into British Columbia, returning to Kalispell to complete the circle. I conducted seventeen semi-structured interviews with individuals from public land and natural resource agencies (federal and provincial), community organizations, municipal government, private business, economic development groups, higher education, and an ecological research station. Sample questions are listed in Table 5.1 below. Ultimately I envisioned the interview data would allow me to examine discourses about governance, but I was not entirely sure which narratives would emerge, so the questions were left somewhat broad and open-ended.

Table 5.1 Interview Questions Arranged by Theme.

Analytical theme	Sample question: Civil Society Organization/Non- Governmental Organization/University	Sample question: Federal, State, or Municipal Government
<i>Trust – How do participants view others?</i>	Do you collaborate or share resources with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service? Do you share confidential information or strategic approaches with other NGOs?	Without the Memorandum of Understanding document, would you collaborate with other agencies in [province/state]?
<i>Norms – what are the shared standards and protocols?</i>	With regard to climate change science, do you think most Roundtable members use IPCC data?	Does the Roundtable set management protocols?
<i>Identity – do participants see themselves and their organizations as part of the larger landscape?</i>	How do you encourage groups to participate or foster a sense of buy-in? What is the role of academics in creating a landscape-wide identity?	How do agencies situate their jurisdictions in the larger landscape? How do agencies understand view their place in the network?

³¹ These follow-up questions included asking, for example, more about how trust was generated between individuals and organizations when one respondent told me he valued the tacit agreement to keep certain discussions confidential.

5.2.2 Coding and Analysis

From the beginning, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed participants to have an active role, as I encouraged them to elaborate upon the experiences they had and the issues and challenges that seemed most pertinent to them.³² Toward that end, as I reached saturation for particular topics in earlier interviews, later interviews allowed for exploring new areas with participants (Huntington 2000). This open-ended and reflexive process carried over into the analytical phase. The coding and interpretation of interview data was an iterative process designed to reflexively analyze, rather than simply repeat or report upon, the understandings and perspectives of interviewees (Crang 1997).

I transcribed the longer, in-depth interviews and portions of audio recordings from Roundtable sessions using NVivo software and Microsoft Office. Transcription of selected interviews and meetings resulted in more than 52,000 words. The analysis of these materials was done with the aim of understanding the social constitution of the network, or how actors understand their involvement with the process and their relationships with other conservation practitioners. Instead of merely describing the Roundtable process, in terms of mapping out geographic distribution of participants or listing the agencies involved, or—at the other end of the spectrum—explaining the causal mechanism behind its formation, I sought to further knowledge of how participants in networked governance *understand* their role vis-à-vis the larger landscape and other organizations. That is, the aim was to explain how participants came to see the Roundtable as a legitimate governance space.

³² Talking with participants in their places of work—in the field, the office, and the communities (from Kalispell to Fernie) that they live in—put them at ease and also gave me insight into their various organizational homes.

The coding portion of the analysis took place in two stages, progressing from open coding to systematic coding. Open coding was based upon a grounded theory approach, which consists of “flexible methodological strategies” aimed at mid-level theorization (Charmaz 2003, 440) and requiring the researcher to rely more heavily upon empirical material rather than upon pre-determined assumptions or hypotheses. After reading through transcripts several times, and making notes for noteworthy sections, I devised a host of themes. These emergent themes were unrestricted; that is, I made as many codes as seemed pertinent at the time. This is known as “provisional coding” (Glaser and Strauss 2009). The next step was to see which themes appeared the most. The theoretical density that emerged in later stages of open coding allows me to state with some confidence that three final categories are the most significant.

Theoretical density, or the repetition of themes from one interview to the next (Glaser and Strauss 2009), allowed me to move toward systematic coding. I revisited themes that repeated; rising to the top were trust, identity, and shared norms. From there, I set up three major categories that point to participants’ understandings of their roles and responsibilities and the *trust*, or social capital, they have in working together; the pervasive *norms* in the network; and how the *identities* of participants, their organizations, and the larger network have evolved across the landscape. Parsing the data this way revealed that there was a story to tell for each.

Queries in NVivo allowed me to identify areas where participants spoke about each of these thematic areas, ultimately identifying storylines that serve as discourses to illustrate how each component of social capital was built in the Roundtable. These narratives are illustrative of the discourses that lend to participants’ acceptance of the Roundtable. The narratives, then, are the mechanisms participants use to make “practical judgments” (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) as they proceed with their involvement in the network. These storylines are what create the basis for

accepting the Roundtable. In the following section, I explore narratives pertaining to each of the three components of social capital showing how the Crown Roundtable has come to be accepted as a mode of governance. Direct quotations are used as evidence for the narratives (Corden and Sainsbury 2006); they are particularly helpful for illustrating the ways in which individuals construct or understand their relationship to others in the Roundtable and to the landscape. In the presenting the narratives, I have distinguished between trust, identity and norms for analytical purposes, but it should be noted that in practice they are inter-connected and do not always proceed in step-wise fashion.

5.3 Constructing Legitimacy in the Crown Roundtable

The deliberative basis for legitimacy is a strength of networked governance. In hierarchical settings, the basis of authority is derived from the state, whether it arises from its control of resources or its adherence to the rule of law, free and fair elections, and participation in international processes. In market arrangements, authority is derived from the fulfillment of contractual obligation, which is legitimated through the stability of currencies and the performance of financial mechanisms. However, in networked governance, the governed actively participate in the governing process.³³ This requires stripping away the standards-based requirements in favor of looking at contextual, process-based qualities. As the Crown case illustrates, these qualities are based upon a rootedness in deliberation; beyond this, the qualities of trust, a shared identity, and common norms are important. A collaborative approach to ecosystem management can improve the outcomes of government actions by bringing together a

³³ In this sense the governed truly are the governors. Anyone can participate; there is no boundary between the Roundtable as a governing body and a separate population that is affected by its decisions.

wider host of resources; when these resources are used to work toward achieving public goals, it becomes possible to build a wider base of support than may otherwise be present (Steel and Weber 2003).

A common identity fosters a sense of shared fate and shared potential. Identity at the landscape level facilitates collaboration between individuals and organizations across borders because there is an understanding that those across borders are similar and face common challenges. It fosters a sense of community and credibility (Cheng and Daniels 2003). The presence of a perceived community is important to stitch together the ways of understanding landscape change (Davenport and Anderson 2005). Its absence can pose considerable challenges. In Zürn's terms, "The absence so far of a fully developed transnational political community is incongruous with the existence of transnational social spaces, and poses a congruency problem that cannot easily be overcome" (2004, 260). This move toward a transnational sense of community is a critical component for building trust. However, the process is mutually reinforcing. To build the perception that a community exists without borders it helps to include a host of actors who trust each other.

When working at the large landscape level, it is important that individuals trust each other. This is what has allowed project implementation to move forward in various locales across the Crown landscape as the Roundtable has moved into its project implementation phase. Opinions on management decisions are heeded when actors trust each other enough to view them as appropriate ways of solving common problems. This trust is built upon the deliberative qualities of the governance process: namely a shared identity and common norms. The investigation of each of these qualities—trust, identity, and norms—proceeds with qualitative discourse analysis, situating each in the Roundtable context by presenting illustrative narratives.

5.3.1 Trust

When a process is described as legitimate, it implies that decisions are made with the democratic majority of “a political community based on trust and solidarity” (Zürn 2004). As trust is built into relationships between individuals, particular views are legitimated (Ball and Junemann 2012). If mechanisms for engaging users across jurisdictional borders are absent, the goodwill required for collaboration decreases. Mere compliance does not reach the cooperative standard required in networked governance. As Barbara Misztal (1996, 245) points out, “While obedience can be sufficiently procured by incentives and sanctions, social cooperation, however, is unachievable without trust...” Cooperative governance arrangements require trust because they are about shared visioning rather than simply enforcing rules.

Trust involves taking some risks in that actors are vulnerable but proceed with the best intentions, believing that others will do the same. In governance trust is a stable expectation that actors make decisions with the broader interest of others in mind (Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010). Trust is a critical component of social capital. As the complexity of a problem increases, so too must social capital (Huppé et al. 2012). When uncertainty about challenges is high, or there is conflicting scientific information, trust is especially important (Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010). As a problem crosses borders, the institutional design process becomes more in-depth and requires more good social will in order to work within the bounds of both collaborative visioning and environmental effectiveness (Huppe 2012, 19).

Opinions on management decisions are heeded when actors trust each other enough to view them as appropriate ways of solving common problems. Working at the large landscape level, trust can become an obstacle. In some of the rural portions of the landscape, in particular, there is significant opposition to large-scale collaboration. In another study, one rancher rejected

the notion of a Crown-wide identity, because as she put it, “It’s all about who controls the land” (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). In other words, this private individual saw linking up at the transboundary ecosystem level as a threat to her ability to make decisions or to even remain on her ranch, “which she believed was coveted by conservationists and agencies” (Ibid). Participant observation at the Roundtable revealed similar challenges. These sentiments emphasize just how important it is for individuals and organizations to come together in collaborative relationships of trust.

Indeed, in the case of the Crown Roundtable, the board of directors explicitly recognizes the value of a regional forum for exchanging ideas and building relationships with the ultimate aim of creating “opportunities to work together” (‘Remarkable Beyond Borders’ 2012), none of which would be possible if participants did not trust one another. One interviewee confirmed,

[W]e all work well together; we all are completely open and trust each other we know how to delegate different aspects of the work to the appropriate organization and no one’s really concerned about the ego gratification. We’re all concerned about the outcomes, so it’s not about taking credit, it is about getting results.

The interviewee’s statement reinforces the notion that working relationships must be formed on the basis of trust. Without trust in other participants, it would be difficult to accept the governing authority of the Roundtable. This basis of acceptance was reiterated by other interviewees and also in a case study report on the Crown. Under a collaborative rationality, decisions are inherently contingent, and can be revised McKinney (2011). Especially given what we know about environmental problems: that new scientific information may reveal changing conditions, and that the people who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods may change their demands or desired level of involvement. In the context of uncertainty, decisions can be revised in light of new information or changing preferences. The glue that holds the process together is the trust that participants have in one another. Starting from the baseline of trust, participants

accept the governing authority, knowing that they can actively shape the process as it proceeds. This acceptance is based upon the deliberative qualities of governance, including that actors believe others have their best interest in mind.

A shared identity is closely related to the notion of trust. Indeed, one of the major players in creating the landscape-wide Crown of the Continent identity stated,

I realized that building those relationships and trust across these borders was going to be absolutely essential to any long-term solution. It was in the spirit of the world's first international peace park but we needed to take the concept of international cooperation beyond just the Waterton-Glacier International Park to encompass the entire Crown of the Continent.

One of the major preceding efforts to the Roundtable, the National Geographic map project, required trust across borders. This fits with observations from the Roundtable and in conversations and interviews with other actors on the landscape. In order for individuals and organizations to want to be associated with others across jurisdictional borders, let alone commit the time and resources toward the collaborative process, they had to trust that these relationships were formed on the basis of shared goals. A conservation NGO in Montana, for example, might want to engage the governance process with a public land management agency if there is a basis of trust that creates a backbone of mutual goals.

Trust is bound up in the notion of identity, because without it, it is easy for individuals and organizations to imagine that there is a vast chasm between their own goals and others'. Prior to the National Geographic map project, a degree of isolationism between rural residents and communities prevented them from seeing shared interests. As an NGO founder put it, the hurdles in community engagement for conservation included a shared mistrust for public management agencies: "people don't trust government in these small communities—government

is not the best messenger. Government is not very great at communications; they're not comfortable with it. They shouldn't be the ones to invite people to the party."

Once a level of trust is established, it becomes possible for individuals and organizations to relate as similar entities, making it seem as if there is a singular identity blanketed across the landscape. However, the creation of trust does not always precede the formation of an identity. Sometimes the identity, when cast in place, can create a space for trust in advance, where it may not exist yet. In the words of the same co-creator of the National Geographic project,

...[T]he idea of it was to start to stitch together a regional identity for the Crown of the Continent to help people in Choteau, Montana and Pincher Creek, Alberta or Cranbrook, British Columbia; Big Fork or Polson Montana to realize and be proud of the fact that they are part of this internationally significant region that is surrounds the world's first international peace park. Everyone wanted to be on that map.

The formation of the trust was, in part, co-created in a bottom-up fashion by the desire to share an identity.

Can trust also be engendered in a top-down fashion? Bailer and Heinrich (2012) present quantitative evidence that trust is not robust in the bottom-up context of political culture. Top-down claims that trust is created through institutions, however, are well supported. That vibrant political institutions are crucial is indeed supported in the case of the Crown. Several interviewees offered support for this claim by pointing to a Memorandum of Understanding between the governors of British Columbia and Montana placing a moratorium on mining activities in the Elk River Valley of BC.

The activist NGOs and concerned land managers alike were elated by the formal recognition that these practices were harming delicate ecosystems. A land manager said of the process of creating the 2008 BC – Montana MOU:

There are the MOUs, they speak to working together, because they're—it's not really rocket science here but its—we're all trying to maintain grizzly bears on the landscape,

you know, we've all got to do things to make that happen, because the bears are going to move around... And that MOU talks about things both governments will do to work together, and after that British Columbia passed further legislation and we're waiting for the US to do the same.

However valuable the MOU is for fostering cooperation, it would not exist without the bottom-up quality of social capital, trust, and neighborly good will.³⁴ Similarly in Alberta, an MOU was created through community and cooperation. In response to invasive aquatic species,

So we simply chose something simple. We don't have these three things. We don't want them. Our outcome is to keep them out. Does Montana agree with that? Yes. Does BC agree with that? Yes. Does Alberta agree with that? Yes. Ok, what's Alberta doing, what's Montana doing, what's BC doing? What are we doing together, within the Crown? So that's how we're dealing with it in the Crown. The mechanism—my long spiel is about to come to an end—the mechanism would probably be an MOU, Theresa. We'd write this down, formally. Is the outcome, is what the individual jurisdictions are doing—and then we'd have that signed off.

These instances and the managers' perceptions of them support the claim that top-down institutional arrangements and bottom-up trust and social capital confer legitimacy on the transboundary civil society (or political community, or deliberative transboundary space) in the landscape whose effects would not be felt without communicative practices. That is to say, the MOUs were necessary, but not sufficient, components of legitimation in the Roundtable.

A clear order is not always apparent in the creation of legitimacy and that the elements identified (trust, identity, and norms) may not proceed in stepwise fashion in every instance; rather, they may crop up in phases, tugging at each other in a general push toward the end product. In this sense, the analysis shows that legitimacy cannot be examined in terms of strict *a priori* protocol, reinforcing Bernstein's (2011) notion that legitimacy in global governance is contextually conferred.

³⁴ This again reinforces the notion that broad participation—including civil society – is required for process-based sociological legitimacy.

5.3.2 *Identity: Being Part of a Place*

The case revealed the importance of another component beyond establishing trust. Legitimacy, as a process, depends a great deal upon the shared identity across the landscape. As a “social fact,” collective identity follows the Durkheimian notion that people construct the meaning of the world around them not through individual choice but through the ways that others view them (Misztal 1996). The presence of a shared social identity can have the effect of changing behavior in a pro-environmental direction (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 2008). Having already gone through the process of creating a shared identity in the Crown of the Continent allows decision-making to move more swiftly through initial stages of communication, because it is understood where the bounds of the landscape lie. In the words of an NGO director, the shared identity allows the Roundtable to “communicate really quickly to the public” what the ecosystem is, almost as if it is a “commercial brand” with instant recognition.

Maps matter a great deal for creating a landscape identity. Different assumptions are projected depending on the focal components, how the lines are drawn, and which jurisdictions or features are portrayed. Many of the interviewees either referenced a particular map in conversation or pointed directly to one displayed on office walls. Two interviewees even drew out their own maps, sketching out landscape boundaries, both in terms of political jurisdictions and natural features, while we spoke. In the Roundtable panel discussions, maps were displayed to illustrate In the Crown landscape. The map, then, became a boundary object that allowed participants to explore their shared identity. It forms a virtual “meeting place” that allows participants to link up with each other.

The study of place is “an integrative approach to understanding people’s relationships with particular areas” (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). Place research has become

increasingly popular in forest governance scholarship both at the domestic level and the international (Manuel-Navarete, Slocombe, and Mitchell 2006; Nie and Fiebig 2010; Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). It is particularly important to consider place and context, because so much of forest management is bound up in land use patterns and decisions. Furthermore, land use and tenure are heavily linked to people's perceptions and the revelation of new scientific information is unlikely to change basic desires and goals, despite an improved understanding of natural systems. Sense of place is tied closely to discourse (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003), which means that forest management will always be inherently political. A focus on place "moves forest policy and management beyond the narrow confines of economic research by acknowledging the multiple relationships people have with geographic locations" (Ibid, 860) and is concerned with the values, symbols and identities of a landscape.

A shared identity has been particularly strengthened through a National Geographic map project. As a large, fold-out publication with images of the landscape as well as vignettes from those who live and work in the Crown of the Continent, it provides a cohesive picture of how the various jurisdictions fit together. One of the creators of the map stated,

But the idea of it was to start to stitch together a regional identity for the Crown of the Continent to help people in Choteau, Montana and Pincher Creek, Alberta or Cranbrook, British Columbia; Big Fork or Polson Montana to realize and be proud of the fact that they are part of this internationally significant region that is surrounds the world's first international peace park. Everyone wanted to be on that map.

The map was made through a deliberative process that involved interviews and focus groups in communities across both Canadian provinces and the state of Montana. It was crafted in the spirit of geotourism, and commissioned by National Geographic. Geotourism is meant to "sustain or enhance the geographic character of a place—its environment, culture, aesthetics, heritage, and the well-being of its residents" (National Geographic 2009). Fitting, then, that it was made

collaboratively by those who live on the landscape through a process that involved going out into towns and rural areas to talk to people and hear their stories. One community member in Fernie, B.C., a retired geologist, recalled with pride that he helped in the map-making process by telling the story of mining in the Elk River Valley. Another interviewee, one of the map's key developers, insisted that he did not "write" the map, but instead drew together information from traveling around the region, holding focus groups, and getting to know people in other communities.

The implications of mapping the Crown of the Continent landscape in such a visible and widely-recognized format have been significant. A Crown of the Continent geotourism web site heightened a sense of identity "among residents and visitors alike" with positive impacts on conservation goals as well (Chambers et al. 2010). The National Geographic map took this project a step further, in particular, by stitching together communities across the U.S.-Canada border. As the map project leader put it, "when you would talk about Crown of the Continent, maybe five or six years ago, it was just Montana. It was Glacier and Bob Marshall [Wilderness]." The Crown name and its counterpart identity was attributed to Montana, but not extended into Canada.

[Montana], that's only half of the Crown of the Continent—it goes up into Canada. Well he knew that, but he didn't know that landscape. He taught a course at University of MT on the Crown of the Continent and he didn't include anything in Canada. I said, that does not help the situation, because frankly some of our biggest conservation challenges are on the Canadian side. So if you're just talking about Montana, you're going to fail.

To change this perception, the map broadened perspectives beyond particular subregions.

This process would not have been possible without shared collaborative visioning. Here constructivist approaches to IR remind us that the dynamics of group decision making have the potential to significantly shift outcomes (Holsti 1985), making it possible for a unified, but not

singular, identity to emerge. The map, for example, lists vignettes on a variety of topics from farming, mining, recreation, tourist destinations, climate science dynamics, local eating, seasonal shifts, first nations, and cultural festivals. The identity formation as a rich and varied landscape laid the foundation for trust, emphasizing the interconnectedness of these components.

As civil society actors design solutions for transboundary problems, we see governance innovations that may eventually reach more formal levels of agreement. Borderlands are laboratories for this type of institutional change (Blatter 2003, 505). In terms of establishing accountable relationships, the way boundaries are drawn matters a great deal. The space in which a landscape is delineated can determine which communities are included and which particular problems are important. This is playing out in the Crown Roundtable. As one participant told me,

...we are trying to go down this path and it's still difficult; we're still in our silos in terms of water, fisheries objectives, these are the groundwater or air quality objectives. But we're trying to sort of integrate that around landscape intactness... How you set the landscape is ultimately going to determine what you're seeing in terms of species or connectivity or intactness or whatever quality or criteria.

In other words, the borders matter because the width of the net cast will return varying numbers of problems and implicate their according agencies, landowners, and interested parties. In that sense, the Crown of the Continent initiatives are incredibly ambitious in seeking to trace around a landscape of over 18 million acres.

In setting up the Crown of the Continent boundaries, one environmental compliance officer for the National Parks Service told me that “[the Crown Manager’s Partnership] looked at landscape features. The ones that were harder were this prairie. You know, we could have easily gone further. But we felt like this prairie basin here was what made more sense from an ecological perspective it changes as you get out there.” Additionally, it was important that the landscape be defined beyond the peace park, as another interviewee informed me, “building

those relationships and trust across these borders was going to be absolutely essential to any long-term solution. It was in the spirit of the world's first international peace park but we needed to take the concept of international cooperation beyond just the Waterton-Glacier International Park to encompass the entire Crown of the Continent." The decision to draw the landscape boundaries was also based on increasing geotourism and a National Geographic map drew quite a bit of attention to the landscape as well. Interestingly, many of the same individuals involved in making the geotourism map are involved in the Crown Roundtable process now.

The National Geographic map creation was an involved process that took into account input from interviews and focus groups, as well as consulting with many local conservationists.

As one of the leaders of the project informed me, this was not an uncontroversial process:

Part of the attitude was, if we start talking about ecosystems, the Crown of the Continent ecosystem, all these—we've got them on both sides of the border—these black helicopter type people that think the United Nations is going to come and get them. Or as one person said in a focus group, "I don't want to be part of your stinkin' ecosystem!" I don't understand what an ecosystem is but it's scary and it smells of United Nations and one-world government and all these conspiracies that these small-town people in Montana and British Columbia have.

Returning to the notion of the borderland as a laboratory for change, it is apparent that the process of defining the Crown of the Continent landscape was not without political contestation. Perhaps twenty years ago, it may have been difficult to imagine that individuals, groups, and public organizations would link up across the space. This notion of interconnectedness, however, seems to be winning out and it certainly predates the Crown Roundtable, supporting the claim in chapter four that prior initiatives create a background for trust.

5.3.3 Norm of Autonomy: Finding Freedom and Obligation

In the Crown Roundtable case, I found that identity was tied to norms insofar as there was an understanding amongst participants that they would simultaneously maintain their collective and individual identities. Ariel Colonomos (2008, 204), in writing about this refers to identities as composites; for her, the “plurality of the self” implies that individuals will present themselves differently based on the context in which they find themselves. This freedom to focus on different identities is a type of autonomy that is imperative for legitimating networked processes. It hearkens back to the voluntary and decentralized nature of networked governing arrangements and also the functional differentiation between units. The Crown network itself is not a site of management or direct implementation: so in order for the network to be effective, each organization or component entity must still perform its functions. In this sense, multiple identities provide the freedom necessary for component parts to meet their obligations. Like a good marriage, the maintaining separate and collective identities allows for networked governance to take place in public and private spheres. These spaces, taken separately or together, would not be possible without plural identities.

One participant told me she “wears many hats” in the Roundtable. Trained as a biologist, she worked at a field station doing ecological monitoring but also worked in the policy context. She found the Roundtable’s origins in academia especially important as this space allowed participants to nurture their separate perspectives. In her words,

...it’s rare where you have sort of industry, government and conservation groups all at the table so academia is the place where you can wear a government hat... because the University of Montana is a state entity but at the same time I can very well be a part of the NGO and industry and all the other conversations that are taking place. I wear that hat and can be part of the conversation. I’m obviously not a manager, I’m a research scientist at the [X] Biological Station; I’m on the Crown Roundtable and the University [of Montana] is on it as well. I work with the Crown of the Continent Conservation Initiative also kind of wearing my science hat at that table, but also assisting with the coordination

of the British Columbia-Montana Memorandum of Understanding and implementing that negotiation over the Flathead River.

If her role sounds exhausting, that's because it probably is. I was impressed time and again both in talking with her and others about her work. In fact, part of the interview took place on a bus to the field site, a testament both to her ability to think on her feet (or bus seat, as it were) and the fact that she was so busy the only time she could carve out was during transit. Beyond being extraordinary in this case, and perhaps somewhat simpler in others, this ability to maintain multiple identities can also be seen as a norm of autonomy. The next part of the section elaborates on the norm of autonomy.

Because networked governance follows a fundamentally different pattern of organization or configuration of authority, it is difficult to know what the role of the public official is. While it is true that NGOs are inserted more directly into the policy process, public officials still need to take on a role of responsibility. It shifts the role of government from one of oversight and final say to one of hitting the streets and sitting at roundtables without a strong agenda of its own. This is evidenced by one participant's remarks, from a public land management agency perspective:

In some ways I think we've been cautious because there's this perception of, you know, the Flathead Valley, is pretty conservative. There is a population here that is afraid of 'big government' and that's why... it's one of the reasons about being very clear ... We're just a co—we're a group of willing land managers that see value in working together collaboratively on some things and we're each engaged to achieve our own missions.

The land manager here was careful to acknowledge that her agency had its own mission and mandate and that her participation in Crown-wide collaboration should not detract from it. Much of the sentiment from agency officials I spoke with echoed the same: they did not want to abrogate their responsibility, their official role within the agency, by their membership and participation in the Roundtable process.

Another state-employed scientist put it this way, noting that the Roundtable “does not govern as an entity,” saying “We leave it up to the jurisdictions to govern in their jurisdictions. We talk about the areas where we can collaborate effectively and where working together collectively we can make a difference.” Multiple individuals told me that at the end of the day, each of their organizations and agencies had their own missions and mandates. Therefore, participation in the Roundtable could not replace or usurp those identities. Autonomy was not a problem in the Roundtable process because it is understood that others are facing the same challenges and constraints.

For some, governing authority is fleeting and still very much a work in progress; it is an endpoint that has not been achieved at the transboundary level because agencies must retain their own local autonomy, to avoid straying from local needs and to be sensitive to those who are wary of transboundary governance. In the words of one US National Park Service representative describing governance in the region, “[we] need to be cautious because there is a contingent in the Flathead Valley that is wary of big government. The Crown Managers’ Partnership is very clear about saying the Crown initiatives are not management agencies and that ultimately managers have the decision-making authority.” Directly including citizens in the Roundtable process may be one way to overcome the distrust of government felt in the Manager’s Partnership. Bringing in a wider base of participation while also recognizing that individual communities will continue to face their own challenges is a strength of the Roundtable. In sum, finding the balance between obligations to the larger landscape and one’s own community can also have the effect of boosting overall legitimacy in the process.

5.4 Concluding Thoughts: The Transboundary Landscape as a Deliberative Space

The narratives told by Roundtable participants support the notion that acceptance is conferred not through traditional, state backed mechanisms found in codified rules; neither does it hinge on economic inducement or the pursuit of self-interest. Rather, it arises from the incredible amount of social capital that has been built between and among individuals and organizations across the landscape. The relationships formed through the Roundtable process are more than work-related. These bonds of friendship link agency representatives with private landowners, and forge a network that traverses jurisdictional lines. Friendships across borders have historically been an important part of this landscape since 1911 when the first two park rangers in Glacier and Waterton spent a long winter together. The recent development of the Roundtable has transformed these informal social ties into a promising governing arrangement. As it continues to convene each year, hold workshops and field trips, build upon project implementation, and connect conservation practitioners, these relational ties will likely become more central to legitimation.

Collectively, these stories support the claim that legitimacy in networked governance is sociologically conferred. The findings suggest that legitimacy in networked arrangements is linked with social capital that is brought about through deliberation. Further examination of legitimacy in transboundary NG should consider deliberative components of the process. The next chapter considers how the social processes of trust, identity, and norms can boost the accountability of networked arrangements. In the concluding chapter I explore this notion of deliberation across borders, building from these findings to make suggestions for institutional design in transboundary deliberative spaces.

CHAPTER SIX: Accountability in the Crown Roundtable

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the features of accountability in a networked forest governance setting. It begins by briefly presenting the methods that are specific to the analysis of accountability in the Crown Roundtable case, to complement the more general methods discussion in chapter three. A combination of network visualization and qualitative interview analysis is used to uncover the patterns of accountability. Social network analysis (SNA) gives a visual depiction of the working relationships between individuals. SNA also measures the network's structural features, providing information about the ties between nodes. Interview data add context and depth. Findings from the social network analysis are presented in tandem with insights from interviews to paint a richer picture of accountability in the context of the Crown Roundtable.

Accountable relationships are built upon trust. In the previous chapter, the process of legitimation examines how this component of social capital has been developed in the Roundtable. It is critical for establishing relations of accountability. When ties within a network are strong relationships built on trust, shared norms, and a common identity, they are imbued with the potential for allowing actors to make demands of each other when things go wrong. In other words, the components of legitimacy allow the Roundtable to weather times of conflict or disagreement.

Building on the previous chapter's consideration of the components in the process of legitimation, the three major insights here are that that accountability in NG (1) is relational,³⁵ (2) that it depends more upon rewards than punishment (or redress), and (3) that it is layered with

³⁵ The first point has two components: first, "connectors" serve an integral function of bringing subgroups of the network together, and second, the features of the network vary depending on its purpose.

traditional forms. The chapter examines these claims in turn. Results from the Crown Roundtable case indicate that networked forest governance can contribute to an overall net gain in accountability by broadening answerability, moving from redress to reward, and layering on additional relationships that help individuals and organizations tap into other forms of control, such as hierarchical rule sets or market-based standards. The chapter concludes with suggestions for how accountability might function in other cases of networked governance and points to areas where gaps still remain. The conclusion also lays out directions for future research.

6.2 Methods

The section presents a background on the methods specific to exploring accountability. The data collection and analytical techniques combine a range of qualitative field research methods with social network analysis (SNA). It has been beneficial in other studies to combine SNA with interviews, observation, and historical research (Cross et al. 2009).

SNA offers a way to objectively measure the features of a somewhat malleable concept, global civil society. The literature on global civil society proposes there is a space where individuals link up across borders. Keane (2003, 8) refers to global civil society as an “unfinished project,” that is made up of “sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who organize themselves across borders.” This description offers an intriguing proposition: relationships within civil society are arranged in configured patterns across borders. The question becomes, how do we visualize these patterns? Is it possible to take a snapshot in time of the structural features of networks? The more complex a process or problem becomes, the more difficult it is to pinpoint an answerable set of individuals or groups. This is where SNA mapping becomes so

important. Accountability in NG rests on the linkages between individuals, crisscrossing various boundaries. SNA helps us visualize these edges. Further exploring how SNA reveals relational patterns makes it possible to link them to accountability. The structure of a network has been linked to its effectiveness, productivity, and to the sense of obligation between its members (Burt 2000; Pentland 2014).

SNA is a relatively new application in the study of global governance. It has been used to show how individuals are connected (in an ‘ego network’) and also to show how organizations are connected (in a ‘whole network’). It is not a theory, but rather a set of descriptive and analytical approaches and techniques for examining relationships among individuals and organizations (Anheier and Katz 2005). In some instances, it is a tool to show how patterns of governance are structured. Paterson et al. (2013), for example, use it to first understand the diffusion of authority, or polycentricity, in emissions trading schemes and as a mapping tool to identify significant nodes for follow-up interviews. In other instances, it can be used to show how social-relational patterns “enable and constrain” individuals and processes (Bodin and Prell 2011). A major advantage of network analysis is its ability to consider the social units that traverse across and around the boundaries of the nation state (Anheier and Katz 2005).

Just as there are many reasons for examining social networks, there are many ways of gathering the data. Some studies use web presence and links to show how virtual policy networks (informational networks where social relationships are proxies for hyperlinks to other webpages) are structured (McNutt and Rayner 2012). In other instances, attendance at forums, conferences, and meetings is used as a way to link individuals (Paterson et al. 2013). For this portion of the study, data were collected using surveys. Table 6.1 below provides a thematic overview of the

prompts used in the survey.³⁶ With free-response surveys, SNA can be harnessed to more directly examine social linkages as the individuals involved construe them, rather than as a whole-network approach where respondents are asked to indicate their working relationships by choosing from a pre-set list of organizations.

The investigation began in September 2012 with three weeks travelling in the landscape doing participant observation and interviews. The first round of social network surveys was conducted at the third annual Crown Roundtable meeting, which took place in Fernie, British Columbia from September 27-28, 2012. The data, collected with open, free-response prompts, reveal relationships that are numerous and far-flung, showing how individuals and organizations tap into efforts from other communities in ways not captured in meeting minutes, attendance lists, web presence or other proxies. The second round, a web-based survey, was sent for those participants who requested more time to respond.³⁷ Table 6.1 lists three of the prompts used on the survey.

Table 6.1 Survey prompts for modeling the three network types.

Prompt 1	Please list the top four individuals you are most likely to discuss issues regarding the Crown with.
Prompt 2	Please list the top four individuals you are more likely to contact when there is a resource management problem or question.
Prompt 3	Please list the top four individuals you think are most influential in setting goals for the landscape.

Network analyses were conducted using Gephi, an open-source network visualization platform for Windows, Linux and Mac operating systems. The software allowed for interactively displaying nodes in various spatial configurations, along with a quantitative set of measures to

³⁶ For a more detailed list of the survey prompts, see Table 3.3.

³⁷ Some individuals expressed that there was not enough time during the meeting and told me they would be able to fill out a survey once they had returned home, but that they felt time was a little too limited during the meeting to give it their full attention.

examine the relationships between them. Most useful, perhaps, was the ability to visualize the data, to literally see the connections between individuals. To a large extent, the ability to recognize new patterns of engagement in the networks depends on being able to perceive them visually (Bastian et al., 2009). The network graphs were analyzed with standard algorithms for degree, density and modularity. More importantly for this analysis, the graphs were examined with an eye out for patterns formed by strategically configuring the network. Sometimes nodes overlapped or obscured each other. Similarly, connections between nodes needed to be spread out in order to see them. Ultimately, I used a Force Atlas 2 configuration, which disperses groups and gives space around larger nodes. The function ran until the graph was stabilized, with zero percent overlap (the nodes were separated out as to show the edges, or the ties, between them) with a scaling factor of 10. This configuration puts enough space between nodes so that the edges can be seen without excessive overlap of the nodes on top of one another.

Visualizing the patterns of connectivity between individuals alone, however, does not paint the complete picture of accountability. Supporting social network data with other forms of qualitative information adds needed context. While SNA produces an outside view of the network structure, the in-depth interview data add to an insider view, with closer attention to the content, quality, and meaning of social relations. Mixing methods also provides a focus on network dynamics, in this case highlighting the dimensions of accountability that are not always apparent in the structure alone, such as the types and quality of interaction. The main objective in combining network analysis and qualitative inquiry, then, is to depict the relationships between individuals and to determine whether accountability is present.

The qualitative analysis was conducted on transcripts from interviews and Roundtable panel discussions. Interviews were recorded with an audio program, and then transcribed. The

coding was conducted in NVivo and Microsoft Word. For this portion of the study, as a complementary piece to the SNA, the transcripts were examined more for context and historical details rather than discourses or themes, as they were for the following chapter. As a supplement to the SNA data, the qualitative data provide a richer background for the three claims about accountability.

The inferences drawn from the Crown Roundtable are presented as plausible patterns, with the idea that they represent ways that accountability can work in this particular case of networked governance, rather than being general claims about how accountability works in *all* instances of networked governance. By presenting observations in tandem with theory, it is possible to generate possible interpretations rather than seeking to prove the ultimate nature (if one exists) of accountability in NG.³⁸ It is consistent with a desire to make inferences and observations that go as far as the data allow and not beyond.

6.3 The Relational Nature of Accountability

Networked forms of governance are characterized by unique patterns of accountability. Because actors relate to each other in a non-hierarchical fashion, it is not always clear where directives or redress are initiated. Going back to the definition of networked forest governance (presented in chapter two) helps highlight the focus of the research. Networked forest governance is built upon the lateral linkages across a multiplicity of actors—state agencies, NGOs, citizen advocacy groups, and national governments, among others—that hinge on norms of trust and a shared purpose and identity, for the purpose of making decisions or informing

³⁸ Though the grounded research design here means that findings and conclusions are generally limited to the case of the Crown Roundtable, the methods in this study could be used to investigate another case. The findings are used to make institutional design recommendations in the concluding chapter.

decision-making procedures. An understanding of network structure aids in determining the presence of these features. The structural features of networks (e.g. the relational ties) have an effect on the social processes (e.g. learning, knowledge transfer, information sharing, power dynamics, and the ability to build consensus) between participants (Bodin and Crona 2009). When it comes to examining accountability, the focus is on whether and how actors impact one another's decisions in a two-way responsive pattern.

The network analysis suggests that there are many ties between participants but does not always offer a clear explanation of why the ties exist. Interview data are helpful here. For example, several practitioners from the province of Alberta at the September 2012 annual conference told me that they participated in the Roundtable because of their relationship with one particular individual who works for a provincial natural resource agency. Without their strong ties to this individual, it is possible they would not have been involved in the Roundtable. Social network theory points to the importance of connectors, with a social network as “a structure composed of a set of actors, some of whose members are connected by a set of one or more relations” (Knoke and Yang 2008, 8). Nodes are the members of the social system and ties represent the relationships between them. The relationships will vary in form. More specifically, relational form is defined as “(a) the intensity, frequency, or strength of interaction between pairs of actors; and (b) the direction of relations between both dyad members—null, asymmetric, or mutual choices” while *relational content* refers to the “substance or reason for occurring” (Knoke and Yang 2008, 11).

Network structures can say quite a bit about the relationships between individuals. Granovetter's (1973) approach to network theory suggests that even when individuals are not directly linked with one another, if there is a single connector between them, they are weakly tied

together. However, the evidence suggests that across the Crown landscape, there are stronger ties at play. Observation in the Crown Roundtable reveals that agency officials sometimes step outside the bounds of their official roles, working together as friends and collaborators rather than in their formal roles as land managers. For example, while spending time in a couple of the communities on the landscape, especially Kalispell, Montana and Fernie, B.C., it was not uncommon for me to bump into land managers, scientists and NGO leaders meeting around town. Not only was this interesting for me as a qualitative researcher as it allowed additional exposure to the study population, but also for another key insight that emerged. These individuals—drawn from disparate groups of private citizens, landowners, public employees, and activist organizations—were not just working together during the Roundtable sessions. They were friends who spent time together otherwise. They knew each other's families, they shared hobbies and pastimes, they traveled together, and ultimately they genuinely liked each other and enjoyed each other's company.

Fitting then, that just as Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park emerged as an idea between two friends, the first park rangers in 1910 and 1911 (Stewart 2013), friendship continues to be the glue that holds collaboration together. As these friendships are formed and maintained, a sense of obligation links individuals to each other across borders. Under Granovetter's framework, we might think about these friendships as strong ties. The more frequently individuals interact, the more likely they are to develop a friendship. In this space of civic engagement, the important aspects of accountability in a networked setting come from the relationships that individuals have with each other. Because NG is a pattern of organization and not a commitment to a strict set of procedures and protocols, it matters what each individual brings to the process.

SNA reveals that not all members of the network are equally equipped to hold one another to account because the structures of their social relationships vary. This suggests that accountability in networks may be relational. That is to say, there is variation in the ability to hold one another to account. For this reason, it is especially important to look at the way a network is configured. Accountability in NG is created through connectivity: bringing about change by forming and maintaining partnerships. This is not a new argument. In the study of environmental politics, it is commonly accepted that collective action is a requisite for change.

Moving beyond the notion that it only takes one individual to change the world, Maniates (2001) argues for the importance of community engagement. Connecting with others who are working on similar problems leads to more collaborative solutions that may ultimately more effective in achieving outcomes. That individuals cannot act as effectively alone is echoed in a report on the Crown Roundtable, in which Margaret Wheatley and Deborah Frieze (2009) offer,

Despite current ads and slogans, the world doesn't change one person at a time. It changes as networks of relationships form among people who discover they share a common cause and vision of what's possible... We don't need to convince large numbers of people to change; instead, we need to connect with kindred spirits.

Rather than thinking that one can single-handedly solve complex problems, particularly ones as complex as those related to environmental degradation, it can be more effective to form partnerships with others who may be able to help work toward the same goals. To lend to a better understanding of how these processes play out it is important to know the basic configuration of networks.

6.3.1 Modeling Network Subtypes

Three network subtypes were modeled graphically: informational, problem solving, and influence. Modeling the network subtypes illustrates a key finding; it suggests that the ways

individuals hold one another to account can change depending on the perceived purpose of the network. Several key quantitative measures for each are included in Table 6.3 below. *Degree* refers to the number of ties an individual has; it is the number of edges emanating from a node. The *average degree* pertains not only to the overall number of edges and nodes in a network but how many of these edges emanate from singular nodes. *Graph density* provides an indication of the level of connectedness in a network. It is the number of actual edges in a graph divided by the number of edges possible (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-wostl 2010; Otte and Rousseau 2002). Larger networks tend to be less dense (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010). Otte and Rousseau (2002) explain that a density score of 0.05 is “very loose.” Fitting with what is known about civil society in the context of network theory, though, it is common for social networks to contain a central network (the core) within a larger subset of nodes that may not be so tightly linked (the periphery) (Anheier and Katz 2005).

Modularity refers to the way that sub-communities emerge. It captures the notion that not all entities in a network are connected; rather, there are sub-groups that nest within a larger network and may not necessarily link up with the larger universe of individuals and organizations. Modularity is calculated by subtracting the number of edges in the network if they were placed at random from the number of actual edges falling within groups (Newman 2006). A positive value indicates the possible presence of a community structure (*Ibid*). The *clustering coefficient* reflects the tendency for tightly knit groups to form neighborhoods—it has been called the “small world” effect (Watts and Strogatz 1998). *Average path length* refers to the number of shortest paths passing through a node; it is related to the average ‘betweenness’ (Otte and Rousseau 2002). Path length, or betweenness, on its own, shows “how important a node is to the connectivity of the network” (Paterson et al. 2013).

Table 6.2 Key measures for the three networks.

	Informational Network	Problem-Solving Network	Influence Network
Average Degree	0.895	0.588	0.726
Graph Density	0.010	0.007	0.010
Modularity	0.743	0.796	0.765
Clustering Coefficient	0.014	0.004	0.024
Average Path Length	2.005	1.161	1.418

The variation in measures between the network subtypes suggests that individuals relate to each other differently depending on what they view the purpose of the network to be. For example, when individuals see their goal as sharing information, the network becomes denser. Here individuals may respond more readily to one another than when solving problems or engaging in project implementation. This finding was echoed in interviews as well. As one conservation practitioner told me, “Well, the Ministry of Environment, said that ‘this is our mission, this is our responsibility to do energy development’ and the Parks Service [said], ‘This is our mission to protect resources. We need to work together.’” This same interviewee emphasized that it was sometimes difficult to achieve cooperation or agreement for on-the-ground management practices like placing a moratorium on mining, but that when it came to sharing access to information on best management practices for aquatic invasive species, it was much easier. Information sharing through reports, in other words, is more easily achieved. However, when it comes to implementing projects or changing management protocols, separate agency and organization goals can get in the way of the ability of individuals to feel they can freely respond to each other’s needs. The three models of the network subtypes demonstrate these shifts by showing differences in measures of degree, density, modularity, and path length (see Table 6.2). This suggests individuals relate to one another differently depending on the purpose of the network.

The informational network depicts the linkages individuals report when they are looking to share information or discuss general issues. Data from prompt 1 populate this network model.³⁹ This network consists of 95 nodes and 85 edges. Figure 6.1 depicts the graph of the central portion of the informational network.




Figure 6.1 The Central Portion of the Informational Network.

The informational network was built as a directed graph, meaning the edges are graphed with arrowheads to depict which individuals report reaching out to others. The way the survey was crafted allows for displaying ties directionally, showing which individuals report having the connection. The nature of the prompt, in other words, meant that respondents could name any other collaborator without being constrained to choosing from a list. This means that some nodes represent individuals who did not participate directly in the survey process.

³⁹ Prompt 1 read “Please list the top four individuals you are most likely to discuss issues regarding the Crown with.”

The network graph of the informational network reveals disparate sub groups, or clusters. These groups would not be connected without the brokers. When these connectors bridge communities, they act as ‘hinges’ in network structure bringing together otherwise disconnected groups and thus promoting innovation and learning and providing opportunities for emergent leadership and collaborative innovation (Crona and Parker 2012). Through these connections, the brokerage organizations establish norms of interaction and information sharing and thus play an important role in the broader network processes of accountability.

Next, the problem-solving network shows how individuals report connections when they are facing management challenges. It was graphed using data from prompt 2, “Please list the top four individuals you are more likely to contact when there is a resource management problem or question.” The network has 80 nodes and 47 edges and was also built as a directed graph using arrowheads to visually depict the direction of ties. Figure 6.2 depicts the graph of the central portion of the problem-solving network.




Figure 6.2 Graph of the Problem-Solving Network.

The third subtype is the influence network, which reflects how individuals are linked to those they perceive as having higher ability to set direction for the Roundtable. Prompt 3 asked, “Please list the top four individuals you think are most influential in setting goals for the landscape.” Here, a built-in component of the survey that asks about frequency of communication verifies that individuals actually do collaborate with those they name. In other words, this network model does not merely depict a “who’s who” but real working relationships. Figure 6.4 depicts the graph of the central portion of the influence network.

In sum, interaction and communication can vary quite a bit in networks, largely due to the variation in ways that the connectors can be configured. Parsing out the network subtypes helps display these differences. The number of ties and path length can vary quite a bit depending on the particular function of the governance network, but the basic pattern emerges that a few select individuals are hubs. They essentially serve as central connectors, drawing together a variety of actors from many organization types.




Figure 6.3 Graph of the Influence Network.

What do differences in the analytical measures tell us about the way these sub-networks vary? Measures reveal differences in structural tendencies that suggest relational tendencies change depending on the task at hand. As Table 6.3 shows, each of these measures varies a bit between the three networks. As individuals work together to address challenges related to resource management, for example, network analysis shows that there are fewer edges or linkages but that, on average, they are of a shorter path length. This suggests that the problem-solving network may be less developed, or that the Roundtable is still developing ways of responding in times of difficulty or conflict.⁴⁰

However, where connections do exist in the problem-solving network, they are of a shorter average path length, indicating that individuals tend to engage one another more directly, rather than working through brokers or intermediaries, when it comes to management problem-solving. What does this variation in network structure mean, and why is it important for accountability? The evidence suggests the ‘connector’ has a greater capability to hold others to account than non-connectors. It seems intuitive that we should be interested in the patterns the network takes on around these individuals, but why does it matter for accountability?

In many ways natural resource governance is intricately bound up with the relationships between people and communities. The decisions we make about managing natural resources depend upon the patterns of these relationships and interactions (Bodin and Crona 2009; Bodin

⁴⁰ This was supported in the network analysis and in interviews. One Parks Service representative acknowledged the peaceful context for the conservation in the Crown landscape, saying,

Canada and the US never really have been at war, but other places like between Finland and Russia where there’s a park. They have been at war, and while they aren’t currently, the effects of that have created— So it’s, can we learn from others, for sure. But in a lot of ways we are pretty unique. We have some of the cleanest water in the world and we maintain almost the full complement of carnivores, our vegetative diversity is huge, between the prairies and the mountains, and the Western edge where we’ve got some of the Pacific Northwest influences and vegetation.

The lack of difficulty related to underlying ecological conditions suggest that the governance network may be less equipped to address problems.

and Prell 2011). Whether or not we refer to governance arrangements as being networked, there are key social processes at play. For example, studies in community based natural resource management show that not all individuals are positioned in equal ways; some social actors are more capable of commanding goods and services than others (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1999).

6.3.2 The Role of the Connector

The notion that connectors, or brokers, matter for accountability in networked governance is supported by participant observation. Highly connected individuals can “bridge” divergent groups that would not otherwise connect (Putnam 1995). At the Roundtable meeting, several individuals from Alberta mentioned that they attended the meeting at the suggestion of a key resource manager in the province. They mentioned things like having first heard about the Roundtable from this particular individual, or that this individual is the one who sent them the reminder about attending in a given year. It was sometimes as simple as the connector providing basic information about the dates or location of the Roundtable, but often went beyond into their working relationships. This individual, a ‘connector,’ embodies the hub in the sub-and-spoke pattern within civil society (Keane 2003). Even when a relationship may not exist between the nodes at the end of the spokes, the common link of a connector suggests they may become linked in the future. While Granovetter (1973) calls these weak ties, more recent work has referred to this notion as transitivity, which claims that individuals who know another person in common will eventually know each other (Holman 2008).

Analysis reveals the Crown Roundtable matches larger trends in other studies of global civil society that show a clear distinction between a central core of well-connected individuals

and organizations and a larger cohort that is isolated on the periphery (Anheier and Katz 2005). Brokers fill structural holes (Burt 1992, 2004), increasing the density of networks. Denser networks with a higher number of ties have a greater potential for collective action (Bodin and Crona 2009). Furthermore, denser networks have higher potential for deliberation because more participants know each other more closely (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010).

It became clear that the member organizations, while each has their own mission and leadership composition, benefit from a core group of dedicated individuals who serve across multiple leadership boards, and devote large portions of time to conservation, in various forms, across the landscape. These individuals are the connectors; they are what make the Roundtable a “network of networks.” Brokerage, beyond its function linking together disparate portions of a network, is an important phenomenon in maintaining pathways between distant organizations and social groups (Anheier and Katz 2005). This was confirmed in interviews. In fact, one community organizer told me that he was the core of his group, that the organization was based on the connections he has, a fund of social capital that draws upon. In his words, without him, the organization would not exist. This is true in agencies as well. A U.S. Fish and Wildlife representative said,

If you have the right leaders—the things I've done, the power of a leader is unbelievable. When we started the big project, we rebuilt one and a half miles of stream. The best trout stream in the US probably. The first meetings I'll never forget, was extremely contentious. You know, and here's the agencies trying to drive something. [Some landowners and community members] are already anti-government anyway. So we proposed it and everybody's going, ‘well that's not going to work 'cause of this and that.’ And so, one landowner said—an elderly gal— ‘You know, they have money, they want to do something. I think we all should listen.’

This agency official was an important part of bringing together the public and private landowners necessary to complete the project.

The role as an “institution” or a *connector* can be explored with social network analysis, which offers ways to visualize the ways individuals are connected. ‘Betweenness’ is a measure based on the shortest number of paths passing through an actor; those with high scores play connecting roles integral to overall network function—they are the ‘middlemen’ linking different subgroups. Figure 6.4 below illustrates this effect in the Crown Roundtable. The first image shows all of the nodes and edges gathered in the survey while the second zooms in on the major subset, showing that there are a few key places where individuals with high betweenness scores are the only link some others have with the network.




Figure 6.4 “Connectors:” Individuals with High Betweenness Scores.

Many of the individuals who participate in the Roundtable also serve on the boards or are members of the other Crown conservation initiatives. For example, a professor emeritus in Earth Sciences at the community college in Kalispell, Montana was a critical individual in starting up the first of the Crown-wide initiatives, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education Consortium (COCEEC). While this individual was instrumental in linking up outdoor educators across the landscape in his role with COCEEC, he also continued to participate in the various governance arrangements as they have evolved and culminated in the Roundtable. In fact, the

director of a Flathead Valley NGO stated this individual was so dedicated that he really could not disengage from conservation in the Crown:

Well he's like late 70s and he's trying to disengage, although he's a very engaged person. He helped start the Glacier Institute and he started COCEEC. He's a great guy. If you have the time, you should talk to him because he's an institution in and of himself.⁴¹

NG initiatives play out differently by setting and context based on the personalities and levels of social capital, engagement, and trust.

One participant described another's success in building relationships in the following way:

[X] has a personal relationship with all these academic scientists, all these government scientists, land managers in Alberta, British Columbia and Montana, he's done this work for a long time. He didn't do any of the original ground research. He's done it in the past. But for these two reports I'm talking about—he basically went to all these scientists and said, Hey can I have your data? A lot of them hadn't even published it yet. They were going to use their data to publish it next year. But he has a good enough relationship, he got, I don't know 30 different data sets on all these different pieces of the Crown of the Continent and he started to put them together to really look at the big picture.

Without the relationships that this land manager had with other conservation practitioners across the landscape, he would not have been able to generate the knowledge needed to plan and implement projects, or in this case, compile a wildlife management report and plan.

Depending on the perceived purpose of the network, individuals report different patterns of engagement. This is consistent with existing work on accountability at the individual level. Psychological studies have shown that when there is an expectation that decisions will have to be justified later, individuals feel a stronger sense of accountability toward one another and their task at hand (Tetlock 1985). This speaks back to the form of obligation in the Crown Roundtable. When working relationships are overlaid with friendships, collective intelligence can contribute to performing better on tasks, especially when individuals in the group are socially sensitive

⁴¹ In speaking with this individual, his enthusiasm for transboundary work confirmed what others had told me.

(Woolley et al. 2010). Other studies document the benefits of working in groups. Pentland (2014) shows that network ties can lead to cascading behavioral change as individuals learn new practices from each other.

In the Roundtable, participants with a greater number of ties are integral for bridging disparate groups (Bodin and Crona 2009; Putnam 1995). These individuals are the levers for promoting trust and cohesion required for reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships. As one interviewee, a founding member of the Roundtable told me, “My focus became the entire Crown of the Continent. I realized that building those relationships and trust across these borders was going to be absolutely essential to any long-term solution.” Ultimately, being able to build consensus and resolve conflict (engaging in the coordination and steering of governance) is essential for holding participants to account.

An expanded number of social ties can increase the potential for learning and behavior change as people are exposed to new and routine ways of doing things. These ties become social space for interaction, allowing participants to negotiate, express discontent, and pose solutions (Steyaert and Jiggins 2007). Returning to the definition of accountability, and acknowledging that it involves a level of responsiveness between those making claims and those solving problems, some evidence for this can be found in the Crown case. One participant (a key node identified in the influence network) mentioned that in dealing with uncertainty on the landscape, learning from each other becomes critically important,

We don't know what the future is in a year, we don't know what the future is in five years, but you know, there are models out there of how people change the way they do things to the circumstances that they're dealt and I think this is in the landscape way, not one sector is going to be able—not one type of person puts together a Toyota car. There are people who focus on the windshields, the tires, the engines, whatever. The car has to be built by all and they all have to change because each of those components is changing over time and I think we can do this. I think we can do this in a landscape way; and we can't do this in silos. The timber community can't do it separately the ranchers can't do it

separately, the conservationists can't do it separately, the tribes can't do it separately. We all have our part to play and we need to start playing together better, and learning from each other better. The Roundtable is a way for us to connect better on how to do that. The projects we have in front of us is a first attempt at how we put together better the Toyota of landscape conservation as a community from all sectors.

In this sense, the connectors of the Roundtable recognize the importance of learning from each other. Connectors play an important role in facilitating the learning process and in getting work done (Makoto-Su, Mark, and Sutton 2007).

However, it is important to caveat the role of the connector by acknowledging his or her potential to exercise power. Power can be defined as the ability of actors to compel others to change (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Connectors sometimes facilitate the learning process by serving as acting examples of acceptable behavior. However, because others look to them for direction, their actions can have the potential for a harmful impact. Highly connected nodes can have a negative effect when differential social positioning gives some individuals in a network the ability to unilaterally set the agenda. In essence, connectors can become sites of power when they choose which storylines rise to the surface. Interviews with individuals working on the Montana side of the border indicate that resource extraction can dominate the discourse in some communities. One conservation leader spoke to a conservative pro-extraction mindset he had observed in Northern Montana,

So politically, and the Flathead values are very conservative and you know, "let's just rape the Earth if we could" because they've done it in the past in terms of logging. The idea of getting our population on side withdrawing energy resources in the United States, I mean, give me a break, that's not going to happen because energy is king. These and other storylines could creep into the process. Once a storyline becomes dominant, it can be difficult to change directions, rendering some individuals and organizations less powerful.

A predisposition for a particular set of ideas⁴² can result when dominant narratives eclipse other storylines. Connectors can choose which stories to recount, and therefore have the potential to set the agenda. “Discourse coalitions” can form when influential individuals and groups endorse a particular narrative over another (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). More attention is warranted to look at how this process can happen. Hyperconnected nodes, rather than being connectors, may be controlling which discourses make the agenda or which pieces of information and resources are passed along. The ability to choose which storylines rise to the surface potentially places connectors in positions of power. Deciding which topics are open for discussion is a form of agenda setting. The choices made about narratives are essentially choices about defining problems. In other words, stories determine whether problems are defined as problems to begin with. Furthermore, deciding how the stories are told can have a significant impact on the solutions that are proposed (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).

From the evidence gathered at the Roundtable, this did not seem to be the case. Members of the Roundtable are pre-emptively considering the challenges to building a truly collaborative network. As one participant put it,

To build a regional neighborhood, we’re going to think very hard about who’s not at the table, who doesn’t have their interest or the capacity to be there. This is very time-intensive work and how can we have conversation with them that are—we just might call them up or have coffee or meet them in the field.

Even though participants in the Roundtable seem to be genuinely aware of and concerned about the challenges related to exclusion and the exercise of power, it would be hasty to assume that every thing is going entirely as planned. In that case, further investigation might consider the ways that individuals are chosen to speak at the Roundtable, the sources of program funding,

⁴² This dominance of a particular set of ideas has been referred to as hegemony. Cox (1993, 63) uses an apt metaphor, explaining that “hegemony is like a pillow; it absorbs blows and sooner or later the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon.”

which organizations are not taking part, or the types of narratives that are passed along. The highly connected, or influential nodes, may have the ability to limit or select which options for solving problems are on the table.

Ultimately, though, in the Crown case, the ability to complete projects by utilizing ties with other individuals and organizations strengthens the network by bridging a gap. This is reinforced in the literature. The broker becomes a quasi-institution herself, as her ties between actors serve to bridge “structural holes” (Burt 2004, 2005) or gaps in accountability between actors. One possible interpretation is that accountability is founded upon the reputation and social standing of key individuals within the network. From participant observation at the Roundtable it became clear that certain individuals were well liked and respected. Their ability to bring participants together around a common agenda for conservation speaks volumes. The notion of reputation as a form of accountability is addressed in the next section.

6.4 Recasting Redress as Reward

The Crown Roundtable has created a favorable set of conditions for the formation of a transnational public and a space for individuals to directly engage with one another across borders. At the front end of the project, I had a suspicion that the horizontal nature of authority in the relationships between actors would complicate the ability to view accountability in terms of a power relationship based upon the ability to punish an actor in the case of failure to meet expectations (Newell 2006). In the Roundtable, and in the context of NG more generally, classic oversight such as administrative procedures and judicial review (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987) are absent because of the reticence to cede decision-making authority vis-à-vis management protocols. In fact, the non-binding nature of the arrangement, according to several

public land managers I interviewed, is what made it possible for them to participate without overstepping their own agencies' legal constraints, missions or mandates.

So then, under a non-binding governance arrangement, how is it possible that individuals can be held to account? As the project progressed, I saw that redress, was eclipsed by another "R-word," *reward*. Because the logic of NG fundamentally relies on collaboration, the governance arrangement delivers well on rewards, but not on the ability to punish other participants. Let us leave that for traditional, hierarchical arrangements. What is necessary, then, is a move toward incorporating informal rules as well as *positive* patterns of behavioral reinforcement. With an expanded view of principal-agent theory, for James Fearon (1999, 55 emphasis added) the notion of accountability is less rigid:

We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B is empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps *informal rules* to sanction or *reward* A for her activities or performance in this capacity.

Important to note, and somewhat surprisingly for this principal-agent (P-A) theorist, informal rules can stand in place for formal institutions. Additionally, we can expand beyond redress or sanction to include rewards as pathways to bind behaviors to expectations. This definition is consistent with P-A theory in its focus on the relationship between actors, surrounding behaviors and expectations, and also with governance at the international level, where formal institutions are often not in place. This is the case in the Roundtable where the agents are acting as principals.

One of the critiques of NG is that it lacks mechanisms to convey dissatisfaction or deal with conflict. Polodny and Page (1998, 59) point out that a network "lack[s] a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange." While this may be problematic for those who limit it to the terms of having a single arbiter,

because authority is diffuse in NG, as long as each participant is perceived as able to hold other entities to account, we can still see patterns of responsiveness. There are multiple ways that individuals can do this. Redress looks different in a collaborative setting, but there are mechanisms to convey dissatisfaction. For example, individuals may choose to withhold information, or sever a working relationship. As one interviewee put it,

So, we are exchanging inside information that we have with our contacts, you know Canadian federal government, B.C. provincial government, we are exchanging information on our contacts in state government, Senate, U.S. Congress and it all stays—there's no public discourse about what we talk about in our meetings, it's all, we all understand that the meetings are for our information only and there's some information that's absolutely taboo to go out of the group because it would compromise relationships. So that's how we function, as a coalition... so if someone violates "the oath," or violates information or whatever, you can be severely reprimanded. Or you can even be—it hasn't happened—but, you know the consequences are that you burn yourself if you violate that trust.

Accountability in NG is based on peer-to-peer relationships and thus is more about reputations than formal sanctioning. Maintaining these reputations can be a form of reward itself (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004).

Though there are mechanisms for conveying dissatisfaction, interviewees often pointed more toward the positive reasons for participating. In other words, the rewards worked as stronger enticement to participate than any fear of negative consequences. Not only are participants coming back year after year to the Roundtable, but they are following through on their commitments to one another. They do this because they genuinely care about the issues, get along with each other, and enjoy being part of the Roundtable. The positive response that came from being in the network outweighed anything else. One interviewee put it this way,

Yeah, so we have good working relationships with a lot of people, with a lot of bureaucrats and they are on the side—so we've got everything kind of lined up to where we just need the powers that be to agree with protecting the internationally significant wildlife values in this region.

In this sense, it became clear that participation is more about the rewards that stem from personal connections than punishment from not following formal rules. The rewards are related to exchange of information and the perpetuation or continuity of a relationship. This ability to focus on the positive reasons for being in the network was a common thread in comments from participants.

Social networks are not impersonal institutions (Bodin and Prell 2011); they link actors up in ways that are quite compelling. As friendships are formed, individuals may feel a stronger sense of obligation to one another. Even budding friendships that make up “weak ties” can form a basis for obligation across borders. As an NGO representative on the U.S. side of the Crown put it, participants form bonds when they see that they have similar goals. He stated, “down south of the border we’re trying to support our Canadian friends in achieving what we both want to achieve which is more security for wildlife, more security for landscapes at a large scale.” This component of wanting to help new and old friends, to share pertinent resources with those who are pursuing a common cause, suggests that actors in NG are bound together in a way that is based on positive inducements. Participants willingly take on obligations to one another because they find it to be rewarding.

Another motivating factor that kept people drawn to the Roundtable was feeling like they had a space to express their opinions. For example, one interviewee referred to this notion as giving people a space “to tell their stories.” As the interviewee wove a story himself, explaining,

So a lot of the issues we’re dealing with in resource or conservation management—there’s a lot of science: water, wildlife, for farming, for forestry—and all of that’s technical, but just because we know the right thing to do doesn’t mean we do it and there’s a lot of acrimony, controversy over these issues at sort of an abstract level. The biggest challenge facing the conservation community is our record of being able to communicate well, because people are not moved by facts or science. How many people, just deny climate change is happening? How many people believe President Obama was

born in Kenya but they don't believe in [the anthropogenic causes of] climate change—especially in this region? What are we going to do with another scientific report? How do you start to move the dialogue—bring people together around a common conservation vision? You do it by telling a story. You tell stories about real people. You have people tell their own stories, you put a Montana face, you have people tell their own stories on conservation as opposed to mission statements or the latest scientific reports. That's not what moves the community dialogue.

This suggests that beyond receiving information, rewards are also based on having a place to express opinions, tell stories, and being heard. This is a strong inducement to participate.

The desire to be heard and recognized is a strong motivator. At the Roundtable conference, sometimes the question and comment period would go on longer than the panel or presentation that preceded it. From the artists to the forests products industry representative, many participants seemed to want a venue for sharing the reasons they felt strongly about protecting the landscape. They would often begin their statements by describing the natural features of the environment where they lived and what kinds of wildlife or forested ecosystem they were surrounded by. It was clear that this space for storytelling (both to tell stories and to hear other stories) was an important motivator to attend the Roundtables. Sharing narratives can contribute toward more clearly defining conservation goals and the meaning of resilience (Goldstein et al. 2013), and it is also rewarding for participants.

Whether they referred to the annual Roundtable as a time to catch up with people they enjoyed seeing, or feeling proud to have done the work that linked their organization up with something larger than their own group, a repeating theme was that at the end of the day participants genuinely enjoyed being a part of the Roundtable. From year to year, the themes of the conferences may have been forgotten, but participants remembered the people they met and the connections they made. This sense of reward is strong motivator. The reward of participating

in the process is two-fold: participants form positive relationships and also gain access to information and resources with which they might not otherwise be able to link up.

The evidence from the Crown Roundtable suggests there is a host of incentives and more subtle forms of obligation in networked governance. This fits with the latest findings in social network research, which suggest that there is a pre-emptive component of accountability. In social networks, individuals interact over time, adjusting their decisions in subtle ways to reflect what they learn from one another (Pentland 2014). In many ways, the influence of social learning in networked processes is not directly measurable with SNA, which is where it became important to use interview data⁴³ to uncover the ways that individuals learn from and influence each other, and perhaps ultimately shift the ways they make decisions. Reward is a form of obligation that keeps individuals coming back to the Roundtable; because participants genuinely enjoy taking part in the Roundtable, they continue to come back and also follow through on common goals. However, accountability in NG goes beyond rewards. It is layered onto and intertwined with other forms.

6.5 The Broadened and Layered Nature of Accountability

The notion that social-relational accountability is layered with other types—namely, more formal mechanisms—is supported in the literature as “pluralistic accountability:” which is based on actors, processes and outcomes (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004). It has also been called ‘meta-governance’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Whatever we call it, it is important to recognize the layering of accountability mechanisms, because, as (Newman 2004, 20) puts it,

⁴³ Interview data were also important for corroborating the role that connectors play in NG.

“network governance is not the only game in town: hierarchy and markets continue to pervade the governance regimes of modern states, and managers are faced with the task of resolving the tensions and dilemmas that are produced as multiple regimes of power intersect, collide and conflict.”

Some have claimed there is a need for “both traditional and new forms” of accountability (Bovens 2007). The new forms, here, by implication, are relational and informal. Hierarchy has been referred to as an ‘old mode’ of governance reliant upon command-and-control regulations and chains of delegation. This is a confusing distinction, as voluntary arrangements, or ‘new modes’ of governance, often continue to operate in tandem with or alongside hierarchies. Bäckstrand et al. (2010) claim, “the rise of new modes of governance is in many instances based on the continued operation of traditional regulatory policies” (Bäckstrand et al 2010, 29). So it may not be accurate to refer to new and old modes, as a move to NG does not necessitate phasing out hierarchical mechanisms for answerability and redress.

Networked governance solutions are so important because they allow states to fulfill their obligations to their domestic population. As Habermas puts it, “Whereas internal state sovereignty is no longer restricted to simply maintaining law and order but also includes the effective protection of the civil rights of citizens, ‘external sovereignty’ today calls for the ability to cooperate with partners as much as the capacity to defend itself against external enemies” (Habermas 2010, 270).

This begs the question, what is the relationship between sovereignty and accountability? Sovereignty, or the sole right of a government to rule its territory free from outside intervention, is conferred upon states with peaceful, acquiescent populations. The consent of the governed is given in exchange for certain protections and in today’s world those safeguards should include

protection from environmental harms, whether they emanate from a local or transnational source. The state, then must be *accountable* to its population when it comes to dealing with environmental threats; if it fails to do so, it has lost some of the claim to sovereignty. Therefore, given the transboundary nature of the threat of forest landscape degradation, it only makes sense that an accountable state will be part of the NG process. However, the state's ability to remain accountable is only made possible through the involvement of civil society.

Singleton's (2002, 56) multi-community study implicates the absence of linkages between local and distant stakeholders with failures in collaborative governance arrangements. For her, these linkages are "the mechanisms for political accountability between 'upstream' and 'downstream' resources users and between the providers and the beneficiaries of environmental preservation." Even though they are incredibly important, these layered institutions that are nested within global civil society can be difficult to map or measure. In global civil society, as Keane (2003) puts it,

...actors are not mute, empirical bits and bytes of data. Linked to territories but not restricted to territory, caught up in a vast variety of overlapping and interlocking institutions and webs of group affiliations, these actors talk, think, interpret, question, negotiate, comply, innovate, resist. Their recalcitrance in the face of classification is a basic feature of global civil society, which is never a fixed entity, but always a temporary assembly, subject to reshuffling and reassembly.

Keane goes on to note that standardized measures, such as the number of INGOs registered within a country do not adequately measure civil society. Similarly, Anheier and Katz (2005) note that when studying global civil society, it is important to avoid the trap of "methodological nationalism" which looks at state-based measures like gross domestic product (GDP).

6.5.1 Layering: Relying on Different Types of Accountability

Another key application of SNA is the ability to focus in on particular areas of interest within the network (Anheier and Katz 2005). Here, honing in on a sub-set of the network and altering the visualization to configure the edges and nodes in space so that it became possible to see the relational pattern between nodes. Two noteworthy arrangements emerged—the ‘broker’ and the ‘linked hierarchy’ arrangements. Figure 6.5 depicts a subset of the Crown Roundtable, shows how some nodes are related to others in unique ways, even within the same network.




Figure 6.5 Borrowing from other forms of accountability—hierarchical and market logics: ‘broker’ and ‘linked hierarchy’ subsets.

First, the fan-like pattern suggests a brokerage function by one node, much as a supplier in a market. Brokerage allows for a balance between centralized and decentralized control (Huppé, Creech, and Knoblauch 2012), drawing participants into the process in a voluntary way, linking them to the network through social ties and not binding obligations. One particular individual who emerged as a broker worked in provincial government, showing the continued importance of state agencies in NG. This finding is consistent with Ostrom's (2010) argument for polycentricity, that institutional arrangements are nested across scales, and the claim that

networks do not replace the traditional forms of accountability found in hierarchically-ordered bureaucracies (Kettle 2000). Second, the adjoining circular pattern, which links a chain back around, turns the traditional notion of hierarchy on itself. It borrows from hierarchy that individuals respond to others in along a line; however, when each node is linked in a larger network, no single node has ultimate sway over others—a distinct contrast with hierarchy.

It is important to acknowledge the guiding role of agencies and state institutions. However, it is a different approach than outright management. The argument for social-relational accountability points to the altered role of the governors once drawn into civil society. Because the arrangements are layered within the space of a transnational public that is rooted in civil society, the role of public officials is changed from overseer to peer. Brokers may be based within state agencies, but in the networked setting are acting as peers rather than governors. In other words, public officials step outside their formal roles when they engage in NG as members of civil society. Once public officials become engaged in the network, they are part of the transnational public.

When we map accountability in networked governance, we see that patterns emerge. While it is true that authority is diffuse and fragmented, this complexity does not preclude our ability to map and understand accountability. As shown above, relational accountability can look different depending on the nodes we choose. Fan-like patterns might suggest a brokerage function by one node, much as a supplier in a market. Circular patterns link a chain back upon itself, turning the traditional notion of hierarchy on itself when no one node has ultimate sway over others, because each node is linked in a larger network.

Touting the promise of NG is not to suggest that networked modes of governance are superior, or that there is nothing to be learned from other patterns. In fact, from hierarchical

patterns we learn the benefit of conscientious institutional design in terms of establishing a clear division of labor or a rules-based set of interactions. In both, actors know what is expected of them and others, and accountability comes more clearly into focus. In terms of setting out a clear division of labor, actors operate with a clear set of expectations for behavior, goals, and products. Another benefit of rules-based interactions is that, ideally, repercussions are set out in advance if expectations are not met. The benefits of conscientious design that borrows from hierarchical patterns then, in networks, include bolstering accountability through expectations and repercussions.

Market-based patterns of governance also have advantages in terms of accountability. They can empower even small shareholders, especially when they link together to make purchasing decisions. Market governance is also advantageous in terms of being voluntary and flexible, allowing actors to hold others accountable in different ways depending on the needs of the day. While expectations are much more fluid than in hierarchies, the repercussions remain relatively clear—bad choices usually lead to financial losses. In a setting based on incentives and exchange, accountability is based on compensation or fulfillment of contracts or duties. If a supplier falls short or goods are deemed inadequate, the client or customer uses money as a form of punishment or reward. Stakeholders, through their financial investment can push and pull levers, making demands of corporations. Currency is a way that we can track the fulfillment or negation of obligations.⁴⁴

While some problems are becoming so complex as to require high levels of social capital to solve them, the reality is that we have not come far enough in terms of true cooperation and

⁴⁴ For example, the term “remuneration” incorporates the fact that money is used as payment or the completion of a contract.

collaboration. There are still instances in which litigation is needed, or the heavy hand of a management agency is required. This constitutional basis of accountability is built upon the performance of elected ministers (Newman 2004). Alternately, there are instances when market transactions are required to secure ecological outcomes—such as conservation easements or certification programs. The transactional basis of accountability adds economic incentives to abide by standards. The types of accountability found in both hierarchical and market logics still matter a great deal in the case of the Crown Roundtable. This fits with what the literature suggests—that the dispersed authority in NG naturally lends itself to multiple forms of accountability (Bäckstrand 2006b; Jedd and Bixler 2015; Newell 2005; Newman 2004; Zelli and van Asselt 2011b).

6.5.2 Broadened Answerability: Working with Traditional Forms of Accountability

Effectively dealing with global problems, requires engaging in transnational governance (Biermann et al. 2012; Jordan 2008). However, formal, treaty-level agreements are either absent or slow-coming in terms of addressing environmental concerns. This has certainly been the case in the Crown of the Continent landscape. This section addresses how individuals within the network can use their social relations to access forms of accountability outside of the network. In the province of British Columbia (BC), Canada, the conservation practitioners I spoke with expressed frustration with stream contamination in forested areas as a result of coal mining operations. Particularly high levels of Selenium run-off from metallurgical coal mining were found in the Elk River Valley. The mining company refused to respond to NGOs' requests to reduce tailings, as they pose significant risks to forest health. The provincial natural resource

agencies did not have regulatory oversight, and were therefore ineffective at curbing threats to water quality.

However, the NGOs in British Columbia were able to work with US federal agencies in Montana to enforce regulations on water quality in streams flowing into US territory. Let us examine how this plays out in the instance of the 2010 agreement. To achieve a moratorium on mining activities in the Elk River Valley, the 2010 MOU between Montana and British Columbia would never have been reached without layered (or additional) accountability of the use or threat of legal action based on federal water quality standards in the United States. It is precisely the diffuse nature of authority that implicates a broader host of actors as being equipped to call attention to and request redress for mistakes.

Two elements conspired against international cooperation: citizen opposition, and individual agency mandates. First, interviews revealed competing ideologies and visions for the Crown landscape, ranging from preservation to pro-development. The radio programming in rural northern Montana was peppered with talk shows about pulling the U.S. out of the United Nations. Some residents of rural Montana, according to one community organizer, are so opposed to any type of intervention that they also oppose federal management, let alone international visioning. These competing visions reinforce the notion that it would be difficult to reach a treaty-level agreement between the U.S. and Canada.

Made up of many independent rural communities and swaths of private land, the landscape hosts a variety of political leanings, some of which are less amenable to linking up across borders. One interviewee mentioned the formation of a militia cell around Kalispell in Gallatin County, Montana, with the supposed aim of “multiple use.” However, there was also a strong component of the group that focused on stockpiling weapons to ward off the perceived

threat posed by international environmental cooperation. Another interviewee relayed the story of a focus group where the prevailing sentiment from private landowners was one of disinterest in linking up at the larger level. He explained, “Part of the attitude was, if we start talking about ecosystems, the Crown of the Continent ecosystem, all these—we’ve got them on both sides of the border—these black helicopter type people that think the United Nations is going to come and get them.” This isolationist sentiment was echoed on the local talk radio that I listened to as I drove around the park or between communities in northern Montana. Several other interviewees mentioned that private landowners were wary of landscape-wide conservation efforts not only because they perceived them as placing limits on future development activities, but their existent ranching livelihoods.

Second, interviewees tended to suggest that the MOU was a more realistic option because it still allows agencies to pursue their mandates. Two agencies named in the MOU have mission statements that clash with one another. British Columbia’s Ministry of Environment’s mission is energy development, which conflicts at times with the U.S. Park Service’s mission to protect lands and natural resources. One interviewee explained that residents on the landscape are fearful of treaties, equating them with “big government.” Another interviewee in elaborating the differences between a treaty and an MOU, pointed out that a treaty is a legal document with formally appointed obligations and commitments, whereas an MOU is more of a “handshake agreement” that is symbolic of working toward a shared vision for the landscape.

Because it is unclear where the decision-making authority lies, networked arrangements can be ambiguous when it comes to seeking recompense for wrongdoing. Sometimes networked mechanisms are simply inappropriate or incapable of producing redress; in these cases traditional (hierarchical) mechanisms can be more useful. As shown in the Crown Roundtable, for example,

compensation for riverbed contamination due to mining activities is often achieved through traditional hierarchical mechanisms—namely, the United States’ court system for enforcement of environmental legislation.

In some ways the informal role of the network is layered on top of or underneath traditional governance, and in other ways it looks more like “texturing,” as both informal ties and binding agreements continue to shape outcomes in tandem. Without the broadened and diffuse pattern of authority and the relationships spanning beyond the Elk River valley community, civil society alone would have been ineffective in holding the mining company accountable for its actions. As one participant, an NGO leader, told me,

because the political process is so much different in Canada than it is in the United States and Canadian politicians respond so much differently to pressure than American politicians do and I, as [Organization Name], don’t have a lot to do with the Canadian politicians. I don’t have anything to do with them except sit with my team members from Canada and listen to them and provide moral support. But there have been things in the past where they’ll say, “What we really need”—well, before we got the MOU—“we really need to find a way to engage the government.”

In this sense, for accountability, the network is layered over the backbone of traditional hierarchical mechanisms. The *sine qua non* of this layered pattern of accountability, though, is the NG arrangement that allowed activists in British Columbia to access the United States’ regulatory system. That is to suggest, the formal mechanisms (the MOUs) would not have been possible without the informal interactions of the Roundtable actors.

In the face of local opposition, formal mechanisms might stall out at the international level, but there are other approaches to linking up across borders, including memoranda of understanding (Slaughter 2001). Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) are agreements made outside of legislative channels between two or more parties. They place commitments in writing between subnational political units (e.g. states or provinces) but do not obligate a national government to a particular course of action. In the case of the Crown landscape, one particular

MOU has been an important component of relations between the state of Montana and the province of British Columbia. This agreement, signed in 2010 by Governor Brian Schweitzer of Montana and the Premier Gordon Campbell of British Columbia, titled “Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Environmental Protection, Climate Action and Energy,” illustrates the type of layered accountability in the Crown.

In addition to the MOU, the ongoing efforts of agencies continue to play an important role. In many of the interviews, participants reiterated that management jurisdictions are still retained, and that this is a necessary component for effective landscape-scale governance. Jurisdictional boundaries must be maintained to some extent, in order for entities to perceive that it is not an abrogation of their own missions to collaborate with others. As one U.S. federal agency manager put it, “from a Crown Manager's perspective, we've recognized for all of us to achieve our mandates, and the CMP doesn't manage, they agencies do. That's kind of a basic understanding.”

These individual management directives are built upon a solid institutional capacity that allows work to be done. Without it, agencies would falter in their efforts to remain accountable to the general public. Collaborative potential cannot be bought at the expense of institutional capacity. In fact, some of the NGO representatives expressed a strong desire for management agencies to take a firmer position on protection mechanisms, and the ultimate goal of a couple of community mobilization projects was to establish park designation, wilderness, or management boundaries at the federal or provincial level. Park designation or protected status would lend the type of hierarchical accountability not found in NG. Particularly related to land use, where many different users are accessing space and resources, it is still necessary to have more centralized forms of control that rely upon a legal basis for answerability and redress. In other words, as one

NGO director explained, designated protected status in interior British Columbia, where a “piece of the pie” is missing from Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park, would send a clear message that certain activities (mining and other forms of potentially harmful resource extraction) are not allowed. The backing of the province and the international community would, as he suggested, be more effective than the informal, social ties found within the Roundtable.

Because networks depend so heavily on the social relationships of which they are comprised, accountability largely hinges on the maintenance of these relationships. This type of accountability can be parsed out as “professional/peer accountability,” which hinges on adhering to a code of conduct (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004), set of norms, or maintaining an appropriate identity. This type of accountability is based on the logic of appropriateness, rather than the logic of consequences grounded in a rational calculation of costs and benefits.⁴⁵

Evidence from the Crown Roundtable reinforces what the literature on transnational accountability suggests. Though it builds on Kant’s belief that IR is contingent upon more than state interactions, Michael Mason’s notion of a transnational accountability offers a modified accountability that depends less upon legal code and more on the moral obligations that people have to each other. Kant suggested the ultimate aim in international affairs would be a legal backbone, “a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all others.” Mason’s notion of transnational accountability is such that it recognizes the importance of a legal framework, but he explicitly expresses the desire to see it come about as a result of civic

⁴⁵ March & Olsen (1998) lay out the “logic of consequences,” which is the rationale of *homo economicus* and the “logic of appropriateness,” which is the rationale of *homo sociologicus*. *Homo economicus*, motivated by the logic of consequences, assesses choices based on strategic cost-benefit analyses and makes decisions based on what will most efficiently deliver the desired ends. On the other hand, *homo sociologicus* abides by the logic of appropriateness—or the concern with norms and identity.

cosmopolitanism rather than as an institutional process driven by neoliberal instrumentalism (Mason 2008). NG is a logical pathway to establishing a set of consistent principles about responsibilities that cross borders, even if the principles are not yet codified by international law. In other words, as civil society actors design solutions for transboundary problems, we see governance innovations that may eventually reach more formal levels of agreement.

6.6 Concluding Thoughts and Future Directions

The fragmentation of authority that has been suggested to complicate accountability may actually be an advantage. The current configuration of the global forest governance landscape is such that governing authority is spread over a broad range of mechanisms, borrowing from hierarchical, market, and network logics. With regard to NG, answerability is only possible where a broad host of actors is granted governing authority; in effect, when principals become governing agents. That is to say, the same diffusion of authority that implicates a shift away from hierarchical mechanisms for accountability also reconfigures the ability to demand redress. The ability to demand redress in NG only comes with the diffusion of authority. If a rank order is established, as in a hierarchy, accountability can only ever be uni-directional. However, in a “flattened” governance scheme, relationships link actors together in a way that allows individuals to hold one another to account on the basis of social obligations. These ties allow individuals to interact as collaborators, equaling capable of holding one another to account.

Transnational NG has perhaps been somewhat unfairly critiqued for not being accountable. Though participants may come and go freely and do not have binding legal duties to one another, informal obligations stand in their place. The Crown Roundtable fosters a network that relies on informal obligations. They depend upon a social “glue,” or cohesiveness, that runs

deeper than the surface-level legal arrangements. Evidence from the case of the Crown Roundtable suggests that it is possible to find forms of accountability even at the scope and scale of conservation in a transnational landscape. Where individuals link up across borders, a new space is created with its own democratic potential. This notion of a transnational civil society is at the core of maintaining the linkages for accountability in the Crown of the Continent.

The analysis of the Crown Roundtable suggests that NG may only pose an accountability challenge to the strict pluralist notion of democracy. With broadened answerability, we see that NG results in net gains in accountability. Network analysis demonstrates that there are multiple and overlapping ties between members of the network. These linkages emerge in the absence of any codified or legally binding arrangements. The obligations do not rest on elections, currency, or legal agreements.⁴⁶ The analysis supports previous findings in other social networks studies that found connectors are important individuals for bringing different communities together and for getting work done (Makoto-Su, Mark, and Sutton 2007).

The analysis suggests that the accountability deficit in NG is a false problem. Social networks, even across large landscapes, have the potential to foster civic engagement. Evidence from the Crown network demonstrates there are clear linkages between natural resource agencies, conservation groups, and concerned citizens. Networked forest governance is not a backroom dealing where agency officials make decisions behind closed doors. Members of civil society are equal participants. In the case of the Roundtable, civil society is a vibrant component. In fact, concerned individuals and NGOs make up the largest portion of participants. This brings the governed into the governing process, which may ultimately enhance its legitimacy. This is explored in the following chapter.

⁴⁶ Instead, as the next chapter explores, these obligations are based on a sense of trust, normative judgments, and shared identities.

Furthermore, accountability in the NG setting is layered on top of traditional modes—potentially strengthening them in the process. In this sense, for accountability, the network is layered over the backbone of traditional hierarchical mechanisms. The *sine qua non* of this layered pattern of accountability is the NG arrangement that allows network participants to access traditional modes of accountability across jurisdictional lines. In this sense, the interconnectedness of the network allows traditional modalities to be expanded and broadened over the whole landscape, where they were previously partitioned. This type of external accountability is different from the previous two types in sections 6.3 and 6.4, which have more to do with how individuals inside the network honor their obligations to one another.

More investigation is warranted on how connectors might exercise their role. In some cases, they may bridge gaps between individuals and sub-communities that are not connected. In other cases they may serve along pathways for passing along information and sharing resources. However, connectors might not always be neutral facilitators. In some instances it may be worthwhile to consider whether and how they make choices about the storylines that become important, what type of information and which resources they pass on. Further investigation is warranted in the Crown Roundtable to look at how these dynamics may play out. This would contribute to an understanding of how actors may use their different positions and social capacities to achieve their goals.

It is also important to look further consider how networked forest governance layers with state-based governance. Starting from the proposition that citizens hold governments to account for their international commitments, future work should more closely examine how the insertion of civil society makes the NG process externally accountable. An expanded social network

analysis project that surveys members of civil society that are not directly involved in the Crown Roundtable might show linkage patterns between those who are inside the network and those who are outside.

CHAPTER SEVEN: Concluding Thoughts on Democratic Design for Networked Forest Governance

*“Reason does not itself work instinctively,
for it requires trial, practice and instruction
to enable it to progress gradually from
one stage of insight to the next.”*

–Immanuel Kant⁴⁷

“It is not what one does, but how one does it that matters most.”

–Stephen Chan, *The Zen of International Relations*

7.1 Networked Governance and the Crown Roundtable

In this concluding chapter, I argue that both the accountability deficit and the legitimacy trade-off are false problems when we look toward transboundary space as one rich in deliberation. NG ideally brings civil society together with conservation practitioners in a way that allows them to engage one another as equals, regardless of their home political jurisdictions. Solutions require the involvement of actors across sectors and scales of organization. In the absence of a legally binding treaty regarding forest management, the Crown Roundtable has emerged as an informal networked governance arrangement to address conservation needs. I have argued that the social ties between the individuals in the Crown Roundtable form the backbone for accountability and legitimacy in this instance of networked governance. Beyond the inclusion of multiple actors across multiple scales, success entails having reflexivity and discursiveness built into the process.

The chapter begins with a general discussion on the contribution of a networked governance framework to the study of global forest governance, and more broadly, the study of global environmental governance. It then moves into a discussion of the ways in which a joint

⁴⁷ From the second proposition in his essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.”

commitment to deliberation and cosmopolitanism is reflexive and discursive. I conclude with considerations for shaping NG processes to be more democratic, filling a gap in the literature where it tends to focus on higher-level theory in place of practical recommendations.

Hierarchical modes of governing can fall short because governments often “have not used their exclusive responsibilities, like land use planning and law enforcement, which are crucial in forest biodiversity conservation” (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007, 416). Whether forests management itself precludes top-down chain of command or the state’s sole authority is eroding under globalization, the trend remains that forest management public-private partnerships are increasingly a fill-in-the gap measure when governments are unable or unwilling to enforce regulation (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). Since governments have not taken a proactive role in setting rules either at the domestic or international level, it is increasingly common to see networked arrangements in which the state is only one of a host of actors in a multi-centric governance context.

7.2 Challenges in Networked Governance

A focus on networked governance reveals insights along empirical and normative dimensions. First, the empirical trend toward inclusion of a broader swath of actors shows the importance of civil society in global environmental governance. Non-governmental organizations enmeshed in a voluntary scheme across borders where formal political arrangements are lacking can fill gaps in governance. If democracy is the “main legitimating principle of government” as Dryzek (1999) claims, and a vibrant civil society is a major component of democracy, it follows that legitimacy in transboundary governance rests on the notion of creating a shared identity, building trust, and shared norms. As the case of the Crown

Roundtable shows, informal arrangements based on social networks can provide channels for cooperation and communication, holding actors and organizations accountable across national and sub-national jurisdictions. These networked arrangements merit our attention, especially at the international level with regard to environmental challenges where formal treaties may be undesirable or infeasible.

7.2.1 Accountability Deficit?

As shown in chapters two and four, the advantages of NG also potentially set it up for some unique challenges. The traditional chain-of-command found in hierarchical authority is lacking. This could pose several challenges: without a clear principal-agent relationship, the social demands may not have any way of being transmitted up to the level of decision-making. As Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997, 197) explains, “Critics [of networked governance] contend that government institutions engaged in policy coordination with their foreign counterparts will be barely visible, much less accountable, to voters still largely tied to national territory.” It certainly seems anathema to liberal democracy to accept decisions made by rule-makers not elected by or drawn from a state’s own citizen base.

Anne-Marie Slaughter (2001, 348) borrows from Stephen Toope, who claims networks “are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality... Indeed, as typically subterranean creatures, operating outside the realm of public scrutiny, governance networks may be even less accountable than some states.” Indeed purely state-populated “Networks are based on flexible and functional peer relationships. Their very informality and clubishness, however, invite exclusion and make monitoring and participation by non-state actors and other government officials often difficult” (Raustiala 2002, 24). This characterization, however, does not take into account the full spectrum of membership.

Furthermore, decision-making is complicated by the fact that governors in networks do not respond to only one contingent, nor does any one actor hold a high degree of influence to push others toward efficient and timely solutions. These problems stem largely from a lack of centralized control. Especially at the large landscape scale, covering a very large amount of forested (and unforested) land, there is a lack of a clear principal, electorate, or consistent constituency—or overly broad and perhaps too large a constituency.

Van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004) express trepidation that the traditional checks and balances of government could become obsolete in networked governance. They explain that the state, as the primary organ designed to maintain order, is uniquely positioned; by implication other actors might not be up to the task, especially when in a networked configuration.

“Governability – the capacity to solve urgent societal problems – often required a certain centralization and concentration of political power. Basic examples are the protection of man against man – the problem of social order, of criminality, civil war and war – the protection of man against nature – the problem of material and economic survival – and the protection of nature against man – the problem of the environment” (VanKersbergen and VanWaarden 2004).⁴⁸ At the same time, we know that in today’s globalized world the state’s duties have been passed along to other entities: above, below, and around national governments. So to some degree functional differentiation is a necessary component of global governance as it simply may not be possible to have a centralized unitary governing body at the supranational level. The Roundtable provides a way to bridge the need for a transnational approach to managing forests with the realistic assessment that the level of agreement found in a treaty might be unattainable.

⁴⁸ This is not to suggest that the authors do not recognize the shifting and evolving shape of states, and that over time certain tasks have been parsed out—including to private actors.

7.2.2 Obstacles to Legitimate Governance

Placing governance in the transnational context poses some challenges. If problems cross borders is it also possible that transboundary governance can be accepted as adequately addressing them in a way that is responsive to a transboundary population. This is a population, in the case of the Crown of the Continent, that for one, may not even recognize itself as being knit together, and secondly, may not realistically be able to achieve entirely inclusive participation. These are not small challenges.

In the absence of a legal basis, is there a substituting role that broad participation plays, when it is drawn from across borders? Can actors' presence at the table be deemed enough to justify the decisions made? The answer is yes and no. I argue that the process of participation, as the fundamental requirement, must take on particular deliberative qualities in order to confer legitimacy in NG. That is to say, the fact that participation is entirely open and includes a large portion of civil society matters quite a bit in the Roundtable case. However, simply having civil society organizations at the table is not enough. In a transboundary space, since it is not possible to have entirely inclusive participation, the nature of the interactions that individuals have becomes even more important.

One potential challenge here is that high levels of participation (inclusiveness) can slow the decision-making process and push real policymaking back in favor of building the processes around inclusion. Adding many voices can imply adding just as many perspectives. In cases where there is not much overlap of opinion, each voice can represent a significantly different policy direction. When these competing demands must be balanced, especially in the case of consensus-based governance, decisions can come to a screeching halt altogether. If legitimacy is process-based, or built upon the notion of inclusiveness, then the trade-off between efficiency in

decision-making and the paralysis that sometimes comes along with consensus-building becomes very real.

Bernauer et al. (2013) pose the question, “is there a democracy-civil society paradox in global environmental governance?” They entertain the notion that in some settings, namely more autocratic regimes where democratic development may not have progressed very far, the participation of civil society can result in higher levels of ratification for environmental treaties.⁴⁹ It is not clear, though, that in highly democratic settings, the mere presence of civil society will result in higher levels of international environmental cooperation. The authors explain, “The impact of ENGOs on international cooperation is generally positive but is likely to decrease or even disappear at high levels of democracy” (Bernauer et al. 2013, 104).

This suggests that there is something outside of the mere presence of civil society that brings about improved environmental governance. There may be particularized benefits of bringing civil society into governance arrangements. Strengthening ENGOs in less democratic countries can help quite a bit in terms of counteracting the generally negative effect that autocracy has (purportedly) on international cooperation.⁵⁰ However, the benefits of having civil society’s involvement may lie closer to the process in which this is done.

This was evident in the case of the Crown Roundtable. The list of participants is

⁴⁹ Here it is possibly helpful to consider political development in tandem with economic development. The two have been linked for various purposes including to show how economic development may be a prerequisite of political development, or how economic development may lead to peace within and between countries (Gartzke 2007; Lipset 1959). Though Bernauer et al. (2013) do not explicitly make this connection between economic and political development, their paper presents a thought-provoking analysis that prompts reconsideration of the factors affecting ratification of environmental treaties.

⁵⁰ The authors recognize the counterintuitive nature of this argument, since democracy is usually thought of being concordant both with a more active civil society and with increased levels of international cooperation in the form of civic engagement and not corporate investment. There is much fodder here for the political economist. The intervening variable of economic development suggests that corporate influence taints the waters of civil society. In the case of the Roundtable, though, very few member organizations are corporate entities; therefore, the study does not borrow from the IPE literature.

impressive, and draws upon a wide variety of types of community groups and organizations. From the individuals working as self-employed artists, to the community college administrators, environmental lawyers, tribal leaders, and NGO directors, there is a broad swath of civic engagement. However, without conscientiously crafting an environment at the Roundtable where all interests can be equally heard and represented, the mere presence of these civil organizations may not be enough. The forms these interactions take on can become particularly important in a networked arrangement. One participant emphasized that looking at the rules for interaction was an important part of his participation,

so the collaborative processes and the coalition processes are driven by the goals and what you need to accomplish but, you know, when you're talking about the US and Canada you just really have to think about "what are the rules here? And what are the rules there? What can the US do to influence BC? Is there anything that BC can do to influence the US?" And then just weigh those opportunities, create the opportunities and move forward.

As the statement reflects, the process design makes a difference from the perspective of civil society actors.

Traditional electoral models of legitimacy that focus on the free and fair elections of representatives at the state and federal level are warranted in pointing to the importance of open elections and the added legitimacy that representative democracy brings, but in terms of a full deliberative democratic system of governance, there are some shortcomings. First, the electoral cycle imposes a certain short-sightedness for immediate policy items. Election cycles bound the amount of time available for solving a problem. For both the limitations imposed by the electoral cycle and population numbers at the transboundary scale, it is both undesirable and simply infeasible to have elected officials be the sole decisionmakers at the landscape scale. In terms of legitimacy, this means that we are moving away from a notion that elections make a policy process legitimate. It may be the wrong focus at the international level. Since it is not possible to

balance votes by economic might, population size, or otherwise, it seems fruitless to pin legitimacy onto representation across borders. But what does this mean for legitimacy? Are there alternative channels for legitimizing transboundary governance?

Legitimacy, as a normative component of governance, does not speak directly to environmental outcomes—such as a net increase or decrease in forest cover—nor does it directly stipulate which management practices are to take place. Performance-based standards for evaluating governance are important because they allow for short-term evaluation and also provide for an honest look at how well arrangements address social demands. Environmental problems are often so complex that resolving them is a very long-term endeavor; for some, indeed, their resolution will take lifetimes. Anthropogenic climate change, for example, is the result of industrial activity over centuries of human impact. The problem of excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere was not created in the short term, nor is it likely the solutions will pop up in the short-term time frame. A focus on the sociological basis of legitimacy allows us to look at how well arrangements address social demands, which often require a longer period of time to articulate. Building trust and a shared identity into the process can help it become more responsive over time.

Paying attention to social demands on governance, we see that ethical concerns rise to the top. In terms of equity and fairness, solutions to environmental problems should not impose unduly harsh or unfair demands on those who are not to blame for their creation: this is especially clear in the developing countries that are now forced to carefully consider their industrial trajectory given what we know about atmospheric science and greenhouse gas pollution and the stark economic constraints imposed by energy production costs. Social

demands on governance are not restricted to equity and fairness. They are also closely bound up with notions of legitimacy.

Even for those populations with the knowledge and means to reduce emissions, there are thresholds of what is deemed *acceptable*. For example, rigorous treaty-based binding emissions reduction targets seem to evade states where incentive-based market schemes might seem to make it easier for emitters to behave in more environmentally-friendly ways. The governance options we choose have quite a bit to do with their perceived legitimacy. Certain modes are simply deemed inappropriate and no amount of environmental effectiveness (or objective outcomes) will convince a governed population otherwise. However, just as the accountability deficit is a false problem, the legitimacy trade-off is also a source of unneeded worry. Legitimacy in governance is possible at the supra-state level, with the transboundary landscape as a deliberative space characterized by civic cosmopolitanism. This notion is explored in the following section.

7.3 Creating More Accountable and Legitimate Networked Forest Governance

In natural resource management around the world, for example, the term “conservation” has varying connotations. Some are distrustful because they see it as park designation, or cordoning people from areas where they pursue their livelihoods (Igoe 2014). Conservation, then, has become a notion that some suggest is meaningless without contestation. In other words, seeing conservation as a set of technical interventions is a fruitless exercise (Igoe 2014). Instead, we should continuously define and redefine its meaning.

Just as we should mindfully consider how we define concepts, and be reflexive in allowing for their multiple and shifting meanings over time, governance processes should not be

unconditionally accepted, but continuously shaped by active participations who are simultaneously abiding by rules but also acting as agents of change.⁵¹ Here, it is useful to examine how various arrangements are legitimated, and to contrast the sociological with a normative basis in order to highlight the importance of deliberative qualities in the former.

7.3.1 Transboundary Deliberation as a Reflexive and Discursive Practice

In *The Zen of International Relations*, Chan, Mandaville, and Bleiker (2001, 232) suggest that “It is not what one does, but how one does it that matters most.” Applied to transboundary networked governance, this points to the trial-and-error required. Stitching disparate jurisdictions into a single geography is not an easy task. Individuals and organizations must be willing to participate, but on the basis of being open to deliberation—trusting that others will do the same. This requires some amount of courage as it means that actions taken in one jurisdiction are no longer subject to scrutiny from within narrow borders but answerable to larger audiences. Assisting the process of trust-building, as shown in the previous chapter, are a common identity and shared norms. These qualities, together, are part of a broader trend toward democratizing international relations and global governance. Deliberation is a process in which participants are committed to sharing the same table regardless of their differences; it is a fundamental building block in this process.

The process of deliberation alone, however, is not sufficient. We should not forget the importance of the discursive framing in governance networks. Storytelling either in terms of public political accounts about societal problems, moral values and common futures, or

⁵¹ The sociological basis of legitimacy is not unique to NG. The state’s governing authority can also be examined as a process of continuous evaluation (Bodansky 1999; Uphoff 1989; Weber 1946; Zürn 2004).

regarding the propagation of ‘best practice’, can be used deliberately to influence the policy-making processes within governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2005, 204). Therefore, a deliberative setting should allow for the co-existence of multiple, overlapping, and even competing discourses. While not all individuals or organizations may be given a seat at the table, discourses can stand in their place.

Bound up in this notion is discursive representation, which allows governance to retain the qualities of democracy at the global level where it is not possible to represent individuals or even all organizations, but it is possible to represent broader perspectives. Giving space to discourses as perspectives (or worldviews) allows for representation, through albeit unconventional means. Dryzek (2010) sees networked governance as the most appropriate channel for discursive representation. Going back to the importance of rhetoric, informal arrangements allow for a more spontaneous form of expression than formal hierarchical arrangements.

Discursive legitimacy according to Dryzek (2010, 191) fits in the transnational context, in fact, as he claims, “far better than most alternative conceptions of democratic legitimacy, which are tied to a constitutional structure and set of accepted rules that do not exist at the global level.” Here he uses the notion of meta-consensus, which is essentially the general agreement that, because collective constitutional rules are not available as they are in the domestic context, competing discourses or values will be seen as equally valuable. Whether an opinion ultimately transfers itself from a discussion phase to a decision-making context, meta-consensus allows for its validation and recognition. Where Dryzek differs with the findings in the case of the Crown Roundtable is that he focuses on the value of rhetoric and discursive representation. Rhetoric is so important for him because it enables the transfer of preferences from the ‘public space’ to the

‘empowered space’ (2010). The way civil society speaks and writes about issues is a vehicle or mechanism for expressing demands to decision makers. In the case of toxic runoff from mining operations in British Columbia, civil groups linked up across borders. Their powerful stories made the campaign successful.

Cosmopolitan citizenship is a form of “universal citizenship that can bind all members of humanity together” (Brown and Held 2010). Along with Habermasian thought, it focuses on the well-being of the individual and not of the sovereign state. Under the aegis of “shared risk” it is imperative that notions of citizenship extend beyond state borders (Mason 2005), which are particularly arbitrary in the case of conserving forested landscapes. Sovereignty, then, should be contingent in the transboundary landscape when it impedes ecological connectivity. It has been suggested the regional or ecosystem level is the most appropriate for the types of public-private partnerships that address forest ecosystems (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007).

A cosmopolitan approach does not merely require more citizen participation. Instead, it is important to pay attention to the quality of participation. So rather than bringing more actors on board, it is important to consider the terms of their involvement when drawing participants into a process. In fact, increased citizen involvement does not necessarily lead to better outcomes. Increased citizen participation did not result in higher levels of treaty ratification (Bernauer et al. 2013). While they entertain the notion that in some settings, namely more autocratic regimes, where democratic development has not progressed too far—possibly in tandem with economic development (though the authors do not explicitly make this connection)—the participation of civil society can result in higher levels of ratification for environmental treaties, it is not clear

that in highly democratic settings, the mere presence of civil society will result in treaty ratification, the proxy for international cooperation.⁵²

Conceiving of civil society outside the traditional bounds of political communities, especially outside of the state avoids nationalism and statism, there are two barriers to making transnational governance democratic. It is possible to simultaneously embrace sovereignty and to recognize that it must continually be reevaluated and reendowed. It is not a given. Mary Kaldor (2003) expresses this notion as “contingent sovereignty.” Contingent sovereignty implies that transboundary concerns must be addressed, and that legitimacy is not only endowed from the domestic population. In other words, the state must earn the right to remain autonomous or immune from external intervention. It borrows from the idea that “...states will continue to be the juridical repository of sovereignty, although sovereignty will be much more conditional than before—increasingly dependent on both domestic content and international respect” (Kaldor 2003). The implication of moving toward a global system or even global society and away from episodic engagements, with continual and more lasting arrangements⁵³ constructed around shared norms, identities, and visions is that empirical sovereignty⁵⁴ will depend on the state’s ability to govern.

⁵² There are however, particularized benefits of civil society in that strengthening ENGOs in less democratic countries can help quite a bit in terms of counteracting the generally negative effect that autocracy has (purportedly) on international cooperation. The authors recognize the counterintuitive nature of this argument, since democracy is usually thought of being concordant both with a more active civil society and with increased levels of international cooperation in the form of civic engagement and not corporate investment. There is much fodder here for the political economist. The intervening variable of economic development suggests that corporate influence taints the waters of civil society. In the case of the Roundtable, though, very few member organizations are corporate entities; therefore, the study does not borrow from the IPE literature.

⁵³ Though admittedly, these budding arrangements are complex and layered—and sometimes fleeting.

⁵⁴ Juridical sovereignty, or constitutional sovereignty, means that no other state has legal authority within its borders (R. Jackson and Sorensen 2010). Empirical sovereignty refers to the development of national unity and popular support for the state; it is “the extent to which states have developed efficient political institutions, a solid economic basis...” (Ibid, 20).

Thinking in the liberal Kantian tradition, the quality of democracy can be conferred based on the will of or the “ethos of a people,” regardless of the political borders that bound or transect the group (Habermas 2010). This means that transboundary governance can be freed from the boundaries of the state, bound instead to the will of the people, even if formal mechanisms are not in place to elect leaders, pass referenda, or appoint legislators to enact binding policy. In order to adequately free governance from political borders that transect a space, however, social capital is needed in order to build the levels of trust for true democratic engagement. Together with trust, a concordant component is the shared norm of retained autonomy. The norm of autonomy and the multiple, simultaneous identities it engenders strengthens deliberation immensely. If individuals are able to maintain their collective and disparate identities, they may be more receptive to seeing others’ perspectives as valid because they can relate to the challenges and struggles in other areas of conservation.

Transboundary networks form the basis of deliberative democracy at the supra-state level. They are the hardware of the voluntary governance logic, to Dryzek’s (1999) “software” – or the coding that stipulates the non-binding nature of arrangements in an anarchic international system. As Bäckstrand (2010, 30) puts it, “Networks are interesting from the perspective of deliberative democracy because relations between actors in networks rely on communication, exchange of information, and on trustful and cooperative attitudes, which can provide arenas for deliberation.” In this sense, the transboundary network is incredibly important for adding a deliberative quality to international relations.

Habermas calls bringing this democratic quality above the state creating a “global domestic politics.” The global-domestic linkage here refers to bringing the quality of democracy to the international level where it previously did not exist. It is an arena in which diverse actors

and entities—including world organizations and transnational networks—are recognized (Jurgen Habermas 2010).⁵⁵ The argument for transnational democracy is not that traditional institutions are possible or even desirable above the state, but that legitimate governance does not always have to depend upon elections. Instead, if a deliberative space is created, political borders do not matter so much as the engagement of citizens with one another. The social relationships that cross borders, then, legitimate the governance process when decision-makers are accountable to one another in ways that move outside the scope of state-based mechanisms.

Reputations as linkages of trust. The notion of a reputation brings together components of accountability and legitimacy. Reputations assume that there is a linkage between individuals, but also depend upon a sense of trust between them. This fits with the notion of social capital. Broadly speaking, social capital is a defining feature of NG (Huppé, Creech, and Knoblauch 2012). Social relational features lend legitimacy and accountability to all sorts of networks; they are not unique to environmental conservation governance networks. Other types of networks also rely on trust. For example, “collaborative consumption” networks are becoming popular. It is now possible to link up with other individuals who loan, rent or trade the use of their cars, power drills, and even their homes. Online peer networks link individuals up who need the use of various items with those who have them. Someone may loan out her lawn mower to a neighbor one day, and the next week she might borrow a shovel or step ladder from another neighbor. The

⁵⁵ It might be easy to confuse these three levels with Kenneth Waltz’s three “images” of world politics, but this is a dangerous mistake. Waltz used the notion of an image much like a snapshot. The levels of politics—man, the state, and war (the international system)—simply allow the neo-realist to distill the unit of analysis. However, Habermasian global-domestic politics is an approach that identifies “arenas” instead of images. For Habermas, these three overlapping spaces are where contestation and deliberation take place; in this sense, for Habermas, there is process or “work” involved in politics. For Waltz, outcomes are pre-determined based on capabilities and material resources. “Governance” would be a foreign concept because it is too messy, and deviates from—and often rejects—the notion that politics is a machine upon which actors merely press play.

peer-to-peer model works because participants not only know that their favors will be returned, but that they can trust their items will not be mistreated.

Trust is built into the system by keeping track of peer reputation. NG is successful in these cases because social capital is readily measured and displayed on user profiles, allowing others to trust that their items and homes will be used wisely because reputations have been established over time. One's reputation, then, is "a new form of social currency that could become as powerful as our credit cards" (Botsman 2010, 15:30).

7.3.2 Reflexive Governance for Complexity

Albert-László Barabasi (2002, 6) suggests we are "close to knowing just about everything there is to know about the pieces" or the constituent components of the world around us. This means very little about our progress toward understanding whole systems, though. As Barabasi succinctly puts it, "Riding reductionism, we run into the hard wall of complexity. We have learned that nature is not a well-designed puzzle with only one way to put it back together" (Barabasi 2002, 6). He suggests that natural systems are complex, and so, too, should our approach be to understanding them.

The complexity inherent in natural systems is sometimes masked. It is often easy in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, to limit our scope to one particular problem. Once we master our understanding of a small corner of the world, we can easily slip into complacency, fooling ourselves that we understand the whole of it. The desire to state claims with confidence about how the world works, to espouse generalities that transfer from one system to another, is a dangerous tendency that can pervade governance efforts as well. Hierarchical arrangements are particularly prone to the tendency to 'lock in' particular rules, applying them across space and

time. This approach has historically failed in forest governance, because communities' needs can change over time, and people depend on forested landscapes for so much more than timber resources.

Reflexivity, then, is the necessary mindset to embrace complexity. In governing natural systems, we need to be careful not to make generalizations or assumptions that what works in one place will work in another. With regard to setting rules for forest management, whether they pertain to timber harvest, energy development on forested lands or the movement of wildlife across a landscape, it is important to avoid universalism. Instead, a commitment to the process of working with other individuals and organizations across a landscape is what will move governance toward higher democratic standards. Rules in global forest governance can provide a basis for the types of evidence that are deemed acceptable but rules should not set unflinching management protocols.

Reflexive governance is a process of continual self-examination and mid-course adjustments. It is related to the capacity of a structure or process to change in light of scrutinizing successes and failures (Dryzek 2014). This implies that making networked governance democratically accountable and legitimate is a slow process and does not happen overnight. This notion is supported by the analysis presented here as well as in the literature. In one study on protected area landscape governance, Lockwood (2010) found that identifying best management principles is an iterative process, requiring back-and-forth vetting. In the case of protected area governance, the Lockwood study started with the first step of drafting management principles with an expert panel. Next, input and feedback from land managers, 'key informants,' and others was required in order to identify which practices would be feasible, desirable or some optimum

combination thereof. These draft principles, once vetted by those working in the field, were then used to evaluate actual governance practices in protected areas.

In a study offering lessons for institutional design in networked settings, Agranoff (2006) shows management practices come about as the result of mutual learning and adjustment. Because networks themselves are comprised of individuals and organizations, they are not usually the site of decision-making, but rather, where agreements are reached (*Ibid*). Shared authority generally leads to consensus-based decision-making, which hinges far less on procedural rules and more on ongoing discussions. The loosely coupled organizational structure inherent in NG provides benefits in terms of social learning (Stankey, McCool, and Clark 2003). Mutual learning through the exchange of ideas and negotiation around sensitive issue areas are key to the process, which Newell et al. (2002) also reinforce. Mutual learning in the case of the Crown Roundtable meant that individuals, by sharing their experiences, could learn how to better move forward. This process proceeded in fits and starts, with some backtracking as mistakes were corrected.

7.3.3 Moving from Pluralist to Deliberative Democracy

One of the defining elements of democracy is pluralism, or the inclusion of a broad range of interests in the policy making process. Pluralism requires broad participation. As participation levels increase, according to this logic, so do levels of legitimacy. Pluralist notions of democracy at the domestic level point toward the multiple, diverse, and sometimes competing interests surrounding environmental issues. Governance under traditional perspectives is often conceived of as formal public policy, which should be the “outcome of competing interests in the environmental realm to produce effective policy” (Davidson and Frickel 2004). Pluralism places

the state as a neutral actor that houses the space for the pursuit of a suite of goals and interests. The state remains capable of being the neutral space insofar as decisions and policies are set forward by elected officials and carried out by impartial resource managers.

It is noteworthy that Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, two founders of the pluralist school of democratic governance, both tended to focus on domestic politics, which may explain some of their reticence to scale the notion up to the international level. It seems pluralists, conceiving of legitimacy in terms of participation, are disinterested in transnational democracy altogether. In fact, Dahl (2010) stated, of civic participation at the international level, “I see no reason to clothe international organizations in the mantle of democracy simply in order to provide them with greater legitimacy” (Dahl 2010).

It is often assumed that broad participation brings legitimacy automatically—that simply having broad participation does not mean all participants view each other as appropriate and/or capable sources of decision-making authority. Mere participation should not be equated with legitimacy. Simply bringing actors to the table does not always mean they will view each other as equally equipped to address challenges. For example, actors in any governance setting will “size” each other up, making judgments about their capabilities. This carries from the town hall, city council, to the domestic courtroom, to international negotiations. Participation in a process does not automatically mean that actors perceive one other, let alone the process, as appropriate governors or arenas for governance. Conceiving of legitimacy as mere participation obscures its deliberative qualities.

What does it mean to bring deliberation into democratic processes? Deliberation is “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims

made by fellow participants” (Chambers 2003, 309). If we insert deliberation into a democratic system, we see that participation in the form of voting is not in itself a deliberative practice. Instead, deliberative practices require back-and-forth engagement between parties that are willing and able to revise their positions depending on the demands of the situation or the needs of their peers. It is the commitment to a process rather than any particular set of values. Any a priori requirement for agreement comes from the need for continued engagement.

As John Dryzek (2010, 15) puts it, “the key goal of deliberation is to produce meta-consensus that structures continued dispute.” Meta-consensus is “agreement on the legitimacy of contested values, on the validity of disputed judgments, on the acceptability and structure of competing preferences, and on the applicability of contested discourses” (Dryzek 2010, 15). In this sense consensus does not mean that participants must all agree on outcomes; instead, reaching meta-consensus means that participants agree that others’ preferences are worthwhile additions to the governance process.

Deliberative democracy “focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting” –consent becomes more important insofar as it involves a richer justification of policies than in an aggregative model of democracy (Chambers 2003, 308). To say that the deliberative model replaces the aggregative model implies that the quality of participation matters more than the numbers (or even types) of participants.

Conflict: creating space for disagreement. We should not always agree with one another. This sentiment is wittily stated in a quote from Bill Bishop’s *The Big Sort*: “I hope not to be exiled to some place where the vast majority agrees with me,” said one Republican in South Austin. This particular individual who found himself (understandably) out of place within his neighborhood organization, bravely continued to participate for the sake of dialogue and an

honest desire to work toward bettering his community. However, as Bishop points out, this is increasingly becoming the exception. Cities and regions of the country are sorted along ideological lines, a trend that has been documented by political scientists for some time. Similarly, if American media outlets are any indicator, what suffices for political debate now looks more like token personalities peppered into primetime “news” programs as foils for delivering the polarized networks’ biased messages; print journalism is not immune either with its op-ed contributors selected based on keeping readers sedate and subscribing.

We cannot afford to ignore differences for the sake of finding common ground—place is about shared and *contested* meanings (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). Identities can be created through a wide range of processes ranging from collaboration to contestation. But in the end, land management that is not only ecologically sound but “socially acceptable” will have the greatest staying power (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). Identities that are co-created will likely be more durable.

In order to ensure networks do not simply deliver self-affirming information we must encourage diverse perspectives,⁵⁶ not just diverse membership sectors. In other words, pluralism in membership base is not enough to constitute the deliberative basis of legitimacy in NG; instead discursive pluralism, or the recognition of competing narratives is what ultimately brought about acceptance in the Roundtable. The fora allowed participants to express themselves freely without fear of punishment. Furthermore, in the Roundtable participants did not gloss over or skirt contentious topics.

⁵⁶ Agonistic democracy is another approach that points to the permanence of conflict in political life. I feel much of what is articulated in NG supports this approach. That conflict is inevitable is not to suggest that differences of opinion need result in violent fighting or that disagreements will destroy governance mechanisms, but that it is impossible to suggest permanent rules or unchanging decisionmaking procedures.

Embracing irony. Consideration of non-state interests increases legitimacy, but may slow down or hinder environmental protection (Newig and Fritsch 2009), but engaging in the process—even where one recognizes that the outcome may result in failure—is critical to maintaining the deliberative quality of transboundary governance. This is the “irony” of reflexive governance that Bob Jessop (2003, 163) outlines: “the ironist adopts a satisficing approach. She accepts incompleteness and failure as essential features of social life but continues to act as if completeness and success were possible.”

7.4 Design Principles for Democratic Networked Governance

Through its altered forms of accountability and the social basis of acceptance that legitimates the process, networked forest governance harnesses the inherent desire that people have to protect and improve the places they live in and do good by the people they call friends. The Roundtable has engendered some of the best attributes governance theory suggests of NG. However, I recognize that this may not be true for other networked arrangements and it also may not be true for the Roundtable as the years progress. Part of the value and contribution in this project, then, is to offer concrete and practical suggestions on institutional design for NG. It is my hope that by elaborating on the components of the process that serve the Roundtable well, I can highlight the ways that other collaborative networked arrangements can reach their potential.

7.4.1 Face-to-Face Interaction

From the literature on collaborative governance all the way to networked governance, there is general agreement that face-to-face communication is of limitless value (Jessop 2003;

Newig and Fritsch 2009). Indeed, the major shift toward networked global governance hinged in large part on its broader inclusion and participation base.

In order to be participatory, individuals must take part in conversations with each other.

One participant noted:

So I realized that as long as this issue was framed as US versus Canada we were never going to get results. After I spent some time in Fernie, I realized, ‘My gosh, we have so much in common. But we don’t know each other. We have the Elk Valley and the Flathead valley, communities like Whitefish and Fernie—we are ignorant of each other. In the face of ignorance comes suspicion and distrust and raw emotions like nationalism and jingoism.’ *We had to change that dynamic, and the best way to do it was to get to know each other.*


Much of what participants told me echoed this sentiment—that without knowing each other it would be difficult to link up at the landscape level. The type of communication is informational and not demanding, largely because decision making often still resides within individual jurisdictions. One research scientist put it this way, “So it’s complicated, and that’s where the relationship part of it comes in because we can all talk frankly about it when we’re just sitting around having a chat, but ultimately, you know, that decision would be carried out at the highest levels of government.”

The sense of obligation stemming from face-to-face participation enhances the democratic quality of governance. Communication is just one of multiple components of fully collaborative or democratic NG. This type of accountability gets us further toward the patterns observed in the Roundtable, but what is the optimal number of participants and is NG possible in a meaningful way at the global level? This is a question that scholars of international relations and global governance have weighed in on. Some say that global-level democracy is simply not possible; therefore, binding arrangements are not desirable. Others, such as Eckersley and Dryzek are more optimistic about the prospects for democratic engagement at the global level.

The crux of the matter is probably, however, that the decisions made must be more about collaborative visioning and identity than specific management protocols. There is a danger in simply bringing as many individuals and organizations on board as possible.

Therefore, a suggestion for the Crown Roundtable, or networked processes more generally, is that it is wise to look for areas of overlap, where shared goals and visions live. It is easy to make a list of all organizations and individuals working in the landscape. This is essentially an exercise in directory-making. It is even possible to sort organizations by issue/resource, region, or sector. However, directory making is *not* reaching the full potential of shared visioning. The shared visioning space is crucial for collective goal setting. Figure 7.1 below maps the range of weak collaboration to full deliberative engagement along the axes of meeting format and activity type. Meeting in person, face-to-face, lends to the deliberative process and ultimately results in strong or ‘thick’ notions of legitimacy and accountability, where actors are bound to one another because they build the same process together.

Figure 7.1 The Pathway toward Full Deliberative Engagement, Mapped on the Modes and Degree of Interaction Axes.



7.4.2 Iterative Engagement

Iterative interactions in networked processes should ideally take place over the span of many years. The slow food movement has reminded us to take the time to enjoy the fruits of our agricultural and culinary work, and to do so with good company (Petrini 2007). In recent years, other “slow” movements have included slow money, slow gardening and even slow wine.⁵⁷ The more politically-relevant version has been *Slow Democracy*, in which Susan Clark and Woden Teachout (2012) build on their backgrounds in community organization and democracy scholarship to document examples of participatory democracy around the United States arguing that local citizen engagement, when paired with new communication technology, can bring about changes in governance needed to address today’s challenges in areas from community forest management to local school redistricting.

Slow collaboration. Broadened participation takes time. High levels of participation (inclusiveness) can slow the decision-making process and push real policymaking back in favor of building the processes around inclusion. Adding many voices can imply adding just as many perspectives. In cases where there is not much overlap of opinion, each voice can represent a significantly different policy direction. When these competing demands must be balanced, especially in the case of consensus-based governance, decisions can come to a screeching halt altogether. If legitimacy is process-based—built upon the notion of inclusiveness—then the trade-off between efficiency in decision-making and the paralysis that sometimes comes along with consensus-building becomes very real. However, the old adage that one must sometimes go slow to go fast applies here. The governance process is not enhanced if increased participation is

⁵⁷ Chelsea Green Press in White River, Vermont has published quite a few monographs on these topics.

the sole goal without considering the time it takes for collaborative visioning. As Dryzek (2013, 234) puts it, “Any shift from government to governance does not necessarily yield better results if governance is dominated by the same old actors committed to the same old imperatives.”

If improving the governance process takes time, one can imagine that achieving outcomes is time-intensive as well. Indeed, even amongst those in the field of conservation, individuals who work daily on issues surrounding wildlife and natural resource management sometimes struggle to adopt recommended practices. “Did I tell you a bear came and ate all my chickens?” I heard one conservationist say to another, while I’m sitting at my temporary desk at the NGO office in Fernie, British Columbia. Just after having a lunch interview with the director about “Bear Aware” program, it seemed that those running the program do not always follow their own advice. They were keeping major attractants (the chickens) in their own yards. This vignette demonstrates that achieving goals at the community level, let alone the landscape level, is slow-moving and it comes in fits and starts.

When new pieces of knowledge are revealed, or new best practices exposed, it takes time for them to catch on. “Coking” and metallurgical coal mining in the Elk Valley (Fernie, B.C.) gives it the nickname the “slow valley” in reference to the 2-3 day process of baking coal to produce a high quality, high-C content product that can be used to make steel—the metallurgical character of the coal found in the Elk Valley. The process involves using airless high-heat ovens to “drive off the liquid and gaseous volatiles.” Another participant stressed that doing transboundary collaborative conservation is “slow, but these processes with many players take time.”

Multi-day events. On the shorter time frame, roundtable or conferencing events that bring individuals together should be long enough to create a comfortable amount of time for

participants to sit at the same table without rushing through an agenda. Some land managers are accustomed to seeing one another, and disgruntled groups in a dispute resolution setting where arbitration or dialogue is facilitated (Kemmis and McKinney 2011). Structured and guided interaction is valuable in many cases, but is not necessarily conducive to fostering the type of deliberative engagement necessary to make NG work well. Networking events that take place over the course of multiple days allow participants to interact in an unstructured setting where informal conversations in hallways and lunch tables helps people get to know each other as peers who face similar challenges and are motivated by common rewards.

7.4.3 Collective experiences

Experiential learning is valuable not only for showing participants new places and ideas, but for creating a shared learning experience that draws individuals together (Cheng and Daniels 2003). Field trips during the Crown Roundtable involved group transportation, which gave participants time to get to know each other while traveling through the landscape. In fact, on the bus to a field excursion to an old-growth cottonwood forest outside of Fernie, B.C., I got the chance to talk to an individual who had been too busy during the conference to meet for a formal interview. If we had not talked on the bus, it is possible that I may not have had the opportunity to meet with this interviewee at all.

7.5 Conclusion

The democratic deficit is a false problem in NG. The openness and flexibility inherent in the informal nature of networked arrangements offers a large degree of flexibility while also encouraging participation. The Crown Roundtable brings in a diverse set of actors who might not

otherwise be involved in making decisions at the large landscape level. While this might seem like a departure from the ways we may be accustomed to holding each other to standards at the domestic level, NG offers incredible promise for conservation in the transboundary context. Even though there are few formal rules in the case of the Crown Roundtable, there is evidence that individuals feel a strong sense of obligation toward one another; they share information and resources with one another, facilitated by leading individuals who are connectors, rewarding each other for linking up across the landscape. Furthermore, the whole process is perceived as acceptable, characterized by a common identity, a set of shared norms about conservation, and a strong sense of trust. All of this lends to the ability of this instance of NG to achieve outcomes for sustainability.

Approaches that emphasize deliberative democracy and civic cosmopolitan help us see these newer forms of accountability and legitimacy in NG. In light of the lessons learned in this case, I have offered some design recommendations for enhancing the democratic quality of NG. Namely, it is important that we move beyond a pluralist vision of democracy toward a deliberative one. Under a model of deliberative democracy, it becomes possible to reflexively consider it is what we are seeking to govern and the best way to achieve the outcomes we want. Three major institutional design principles emerge. To sum up, deliberative and reflexive governance should involve face-to-face interaction; it should take place over multiple sessions (it may be “slow” to come about), and it should create spaces where participants can share experiences together. These three elements help to bring about an NG process where individuals are not only connected across a landscape, but they perceive their involvement as important and appropriate.

7.5.1 Future directions

Many of the benefits of networked arrangements come from their informal and non-binding nature. This same informality can also implicate a tendency to change or shift as the needs of the day may call for new approaches. Governance arrangements should be dynamic in order to account for these changes. Furthermore, because organizations are not required to participate, they may choose to opt out at any point. In fact, evidence from the Crown Roundtable supports this. In the first four years of the Roundtable, there was some variation from one year to the next in terms of participation numbers. Some participants attended in the first years or two, but were unable to in subsequent years, while new participants joined in for the first time in the third and fourth annual Roundtables.

There is a need to better understand the structure of networked arrangements as certain network structural characteristics may be tied to better outcomes. Carlsson and Sandstrom (2008) suggest that particular measures—including density, centrality, and heterogeneity—may be tied to performance. Jedd and Bixler (2015) examine two of these features (density and centrality) in collaborative arrangements on the Crown landscape. However, further investigation is warranted for the Crown Roundtable in its current configuration.

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