

DISSERTATION

GENDER, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN

Submitted by

Nicole Freiner

Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, Colorado

Spring 2007

UMI Number: 3266394

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3266394

Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.


ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346


COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY


December 15, 2006

WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE DISSERTATION PREPARED UNDER OUR SUPERVISION BY NICOLE FREINER, GENDER THE ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN JAPAN, BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING IN PART THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.


Committee on Graduate Work


Dr. Sue Ellen Charlton, Adviser


Dr. Valerie Assetto


Dr. Brad Macdonald


Dr. Paul Trembath


Dr. William Chaloupka, Department Chair

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

GENDER, THE ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN JAPAN

This dissertation examines women's centers in Japan; these government institutions were established in order to promote women's formal political participation. The women's centers are designed to raise awareness about public issues and provide networking opportunities. Although some have criticized these structures as being a "top-down" initiative, others have seen opportunities for creating new pathways into politics for women. This dissertation utilized qualitative interviews in order to ascertain the role of women's centers in formalizing women's political participation. Moreover, this dissertation examined the degree to which environmental issues are addressed in the activities of the women's centers because there is a historical trend in Japan which suggests that the environmental issue area is particularly salient for women. This dissertation research finds that while the women's centers are offering services for women in the area of domestic violence which challenge traditional gender norms, the women's centers examined have not significantly altered women's status or access to formal politics.

Nicole Freiner
Department of Political Science
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado
Spring 2007

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been successfully defended without the support of many people. My dissertation adviser Dr. Sue Ellen M. Charlton, provided me with helpful feedback, room and board as well as counsel throughout this process, for all of this she has my deep thanks. My dissertation committee: Dr. Bradley Macdonald, Dr. Valerie Assetto and Dr. Paul Trembath gave me useful advice for strengthening my arguments and thinking beyond the dissertation which I greatly appreciate. Also at CSU, Dr. Bill Chaloupka and Violet Marquardt assisted me with finishing at a distance.

Partial assistance for completing this dissertation research was given to me by the University of Dayton and the Kettering Foundation. I would like to thank Dr. Christopher M. Duncan and Dr. David Mathews at each institution for this support. I am indebted to the women that I spoke with at the gender centers, as well as the staff at all of the gender centers for helping me gather information.

Personally, I would like to thank my family, James, Dianne, Mariann, Haleigh and Anarose. Friends, both near and far were also a constant source of support and I would like to acknowledge them by name here as well: Donna, Janeane, Anne, Kelly, Theresa, Jean, Dawn, Karen, Tonie and Beth. I have also greatly appreciated the coaching and positive reinforcement of my someone special, Mark Güven Heath, who kept my sane and well fed.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Women's Centers, Environmental Issues and Japanese Politics.....	pg. 1
Women in Japanese Politics.....	4
The Spectrum of Political Participation: Formal to Informal Politics.....	7
Research Approach.....	12
Regional Politics and Comparative Cases.....	18
Interviewing in Japan.....	21
Contribution to the Field.....	22
Outline of Study.....	23
 Chapter 2: The Japanese State: The Gender Ideology of Social Intervention.....	25
The Japanese State.....	25
Who Decides? Theoretical Debates.....	26
Political Parties and Representation.....	29
Cabinet.....	31
Bureaucracy.....	31
Levels of Government.....	36
Social Management by the Japanese State.....	40
Women's Policy Machinery.....	44
Domestic Gender Policies.....	49
Policy Machinery: Gender Centers.....	55
 Chapter 3: EnGendered Politicking: Confucian Legacies (In)Formal Spaces.....	59
Theoretical Debates: Gender and the State.....	59
Institutions of Political Participation.....	65
Social Movements, NGOs and Informal Networks.....	67
The Confucian Legacy in East Asia.....	70
East Asian Institutions of Political Participation.....	71
Social Movements, NGOs and Informal Networks in East Asia.....	76
Gender and Political Participation in Japan.....	78
 Chapter 4: Development, Environment and Women's Activism.....	83
Gender and the Environment.....	84
Women and Development.....	84
Social Movements.....	87
Eco-Feminism.....	89
Industrialization and Environmental Pollution.....	93
Environmental Activism in the 1960s and 70s.....	95
Movements and Political Parties.....	98
Environmental Policy Response.....	99
Overseas Development and <i>Gaiatsu</i>	103
Gendered Environmental Activism in Japan Today.....	106
Environment, Gender and the Japanese State.....	111

Chapter 5: Women's Centers, Politics and Environmental Issues in Japan.....	113
<i>Gaiatsu</i>	113
Women's Centers in Japan.....	117
Tokyo Women's Plaza.....	123
Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center.....	124
Yokohama Women's Forum.....	125
National Women's Education Center.....	126
Wings Kyoto.....	127
Dawn Center.....	128
Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women.....	129
Toyama Sunforte.....	129
Interviews.....	130
Domestic Violence Issues and Mental Health Issues.....	131
Women's Centers and the Japanese Family.....	136
Networking/Career Issues.....	138
Alternative Information Production (minikomi).....	141
The Japanese Woman and Political Life.....	141
Environmental Conservation and Women's Centers.....	143
Home Matters: Japanese Women and the Environment.....	145
<i>Seikatsu Club Seikyo</i>	145
Greenpeace Japan.....	147
 Chapter 6: Conclusions: Women's Centers, Politics and State Rhetoric.....	 150
Japanese State Agenda: Rhetoric vs. Reality.....	153
Women's Centers: Political Vehicles.....	156
The Conservative Backlash.....	158
(Un)State(ed) Feminism.....	161
Conceptual Reach: How Far Does State Feminism Travel?	162
Environmentalism and Women's Centers.....	163
Centers for Domestic Violence.....	166
Suggestions for Future Research.....	167
 Appendix 1: Timeline of the Development of Japan's National Women's Policy Machinery.....	 169
Appendix 2: Reasons for Promoting Household Eco-Account Books.....	170
 Bibliography.....	 172

Chapter 1: Women's Centers, Environmental Issues and Japanese Politics

In the past three decades women have become increasingly influential and important in the politics of industrialized democracies. Japan, however, has lagged behind this process. Despite this lag there is increasing evidence that women are becoming more important in formal and informal politics in ways typical of other industrialized democracies but also in ways unique to Japan. This study examines these changes in women's political participation in Japan and asks whether environmental issues have been a catalyst to expand that participation. Further, it asks whether publicly run "gender centers" offer an institutional setting for women interested in environmental policy to learn the skills and make the contacts that enable them to play a significant role in defining environmental problems and crafting solutions. Thus the overarching question is what role gender centers play in the politics of environmental issues.

Political participation takes place along a spectrum which ranges from formal methods to more informal ones. Formal methods refer to political activity which takes place inside of government political institutions, including voting, representation, and membership in government committees. In contrast, informal methods include political activity which, while its aim is to impact formal politics, takes place outside of

government political structures; it includes interest groups, advocacy groups, and new social movements. This distinction, and the spectrum of intermediate activities that links them, such as the gender centers, is discussed in the following section.

An unusual institutional feature of Japanese politics is a network of “gender centers” (*danjokyoudosankaku* 男女共同参画), now more commonly known as “women’s centers” (*josei sentaa* 女性センタア) established by the Japanese government pursuant to the United Nations Year (and Decade) for Women. Although criticized by some as being a “top-down” initiative by the state to manage women’s social roles, others have seen in these centers an opportunity for creating new pathways into politics for women. This dissertation seeks to understand the effect of the gender centers on women’s political participation.

Central to the questions about political participation and the role of the gender centers is the role of environmental issues. There is some historical evidence suggesting that Japanese women were particularly attracted to citizens’ movements that focused on environmental degradation during the 1960s and early 1970s, a period when women were largely absent from other forms of political activity. The history of women’s participation in early citizen’s movements leads me to ask if environmental issues play, or have the potential to play, a similar role in contemporary Japan. In particular, I ask the following questions about the link between environmental issues, political participation and the gender centers.

- To what extent and in what ways, are environmental issues addressed in the activities of the gender centers? Is there any evidence that environmental policy is more salient

than other policy areas in gender center programs, or more likely to attract women to the centers?

- Do any of the directors (or other key personnel) staffing the gender centers have connections to the earlier citizen's movements? Is there any evidence that involvement in a citizen movement generated the political interest that attracted women to the center?
- What links exist between the gender centers and non-governmental environmental organizations in Japan? Do women play an important role in the latter, or in establishing connections between these organizations and the gender centers?
- Do the gender centers operate specific programs to recruit and train women to play active roles in politics, and what is the role of environmental issues in any such programs? Is there any evidence that women have had greater access to politics as a consequence of gender centers?
- Does the evidence from the gender centers suggest that interventions by the Japanese state on behalf of women have advanced their status?

In order to address these questions, I propose a negative working hypothesis for this study: Because the gender centers were created by the Japanese state and are financed and staffed by public agencies from the local to the national level, they do not serve as effective pathways for women to move into more active political roles, nor are

they effective institutions for influencing environmental awareness or policies. The logic of this hypothesis and the preceding questions, as well as a strategy for answering them, is laid out in the section in this chapter entitled “Research Methods”. The two sections that follow introduce the debates about the role of women in Japanese politics and the spectrum of political participation.

Women in Japanese Politics

Although there has been more scholarly research on gender and political participation in Japan has expanded in recent years, it is still an area which has been understudied. Many of the most comprehensive work is in disciplines other than political science; sociology and anthropology, for example, are fields which are much richer in the literature on this topic. There are several biographies of Japanese feminists such as Oku Mumeo, Ichikawa Fusae, Hiratsuka Raicha and others who were active during the Pre-War and Post-Occupation period (Tanaka 1995, Tokuzo 1988, Vavich 1998). The influence of these early feminists is reflected in the proliferation of women’s associations after the American Occupation. Many of these associations were inspired by earlier interactions between women and the state, and earlier battles between the two over women’s suffrage. For example, in their book on suffrage and gender politics in the postwar period, Matsukawa and Tachi (1994) discuss the importance of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union which was founded in 1886 and organized around temperance and social issues. Naita, Yamaguchi and Kubo (1994) also document the status of women in Japan, and early women’s political rights movements in their work on the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The issue of

women's status and women's political participation is also evident in the works of Iwao (1983) and Pharr (1990).

One of the foundational works on Japanese feminism is *Flowers in Salt: Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Japan* by Sharon Sievers (1983). This work sketches the development of the Japan Women's Patriotic Association (JWPA), which, Sievers argues, received special support from the Japanese state in order for it to further its program of politicization of women. In this early stage of the women's movement Sievers work also documents the urban-rural split and the movement's inability to incorporate working women, a trend which is also noted by Leblanc (1999) and Noguchi (1992). The characterization of the relationship between women and the state in the postwar period as one marked by mutual reliance is shared by Garon (1997) who details the relationship of women's groups and the state in four in-depth historical case studies. The modern women's movement has been the object of inquiry for writers such as Shinoda (1968) and Ueno (1988) who focus on the post-war women's movement.

Several works also touch on the impact of modernization and development upon women's status in Japan, including Imamura (1996) and Hayes (1992). Many feminist authors, most notably Elshtain (1981, 1983), use a dualism of public and private to explain how women's lives are structured. The private sphere consists of the home and family while wage earning and politics take place in the public sphere. In Japan, there is a consensus among authors that women's participation in the labor force further strengthened the gap between public work and private home-making activities. State gender policies also affected this trend in women's activities that were mirrored in the women's movement. For example, Peng (2002) argues that Japanese welfare state

policies have at times helped to further polarize the Japanese women's movement which was bifurcated by the 1980s into two schools, one which advocated for a radical contestation against gender roles (the woman's liberation movement) and another which sought to reform the existing system by making woman more prominent within its spaces. While the women's movement has a promising start in the 1960s, by the 80s the movement had split into two groups: one a housewives movement concerned with protecting the family structure; the other comprising social feminists and career women who wanted greater equity at home and in the work world. Osawa (2000) also presents an in-depth analysis of gender equality approaches by the Japanese government in the 1990's, including the gender centers.

More recent examples of studies on Japanese women's political participation are reflected in the work of Robin Leblanc (1999) and Mary Goebel Noguchi (1992). Both authors outline the importance of housewives activism in Japan, a heretofore understudied phenomenon. These studies are relevant because they attempt to understand women's participation by expanding the notion of the political, while also broadening the characterization of the public vs. private dualism. Public and private is by some taken to mean political versus non-political. However, this is a conventional distinction which has been challenged by feminist theory which argues that private activities are, in essence, political.


Collectively, these works highlight a relationship of social management by the Japanese state, which many of the authors mentioned above cast in a negative light. Although the state funneled resources to women's organizations, it did so to advance a state agenda rather than a feminist or women's needs-based one. Few authors discuss

women's role in environmental movements as a springboard to women's participation in other forms of political organizing or formal politics. There is also a significant gap in the literature related to the effect of state interventions on women's political role or participation.

The Spectrum of Political Participation: Formal to Informal Politics

Political participation occurs along a spectrum of activity that ranges from formal methods to informal ones (See Figure 1.1). Political participation takes place along this spectrum with elected office being closest to the formal end, while social movements are near the informal end. In the field of political science, early studies of political participation focused primarily on voting and electoral behavior. However, authors writing as early as the 1970's acknowledged that this narrow focus did not allow for a broad enough consideration of political participation. For example, in their cross national comparison of political participation, Verba, Nie and Kim note that "the idea that citizen participation in political life is or should be limited to the periodic selection of leaders at election time is empirically inadequate" (Verba et. al 1971, 10). Furthermore, these authors recognized a dimension of political participation which they label "cooperative activity," consisting of cooperation among citizens in groups working formally or informally to attempt to influence government officials (Verba et al 1971). This type of "cooperative" dynamic is relevant because it exists between the government and citizens in Japan. Garon's (1997) study of social management in Japan analyzes relationships between citizens and the state which, while from his perspective may not be labeled cooperative in the sense that both groups do not benefit equally, *are* cooperative in their attempt to negotiate cooperatively for a desired outcome. The women's groups which

Figure 1.1 : Spectrum of Political Participation



Garon studied formed ties with government officials which were mutually beneficial. Similarly, women's involvement in consumerism grew out of cooperative activities with the state, an outgrowth of consumer protection policies which fostered consumer organization and other programs. In fact, early environmental groups developed from women's education groups sponsored by the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, and many were federations of consumer education groups sponsored by the Office of the Prime Minister called *seikatsu gakko* (Garon 1997). Examples of cooperative activity between citizens and government agencies to shape policy can also be found in the efforts of the Ministry of Health and Welfare to solicit the views of consumer organizations and cooperatives in order to formulate its product labeling policies (Vogel 1992).

Thus, the understanding of political participation has become more complex and with the consideration of increasingly less formal ways that citizens can influence their governments. Formal politics, which has often been seen as solely state-centric politics "has been steadily eroded by the progressive intrusion of state power into society until the two spheres have been virtually fused" (Fukui 2000, 7). This fusion means that it is more difficult to concentrate solely upon state institutions in order to gain a complete understanding of what are oftentimes complex interactions running the gamut between voting activity and social movements. A truly more universal definition of political participation includes any activity in which citizens engage to influence their governments, and power relations.

Scholars of Asian politics have also noted the importance of informal political participation. For example, Dittmer et al (2000) define informal politics as consisting of the use of non-legitimate means (albeit not necessarily illegal) to pursue public ends. This is a very broad view of political participation which relies upon judging what is or is not legitimate, a political move which may have more to do with social norms and mores than it does with the institutions that are actually in place. While this definition provides a starting point, it is problematic in terms of practical application and analytical clarity.

For the purposes of this study, I define informal politics more narrowly as political activity which, while its aim is impact on the government structure, takes place outside of formal government institutions. Frank Wilson (2002) provides an adequate definition, which this work relies upon. According to Wilson informal politics is comprised of interest groups, advocacy groups, community action groups, and new social movements. Wilson notes the importance of informal political actors also as essential

vehicles that allow individual citizens sharing common concerns to have a meaningful impact on the policies that govern their lives (121).

As an analytical tool, the distinction between formal and informal politics defines the categories within which political participation (by women and other actors) occurs. However, there is overlap and fusion among activities, and this is illustrated particularly in the citizen's environmental movements in which women played an important role during the 1960s and 70's. In addition, the distinction is an important one because the literature on gender and participation suggests that informal methods of participation are an important part of women's political repertoire (Neuhouser 1995, Kuumba 2001, and Payne 1990). For example, Robnett (1997) identified a distinct type of informal grassroots organizing by women who were excluded from occupying formal leadership positions in the black Church in the United States. Blee (1998), found that women in the Ku Klux Klan used informal strategies including drawing on family ties, church suppers, and family reunions to mobilize women. Taylor (1999) studied self-help organizations and found that these activities are often subsumed in networks and communities organized around an informal leadership of personal relationships. Taylor further argues that a wide range of women's collective action has been ignored by social movement scholars preoccupied with "movements operating in the political and economic arenas rather than the cultural arenas, an emphasis on formal organizations and exclusion of more fluid and diffuse forms of association" which employ non-tradition, informal methods (16). Stephen (1992) similarly argues that definitions of social movements exclude "many contemporary mobilizations and grass-roots organizing efforts in Mexico, and certainly render rather invisible the participation of hundreds of thousands of women

motivated by class-and gender-specific social roles” (82). Women often mobilize because they are unable to fulfill their household obligations because of economic or ecological stress, but they also participate because of their responsibilities as mothers (Martin 1990, Jelin 1990). In Japan, women’s groups started by housewives and mothers have provided most of the focus for the emergent consumer interest activism. Kirkpatrick (1975) notes that this activism reflected the “special responsibility for the home and home management and family well-being associated with the women’s role in Japanese society” (236). Women in these consumer movements used informal methods of organizing such as protests, boycotts and publicity campaigns.

Of course, the activities that lie along the spectrum between formal and informal politics consist of institutions and groups which possess characteristics that may be ascribed to both formal and informal politics. These would include the gender centers because they are publicly funded bodies that sponsor cultural and educational activities while being connected to prefectural and national level governments. The centers lie between formal and informal politics because they do not address only political issues, nor do they provide direct access to government. Women’s centers include an array of activities relating to political organization such as *koenkai* as well as providing counseling to domestic violence survivors and a space for non-profit organizations to network . The distinction between these two sets of activities is important because of feminist debates regarding the meaning of the “political.” For the purposes of this case study, I define political as those activities which directly seek to influence or access government, including environmental movements and networking for political candidates.

Research Approach

Gender centers represent an important initiative by the Japanese government on the behalf of women, but have these centers changed the way women participate in politics? As I stated in the introduction, this research began with the hypothesis that the gender centers have not had a significant impact on women's political participation in Japan. The reason for the use of a negative hypothesis stems from the fact that the gender centers are funded by the Japanese government and are staffed by public agencies. The literature on government policy machinery designed to advance women's status argues that many times these government initiatives hamper the growth of grass roots initiatives and may even co-opt the efforts of women's groups.

Research on women's political participation in advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe suggests that governmental structures may advance women's participation when certain criteria are met. Stetson and Mazur (1995) define these criteria as being met on the one hand "when the state is defined as a site of social justice and has the structural capacity to institutionalize new demands for equality and, on the other, when society sustains widely supported feminist organizations that challenge sex hierarchies through both radical politics from outside and reform politics in unions and parties" (290).

This set of broad preconditions is difficult to realize because of the complex historical, political, and cultural context within which state-society relations operate. The difficulty of finding, let alone creating both social justice and capacity in state institutions and social support for feminist organizations that challenge sex hierarchies explains why many feminist authors discuss the state as a site which holds minimal possibilities for

advancing women's interests. Authors such as Elshtain, (1981,1983), MacKinnon (1989), Phillips (1991), Eisenstein (1994) and Landes (1998) offer critiques of the liberal democratic state and its inability to promote women's participation because of its tendency to promote and sustain a hierarchy of male dominance and female subordination. This assessment, coupled with the gender norms in Japanese society suggests that the probability for government structures to achieve progressive changes in women's participation is low.

To examine these relationships, I use data on women's political participation in Japan. Specifically, I gathered information on the number of women participating in political activities at the gender centers as well as information on women participating in environmental movements. The level of participation I am analyzing is concentrated at the regional level, where I collected data from interviews at eight gender centers. Data on women's political participation at the national level is also used in order to situate the regional data and to make comparisons between the two levels. The information was collected through the use of qualitative interviews of women activists and public officials. I interviewed women's environmental movement participants, clients of the women's centers, and women's center managers and staff. I allowed the respondents to present as broad a view as possible of their perceptions of problems of political access facing women and then to offer both summarization and interpretation. The technique comes from an approach by Denzin (1978) termed "interpretative interaction". The ultimate intention of this approach is to arrive at a better understanding of the perceptions, motives, intentions and beliefs of movement participants.

Eckstein (1975) argues that there are various types of case studies, including the heuristic case study, which is used to stimulate the imagination toward finding important general problems and possible theoretical solutions. One uses such a case study as an intensive analysis, which may arrive at preliminary theoretical constructs. This notion is synonymous with Lijphart's (1980) conceptualization of case studies as theory-infirming mechanisms. This research is relevant for both feminist theories of the state as well as analyzing state and civil society relationships. Single cases may employ the comparative method because one observation is being made and the independent and dependent variables do not change during the period of study. Another strength of the case study is its ability to locate findings in particular historical and cultural milieu. As a result of such conceptual 'embeddedness,' the case study can look directly at a sequence of events that produced an outcome, rather than just at the outcome itself (Peters 1998, 141). Furthermore, case studies are comparative in the sense that they are implicitly viewed in the theoretical context of a larger number of cases, and, as the study of a certain problem, a particular case belongs to a larger category of cases.

My research examines both formal structures and practices and informal politics. The eight centers which are the focus of this dissertation make apt case studies because of their similarities and differences among a number of different factors: geographic location and elements of social structures; relationship with city and prefectural governments; and, demographic characteristics. This project analyzes case studies, utilizing fieldwork to gather information and employing an interactive interview approach to answer questions about women's centers in Japan. This research is comparative on several levels. First, eight women's centers are compared with one

another and are also utilized as sub-units of Japanese gender centers. Environmental organizations are also utilized as sub-units of environmental organizations in Japan while they are compared as cases with one another. Furthermore, these cases are part of a cross-time analysis of a broader phenomenon in Japan; namely, the relationship between women's political participation and Japanese government initiatives on gender.

The Japanese case also speaks to the larger question of government structures and institutions specific to advanced industrial democracies which influence women's political participation. These cases illuminate an array of activities and relationships across prefectures and cities in Japan which reflect similar arrangements in other democracies. These institutions exist in Japan as well as other democracies. For example, Stetson and Mazur (1995) compare institutions which they dub "women's policy machineries" in North America and Western Europe. This research studies issues which may be compared with those of other countries, in particular, the impact of government initiatives on increased political access for women the broader theme of gender and political participation.

In 1975, the Japanese government started to establish gender centers at national, regional, and local levels. Ostensibly, the centers were part of a coordinated effort to move women's participation toward the formal end of the spectrum (Plan for Gender Equality 2000). The centers are designed to raise women's awareness about public issues and may also provide informal networking opportunities for women to politically organize. The gender centers in Japan represent an institution that bridges formal and informal politics because they receive public funding and their activities represent a broad range of activities.

In order to develop the case studies, this project required field work in Japan. Field research allowed access to primary sources often hard to access from outside Japan, and these were supplemented by conversations with personnel of the women's centers, women activists, and women who used the centers. The research includes interviews that revealed relationships not identified in other sources. The research also focuses on environmental movements because in Japan there is a political and historical trend which suggests that such movements appear to have special capacity to recruit women for political activities (Schreurs 2001). Also, the environmental citizen's movements of the 1960's and 70's predate the gender centers. Therefore, a central question in this research is whether the centers made a difference or influenced the "second wave" of environmental movements in the 1990's.

I interviewed women at eight gender centers across Japan: Tokyo Women's Plaza, the National Women's Education Center (located north of Tokyo); the Yokohama Women's Forum; Asian-Japan Women's Resource Center; Dawn Center in Osaka; Wings Kyoto; Kitakyushu Women's Forum; and, Toyama prefecture's Sunforte Gender Center. These women's centers were chosen because they represent diversity in location and missions. NWECC is a national center which is a clearinghouse for information and is overseen directly by the Minister for Gender Equality. Tokyo Women's Plaza is run by the city of Tokyo and is located in the heart of the city, Yokohama Women's Forum is located in a suburb of Tokyo and is overseen by the city government of Yokohama, Kitakyushu Women's Forum is on the island of Kyushu rather than the main island, and Toyama Sunforte is in Toyama prefecture which is in a more rural and isolated region of Japan. These centers each represent an array of demographic characteristics which will be

outlined in more detail below. Each of the centers I am studying has its own distinct mission and array of services; by examining these cases, I hope to glean information about political activities and the needs of the women who use these centers.

The environmental movements that I study include the Seikatsu Club Consumers Cooperative, which started in Tokyo and now has spread across Japan and Greenpeace Japan (whose main office is also in Tokyo) which is affiliated with Greenpeace International. These movements were chosen because each is located in a city which corresponds to a women's center's location or there was a branch of the movement located in the same region or area as a women's center. By studying a movement and a women's center located in the same geographic region, I was able to examine the connections between the two bodies. Concentrating in these eight locations in Japan also eased the confines of money and time.

I asked women who work at the gender centers specific questions about how they have interpreted the change in politics for women since the gender centers became part of the national apparatus of political participation. In order to ascertain whether or not gender centers have had a positive impact on participation, it was necessary to interview women who have participated in movements to find out if they have become more active in formal politics, and if gender centers motivated this change or if there has been a significant change in movement participation at all.

A subsidiary question which guides the research is to ascertain whether the gender gap in political participation is increasing or decreasing over time. This question is relevant because it illustrates the degree to which women are involved in formal politics. Broad longitudinal data is necessary to address this question; although such data are

present in terms of elected office and some data is available for other areas it is not present for informal methods of participation. This kind of data is necessary especially on women's participation in environmental movements and gender centers in order to address the questions, which I propose. Therefore, a necessary component of this study included research on documents gathered while in country to supplement interviews. Specifically, I collected and analyzed information on numbers of women in elected office, advisory committees and in local politics. By comparing these numbers across time with regard to participation before the gender centers came into existence and afterwards. The Japanese government publishes many of the materials that I looked for but I also accessed unpublished materials and documents only available at the gender centers themselves to find out if there are connections between the gender centers and environmental movements. In order to establish a context of comparison the next section examines basic information concerning the cases, exposing similarities and differences between the prefectures as necessary for comparative studies.

Regional Politics and Comparative Cases

The eight women's centers examined in this dissertation are located in four main regions in Japan. Although Japan is homogenous in ethnic makeup there are significant differences between the Tokyo (Tohoku) area and the others. The Tokyo metropolitan region has drawn large numbers of people and industry, the concentration of which has created problems for other regions. Other areas, especially those that rival Tokyo, have declined in their economic capabilities and population. Tokyo is at the heart of Japan's economy and government, illustrated in the fact that a large number of Japanese sub-national governments keep liaison offices in Tokyo. The capital region is the nucleus of

political, economic and administrative functions it is a major center of international finance and the largest metropolitan economy in the world.

Although at one time the Kansai region including Kyoto and Osaka was the seat of the Japanese empire, in recent years the area has experienced a decline in population. During the 1950s and 60s many trading firms were headquartered in Kyoto but since that time, most corporations have moved their central offices to Tokyo. Recently, cities in the area have begun large public works projects to draw business into the area, including the floating airport in Osaka bay and the creation of a direct connection between Kansai and Shikoku. Kyoto is the cultural center of Japan, its historic sites were untouched during World War II and tourism is the base of Kyoto's economy. Osaka has long been a major industrial center because of its location as a port city which is vital in connecting Nara and Osaka prefecture to Korea and China. Kansai is rapidly developing as a cultural academic and research center that will progress from Kyoto and Osaka to Nara.

Fukuoka is the center of the regional economy in the Kyushu region and is close to Kitakyushu where Kitakyushu Women's Forum is located. Fukuoka and Kitakyushu are often linked together as an industrial center which has experienced a reinvigoration in recent years as processing industries such as electronics and automobile manufacturing have developed there. Kitakyushu's urban area has grown 90% in the past ten years and the city has become the leader in trading with Korea, China and Taiwan

(www.pref.fukuoka.lg.jp. 6/13/06)

Like the Kyushu area, the Sea of Japan area is employing the economic strategy of developing relationships with other Asian nations as well. Although the region has long been called the backside of Japan "*ura Nippon* 裏日本"; the prefecture of Toyama

is forming partnerships with other countries across the Japan Sea. In recent years especially, the Sea of Japan region has become an important trading partner of Russia and China. The last ten years have brought major changes to the towns and villages of Toyama prefecture, which has prospered as the leading industrial prefecture in the region. Toyama has the highest percentage of home ownership in Japan and because of innovation in providing inexpensive electricity Toyama is a leader in processing technology. As a result of this growth, public works projects including road widening have brought industry to the area as large malls have replaced the small family owned shops that were once the center of many of these communities.

As noted above, because of their location, economic position and distance from the capital city, there are differences among the prefectures examined as illustrated in the table below. Although one would expect to find a great deal of similarity among the women's centers in these six prefectures because Japan is a homogenous country, it is important to recognize these differences.

Table 1.1: Prefectures of Japan

	Tokyo	Kyoto	Osaka	Fukuoka	Toyama
Geographic Location	Honshu	Honshu	Honshu	Kyushu	Honshu
Region	Kanto	Kinki	Kinki	Kyushu	Japan Sea
# Municipalities	62	38	44	91	27
Population	12,557,115	2,644,331	8,815,757	5,057,932	1,111,602
Density/km²	5655	573	282	1,017	264
Economy	international banking/finance	Tourism, electronics	Major port industrial	Industrial,autos semiconductors	industrial Processing
GDP per capita(\$)	64,722	34,884	43,090	32,097	37,734

Adapted from: National Statistics Database Japan, www.stat.go.jp (6/25/06).

Toyama and Ishikawa prefecture are both on the Japan Sea and have more rural populations than the other areas. Kyoto and Osaka prefectures are in the Kinki region of Honshu which attracts a large number of foreign tourists and is establishing itself as a region of international expertise. Osaka is also the first prefecture to have a female mayor. The Kyushu area is similar to Kyoto and Osaka prefectures in its geographic location and linkage to other Asian nations, Toyama and Osaka prefectures share this trend as well.

Interviewing in Japan

An additional element of complexity is added to this research because interviews will be conducted in Japanese and translated. Chilcote (2000) discusses the problem of defining concepts in comparative politics. He points out the inherent difficulty of doing research in a foreign language where different language connotations from culture to culture may also pose a problem (p.6). The process of asking for permission to interview is a daunting task in Japanese because it is a favor which requires the use of honorific language or *keigo* (敬語) that expresses respect toward others and self-effacement. *Keigo* entails the use of different pronouns for the words "me" and "you" depending upon one's social position and relationship with the speaker, different verb endings indicate one's distance from another person or group (Bachnick and Quinn 1994; Kondo 1990). This requires attention to the relationship between self and other person as well as self and group. Although these language rules are less strict for foreigners, this attention to the Japanese language illustrates the difficulty and care one must take when doing interviews in a foreign language and culture.

Contribution to the Field

Japan is significant because it is a state-centered industrialized democracy which has lagged behind the trend of women becoming more involved in government as political office holders. Japan is considered a state-centered democracy because it has a strong central government and a heavily institutionalized bureaucracy, which means that to affect political policy one must work with state agencies. Japan, like many industrialized countries has had to deal with negative environmental consequences of industrialization, but some evidence suggests that women have played an important role in this endeavor. As a case study Japan has comparative significance because it is an established Asian democracy which will allow for comparison both with other industrial democracies and Asian nation-states that have similar cultural heritages. Japan will serve as the single case study for this research because it possesses qualities that are unique to Japan as well as being one of many advanced industrial democracies. Therefore, Japan is an interesting case allowing for rich comparisons with other countries. As such, this case study will lay the groundwork for further comparative research on Japan and other countries. By looking at gender centers in Japan and their interaction with environmental movements, one can learn more about women's political participation as well as the state-society interface. The primary focus of this dissertation is the link between environmental politics and the specific institutions (women's centers) which governments have created to positively impact women's political participation. This research adds to the literature which says something about the usefulness of state institutions in women's participation, also noted in feminist literature as the "top-down" approach as well as adding to the literature base in general concerning feminism and the state. The dissertation will also

speak to the salience of the environment as a special arena for women's political participation. Methodologically, this research expands the way political participation is understood by examining the role of women's centers in state-society relationships.

Outline of Study

In Chapter 2, I situate the study by outlining the domestic context of the Japanese state. The history of state policies regarding women and the national women's policy machinery, which supports those policies, are presented in detail. Chapter 2 deals with the question of linkages between women's political participation and the hypothesized special salience of environmental issues. Citizen's environmental movements have been important as an arena motivating political activity by women; therefore I explore this connection by sketching out the history of women in these movements. Environmental movements are a kind of informal politicking; one facet of this dissertation research is to find out if gender centers assist in this kind of activity as well as assisting women to engage in formal political mobilization.

The third chapter deals with the question of formal politics in Japan as an example of a country in the advanced stages of democracy. This chapter will situate Japan within the broader literature of state feminism by detailing the record of political participation by women in East Asia and Japan. Chapter 3 examines the question of linkages between non-governmental environmental organizations by studying the history of those interactions. In chapter 3, the women's policy machinery including the gender centers and the evolution of those institutions is presented as well.

Chapter 4 investigates the questions regarding linkages between environmental issues and women's political activity by examining the theory and historical information

regarding these connections. Japan's experience with development as well as the citizen's movements that formed to protest the environmental destruction that resulted from these activities as well as Japan's record of environmental policy making is presented.

Chapter 5 outlines the activities and history of the eight specific women's centers which serve as the cases for this research, here I will examine questions regarding the specific programs of the centers which recruit and train women in politics if such programs exist. The outcomes of qualitative interviews are presented and the themes of these interviews are examined. Chapter 5 also outlines and analyzes the environmental movements examined while presenting the outcomes of interviews with women participants of each of the groups studied.

The final chapter analyzes the research findings and raises questions about the results of interviews. In Chapter 6, I will also suggest some possibilities for future research and present my conclusions.

In order to understand where gender centers fit in the schematic of Japanese politics it is first necessary to outline the unique history of the Japanese state's involvement with women's movements. These are discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 2: The Japanese State: The Gender Ideology of Social Intervention

This study examines women's centers, institutions created by the Japanese government in order to increase women's political status. In this chapter an overview of the Japanese state is outlined in order to situate this study within the history of interactions between Japanese women and the state. The historical relationship between women and the state is presented and I explain in detail the machinery of the Japanese state that deals with women's issues. Women's centers represent an example of this national machinery. By examining this context, one can begin to clarify the question of the impact of the state on women's political participation. The gender ideology of the Japanese state is central to the understanding of women's centers and the ability of these centers to meaningfully achieve the goal of advancing women's status in society and in formal politics.

I. The Japanese State

The structure of the Japanese state is founded upon the system of parliamentary democracy. The Japanese parliament, called the Diet, is made up of two houses with the

lower house (*shugiin* 衆議院 House of Representatives) possessing the most power¹. For much of the last 50 years, the Japanese government has been controlled by a single party, the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) which was responsible for re-creating Japan and industrializing the nation after World War II. Although the Emperor of Japan no longer possesses formal political power, he is the Head of State, which emphasizes the conservative social order which prevails in Japan. In recent years, the Prime Minister (Head of Government) has consolidated the governmental ministries, thus strengthening the government. Although there were challenges to the LDP's dominance in the late 1990s, and in the last election in 2005 many anticipated a change in power, the LDP not only maintained its hold over control of the government but gained seats in both houses, crushing its main challenger, the DJP (Democratic Party of Japan).

Who Decides? Theoretical Debates

The strength of the LDP illustrated in the most recent election emphasizes the debate concerning the nature of the Japanese state and the importance of political parties in policymaking. Historically, the major arguments in this debate can be categorized into two distinct schools of thought: the elite power model and the pluralistic model (Fukui 1977). Moreover, the field of comparative politics has vacillated between a focus on the state or society, the literature on Japan reflects these trends. This debate presents scholars with dueling conceptualizations, itself reflecting a tension in the Japanese state between elitism and pluralism.

The elite power model (or iron triangle) is a derivation of an argument made by C. Wright Mills about American politics; when applied to Japan the argument has sustained

¹ The upper house is the 参議院 *sangiin* or House of Councillors

a much more devoted following (see Scalapino and Masumi 1962, Thayer 1969, Ike 1972, Hrebienar 2001, Cutts 1997 and Pempel 1974). This school of thought emphasizes the strength of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which has dominated for over 40 years. The argument states that in postwar Japan Diet members act on the wishes of the LDP; the LDP cannot maintain power without businessmen and bureaucrats. In turn, both businessmen and bureaucrats depend on each other and the LDP to promote their best interests and to accord them favor in appropriations respectively. One outcome of this ruling triumvirate is the practice of *amakudari* 天下り (descent from heaven) wherein retiring bureaucrats and public officials seek to retire to boards of public corporations; at the same time, some bureaucrats hope to enter politics after early retirement. Because there is recognition of the fact that this form of retirement is merely a lateral move to another branch of government, it is often called a "sideslip" (*yokosuberi* 横滑り) rather than *amakudari* (Fukui 1977).

Although political reforms were passed in the 1990s to control corruption and break the grip of the iron triangle, Kerbo and McKinstry argue that the elite power model is still very much in place, "the major elite groupings are still in place, even if under new party names, with relatively the same power of magnitude over what happens in Japan" (1995).

The pluralist perspective questions the correctness of assumptions which underlie the power-elite model. The assumptions of the power-elite model maintain that the three groups are united in purpose and actions; they participate in most if not all policy decisions; and groups or individuals outside the three elite actors are regularly excluded. However, in practice the three groups do not act in a singularly manner, nor do they

possess a unitary purpose or focus. For example, the LDP is split into many factions which divide the party, “(F)actions are said to weaken party unity, breed corruption and undermine the power of the prime minister’s office (Krauss 1989).” Studies by Kawanaka (1974) and Curtis (1989) illustrate the prevalence of tension and opposition among policy actors. Hellman (1976) and Packard (1960) both present studies which illustrate factionalism in the LDP which represents “perhaps the most persistent, form of dissension” (Fukui 1977, 37). However, the factionalism need not be viewed negatively; the divisions may pose an effective form of opposition from within the LDP. “Factions provide a check on monolithic power, partially substituting for the lack of alternation of parties in government” (Krauss and Ishida 1989, 48).

Several attempts have been made at reform to curb factionalism and the corruption that is oftentimes a corollary; in the early 1990's, the LDP began to lose ground and was forced to create coalitions with other parties. For a limited time the Japanese Socialist Party, Komeito (the Clean Government Party), and the Japanese Communist Party were important. These rival parties were important because they tended to capture and represent the opposition ideologies of both women’s and environmental movements; which largely ignored by the LDP.

In elections during the past five years, there was considerable debate about the evolution of a two-party system in Japan as the LDP lost a clear majority and the DPJ made enough gains to contend the LDP’s dominance. In the 2004 election, there was a clear two-way battle in nearly every constituency and polls showed the two parties neck and neck (Curtin 2004). However, this apparent reversal of fortunes was short lived, in the 2005 election the LDP regained its supremacy and the DJP suffered such a loss that

its continued existence is questionable. For women's and environmental movements, the reassertion of LDP power may mean that once again, their interests may not be represented as the opposition parties lose power.

Political Parties and Representation

The waning relevance of leftist parties is particularly worrisome for women politicians. The Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) has staunchly supported women; in 1989, the party was headed by a woman (Doi Takako) and the party has consistently had higher numbers of female representatives (in 1989, 52.6% or 10 of the party's 19 House Representatives (HR) were women). Moreover, the Communist Party (JCP) has also advocated feminist concerns in its platforms and in 2000, 20% of its 20 HR were women. The DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) has offered some affirmative measures for women but the DPJ's women candidates have not fared well historically. The LDP has the lowest number of female election candidates: 17, compared to 23 for the DPJ and 68 for the JCP. Women's representation has increased only slightly over the years and as of July of 2004 the Diet had 67 female members, 9.3% of the total. In the 2005 election, the number of women in the House of Representatives decreased to 9%, as illustrated in the table below.

Table 2.1: Women's Representation in 2005 House of Representatives election

Distribution of Seats	Total	Gain/Loss	% Seats	Women	% Women
Liberal Democratic Party, LDP	293	84	62	26	5
Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ	113	-64	24	10	2
Komei	31	-3	6	4	0.08
Independents	20	-14	3	1	0.02
Japanese Communist Party, JCP	9	0	1	2	0.04
Social Democratic Party of Japan, SDPJ	7	2	1	2	0.04
Kokumin Shinto, People's New Party	4	0	0.08	0	0
Shinto Nippon, New Party Japan	1	-2	0.02	0	0
Shinto Daichi, New Party Mother Earth	1	1	0.02	0	0
Total # of Seats*	479			45	9

From: Data compiled from www.ipu.org (Inter-Parliamentary Union and www.shugiin.go.jp, (House of Representatives of Japan

*Data is based on a total of 480 seats although one seat was vacant as of May 30, 2006.

It is particularly important that women have a home within the LDP's sole opposition party given the recent political climate in Japan. Currently, the LDP is promoting a return to family values, which attacks women along with a campaign against gender and sex education. The government has restricted the eligibility of single mothers for childcare benefits and is pursuing rewording the guarantee of gender equality in the Constitution (Makino 2005). The gender backlash is prompted by the government's struggle with the social security issue, and an effort to urge families (meaning mothers and daughter's in law) to take on the responsibility of caring for the elderly amidst the government's inability to provide future social security benefits. Promoting family values and nationalist family values against selfish individualism alleviates the state's responsibility to provide social security to the elderly. Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori (an LDP member) has even argued that childless women should not receive pension benefits: "It is truly strange to say that we have to use tax money to take care of women who don't even give birth once, who grow old living their lives selfishly (Makino 2005)."

Cabinet

In 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi restructured the Japanese cabinet; this reform was, in part, a response to corruption in the bureaucracy and mistrust of bureaucrats by the general public. As a result of this change, government (Prime Minister and Cabinet) was strengthened and enhanced the powers of the executive branch. The Cabinet has a larger Secretariat, an enlarged Cabinet Office (now led by the Prime Minister) and bodies such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy attached to it that makes budget decisions (it was once part of the Ministry of Finance). The change in the structure of the Cabinet is relevant for women because Japan's national women's policy machinery is now based in the Cabinet; there is a Cabinet Office on Women's Issues, which is overseen by the Prime Minister. This policy machinery will be discussed in greater depth in Part II of this chapter.

Bureaucracy

The basic structure of the bureaucracy is organized by ministries; prior to the central government reform of 2001, there were several ministries recognized as holding important powers : MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry), MOF (the Ministry of Finance), the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 2001, 24 ministries and agencies were consolidated into 11 ministries (4 of these are super sized) and 2 agencies that report directly to the Cabinet Office. Chiba (2004) argues that this redistribution of power produced a triumph of political over bureaucratic power because the arrangement arguably strengthens the executive branch as the bureaucracy is weakened. As a result of this restructuring, the power of the bureaucracy may be

changing, although as yet it is still too early to tell what effect the reforms have had on the way politics is done.

The bureaucracy plays two roles in legislation: policy making and policy implementation. Unlike many other advanced democracies, the policy process begins in the bureaucracy in Japan with most laws being formulated by government bureaucrats. The practice of administrative guidance (*gyousei shidou* 行政指導) is also exercised by bureaucrats who may issue administrative ordinances that have the force of law or communicate informally to persuade social groups to comply with a particular policy. The political process operates out of public view in large measure, and decisions are made within the context of bureaucratic authority, among officials who have close personal ties and a high degree of mutual trust. However, this does not mean that the political process is a consensual one. In fact, Kawanaka uses the term “jungle warfare” to portray the prevalence and ferocity of intra-bureaucratic conflict in his analysis of administrative bureaucracy in Japan (1974).

More recent work has attempted to capture the social nature of Japan’s bureaucracy. For instance, Peter Drucker argues that many assumptions advanced by Japan scholars are dubious at best; Drucker argues that *amakudari* is hardly a practice distinct to Japan, citing examples of similar shifts in Austria, Germany and the United States (Drucker 1998). Although the record of the Japanese bureaucracy is dismal (failing to choose economic winners in the 1960s and 1970s and urging the speculative fiscal bubble that burst in the 1990s, bringing economic recession), it is the only group which is accepted by society as the ruling elite (Drucker 1998).

However, this is a ruling elite, unlike those depicted in the elite power model, for as Drucker argues, the Japanese bureaucracy does not act in concert with big business or the LDP when it chooses to act at all. Citing examples of serious social problems faced by the Japanese (a rural unemployed majority post World War II and the economic downturn of the 1980s), Drucker argues history has “confirmed the bureaucracy’s conviction that procrastination is wiser than action” (1998, 77). For scholars of Japanese politics:

the most important key to understanding how the Japanese bureaucracy thinks, works and behaves is understanding Japan’s priorities. Americans assume that the economy takes primacy in political decisions, unless national security is seriously threatened. The Japanese—and by no means the bureaucracy alone—accord primacy to society (Drucker 1998, 77).

As a result of this concentration on the social, the policies supported by the bureaucracy are often interventionist in nature, seeking to ensure social stability rather than create change. The conceptualization of the Japanese state as interventionist underscores the closed nature of the state and the weakness of citizens in impacting governmental policy.

While this conceptualization illustrates narrow avenues for political access, making the Japanese state more closed than open to political engagement with social groups, some authors argue that this has led to protest groups playing a significant role in politics. In some ways, the nature of the Japanese bureaucracy has led citizens to develop other means of impacting their government. For example, Ishida argues that:

Japan’s peculiar combination of strong protection of civil liberties, an election system which seriously distorts legislative accountability, and a powerful professional government bureaucracy, greatly increases the probability that citizens will engage in extra-institutional protest (p.176) ”

A number of groups have used protest activity as a way of having their interests

represented formally, including the environmental movement, the antiwar group *Beheiren* ベヘイレン, student movements and feminist groups (Ishida 1989). The changes taking place in Japanese politics as a result of the 2005 election will also likely affect the way citizens, including women, attempt to impact government. As the LDP's dominance returns once again, Japan may be characterized as a single party dominant system in which reform and leftist parties are marginalized, and "the problems for the revolutionary left in Japan are to take up the possibilities of growing mass opposition ... and to facilitate the process of re-groupment of the fragmented left group" (Hirai 2004). These developments in Japanese politics may affect the way the Japanese government deals with women. In the past, women's groups have had a close, give and take relationship with the Japanese state which has served to help and hinder the women's movement, which is discussed later in the chapter.

The nature of Japan's bureaucracy and its concentration on social policy directly impacts women through the promotion of policies which at times have sought specifically to manage women's lives, as will be discussed further in later portions of this chapter. Although I do not wish to overestimate the importance of the bureaucracy, which is heavily informed by the priorities of the LDP, it is also essential to recognize the gender dimension to this arena of formal politics. Women are under-represented in all levels of the bureaucracy, especially among the upper echelon of the civil service, which is a professional and elite group. As a result, there is a tendency toward "parochialism and old boy ties among bureaucrats" (Hayes 1992, 61). Women are increasingly making inroads into this area of politics, however. In 2004, , a record 304 women passed the top ranking level-1 civil service exam accounting for 17.3% of those who passed, up by 40 from a

year earlier (Japan Times 2004) . Passing the exam generally leads to appointments in senior posts in the bureaucracy.

Within the bureaucracy there are several ministries, that more than others affect legislation and policy implementation on gender and environmental issues: the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology (MEXT) (formerly the Ministry of Education, MOE) creates national courses of study (controlling the courses available to girls). In the past, this has meant that girls have been unable to take courses in science and technology, being pushed instead into courses on home management while young boys are encouraged to take the pre-collegiate course sequence. For example, in 1989 the MOE revised the national Course of Study to make home economics compulsory for both boys and girls starting in 1994, as part of a campaign to make education gender neutral. MEXT is also now responsible for all scientific and technological research related to economic development as well nuclear reactor safety and radioactive waste management. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MEW) directs legislative action on abortion and contraception; it is also responsible for securing the safety of food and creating measures related to pollution control. The MEW is therefore an important site of knowledge for issues related to gender as well as the environment.

The Ministry of Labor (MOL) and its Women's Bureau inform the policy direction that has been taken in the areas of discrimination, sexual harassment and equal employment. The MOL Women's Bureau dominated the process leading to the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law and its amendments (which will be analyzed

later in this chapter). Female bureaucrats from the Women's Bureau have also been active participants in the creation of the national women's policy machinery, working at the national level to promote measures such as the gender centers.

Levels of Government

Japan is a unitary state with a centralized vertical distribution of power. The national government possesses the most power and is the most powerful policy initiating level of government. The responsibilities and prerogatives of lower levels of government are established by the national government. The central government in Japan establishes laws that are imposed uniformly throughout the country and are implemented by local governments, making Japan a de-concentrated, rather than decentralized arrangement. Takao (1999) draws the distinction between decentralized and de-concentrated power distribution in unitary states in the following manner:

In unitary systems one may distinguish between decentralized and deconcentrated arrangements, when the state system is decentralized lower levels of government can participate in decision-making through specific delegation or delegated autonomy. In a deconcentrated arrangement decisions are made at higher levels of government while their implementation is delegated to lower levels, local authorities act as agents for the central government (21).

The relevance of a deconcentrated arrangement is related to the ability of local government and local citizen's movements to affect decision making. Prefectures and local governments act as agents for the central government which means that local issues and concerns may not be considered when policy is implemented. Also, as the central government is the primary decision making body, citizens' political activity must be directed to it for the political activity to meaningfully affect the policy process.

The occupation of American forces and restructuring of Japan's government instituted important reforms; the most important of these is direct election by universal suffrage at the local as well as the national levels. During the Meiji era, only one per cent of Japan's adult population was given the vote, but universal male and female suffrage granted after the war drastically enhanced participatory autonomy (Takao 1999). The status of the Emperor changed from that of direct influence to a symbolic Head of State (the power of the Emperor in this symbolic role is equivalent to the power of the British monarch in the British parliamentary system). Prefectural governors, who formerly had been directed by the Home Minister, were popularly elected and the Home Ministry, which governed central-local relations prior to the War, was broken up into the ministries of Home Affairs, Construction, Labor, Health and Welfare. Each of these changes altered the relationship between the national and local governments and this was reinforced by the language in the constitution. Terms such as "self-government" and "charter" were replaced in the final document with much weaker terms such as "local autonomy" and "ordinance," which emphasized the centralization of power to the national level. On balance, Japan's unitary system is more centralized than most states, an arrangement which has been strengthened recently by the restructuring of government ministries discussed earlier.

In July 1999, the Local Autonomy Law was amended by the Law Concerning the Provision of Related Laws for the Promotion of Decentralization of Power (Omnibus Decentralization Act). This law altered and clarified the relationship between central and local levels of government. Where previously Japan had an agency delegation system that

used local authorities as agents of the central government, the functions of local government under the new law were reorganized into statutory entrusted functions. Statutory entrusted functions are those functions legally delegated to local authorities that were originally the responsibility of the central government. These functions are stipulated in the Local Autonomy Law and include such things as the issuance of passports, management of national roads, and compilation of statistics for the central government or prefectures (CLAIR 2002). These changes give more power to the prefectures to perform certain tasks, although the relative real gains in terms of self-governance are debatable.

As the local autonomy law illustrates, lower levels are policy implementing bodies instead of initiating policy on their own. This is in contrast to many industrial democracies where lower levels of government do have the power to initiate policy. There are two tiers of local government in Japan: prefectures serving wider areas and municipalities providing local services. There are 47 prefectures which range in size from the Tokyo Metropolis, with more than 10 million people, to Tottori prefecture with just 600,000. Municipalities exhibit even greater variety, ranging from Yokohama city with a population over 3 million to Aogashima Village (*Aogashima-mura* 青ヶ島村) in Tokyo with a population of 200. Names of municipalities illustrate their size; cities are called *shi*, while *machi* (町) and *cho* (著) refer to towns and the smallest are called *mura* (村) which means village. The number of prefectures (47) has remained unchanged since the system was adopted during the Meiji period. Prefectural areas are based on administrative units established under eighth century statutes which were also related to relationships between the Shogunate and local clans during the Edo period (which began

in 1603). As a result of this historical legacy, these areas are well established in the minds of the Japanese people.

Despite their seemingly powerlessness, local governments have played an important role in Japanese democracy. Ishida (1989) notes that local governments “provide a buffer against bureaucratic arbitrariness, creating additional points of access and influence for groups poorly represented nationally, and serving as an arena for more fully realizing certain rights such as healthful and cultured living...”(165). Innovation at the local level initiated the creation of social programs which have in turn pressured the national government to develop similar systems and national policies, thereby creating a channel of advocacy for citizens.

Regional and local politics are also friendlier to women and women’s political participation at this level has grown more quickly than at the national level. Most commonly, women’s movements arise to support female politicians and send women to local assemblies. The number of women elected to assembly after the 2003 nationwide election was the largest ever, 4,804, a 7.6 % (out of total 60,200 seats). Also, although only 34.2 of all assemblies had at least one woman member, in 1991, this number had nearly doubled to 62.5% by 2003. Many of the gender centers have municipal funding and oversight which makes women’s participation at this level particularly relevant. The presence of women’s higher political status in regional and local level politics illustrates that women’s political participation in Japan is more complex than just looking at Diet or national level politics.

Although local politics may give women a better chance to become elected to a government position, local politics and local politicians are not always supportive of women. The role of local leaders, including governors of prefectures, city mayors and other local politicians is significant in local level politics, which can have more direct impact upon the lives of women than national level politics; this is especially true of the women's centers that are often run by city and prefectural governments. Some women's centers are in danger of closing because local politicians, hostile to activities of the centers, may discontinue funding.

Recently, gender-bashing by prefectural governors and local politicians has increased. Funabashi Assemblyman Minoru Nakamura blasted the Funabashi Women's Center in 2004, saying women who advocate gender equality have obviously been slighted by males or are married to the worst men in society (Brasor 2005). Tokyo Prefectural Governor Shintaro Ishihara, with the support of several other LDP members, publicly denounced the use of the term gender-free. As Governor of Tokyo prefecture, Ishihara also dismantled the foundation that ran Tokyo Women's Plaza, which is now run by the city.

Social Management by the Japanese State

Scholars have emphasized the importance of the Japanese state's philosophy of intervention in its efforts to modernize. For example, Johnson notes

(D)uring the period of Japan's high speed economic growth, approximately 1955 to 1975, its state organs for formulating and implementing industrial policy, particularly MITI and the Ministry of Finance, achieved exceptional levels of autonomy from vested interests. They also enjoyed high internal esprit de corps and respect from the public (2001, 9).

Johnson's analysis, though concentrated on the economy, serves as an illustration of heavy handed management by the Japanese state.

The Japanese state has often been characterized as interventionist in terms of its relationship with women's movements and its handling of women's issues. Sheldon Garon (1997) uses the phrase "social management" in his description of a state which has attempted to "mold the values and habits of (its) citizens (p. xiv)". At the end of the nineteenth century, a state ideology toward women was a reality. The pervasiveness of *ryousai kenbo* 良妻賢母 (good wife, wise mother), a term which defined women's proper role in imperial Japan, is noted by many authors. The term suggests that in order to fulfill her responsibility to both family and state, the Japanese woman must become the manager of domestic affairs as well as the nurturer of children. This phrase "came to constitute the official discourse on women in Japan (Uno 1998)". The mere presence of such a gender definition by the Japanese state is meaningful and instructive regarding the state's view of its relationship with civil society in general, and women in particular. *Ryousai kenbo*, when viewed in the context of the Meiji period and the massive reforms undertaken by the state during this time, reflects a reconceptualization of the relationship between government and society. The reconceptualization advocated an increased presence by the government in the everyday lives of citizens through its policies.

Ideologues, bureaucrats, and politicians lauded the family as the foundation of the state, equated filial piety with loyalty to the emperor, and exalted the emperor as the father of all Japanese subjects in the family-state (*kazoku kokka* 家族国家)...*Ryousai kenbo* defined women's contribution to the good of the nation as their labor as "good wives" and "wise mothers" in the private world of the home (Uno 1998,298). The

contribution of women defined by the state and the role accorded women during the Meiji years was a departure from earlier definitions. “Good wife, wise mother” represented a different image from the “model samurai wife prevailing during the Tokugawa era (Garon 1997, 119).” Whereas before the woman was viewed as a subordinate member of the household, now women became the primary figures responsible for household management and family education, which elevated the women’s status from her former role.

Despite the argument that women’s status in the home and family were raised by their state-promulgated role, this trend was not mirrored in the public position of women. Rather, more powerful measures were enacted by the Japanese state which served to exclude women politically and gradually the loopholes that previously had allowed women to engage in political activity were eliminated. The Civil Code of 1898 was enacted, defining women as legally dependent without individual rights (Tokuza 1988). The Civil Code also excluded women from “receiving or using money, making contracts, and negotiating property”, confining women to the home where primogeniture and the absolute authority of patriarchy reinforced women’s inferior public position (Tokuza 1988, 63). Societal conceptions about women assumed that the nature of womankind was submissive and inherently inferior to men. Women were thought to lack the intelligence to participate in politics and were incapable of making decisions for the family other than those related to the home and family. Although the role of women in the home was elevated, women’s position in society still reflected a limited and low status role.

In the decades following 1899, the image of “good wife, wise mother” was an image embedded in the burgeoning Japanese educational system. In 1906, Education

Minister Makino Nobuaki echoed this feeling in the following statement:

As the male and female sexes differ, so too do their duties differ. The purpose of girl's education is to make *ryousai kenbo*. Recently some girls have received specialized education and wish to engage in vocations, but they are exceptional. In the end, a girl's duty is to become someone's mother; to manage the household; and to educate children (Komano 1975,141).

Despite the changes which came with the restructuring of the Japanese state in the post World War II era, many authors concur that the term *ryousai kenbo*, while falling into disuse, remained as a rudder for government policies through the 1980's (Uno 1998, Buckley and Mackie 1986, Tanaka 1975, and Mackie 1988). The persistence of the state's influence in defining womanhood in contemporary Japan is noted by Allison (1996), who examines the relationship between the institutions of school and motherhood in Japan and the "syndrome of the *kyoikumama*" (虚行くまま education mother).

Kyoiku mama is

the type of mother so committed to furthering the education of her child that she does everything from sharpening pencils, making midnight snacks, and pouring tea for a studying child to consulting with teachers, investigating the range of schools, tutors, and juku (cram schools) available and even attending class herself in subjects where the child is deficient (Allison 1996, 136).

Kyoiku mama is a phenomenon that has arisen since World War II in the era of economic re-building and national mobilization of the school system in a manner which mirrors pre-war structuring of the education system as a location of primary importance in the development of Japanese society. The *kyoiku mama* role harkens back to the earlier *ryousai kenbo* and Allison argues that the former "is a relationship between mothers, children, and a school system that has been situated within the political and economic relations of Japan's post-industrial labor market (p.152)".

The intersection of state policies designed to further the interests of the Japanese state and the role of women illustrated by the two examples above have impacted women in their everyday lives and in their potential to engage in political activity. In the following section, I outline the national women's policy apparatus of the Japanese state which deals with gender issues.

Women's Policy Machinery

The concept of state feminism examines the women's policy machineries designed to elevate women's status and to challenge traditional gender roles for women. The bureaucracy and government still continued to be a powerful figure in gender policy through its national women's policy apparatus. The gender equality measures advocated by the U.N. Conferences on women and International Women's Year contradict many of the former views and policies of the Japanese government which reflected the traditional Japanese notion discussed earlier.

The existence of a post-war formal institutionalized relationship between women's organizations and the state began during the 1945-52 Occupation when the Women and Young Worker's Bureau in the Ministry of Labor was created in September 1948. The Bureau was established to protect working women and minors and its central purpose was the improvement of working women in general (Vavich 1998). As part of the reorganization and recreation of the Japanese state by General MacArthur another major change took place with the creation of the Ministry of Education (formerly part of the Home Ministry) an institution which had significant influence over women in its policies and ideologies concerning gender (Garon 1997).

In November 1975, the Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies Relating to Women was set up in order to incorporate into national policy the decisions made at the World Conference of International Women's Year (IWY). Furthermore, as part of its World Plan of Action for IWY, Japan established the National Women's Education Center in 1977. Many other women's centers were established by local governments during this time period as well. During the 1980s, efforts were made at prefectural, city, and local levels to draw up plans of action to complement the national plan. Often, these plans were created by government officials in cooperation with women living in the community. "This experience ..played an important role in awakening women's awareness of issues facing women in communities throughout Japan" (Fujimura- Fanselow 1995 ,368).


In 1984, the percentage of married women in the labor force reached over 50%, overtaking that of full-time housewives for the first time. This development led to a restructuring of the Women's and Young Worker's Bureau in the Ministry of Labor so that an independent Women's Bureau in the Ministry of Labor was established. The Women's Bureau is an important actor in employment reform, childcare issues and labor standards, to be discussed further in the following section.

A national machinery to deal specifically with women's policy issues was created in Japan in 1994, when the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality was established in the Cabinet (See Appendix 1: Timeline of the Development of Japan's National Women's Policy Machinery). The new Headquarters is different from the previous body, established in 1975, primarily because it is responsible for monitoring Japan's commitment to the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. The Headquarters also

oversees the promotion of appointments of women in order to increase the representation of women in governmental policy and decision-making; it has led to increases in the representation of women on national advisory councils and the setting of targets for such representation. Additionally, the Office for Gender Equality and the Council for Gender Equality were established by the Cabinet's orders. The Council for Gender Equality (CGE) was an advisory body to the prime minister and on March 31, 1997, the administration enacted the Law for Establishing the CGE which recreated this body on stronger terms backed by law rather than ordinance (www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/index.html).

In the restructuring of the central government under Prime Minister Koizumi, implemented in January 2001, the central government was restructured from its former one office and twenty-two ministries to one cabinet office and twelve ministries. As part of this reorganization, a Cabinet office on Women's Issues, headed by the Prime Minister, was established in the Cabinet and the Council for Gender Equality and Gender Equality Bureau were established within this cabinet office (See Figure 2.1: Japan's National Women's Machinery).

Figure 2.2: Japan's National Women's Policy Machinery



Source: www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/index.html (accessed 11/28/06)

The national women's policy machinery in Japan from 1994 to the present includes the

monitors the implementation of government measures promoting the formation of a gender-equal society and surveys the effects of government measure on the formation of such a society.

Gender Equality Bureau: Functions as secretariat to the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality and the Council for Gender Equality as well as formulating plans related to the Basic Law and Basic Plan for Gender Equality.

- **Minister for Gender Equality:** Newly appointed following restructuring in 2001 as one of the “Ministers of State for Special Missions” in the Cabinet Office; this position is filled by the Chief Cabinet Secretary.
- **Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality:** Established in the cabinet in 1994, with the following appointments (President: Prime Minister, Vice President: Chief Cabinet Secretary, Members: All Cabinet Ministers).
- **Liaison Conference for the Promotion of Gender Equality:** Inaugurated in 1996 to promote the exchange of information and ideas among NGOs, intellectuals and other groups in society.
- **Equal Employment, Children and Families Bureau of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare:** A restructuring of offices in 2000, integrated Prefectural Labor Bureaus with the former Prefectural Women’s and Young Workers’ Office to implement labour administration more comprehensively and effectively (CEDAW 2002).

The new Cabinet Office is a “bureaucratic organ designed to strengthen and expand the functions of the Cabinet office and the Prime Minister’s Office” (Osawa 2000,13). The Cabinet Office coordinates economic and fiscal policies, comprehensive science and technology policy, disaster prevention, gender equality and Okinawan problems (Osawa 2000). The Cabinet Office has greater power than the ministries did and it is consulted by four bodies; the one which deals with women’s policy issues is the Congress for Gender Equality (CGE). This reorganization centralizes power within the Prime Minister’s Office while leaving implementation to individual departments and ministries, presumably promoting gender equality at a higher level than previously (Sato and Takahashi 1998).

This restructuring also illustrates the division between full-fledged ministries such as the MOL (and its Women's Bureau), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology MEXT, and staff offices, such as the CGE and Gender Equality Bureau. Ministries are structures that (until 2001) were largely unchanged, carrying more status, policy making power and the ability to develop long term goals. On the other hand, staff offices are much more changeable: they are semi-permanent and are not equipped with the large budgets or personnel of ministries. These conditions mean that the ability of the new gender offices to formulate and direct policy may be questionable.

Domestic Gender Policies

As was the case with earlier policies designed to further the interests of the state, the contemporary Japanese state formulates its stance on gender in terms of a larger concern for the social welfare of Japanese citizens. The ministries discussed earlier are the primary actors in the bureaucracy responsible for this emphasis on societal maintenance. Increasing labor shortages, larger welfare burdens for the young and the lack of provided care for the elderly are all trends which have shaped government policies. Peng (2002) argues that since the 1980s, the postwar Japanese welfare state has begun to shift its response toward women due to two overlapping factors: the first is economic and the second involves a shift in women's attitudes. Women began entering the labor force in large numbers in the 1970s to help the family increase its purchasing power as inflation increased (Peng 2002). At the same time, increasing numbers of women made the decision to delay getting married (if at all) and to have fewer children. In fact, when the birthrate reached below 1.5 in 1989, then finance Minister Hashimoto made a policy recommendation to the Cabinet to consider ways to cut back the number of

women entering university as a way to combat the trend of marriage postponement

(Peng 2002). The 1.47 shock as it was called by the media led to a feeling of panic among Japanese politicians:

there (was) growing perception among the LDP politicians and their colleagues in industry that gender equality is good for business. There is a mounting sense of crisis about the tumbling birth rate, and a realization that it will not be reversed until women have the sense of financial security that will allow them to have larger families. At the same time, the coming decline in the active working population means that women's labor will have to be used more efficiently than at present, which implies giving them the opportunity to participate fully in the national economy (Osawa 2000,4)

It is clear from the passage above that politicians recognized that the low birthrate problem had to be defined as a problem reflecting the existing highly gendered social structure which places a burden upon women to provide care in order for change to take place. Moreover, the 1990s were a singular time period in domestic Japanese politics as a confluence of problems affecting the Japanese state contributed to an atmosphere which encouraged gender equality initiatives. The political environment for gender reform was favorable and therefore, during this time period the Japanese state first seriously took steps to establish a strong national women's policy machinery.

The policy response to these changes in Japanese society has been a bipolar one. As Peng notes, "it attempts to follow the trajectory of welfare restraint established in the 1980s, while at the same time, extend social welfare as a way of staving off future crisis" (p. 50). This dualistic response has created new forms of danger and opportunity for women as the state has created policies aimed at promoting women's social and economic participation while also strengthening the family's capacity to provide care. The Social Security budget was restructured to include a higher provision for social

welfare services in 1995 and the New Gold Plan was implemented along with the Chronic Care Insurance legislation in 1997 to extend social care services to the elderly (a plan advanced by the Ministry of Health and Welfare). In 1992, child care leave was implemented and in 1995, additional family leave was added to this legislation. However,

these moves towards more social care and a more women-friendly work environment have been running in conjunction with a fiscal control policy which continues to underscore the important of individual self support and private family-based care (Peng 2002, 41).

In fact, these contradictory responses conflate the divide between full-time career women and part-time career women as those working part time jobs are those in the family responsible for taking care of elderly relatives, increasing their work load. At the same time, full-time career women do not have the social support which would allow them to have children while also providing financially for the family, so career women delay having children and shun the caretaker role which part-time working women must bear. These policies lengthen the distance between full-time and part-time working women, which effect is to “disable the women’s movement from becoming a real political force capable of challenging social policy (Peng 2002, 59).”

The earlier welfare reforms documented by Peng were strengthened during the Hashimoto administration (1996-1998). Three of Hashimoto’s six major reforms (Hashimoto *roku dai-kaikaku*) related directly to gender issues: administrative reform, especially the creation of the Cabinet office; economic structural reform, especially deregulation in the area of employment/labor; and structural reform of social security (Osawa 2000).

The establishment of a Cabinet Office included four organs which were given more power than the previous ministries, including the Congress for Gender Equality. In the same year that the law for reforming government ministries was passed, a Basic Law for Gender-Equal Society was passed by the Diet as well. The Basic Law went into effect in 1999; it clarifies basic concepts related to forming a gender equal society and also indicates a direction these should take. The roles of the national, prefectural and local responsibilities are outlined in the Basic Law and the national government is required to formulate a basic plan to institutionalize the goals outlined in the Basic Law.

Deregulation of employment included removal of provisions which protected women in the Labor Standards Law (Osawa 2000). This provision limited the number of hours that women could work overtime, including holidays and night hours. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) was revised to reflect an end to discrimination against female workers, including sexual harassment measures. The EEOL and Labor Standards Law both fall under the purview of the Ministry of Labor. The process of revising the EEOL was heavily impacted by a *shingikai* (advisory council) that was dominated by female bureaucrats in the Ministry of Labor Women's Bureau, female union leaders and male leaders of the top business association Nikkeiren (Kobayashi 2002, b). The revision of the Labor Standards Law was heavily influenced by the Kinto Ho Forum of the Women's Bureau of the Japanese Trade Union Federation (RENGO) the forum was organized in the 1990s to help coordinate the efforts of the Women's Bureau of the MOL (Gelb 2003). RENGO is the biggest and most powerful trade union in Japan, and its relationship with the MOL and influence over the Labor Standard Law's revision illustrates the connection between government and non-political actors, as well

as the cooperative relationship between the Japanese state and civil society. These kinds of cooperative relationships are reminiscent of the cooperative relationship between women's groups and society noted by Garon (1997) as social management.

The third reform area addressed social security, which was the first step toward structural reform was to establish a nursing care insurance system according to the 1998 white paper on welfare published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Alongside nursing care, childcare and pension reform have been targeted to receive increased budgets (a positive measure) under structural reform initiatives. In each of these areas, gender is a major concern and the results which the government hoped for (an increase in the number of women having children) have not materialized. The Ministry of Health and Welfare has yet to address nursing care and those reforms related to gender regarding public pensions were postponed indefinitely in October 1998 after the *Nenkin Shingikai* (年金審議会) submitted a written opinion to the Minister of Health and Welfare (Osawa 2000). When the public pension was finally reformed in 2004, amidst a public outcry and lobbying against the proposed measures by trade unions, the gender reforms proposed by women's groups and trade unions were not part of the reform package. The Ministry of Health and Welfare agreed to form a committee on those proposals related to gender in 2006, but at present, this has yet to take place.

The Koizumi administration continued along the same social security reform path as the Hashimoto administration. In 2003, the birthrate fell to 2.9 and has had severe political repercussions for the ruling coalition, with the LDP at its helm. In a highly criticized and dramatic measure, parliament passed a pension reform package to raise employee premiums from 13.58 to 18.3 percent, and National Pension contributions from

13,300 (\$150) to 16,900 (\$190) yen per month (Gender Affairs Division, Pension Bureau 2005). Under the new child care support section of the pension reform package, women are able to work shorter hours and use flex-time until a child turns three but there are no regulations which enforce these measures or fiscal support given to companies as inducement to provide such programs to women workers. The pension also maintains the tax concessions for housewives called the Spouse Special Tax Deduction (*haiguusha tokubetsu koujo* 配偶者特別控除), or male breadwinner model which makes housewives exempt from national pension contributions if they make below 1.3 million yen (Curtin 2002). This aspect of the tax law encourages dependence on husbands and encourages women to take low paid part time work, weakening women's economic position. There is currently an increasing number of divorced mothers in Japan of precarious financial status the *haiguusha tokubetsu koujo* is blamed in part for the prevalence of women in this situation.

Although there is a willingness on the part of the Japanese state to engage in the rhetoric of gender reform, it hasn't provided a substantial fiscal endorsement to give the rhetoric any meaning yet. The problems inherent in the new social security reform package have been criticized by women. Feminist critics of the Koizumi reforms argue that they "leave deep uncertainty over the prospects for future livelihood. That uncertainty could end up depressing the birth rate still further, as women contemplate a lack of concrete support in rearing children and caring for their elderly relatives" (Osawa 2000, 17). While the government has been willing to engage in the rhetoric of gender reform, its version of state feminism in the social security realm is suspect. In November 2004, a campaign to protect Article 24 (which guarantees equality between the sexes and

respect for individuals within families) was launched at Tokyo Women's Plaza. According to an article in the *New Internationalist* 245 people attended the campaign (Stronell 2004). Feminist activist Mamiko Ueno argued at the meeting that the social security reform enacted by the LDP will "foist state responsibilities onto the family, which will mean, in the end, women. We can imagine the issue of care for the elderly in an aging society, which is sure to become increasingly difficult, simply labeled, as one member of the Project Team put it, 'the responsibility of the children' (read 'daughter' or 'daughter in law' (Stronell 2004)."

Social security reform illustrates the myriad ways in which state feminism initiatives impact women's lives. Although politicians recognized the value of incorporating gender reform in order to allow women the financial security to have more children, many of these reforms strengthened the very structures in society which support these gender roles, namely the home and family. In this case, the way the Japanese government has used its brand of state feminism is inconsistent, and therefore problematic for women.

Policy Machinery : Gender Centers

A central aspect of gender reform was the government's establishment of gender centers throughout the country in response to the mandate to implement the goals of the United Nation's International Women's Year (IWY 1975). Following the U.N.'s World Plan of Action for IWY, the central government announced a National Plan of Action, and prefectural and municipal bodies followed with their own plans for the improvement of women's status. In a departure from earlier initiatives targeting women, women were invited to play an active role in the planning process (Sugisaki 1986, Nuita et al 1994). At

the behest of women's organizations and informal groups, the *kokuritsu josei kyoiku kaikan* (public women's education center or hall 国立女性居行く会館) was established in prefectures and major cities under the auspices of the women's policy sections of local governments. The purpose of these new resource centers was to provide a space for women to meet with an expressed goal of carrying out local IWY plans of action, and ultimately of advancing women's social status and changing traditional relationships between men and women. The women's public centers are "regarded as a symbol for the administration of women's affairs by local governments (Uno 2000)". These centers sponsor activities which emphasize education and cultural enrichment as well as programs that are designed to raise women's consciousness about public issues. In the past, these activities have tended to support the prevailing notion of women as housewives; however, more and more these activities challenge gender roles and empower women in meaningful ways.

[A]ccording to data compiled by the Women's Education Section of the Ministry of Education, the percentage of courses in the category of "hobbies" declined from 22.2 percent in 1978 to 2.9 per cent in 1987; on the other hand, courses on women's issues and women's history jumped from a mere 4.3 per cent to 30.1 per cent (Mombusho fukin kyoiku ka 1978 and 1987).

Currently, there are over 722 women-related centers and facilities in Japan, and thirty-eight comprehensive centers for women in prefectures and designated cities combined under the jurisdiction of the women's policy section of regional governments. In addition, at the local level, there are women's centers in 190 municipalities. As the above quote illustrates, these women's centers are offering courses which address women's problems and seek to help women in substantive ways, rather than merely offering women activities which are diversionary. Women's centers (*josei sentaa* 女性セ

ンタア) are established by women's policy departments of regional governments for the purpose of addressing women's issues, improving women's status and promoting women's participation in politics. This group also includes facilities established by local boards of education and the private sector. According to a study on women-related facilities published by the National Council of Women's Centers, 48.3% of women's centers are publicly established, funded and operated, 31.5% are publicly established and privately operated, while 18% gave no response (NCWC 1998).

The number of women's education centers, facilities established and funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEXT) totaled 199 in November, 2002. The women's education centers are government facilities which fall under the "Social Education" program for MEXT they are staffed by public employees and sponsor programs.

Women's centers provide a potential pathway to politics because many women's centers in Japan already possess some type of government linkage as regional and local governments fund them; centers also work closely with the Gender Equality Bureau of the National Government. Women's centers are beginning to receive scholarly attention for their ability to involve women in political activity. In her recent book comparing Japanese and U.S. women's movements, for example, Gelb notes that the "most active (of the centers) have been the Yokohama and Kita Kyushu Women's forums and the Dawn Center in Osaka, Wings/Kyoto and the Tokyo Women's Plaza. All provide meeting space, workshops and training of various kinds, and provide resource materials--the 'space' needed by groups to form a collective identity (2003, 34)." Sandra Buckley (1994) also suggests that the politics of gender centers has been renegotiated oftentimes

leading to more radical outcomes than initially intended by the funders (local and prefectural governments). Jan Bardsley (1999) compares the National Women's Education Center in Japan with a national women's center in Korea in order to draw attention to the sites as potential resources for feminist exchange.

On the spectrum of political participation, gender centers lie in the middle, in between informal methods such as environmental and other social movements and more formal methods, such as sitting on a government advisory committee. Gender centers possess both informal and formal characteristics: They receive government funding yet they are not historically an institution which formally addresses political issues. Moreover, it is unclear what role centers play as a networking resource for feminist activities, as Bardsley notes "some women in western Japan complained to me in spring 1997 that prefectural control of women's centers has hampered grassroots activities" (1999, 141). As a result of evidence based on a history of interactions between Japanese women the state, and the state's philosophy of social intervention, this dissertation questions the potential of these gender centers to politically empower women. The following chapter expands on this theme while examining the literature on feminism and the state.

Chapter 3: Engendered Politicking: Confucian Legacies (In)Formal Spaces

As outlined in Chapter 2, the Japanese state has a history of interactions with women's groups which underscores the potential problems inherent in government initiatives regarding women's politicization. The literature on women and the state, as well as feminist critiques of the state, are particularly relevant for Japan because of this relationship. The women's centers examined in this study are one example of institutions created by the Japanese government as part of its gender initiatives. Structures such as the women's centers, which are the focus of this dissertation, have been criticized as top-down measures. For this reason their ability to increase women's political participation is questioned. The ability of the state to provide genuine political opportunities for women is questioned by feminist scholars, in particular, and those writing on women's movements in general. In the following chapter, I present the major arguments in this debate and situate my own stance within this literature base.

Theoretical Debates: Gender and the State

Stetson and Mazur (1995) use the term state feminism to refer to government structures and activities which are formally given the task of working on behalf of women's status and rights. Structures such as the gender centers are but one example of

state feminist measures. However, in feminist theory regarding the state, there is a debate over whether or not government initiatives (such as gender centers) can truly provide women with opportunities to engage in political activity that will alter oppressive structures in societies. The idea that the state could further a feminist agenda has been challenged by many feminist activists and theoreticians.

The literature on state feminism may be viewed as an attempt to apply the lens of feminism to a more balanced reading of interactions between governments and women. The debate concerning the state in feminist literature mirrors the larger debate about the state in political science. Within the past several decades, scholars have argued for a more sophisticated analysis of the state that recognizes that states are in fact, part of societies. Therefore, states mold and are molded by the society and state-society relationships are complex, occurring within different levels of government, from the local to the national. On the whole, this way of viewing the state has received attention because the argument possesses considerable merit for the balance it brings to a debate which has oscillated back and forth between a focus heavy on state versus societal forces.

The language of state feminism represents one of the ways in which feminist scholars have referred to the relationship between women and government. In feminist literature, there are three general approaches to this debate: liberal/democratic/reformist, Marxist feminist, and deconstructionist. Liberal feminists seek to reform state institutions in order for women to receive equal representation, inclusion and nondiscrimination. This perspective seeks to work with the institutions that exist in order to increase the potential of women. Anne Phillips (1993) presents a reasoned expression of faith in the liberal democratic state and its potential to grant women equality. Phillips' proposal rests on the

argument that the opposition of the neo-liberals and neo-conservatives to gender politics is itself an indication that liberal democracy has moved far from its founding moments (Rajan 2003, 11). Phillips does not agree that the state is constitutive of gender relations arguing that this is a question that remains unanswered in the context of feminist work which suggests that social citizenship has added gender protection to state responsibilities (Phillips 1993, 105). However, merely protecting women's interests in one area does not dissolve state actions or responsibilities in other areas; Phillips' argument presses us to move beyond monolithic conceptualizations of the state. Stetson and Mazur move beyond such monolithic notions by disaggregating the state, arguing that one cannot address the question of the state's impact on women without examining the myriad ways in which the state impacts women's lives. According to these authors, many feminist critics view the state in a monolithic fashion, which may overlook opportunities; therefore, they argue for a more concentrated analysis which separates government institutes into various levels and agencies. This requires a reexamination of what the state is, looking at informal methods which one may not recognize as the state. The call to disaggregate the state presented by Stetson and Mazur is also repeated in other writings by feminist authors. Watson for example, argues that to conceptualize the state one must see it as a set of arenas and a collection of practices produced by history. Group interests and demands are constantly shifting by interacting with the state. The state is made up of a variety of actors and interests, often conflicting, which is important for understanding gender relations.

Marxist and neo-Marxist criticisms rely on the assumption that the state serves the interests of the bourgeois class, and therefore it is an instrument of capitalist production.

For women this has meant that woman's roles as mothers and workers (a double role and double burden) have been institutionalized. Feminist authors, who critique liberal democratic welfare states from a reformist standpoint, argue that by integrating with the state (and dominant class interests) female power is lost and that joining with formal institutions occurs at the expense of a feminist agenda which represents black women, Hispanic women and all other underprivileged classes of women. Also included in neo-Marxist criticisms are subaltern studies and post-colonial theory which analyzes the way in which identities, are altered, reworked and recovered in countries that have experienced colonialism.

Deconstruction as part of post-modern theory examines the relationship between women and the state. Deconstruction is used here to imply the literary theory of Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction examines power and shifting meaning which is common to post modern theory. Deconstruction is the de-centering of a text to illustrate that multiple meanings are possible; texts are never stable in their interpretation or meaning. Deconstruction is not merely dis-assembly which is taking a text apart, although this may be involved. Deconstruction studies the shifting meaning of texts, arguing that when meanings are stable, power relationships and hierarchies emerge which necessarily subjugate other interpretations. For example, Franzaway, Connell and Court (1989) inquire into the nature of the state by insisting on two developments in state theory: The state is not merely a set of rules of institutions but a social process; and the state is not just an instrument of dominant interests but a social force that creates change. The state itself is called into question as an agent in sexual politics, how the state is "constituted by

gender relations and shaped by the vicissitudes of sexual politics” (Franzway et. al. 1989, x).

While some deconstructionist feminists question the categorizing of women as subjects at all (Mouffe 1993), deLaurentis questions the usefulness of such a stance arguing that one can deconstruct the category of “women” while preserving women as political subjects. She quotes Kristeva saying, “believing oneself ‘a woman’ is almost as obscurantist as believing oneself ‘a man’ . I say almost because there are still things to be got for women: freedom of abortion and contraception, childcare facilities, recognition of work, etc. Therefore ‘we are women’ should still be kept as a slogan, for demand and publicity (1984, 95).” As Rajan summarizes, what is key in this statement is the identification of women as citizens, who have been historically oppressed as a class by virtue of their femininity; and the resulting politicization of this oppression (Rajan 2003 16).

Women themselves must decide whether to embrace their identity as women or repudiate that category in order to make political gains. In any case, it is necessary in the Japanese context to recognize that either of the two strategies (embracing or repudiating gender identities) may bring useful outcomes and political gains for women. As housewives and mothers Japanese women are excluded from elite politics in large measure, but their position and status in the family is accorded respect. Therefore, Japanese women may be able to make political gains as housewives and mothers and through their identification as such in the political realm. This strategy runs counter to common feminist thinking in western countries such as the United States, where feminist political strategies heavily critique gender roles.

The question of state capacity and the potential for women has led to the study of new institutions created by governments to deal with women's issues. Many such institutions were created because of recommendations made by the UN's Commission on the Status of Women that governments around the world establish such structures, which it calls women's policy machinery. Writers in comparative politics who have engaged in the debate over the "return to the state" have influenced feminist scholars who study the capacity of the state to encourage women's political participation. Like Stetson and Mazur, I am drawing from this literature base on the relationship between the state and civil society as a framework to analyze a less monolithic state which is potentially able to represent women's interests. However, disaggregating the state may not be enough and therefore this study moves theory on women and the state forward by using the tools of state feminism and while expanding this theoretical lens by considering alternatives to western feminism such as those which exist in Japan. Furthermore, through the application of the tools of deconstruction, the language, ideologies and practices illustrated in Japanese state policies on women and the environment are examined. As this chapter will illustrate, the debate over state feminism can be illuminated with reference to Japan, a state with a woman's policy machinery that aims to improve women's social status and participation in political decision making. The Japanese government's initiatives for women include the women's centers which I use as the theme of this dissertation; these centers are part of the government's institutions of political participation, the usefulness of these institutions for women in general are discussed below.

Institutions of Political Participation

Political participation in general and women's political participation in particular occurs along a spectrum from formal to informal methods. Institutions of political participation include political parties, representation in the legislature and other government offices including advisory committees. Pippa Norris (Githens et. al. 1994) notes that the trend in the literature on women in political participation has shifted from an emphasis on traditional participation to recognition of the fact that women participate in ways that these traditional studies don't take into account. While positions among authors vary in explaining the reasons for a difference in the way men and women participate, all authors acknowledge the importance of political institutions. For example, Lee and Clark (2000) study the importance of democratization in East Asia and the impact of democratic political institutions on women's participation.

Studies on women's political participation have also recognized the important role that government bureaucracies can play in addressing gender-based inequities. Stetson and Mazur (1995) study the extent to which women's policy machineries (government agencies devoted to women's policy issues) provide opportunities for women's movement activists to influence the formation of feminist policy and promote feminist political agendas. Their case studies in *Comparative State Feminism* examine Western European structures that are similar to the gender centers in Japan. By studying issues similar to those brought up in Stetson and Mazur's book in the Japanese context illuminates the unique characteristics of industrialized East Asian countries, allowing for comparison with other Western democracies.

Political parties and interest groups are part of a broad category of traditional democratic political institutions that women have used with limited success in order to become involved in politics. Ware (1996) offers several explanations for this: first, women's votes historically were viewed as an extension of male family members' votes; second, party leaders did not want to increase internal competition by giving women more power; and third, women did not participate in party politics because there was little incentive given their exclusion from the power structure. Worldwide, women today are still underrepresented in political parties and rarely assume leadership positions, despite some notable exceptions. For example, the International Parliamentary Union which organizes statistics on women in politics world-wide, notes that the average representation of women in parliaments, is about 20% (with Arab countries at 78.2% and Nordic countries at 39%). This means that women are unable to have their interests represented by political parties and aggregated with the interests of other political actors; because women do not have the same access to these powerful and important political tools they are politically disenfranchised.

Although Japan's "Madonna boom" of the 1980's during which a significant number of women were elected as representatives was a hopeful time, it was short lived.² There is a increasing trend among Diet members to inherit their seats from fathers or other close male relatives (Leblanc 1999). For the average Japanese woman this trend signals a closure of the political world and further distancing from her world.

² The Madonna boom began when a woman nicknamed the "Madonna of Niigata" was elected to the House of Councilors in July of 1989. The total number of women councilors elected that year was 33 out of 252, a new record for women. Iwamoto (2001) argues that the consumption tax affected female voters, as did the prominence of female politician Doi Takako, then head of the Socialist Party of Japan.

Social Movements, NGOs and Informal Networks

Social movements are civil society organizations are groups which seek to influence government but do not want to become government. In the political science literature since the 1960s, the analytical category of new social movements has been developed to explain the unique characteristics of the environmental, feminist, peace and student movements. These types of activity were different from labor unions for example, which typified conventional movements up to that time. The actors in new social movements are the “peripheral citizens of modern industrial societies. They are the women, youth and ethnic minorities who have been excluded in one way or another from the modern ideals of ‘freedom and equality’, and who have been stripped of self-definable identity (Hasegawa 2004, 129).” Along with social movements, a variety of other civil society organizations including consumer groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activist networks have arisen to express the interests of those who do not feel that their interests are already communicated in formal politics. These forms of political organizing are relevant because women have been prominent members and leaders of many such movements both worldwide and in Japan, as later sections of this chapter illustrate.

The relationship between political participation and the use of informal politics by women is also well documented. For example, scholars of women in movements have noted the importance of informal networking on movement growth and success (Buechler 1993; Neuhouser 1995; Kaplan 1990; Kuumba 2001). Payne notes that

Movement participation tends to be structured along the locations in which people find themselves: the workplace, the community, and/or the family. These

networks and structures that impact movement mobilization are embedded in the gendered nature of the social order. The centrality of women in household and community spheres affords them greater access to and need for kinship-based and community-centered social networks (1990).

Payne's position recalls the important distinction made during the past several decades between the "public" and the "private" spheres. One premise of this thinking is that women's traditional position as caretakers of the home and family confines them to the private space which excludes women from the so-called public sphere where politics takes place. In order for women to become political actors there must be a political space open to them which necessarily entails either women leaving their private space and entering the public sphere or an extension of the public sphere (Elshtain 1981, 1983, Pateman 1989, Jones 1993). Dietz argues that this view essentializes women into gender roles that presume inequality and it is this inequality that determines political capability; therefore, the presumption is one that is not helpful in restructuring gender roles (1985). On the other hand, Patricia Boling suggests that women's inclusion in politics has often been linked to maternal and family issues which might lead one (such as Dietz) to reject the everyday, particular sorts of political action done by women as possibilities for women to contribute meaningfully to public life (1991).

While I do not wish to overemphasize the explanatory power of the split between public and private spheres, numerous authors, such as those cited above suggest that women use their position in the family as household caretakers and mothers as a location from which they ground their political activity. For example, scholars of Latin American women's movements noted that "the crux of women's self help is to be found in the submerged networks or social movement communities that coalesce loosely around

the informal leadership and personal relationships stitched out of participants' giving and getting emotional and other very individualized kinds of support (Taylor 1999, 18).

McMahon (1995) agrees, stating that women's self help communities contribute to the reconstruction of gender by cultivating emotional cultures which legitimate the emotive and give attention to the personal, thereby challenging the division between "public" spheres of states and markets and "private" spheres of family and kinship. Moreover, Martin (1990) notes that women are often pushed into environmental organizing because they are unable to fulfill their household obligations due to economic and ecological stress. They also participate because they are mothers.

Overall, I argue for a more broadly defined use of the term political participation which recognizes a range of options which are available to women. These options include informal methods but also consider a spectrum of methods between formal and informal participation which moves one beyond an artificial dualism. In order to understand political participation in Asian and in Japan in particular, it is essential to recognize the interplay of formal and informal politics and the entire spectrum of political activity which is available to citizens. Therefore, in this study of Japan the definition of informal politics that I use includes citizen's environmental movements and gender centers such as the National Women's Education Center (NVEC) which have been established throughout Japan. All of these lie on the spectrum in between formal and informal methods. Confucianism which is central to the structure of Asian societies is important in understanding the interplay between formal and informal as the following paragraphs explain.

The Confucian Legacy in East Asia

While Confucianism developed in different ways throughout Asia “residues of Confucianism continue to have social or political importance (Moody 1988, 4).” The pervasiveness of Confucianism is still an especially important consideration when studying gender and political participation in East Asia.

Theorists of Asian politics underscore the manner in which Confucianism historically reflected the fusion of state and society. The household has traditionally been the model for the state in most East Asian societies including Korea, Japan and China. This linkage serves as an illustration of the distinctive characteristics of traditional Asian politics. In his landmark study Lucien Pye (1985) discusses several elements distinct to Asian politics which illustrate a political culture that possesses an inherent acknowledgment of the linkage between formal and informal politics. These characteristics are: (1) centralized authority; (2) paternalism; (3) factionalism; and (4) informal political participation (Pye 1985). Pye’s characterization derives from the acknowledgment of the role that Confucianism has played in politics in East Asia. In particular throughout Asia “the family was considered the proper model of government. Relations between ruler and subject were seen as analogous to those between parent and child (Pye 1985, 61)”. One result of this practice was an understanding of power as residing in personal relationships associated with indebtedness and mutual obligation. For politics this has meant that personal relationships have historically been more important than formal political ones (for instance those between representative and constituency). This also expresses itself in factionalism and the importance of bureaucracy as noted in Chapter 2.

Confucianism in Asia provides a hierarchical patriarchal structure which guides interactions among people. Women in Confucian cultures have historically been relegated to subordinate positions. Above all, the most entrenched system of order was found in the family, where relations between husband and wife rested on inviolable inequality without exception. Under this patriarchal system, man was the master and woman was the servant required to pay strict homage to her master. This gross gender inequality within the family extends into economic (and social) activities, even in the modern era (Chin in Lee and Clark 2000, 93). The idea that men should be involved in social activities while women should be confined to the home has meant that formal politics is not an arena which has been viable for women in the Confucian system. Despite the differences among East Asian democracies, the norms and values of Confucianism have played a key role in the development of the nature and form of democracy as well as the interplay of formal and informal politics.

East Asian Institutions of Political Participation

While many Asian countries have made remarkable progress in the economic realm, processes such as economic growth, industrialization and modernization have failed to bring gender equality, despite undeniable improvements in women's life chances. In her study of gender differences in participation in six Western European and North American democracies, Carol Christy (in Githens et.al. 1994) argues that gender differences in participation are diminishing, but that the rate of change is very slow. Christy's assumption that as the democratization process takes hold in newer democracies women's participation will increase has been criticized by a number of feminist scholars including Lee and Clark (2000), LeDouff (2002), Phillips (1998) and

Shanley and Narayan (1997). They argue that Christy's assumption does not hold true for East Asian democracies, where women continue to be politically marginalized.

Women remain "woefully under represented among political officials in all but a very few polities, even in the developed world" (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994). Recent rankings from the U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women illustrate the gap between Asian countries and the rest of the world in terms of women's formal political participation. Japan, South Korea and Mongolia have the lowest rankings among all countries in the world for percentage of women in government. In Taiwan, while 32% of women are civil servants, only 8% of political appointees are women. In 1994, Japan reported that women represented only .9% of government officials in the national legislature and women in local government constituted 2.6%; the number of female ministers jumps to 6.1% in 1996, while worldwide the figure was 9.1% (www.un.org 2006). At the highest level of politics women in ministerial positions accounted for less than 5 percent of the total in the Asia/Pacific region. Japan, with women in 5.9 % of ministerial positions is significantly below other democracies such as France (14.7%), Germany (10.7%), the United Kingdom (8.3%) and the United States (14.3%) (www.un.org 10/7/02). Since 2002 these numbers have changed very little, worldwide the number of women leaders is just 11 out of 193 countries, 2 less than in 2002 when a record of 13 women were in charge of counties (Hoffman 2006). These numbers tell a powerful story of gender exclusion; especially in the ministries of Northeast Asian countries, where many political decisions are reached, women are underrepresented and remain on the periphery of politics (Schreurs 2001).

While democratization was expected to improve the status of women by increasing women's representation among policy elites and by increased political activities among autonomous women's groups, this has not been the case. In terms of legislative representation, women in the Asian region are below the 30% mark for percentage of women in the legislature and this is the best case, Vietnam, which is ranked 16th in United Nations statistics on Women in National Parliaments. Japan, the country with the longest history of democratization, does significantly worse, placed second to last for Asian countries with 8.96% of legislative seats held by women in 2005. The only country with worse statistics is North Korea, while authoritarian governments in Singapore and China have achieved significantly better records (See Table 1: Women in National Parliaments in Asia).

Table 3.1: Women in National Parliaments in Asia From: Women in National Parliaments in Asia (ipu.org, 9/04).

Rank	Country	Lower or Single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats	Women	% Women	Elections	Seats	Women	% Women
16	Vietnam	2002	498	136	27.3				
31	China	1998	2984	650	21.8				
39	S. Korea	1998	687	138	20.1				
50	Phillipines	2001	214	38	17.8	2001	24	3	12.5
68	Singapore	2001	85	10	11.8				
75	Mongolia	2000	76	8	10.5				
76	Malaysia	1999	193	20	10.4	1998	69	18	26.1
84	Thailand	2001	500	46	9.2	2000	200	21	10.5
92	Indonesia	1999	500	40	8				
97	Japan	2000	480	35	7.3	2001	247	38	15.4
103	N. Korea	2000	273	16	5.9				
N/A	Taiwan	2004	225	47	21				

These statistics suggest a trend that raises important questions about the success of democratization in improving the status of women. It is clear from these statistics that

democratization does not hold the ultimate answer in improving women's political participation in Asia. The reason for this lack of progress has been attributed to a variety of cultural and institutional factors which are unique to East Asia, including both cultural factors such as Confucianism and also institutional factors such as party recruitment, the electoral system, and bureaucratic recruitment (Pye 1985).

Another factor which has been important in explaining the low representation of women in politics is party recruitment. In Japan, Taiwan, China, Singapore and the Philippines, one political party has remained dominant for a long period of time. If the dominant political party in a country does not play an active role in the recruitment of women for representative positions in government, there is little likelihood that women's representatives will hold office. Leblanc gives an anecdote about the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan which illustrates the lack of support which it has given to its female members:

I attended a nationwide gathering at party headquarters for all of the LDP-elected women representatives at every level. In a hot, crowded room, the women addressed male leaders in their party who sat above them at a head table. As, one, by one, each woman took the floor to introduce herself and make a short statement of her most pressing party-related concerns, the feeling that the party ignored its women politicians was echoed again and again (Leblanc 1999, 191).

Furthermore in Japan, the political landscape is changing as the LDP regains strength, the country may again be a one party dominant system. This kind of arrangement means that groups on the fringes of politics, including women may not have their interests represented and reinforces the notion that women in Japan are similar to those worldwide in their exclusion from top power positions in political parties. LeBlanc

notes in her study that “(P)olitics is, first and foremost, elite, national-level politics, what is reported on newspaper pages and television news. Politics is male-dominated and requires special qualities of its participants that are not available to women—time, experience, money, and reputation—for them to achieve success. (pp.82).”

The cost of raising enough money to mount a successful campaign in Japan is substantial; without party support and the extensive network of fund-raising mechanisms that party connections provide, it is difficult to be elected to office. In such a context, when women are not given party support, their likelihood of achieving political success is slim. Christensen looks at similar issues in his case study which shows discordant rates of representation between women and other minorities who have done much better in gaining positions in the House of Representatives (in Lee and Clark 2000). Christensen argues that severe restrictions on campaign activities have led to reliance on personal support groups called *koenkai* (小宴会), which are easier for cohesive minorities to establish than for women (in Lee and Clark 2000). Although women may be at a disadvantage because they are not asked to join *koenkai* as often as men are, women are no longer dismissed as apolitical by parties, candidates, campaigners and supports, as Steel (2004) observes. However, as more women are asked to join and women’s participation in *koenkai* increases, women’s and men’s participation in *koenkai* takes on different qualities.

In addition to the political functions of *koenkai*, they have a strong social or community component which is organized along gender lines. Entertainment aimed at appealing to women includes cookery classes, women’s volleyball, flower-arranging, kimono classes and so on. As a result, the political and politicizing role of *koenkai* may be different for men and women (Steel 2004, 240).

In her comparison of electoral systems in Taiwan and South Korea, Rose Lee finds that low levels of women's representation in South Korea are due to institutional factors as well. Lee found that when party leaders were given considerable discretion to nominate, "(A) n unprecedented number of women were placed on the at-large candidate list by the ruling party and were consequently elected. But because such practice was carried out on an ad hoc basis under the leaders 'paternalism' it disappeared when the democratic transition occurred. (Lee in Clark and Lee 2000, 58)." On the other hand, Taiwan has had high proportions of women's representation due mainly to its reserved seats system for women. Women in that country now "win at least half again as many seats as are reserved for them in almost all of Taiwan's assemblies (which) demonstrates that women can build upon the opportunities opened up by such a set of quotas to become legitimate and independent political actors in their own right (Lee in Clark and Lee 2000, 58)." The Taiwanese case illustrates the potential for institutional arrangements to neutralize and perhaps to even counter, cultural norms. In countries where there are reserved seats for women, women are more successful in becoming elected representatives. Japan does not have a reserved seats system or any other type of institutional incentive, such as the one that exists in Taiwan, which would assist women in this manner.

Social Movements, NGOs and Informal Networks in East Asia

Within the last three decades social movements and other civil society organizations have become more prominent in East Asia as they have worldwide. The student movement and worker's protests in China, the rise of political Islam in Indonesia, women's movements in Korea and Vietnam as well as the environmental movement in

Japan are but a few examples of a wide range of this type of activity. As these forms of organizing are becoming more widely used by citizens, so too are they more commonly used by women. The number of women's groups and organizations in Asia has grown exponentially over the past several years and these groups are also making linkages to one another. To illustrate, the Japanese women's movement in coordination with Chinese, Vietnamese and Korean women held a mock trial of the Japanese government for the Japanese military's treatment of Korean and Vietnamese women as sexual slaves during World War II (Violence Against Women in War Network, Japan 2006). In Japan, a wide variety of housewives clubs, cooperatives, as well as *josei sentaa* 女性センター represent this form of activity which will be discussed in greater depth in later sections.

In recent years, women have also begun forming women-only unions to represent women's interests in the workplace. Broadbent (2005) notes the existence of twelve women's only unions which form a loose coalition and have the goal of expanding membership to create a national network. These women's unions have made connections with RENGO (mentioned in Chapter 2) and cooperated with international organizations to improve the conditions of union members and to abolish sex discrimination, gain equal pay for equal work and to advance women's social status. Women's increasing activity on labor issues is also noted by Bishop (2002) who discusses this trend within the context of globalization. Although Japan's cultural norms structure political participation along gender lines, women's organizations in this context provide an autonomous basis from which to "challenge women's exclusion, and to challenge the existing political hegemony (Bishop 2002, 9)". Globalization has provided an international stage for women's groups

which have built linkages with other women's groups and added to foreign pressure on the Japanese government to share information and build solidarity.

Gender and Political Participation in Japan

In the past, Japanese women have had low representation in elected office and there has been only slight upward movement in this trend, as illustrated in the following table:

Table 3.2: Number of Female Members in the Post-WWII

	<u>Diet as Whole</u>			<u>House of Representatives</u>			<u>House of Councillors</u>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>% Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>% Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>% Women</i>
April 1946					39	6.4	0	0	0.0
Apr. 1947				0	15	3.2	0	10	4.0
Nov. 1950	699	24	3.4	449	12	2.7	256	12	4.8
May 1955	716	23	3.2	466	8	1.7	258	15	5.0
Sep. 1960	583	24	3.4	451	11	2.4	247	13	5.3
Dec. 1965		24	3.4	454	7	1.5	251	17	6.8
Jan. 1970	733	21	2.9	466	8	1.7	251	13	5.6
Oct. 1975	726	25	3.4	475	7	1.5	251	18	7.2
Jul. 1980	782	26	3.4	511	9	1.8	252	17	6.8
Jul. 1986	763	29	3.8	512	7	1.4	252	22	3.8
Jul. 1992	749	40	5.3	497	7	1.4	252	33	13.0
Mar. 1994	761	52	6.8	509	14	2.8	252	33	15.0
Aug. 1995	752	47	8.3	500	12	2.4	252	35	14.0
Oct. 1996	752	57	7.6	500	23	4.6	252	31	14.0
Dec. 1997	752	60	8.0	500	24	4.8	252	38	14.0
Dec. 1998	751	67	8.9	500	24	4.6	252	43	17.0
July 2006	722	77	11.00	480	43	8.96	242	34	14.0

Although women in Japan are not high political office holders at the national level, there are many other options for women to express themselves politically, including women's movements and lower levels of government. Japan's statistic for women in formal politics rises significantly at the sub-ministerial level. Japanese women also have a high voter turnout, which has increased significantly since the 1960s and is now higher than

male voter turnout (the male/female ratio is 15.8/16.8). There have also been women's movements that have achieved important political victories, including the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL). However, within a worldwide context of women's political activism, Japanese women have been markedly quiescent in the political realm.

Regarding the endurance of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, Pye notes that: the Japanese respond not just, or even primarily, to the ultimate forms of public authority but also to their more immediate power relationships. The continuing success of the LDP and the faltering of more ideologically oriented opposition parties show this to be the case. Indeed, as Gerald Curtis has discovered by examining the Japanese election campaigning, the successful Japanese politician must rely very heavily upon the power of personal relationships in Japanese communities (Pye 1985, 165).

Chie Nakane has also discussed the importance of networks, particularly patron-client networks. Nakane typifies Japanese society as a hierarchy in which superiors and inferiors form patron-client relationships; in these relationships patrons represent the interest of their clients in return for client loyalty, and emotional ties between patrons and their clients (1970). Group solidarity is formed through Confucianism's hierarchies. Ike (1972) uses this argument to explain the way government functions, noting that patron-client relationships have helped form a democracy in Japan in which "individuals...tend to relate to the political system through their patrons, who typically are local notables, political bosses, union leaders, local politicians, and leaders of local organizations (pp. 19)." Curtis argues that these kinds of informal networks also play a role in mobilizing voters, which he calls social obligation voting. This type of voting is based on personal

ties arising from *giri* (義理), or obligation to those who have influenced a voter through personal ties (1971). In their detailed study of electoral politics in Japan, Fukui and Fukai note the importance of informal methods as political tools for female Diet candidates; informal campaign and fund-raising groups, spousal and family connections as well as workplace relationships, their work illustrates the strength and tenacity of informal politics (in Dittmer et. al. 2000, 40).

In Japan, women's social status has played a significant role in the way women have expressed themselves politically. The status of women in Japanese society is strongly connected to the Confucian ethic, which Japan imported during the feudal period. Society under Confucianism was organized hierarchically, stratified by classes and gender; women possessed the least status in this system. The Meiji period, which brought promises of freedom from feudal castes, saw the enactment of the Civil Code of 1898 (revised in 1902), which defined women as legally dependent without individual rights (Tokuza 1988). The Civil Code reinforced the patriarchal system legally and rendered women powerless in all realms of their lives. Many authors also recognize that the Meiji program of modernization occurred against the backdrop of the centralization of rule and a reformulation of gender ideology (Garon 1997). The state conceptualization of womanhood required their political exclusion and the state gradually eliminated the loopholes through which previously women engaged in political activity. One of the most important developments for women came after World War II, when the American occupational authorities granted suffrage to women. Women gained a large measure of legal emancipation, bringing them into social life. Women organized themselves into a

proliferation of women's groups and associations which advanced women's issues related to the home and family.

In the postwar period Japanese society changed as women moved into the workforce and access to education offered them access to public roles closed to them prior to the war. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, new forms of political protest appeared, coupled with an increase in leisure time this trend contributed to women's participation in grass-roots movements to counter the effects of environmental degradation, long work days and the need for child care facilities (Nuita et al 1994). By the late 1960s, a growing consumer movement had expanded into a national campaign dominated by housewives. "They tackled homemaking problems that had immediate relevance to them, such as the high cost of living, food additives, and false advertising. Their activities directly contributed to democratization at the community level" and raised awareness about public issues. However, this awareness and organizational skill were not used in a broad-based campaign to advance the status of women (Nuita et al 1994, 402).

This lack of broad-based campaigning can be understood from Robin Leblanc's perspective (1999). Leblanc argues that the traditional methods of political science including mass studies of voting behavior or party membership neglect participation by housewives because our theoretical categories are male-driven. Japanese women do not participate in the same way Japanese men do. "(W)omen are less likely than men to report supporting a particular political party, participating in a campaign, joining a political support group, or meeting an elected official or powerful political activist (Leblanc 1999, 67)." When conducting interviews with housewives, Leblanc found that women who

described apathetic feelings toward politics did so because of their dissatisfaction about the choices available to them in political society (1999). Steel (2004) also notes that in Japan norms for women still emphasize their “primary role within the household as wife and mother. Women are concerned with public policy issues that affect their household, but they do not see them as ‘political’...(228).” This underscores the importance of the distinction in Japanese culture between public and private. For this reason it is necessary to include a range of political activity from the formal to the informal in order to adequately capture the reality that women often participate in politics as housewives (as Leblanc notes) from locations such as the gender centers described below. In recent decades women in Japan have had increasing access to politics because of the outside influence of the United Nations as well as westernization and globalization which emphasize different, more equal conceptions of gender as opposed to more traditional, Confucian gender roles. However, in spite of this, women’s representation in politics is still low when compared with the strides that women in other advanced industrial democracies have accomplished.

Chapter 4: Development, the Environment and Women's Activism

A major theme of this dissertation is the connection between women's political activity and the environmental issue area. In Japan, this connection has historical weight as well as political salience, given the high number of women participating in environmental movements and non-governmental organizations. Japan is similar to other industrialized democracies in terms of its experience with industrialization and economic development. These processes are theoretically linked to democratization and their consequences have ramifications for women as well as the environment. These theoretical linkages are outlined below. During interviews at the *josei sentaa* (women's centers) women were asked about the environment in order to ascertain possible linkages with citizen's movements or environmental activists. In order for women's centers to act as vehicles for women's political participation it is important for them to have ties to women environmental activists for networking and information sharing purposes because environmental issues have been the one arena where women have had political success. This chapter explains the nature and context of Japan's environmental issues and the links with gender, beginning with a theoretical discussion of these topics.

Gender and the Environment

The theoretical literature which makes connections between gender and the environment in political science is disparate, with different areas of the discipline making contributions. This means that although there is a variety of authors and arguments on the topic, there is not yet a cohesive theory which explains the linkages between gender and politically motivated environmental movements. Within the field of political science environmental activism by women has been analyzed from various theoretical lenses including women in development, social movements and ecological feminist theory. Each of these perspectives offers insight on the connection between women and the environment which is relevant in Japan.

Women and Development

Literature on women in development analyzes the process of economic development from a gendered perspective which recognizes the linkages between industrialization and its ecological consequences. Although political and economic development are distinguished from each other, for some scholars they are theoretically intertwined as part of a linear process from traditional to modern. Programs and projects which promoted development often assumed that democratization and industrialization went hand in hand; it was assumed that the growth of a nation's economy would produce increasing social mobility and political participation which is necessary in a democratic system. Writers in the area of women and development note the linkages between political development characterized by democratization and economic development or industrialization (Merchant 1990, Shiva 1989). However, democratization and industrialization are development goals which may bring potential harm to women.

Industrialization, a primary goal of most development strategies, has negatively affected the environment in both the industrialized and developing world. Although developing countries may attempt to build environmental matters into their policies, ultimately, the prevailing growth model followed by industrialized countries has devastating consequences for the environment. Environmental degradation also has bearing on women's lives day to day. Women are the managers of natural resources because they are responsible for sustaining and caring for the family and community. Therefore, economic development is linked to processes which affect women, and has a gender component which has been recognized by international organizations. The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) also does work in the area of gender equality through its Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET). Gendernet is the only forum at the international level which brings experts together from development agencies in order to define common approaches and share information on gender related topics. GENDERNET recognizes that for developed and developing countries, gender equality and women's empowerment are necessary components in improving social and political conditions. Support is provided to Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members countries to take gender equality into account while undergoing economic development strategies. In many areas of the world, including Japan, women are responsible for providing meals for the family and managing the family garden plot. Therefore, women are environmental agents at the center of the domestic sphere there is an environmental dimension to daily life and women manage this space.

The theoretical frameworks in women and development may be categorized into three distinct theoretical paths: Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD) and Gender and Development (GAD). Each of these theoretical perspectives places women at the center of analyses regarding the role of women in development although there are different prescriptions offered by each perspective in terms of how women should be included in this process. The effect of the women and development literature on Japan occurred in the 1980s through the early 1990s and has primarily been confined to the intellectuals and academia. Charlton (1999) analyzes the way in which Japanese feminists made a difference in overseas development assistance (ODA), arguing that this progress has been confined to small niches due to the nature of policy formation on aid in Japan.

One important aspect of political development which affects women is nationalism, the sense of belonging that people in a country have toward their state. The process of political development includes nation-building, which is essential to democratization. The consolidation of citizen identity, or nation-building, creates boundaries between citizens and the state while reinforcing the common traditions, beliefs and culture of the population. For women, development often reinforces the strength of state and separates the public and private, which alienates women (whose dominion in many societies is the private) from public (the state and political institutions) political participation. Nationalism, which has arisen with political development and the process of nation building, is connected to women because “(T)hroughout global history, with few exceptions, women, the feminine, and figures of gender, have traditionally anchored the nationalist imagery (Heng 1997, 31). “Nationalist movements use this

vocabulary to define themselves; women's concerns, which reflect the home, family and traditional lifestyles, can be utilized to mobilize different communities and to unite national identities (Stewart, Smith and Denton 1994). As explained earlier the Japanese state intentionally incorporated women and images of family and the home as part of its development strategy. The use of women as symbolic representations by the Japanese state illustrates the susceptibility of women and women's issues to rhetorical manipulation and underscores the way Japanese society views women.

Social Movements

There is a gap in the social movement literature that focuses specifically on environmental issues and gender. However, there are authors beginning to write in this area. For example, Garcia-Gorena (1999) analyzes the *Madres* (Mothers) in Mexico who organized to protest the existence of a nuclear power plant. The New Social Movement approach used by Garcia-Gorena illuminated the importance of identity and the imagery used by the *Madres* to mobilize members.

The *Madres Veracruzanas* argue that Mexican society is more likely to listen to women who call themselves mothers rather than feminists. Thus, they were constrained by societal forces: the women who founded the group believed that maternal imagery was more likely to be effective in their mobilizational efforts (Garcia-Gorena 1999, 131).

The use of maternal imagery by women to mobilize on an environmental issue is relevant because it is primarily from their maternal role that women from Japan mobilize on environmental matters as well. Several authors document the importance of women in these movements as leaders and initiators of activities because women have not mobilized in such a dramatic way on other issues (see George 2001 , Kirkpatrick 1975,

and Schreurs 2002). In Japan, the environmental movements initiated by women were part of a wide variety of citizens' activities and social movements which began in the 1970s as local and regional citizens initiatives, expanding in the 1980s. These movements were responsible for a transformation of civil society within the citizens sector. Public activities by citizens including non profit organizations and social movements rapidly progressed, which was a remarkable development in Japanese citizen politics. (Hasegawa 2004).

Both women's movements and environmental movements may also be viewed as part of a larger class of social movements. Social movement theories were developed to explain the characteristics of movements in advanced industrial democracies in the 1960's, such as the feminist, peace and environmental movements (also called new social movements or NSMs). These movements are unique in their contrast to more conventional movements, such as labor movements, because these social movements represent actors on the periphery of politics (women, the youth and minorities) who have been excluded or under-represented. Also, the issues in which these actors are involved are related to social issues confronting modern society which are identity issues for some. Unlike more traditional movements, social movements are organized informally and react to a single issue. Social movement literature analyzes a distinct set of activities and properties of states and the opportunities for collective action within states. States are viewed as sites of contestation and challenge as various groups pressure the state in order to have their demands met. Social movements are more likely to form in a political system which is open, where there is the opportunity of political access, where there is

division among the elite power structure, and when they have the support of influential allies under a state whose propensity for repression is low (McAdam 1996).

The Japanese history of social movements began when women's movements began to pressure the state for suffrage in the Meiji era. Moreover, the citizens and housewives movements of the 1960s are also prominent examples of social movement activity. However, the citizen's and housewives movement used non-conflictual, indirect methods when compared to social movements in other countries. The early women's movement in Japan forged a mutually beneficial relationship with the state when women were assigned a special societal role during the late years of the Meiji period and also after World War II. The ways in which social movements in general, and women's movements in particular, are limited because of their relationship with the state and limited ability to challenge the social norms of Confucianism, which run counter to the way in which NSM's engage in politically activity. These norms, which are still pervasive in Japanese society are antithetical to direct action. Social movements in Japan rarely engage in protest techniques; rather, many groups participate in local activism, volunteerism and through clubs and cooperatives.

Eco-Feminism

An additional area of theory that makes an argument about women and nature is ecological feminist theory or eco-feminism. A common starting position for different ecofeminist positions is to show how relationships between humans and the environment are represented by dualisms that associate femininity with nature and masculinity with culture. There are two main variants of eco-feminism, those based on culture and those based on social and political critiques. "Culturalists" assert that the feminine essence

exists as an ahistorical reference point while sociopolitical eco-feminists aim to deconstruct the assignment of gender. Culturalist stances suggest that the link between women and nature is natural, based on the ability of the female body to give birth and also in women's caretaking activities which are closely associated with maintaining and nurturing life (Mies and Shiva 1997). A spiritual link exists between women and nature which provides for strong assertions of feminine superiority in managing the environment. Therefore, alongside the critique of patriarchal hegemonic environmental management models, these scholars advocate for a different environmental order based on the everyday and prioritizing conservation and caring for nature. Writers such as Shiva (1989) and Starhawk (1989) believe that women and men intrinsically think and feel differently. In order to liberate women and nature, there must be an end to patriarchy. Women in the third world are often the most severely affected by ecological harm because they are the providers of fuel, fodder and water. When forests are destroyed because of logging, women are forced to walk further to provide firewood to their families. As Shiva notes, "(F)or hill women food production begins with the forest. Disappearing forests and water are quite clearly an issue of survival for hill women...(1989, 189)". This very real and material relationship between women and environmental resources has also been linked by eco-feminists to an argument that it is women's reproductive capacity, the ability of women to reproduce and create life, to nurture and care for the young, that situates women closer to nature than men. Women are closer to nature as a result of the oppression of both women and nature by patriarchy, which also uniquely situates women as the agents who can bring about transformation and ecological sustainability.

The sort of eco-feminist argument made by Shiva has been criticized as essentialist by other female authors because it lumps all women together vis á vis the environment and fails to distinguish between class, caste, ethnicity or other differences. Within the culturalist camp of eco-feminism, there are writers who argue for broadening the diversity of the feminine and introducing new identifications that differ from western feminism. Socialist-based and Marxist-based cultural eco-feminisms place class exploitation alongside gender oppression as a central category of analysis (Merchant 1990, Warren 1996). Environmental problems are the result of capitalist patriarchy and the ideology that nature can be exploited for human progress. The connection between women and the environment is related to the material needs and position of women in society. In order to solve environmental problems, socialist/Marxist eco-feminists believe that it is necessary to end capitalism and bring about a society which will use resources for the good of men and women at the same time.

Socio-political eco-feminism points to gender difference as social and cultural facts. Neither the attributes nor the meanings attributed to the environment nor the feminine are ontological; rather, they are cultural constructs which have resulted from complex historical processes. Gender differences are projected into many relationships including those established with nature and therefore, they are an integral part of policies. Women's participation in natural resources and environmental decision making is important because of historical relationships, not because there are special inherent qualities possessed by women which make them closer to nature than men.

The idea on the one hand that femininity is essentially nurturing and therefore closer to nature and the idea that gender is a cultural construct were positions that were

popularly debated in Japan in the 1980s by Yayoi Aoki and Chizuko Ueno, both leading feminists in Japan at the time. During the “Aoki and Ueno debate”, as it was popularly known as in the media, Ueno and her supports criticized as essentialist Aoki’s call for a return to the feminine principle as a strategy for rejecting masculine power structures. Both scholars wrote books and articles to support their position but they have not been translated into English so the debate has not received notice from western writers analyzing environmental politics and eco-feminism in Japan. Also, the debate was not picked up by future Japanese feminists; thus, information about a Japanese variant of eco-feminism is scant. Mike Danahar (2003) makes linkages between environmentalism, feminism and left-wing politics in Japan, noting that left-wing parties have captured both feminist concerns and environmental concerns to a higher degree than majority parties like the Liberal Democratic Party or Democratic Party of Japan. One other author, Maruyama (2003) also discusses eco-feminism and argues that in Japan, the dualisms critiqued by eco-feminism are not present because Japanese culture and language does not exhibit the same concern with binary thinking or oppositions as western culture does. Moreover, in Japanese religion and culture, nature and women are not identified with one another. For these reasons, Murayama (2003) concludes that eco-feminism may be difficult to apply to a Japanese context in order to argue against the oppression of women and nature.

The Japanese experience with environmental activism can be tracked historically to earlier experiences with industrialization that produced pollution that had devastating consequences for the health of its citizens. The practical effects of industrialization on nature, and the political movements which resulted to protest such pollution, are analyzed

below. Furthermore, later development practices also had problematic environmental components and these are presented as well in chronological sequence.

The literature on Women and Development, Social Movements and Eco-Feminism each address the relationship between women and the environment. While women and development highlights the role of women in economic development process, social movement theory analyzes citizen activity and eco-feminist arguments rely on the construction of a woman-nature dualism. As discussed above, eco-feminism is, in the end, not relevant to Japan because a special connection between women and nature does not exist in Japanese society. Women and development literature is useful in the critique of Japanese aid policy while arguments from the social movement school highlight the importance of opportunities for social movements which is relevant in Japan because of the Japanese state's historical relationship with women's groups.

Industrialization and Environmental Pollution

During the Meiji period, Japan established the Ministry of Industry in 1870 to oversee economic development. The government built model factories to provide experience with new technology. Public education was extended as a means of developing a work force. Private enterprise soon joined government initiatives, particularly in textiles. By the 1890s, industrial corporations, or *zaibatsu*, served to accumulate capital for major investment. Japan's careful management of industrialization limited foreign involvement, but Japan continued to depend on importation of equipment and raw materials from the West. Rapid growth depended on the existence of a cheap supply of labor, often drawn from poorly paid women (Hunter 2003, Mackie 1997). Japan's industrialization depended on selling manufactured goods abroad.

After World War II, the new American controlled government imposed military reforms to modernize Japan's army and establish the foundation for post-War development. A lack of capital dictated that the government be directly involved in the early stages of re-industrialization. An internal infrastructure was created, guilds and internal tariffs were abolished, and clear title to land was granted to individuals. Government spending emphasized creating a favorable environment for future growth, including investment in roads, flood-control projects, harbors, airports, and basic industries such as hydroelectric power. The Japan Development Bank (JDB) issued low interest loans mainly to develop shipping and energy (coal mining, nuclear plants and oil refineries) for industrialization. Government spending also targeted agriculture, because of food shortages, as well as the national railway system which was considered key to modernizing transportation.

During this time period, the infusion of American aid allowed Japan to pursue industrialization with substantial vigor. In the 1960s, Japan experienced extreme economic growth as the gross national product increased eightfold (Hayes 1992). Despite the devastating damage to Japan's infrastructure at the end of World War II, the country achieved amazing economic growth during the postwar period. Although economists cite many reasons for Japan's success, the industrial policy formulated and implemented by MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and the Ministry of Finance was integral for much of Japan's economic development from 1955 to 1975 when economic growth was at its top speed.

However, the process of accelerated industrialization had devastating environmental consequences. These consequences included major pollution events such

as the Itai outbreak of 1972, the Minamata (1960-1974) outbreak and asthma in Yokkaichi city from 1970-1974 (Murota 1985). Each of these events had associated diseases, which resulted from toxic substances traced to industries. The *Itai* (“it hurts”) outbreak was caused by ingestion of cadmium traced to a metal refining company; Minamata disease was caused by poisoning from methyl mercury waste produced by a fertilizer company; and citizens in Yokkaichi city suffered asthma induced by air pollution generated by the city’s industrial complex (Patrick 1976).

Environmental Activism in the 1960s and 1970s

Many small, locally focused citizens’ groups protested industrial pollution because of the severe health problems caused by such pollution. These groups fought denials of responsibility on the part of industry and unresponsiveness on the part of local governments. Although Schreurs (2002) notes the presence of advocates within the bureaucracy, the majority party prevented environmental progress.

An early example was in 1953 when the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW) conducted a national survey of pollution that found that many Japanese were suffering from air, water, and noise pollution. On the basis of this survey and similar debates that were going on in the US, the UK and Germany, the MoHW formulated a bill to prevent contamination of the living environment. Other ministries, industry, and the LDP, however, opposed the bill (Schreurs 2002, 38).

The unresponsiveness of both industry and government forced citizens to consider litigation, a political move that had been largely unused previously and was uncharacteristic of Japanese culture. The citizens movement’s use of the court system illustrates the seriousness of the government’s unwillingness to protect its population

from polluting industries.³ At the same time, the tension between industrialization and environmental protection was being played out in the bureaucracy as the two ministries responsible for these areas (the MoHW and MITI) vied with each other to protect their interests. Four large pollution cases brought to court by victims forced major changes in a political system which had been closed: mercury poisoning in Kumamoto and Niigata prefectures, *itai-itai* disease in Toyama prefecture and asthma in Yokkaichi city. These court cases focused media attention on environmental problems and it is widely acknowledged that the media helped turn national attention to the plight of victims of pollution diseases in the 1960s and 1970s (Schreurs 2002, 42).

Japanese women played an important part in these citizen's movements that attacked the problem of increasingly destructive practices toward the environment. So called "Housewives movements" were organized and led by women. Many housewives movements became part of larger citizen movements, but housewives activism is distinct from the larger set of more radical, politically minded citizens groups. Housewives participated in movements to correct pollution problems which affected the home and family locally, whereas citizens movements fought for large-scale change at the national level and for legislation to reform polluting industries.

(I)n the late 1960's and early 70's, public resentment about worsening pollution burst into a full-fledged environmental movement. Women's groups, including affiliates of the Housewives Association and the National Federation of Regional Women's Organizations furnished much of the dynamism behind these citizen's movements. Anti-pollution protests meshed well with the organized women's long-standing identification with daily life. (Women's groups) and other

³ The use of the court system in Japan is outstanding because Japan is not a litigious society.

associations attacked the government and business community for having pursued high-growth economic strategies with little commitment to conserving and recycling resources (Garon 1997, 194).

While ecofeminism posits that women and the environment are connected because of their dual oppression, it is not necessary to posit such a strong connection between the two in order to comment on the linkages between women, economic development and the environmental activism of women. The logic of development was pervasive in Japan immediately following World War II, and its effects upon the environment motivated women's political action. The linkage between women and political participation on environmental issues is very strong in Japan, where women are more likely to be involved in citizen's movements that have environmental issues as their primary concern. Women's groups became a symbol of the sectors of Japanese life most affected by pollution, and in that capacity they served as an important counterpart and legitimization for the environmental movement and its efforts to urge the government to change its lenient environmental policies. For example, Broadbent notes the important role of women in protesting Landfill No.8 in Kozaki; in interviews, one participant noted "(W)omen are the base of the movement. They want to protect life and health. They are the mothers of kids and do it for them. Men have jobs so they can't participate. Women are at home (1998, 163)." Broadbent's interviewee's insight reflects the structure of gender roles in society and also the unique ability of women to impact environmental politics because of their societal position. The citizens movements during this time period were able to articulate their demands to the Japanese government and because of coinciding high media attention from the late 1960s through the early 1970s, public

sympathy was at a high point. The government response which resulted from these efforts is outlined below.

Movements and Political Parties

Rising public interest in environmental issues gave opposition parties a chance to challenge the LDP in local elections, and eventually the LDP began to fear the salience of this issue on the national level. Environmental movements, which are traditionally localized phenomena in Japan, have received help from prefectural and district level labor union organizations, along with other support groups, national and international assistance. Many times, opposition parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party mobilize these support groups in the early stages of environmental disputes (Hasegawa 2004). However, the dominance of the LDP has strengthened Japan's centralized system, and Hasegawa (2004) argues that the result has been ineffectual deliberative bodies in the Diet and other councils of review. Given this context, the contributions made by environmental movements to government decisions have been substantial because of their ability to influence public opinion and the policy process to achieve policy change.

Although opposition parties gave voice to the grievances of victims of environmental pollution, many of the most powerful movements used patterns of organization and networking separate from the established parties. For example, George (2001) argues that because it was independent of the parties, the dominant stream of the Minamata movement was able to build a broad base of support which allowed the

movement to achieve a favorable court decision with substantial public backing.⁴

Unfortunately, because of its independence (lack of connection with any formal political party) the Minamata movement did not continue after the 1973 court decision. The Minamata case presents a contrast to other protest movements which became incorporation into the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party. According to Steinhoff (1984) there is a national protest cartel, formed by several opposition parties that monopolizes the protest market, and eagerly swallows up new protest movements whenever possible. The literature on the relationship between environmental groups and opposition parties thus represents a contradiction: While opposition parties may help mobilize support for movements in early stages of environmental disputes, there is also a tendency for the parties to incorporate local movements into their political structure. This dynamic may be helpful to environmental movements which need party support to gain a political voice, but it may also mean that some environmental groups do not become political actors in their own right, separate from political parties. These movements were “swallowed up” as Steinhoff notes, by opposition parties in order to strengthen the parties themselves, which (as explained earlier in Chapter 2) tend to be weak political actors, especially at the national level.

Environmental Policy Response

The environmental movement, which emerged as a response to the environmental catastrophes described above, began an era of social protest in the 1960s that lasted into

⁴ Although Chisso Ltd and Showa Denko Co. Ltd. were ordered to pay compensation, lawsuits seeking compensation from the Japanese government were also decided in favor of Minamata victims in 1987 and 1993.

the early 1970s. As a result of these developments, changes began to take place in Japan's environmental policy.

The first such development was the establishment of the Pollution Control Office within MITI in 1963 and in the (Ministry of Health and Welfare) MoHW in 1965. During this time period, Japan went from having almost no environmental policies to having among the strongest environmental laws in the world (Schreurs 2002, 5). As a result of citizen initiatives, in 1967 the Japanese government introduced several measures, including the Environmental Pollution Control Act and the Nature Conservation Law in 1972. Special Standing Committees for Industrial Pollution were established in both houses of the Diet and an Advisory Commission on Environmental Pollution was created under the MoHW's jurisdiction. The MoHW was still at odds with MITI, which argued that environmental legislation should not hamper the growth of Japan's industrial sector, and as a result the 1967 Basic Law was adopted without the inclusion of strict liability for polluting industries advocated for by the MoHW. Additionally, in 1968 the Air Pollution Control Law was passed, setting standards for sulfur dioxide emissions sulfur dioxide(SO²), following a Cabinet ordinance on ambient air quality standards for SO₂. Also, in 1968, the PCB pollution outbreaks in Kanemi led to stronger demands from activists for significant change. Alongside this development activists in the US started to win victories that gave legitimacy to environmental demands worldwide.

In 1970, the Diet held a special session on pollution, enacting 14 anti-pollution laws and establishing a Headquarters for Pollution Countermeasures. Furthermore, in 1971, the Environment Agency was established, the National Park and Air Pollution Divisions were taken from the MoHW and put in the new agency and four agency

bureaus were created: air quality, water quality, nature conservation, and planning and coordination (Schreurs 2002).

The environmentalist movement in Japan grew out of citizen response to the pollution of coastal areas and marine life as a consequence of industrial practices. While the environmental movement in Japan was health driven⁵, it was successful in accomplishing major changes in the way the Japanese government dealt with the environment. However, by the mid-1980s, there was a decline in the environmental movement in Japan. The reason for this decline can be attributed partially to the positive measures taken by the Japanese government addressing many of the worst environmental problems and the fact that the quality of the environment had taken a noticeable turn for the better (Schreurs 2002, 6).

Alongside the success of government policies, Japan enjoyed a time of economic success during the 1980s and Japanese citizens were reluctant to criticize their government or its environmental policies while enjoying the benefits of such prosperity. Without pressure from citizens groups, the Environment Agency was unsupported and the LDP returned to protecting industrial interests; consequently, Japan's economy took off during this period and the country enjoyed the highest per capita GNP in the world (Ministry of Environment brochure 2004). However, under Koizumi's leadership the government cut back environmental spending due to economic downturn experienced in the 1990s. The Japanese government's response to environmental problems can be gauged in part by analyzing how much of the national budget is allocated to

⁵ As opposed to being driven by concern over environmental protection, many environmental scholars argue that such health-driven movements are reactionary rather than proactive and therefore tend to disappear after negative impacts on human health are curbed.

environmental spending, which is outlined in Table 4.1: Conservation Spending in the National Budget (below).

Table 4.1: Conservation Spending in Japan's National Budget
(Value in 100 millions of yen, highlights indicate periods of high spending)

Year	National Budget	Conservation*	% of GDP
1971	163,986	114	0.68
1972	193,616	1,693	0.87
1973	234,464	2,737	1.17
1974	286,760	3,421	1.19
1975	358,977	3,751	1.04
1976	444,911	4,856	1.09
1977	523,297	6,267	1.2
1978	625,246	8,682	1.39
1979	712,415	11,253	1.58
1980	781,129	11,664	1.49
1981	852,082	12,030	1.41
1982	903,848	11,923	1.32
1983	960,370	11,769	1.23
1984	992,804	11,469	1.16
1985	971,029	11,172	1.15
1986	1,021,610	10,944	1.07
1987	1,058,987	10,879	1.03
1988	1,125,037	12,848	1.14
1989	1,163,735	13,295	1.14
1990	1,218,562	13,402	1.1
1991	1,299,008	14,513	1.12
1992	1,372,703	15,514	1.13
1993	1,417,947	17,148	1.21
1994	1,529,958	25,124	1.64
1995	1,595,419	25,987	1.63
1996	1,717,614	27,441	1.6
1997	1,803,725	28,211	1.56
1998	1,842,303	27,222	1.48
1999	2,018,035	30,213	1.5
2000	2,088,092	30,420	1.46
2001	2,509,351	30,484	1.21
2002	2,484,001	29,099	1.17
2003	2,323,450	27,423	1.18
2004	2,424,352	25,772	1.06

* Represents the amount allocated to conservation measures

Source: Environmental Strategy Division, Environmental Policy Bureau, Ministry of the Environment.

Despite the decline in environmental activism from the mid-1970s and to the mid-1980s, there was a return to environmental policy concern in the late 1980s that has continued through the 1990s (Schreurs 2002). This return to a concern with environmental matters reflects a growing international awareness of environmental issues as well as criticism of Japan's overseas development policies.

In the 1980s several groups in Japan began to address international environmental concerns and a fledgling national presence of environmental organizations emerged which replaced many of the local, grassroots organizations of the 1970s. (Mason 1999). In the late 1980s and early 1990s consensus grew regarding the impact of Japan's postwar economic development on the global environment. As a major importer of food, energy and resources, Japan is responsible for the depletion of natural resources both at home and abroad. One article from this period calls Japan "an "eco-outlaw, a whale killing, forest-stripping bogeyman on the environmental stage"(Miller 1989). During this time period, Japanese consumption accounted for 40% of the world's imports of wood, mostly from tropical, undeveloped countries; Japanese fishing vessels engaged in the practice of drift netting and whaling, killing thousands of porpoises, seals, and dolphins and endangered species of whales. In 1989, the United Nations Environmental Program ranked the Japanese the lowest in overall environmental concern and awareness (Impoco 1992). In 1992, when Japan hosted the International Convention on Trade in Endangered Species, activists were "aghast at the Japanese fishing industry's fierce lobbying campaign against a proposed ban on imports of West Atlantic bluefin tuna (Impoco 62, 1992)."

Along with destructive environmental practices due to consumption of the world's natural resources, Japan's economic assistance policies also had powerful environmental consequences. During the early 1990s, Japan was the one of the largest contributors to developing countries with development assistance. As a country with such economic clout in the world, Japan was able to substantially alter the global environment. Much of Japanese foreign aid went to large development projects such as manufacturing plants and mines, which have high environmental costs. For example, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) helped to fund, in part, the Narmada dam project in India which was protested by local citizens and international environmental groups. In the early 1990s, development assistance was the fastest growing item on Japan's national budget and, "often those aid packages came with a disturbing quid pro quo: developing countries use the funding for projects that yield (and deplete) resources needed by the Japanese" (Miller 1990, 15).

Japan's development policies at home and abroad generated international criticism that affected the government's posture on environmental affairs, especially at the global level (Mason 1999). During the run-up to Rio (the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development), as well as at the conference itself, Japan's Liberal Democratic government sought to counter negative opinion and position the nation as a model global environmental citizen. "In contrast to the situation in the early 1970s, these recent initiatives were largely government-inspired; proactive rather than reactive....In December 1997, Japan hosted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 3) in Kyoto and, again, the government sought to exercise environmental leadership by brokering an agreement (Mason 1999, 203)".

Japan's government has been responsive to international pressure in some issue arenas when there is particular governmental concern about the way the world views Japan. *Gaiatsu* 外圧 (foreign pressure) has made the Japanese government more proactive on women's issues (this theme is pursued further in Chapter 5), and this is the case with environmental issues as well. Mason (2001, 201) notes that as one of the world's leading ODA donors, it is important that Japan's development-related activities be viewed favorably. "Gaiatsu was employed early on in the modern environmental movement when Minamata victims embarrassed the government by their appearance at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the environment (Mason 201)." Thus, citizen activism utilized *gaiatsu* as an important tool to pressure the government in cultural and political ways. In 1990, Japan also canceled ODA credits for the Narmada dam project in India in light of highly visible international pressure and criticism which forced the World Bank to withdraw support from the same project. This change in direction from the policy retreat noted in the 1980s stems from an increase in international awareness of environmental problems coupled with the recognition that the development policies of industrialized nations have devastating consequences on environmental degradation in the developing world. At the sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(COP6) held in 2000, Japan earned the shameful moniker of "Fossil of the Day" for two days in a row because of its negligible commitment to global warming when these activities are seen as adverse to Japanese national interest (Nakai 2001). In order to conform to international environmental policies, in 1993 Japan adopted the Basic Law which integrates sustainability (the main theme of the Rio Summit) as its mission and includes recommendations for a basic

environment plan, environmental impact assessment, economic measures, environmental education, promotion of NGO activities and promotion of science and technology (Nakai 2001).

Gendered Environmental Activism in Japan Today

The issue of the environment has been of particular concern to women as initiators of the citizen's environmental movements of the 1960's and the Housewives Movement of the 1970's. More recently, women in Japan have also played a hand at countering environmental degradation through their participation in community-based movements and consumer groups. These locally motivated, politically active groups have taken on many issues related to the trend of economic growth (including those related to the environment), such as the effort to spread the use of soap bars in place of detergents that are harmful to health as well as to the environment: protection of clean water; waste disposal, including collection of garbage by type and recycling of waste; and efforts to preserve forests, mountains and green zones (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995). Although several scholars note a lack in the development of a national broad-based environmental movement, locally based consumer environmental groups are strong (Mason 2001, Schreurs 2002). According to a recent Environment Agency survey, there are approximately 4,500 private environmental organizations in Japan and forty percent of these have environmental protection as the major focus; the majority of these groups are locally based (Hasegawa 2004). There are also national level NGOs, such as Greenpeace Japan and Friends of the Earth, that are studied as part of this dissertation. These organizations often have connections to left-wing politics and have their foundations in women's initiatives.

Large-scale women's organizations, such as the National Council of Women's Organization of Agricultural Cooperatives and the National Federation of Regional Women's Organizations⁶, which has a membership of over 20,000, and the Housewives Association with branches all over Japan, have taken an interest in issues involving consumer protection, environmental quality and peace (Tanaka, 1995). Another example is the Seikatsu Club Seikyo, a nationwide network of women, which is designed to help housewives improve their lives through cooperatives that provide organically grown food (Fujimura-Fanselow, 1995). In fact, the number of grass roots conservation organizations is estimated at approximately 3,000 (Steel 2004). When asked how many of these groups are run by housewives, Suda Harumi of the National Center for Citizen's Movements said that almost all environmental and conservation groups are run by housewives. Holliman estimated in 1990 that recycling groups nationwide have over 40,000 supporters. These figures illustrate the fact that "in Japan the kind of person most apt to represent an environmental concern on a television program or in the printed media is a middle-aged woman who calls herself a housewife (Noguchi 1992, 339)." There are a wide variety of consumer and conservation organizations in Japan, and women still provide the impetus and maintain the membership of most of these organizations (Hasegawa 2004).

Rural women have also formed collectives in order to process their own agricultural products which are then sold to other families or workers cooperatives in larger cities (Hikita 1996). In many small towns and villages in the countryside, women

⁶ Their website is www.chifuren.or.jp, the other two organizations listed do not as yet, have websites.

are responsible for the family farm. "The status of Japanese rural women is deeply rooted in the continuing patriarchal *ie* (家 family) system in both the household and community structure. However, along with Japan's rapid industrialization, the whole country is moving towards diversification and individualization of values (Shinozaki 2001,102)." These economic changes have also changed the rural agricultural system as "(t)he government's liberalization policy, which intensified in the 1980s and 1990s has driven agriculture to collapse (Hikita 1996, 145)". For this reason, women have worked together to develop worker's collectives to sell produce; this helps all members learn to develop their own agriculture and to make a living. This kind of agriculture is very environmentally sound as most collectives are small scale, abstaining from the use pesticides, growing fruits, and vegetables and rice organically.

The reasons for women's participation in these movements and explanations for their success are varied. Broadbent (1998) notes several examples of women's participation and leadership of environmental protest and movements. In Kanazashi a fishing village on the outskirts of Usaki City, in Chiba prefecture near Tokyo, women protested a plan to create a landfill on which a cement plant would be built. The nearby town of Tsukumi had already suffered respiratory problems, including higher asthma rates, as a result of the dust produced by their cement plant. The women of Kanazashi braved the cold winter and floated a raft on the waters proposed for the landfill, conducting a waterborne sit-in (p. 147). Their activities prevented surveying and other construction activities. Eventually, the villagers and the female leaders were successful, winning a lawsuit to stop the cement plant. Women in Kozaki village used their young persons' group as a forum for discussing the pollution issue and formulating plans to

oppose the landfill to extend the coastline and fill in their bay. Women played an important role in the mobilization effort to stop the landfill and plan to build a large industrial plant.

Women acting politically on environmental matters have also made remarkable strides in achieving political leadership roles. As Schreurs notes in her study, “(I)n Japan women have come farthest of all the countries of the region in terms of being selected for high level environmental decision-making roles. Women are now on equal footing with men when it comes to being appointed Environment Minister (2001, 85).” Hasegawa offers a convincing argument based on the traditional notions of mother and parent in Japanese culture (2004). These roles have been used strategically to mobilize women with great effect and also were central values in the way in which the citizen’s movements defined themselves politically. The usefulness in employing this strategy is especially important in the context of Japanese politics.

[W]here the normative value of ‘citizen’ and ‘civil society’ is rather weak, the iconic ‘mother/parent’ can signify the universality and solidarity of the movement. It has come to symbolize a ‘post-political’ responsibility for others beyond the particular parent/child relationship, and can thereby position a social movement as above or outside of ideology, political parties and self-interests (Hasegawa 2004, 141).

Broadbent (1998, 163) echoes this argument as well, noting that “because women are defined as outside the realm of politics and power, they are freed from a degree of social control, giving them greater freedom to mobilize” (1998, 163). In a culture where the norm is to undervalue women’s knowledge, the role of mother stands out as a position from which women’s knowledge is socially valued. The “mother’s word” represents a

“devoted, self-sacrificing, and altruistic position” which is highly valued (Hasegawa 2004, 141).

As noted earlier, this conception of women is also one that has been employed by the state in order to mobilize women for its sake. The Japanese government also employs traditional imagery of the Japanese housewife in its environmental literature. In a Ministry of Environmental publication, a cartoon caricature housewife waves her finger to chastise the Japanese citizen to use household eco-account books which will reduce spending and environmental waste (See Appendix 2: Reasons for Promoting Household Eco-Account Books). Oda (2001) criticizes such imagery, noting that “(U)nless a more gender sensitive approach is taken, there is a risk this reinforces the stereotype that household account book keeping is women’s domain (p.101)”. The employment of this kind of imagery is present in contemporary Japan; in April 2006, the Minister for Environment, Yuriko Koike, presented the “*Mottanai Furoshiki*” (waste not wrapping cloth) at a press conference, as depicted below.



(Minister Koike wraps two wine bottles in the *furoshiki* to illustrate its use, from InFocus, news from the Minister of the Environment, www.env.go.jp 5/26/2006)

Mottanai means waste not want not, and the *furoshiki* is a traditional wrapping cloth. Using a traditional symbol of Japanese culture, such as the *furoshiki*, to promote conservation is not problematic in itself; however, it is commonly known that the *furoshiki* is used by women to wrap gifts and other household items. This is another example of the way in which the Japanese government is connecting traditional notions of femininity with care of the home. Although there is potential for women, it is important to note the way in which the feminine ideal is employed by the Japanese government in the gendered interests of the Japanese nation-state.

Environment, Gender and the Japanese State

In recent years, Japanese women have become more active on both government advisory committees and as elected officials. Alongside this development, the Japanese government has established gender centers as part of the initiative of International Women's Year to encourage women's formal political participation. The information presented in this chapter illustrates the salience of environmental issues for women in Japanese politics. Although the reasons for women's political mobilization on these issues may be multi-faceted, the fact that women in Japan do mobilize to protect the environment is valuable.

It is relevant to also ascertain the degree to which these politically salient issues are addressed by gender centers, institutions created by the Japanese government to increase women's political participation. In order for the gender centers to perform a meaningful political empowerment function, it is essential to find out whether or not the centers create linkages between women's everyday political activity as well as equipping women with the tools that will strengthen and formalize their political activities.

Therefore, the next step is to analyze the linkages between gender centers and environmental organizations in Japan. Practically, one would expect to find specific programs at the centers to recruit and train women to play active roles in politics and to also find an environmental component to these activities. In the following chapter, I will present an overview of each of the gender centers that I visited, as well as my analysis of interviews completed in Japan with women activists and women who use the gender centers.

As noted earlier, the approaches analyzed in this chapter differ in their relevance to Japan. The historical relationship between Japanese women's movements and the state is usefully critiqued from the lens of social movement literature which is also helpful in explaining how Japanese environmental movements have organized. The use of eco-feminism is problematic when applied to Japan because of its focus on an inherent connection between women and nature which, while present in Western notions of femininity, does not exist in Japanese notions of femininity or the environment. The Women and Development literature is helpful in understanding the nature of Japanese development assistance, which has consequences for women in areas which receive Japanese aid. Understanding the role of women in development is also useful in analyzing the participation of women in movements which have protested the consequences of economic development in Japan and worldwide.

Chapter 5: Women's Centers, Politics and Environmental Issues in Japan

In order to understand the formal politics of women's rights, it is important to recognize the United Nations as the creator of a global structure which has shaped the actions of member states such as Japan (un.org 2004). The UN may be viewed as the primary reason for the existence of Japan's gender equality measures; therefore, it is essential to begin with an understanding of these UN initiatives. Over the past 50 years, UN activities have set a global agenda for women and have been the hub of a growing movement worldwide for women's rights. By adopting international laws and treaties on women's rights, the UN has helped set a common standard for measuring how societies advance equality between men and women. The previous chapter introduced the concept of *gaiatsu*; the United Nations has been a powerful influence on Japan's gender policy and is an example of *gaiatsu*, as is further outlined below.

Gaiatsu

As an advocate for women worldwide, the UN has promoted measures which encourage the reform of state institutions to increase women's political involvement. The U.N. has played a significant role in advocating for women and creating a climate whereby countries such as Japan are more inclined to make politics more accessible to

women (Sugisaki 1986, Fujimura-Fanselow 1995). The institutions analyzed by state feminism are primarily structures created by countries around the world in order to fulfill their commitments to UN gender initiatives. Much of the national machinery devoted to promoting gender issues in Japan has evolved because of the UN, through its pressure on countries to comply with UN norms concerning women.

The principle UN organ for coordinating its work on women is the Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC, as it is better known. Within ECOSOC, the Commission of the Status of Women (CSW) was established in 1946 to deal with policy decisions on women's status. The CSW also monitors women's situations worldwide and prepares recommendations for the UN and its member states. The CSW worked to have several conventions on women's rights adopted by the UN and the most important of these is the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination against Women or CEDAW. The CEDAW was adopted in 1979 and entered into legal force in 1981, during the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985). The CEDAW is best described as an international bill of rights for women which prohibits any "distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex that impairs or nullifies human rights and fundamental freedoms of women in all areas. (un.org 2004)." A UN Committee regularly monitors progress in implementing the Convention and holds hearings on reports submitted by member countries. The CEDAW has been a rallying point for women's groups in many countries, as UN expectations, coupled with inside pressure from women's groups, has provided the impetus for governments to change their laws. During my interviews at the women's centers, one woman noted that the biggest international influence on the Japanese government was the CEDAW : "Before we (Japan) ratified the CEDAW the situation was not up to that

standard in Japan. So in order to ratify the convention and attend the conference, the government sort of hastily had to prepare for the convention and to attend the convention so I think we changed certain laws, labor laws I think and set up the committee to prepare for the conference” (Interviews 2006). One author also notes the importance of national image, as the names of countries who have not yet ratified the document are read at the General Assembly every year “and attract special attention among governments as do those names which are missing (Pietila and Vickers 1996, 128).”

Other UN activities which have helped to mobilize public opinion are the global conferences on women. During the past twenty years there have been four such conferences: Mexico City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995. Each conference has helped to define the unique obstacles which women have to overcome to be on equal footing with men, as well as providing policy initiatives to countries that will help women surmount those obstacles. At the last conference in Beijing, members of 189 governments adopted a new five-year global action plan aimed at equality, development and peace (un.org 2004). Comparatively speaking, efforts by the Japanese government reflect a worldwide initiative taken by many countries.

At the behest of the UN, the governments of many countries established state institutions to meet the needs of women. In the case of Japan, the international pressure of the UN was an important motivator. In the midst of the country’s outstanding economic successes “Japan’s political and economic leaders were highly sensitive to these pressures from abroad and the Japanese state responded to these pressures in a variety of ways” (Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, xxvii). In the following section, examples of

these women's policy machineries are presented; the breadth of such measures worldwide illustrates the relevance of this research as well as providing context.

Both domestic and international forces induced governments to create women's policy machineries, which the UN has recommended to governments around the world since the 1960's. The CSW used the term women's policy machinery to refer to agencies devoted to women's policy issues. These structures are established by governments with the express purpose of bettering women's social status. Reports to the United Nations about national machinery indicate a wide variety of forms: permanent national commissions on the status of women, ad hoc and regional commissions, advisory committees, permanent bureaus within departments and ministries, and, in Communist countries, administrative committees within ruling parties (United Nations, 1998).

Among national women's policy machineries, those in the Netherlands and Australia are oft-cited examples of effective mechanisms which are also strongly feminist, as noted in the literature on state feminism. Australia's Office of the Status of Women is located in the department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (a similar arrangement to Japan's machinery) and thus acts as a hub to coordinate policy efforts across ministries (Stetson and Mazur 1995). The *Directie Coordinatie Emancipatiebeleid* (Department for the Coordination of Equality Policy) in the Netherlands also acts from the powerful location of the Ministry of Social Affairs. This kind of centralized arrangement may give a women's policy machinery greater ability to influence policy.

Although there has been significant progress across the world, the Expert Group of the UN recognized that many national machineries are as yet unable to act as a catalyst in the process of gender main-streaming. It was noted in the report from Santiago that

links with civil society and mechanisms to hold governments accountable are two areas that need improvement, and the role of NGOs in these areas is significant (UN 1987).

The designation of International Women's Year in 1975 forced the Japanese government to take the problem of discrimination against women seriously in order to match up to international gender norms. The women's centers are one aspect of the Japanese government's response to these pressures, and they are one example of the changes in institutional arrangements recommended by the U.N. The Japanese government also responded to the U.N.'s challenge by establishing the Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies for Women in 1975 (this apparatus has changed a great deal over time as outlined in Chapter 2). This agency, which reported to the Prime Minister, was given the task of creating domestic policies to implement the goals outlined in Japan's World Plan of Action (adopted at the U.N. Conference for Women in Mexico City, it outlined Japan's objectives for the International Women's Year), including the establishment of women's centers.

Women's Centers in Japan

Women's centers or *josei sentaa* (女性センター) are the descendants of similar facilities which have existed in Japan for decades. For example, the *fujin kaikan* (婦人会館) mentioned in Chapter 2, were also part of the Japanese government initiatives related to the home and family, institutions which are central to the Japanese national identity⁷. Today, there are a variety of facilities that address women's needs in Japan, such as

⁷ Debbie Lunny (1995) goes so far as to say that the *fujin kaikan* have conservative agendas while the *josei sentaa* are a new breed of women's center, the distinction between the two types of facilities is meaningful.

public and private women's and gender equality centers, homes for working women and homes for rural women. These types of centers are in existence today along with various others, as shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Categories of Facilities Related to Women and Gender in Japan.

<u>Type of Facility</u>	<u>Japanese Name</u>	<u>Romanized Name</u>
Women's Center	女性センター	<i>josei sentaa</i>
Housewives Public Hall	婦人会館	<i>fujin kaikan</i>
Housewives Home	婦人の家	<i>fujin no ie</i>
Working Housewives Home	働く婦人の家	<i>hataraku fujin no ie</i>
Men's and Women's Gender Equality Center	男女共同参画センター	<i>danjo kyodo sansaku sentaa</i>

From: NWECC Women's Facilities Database (女性関連データベース).

Many of the founding dates of these facilities can be linked to international initiatives, specifically the U.N. Conferences on Women; their existence may be interpreted in part, as fulfilling Japan's obligations to the international community. Working Housewives Homes and Housewives Homes have founding dates in the late 1970s⁸ and early 1980's while most of the housewives public halls were founded in the early 1970s. There are distinctions with regard to the focus of each type of center outlined above.

The women's centers that are the focus of this dissertation, *josei sentaa*, were founded in the mid to late 1990s, after the U.N. Conference on Women in Beijing. Many of these facilities, along with the "equality centers", are named using foreign words in order to indicate an international focus and networking with women outside of Japan.

⁸ These facilities were founded after the Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies related to women was established in 1975, which also marks the year of the U.N. Conference on Women in Mexico City.

Examples include Wings Kyoto, Sunforte Toyama, Rapport Hitachi, and With You Saitama (See Appendix 4: Women's Centers by prefecture). Gender Equality Centers were founded in the late 1990's to early 2000s after the Council on Gender Equality was recreated under Prime Minister Hashimoto. The shift in terminology from women's center to gender equality center or gender center is significant because it is directly related to government funding initiatives. Many of the women's centers were built and founded by cities and prefectures following a national policy push in the early 1990s. Then, in order to fulfill its obligations to the UN gender equality initiatives, the government provided funding for gender equality centers⁹; the result of this policy directive was that many women's centers changed their name to gender equality centers in order to qualify for government money (Interviews 2006).

There are significant distinctions in the activities and goals of these centers, and for the purposes of this dissertation, it is essential to situate the centers used for this study within the larger context of the many women's facilities in Japan. The eight women's centers studied are both women's centers and gender equality centers which indicate a focus on promoting equality for women as well as raising awareness regarding gender stereotypes about both men and women. Housewives Homes and Working Housewives Homes as well as *fujin kaikan* (Housewives Public Halls) are women's facilities which do not seek to alter women's status; rather they support women in their role as housewives and mothers. *Josei sentaa* literally means women's center, whereas *fujin kaikan* means women's public hall and uses the word *fujin*, which refers to a housewife or married

⁹ The steps taken by the Japanese government in relation to UN Gender Equality initiatives are outlined in the Gender Equality Vision (written to reflect the goals outlined in the Beijing Platform for Action) 2000.

(usually older by implication) woman. The kinds of programs and classes offered at these public halls center around the home and family, including cooking classes, flower arranging, household accounting, and childcare. While these are supportive and worthwhile programs, they tend to reinforce gender stereotypes rather than seeking to change them, which is a significant difference between these facilities and the women's and gender equality centers.

Eight women's centers were used as cases for this dissertation: Tokyo Women's Plaza, Yokohama Women's Forum, Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center, National Women's Education Center, the Dawn Center Wings Kyoto, Kitakyushu Women's Forum and Toyama Sunforte.

Table 5.2: List of Women's Centers

<i>Women's Center</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>
Tokyo Women's Plaza	Tokyo	Tokyo city
Yokohama Women's Forum	Yokohama	Yokohama city, managed by YWACN*
Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center	Tokyo	private NGO
National Women's Education Center	Ranzan	National government
Dawn Center	Osaka	Osaka city
Wings Kyoto	Kyoto	Kyoto city
Kitakyushu Women's Forum	Kitakyushu	NGO affiliated with Fukuoka city
Toyama Sunforte	Toyama	Toyama prefecture


Each of these centers offers a variety of activities and support for women; when taken as a whole, they represent a range of philosophies on gender roles and social activism.

These centers were chosen because of the variance in their size and range of activities as well as their location near major cities (See Figure 5.1: Women's Center Locations, below). All of the centers have relationships with local and city governments except

* Yokohama Women's Forum is managed by the Yokohama Women's Association for Communication and networking, an independent branch of the Yokohama city government.

National Women's Education Center (NVEC) which is connected to the national government, and the Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center which is a private facility, funded by a private NGO. Toyama Sunforte is a women's center while at the same time housing the gender equality office for Toyama prefecture. It is common for many women's centers and gender equality offices to be housed in the same building because of the overlap in services. At each of the centers, I conducted interviews with women activists working at the centers as well as women visitors to the centers. The location of these centers is shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 : Women's Center Locations.



Source: US Central Intelligence Agency, 1996

Tokyo Women's Plaza

The Tokyo Women's Plaza (TWP) was established by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in November of 1995. Its mission is to improve the social status of women and promote women's participation in social, economic, cultural and other various aspects of life, thereby contributing to the realization of an affluent and peaceful gender-equal society (Tokyo Women's Plaza 2004). Tokyo Women's Plaza is housed in a modern building located in Shinjuku; there are signs prominently displayed near Shinjuku station with directions to the building, which is easy to find (even for a non-native). The TWP hosts seminars and training on subjects related to the promotion of gender equality (including information for working women), administers a library collection of materials on gender equality and provides a counseling service to women (25% of its sessions were related to spousal violence in 2002). There are three populations which the centers services are geared towards: young working women, working women with children, and victims of spousal violence. The Plaza serves approximately 740 women per day and in the 2002 fiscal year 255,000 women utilized its services (TWP 2004).

The TWP is housed in a multi-story building; the library is on the main floor and meeting rooms are located in the upper floors as well as the offices of the administrative staff. In the basement of the building there is a large open area used as a gathering place for visitors and a small store. On a day that I visited TWP, there were several women eating lunch and talking in this area, which is also the location where I obtained permission to recruit interviewees. During the course of my interviews several

respondents called attention to posters which lined the walls in the area to point out information related to my questions.

Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center

The Asian-Japan Women's Resource Center (AJWRC) is distinct from the other centers because it is privately run and privately funded. The center has a large presence on the web and is connected to the Asian Women's Resource Exchange, an Internet-based networking service for women which has a mission of addressing gender disparity by advocating for women across Asia. AJWRC was formed in 1995 as a

response to the challenge of creating an alternative society for the 21st century: a society that is based on gender justice, ecological sustainability, as well as local and global democracy. AJWRC's strong internationalist "Asian perspective" is grounded on its analysis of Japan's role as a regional and global economic giant, and how such a role impacts on women all over Asia. Japan is not only the largest importer of raw materials from other Asian countries, but it is also the destination of the largest number of Asian women who are victimized by trafficking (aworc.org/org/ajwrc/ajwrc.html 7/6/2006).

This rhetoric and mission statement is much more critical of Japanese government policies than those of the other women's centers, and it is also more openly feminist.

When I visited the center, I was impressed first of all by how small it is compared with the other women's centers. AJWRC occupies a small office in a building near Shibuya station in Tokyo; the office is difficult to find as the entrance is in the back of a carpark on the third floor. When I entered AJWRC's office, I was struck by the openly feminist, critical and sometimes radical posters which covered the walls and the office door. It was the first time I had seen such posters in Japan. Also, the space was teeming with books, pamphlets, articles and other materials which literally were spilling off of the shelves.

The office is staffed by two full time workers and many volunteers who help organize

information and keep the website updated. While I was there several women visited the office and there was a great deal of activity as the workers prepared for an upcoming conference. The conference in Beijing, China included a forum for NGOs on women in Asia. The director of AJWRC, whom I interviewed, was going to the conference to present a paper on the changes in Japan's government in recent years.

Yokohama Women's Forum

The Yokohama Women's Forum (YWF) is located in the suburb of Yokohama on the outskirts of Tokyo. It is easily accessible by train and is well marked by signs and a map from the train station. Like Tokyo Women's Plaza, the YWF was created by the city government. It is administered by the Yokohama Women's Association for Networking and Communication, a non-profit organization. In its own literature, the YWF defines itself as a center for the discussion of women's issues, in order to raise women's status in society. The Forum aims at the realization of a society in which women and men can live and work together as equal partners in a spirit of independence and cooperation (YWF 2004). The YWF provides a range of services from childcare and counseling to a library and fitness space. The second floor houses an open creative space for cooking and crafts as well as a *tatami* room for tea ceremony.

On the day that I visited the Forum, there were many visitors to the center and it was obvious from the presence of children on the lawn in front of building that the childcare service was important to the mothers and families who used the facilities provided by the center. The Forum was also hosting a conference on networking strategies for working women, which was organized by an outside non-profit organization. The building was full and well-used, there was a substantive feeling of

community at YWF as families ate lunch on the lawn and women gathered together inside.

National Women's Education Center

In contrast to the accessibility and sense of purpose at the Plaza and YWF, the National Women's Education (NWE) stands miles from Tokyo on an isolated, private rail line¹⁰. It takes 3 hours to travel from Tokyo to Ranzan *machi* (嵐山町) where NWE is located and once there, the center is about a 25 minute walk from the train station. As I disembarked from the train and started to walk toward the center, I stopped to ask two young women in school uniform the way and they responded with incredulous looks. As they talked with each other and tried to understand where I desired to go, I heard a change in language from the term I used *josei sentaa* to the more archaic term *fujin kaikan* (婦人会館).¹¹ This statement illustrates the potential confusion in understanding the difference in these two types of facilities, which may mean that there is a lack of awareness among most Japanese about the way in which women's centers promote gender equality.

The NWE is a huge facility with several buildings. The main building houses offices, the library, and several educational rooms. It is attached to a residence hall with the capacity to house over 300 people. There is also a traditional Japanese house, a tea ceremony house, a conference hall and a complex of sports facilities including tennis courts and an indoor swimming pool. It is clear that NWE is a facility which requires a

¹⁰ For travelers this is meaningful because most of Japan's trains are Japan Railways (JR) and passes and tickets purchased for JR trains are not transferable to privately owned lines which are usually also more expensive.

large measure of financial support to maintain the buildings and support staff to run the center. Although my first impression was surprise at the sheer size of the facility, I also understood very quickly that without support and monies from the federal government, it would be difficult for such a large facility to stay open. NWECC was built in 1977, and anyone paying a visit would see quickly that the facility had not had any basic updates made since that time. The furniture was well worn and needed to be replaced as did the carpeting and drapes. The building very much felt like a facility that once it had opened, had been left to run with very little investment in the building's decoration or appearance. The state of the facility echoes the instability of government support which the center receives. For example, in 2003 the government moved to terminate support of NWECC, a move countered by mobilizing letters of support for NWECC from across Japan and internationally.

Wings Kyoto

Wings Kyoto is a modern facility located minutes from a train stop in downtown Kyoto; it is easy to find as there are large signs prominently displayed upon emerging from the train station and along the pathway to the center. The mission of Wings Kyoto is gender equality for men and women; its programs complement this mission. Wings offers very practical courses and programs to its community members in order to expand opportunities for women and to bring men into the equality mission as well. As their website states, "The name Wings is meant to communicate the importance of building a fair and good-to-live-in society where women and men can live together in harmony and total cooperation, just like the perfect balance required in both wings for a bird to fly" (Wings Kyoto 2005). On the day that I visited Wings Kyoto, I observed many men and

women using the facility; there was a high level of activity. The building itself is architecturally striking as it blends part of a former bank building with a modern glass façade.

Dawn Center

The Dawn Center fills a modern building of several stories in the downtown business district of Osaka and is easily accessible along the city train route. The Dawn Center is operated by the Osaka Gender Equality Foundation, and was established by the Osaka Prefectural Government. The Center “serves as a base for creating a new partnership between women and men.” Its basic mission is “a creation of a new society of women and men working together based on the independence of the sexes, allowing everyone fair and equal opportunity to participation” (Dawn Center 2006).

On a day that I visited the library at Dawn Center, the weather was sunny and beautiful. As I walked into the center I noticed many businessmen standing outside smoking cigarettes. Inside the atrium of the center (which is available for public use), salary men filled the available seating and were loudly eating their lunches and smoking. While the use of the center as a community gathering place is a positive development, it may be problematic for women who are coming to the center to discuss domestic violence, for example, to enter a building largely occupied by men. There were no women in the lobby so I took the elevator upstairs to the library for my appointment with Dawn’s librarian, and after our meeting I sat outside the library in a seating area in front of the library’s entryway to do my interviews.

Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women

Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women is housed in the same building as Move Kitakyushu, which it operates and maintains. The Forum is a non-profit non-governmental organization, while Move was established by the city government. KFAW itself is not a women's center although unlike the other cases examined, it manages Move, which is the gender equality center for Kitakyushu. As the name indicates, KFAW's focus extends beyond Japan. It publishes the *Journal of Asian Women's Studies* and *Asian Breeze*, which presents and studies issues facing all Asian women. Networking with women outside of Japan is a focus of KFAW's work; it solicits the voice of foreign correspondents who are mainly women living in other Asian countries. The building in which the Forum is housed is expansive and active; On the day that I visited it, the lobby/cafeteria was filled with people browsing the booths selling homemade goods by women in the area in order to raise money for the Forum's activities.

Toyama Sunforte

Like many of women's centers in Japan, Toyama Sunforte is also the gender equality office for the prefecture of Toyama and it has also benefited from governmental funds set aside to build such centers. Toyama Sunforte is a large, new building of modern design on the outskirts of town. The Sunforte's mission is promoting the "actualization of of women and men's joint participation in society" (Toyama Sunforte pamphlet 2006). On the day that I visited the Sunforte, it was pouring rain and the parking lot was full of cars; inside there were women gathering in the library on the first floor. Toyama Sunforte offers classes on employment for women including several which focus on empowerment and improving self-confidence. Toyama Sunforte also offers classes which support men,

including cooking and childrearing, as well as counseling services (Toyama Sunforte pamphlet 2006).

Interviews

Several themes could be clearly discerned from the interviews I conducted at the women's centers. Although women were reluctant to speak in political terms, many spoke about issues which are political nature and involve the Japanese state. I conducted interviews with women visitors to the women's centers as well as center employees and those center directors with whom I was able to schedule appointments. I interviewed a total of 40 women, of those 11 were employed by the women's centers and 28 were women visitors. The interviews began with general questions about the mission and activities of the center and then I asked questions about specific policies and issues. At times women went off topic and spoke freely about issues of concern to them and I have included those topics here. I have identified the following themes from the women I interviewed: domestic violence, mental health issues, women's centers and the Japanese family, networking/career issues, Japanese women and political life as well as environmental conservation and consumerism. These themes resulted from studying interview results, while the grouping of issues under themes reflects my interpretation of interviewers' responses, they emerged independently from the interview process and were not prompted by my questions. Domestic violence and mental health issues are linked because many centers provide counseling to victims of domestic violence. In the following sections, I discuss each theme and present evidence from interviews which suggests that each of these categories of activities is particularly relevant in the lives of Japanese women.

Domestic Violence Issues and Mental Health Issues

Counseling and Domestic Violence (DV) issues came up in interviews when women were asked what kind of service the center offered which they thought was most important and when women were asked why they came to the center. This is an unexpected result: Domestic violence issues are private and therefore are not discussed publicly in Japan (just as they were once taboo in the United States). However, clearly DV and related issues are becoming more politicized in Japan as both interviewee responses and recent political developments suggest.

In December, 2004 the revised Domestic Violence Prevention Law was enacted. The revised law expands the definition of violence against women to include mental and sexual abuse, and the protection order system was expanded to include not only spouses but also ex-spouses and includes children of the abused in its coverage. There is also a meaningful change in the new law which provides survivors with assistance for self-support services including counseling. Under the current system, local governments issue resident cards based on one's registration in order to receive local government services. Women who are stalked persistently by their spouses can be easily found by their stalkers based on this record, but with the new law the viewing and copying of resident registers is limited. This should help survivors who are afraid of changing their registered address for fear of being stalked. Access to public housing is also prioritized for DV survivors (Yokohama Women's Forum 2005).

While these changes are meaningful, the revised law has been criticized by some because it still pertains only to married and divorced couples, not those co-habiting; the law also does not include dating violence (Japan Times 2004). There is also a

contradiction in the law because offenders retain the right to see their children; this may present a difficulty for women victims of spousal violence because it means they may have to interact with the abuser when children are involved. However, perpetrators of violence against their spouses can be legally required to stay away from the victims' children even if they were not targeted with abuse. According to some this leaves a large loophole in cases where a (previously) married couple shares children and the abuser asserts his parental rights to see the children of that marriage (Interviews 2004).

One woman that I interviewed at Tokyo Women's Plaza, when asked about center's services responded in the following way, "(Y)ou can get different kinds of books but as to the extent that I will use the library more, this is questionable, many of the books are old and the information here is wrong." At this point she pointed to one of the posters in the public space which gave information on a domestic violence hot line: "That phone number for example, is wrong, it is a disconnected number" (Interviews 2004). She went on to add when asked about her reason for visiting the center "I've never spoken about this...but my main use of the women's center is for group therapy" (Interviews 2004).

Women at the other centers also brought up the issue of domestic violence in interviews. In Yokohama, one woman said, "I came here today because of a private concern... I don't have what you call special women's problems very much... But I am fighting the same kinds of thing (that other women are). There are various books which I received." Although the Forum did not provide me with information about the number of women it served, a pamphlet on counseling related to violence states that in 2001, 649 women were provided with counseling and 39% of these dealt with women who were

victims of violence (YWACN 2004). At the Dawn Center in Yokohama, one woman put it this way when asked about why she came to the center: "...troubling problems which you have to have help for." She then pointed to the counseling room on the map of the center which I had gathered as part of my research material.

Each of the centers which I visited offered some type of domestic violence services ranging from individual counseling and group therapy to classes on self-defense techniques and even self-reliance and recovery from domestic violence at Yokohama Women's Forum. The organization which oversees the Yokohama Women's Center, Yokohama Women's Association for Communication and Networking, has developed programs with the city government to assist DV survivors in building new lives. Partly, this is a result of a change in the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims amendments which went into effect on December 2, 2004. In these amendments "definitions of spousal violence and the potential targets of the protection order system were expanded, and the responsibility of state and local governments for the support of survivors in achieving self reliance were made clear (Yokohama Women's Forum 2005, 7)."

In anticipation of these legal changes, Yokohama city started the Easy Moving and Dwelling Private Program in October 2004. This program supports survivors of domestic violence who are unable to move into their own apartment because they do not have a lease co-signor (a requirement for renting private apartments in Japan). In this system, companies contract with the city government which arranges for the guarantee of a house for people who need housing. In some cases, support includes subsidizing the guarantee money (deposit) and provides social welfare services counseling. The goal of


the program is to help open up “the road to self reliance” for DV survivors. The ratio of counseling on DV at Yokohama Women’s Forum has increased significantly in recent years. According to the center’s records, 14.8 % of all counseling sessions in 1997 were related to violence against women and this number jumped to 39% in 2001 (YWACN 2001). The total number of counseling sessions also grew, from 3,520 counseling sessions offered in 1997 to 6,491 offered in 2001, a nearly two-fold increase (YWACN 2001).

In information published by the Tokyo Women’s Plaza, counseling services are outlined:

The number of counseling sessions is increasing every year, and has tripled during the five years from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. Over 16,000 sessions were provided in fiscal year 2002. 20% to 25% of the sessions are related to spousal violence. One of the telephone lines is dedicated to male counselees. This line received 160 calls in fiscal year 2002 (Tokyo Women’s Plaza 2004).

It is significant that men also have access to counseling services and use them because this challenges the stereotype that women are the only victims of abuse. Tokyo Women’s Plaza has operated as a spousal violence (SV) center since 2002, when the Law for Prevention of Spousal Violence and Protection of Victims went into effect. As the Figure 5.2 illustrates, in the past several years, use of counseling services has grown dramatically,

Figure 5.2 : Trend of Counseling Sessions at Tokyo Women's Plaza



Source: Adapted from TWP pamphlet, 2006

Services offered by TWP as an SV center fall into three categories: seminars and training given with the aim of helping victims achieve self-reliance (this includes practical training in how the welfare system works, how to deal with medical professionals and police officers, for example); information in the form of a manual on how organizations may better deal with victims of SV; and counseling services for victims, including access to legal services (TWP 2004).

Although the women's centers, many of which also operate as SV centers, offer valuable services to women in this area, one interviewee noted that there are limits to what the centers can do for women in these situations. "They (the SV centers) actually provide counseling or advice but when the victims run out from the abusers, they can't do

(Interviews 2006). Of course, it is also important for the Japanese government to formulate laws that get at the root cause of domestic violence, namely, societal views of women. As one woman I interviewed stated, “public institutions should prepare the circumstances so that women can be economically independent and equal to men” (Interviews 2006).

In 2002, the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office conducted a survey on domestic violence which was mailed to 4,500 men and women over the age of 20. Responses were obtained from 1,802 women and 1,520 men, a 73.8% response rate (NWECC 2003). The survey reports that approximately one out of five women (19.1%) has experienced physical assault, the threat of physical harm or sexual assault. Of all domestic violence victims (328 women, 131 men), 22.9% of the women and 7.6% of men feared for their lives as a result of these acts (NWECC 2003, 6). In comparison with a similar survey done in 1999, more people regarded hitting and threatening to punch a partner as violence and support for government intervention also increased (NWECC 2003).

Women's Centers and the Japanese Family

One of the most important functions which women's centers provide is the support function they give to women as housewives and mothers, activities that resemble the services offered by the *fujin kaikan*.. The women's centers that I visited provided daycare facilities, cooking classes, courses on managing the family income, along with many others. Although it may be argued from a western viewpoint that these activities do not promote women's independence or liberating feminism, these practical activities are essential and basic to the running of a Japanese household. Support mechanisms such as

these may also free up time so that women are better able to participate in non-governmental organizations, environmental movements or in politics. While this dissertation research does not confirm whether or not women do indeed use the extra time for political activity, if women are supported in these ways there is at least the potential.

The director of Yokohama Women's Forum discussed the context which Japanese housewives live in now, and she stressed that "marriage and having a family is a time when support is needed, there are many troubles for women the glass ceiling at many companies, and the declining birth rate, for example". Every single woman I spoke with mentioned the information provided by the centers at some point in the interview, many of the women used the libraries offered by the center while others listed pamphlets, legal advice, and career counseling. As most Japanese families are no longer extended families, women are isolated from the support systems they once had; women's centers fill this niche in Japanese society, and it is a much needed niche. This is especially true in the area of childcare. Five of the eight women's centers which I visited offered some childcare services and these are essential for working women. Many of the women I spoke with mentioned the problem of childcare (*ikuji* 育児) in Japan, and as one women's center employee noted

Many women want to work and put children in the nursing school but they (daycare facilities) simply are not there! I have a friend who is a high school teacher and she wanted to continue working but half of her salary goes to the nursing school tuition and for example if you have two children you may need to send a child to two different schools so that is really inconvenient. The timing that you can ask them to take care of children is very short but some women have to work until 7 or 8 o'clock but most schools close at 5 or 6 p.m. that is the problem (Interviews 2006).

This interviewee went on to discuss the ways in which Japanese culture is unsupportive of working women, because many times women are expected to do child rearing and there is no culture of babysitting (like there is in the United States) so women have few options. During conversations with women at the centers, many interviewees also noted that the lack of childcare, nursing schools and daycare facilities makes being a working woman very difficult (one woman even said this was the biggest obstacle for women); many younger couples are now living with their parents because they need the support in order to raise their own children (Interviews 2006). While many women spoke of gender dynamics which are similar to many developed countries, the role of women in Japan and the burden placed upon women, as the persons singularly responsible for home and family is singular to Confucian societies.

As explained in earlier chapters, women's rights are intimately connected to their place in the family and home. In recent years, women have begun to view these family responsibilities in a critical manner, and women's centers are locations from which women are organizing on these topics. The increasing elderly population in Japan is becoming extremely important for many Japanese families; taking care of elderly parents has traditionally been the responsibility of women. Many of the women that I spoke with mentioned the issue of elderly care, but as yet, the women's centers that I visited do not provide elder care.

Networking/Career Issues

As noted in Chapter 2, *koenkai* are powerful organizing and fundraising tools for political candidates in Japan. These personal networks are responsible for mobilizing support for a candidate and promoting them to voters. Although I didn't ask specifically

about *koenkai*, several interviewees mentioned that centers helped women network and form *koenkai*. Currently more and more women's groups are forming their own support networks and preparatory courses for female candidates called "back-up schools". One of the women I interviewed mentioned that these courses were offered in the women's centers throughout Japan (Interviews 2006). At NVEC, the researchers I spoke with said that although

there were formerly classes on this kind of thing that we did here...However.. candidates didn't come, nor did people from the parties. Tokyo Women's Plaza, in Shinjuku, you should go there and do interviews.. There, they have books and generally do this kind of training. They do networking there, they have famous public elections there (Interviews 2004)."

The small town in which NVEC is located is not politically important in the context of Japanese national elections, this could explain why political training is not offered there.. Political services tend to be offered in larger cities in Japan where there are contested elections and nationally important political figures running for office. Several of the women I interviewed at NVEC said that they came there to gather and to meet other women. Although it does not discuss networking explicitly, pamphlets and information from NVEC detail a set of activities which promotes networking among women. NVEC offers many study programs and seminars that serve a networking function, and several of these cover political topics. For example, the "Seminar on Support for Women's Empowerment",

[p]rovides practical training to facilitate the acquisition of the specialist knowledge and skills required to promote the activities of groups, organizations and NPO, and the planning and formulation of projects related to women's education and home education that support the empowerment (capacity building) of women wishing to build a career or participate in an aging society (NVEC pamphlet 2004).

The brochure also lists the targeted population for this seminar as:

(1) Administrative Officers

- a. administrative officers in charge of women's education and home education;
- b. administrative officers in charge of lifelong learning; and
- c. administrative officers in charge of gender equality

(2) Individuals in charge of planning and implementing programs related to women's education and home education

(3) Leaders from NPOs, groups and organizations concerned with women's education and home education (NVEC pamphlet 2004).

Under the heading of "exchange programs", NVEC also holds a national exchange festival of 650 participants which promotes networking and exchange between groups, organizations and individuals involved in promoting learning towards "the formation of a gender-equal society". Women at Tokyo Women's Plaza also spoke of exchanges with other women and being able to participate in seminars which would allow them to meet other women.

The Dawn Center has a set of activities which could be characterized as more activist and politicized than most because of the center's focus on challenging prevalent notions of gender in Japanese society in a critical manner. The Dawn Center's mission cultivates usage of the center as a base of operations of networking for women, both politically and socially. Specifically, the Dawn Center works with NPOs and women's groups to promote their cause to the public and the government. Literature from the center mentions the importance of a gendered perspective in developing an organization, arguing that "NPOs should be funded with gender equality, a focus on human

relationships, an emphasis on the social significance of the NPOs activities and personal fulfillment”(Dawn Newsletter 2005,1). The Dawn Center has held seminars on women’s issues since 1998 to address information for NPO activities from a gendered perspective, and it is one of the few organizations which offers classes on business management based on a feminist framework.

Alternative Information Production (minikomi みにこみ)

Many of the women’s centers produce and publish their own newsletters and journals and there is a large variety and number of these publications which serve as an important way for women to exchange ideas and strategies. As Lunny (1995) notes, within the context of a fragmented and dispersed women’s movement, the *minikomi* serve as a vehicle for self expression and networking. Also, as many women’s groups and women’s centers focus their activities on a single issue area or set of issues, the publications produced by the various centers serve a linking function and may assist in integrating various women’s perspectives. In interviews, all of the women who visited the centers mentioned gathering information of some sort at the centers; many of these mentioned specially that they came to get a pamphlet or brochure. Each of the women’s centers which I visited published its own newsletter and KFAW also publishes the Journal of Asian Women’s Studies, a full fledged academic journal, one of the few of its kind.

The Japanese Woman and Political Life

The distinction between private and public mentioned in the first chapter presents a difficulty in conceptualizing the political participation of Japanese women. The distinction tends to create a false dichotomy in thinking about politics, and this is

illustrated in the responses of the interviewees. Repeatedly, women discussed civic participation but did not characterize such activity as political or downplayed their activity, often characterizing it in apolitical terms. For example in Yokohama, one woman said, "I don't belong to a group or movement.... I do what I can on my own, for example, I recycle and clean packages from the supermarket to use again." When asked about women in politics another woman in Tokyo said, "It is a common decision for western women...in comparison to western women... women in Japan are different." A female center manager at Yokohama Women's Forum went even further in her comments when asked what political services were offered at the center,

What kind of service? Political services... in Japan there aren't many are there? For example, Dawn Center does this kind of thing, at this time in Japan there aren't many yet..at the city level there are...they exist at the city level. ***Here there is no politics*** (my emphasis). (later) In politics there are limits, women have their own wishes and dreams as human beings, politics is not rewarding.

At NWEF, one interviewee who does research for the center talked about the change in focus for NWEF and the way the center operates when I asked her the same question,,

Three years ago, from this flagship of the state, policy flowed along from the activities, things in the political area were done, they were done but for example there is the basic law, the law totally changed and we still promote these things, we have books here and information, for example, but there isn't much about helping to participate. I can't say much about the status of politics or citizens ...here we have political information but...there are no candidates here.. in Japan the state is strong, there are places and *fusen kaikan* (women's public halls) Really, places that do this type of work are different.

Overall, in interviews there was a tendency for women to avoid discussing political issues or to talk in terms that separated women's citizen activities from political activities.

Women discuss politics in this way because of the gender dynamics discussed in earlier chapters, Japanese women feel distanced from politics and because the ideology that discourages women's identity as political citizens remains. The woman at NWEK quoted above told me that there was political information available but that NWEK's activities themselves were not of a political nature; she then went on to suggest other private facilities where the so-called real political work was being done. Also, the manager at Wings Kyoto stated that:

Change is very important for women's empowerment in politics but as you would think it is, restrictions are strongly limiting. We have various seminars on politics, we have a concern about politics here. For example, speaking directly about this kind of thing, we are having seminars all the time for women to come up in this area."

This interviewee was one of the few who spoke candidly about the restrictions women face in the political realm while also putting forth the possibility for an active strategy which implied the work that her center was doing. Although the response was disappointing, her remarks stood out among those of other center employees which I interviewed.

Environmental Conservation and Consumerism at Women's Centers

When asked about environmental issues several women discussed recycling and the environmental movement in broad terms. One center manager noted that although environmental problems weren't a theme of her center's work, there was crossover with other women's issues, specifically concerning family and safety in the home. She also noted that "...environmental troubles and women have a strong record; 15 years ago most or all environmental movements have had women leaders" (Interviews 2004).

Kitakyushu Women's Forum is the only women's center that I visited which had environmental issues as a theme of their work. This concern is largely due to the fact that the city of Kitakyushu has a strong legacy of women's work on environmental matters, which prompted the government to fund KFAW as part of a hometown revitalization project. According to Oda (2005), women in Kitakyushu in the 1950s and 60s were concerned about the negative impact of pollution on human health. "Women who lived nearby the industries started saying 'We want a blue sky'. Women who were never trained as scientists, conducted research to show how their environment was hazardous for their health. For example, they hung a bunch of white cloth outside a window and took a piece every week to compare and analyzed the color and contents with the help of a professor of a university." Women's initiatives on their environment eventually led the city to make strict regulations to curtail the emission of soot and smoke. Today, KFAW has made connections with the international women's movement, especially in the area of development which complements the forum's work on the environment.

During interviews at KFAW, an employee noted that it is mainly NGOs that do activities related to the environment. This is because of "the compartmentalized system of bureaucracy, environmental activities are under the environmental ministry and gender equality activities are under the gender equality or social welfare...there is little collaboration at the moment" (Interviews 2006). This employee also noted that KFAW is distinct from other centers in its environmental research and awareness activities. "At the moment, probably if you visit any of the women's centers you may not see many activities related to the environment. As far as this forum is concerned we don't have

these kinds of grassroots activities...we may not have as big problems as before”

(Interviews 2006).

Many of the women indicated an interest in environmental issues, including one woman who attended a seminar and another who visited the NWECC library in order to get information on an environmental issue. The manager of Wings Kyoto noted that a local citizen's group visited the center to distribute brochures on recycling and environmental conservation, and she also noted that there was a “great deal of woman's strength” on environmental matters.

Home Matters: Japanese Women and the Environment

Japanese environmental organizations have strong connections to gendered activism, and many environmental movements and organizations have had women as leaders and initiators of political activity. These two organizations were chosen because they are different in their focus and membership. These two environmental groups are also widely known and active in the area of environmental policy and politics in Japan. In order for state feminism in Japan to be meaningful for women's activism, it is important that women activists use or are in some way connected to the gender centers for networking and/or information purposes. The following sections outline the environmental organizations which I studied and present the results of interviews with female members of the organizations as well as interviews conducted at the women's centers.

Seikatsu Club Seikyo

Seikatsu Club Seikyo is one of the few quasi-environmental groups which has been the focus of scholarly attention by political scientists. Seikatsu Club Seikyo (SCS) is

a consumer cooperative, it is both an environmental group and it has been portrayed by itself and others as a women's group as well. SCS was formed in 1965 to collectively purchase milk. The Club has received praise by scholars who note the importance of women in the group; however, recently this assumption has been questioned by Gelb and Estevez who note that the leaders of the club are mainly men and that women are used symbolically but hold very little decision making power within the organization. Today, there are about 600 branches of the club with nearly 259,000 members, and according to the club's website, "most of these are women" (seikatsuclub.coop 2006). The SCS survives on contributions from its members (1000 yen/month) in order to carry out its activities, the main focus of which is purchasing organic non-genetically modified foods and other consumer goods. Along with the concern for safe food, there is a focus on environmental issues that began when the club formed and boycotted the use of detergents that damage the water supply.

The representatives of Seikatsu Club Seikyo with whom I spoke included women administrative assistants and workers in the Tokyo office; their comments confirmed Gelb and Estevez's findings. My initial e-mails to the office received a reply from a female worker that her boss (a male) was busy and he might not have time to see me. I replied that I could talk to her; it was not necessarily important that I spoke with her boss as long as I could speak to someone. The two women that I ended up speaking with were forthcoming about their activities. When I asked them about the leadership of the SCS they told me that the leadership was mostly male, but this was because most housewives spend all of their time caring for their families and did not have time for full time administrative jobs (Interviews 2006). The women also reiterated the importance of

childcare, without which it is virtually impossible for women to do even minimal volunteer work. The membership of SCS is so broad because recycling is a lifestyle choice and does not take extra time for mothers and housewives to perform. Women are able to buy products from cooperatives that sell exclusively to the club and assure that the produce is organic. Members of the club proudly call themselves *seikatsusha* (person who lives harmoniously with nature), instead of consumers and this reinforces the notion that changing lifestyles through the use of cooperatives and a healthy lifestyle will change society. Although SCS has had members elected to municipal offices successfully through political action campaigns in the past, one woman member that I spoke with told me that they are no longer successful in these types of political endeavors. “We can’t do this, politics has changed and seikatsu is no longer strong in politics (Interviews 2006)”.

Greenpeace Japan

Greenpeace Japan, a branch of Greenpeace worldwide is an international NGO which has been vocal and active on environmental issues in Japan. The Japanese branch of Greenpeace was founded in 1989, it has approximately 4,500 members and a staff of 15 operating out of an office in Shinjuku, Tokyo. Greenpeace concentrates its efforts on environmental issues which are transboundary in nature. Its current campaigns include protesting the construction of a US Marine Corps base off the shore in Okinawa which will damage a sensitive coral reef there. Greenpeace Japan is also calling for cancellation of the use of uranium into Japan’s plutonium reprocessing power plant (greenpeace.or.jp).

Unlike many other environmental organizations in Japan, Greenpeace has used protest tactics and public criticism of Japan’s corporate and governmental environmental

practices. Many people tend to view Greenpeace as a more radical organization which reflects negatively in the Japanese context, because Japanese culture values harmony and protest and demonstrations like those organized by Greenpeace (which tend to be shocking and dramatic) are frowned upon. Most of the women that I spoke with claimed either to not know about them or were unsupportive of the kinds of political protest which Greenpeace engages in regularly (Interviews 2006). This is not an organization which caters to the kinds of issues which Japanese women and housewives are more likely to become politically active on. The campaigns which Greenpeace promotes are not generally linked to the home and family rather they reflect international issues such as the disappearance of species.

Greenpeace Japan is perceived by many in the LDP as so anti-government that it has been refused legal status as an NPO (Pekkanen 2000). My meetings with members of Greenpeace at their Tokyo office confirmed that the organization does not resonate with housewives. The representative that I spoke with knew little about the women's centers or any connection to the environment and stated that the recycling and conservation clubs like Seikatsu Club Seikyo were not political enough (Interviews 2006). The office was staffed mainly by young Japanese men and women and young environmentalists from countries outside of Japan.

The array of activities and approaches by women's centers is extensive; the women's centers examined here represent a broad sample of women's centers across Japan. Overall, the women's centers activities tend to reinforce societal norms and focus on the family and home. Although many of the women's centers produce their own publications and promote networking, there are few examples of practical programs at the

women's centers aimed at supporting political candidates or encouraging other forms of political organizing by women. However, in the area of domestic violence the women's centers have begun to create programs which assist victims and the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that these services are being utilized by growing numbers of women.

In the area of environmental politics, two prominent environmental organizations were examined in order to isolate connections between women's centers and these environmental groups. The findings presented in this chapter do not illustrate the presence of significant political activity focused on environmental issues at women's centers, nor do the cases in this chapter confirm the existence of linkages between women's centers and environmental organizations. The absence of such a finding may confirm the notion that dramatic and visible protest movements such as Greenpeace Japan are not palatable to women in Japan who still identify themselves closely with the home and family and at a distance from protest activities which are unrelated to this role. Women who use the women's centers may be uninterested in activity which is highly political in nature; therefore, environmental movements with political goals are unable to make connection with women's centers because the interest is simply not present. Also, women may be likely to engage in environmental activities in private ways, the Seikatsu Club Seikyo is an environmental group, but its members are motivated by private concerns, namely the home and family as well as changing their consumer lifestyles, but in a personal way that is not politically visible or active.

Chapter 6: Conclusions: Women's Centers, Politics and State Rhetoric

This dissertation examined the gender initiatives of the Japanese government, specifically women's centers which are designed to improve women's status and formal political participation. Eight women's centers were examined in detail and compared with one another to highlight the distinctive differences among their activities and their potential as being political vehicles for women. The linkages between women's centers and environmental groups, which have historically been salient political vehicles for women, were also analyzed in order to determine whether or not they have influenced the programs at the women's centers or made linkages with the centers. This chapter presents the major findings of the dissertation by re-examining the major questions proposed in Chapter One.

This study set out to ascertain whether or not women's centers have changed the way women participate in politics. In order to examine this relationship, I conducted interviews with women's center directors and managers as well as clients. I asked women questions about why they came to the centers as well as the types of programs offered. Women were also asked general questions about women's ability to influence formal politics in Japan. Eight gender centers located in throughout different regions in Japan

were used as the focus of the dissertation. Interviews were conducted at women's centers in the Tokyo area, Osaka and Kyoto, Kitakyushu and Toyama prefecture. The linkage between women's centers and environmental movements was examined by asking women questions at the women's centers and by doing interviews with two major environmental movements. I asked specific questions about the existence of connections between the centers and the environmental groups. Government data as well as documents obtained from the centers were also used as part of this study.

This dissertation research was conducted in two phases. During my first research trip to Japan, I contacted women's center managers and directors and arranged to return and to follow up with formal interviews at later date. During preparation for my initial research trip, I e-mailed women's centers and made contact with several individuals working at the centers who had met my advisor while she was living in Japan. The process that I went through to prepare for my first visit to Japan went very smoothly, I received responses to my e-mail requests and many of the women that I corresponded with asked me questions about my research and indicated interest in the topic. On my first visit to Japan I was allowed access to the women's centers and was given permission to do interviews with women clients and visitors to the centers.

Prior to planning my second trip to Japan in order to conduct interviews and do follow up research from my first trip, I found that the process was much more difficult. Many of the e-mails sent to the women's centers were not answered, even when addressed to the individuals I had met with on my first trip. Finally, after it seemed as if I would not receive answers I called each of the women's centers to arrange meetings. During my phone calls many of the women's center employees asked me to provide them

with a list of questions and my own qualifications (although this seemed like standard practice to me, this had not been asked of me previously). One of the women's centers where I had previously spoken to a women's center director as well as clients, claimed that the center had been besieged by requests from *kenkyusha tamago* 研究者卵, which literally translates to "egg researcher" which means a novice or beginning researcher. A *kenkyusha tamago* is someone of low status in the intellectual hierarchy in Japan, which means that the research is not of academic importance. Although I e-mailed this women's center with my qualifications and list of questions I did not receive a reply and was therefore passively denied access.

Overall my second trip was markedly different in terms of the openness of center directors and managers to being interviewed as well as the degree of access I was allowed at the women's centers. For example, at Tokyo Women's Plaza where the previous female director had been replaced by a male, I was met on my arrival by the director's assistant and the interview was conducted under very formal circumstances.¹⁰ After the interview with the director of the center, I had planned to visit the library and look at the center's publications; instead, I was led directly to the front door of the building and virtually led outside. Experiences similar to the one that I had at Tokyo Women's Plaza were repeated at other women's centers. When I discussed this with other Japanese contacts they confirmed my belief that Japan had, over the two year span between my trips, become more closed to foreign researchers. The opportunities for research access in

¹⁰ The formality of the interview was indicated by the level of language used as well as cultural markers singular to Japan including the ritual of drinking green tea and exchanging business cards.

Japan are relevant for future researchers, in order to do qualitative research and interviewing, it is essential to speak with people who have first-hand information.

Japanese State Agenda: Rhetoric versus Reality

The introduction to this study outlined the criteria in state feminism for judging when governmental structures are able to advance women's participation. These criteria are met when the state is defined as a site of social justice (with the capacity to institutionalize new reform demands) and when the society supports feminism which challenges gender hierarchies through radical and reform political activities (Stetson and Mazur 1995). Therefore, in order to meet the first criterion to advance women's political participation through state initiatives, the Japanese state must actively promote a feminist agenda which challenges and deconstructs gender conceptions. This criterion is inadequate. When analyzing the rhetoric of the Japanese state, one might argue that the Japanese state does promote such a feminist agenda; however, the situation on the ground is more complex. Therefore, the criteria in state feminism must be revised in order to include the analysis of specific programs and activities of structures, such as the women's centers, in order to fully ascertain the situation at the local level. The information and cases presented in this dissertation cannot support the claim that the Japanese state meets these revised criteria. The Japanese government does not actively promote a feminist agenda and society does not support challenging gender hierarchies through radical or reform political activities.

Although the state uses feminist language in its rhetoric, practical assistance and tools which would assist women in becoming more politically active are not offered by the Japanese government through the women's centers examined in this dissertation. Of

the women's centers examined, the most overtly feminist is Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center (ARWRC), a private women's center (which does not receive government funding and has no connection to any government agencies). AJWRC sponsors programs and a research agenda which challenges and critiques the predominant gender rhetoric in Japan. Although many of the women's centers provide help for women victims of domestic violence, ultimately the cause of domestic violence is societal gender conceptions which devalue women.¹¹ In order to combat domestic violence at its root cause, government initiatives must work to change societal views of women. International organizations such as the United Nations have institutionalized this linkage in their work, for example, "UNIFEM works on several fronts to interrupt the cycle of violence against women, with an overall objective of linking violence to the source that feeds it: gender inequality."¹² In Japan, there is scant evidence to support the claim that gender centers are doing the type of work which would alter gender conceptions. Also, the support which the women's centers provide is limited, counseling is important but financial and legal support is essential. The only women's center examined in this dissertation which assists in this area is the Yokohama Women's Forum.

Moreover, the Japanese state has created gender initiatives and institutions to support those initiatives but there are several reasons why these institutions and initiatives have not significantly altered women's political participation. First, the government's initiatives on gender run counter to other government programs, especially social

¹¹ The link between domestic violence and societal gender conceptions is widely accepted by both feminist authors and those writing on domestic violence as well as international organizations such as the U.N. and the World Health Organization.

¹² http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/violence_against_women/at_a_glance.php

security, which rely on traditional gender norms, as explained in Chapter Three.

Additionally, the Japanese government's initiatives on gender are not seriously funded or provided with enough legal backing in order for the measures to be successful. The most illustrative examples of these types of policies are domestic violence law and the childcare and family leave policies. There are also many conservative politicians who promoted family values and traditional gender roles because they feel it is in the best interests of the state to encourage women in their roles as mothers which they believe in turn will assist with the declining birthrate.

The second requirement of state feminism above has to do with societal support for feminism which challenges gender hierarchies. The dominant ideologies in Japanese society do not meet this requirement; feminism is not treated seriously by the media or politicians and feminists have been made fun of in other Japanese culture outlets (including television and movies). These public attitudes reinforce the treatment of women as second-class citizens. During interviews women spoke of these issues,

(W)hen you come to jobs the discrimination starts. Officially or on the surface there are laws but in reality the situation is not like that and this is my personal experience. When I was working at a private company, men entered the company four and five years after me and they received a higher salary and are allowed to go abroad for business even though my English is better. I didn't really see the prospect for promotion, maybe if I work ten or fifteen years the situation will change but there is still differentiation and that's why the population is decreasing. Many women find it difficult to work and have a family (Interviews 2006).

These statements suggest that discrimination against women still exists in Japan which supports the claim that broad based societal support for feminism is not significant in Japan. Moreover, it is difficult to confirm the hypothesis that interventions by the Japanese state in the form of creating women's centers have advanced women's political

status. Although women's centers provide useful services to women, these services do not include political training or assistance with political candidacy or networking. In recent years politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party have become increasingly conservative and this trend in Japanese politics affects the ability of state initiatives to empower women.

Women's Centers: Political Vehicles?

The women's centers examined in this dissertation represent a wide variety of ideological approaches and activities related to women's political and private lives. At the outset of this dissertation, a set of initial criteria was outlined in order to assess the political potential of women's centers. These criteria included: 1. the presence of linkages between NGOs and women's centers; and 2. the existence of specific programs to recruit and train women to play active roles in politics. Additionally, the literature on state feminism argues that policy machineries like the women's centers must critique and challenge gender roles in order to advance women's status, and this study argues that this criteria must be revised to also include reference to specific programs and activities that move beyond mere examination of state rhetoric.

This dissertation research does not confirm the presence of linkages between NGOs and women's centers. Moreover, this research challenges the notion that specific programs and activities which critique and challenge gender roles exist at the women's centers.

This dissertation research argues that women's centers may be placed on a spectrum from formal to informal politics (See Figure 6.1: The Spectrum of Women's Centers in Informal and Formal Politics) that highlights the relationship between citizens

and the state and the array of cultural activities of the centers. This dissertation finds that the centers do not increase women's formal political participation.

As noted in Chapter 5, many women's centers offer networking services which generally include classes where women can meet and discuss political issues, including participation in NGOs, and how to plan activities and projects on women's issues. However, there is a marked difference between planning these types of activities, discussing in classes and meetings how to encourage women, and the outcomes of such programs. Both the Dawn Center and National Women's Education Center hold classes that include directions for women on NGO activities. However, the NWECE brochure, while discussing the importance of women's empowerment, makes no mention of the way in which women should challenge gender stereotypes that dis-empower women. The Dawn Center specifically promotes women's causes and assists NGOs started by women in order for women to have a voice in politics, based on a feminist framework which is critical of gender roles. Unlike the programs described in the NWECE literature, those promoted at Dawn Center include practical tools and information.

The distinction noted above between proactive versus reactive responses to gender constructions in society also provides a useful framework for examining the Japanese state's agenda. Activities which respond to women's place in Japanese society and provide support to women are meaningful, however they do not address the underlying reasons for women's place in society, nor do these activities provide women with the tools to critique such status issues. In order to answer the question posed at the beginning of this dissertation with regard to Japanese state interventions and the ability of these interventions to advance women's status, it is necessary to examine whether or not

the activities of the centers are merely responding to women's problems or addressing the root cause of such problems.

By comparing the difference programs of two women's centers on a similar set of issues, an important difference is revealed. While NWECC uses the language of women's empowerment, there are no practical steps offered. Many of the women's centers utilize the language of feminism, offering classes on empowerment and consciousness-raising but only 2 of the women's centers examined (Dawn Center and Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center) actually followed through on that language with practical activities. There is an important difference between activities which are proactive and those that are reactive. Although all women's centers offer activities which support women, most of these activities are reactive, responding to the reality of women's lives rather than seeking to change the a gender framing which devalues and dis-empowers women. Therefore, with regard to the original questions posed by this dissertation, this research finds that the women's centers do not offer specific programs to recruit and train women to play active roles in politics, and there is no evidence to support the claim that women have had greater access to formal politics as a consequence of the women's centers. However, some women's centers do provide networking with NGOs; therefore, the potential for women's centers to act as political vehicles (while negotiable given that only one of the three criteria are met), is present.

The Conservative Backlash

Currently, the political context in Japan is even harsher for women; many of my interviewees spoke about a conservative trend that is affecting women negatively. Most feminist authors and those writing on women in politics argue that for Japanese women to

advance politically and alter their status, a feminist critique is essential. “The backlash against women is very visible and very harmful of course...some of the women’s centers are closed down and those directors of the centers that were feminist have been forced to leave (Interviews 2006).” Several of the centers that I visited had experienced changes in their leadership roles; two of the women feminists that I interviewed in 2002 were no longer employed by 2006 and male directors had replaced them. Also, in 2001 the Tokyo Prefectural Governor Ishihara targeted the Tokyo Women’s Plaza and made a decision to disband the Tokyo Metropolitan Women’s Foundation calling it “administrative reform” (Nakamura and Arita 2006). The continued dominance of the LDP and the promotion of conservative nationalism is also related to this trend. This is an important, negative downslide which is occurring. Without feminist directors the women’s centers are deprived of the strong leadership necessary to instill a feminist mission which is critical of traditional gender roles in Japanese society.

One woman also spoke of the debate concerning the use of the term “gender” in the official plan for gender equality, because of reservation and resistance to the term (Interviews 2006). The term “gender” is radical to some politicians because the term implies a challenge to traditional societal constructions of male and female in Japan. There is also a famous story told about a women’s center in Fukuya where all books containing the word gender (including all books written by Japanese feminist writer Shizuko Ueno) were removed from the library and stored in the bookstore (which is basically a storage area for books). “They keep the books in the store which are not open to the public, they can’t destroy the book but if someone asks to see that book they will get it but they are not open and are not shelved (Interviews 2006).”

The director of Tokyo Women's Plaza also spoke about the return to traditional values and the promotion of Japanese culture. Of course, advocating for these values has a gender component as well (Interviews 2006). These are observable cultural changes; for example, the wearing of kimono (traditional dress for women) has become more prevalent and kimonos are readily available at even low end fashion stores in Japan; this was unheard of even two years ago. An interviewee commented that the reason for this return to traditional social values is that politicians claim that Japanese have become "individualistic and women don't want a family anymore...so they want a return to the public based on national values (Interviews 2006)." The driving force behind many of the arguments promoting a return to conservative values is pro-natalism. Politics in this context is dangerous ground for women; "any woman can't go for public office without becoming like a man, there is little chance for women to impact the system... to change it (Interviews 2006)." Those women who do become politicians may also receive poor treatment. One interviewee spoke of this,

The Minister for Gender Equality is a female and she was attacked by her performance. Whether that is really the reason or not is unclear. She was criticized, by some government officers and she is doing really well but they are jealous. That was a pitiful situation and the grounds are probably not true but that kind of thing is damaging. They also said she caused confrontation among the government community...I believe they say this because they just don't want to promote gender equality...Some people have told me there are very, very conservative people among the MPs and these people are not supportive of women (Interviews 2006).

The shift in political climate is an important development and this change has implications for the women's centers and gender quality initiatives in Japan overall. If the political climate is unsupportive of gender equality, then the women's centers are in danger of having their financial support decrease which means that the centers may be

unable to offer an extensive range of services to women. The continued dominance of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Koizumi's successor) at its helm, demonstrates the prevalence of conservatism in politics. Prime Minister Abe is a nationalist, hawkish conservative, who would like to change Japan's pacifist constitution. Abe was also the chair of the "Extreme Sex-Education Gender Free Education Survey Project Team" set up by the LDP to oppose gender free education (McNicol 2006). Gender equality is accomplished only in the context of societal gender constructions which argue for equally valuing women and men, whereas traditional values in Japan emphasize a hierarchical, Confucian structure where women are seen as less valuable than men. The conservative backlash which argues for a return to these traditional values will result in de-valuing women, undoing any good gender equality work that has been accomplished. As a result of these political developments this research confirms the negative hypothesis that because women's centers are government institutions they do not serve as effective pathways to bring women into more active political roles.

(Un)State(ed) Feminism

One of the broad questions driving this research is the potential for states to provide increased political access to women through political institutions which are funded by national, local and regional state governments. The literature on state feminism claims that states are potentially able to provide women with increased access and support through these structures are generally called national women's policy machineries. This dissertation raises questions about the ability of states with regard to this issue. Although the Japanese state has created state feminist institutions, the women's

centers do not receive the fiscal resources necessary in order to accomplish the task of helping to create a “gender equal society” proclaimed in the government literature. The women’s centers are seemingly under the constant threat of being de-funded by conservative governors; while the Minister for Gender Equality is criticized by conservative politicians in Tokyo. In this context, what chance do these centers have in empowering women politically and promoting a feminist agenda? Moreover, there is potential for institutions such as the women’s centers, as well as other state feminist institutions, to co-opt and dis-empower actual grassroots political organizing by women. This dissertation departs from studies on state feminism which laud the ability of states to empower women in formal politics and confirms questions raised by feminist scholars who argue that states themselves are engendered by the larger societies (and societal gender constructions) which mold state policies.

One of the possible reasons for the failure of women’s centers to advance women’s rights is related to the strength of the state. Japan is in a class of states which may be called “strong states”, which means that the Japanese state is able to advance its interests and direct policy without societal interference (MacAdam 1996). The potential for state feminism success has to do with the state’s ability to direct government policy autonomously. While the state is made up of a variety of interests, actors and policies that may be conflicting and ever-changing, some states are more apt to fit this mold than others—and this has to do with degree of state autonomy.

Conceptual Reach: How Far does State Feminism Go?

Another argument made in this dissertation has to do with the applicability of western notions of state feminism to non-western, Asian states such as Japan. State

feminism is based on the idea that it is possible for states to further a feminism agenda that will challenge gender roles and increase political access for women. In order for states to incorporate such a feminist agenda, the concept of feminism must resonate with the larger civil society and with women who use the tools of feminism in order to critique societal gender norms. In Japan, feminism is not commonly accepted by women, many of whom choose to empower themselves within societal norms still influenced by Confucian values. As noted earlier, while women are accorded lower status in Japanese society, housewives and mothers are revered in the family and have higher status than single, unmarried women. Therefore, women who are housewives and mothers may use their status in the family in order to empower themselves, a strategy which runs counter to many western feminist notions of empowerment. Feminism is a western construct based on particular western notions of male and female. Feminism critiques oppressive patriarchal power structures and the valuing of male over female. While this critique is useful and relevant in western societies the critique itself reflects and reiterates the very dualism which it seeks to change. Asian and Confucian societies are not patriarchal in the same way that western ones are; rather, gender norms derive from Confucian hierarchies. Therefore, it may be possible to overlook or downplay strategies used by Japanese women which, while not seeming to reflect western feminism, might in fact challenge Confucian gender roles.

Environmentalism and Women's Centers

The connection between environmental groups and the women's centers is important because these groups are one of the few ways in which Japanese women have expressed themselves politically. In order for the women's centers to serve as potential

political enablers for women, it is vital for them to make connections with those women's political groups which are already in existence.

Unfortunately, this study concludes that significant connections do not exist between present or former environmental groups led by women and the women's centers established by regional and local levels of the Japanese government. Environmental activities are not addressed to a significant degree at the women's centers and there is no evidence to support the claim that environmental activities draw women to the women's centers. Moreover, it does not appear that the two environmental groups studied here were interested in reaching out to women or in making connections with earlier grassroots citizen's initiatives led by women. Involvement in a citizen's movement generated the political interest to attract women to a women's center in only one case, the Kitakyushu Forum on Asian Women (KFAW). KFAW is also the single case which illustrates a connection between a women's center and earlier citizen's movements on the environment.

There are several reasons why there is a lack of connection between women's groups with an environmental focus and women's centers. One important structural impact on this connection is the governmental structure of ministries addressing these issues. One of my interviewees explained that the environmental ministry and the ministry responsible for gender issues are separate bodies. "Activities related to gender and the environment, are not really conducted at one time, because the compartmental system of bureaucracy, environmental activities are under the environmental ministry and gender equality activities are under the gender equality bureau, so there is little collaboration at the moment (Interviews 2006)." Although the structure of ministries in

Japan, including the separation of environmental and gender equality activities is common to other democracies, there have been no efforts made to create linkages between women's issues and environmental problems which recognize the role of women in advocating for the environment.

Because women's and environmental issues are treated separately by the government and acted on by separate ministries, this makes the growth and promotion of linkages on the issue areas difficult. However, although many women's centers may not be connected to grassroots environmental activities in Japan, some of the women's centers have made international linkages with women's and environmental movements outside of Japan on sustainable development. For example, KFAW has started a project on education for sustainable development (ESD), which is being promoted by the United Nations. As a regional area of expertise on ESD, KFAW will establish a network among governments, NGOs, universities, schools and even pre-primary schools as well as the private sector in order to build a sustainable society (KFAW 2006).

Another factor that must be recognized when examining this linkage is the state of environmental policy in Japan today and the existence of mainstream environmental movements. Currently, environmental issues have taken a backseat because environmental policies have been so successful. Currently, Japan's domestic environmental policies and legislation is strong, however Japan continues to export its destruction of the environment in its relationships with other Southeast Asian nations. The Japanese fishing industry also continues to be criticized for over-fishing and continuing the practice of whale hunting (including the humpback whale). In general, environmental movements are in decline as consumer groups (such as *Seikatsu Club*

Seikyo) are on the rise. Consumer groups do not challenge gender hierarchies or make linkages with feminism; rather, they tend to support the notion of women as housewives and caretakers for the family. As explained in Chapter 5, many of the environmental groups in existence in Japan today are arms of international environmental groups that have no links to their predecessors, which were led by women. These environmental groups seem disconnected to their gendered heritage, and are unrelated to the dynamic grassroots movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Although the environmental movement that exists in Japan today is critical of some government policies, this critique does not include a reference to gender, such as the one made by eco-feminism.

Centers for Domestic Violence

Although this research did not set out to examine the issues of domestic violence or mental health, unexpectedly women mentioned this topic frequently. Domestic violence and counseling services attracted women to the women's centers and provide support in this area. The development of domestic violence issues as a potential arena for women's formal political participation represents an unanticipated finding. In the context of contemporary arguments for a return to family values, women's centers are able to serve as advocates for women in the area of domestic violence and women's centers. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the domestic violence law has been criticized by some as being too weak and under-funded; however, Japan has made great strides in this area by enacting legislation and providing counseling and support for women through the women's centers. Furthermore, women's centers are locations from which a gender critique on domestic violence law is articulated. Yokohama Women's Forum, in particular, has published articles in its journal criticizing the domestic violence law as

being too weak. Similar attitudes have been expressed in other women's centers publications as well. Thus, on the issue of domestic violence, there is a feminist critique emerging from the women's centers which argues on the behalf of Japanese women. The presence of this critique at the gender centers is a positive development and is a potentially progressive trend that may allow women to impact government policies which impact their everyday lives.

Suggestions for Future Research


This dissertation finds that women's centers do not significantly alter women's formal political participation although it is recognized that this is an initial finding that must be confirmed by further study of greater numbers of these women's centers. Moreover, there may be other gender institutions that increase women's formal political participation and these must be examined by future research as well in order to confirm or deny the conclusions presented in this dissertation. For example, the history of the Women's Bureau of the Ministry of Labour is examined by Kobayashi (2005) who argues that state feminism may overlook progressive developments for women in states where the state itself creates a vertical relationship with feminist groups. Furthermore, there are larger theoretical issues raised by this dissertation that must be studied at greater length in order to assess the potential merit of the findings discussed here. This study has broader implications for the established framework of state feminism, which establishes criteria for analyzing government activities that are vague and need to include specific requirements of the analysis of activities at the local level where women interact with state institutions in their daily lives. Future research must be conducted on state feminism and the application of the analytical tools provided by state feminism to other Asian

nation states as well as states which vary in terms of the avenues of political access available to citizens. The issue area of domestic violence may hold increased for potential for women to use their political voice and to present a gendered critique of the Japanese state. As this area of public policy is relatively new, developments in this area must be studied by future researchers to analyze the way in which domestic violence legislation impacts women's political participation.

Appendix 1:
Timeline of the Development of Japan's National Women's Policy Machinery



- 1945 - Creation of the Women and Young Worker's Bureau in the Ministry of Labor
Creation of Ministry of Education (former home Ministry)
- 1975 - Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies relating to Women is established.
Conference on Women's Problems for International women's Year is sponsored by government.
- 1977 - National Women's Education Center opens.
Tokyo Metropolitan Women's Information Center opens.
- 1980 - Japan signs onto the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
- 1984 - The Women's and Minor's Bureau of the Ministry of Labor is reorganized and the Women's Bureau is established.
- 1994 - The Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality is created.
Office of Gender Equality created.
Council on Gender Equality established.
- 1997 - The Council on Gender Equality is recreated as a stronger body by law rather than ordinance by Hashimoto administration.
- 2001 - A reorganization of Central Government creates a Cabinet Office which will coordinate gender equality among other policies.
Congress for Gender Equality is created.
Gender Equality Bureau is set up.

Appendix 2: Reasons for Promoting Household Eco-Account Books



Cutting back just a little everyday can save you as much as 10,000 Yen a year and it's easy.
For example;


**Reduce TV viewing
by 1 hour a day
in one year...**



+

+


**Wash dishes
in cool water
(40°C → 30°C)
in one year...**



+

+


Reduce unnecessary idling by 5 min. each day in one year...



+

+

Run the water 3 min. less each day in one year...



||

||

*CO₂ : kg is the carbon conversion, figure in () is the volume conversion.



Source: Ministry of the Environment Government of Japan
 Godochosha No. 5, 1-2-2 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8975, Japan.
 Tel: +81-(0)3-3581-3351 E-mail:

Bibliography

- Allison, Anne. 1996. *Permitted and Prohibited Desires: Mothers, Comics and Censorship in Japan*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Almeida, Paul. 1998. "Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata". *Social Problems*. 45(1):37-60.
- Aoki, Yayoi. 1994. *Kyosei Jidai no Feminizumu: Hirakareta Mirai o Motomete*. Tokyo : Oriijin Shuppan Senta.
- Bachnik, J and Quinn, I. 1994. *Situated meaning: Inside and Outside in Japanese Self, Society, and Language*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bardsley, Jan. 1999. "Spaces for Feminist Action: National Centers for Women in Japan and Korea". *National Women's Studies Association Journal*. 11 no. 1: 136-149.
- Bishop, Beverly. 2002. "Globalization and Women's Labour Activism in Japan." *Electronic Journal of Japanese Studies*. (December 6th, 2002) www.japanese-studies.org.uk/articles/Bishop.html. (Accessed February 6, 2006).
- Boling, Patricia. 1991. "The Democratic Potential of Mothering". *Political Theory* 19 (November): 600-625.
- Blee, K.N. 1998. *No Middle Ground: Women and Radical Protest*. New York: New York University Press.
- Brasor, Phillip. 2005. "Little Progress on Japanese Gender Equality," *The Japan Times*, February 13th, 2005.
- Brecher, W. Puck. 2000. *An Investigation of Japan's Relationship to Nature and Environment*. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellon Press.
- Broadbent, Jeffrey. 1998. *Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Buckley, Sandra. 1994. "A Short History of the Feminist Movement in Japan" in Gelb, Joyce and Marian Lief Palley eds. *Women of Japan and Korea: continuity and change*, 150-186. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press.
- Buckley, Sandra and Vera Mackie. 1986. "Women in the New Japanese State" in Gavin McCormick and Yoshio Sugimoto eds. *Democracy in Contemporary Japan*, 173-185. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

- Buechler, Steven M. 1993. "Beyond Resource Mobilization: Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory." *The Sociological Quarterly*. 34 (2):217-225.
- Cheung, Fammy M. 1989. "The Women's Center: A Community Approach to Feminism in Hong Kong." *American Journal of Community Psychology*. 17:99-107.
- Chiba, Kazuo. 2005. "Bureaucracy undergoes major surgery."
hugopublications.com/bureaucracy.html.
- Chin, Mikyung. 2000. "Self-Governance, Political Participation, and the Feminist Movement in South Korea" in Lee, Rose J. and Cal Clark eds. *Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia*, 91-106. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Christensen, Ray. 2000. "The Impact of Electoral Rules in Japan" in Lee, Rose J. and Cal Clark eds. *Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia*, 25-47. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Christy, Carol. 1994. "Trends in Sex Differences in Political Participaiton: A Comparative Perspective" in Marianne and Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. *Different Roles, Different Voices: Women and Politics in the United States and Europe*, 27-37. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
- CLAIR (Council of Local authorities for International Relations).2002. *Local Government in Japan*. Tokyo:Japan.
- Clark, Cal and Rose J. Lee 2000. "Women's Status in East Asia" in Cal Clark and Rose J. Lee eds. *Democracy and the status of women in East Asia*, 1-24. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Crump, John. 1996. "Environmental Politics in Japan". *Environmental Politics*. 5:115-21.
- Curtin, Sean J. 2003. "Women in Japanese Politics: Part Seven—Fewer Women Elected in November 2003 Lower House Election." *Social Trends*, no.60 (November 13th, 2003),www.glocom.org/special_topics/social_trends/20031113_trends_s60/index.html (accessed August 24, 2004).
- Curtis, Gerald. 1989. *The Japanese Way of Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cutts, Robert L. 1997. An empire of schools: Japan's universities and the molding of a national power elite. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Danahar, Mike. 2003. "On the Forest Fringes?: Environmentalism, Left Politics and Feminism in Japan." *Transformations*, No.6 (February 2003):1-9.

- Darcy, Robert, Susan Welch and Janet Clark. 1994. *Women, Elections & Representation*. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
- Denzin, Norman K. 1978. *Studies in Symbolic Interaction: An Annual Compilation of Research*. JAI Press.
- Dietz, Mary G. 1985. "Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking". *Political Theory* 13 (February):19-37
- Dittmer, Lowell, Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee eds. 2000. *Informal Politics in East Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Drucker, Peter F. 1998. "In Defense of Japanese Bureaucracy". *Foreign Affairs* 77 no. 5 (September/October):68-80.
- Eckstein, Susan ed. 1989. *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Ehara, Yumiko. 2000. "Feminism's Growing Pains." *Japan Quarterly*. 47 no. 3:41-8.
- Eisenstein, Z.R. 1994. *Feminism and Sexual Equality*. New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1981. *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1983. *Power Trips and Other Essays: Feminism as a Civic Discourse*. Madison, WI: Univ. of Wisconsin Press.
- Franzaway, Suzanne, Dianne Court and R.W. Connell. 1989. *Staking a Claim: Feminism, Bureaucracy and the State*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Fujimura-Fanselow, Kumiko and Atsuko eds. 1995. *Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present and Future*. CUNY: Feminist Press.
- Fukai, Haruhiro and Harold Fukai. 2000. "The Informal Politics of Japanese Diet Elections: Cases and Interpretations" in Dittmer, Lowell and Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee eds. *Informal Politics in East Asia*, 23-41. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Fukui, Haruhiro. 1977. "Studies in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature." in T.J. Pempel ed. *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, 22-59. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Garcia-Gorena, Velma. 1999. *Mothers and the Mexican anti-nuclear power movement*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

- Garon, Sheldon. 1997. *Molding Japanese Minds: The State and Politics in Everyday Life*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Gellar-Schwartz, Linda. 1995. "An Array of Agencies: Feminism and State Institutions in Canada" in Stetson, Dorothy and Amy Mazur eds. *Comparative State Feminism*, 45-58. London: Sage.
- Gelb, Joyce. 2003. *Gender Policies in Japan and the United States*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gender Equality Bureau, the Cabinet Office. 2002. "Enforcement of the Law for the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims". *Women in Japan Today* (January):3-4.
- George, Timothy S. 2001. *Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan*. Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Githens, Marianne and Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. 1994. *Different Roles, Different Voices: Women and Politics in the United States and Europe*. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
- Gottlieb, Robert. 1993. *Forcing the Spring*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Hasegawa, Koichi. 2004. *Constructing Civil Society in Japan: voices of environmental movements*. Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press.
- Hayes, Louis D. 1992. *Introduction to Japanese Politics*. New York: Paragon House.
- Hellman, Donald C. 1976. *China and Japan: A New Balance of Power*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.
- Heng, Geraldine. 1997. "'Great way to fly': nationalism, the state and the varieties of Third-world feminism" in Alexander, Jacquie M. and Chandra Talpade Mohanty ed., *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*, 30-46. New York: Routledge.
- Hikita, Mitsuko. 1996. Women and Alternatives to Agricultural Decline. In AMPO. Japan Asia Quarterly Review ed. *Voices from the Japanese Women's Movement*, 144-149. New York: ME Sharpe.
- Hirai, Jun'ichi. 2004. "After the elections" *International Viewpoint Online magazine*, 356 (February). www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article 108. (accessed March 8, 2004).
- Hoffman, Steven A. 1981. "Faction Behavior and Cultural Codes: India and Japan," *Journal of Asian Studies* 40 (February): 231-54.

- Holliman, Jonathan. 1990. "Environmentalism with a Global Scope". *Japan Quarterly* 27, (July-September): 285-290.
- Howell, Jude. 1997. "Post Beijing Reflections: Creating Ripples, but not waves in China" *Women's Studies International Forum*. 20:235-52.
- Hrebenar, Ronald J. 2001. "Japan: strong state, spectator democracy, and modified corporatism" in Clive S. Thomas ed. *Political parties and interest groups: shaping democratic governance*, 155-174. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Hunter, Janet. 2003. *Women and the Labour Market in Japan's Industrializing Economy: The Textile Industry Before the Pacific War*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Ike, Nobutaka. 1950. *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Imamura, Anne E. 1987. "The Urban Japanese Housewife: traditional and modern social participation." *Social Science Journal*. 24:139-56.
- Impoco, Jim. 1992. "Japan's late greening: Will the world's self-ordained eco-cop keep trashing its own backyard?" *US News and World Report* 110 no. 12 (March 16): 61-63.
- International Women's Year. 1975. *Status of Women Worldwide*. New York: UN Department of Public Information.
- Interviews, 2004. By the author with women's center managers and employees.
- Ito, Masami. 2004. "Revised Domestic Violence Law Falls Short" *The Japan Times*. Dec, 4, 2004.
- Ishida, Takeshi and Ellis S. Krauss ed. 1989. "Democracy in Japan: Issues and Questions" in *Democracy in Japan* in Ishida and Krauss eds, 3-16. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Ishida, Takeshi and Ellis S. Krauss. 1989. *Democracy in Japan*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Iwao, Sumiko. 1993. *The Japanese Woman: traditional image and changing reality*. Harvard: Harvard Univ. Press.
- Jain, Purnendra. C. 1991. "Green Politics and Citizen Power in Japan: the Zushi Movement". *Asian Survey*. 1 :559-75.

- Jelin, Elizabeth. 1990. "Citizenship and Identity: Final Reflections" in Elizabeth Jelin ed. *Women and Social Change in Latin America*, 27-42. London: Zed Books.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 2001. Japanese "Capitalism" Revisited. *Japan Policy Research Institute*, Occasional Paper No. 22 (August). www.
Jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op22.html. 9/24/04.
- Jones, Kathleen B. 1993. *Compassionate Authority: Democracy and the Representation of Women*. New York: Routledge.
- Kaplan, Temma. 1990. "Community and Resistance in Women's Political Cultures". *Dialectical Anthropology*. 15:259-267.
- Kawanaka, N. 1974. "Nihon ni okeru seisaku kettai no seiji katei" [The Political Process of Policymaking in Japan] in Ken Taniuchi et. al. eds. *Fendai Gyosei to Kanryosei*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.
- Kerbo, Harold R. and John A. McKinstry. 1995. *Who Rules Japan?: the inner circles of economic and political power*. New York: Praeger.
- Kirkpatrick, Marine A. 1975. "Consumerism and Japan's New Citizen Politics." *Asian Survey*. 15, no. 3: 234-246.
- Kobayashi, Yoshie. 2005. *A Path Toward Gender Equality: State Feminism in Japan*. London: Taylor and Frances Group.
- Komano, Yoko. 1976. "Shufu ronso SaikoL Seibetsu Yakuwari Bungyo ishiki no Kokufuku no tame ni." *Fujin Mondai Konwakai Kaiho*. (December).
- Kondo, Magara. 1981. *Watashi no Kaiso*. Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan 2.
- Krauss, Ellis. S. and Takeshi Ishida. 1989. "Japanese Democracy in Perspective" in Krauss and Ishida eds. *Japanese Democracy*, 327-339. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Kuumba, M. Bahati. 2001. *Gender and Social Movements*. New York: Altamira Press.
- Landes, Joan B. Ed. 1998. *Feminism, the Public and the Private*. Oxford, NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Leblanc, Robin M. 1999. *Bicycle Citizens: the Political World of the Japanese Housewife*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Ledouff, Michelle. 2002. "Feminism is Back in France-Or is it?". *Hypatia* 15, no. 4: 243-250.

- Liphart, Arend. 1980. *Democracies in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective*. New Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press.
- Lunny, Debbie. 1995. "Women's Movement in Japan: Looking Inward, Looking Outward." *Voices from Japan: Women's Asia*. 21(1):60-62.
- McAdam, Doug. 1996. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions" in McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald eds, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 23-40. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- MacKinnon, Catherine A. 1989. *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Mackie, Vera. 1997. *Creating Socialist Women in Japan: Gender, Labour and Activism 1900-1937*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Mackie, Vera. 2003. *Feminism in Modern Japan*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Makino, Catherine. 2005. "In Japan, Women's Constitutional Rights in Peril." *Women's ENEws*. May 1, 2005. www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2277/context/cover (accessed October 26th, 2005).
- Martin, Sherry. 2004. "Alienated, Independent and Female: Lessons from the Japanese Electorate." *Social Science Japan Journal*. 7:1-19.
- Maruyama, Masatsugu. 2003. "Deconstructive Ecofeminism: A Japanese Critical Interpretation" in Eaton, Heather and Lois Ann Lorentzen ed. *EcoFeminism and globalization: exploring culture, context, and religion*, 177-200. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Mason, Robert J. 1999. "Whither Japan's Environmental Movement? An Assessment of Problems and Prospects at the National Level". *Pacific Affairs*. 72 no. 2 :187-207.
- Matsukawa, Yukiko and Kaoru Tachi. 1993. "Women's Suffrage and Gender Politics in Japan." In Caroline Daley and Melanie Nolan ed. *Suffrage and Beyond: International Feminist Perspectives*, 171-183. New York: NYU Press.
- McGill, Douglas C. 1992. "Japan's Choice: Scour Technology's Stain With Technology." *The New York Times Magazine*, February 4.
- McNicol, Tony. 2006. "Gender Issues Spark Censorship Debate." *Japan Media Review*, March 16th. www.japanmediareview.com/japan/stories/060316mcnicol/ (accessed November 20th 2006).

- Merchant, Carolyn. 1990. Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory. In Diamond, I & Orenstein, G. *Reweaving The World-The Emergence Of Ecofeminism*, 100-105. Sierra Club Books: San Francisco.
- Meyer, David S. and Nancy Whittier. 1994. "Social Movement Spillover" in *Social Problems*. 41 no. 2: 227-298.
- Mies, M. and Vandana Shiva. 1993. Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books.
- Miller, Alan S. Reviewer. 1989. "Three Reports on Japan and the Global Environment" *Environment* 31 no.6:25-29.
- Miller, Annetta. 1990. "Japan's Window of Opportunity" *Newsweek* (May 1):12-16.
- Monbusho fujin kyoika ka, 文部書婦人居いく科 (Ministry of Education, Women's Education Section). 1978. *Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku ni kansuru no genjo* (Current status of policies regarding women's education and family education). Tokyo: Monbusho.
- Monbusho fujin kyoiku ka 文部書婦人居いく科 (Ministry of Education, Women's Education Section). 1987. *Fujin kyoiku oyobi katei kyoiku ni kansuru no genjo* (Current status of policies regarding women's education and family education). Tokyo: Monbusho.
- Moody, Peter R. Jr. 1988. *Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society*. New York : Praeger.
- Moser, Caroline O.N. 1991. "Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs" in Grant, Rebecca and Kathleen Newland eds. *Gender and International Relations*, 95-101. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 1993. *The Return of the Political*. London: Verso.
- Murota, Yasuhiro. 1985. "Culture and Environment in Japan." *Environmental Management* 9 no. 2.
- National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2005. "Social Security in Japan 2002-2003." Tokyo, Japan: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
- Nakamura, Akemi and Eriko Arita. 2006. "Gender-free hard to define, harder to see." *The Japan Times*. February 1st.

- Nakane, Chie. 1970. *Japanese Society*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Nakai, Yasutaka. 2001. Japan's Clean Development Mechanism and the fight Against Global Warming. *NIRA Review* (Winter):12-15.
- Nall, Elizabeth Williams. 1976. "Social Movement to Social Organization: A Case Study Of A Women's Center." Michigan State University.
- Neuhouser, Kevin. 1995. "Worse than Men: Gendered Mobilization in an Urban Brazilian Squatter Settlement, 1971-91." *Gender and Society* 9 no. 1:38-59.
- Noguchi, Mary Goebel. 1992. "The Rise of the Activist Housewife". *Japan Quarterly* 39 no. 3 (July):339-52.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. 1987. "Taking the State Seriously." in Weiner, Myron and Samuel Huntington eds. *Understanding Political Development*, 353-390. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1994. "Political Participation" in Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski eds. *Different Roles, Different Voices: Women and Politics in the United States and Europe*, 25-26. New York: Harper Collins.
- Nuita, Yoko et. al. 1994. "The UN CEDAW and the Status of Women in Japan" in Nelson, Barbara and Najma Chowdhury ed. *Women and Politics Worldwide*. New Haven, CT:Yale Univ. Press.
- NWEC (National Women's Education Center). 2003. "Survey Report: Domestic Violence Findings from the 2002 Domestic Violence Survey." *NWEC Newsletter* 20 no.1.
- NWEC National Women's Education Center). 2004. "Survey Report: Research Report on Policies to Expand and Enrich Lifelong Learning for Women's Empowerment" *NWEC Newsletter* 20 no. 2.
- Oda, Yukiko. 2001. "Toward Gender Mainstreaming: A Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and Beijing Platform for Action in Japan." *Journal of Asian Women's Studies*. 10: 110-124.
- Osawa, Mari. 2000."Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the mid-1990s" *Social Science Japan Journal* 3(1).
- Packard, George R. 1966. *Protest in Tokyo: the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Pateman, Carol. 1989. *The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.

- Patrick, Hugh. 1976. *Japanese Industrialization and its Social Consequences*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Payne, Charles. 1990. "Men Led, But Women Organized: Movement Participation of women in the Mississippi Delta" in West, Guida and Rhoda Lois Blumberg eds. *Women and Social Protest*, 156-165. New York : Oxford Univ. Press.
- Pempel, T.J. 1977. *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Pennington, Eileen. 2000. "When Escape is a Trap: The Gendered Construction of Identity in Japan." *SAIS Review*. 20 (2):197-205.
- Peng, Ito. 2002. "Gender and Welfare State Restructuring in Japan" in Aspalter, Christian ed. *Discovering the Welfare State in East Asia*, 39-62. New York: Praeger.
- Peters, Guy. 1998. *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods*. Washington Square, NY: N.Y. University Press.
- Pharr, Susan J. 1981. *Political Women in Japan*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Pharr, Susan J. 1990. *Losing Face: Status Politics in Japan*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Phillips, Anne. 1998. *Feminism and Politics*. Oxford, NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Pietila, Hilikka and Jeanne Vickers. 1996. *Making Women Matter: The Role of the United Nations*. London: Zed Books.
- Pye, Lucien. 1985. *Asian Power and Politics. The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*. London, UK: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Rajan, Rajeswari Sunder. 2003. *The Scandal of the State: Women, Law, and Citizenship in Postcolonial India*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Rankin, Pauline L. and Jill Vickers. 2001. "Women's Movements and State Feminism: Integrating Diversity into Public Policy". Ontario: Status of Women Canada.
- Richardson, Bradley M. 1977. "Policymaking in Japan: An Organizing Perspective" in Pempel, T.J. ed. *Contemporary Policymaking in Japan*, 239-268. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Robnett B. 1997. *How Long? How Long? African American Women and the Struggle for Civil Rights*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press

- Scalapino, Robert A. and Junnosuke Masumi. 1962. *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schreurs, Miranda A. 2001. "Women in Politics: Protecting the Environment in East Asia." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 1(August): 63-92.
- Schreurs, Miranda. A. 2002. *Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Shanley, Mary Lyndon and Uma Narayan eds. 1997. *Restructuring Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press.
- Shinoda, Minoru ed. Translated by Wake Fujioka. 1968. *Women's Movements in Postwar Japan*. Honolulu: East-West Center.
- Shinozaki, Masami. 2001. "Present Status of Japanese Women Farmers: Distress and Conjugal Partnership." *Journal of Asian Women's Studies*. 10:101-108.
- Shiva, Vandana. 1989. *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development*. NJ: Zed Books.
- Sievers, Sharon. 1983. *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Japan*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Steel, Gill. 2004. "Gender and Political Behavior in Japan." *Social Science Japan Journal* 7(2):223-244.
- Stephen, Lynn. 1992. "Women in Mexico's Popular Movements: Survival Strategies against Ecological and Economic Impoverishment." *Latin American Perspectives*. 19 (1): 73-96.
- Stetson, Dorothy and Amy Mazur eds. 1995. *Comparative State Feminism*. London: Sage.
- Stewart, Charles J., Craig Allen Smith and Robert E. Denton, Jr. 1994. *Persuasion and Social Movements*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
- Stronell, Caitlin. 2004. "Women's rights vs. 'Family values': Constitutional Crisis in Japan" *New Internationalist Japan* 61(November): 9-12.
- Sugisaki, Kazuko. 1986. "From the Moon to the Sun: Women's Liberation in Japan" in Iglitzin, Lynne B. and Ruth Ross eds. *Women in the world: 1975-1985, the Women's Decade, Second edition*, 109-124. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
- Takao, Yasuo. 1999. *National Integration and Local Power in Japan*. London, UK: Highgate Publishing.

- Tanaka, Yukiko. 1995. *Contemporary Portraits of Japanese Women*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Taylor, Verta. 1999. "Gender and Social Movements: Gender Processes in Women's Self Help Movements." *Gender and Society Special Issue: Gender and Social Movements, Part 2*. 13 no.1:8-33.
- Thayer, Nathaniel B. 1969. *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*. (Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University.) Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tokuza, Akiko. 1988. *Oku Mumeo and the Movements to Alter the Status of Women in Japan from the Taisho Period to the Present*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms Incorporated.
- TWP (Tokyo Women's Plaza) 2004. "Outline of the TMG (Tokyo Municipal Government) Plan of Action." Unpublished materials collected by the author.
- Ui, Jun. 1985. "A Citizen's Forum: 15 Years Against Pollution". *Japan Quarterly* 32 :271-276.
- United Nations. 2004. *UN Action for Women*. www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/women/dpi1796e.htm.
- United Nations, Division for the Advancement of Women, Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean. 1998. "National Machineries for Gender Equality". Santiago, Chile. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/natlmach.htm
- Ueno, Chizuko, 2004. *Nationalism and Gender*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Uno, Kathleen. 1998. "Death of 'Good wife, Wise Mother?'" in Beauchamp, Edward R. ed. *Women and women's issues in post World War II Japan*, 227-258. New York: Garland.
- Uno, Sumie. 2000. "What are Women's Centers in Japan?". www.Mydome.or.jp/dawn/edawn/9701/center.htm (accessed June 22nd, 2001).
- Vavich, Dee Ann. 1998. "The Japanese women's Movement: Ichikawa Fusae, a Pioneer in Woman's suffrage" in Beauchamp, Edward R. ed. *Women and women's issues in post World War II Japan*, 30-65. New York: Garland.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nye and Jae-On Kim. 1971. *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross National Comparison*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Vogel, David. 1992. "Consumer Protection and Protectionism in Japan." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18(1):119-154.

- Ware, Alan. 1996. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Warren, Karen. 1996. "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism." In Warren, Karen ed. *Ecological Feminist Philosophies*, 19-42. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Watson, Sophie. 1992. "Femocratic Feminisms" in Mike Savage and Ann Witz eds. *Gender and Bureaucracy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, Frank. 2002. *Concepts and Issues in Comparative Politics*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Wohr, Ulrike, Barbara Hamill Sato and Sadami Suzuki eds. 1998. *Gender and Modernity: Rereading Japanese Women's Magazines*. Kyoto-shi: International Research Center for Japanese Studies.
- YWF (Yokohama Women's Forum). 2005. "What Changes are Expected in the Terms of Support Under the Revised Prevention Law?" *YWACN Newsletter* 22 (Spring).
- YWF (Yokohama Women's Forum) 2005. "Supporting Survivors of Domestic Violence in Achieving Self Reliance: Yokohama Easy Moving and Dwelling Private Programme" *YWACN Newsletter* 22 (Spring).
- YWACN (Yokohama Women's Association for Communication and Networking) 2001. "Summary of Section for Counseling and Support Service of YWACN" Unpublished materials collected by the author.