

DISSERTATION

SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY:
THE IMPACT OF AGE AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES

Submitted by

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements

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
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
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
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


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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY: THE IMPACT OF AGE, SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a considerable impact on the ways in which the United States government manages national security. One of the most prominent changes since these attacks is the increase in the government's ability to investigate security threats, which some argue has come at the expense of civil liberties. The Security-Civil Liberties (SCL) scale was developed as a means of measuring the degree to which individuals are willing to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. The SCL is a unifactorial scale with strong internal consistency. The SCL correlates positively with measures of right-wing authoritarianism, conservatism, and patriotism (Byrne, 2003).

The present study investigated the psychometric properties of the SCL and explored the impact of age, sociopolitical variables, and threat perception on individuals' willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. Participants (252 students at a large university in the western United States and 196 of their parents) completed a demographic questionnaire, the SCL, and measures of right-wing authoritarianism, blind patriotism, constructive patriotism, nationalism, liberalism/conservatism, trust in the government, and perception of threat. Results supported the single factor structure and strong internal consistency of the SCL. A hierarchical regression analysis indicated that

age, right-wing authoritarianism, blind patriotism, and trust in government were meaningful predictors of SCL scores, as these measures were significantly and positively associated with willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. Older individuals who were right-wing authoritarian, blindly patriotic, and had a high level of trust in the government were more likely to support the United States' new security policies.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

“History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure”
- Justice Thurgood Marshall, *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn.* (1989)

The terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. have changed the way both the U.S. government and American citizens view national security. The nation's previous sense of invulnerability was shattered on the morning of September 11, 2001, and Americans found themselves struggling with unfamiliar feelings of uncertainty and fear. In the years following the attacks, few would argue that there have not been significant shifts in the policies, attitudes, and values of the United States' government. Among the most dramatic of these changes has been the advent of the “War on Terror,” the Bush administration's response to these attacks. In addition to efforts to proactively defend against potential enemies abroad, the U.S. government established stringent measures to increase domestic security. These measures significantly impact the American public on both a practical and an ideological level. New security regulations have made travel more complicated, public buildings less accessible, and entrance into the country more difficult. In addition, new legislation regarding surveillance activities, background checks, and criminal investigations has resulted in the U.S. government having more access to information about individual citizens than ever before. As Americans adjust to these changes, they must grapple with ideological questions as well. Many of these new policies come at the expense of individual freedoms. To what degree is it acceptable to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for greater security? How important are individual rights when the safety of the country is threatened?

Such questions are of great importance, as they echo some of the values that form the core of the U.S. Constitution, and, one might argue, the foundation of the United States itself. One of the purposes of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights has been to protect citizens from excessive control by their government. Americans have long enjoyed and perhaps taken for granted these liberties, which have included rights to privacy and the right of due process. However, as the government argues that stricter surveillance and control is necessary for the very survival of the country, Americans must reassess the value of these once fundamental freedoms. The outcome of this assessment has significant implications for many aspects of American society. Restrictions of civil liberties could lead to discrimination against certain populations, particularly Muslims and people of Middle-Eastern descent. As freedom restrictions grow more prevalent, Americans' attitudes toward civil rights may become more conservative, and tolerance for minority groups could decrease. National defense has the potential to become an issue of patriotism, as individuals supporting strong security measures identify themselves as "true" patriots. The concept of what it means to be an American, and the notion of what America itself stands for, could shift considerably.

New Security Measures

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, one of the immediate concerns of both the American public and the U.S. government was the prevention of future attacks. A telephone poll of 1,082 adult Americans on September 13, 2001, revealed that 78% of respondents believed another terrorist attack was likely (cnn.com, 2001). Averting such an attack became a prime concern of lawmakers. In the weeks and months following September 11, additional security measures were established. In his address to Congress

and the nation on September 20, President George W. Bush pledged his personal commitment to national security, promising, “I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.” (Bush, 2001). Bush also announced the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which would consolidate intelligence and defense responsibilities into a single office. The Department would be responsible for both protecting the nation from further terrorist attacks and coordinating recovery efforts should future attacks occur.

Commercial airlines made significant changes in security policies as well. Armed guards established a constant and highly visible presence around and inside airports. Passengers now needed tickets and photo identification in order to enter concourses, and many had to submit to random body searches. New baggage restrictions were established, banning such items as nail cutters, small knives, and tweezers. Curbside baggage checks were temporarily eliminated as passengers were required to have all pieces of luggage screened before proceeding to their terminals. Every automobile entering an airport parking lot was searched as well. Vehicles idling near airport entrances were instructed to move or were immediately towed. Where airport security personnel had previously been hired through contracts with private companies, the U.S. government moved to make such workers federal employees. As such, applicants would be subject to thorough background checks and standardized training. Air marshals, trained to look for suspicious activity and prevent potential hijackings, were placed on many flights.

Security measures were also quickly established through legislation. On September 13, 2001, Congress unanimously passed the Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 (CTA). The first of many anti-terrorism bills, the CTA was later superseded by

new legislation. On September 14, the Senate passed a resolution authorizing the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force” in eliminating the threat of terrorism. On the same day, Congress also approved a \$40 billion emergency fund to be used for increasing national security, aiding law enforcement officials, and helping rescue efforts in New York City and Washington, D.C.

The USA PATRIOT Act

In October, 2001, the Senate and House of Representatives passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA PATRIOT Act. The primary purpose of the Act is to facilitate government’s ability to apprehend and prosecute terrorists in the United States. At 342 pages, the bill is one of the most comprehensive and far-reaching pieces of anti-terror legislation, affecting national security policies in many arenas.

The Act increases the government’s power to investigate terrorist activity in a number of ways. It makes it possible for federal agents to execute a search warrant of an individual’s home or office without notifying him or her until after the search is completed (USA PATRIOT Act, §213). Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) can also request permission to seize books, papers, records, documents, and other “tangible things” if the items are needed for an investigation “to protect against international terrorism and clandestine intelligence activities” (§215). Earlier laws required that those to whom the information pertained must be suspected agents of a foreign power. Under the PATRIOT Act, neither the owner of such records nor the individuals mentioned in the records need to be suspected of any criminal activity. Previous law also required that the subjects of investigation be foreign nationals; the new

legislation extends this application to United States citizens and permanent residents as well. U.S. citizens may not, however, be investigated solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment (§215).

The Act also includes provisions for electronic and telephone surveillance. If information gathered is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation,” government prosecutors can install tracking devices on telephone and Internet dialing and communication, although the ability of prosecutors to collect information on the content of such communications is restricted (§216). Where such surveillance devices used to be legal only for telephone communications, the USA PATRIOT Act extends their use to electronic communications as well. According to legal analyses of the Act, wiretap warrants no longer have to specify the machine or phone that will be monitored, nor are they limited to the jurisdiction of the court that approved the warrant. Thus, agents can apply the warrant to all devices that the individual may have used, anywhere in the nation (Doyle, 2002).

The Act also amends earlier legislation relating to probable cause, making it easier for law enforcement officials to collect information. Previously, investigators could install wiretaps or conduct physical searches without probable cause only if the collection of foreign intelligence or terrorism information was the purpose of the investigation. Under the USA PATRIOT Act, investigators can be exempt from demonstrating probable cause if the collection of such information is merely a “significant purpose” rather than “the” purpose of the investigation (§218).

The grounds for detaining and deporting immigrants have been broadened as well. The Attorney General may detain any immigrant whom he or she “has reasonable

grounds to believe” may be involved in terrorist activity (§412). Immigrants may be detained for up to seven days without being charged with a criminal offense; subsequent criminal charges do not necessarily have to be related to terrorism. Immigrants who cannot be deported may be detained indefinitely (§412).

Additional provisions of the Act further enhance the government’s ability to locate and prosecute suspected terrorists. The statute of limitations for prosecuting terrorists has been removed, and information-sharing abilities have increased among law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. New crimes and penalties have been enacted for money laundering, harboring or concealing terrorists, and providing material support for terrorists. The Act also requires libraries and bookstores to release information on their patrons (including the titles of books that have been borrowed or purchased) at the request of law enforcement officials investigating terrorism; librarians and booksellers who are approached for such information are prohibited from telling anyone about the search.

Other Legislation and Policy Shifts

Following the USA PATRIOT Act, several branches of government announced their own policy changes. In May, 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft published revisions to the FBI Guidelines. Aiming to free the organization from much of its bureaucratic roadblocks, the revised Guidelines give FBI agents greater freedom in conducting undercover terrorism investigations. Undercover agents are now authorized to attend any public event for the purpose of investigating terrorism, including political rallies, meetings, and religious services. Agents can search the Internet for information related to their investigations and can use commercial marketing databases as sources of

information as well. In addition, the Guidelines make it possible for investigations to be initiated without prior approval from FBI headquarters (Attorney General's Guidelines, 2002). In a speech announcing the revisions, Ashcroft stated that he had also given the FBI the right to waive the Guidelines altogether in “extraordinary” circumstances to investigate and prevent terror (Ashcroft, 2002).

In addition to the FBI, other law enforcement agencies have also taken advantage of material witness statutes in their terrorism investigations. Under federal law, an individual may be detained for any amount of time, without being charged with a crime, if the individual is deemed to have information or testimony that is “material” to a criminal investigation. The detainee must also pose a risk of flight if released. Ashcroft adopted a program of “preventative detention,” using such statutes to detain individuals whom investigators deemed at risk of being involved in terrorism, whether or not they could be charged with any crime. Within one year of September 11, reports surfaced that over 1,200 people, primarily of Muslim or Middle-Eastern descent, were arrested in the U.S. One detainee was charged with a crime related to terrorism, and only a few were found to have any connections to terrorism (Simpson, 2002). Some of the detainees were held for weeks or months. In August, 2002, 74 men remained in custody (Associated Press, 2002 September). The Justice Department would not disclose the names of detainees or the number of detainees who are being held as material witnesses.

President Bush initiated additional defense legislation with the announcement of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in July, 2002. The Strategy called for sweeping changes in the budgets and policies of a number of federal offices, including the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Services, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S.

Coast Guard. The Strategy sought to increase information-sharing among government agencies, restructure the FBI, develop databases to identify high-risk immigrants, coordinate minimum standards for driver's licenses, and require visa applicants to present biometric identification (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002).

Reactions to New Security Measures

Early reactions to these new security measures were mixed. Some government leaders praised Congress and the Bush administration for its quick and decisive action, defending strict security policies as necessary in a time of war. Senator Trent Lott, for example, supported increased security while downplaying the importance of civil liberties, saying, "When you're at war, civil liberties are treated differently" (Bolick, 2001). U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, who cast the only dissenting vote against the PATRIOT Act, spoke out against it, claiming that the Justice Department was infringing on constitutional freedoms in its pursuit of terrorists (Straub, 2002). Attorney General John Ashcroft, however, had harsh words for those who questioned whether new security measures violated civil liberties. Ashcroft argued that dissenters were helping the terrorist cause by undermining the cohesiveness of Americans, saying, "To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics aid terrorists for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve" (cnn.com, 2001).

Civil liberties and social justice groups also questioned whether certain security measures extended government control too far. The FBI's use of material witness statutes and Ashcroft's FBI Guideline revisions met with fast, strong opposition from civil rights groups. The Center for Democracy and Technology expressed its concern that the FBI's new investigative flexibility violates Fourth Amendment privacy rights

(Berman & Dempsey, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) claimed that law enforcement officials were taking too much liberty in their pursuit of terrorists without sufficient checks and balances (aclu.org, 2002). Social policy researchers have expressed similar worries. An analysis of Justice Department data conducted by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University revealed that, in the two years following September 11, more than 6,400 people were recommended for prosecution by federal investigators because they were suspected of committing a terrorist act or could potentially be involved in terrorist activity. Of those who had been prosecuted at the time of the report, the median prison sentence was 14 days. These findings led the TRAC research team to question whether the FBI was using a “general round-up” policy in its anti-terrorism investigations, detaining large numbers of individuals who “might” be involved in terrorism regardless of whether there was strong evidence to support their case (TRAC, 2003). The researchers at TRAC reported that they were unable to continue their analyses on prosecution of suspected terrorists after 2003, because the Bush administration refused to provide any more data. Civil rights lawyers have argued that such refusals represent a disturbing trend of secrecy in the highest levels of the U.S. government when issues of terrorism are involved.

The USA-PATRIOT Act has garnered even more criticism. Within months of its passage through Congress, several cities, including Berkeley, California, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Denver, Colorado, passed resolutions declaring the Act a threat to civil liberties (Schabner, 2002). The ACLU immediately published an official statement expressing its concern that the provisions in the Act could be abused (aclu.org, 2001). The American Library Association and the Center for Constitutional Rights issued

similar statements (American Library Association, 2001; Chang, 2001). In the years following September 11, current and former government leaders have been more openly critical of the PATRIOT Act. Former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, has argued that provisions in the Act represent “a dramatic erosion of our constitution” (Associated Press, 2005). Former Vice President Al Gore was even more direct with his criticism, stating that “I believe that the Patriot Act has been, on balance, a terrible mistake” (Brownstein, 2003). Civil rights lawyers have also been vocal in their opposition to the Act. David Cole, an attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights, has claimed that the PATRIOT Act allows for significant violations of civil rights and “throws the Fourth Amendment out the window” (PBS.org, 2003).

International opinion on the United States’ new security measures is also mixed. Although British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been largely supportive of the Bush Administration’s new policies, several other European leaders have questioned whether these policies go too far. At an international terrorism conference in March, 2005, for example, former Irish president Mary Robinson cautioned that the USA PATRIOT Act could represent the first step in a series of increasingly severe civil liberties violations (Agence France Presse, 2005a). At the same conference, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan offered what could be viewed as veiled criticism of the PATRIOT Act, saying, “I regret to say that international human rights experts...are unanimous in finding that many measures which states are currently adopting to counter terrorism infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Agence France-Press, 2005b).

Some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are scheduled to expire at the end of 2005, prompting legislators to extend their debate of the Act’s merits. Senator Feingold

continued to voice his opposition, introducing three bills designed to limit the powers of the Patriot Act and urging fellow members of Congress not to renew the original Act (IPS, 2005). President Bush, however, was equally vocal in his support for renewal of all provisions of the Patriot Act, calling it a “vital” tool in the war against terror (Reuters, 2005). Current U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales also campaigned for the Act’s renewal. Gonzales denied that the Act infringes on civil liberties, arguing that its ultimate purpose is to protect the freedom of Americans and suggesting that the Act’s provisions may even need to be expanded (Chicago Tribune, 2005). The Patriot Act was renewed on March 2, 2006, by the U.S. Senate, with a vote of 89-10. The House of Representatives voted to renew the Act on March 7, 2006, with a vote of 280-138. The reauthorization makes the majority of the Patriot Act’s provisions permanent, with the exception of two provisions involving investigators’ ability to access certain business documents and the FBI’s ability to install “roving” wiretaps to phones and other electronic communication devices. In addition, the majority of libraries are no longer required to submit information regarding their patrons’ usage of materials without proper warrants.

The American public has had equally mixed reactions to the government’s new national security policies. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the majority of Americans appeared to anticipate the cost of increasing security. A CNN/Time Warner poll of 1,004 adult Americans on August 28 and 29, 2002, revealed that 40% believed that the government should have greater power to investigate its citizens (cnn.com, 2002). In addition, 55-79% of American adults polled in September and October, 2001, said that they expected to give up some civil liberties in exchange for security, according

to Princeton Survey Research Associates and CBS/New York Times polls, respectively (Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos, 2002). Polls related to the sacrifice of specific civil liberties, however, illustrated that the public had varying opinions depending on the type of civil liberty in question. Respondents tended to agree with less intrusive measures, such as requiring ID checks in public buildings (75% of those polled supported such a measure). Support appeared to dwindle, however, as security measures became more personally invasive. Approximately half of respondents indicated that they would support giving the government greater power to tap phone lines and read individuals' email in order to gather information in terror-related investigations. When questioned specifically about whether they agreed with measures that would allow investigators to read "your personal" email and communications, only 25% responded in the affirmative (Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos, 2002).

Psychology's Role in Investigating War and Terrorism Issues

Clearly, the terrorist attacks of September 11 have prompted significant changes in the United States' national security policies, causing government officials and individual citizens alike to consider the importance of civil liberties in the face of the country's vulnerability. As time passes, these attitudes continue to evolve, progressively altering the political and ideological landscape of the nation. The field of psychology can play an important role in investigating these changes and their implications. In order to understand the current conflict between civil liberties and national security, it is necessary to understand attitudes toward civil liberties, attitudes toward national security, and reactions to war and terrorism. Psychologists have played a significant role in the study of these topics. Psychology has a long history of exploring individuals' political

attitudes and the values and personality factors associated with these attitudes. If we can better understand the variables that influence individuals' willingness to exchange civil liberties for security, we can gain a better sense of how the terrorist attacks have impacted the American public, and we can predict how the public might react to future events that call into question the safety of their nation.

Research in psychology prior to September 11. Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, much of psychology's war and terrorism-related research centered on coping strategies, prejudices, and affective reactions to events during World War II, the Cold War, and the Middle East crisis. There were no published studies that focused on attitudes toward security or national defense. Civil liberties research generally centered on individuals' willingness to extend civil rights to minority groups, and personality correlates of civil liberties attitudes. No research, however, has been published that examines attitudes toward national security and civil liberties within the context of war or terrorism.

Until September 11, 2001, the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 was the only foreign attack on U.S. soil in the 20th century. As the only other recent instance of war within American borders, it is useful to examine psychological studies relating to this era. Research on Pearl Harbor, however, was limited in both its quantity and scope. Two investigations centered on changes in Americans' attitudes toward both war and Japanese people. For example, Seago (1947) found that adjectives used by participants to describe the Japanese shifted considerably from November, 1941 to 1942 (from "courteous," "shrewd," "ambitious," and "tradition-loving," to "deceitful," "cruel," and "treacherous"). In addition, Jones (1942) found that participants were significantly more

supportive of going to war for ideological reasons (such as preventing the spread of Facism) following the attacks on Pearl Harbor than before the attacks. Another study examined the psychological reactions of adults and children to the Pearl Harbor attack and World War II (Thorn, 1943). The detention of Japanese-Americans in internment camps, a major national security measure established by President Roosevelt, received somewhat more attention. However, research in this area has centered almost exclusively on stress reactions and coping strategies used by Japanese-Americans who were interned (e.g., Bloom & Halsema, 1983; Nagata & Takeshita, 1998; Shreuder, Kleijn, & Rooijmans, 2000).

Research on the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war has been significantly more extensive, although it is similar in content to the Pearl Harbor studies. Some studies focused on Americans' attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Communism (e.g., Osgood, 1961; Silverstein & Flamenbaum, 1989). Yatani and Bremel (1989), for example, investigated changes in Americans' perceptions of the USSR, and reported that attitudes throughout the Cold War were somewhat inconsistent, with favorability ratings ranging from 50% to 90% between 1954 and 1987. With the rise of weapons of mass destruction, a major area of Cold War-era research has been the psychological ramifications of the threat of nuclear war. Dunlap (1955) predicted that psychology's role in the era of technological warfare would be in facilitating the effectiveness of "man-machine" systems. Later research, however, tended to focus on affective and cognitive implications of the nuclear threat and attitudes toward nuclear disarmament (e.g., Allerhand, 1965; Christie & Hanley, 1994; Hamilton, Van Mouwerik, Oetting, & Beauvais, 1988). Newcomb (1989), for instance, reported that anxiety about nuclear war

was significantly correlated with measures of general emotional distress, including depression, interpersonal sensitivity, and obsessive-compulsive behavior. Examining attitudes toward disarmament, Larsen (1985) found that nationalism and “very negative” attitudes toward the Soviet Union best predicted negative attitudes toward nuclear disarmament. These findings appear to indicate that a combination of national pride, aggression toward outgroups, and negative perceptions of the “enemy” may lead individuals to support stringent national defense measures (such as refusing to disarm nuclear arsenals).

Psychological research on terrorism has generally centered on either the impact of terrorism on civilians or the psychology of terrorists themselves. Many researchers have tested therapeutic interventions for victims of terrorist attacks (e.g., Dreman & Cohen, 1990, Simon & Blum, 1987), while others have investigated coping strategies used by individuals in high-risk areas. For example, in a study of Israeli bus commuters, Gidron, Gal, and Zahavi (1999) found that coping mechanisms that focused on preventing future terrorism incidents (e.g., “I make sure there are no suspicious objects beneath the seats on the bus”) were associated with high levels of terrorism anxiety. Incidents of terrorism-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and anxiety disorders have also been the focus of research (e.g., Desivilya, Gal, & Ayalon, 1996; Slone, 2000). In a study of Oklahoma City residents who sought counseling six months after the Oklahoma City bombings, Tucker, Pfefferbaum, Nixon, & Dickson (2000) found that factors correlated with PTSD symptoms included having been injured in the attacks, frequently visiting the attack sites, and experiencing nervousness or fear following the attacks. Bar-Tal has published numerous studies on social aspects of terrorism, examining the effects of

terrorist attacks on political attitudes and stereotypes (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1998, 2001). In one study, the attitudes of Israeli adolescents toward Palestinians, Jordanians, and “Arabs in general” were measured both during a period of relative peace and one day following two terror attacks committed by Palestinians against Israel. Bar-Tal and Labin (2001) reported that attitudes toward all three groups were significantly more negative following the terrorist attacks, despite the fact that Israel has peaceful relations with Jordan. These results seem to indicate that, following a terrorist attack, individuals may generalize negative reactions to all members of a perceived “out-group,” regardless of which specific subgroup was responsible for the attack.

Other researchers have focused on the personality characteristics and social conditions of terrorists (e.g., Victoroff, 2005; Wilson, 2000). One such study examined changes in affinity for martyrdom of former members of Hizbullah (a Lebanese terrorist organization) who had moved to the United States (Schbley, 2000). The findings suggest that as the Hizbullah members accrued more wealth and achieved a greater quality of life in the U.S., their religious conviction and willingness to martyr themselves decreased significantly.

Reviews of civil liberties research in psychology, sociology, and political science reveal that the volume and breadth of studies in this area is also limited. Much of the research focuses on individuals’ willingness to extend civil liberties to specific “out-groups,” such as homosexuals, atheists, and Communists (Guth & Green, 1991; Wilson, 1994). Bobo and Licari (2001), for example, found that “cognitive sophistication” was a significant predictor of individuals’ tolerance for out-groups representing both left- and right-wing beliefs, even when the individual disapproved of the group’s beliefs. The

authors conclude that education increases the complexity of individuals' reasoning ability and, thus, produces greater tolerance for ideas different from one's own. Additional researchers have explored the development of civil liberties attitudes, conducting interviews with children in different age groups (e.g., Helwig, 1995), while other studies have focused on personality and demographic characteristics that predict civil rights attitudes (e.g., Carlson, 1983; Zalkind, Gaugler, & Schwartz, 1975). One such investigation focused on the political and social beliefs of White college students in South Africa (as government control was shifting to the hands of Black South Africans). Duckitt and Farre (1994) found that Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) attitudes strongly predicted anti-Black prejudice. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the authors found that individuals with the strongest RWA attitudes were also in favor of civil rights infringements *against* their own group. Duckitt and Farre concluded that RWA attitudes might represent a generalized intolerance for dissent that supersedes loyalty to one's own group.

Civil liberties scales are equally limited in their number and scope. Many civil liberties measures were developed specifically for the purposes of a particular study (e.g., Carlson, 1983; Chickering, 1970; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Guth & Green, 1991). Most contain between three and seven items, and reliability and validity information for these scales is not available. Civil liberties questions have also been embedded in general public opinion questionnaires, such as the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey and the Purdue Opinion Panel polls. Generally, only three or four civil liberties items are present in each survey, and psychometric data on these items are also unavailable.

Other scales provide more extensive information on civil liberties attitudes.

Stouffer (1955) developed a measure of civil liberties attitudes that assessed respondents' willingness to extend civil liberties to homosexuals, atheists, Communists, and Socialists in specific situations (such as allowing them to teach in a public school). The Human Rights Questionnaire (HRQ) provides a more general measure of civil liberties attitudes (Diaz-Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs, 1995). Consisting of 38 statements related to human rights (e.g., "Everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living"), the HRQ allows respondents to rate their agreement with each statement on a Likert-type scale. Nineteen of the HRQ's statements relate specifically to civil liberties (e.g. "It is never right for the government to read or censor a person's mail"). The Omnibus Civil Liberties Scale (McClosky & Brill, 1983, in Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999) focuses directly on civil liberties attitudes. Consisting of 69 items, the scale measures attitudes toward extending and restricting civil liberties, either in general or toward specific groups. Respondents select one response (yes or no) to each scale questions (e.g., "Should a civic auditorium be used by foreign radicals who want to express their hatred of America?").

Virtually no scales exist to measure attitudes toward national security and defense, however. The HRQ contains a "civilian constraint" subscale with one item related to security issues (i.e., "Every country should have the right to strip a person of his or her nationality if the person threatens the security of the government of that country"). After the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, several public opinion polls included questions regarding anti-terrorism security measures. Although respondents tended to support increased defense against

terrorism, most did not see a need to sacrifice civil liberties in order to do so (Shaw, Shapiro, Lock, & Jacobs, 1998).

Thus, no scale exists to measure the relationship between civil liberties and national security in the context of war and terrorism. Civil liberties scales such as the HRQ and the Omnibus Civil Liberties Scale measure general attitudes toward civil rights, but do not address security or national defense. Public opinion polls in the wake of previous terrorist attacks have addressed both civil liberties and security; however, such polls include only one or two items related to this issue, and therefore do not possess the breadth necessary to accurately study the relationship.

War and terrorism research has traditionally focused on cognitive and affective reactions to war-related events. Research on civil liberties attitudes is limited to such topics as approval of civil rights for minority groups and personality correlates of civil liberties beliefs. Civil liberties scales tend to measure general civil liberties attitudes, without addressing the relationship between civil liberties and national security. The post-September 11 climate of the United States, however, calls for an understanding of the intersection between civil liberties attitudes and reactions to war and terrorism.

A study by Charny and Fromer (1990) is one of the few investigations that focuses on violations of civil liberties in the context of terrorism and war. Ninety-two Jewish Israeli students were asked whether they would cooperate with a hypothetical government program to remove Arabs from Israel. A third (33.7%) of students agreed to participate in at least one aspect of the government's "proposal." The study demonstrates that a significant portion of Israeli students were willing to participate in a government program that violated the freedom of Arabs in Israel. An implicit assumption of this

hypothetical program is that the security of Israelis would increase as a result of Arab expulsion. These results may be relevant to the current situation in the United States, where concerns about national security are high. However, Charney and Fromer's findings relate only to Israeli students' willingness to sacrifice the liberties of others, rather than their *own* liberties, in exchange for security.

A 1974 study conducted by Sorrentino and Vidmar took advantage of a political crisis in Canada to investigate Canadians' attitudes toward civil liberties violations. In October, 1970, the Quebec Labor Minister and a British Trade Commissioner were kidnapped by French Canadian militants. In response, the Canadian government enacted the War Measures Act, essentially putting the country under martial law. English Canadians were surveyed regarding their support for five specific security measures (i.e., government wiretapping, use of the death penalty for kidnapping, arresting suspects without a warrant, detaining suspects without charging them with a crime, and the use of military as guards) during the crisis and several months after the crisis had resolved. Sorrentino and Vidmar (1974) reported that individuals were supportive of the government's actions during the crisis, but support for civil liberties restrictions decreased significantly following the resolution of the crisis. The authors speculated that, although a terrorist act may lead to short-term attitude change with regard to civil liberties, these changes do not persist over time. This study has important implications for post-September 11 research in the United States, where individuals are making similar assessments about the trade-off of civil liberties in favor of security. However, the five items used by Sorrentino and Vidmar do not capture the specific security measures enacted by the United States after September 11.

Research in psychology after September 11. Psychology established an immediate presence in the aftermath of September 11. Within six weeks of the attacks, the APA journal *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policies* published an issue devoted to the event. In the years following the attacks, a large volume of research has emerged on the mental health impacts of September 11 (e.g., Batten & Orsillo, 2002; Hoge, Pavlin, & Milliken, 2002; Kinzie, Boehnlein, Riley, & Sparr, 2002; Rosenheck, 2002; Schuster, Jaycox, Collins, et. al., 2001). Incidents of posttraumatic stress symptoms and PTSD related to the attacks received a great deal of attention, with research indicating that factors such as television exposure to the events, proximity to the attacks, viewing the victims as similar to oneself, and having a history of depression or anxiety were associated with either post-traumatic stress symptoms or PTSD (e.g., Ahern et. al., 2002; Blanchard et. al., 2005; Silver et. al., 2002; Wayment, 2004). Other studies examined use of mental health resources following the terrorist attacks. For example, in a study conducted two months after the attacks, Stein and colleagues (2004) found that although many individuals reported persistent distress, few sought professional help for their symptoms. Similarly, Boscarino, Adams, and Figley (2004) reported that the use of mental health services among New York City residents in the year following September 11 increased only among individuals who were already using services prior to the attacks. Further research has explored whether positive psychological changes have taken place as a result of the September 11 attacks. Peterson and Seligman (2003), for example, report on survey results that indicate increases in “character strengths” such as hope, gratitude, teamwork, love, and kindness in the two months after September 11 relative to pre-September 11 levels.

Other research has examined cognitive and affective reactions to the terrorist attacks. Memory researchers, for example, have used the event as a test of flashbulb memories (e.g., Lee & Brown, 2003; Kvavilashvili, 2003, Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Consistent with other research on the phenomenon, these studies found that memories of September 11 were perceived as more accurate than other “everyday” memories, but were in fact subject to considerable error. Interestingly, even President Bush’s accounts of what happened when he first heard about the terror attacks have been riddled with inconsistencies (Greenburg, 2004). Additional research explored the impact of September 11 on behavioral and emotional variables. Argyrides and Downy (2004), reported that aggression scores among college students increased in the days immediately following September 11, and remained elevated one year after the attacks. Their research also indicated that the participants perceived dissimilar others (e.g., people with different religious or ethnic backgrounds from oneself) as significantly more dissimilar after attacks than the day before the attacks. In examining the impact of perceived fear, Powell and Self (2004) found that feelings of personal fear (i.e., experiencing more fear or anxiety following the September 11 attacks) and personal control (i.e., feeling that one could take action to reduce one’s risk of being victimized in an attack) were positively correlated with behavioral changes after the attacks (i.e., making significant alterations to one’s daily routine). Anthony, Roselli, and Caparyan (2003) explored factors involved in individuals’ attributions of the terrorist attacks, including levels of individualism and collectivism, desire for retaliation, and levels of patriotism. Their results indicated that patriotism was positively correlated with making internal attributions for the events of

September 11 (e.g., “The people who committed these acts are evil”), as well as with suspiciousness of Middle Easterners and a desire for retaliation.

Some researchers have conducted more comprehensive studies on the impact of September 11 on both patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. Traditionally, psychologists have identified that affective attachment to one’s country can occur within two contexts: one can feel pride and love for one’s nation without implicit derogation of outgroups, or one can possess feelings of superiority over and aggression toward other nations (e.g., Allport, 1927; Adorno et. al., 1950; Dekker, Malovà, & Hoogendoorn, 2003). The former has typically been defined by social scientists as “patriotism,” and the latter as “nationalism” (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, Feshbach, 1990). Much of the research regarding patriotism and nationalism has centered on their establishment as separate and distinct constructs. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), for example, developed a scale of both patriotic and nationalistic attitudes, and found that items related to positive affect for America (e.g., “I love my country,”) and items related to American superiority (e.g., “Other countries should try to make their governments as much like ours as possible”) loaded on separate dimensions. When correlated with other measures, the patriotism and nationalism factors again appeared distinct from one another.

Nationalism, for example, was more strongly correlated with willingness to go to war than was patriotism ($r = .40$ and $.26$, respectively); interestingly, however, patriotism was more strongly correlated with willingness to risk one’s own life for one’s country than was nationalism ($r = .47$ and $.27$, respectively) (Feshbach, 1990). Additional research has further established patriotism and nationalism as separate constructs. Blank and Schmidt (2003) examined national identity in Germany and found that patriotism was correlated

with tolerance for minorities, while nationalism was associated with denigration of outgroups. Other studies have indicated that nationalism is correlated much more strongly with authoritarian and totalitarian attitudes than is patriotism (e.g., Blank, 2003; Schatz, et. al., 1999), while researchers in Japan have provided cross-cultural evidence that nationalism and patriotism are separate constructs (Karasawa, 2002).

Schatz and Staub (Schatz, 1995; Schatz & Staub, 1997; Staub, 1997; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999) expanded the study of patriotism by introducing the concepts of blind and constructive patriotism. Noting that love for one's country can lead to uncritical loyalty toward the nation or, conversely, a need to be constructively critical of the nation's policies, Schatz and colleagues (1999) argued that patriotism actually encompasses two separate constructs. They define blind patriotism as an attitude of unquestioning loyalty, in which the individual supports the country regardless of the merits of its policies. Constructive patriotism, however, is tied to love of the country while critically analyzing its actions and dissenting where appropriate. The authors devised a measure of blind and constructive patriotism, and found that the two are orthogonal constructs, appearing to tap distinct dimensions of patriotism (Schatz et. al., 1999). Both blind and constructive patriotism were correlated with national attachment, but blind patriotism was also correlated with RWA, political conservatism, Republican party identification, and concern about "cultural contamination" (i.e., fear that "foreign" cultures may destroy the "purity" of American culture), while constructive patriotism was uncorrelated with these variables. Constructive patriotism was correlated with political information-gathering and politically active behavior; blind patriotism, in contrast, was associated with selective attention to "pro-America" media messages. This evidence

supports the authors' notion that constructive patriotism represents a more critical form of national attachment. Blind patriotism was also highly correlated with nationalism ($r = .65$), but not perfectly correlated, indicating that nationalism assesses dimensions of national identity not accounted for by blind patriotism. Schatz and colleagues (1999) suggested that this difference lies in the fact that blind patriotism addresses only feelings for one's own country, without the intergroup comparisons that are inherent to nationalistic attitudes. Additional research on blind and constructive patriotism (using a non-student sample from France) has further established their identity as orthogonal constructs (Depuiset & Butera, 2003).

Given the current heated debate in the United States over what it means to be "patriotic," investigation of both nationalism and blind and constructive patriotism in the post-September 11 era might add clarity in these changing times. No published studies, however, have explored levels of blind and constructive patriotism after September 11. Li and Brewer (2004) examined general levels of both patriotism and nationalism after the terrorist attacks and found that levels of patriotism were noticeably high, with participants averaging a score of 6.40 on a 7-point scale. Levels of nationalism appeared more moderate, with a mean score of 4.02 on a 7-point scale. Li and Brewer also investigated the relationship between nationalistic and patriotic attitudes by priming participants with a description of Americans as either united toward a common goal or as possessing a shared "essence" or identity. The authors found that, when primed to think of Americans as sharing a common "essence," participants' patriotism scores were highly correlated with nationalism scores. Additionally, the "common essence" prime was correlated with intolerance for cultural diversity within America. This appears to indicate

that, depending on the context, individuals can tap into different types of patriotic sentiment. Li and Brewer's findings have strong implications for the impact of government and media messages regarding the "meaning" of being an American. Messages related to having pride in the American "essence" may result in increased levels of aggression toward outgroups. Indeed, the September 11 attacks have been perceived by many as an attack on the very "character" of the United States. As President Bush (Bush, 2004), for example, stresses the importance of Americans' shared "will and courage" as the key tool in the fight against terrorism, individual Americans may be primed to develop more nationalistic and culturally intolerant attitudes. Fear may be another variable involved in the development of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes after September 11. The research of Coryn, Beale, and Myers (2004) appears to support this hypothesis, as they reported that perceived threat (as measured by Department of Homeland Security alerts at the time of data collection) increased both patriotic sentiment and prejudice against Arabs. Although the authors did not investigate nationalistic attitudes in their study, the presence of prejudice calls to mind the intolerance and outgroup derogation that is strongly associated with nationalism. Thus, although few studies have investigated the relationship between September 11, patriotism, and nationalism, the existing research suggests that the terrorist attacks and their aftermath (e.g., the threat of additional attacks) may have increased patriotic sentiment and, perhaps, nationalistic attitudes as well.

While a great deal of research is available on the impact of September 11 on a variety of psychological constructs, very few studies have directly addressed the debate between civil liberties and national security. Lerner and colleagues (2003) examined the

impact of fear on threat perception and noted that individuals who experienced an experimentally-induced fear state were more likely to support “cautionary public policy measures” to protect the country against terrorism. Attitudes toward specific security measures, however, were not measured. Kim (2004) investigated attitudes toward a specific security measure, racial profiling, by comparing the beliefs of religious individuals (i.e., self-identified as Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish) with the beliefs of non-religious individuals (i.e., self-identified as “no religion”). Kim found that 44-53% of all respondents supported some form of racial profiling, and religious individuals were more likely to support profiling than non-religious individuals. This research, however, is clearly limited in that it examines the attitudes of a single demographic group toward a single security measure. Henderson-King and colleagues (2004) provide a broader investigation into the relationship between willingness to give up civil liberties and other attitudinal variables. In questionnaires administered from October, 2001 through January, 2002, participants completed measures of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), religious fundamentalism, and just-world beliefs (i.e., the perception that the world is a just place and people “get what they deserve”), and rated their support for five “government surveillance” items (e.g., allowing the FBI to gain access to email messages of all those living in the U.S.). Respondents used a 9-point, Likert-type scale to rate their support for the surveillance measures, with higher scores indicating more support. The authors report that the mean total response was 4.77, with a standard deviation of 1.81, which indicates that respondents demonstrated moderate support for the security measures. The authors also reported that RWA, religious fundamentalism, and just-world beliefs were positively correlated with support for new security measures. This research

provides evidence for the notion that there may be attitudinal or personality variables that predict willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. However, the measure used by Henderson-King and colleagues consisted of only five items, and thus may not have the breadth necessary to capture all dimensions of civil liberties-national security attitudes.

Post-September 11th Research in Political Science

Political science researchers have also been active in their study of the impacts of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Some studies have explored Americans' attitudes toward political leaders in the aftermath of the attacks. Gaines (2002), for example, identified an immediate surge in support for Bush, whose approval ratings jumped from 55% in early September, 2001, (before the attacks) to 90% by September 21st. Gaines indicated that such a prompt increase, occurring before media reports had a chance to sufficiently "spin" the President's performance, suggests that Americans' support for Bush was an "instinctive patriotic response." Other research has examined feelings of personal safety and attitudes toward ethnic groups following September 11th. Traugott and colleagues (2002) consolidated poll data in the six months following the attacks and found that immediate reactions to September 11th tended to linger. They reported that 50% of Americans polled in September, 2001, felt that the attacks significantly impacted their personal sense of safety and security, and 48% felt "as shaken" or "more shaken" by the attacks six months later. Traugott and colleagues also found that Americans exhibited unfavorable attitudes toward Palestinians and Muslims living in the Middle East following September 11th, while attitudes toward "American" ethnic groups became more favorable.

Such research is useful as a means of identifying basic feelings and attitudes of Americans in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Many of these studies, however, rely exclusively on analyses of data from public opinion polls, and do not manipulate variables or explore correlations between variables. Thus, our understanding of the underlying factors that contribute to these feelings and attitudes remains limited. In addition, few studies have addressed attitudes toward civil liberties specifically in the context of national security.

A study conducted by Davis and Silver (2004), however, attempted to directly explore this relationship and to identify some of the variables related to civil liberties and national security attitudes. A random sample of 1,448 adult Americans completed the “Civil Liberties Survey,” which contained items related to willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security (nine items), sense of threat (both personal and societal) of future attacks, trust in the government, and national pride. Results indicated that a sense of both personal and “sociotropic” threat (i.e., threat to American society as a whole) were positively correlated with willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. The individual’s trust in the government moderated this relationship, however; individuals who had a low level of trust in the government were less willing to support giving up civil liberties in exchange for security, regardless of their threat perception. Davis and Silver also found that younger individuals were less likely to give up civil liberties than older individuals, and that African Americans were less likely than European Americans to give up civil liberties. European Americans, in turn, were less willing to sacrifice civil liberties than Latinos. Level of national pride was positively correlated with willingness to give up civil liberties. Respondents who identified as

politically liberal were less supportive of sacrificing civil liberties than those who identified as conservative; interestingly, however, liberal respondents who perceived a high level of threat were significantly more willing to sacrifice civil liberties than conservatives who perceived a low level of threat. Thus, as Davis and Silver conclude, one's sense of both personal and societal vulnerability appears to have a considerable impact on willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. In addition, they demonstrate that an individual's level of trust in the government also influences his or her attitude toward giving up civil liberties.

A Measure of Civil Liberties Attitudes in the Context of War and Terrorism

Although a great deal of research has been conducted across multiple disciplines on the impact of September 11, few studies have directly explored the relationship between individuals' needs for security and their desire for civil liberties. Some psychologists and political scientists have started to examine the relationship between civil liberties and national security and have found that variables such as threat perception, trust in government, national pride, and political affiliation correlate with willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. This research, however, does not employ comprehensive, standardized measures of the constructs in question, which calls into question the validity and reliability of their findings.

In response to the relative lack of research on the extent to which individuals are willing to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security, and the need for a standardized instrument to measure this construct, Byrne (2003) created the Security-Civil Liberties scale (SCL). The scale was created after researching provisions of the USA-PATRIOT Act, the revised FBI Guidelines, the Material Witness Statutes, and other proposed anti-

terrorism legislation after the September 11 attacks. The final version of the SCL consisted of 30 items representing both proposed and actual security measures enacted by the U.S. government. Participants rated their support for each item on a 6-point, Likert-Type scale, ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” Results supported the conclusion that the SCL is a unidimensional scale with strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .95$).

In addition, the relationship between willingness to sacrifice civil liberties and other personality and demographic variables was investigated. In addition to completing the SCL, participants also completed measures of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Liberalism, Conservatism, Social Desirability, Self-Esteem, and Patriotism. Both conservatism and Right Wing Authoritarianism were positively correlated with scores on the SCL, indicating that individuals with more conservative or Right-Wing Authoritarian values expressed greater willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for national security. Patriotism was also positively correlated with SCL scores, suggesting that people who reported themselves to be highly patriotic were also more likely to support sacrificing individual liberties for security.

Byrne’s original study contained several limitations that necessitate further research. The samples used in the investigation consisted entirely of college students, whose attitudes toward anti-terrorism security measures may be different than those of other populations. In response to Davis and Silver’s findings (2004) that younger adults are less willing to sacrifice civil liberties than older adults, it seems important to administer the SCL to samples of adults in more than one age group. Another possible limitation of the original investigation involves the liberalism and conservatism

measures employed. Contrary to prediction, scores on the SCL were not correlated with liberalism. This may have been due to the nature of the items on the liberalism subscale of the Social Attitudes Statement Scale (SAS-II). The construct of liberalism encompasses a variety of political and social attitudes. The items on the SAS-II focused primarily on economic liberalism, assessing attitudes toward issues like public health care and government regulation of industry. The SCL, however, attempts to assess attitudes toward privacy and civil liberties, which may constitute an aspect of liberalism not measured by the SAS-II. Thus, the liberalism subscale of the SAS-II might not have been the best instrument to use to assess this aspect of liberalism. Additionally, the α reliability of the SAS-II's conservatism subscale was low, and it may not have provided a reliable measure of conservatism. The SCL's relationship with liberalism and conservatism should thus be further investigated using more appropriate measures of these constructs.

The positive correlation between patriotism and scores on the SCL raises the intriguing question of whether Americans are defining patriotism as supporting the government in its anti-terrorism policies, regardless of the cost. Given that Davis and Silver (2003) also found a correlation between patriotic sentiment and willingness to sacrifice civil liberties, it seems important to further investigate the impact of patriotism on attitudes toward civil rights and national security. As patriotism is itself a complex construct, encompassing a variety of possible attitudes and values, a multidimensional, empirically-validated measure of patriotism should be employed. Given that the "War on Terror" has at its foundation a strong "us vs. them" orientation, nationalistic attitudes should also be assessed. Research on nationalism has suggested that it is associated

with feelings of superiority over and aggression toward outgroups; nationalistic individuals, however, are also less willing than patriotic individuals to make personal sacrifices in the context of war (Feshbach, 1990). This raises the intriguing question of whether patriotism or nationalism will be more highly correlated with willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security.

An additional factor to consider with regard to attitudes toward security and civil liberties is the impact of the passage of time. The original investigation of the SCL took place 18 months after the September 11 attacks. Other published research in the area (e.g., Henderson-King, et. al., 2004; Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos, 2002; Davis & Silver, 2004; Traugott et. al., 2002) has relied on data collected even earlier, in late 2001 and 2002. Given that other civil liberties research (i.e., Sorrentino & Vidmar, 1974) has indicated a decline in support for post-terrorism national security measures as time passes, it may be that attitudes toward civil liberties and national security have shifted. Gathering data on the SCL nearly four years after the terrorist attacks may help us to better understand whether attitudes do indeed change as the attacks become a more distant memory.

Purpose of the Present Investigation

The purpose of the present investigation is to continue the study of individuals' willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for greater national security. The government's new policies on homeland defense represent some of the most significant structural changes in America following the September 11 attacks. While the country as a whole struggles to balance freedom with security, Americans also continue to deal with the ramifications of September 11 at an individual level. As time passes, emotional

distress may either linger or fade, feelings of threat may persist or diminish, and political and social attitudes may continue to shift. All of these factors may influence Americans' beliefs about the importance of civil liberties in a time of war. Research in psychology and the other social sciences has only just begun to shed light on this issue, indicating that variables such as age, threat perception, patriotism, trust in the government, and the simple passage of time may impact one's willingness to give up freedom for security. The present study will attempt to unite and expand upon this existing research.

The investigation will accomplish this objective in several ways. It will continue the original study of the Security-Civil Liberties Scale, further examining its psychometric properties and establishing it as a valid, reliable measure of the construct. In addition, the relationship between scores on the SCL and several demographic, personality, and attitudinal variables will be further explored. In order to identify the impact of age on SCL scores, the subject pool will be expanded to include both college-aged students and their parents. Thorough, reliable measures of patriotism and nationalism will be administered to assess the relationship between levels of national pride and willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. A more appropriate measure of liberalism and conservatism will also be given, in order to determine the impact of political, social, religious, and economic liberal and conservative ideology on SCL scores. A measure of Right-Wing Authoritarianism will be re-administered, to further establish the correlation between Right-Wing Authoritarian attitudes and scores on the SCL. In addition, measures of threat perception and trust in government will be included to assess the effects of these variables on SCL scores. Finally, the impact of temporal distance from the events of September 11 will be

investigated, by comparing SCL scores in the present investigation with scores from the original study.

Chapter II

METHOD

Participants

Students. Participants were 252 (128 female, 124 male) students enrolled in introductory psychology at Colorado State University in the fall semester of 2005. Ages ranged from 17 to 31, with a mean age of 18.88 years ($SD = 1.52$). The majority of students (85.1%) reported their ethnicity as Caucasian, with 6.0% self-identifying as Asian-American, 4.0% as Hispanic/Latino, 1.6% as African-American, 1.6% as Native American, and 2.0% as “Other”. Most student participants were freshmen (65.2%), while 22.4% were sophomores, 7.6% were juniors, and 4.8% were seniors. Of students reporting affiliation with a specific organized religion, 19.7% identified as Catholic, 15.7% as Protestant, 1.2% as Jewish, and 0.8% as Buddhist. The remainder of the sample reported either having no religious affiliation (34.5%) or “Other” (28.1%). Political affiliation varied, with 36.0% of students identifying as Republican, 28.7% as having no political affiliation, 23.5% as Democratic, 10.1% as Independent, and 1.6% as “Other.” The vast majority (99.1%) of student participants reported being U.S. citizens. Participants earned one of four research credits toward a course requirement in exchange for taking part in the study. They earned one additional research credit if one or both of their parents participated in the study as well.

Parents. Participants in the parent sample were 196 (130 female, 66 male) parents of the student participants. Ages ranged from 38-62, with a mean age of 48.61 years ($SD = 4.47$). Students’ mothers accounted for 64.4% of the sample, fathers for 34.5%, and step-parents for 1.0%. The majority of the parent sample self-identified as

Caucasian (93.2%), with 2.1% reporting that they were Native American, 1.0% Asian-American, 1.0% Hispanic or Latino, 0.5% African-American, and 2.1% “Other.” Of parents reporting affiliation with a specific organized religion, 36.5% reported being Protestant, 24.5% Catholic, 2.6% Jewish, and 0.5% Buddhist. The remainder of the parent sample reported either having no religious affiliation (17.7%) or “Other” (18.2%). Politically, 45.6% of parents self-identified as Republican, 25.4% as Democratic, 14.5% as having no party affiliation, 11.4% as Independent, and 3.5% as “Other.” The vast majority (99.0%) of parents reported that they were U.S. citizens.

Instruments

All of the following measures can be found in Appendix A.

Demographic information. Demographic information collected from participants included age, gender, ethnicity [African-American, Asian-American, Caucasian (non-Hispanic), Hispanic/Latino, Native American, Multiracial, and Other], citizenship, year in school (for students only), relationship to the student participant (for parents only)(Mother, Father, Step-mother, Step-father, and Other), religious affiliation (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, Agnostic, Atheist, and Other), and political affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent, No affiliation, and Other).

Security-Civil Liberties Scale (SCL). The SCL (Byrne, 2003) contains 30 items describing security policies that were proposed or enacted after September 11, 2001 (e.g., allowing law enforcement officials investigating terrorism to place wiretaps on the telephones of people living in the United States; allowing FBI agents to keep track of public library and bookstore records to monitor people who borrow or purchase suspicious books). Respondents rated their support of each item on a 6-point, Likert-type

scale, ranging from 1 (strongly oppose) to 6 (strongly support). Scores ranged from 30 to 180, with higher scores indicating a greater willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. Factor analysis indicated that the scale is unidimensional, and internal consistency was high ($\alpha = .95$; current $\alpha = .95$). Scores on the SCL were positively correlated with conservatism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and patriotism (Byrne, 2003).

Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). This scale consists of 30 items describing attitudes and values (e.g., “Obedience in the most important virtue children should learn”) (Altemeyer, 1988). Participants rated their agreement with each statement on a 9-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree). Scores ranged from 30 to 270, with higher scores indicating high levels of right-wing authoritarian attitudes. Reliability data (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Byrne, 2003) indicates that α reliabilities range from .81 to .95 (current $\alpha = .93$). Test-retest reliability was .95 after a one-week period and .85 after 28 weeks (Altemeyer, 1988, in Robinson, et al., 1999). The RWA scale correlates highly with other measures of authoritarianism, acceptance of government injustice, and obedience (Altemeyer, 1996).

Blind and Constructive Patriotism. A 17-item scale developed by Schatz et.al. (1999) was used to measure blind and constructive patriotism. Twelve of the items measure attitudes consistent with blind patriotism (e.g., “I believe that U.S. policies are almost always the morally correct ones”), and five items measure attitudes consistent with constructive patriotism (e.g., “If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them”). Participants rated their agreement with each items on a 6-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from -3 (disagree strongly) to +3 (agree strongly).

Factor analyses supported the notion that blind and constructive patriotism are orthogonal constructs, measuring distinct dimensions of patriotism. The authors reported α reliabilities of .79 (current $\alpha = .87$) for the blind patriotism scale and .71 (current $\alpha = .84$) for the constructive patriotism scale. Both measures correlate highly with measures of national attachment. The blind patriotism scale, however, also correlated highly with Altemeyer's RWA scale, with political conservatism, and with Republican party identification, whereas the constructive patriotism scale was uncorrelated with these variables. In addition, scores on the constructive patriotism scale correlated with political information gathering, while blind patriotism scores correlated with selective attention to "pro-America" media messages (Schatz et al., 1999).

Nationalism. Levels of nationalism were assessed using the nationalism subscale of Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) Patriotism-Nationalism Questionnaire (PNQ). The PNQ is a 46-item scale that assesses patriotic, nationalistic, and internationalistic attitudes. In addition, the PNQ contains items measuring general attitudes toward civil liberties, support for a "world government," and "smugness" (e.g., I would never settle in another country"). The nationalism subscale consists of eight items describing nationalistic attitudes (e.g., "Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are"), to which participants rate their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree). Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) reported that the subscale has an internal consistency of .80 (current $\alpha = .79$) and correlates highly with negative attitudes toward nuclear disarmament and willingness to go to war.

Liberalism and Conservatism. Researchers have operationalized liberalism and conservatism in a variety of ways, most often to suit the specific context of their investigation. Studies examining attitudes toward legal issues, for example, have measured the constructs as they pertain to the law (e.g., support for the death penalty indicates conservatism) (Miller & Seligman, 1999). Other researchers have defined liberalism and conservatism based on controversial political issues of the time (e.g., conservatism is indicated by support for prayer in public schools and satisfaction with the Regan presidency), or based on their associations with other, related constructs (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism) (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Several comprehensive measures of liberalism and conservatism have been developed and repeatedly tested for reliability and validity. However, these, too, are to a large extent reflections of the political issues of their times. For example, Eysenck's Inventory of Social Attitudes (1951), although cited in many studies, contains an item referring to the Japanese as a "cruel" people, and agreement with this statement is scored as a "conservative" response. Such an item could certainly have represented "conservative" ideology when Eysenck's scale was originally published, but it is not likely to connect very closely with conservative ideology today.

Perhaps in response to the lack of consistently accepted measures of liberalism and conservatism, many studies have employed single-item, self-report measures (e.g., Farwell & Weiner, 2000; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Researchers have argued that one-item measures are highly correlated with more complex political attitudes scales, and, as Knight (1999) summarized, such self-report measures have become so customary that they are often used to validate the more comprehensive liberalism-conservatism scales.

However, although single self-report items appear to be reliable means of assessing political orientation, they also have an inherent limitation. There are likely to be a variety of individual values and beliefs underlying one's self-identified political orientation; one person's "moderate liberal" may be another person's "strong liberal." Further, liberalism and conservatism may be perceived as umbrella terms encompassing a number of more specific attitudes, including political, religious, military, economic, and social policy beliefs. For example, one might consider oneself to be an "economic conservative" but a "social policy liberal." Single-item self-report measures fail to capture these distinctions, and thus run the risk of assuming similarity between individuals (e.g., "liberals") where it does not exist.

Capturing the various dimensions of liberal and conservative beliefs will be especially important in the present investigation. Individuals' attitudes toward national security and civil liberties in the context of the September 11 terrorist attacks could be influenced by a variety of ideological orientations. The national security policies enacted by the government clearly relate to military (e.g., homeland defense), political (e.g., support for the largely Republican-controlled federal government), and social policy (e.g., privacy of individual citizens, racial profiling) issues. Further, given the limited data available in this area, measures should be as specific as possible in order to best understand the nature of attitudes toward these national security policies.

Thus, the liberalism and conservatism measure used in this investigation consisted of five self-report items intended to capture the various aspects of liberal and conservative ideologies. Participants rated their attitudes on a 9-point, Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very conservative) to 9 (very liberal) across the following dimensions: in

general (i.e., “In general, I consider myself to be:”), political (i.e., “Politically, I consider myself to be:”) social policy (i.e., “In terms of social policy issues, I consider myself to be:”), religious (i.e., “In terms of religion, I consider myself to be:”), and economics (i.e., “In terms of economic issues, I consider myself to be”). A factor analysis was conducted to assess whether these items formed a single dimension, subscales, or did not cluster together at all.

Trust in Government. The trust in government measure consisted of four items adapted from a survey used by Davis and Silver (2004) to assess individuals’ level of trust in the federal government (i.e., “Most of the time, I can trust the government in Washington to do what is right” and “I would say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves rather than for the benefit of all people”) and law enforcement (i.e., “Most of the time, I can trust law enforcement to do what is right” and “Since the terrorist attacks, my confidence in law enforcement has increased”). Participants responded on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree). The authors did not report reliability data for their four-item measure, but the α reliability of these items in the present study was .68.

Threat Perception. The threat perception measure consisted of five items adapted from a survey used by Davis and Silver (2004) to address individuals’ sense of personal threat (e.g., “Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, how concerned are you about the safety of food and drinking water?”) and a single item used in the same survey to assess individuals’ sense of threat to the United States as a whole (i.e., “How concerned are you that the United States might suffer another terrorist attack in the next three months?”). Participants responded on a 3-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (Very concerned) to

3 (A little concerned). The authors did not report reliability data for their five-item measure, but the α reliability of the scale in the present study was .78. Davis and Silver (2004) report that the personal threat items and the “sociotropic” threat item were somewhat correlated ($r = .44$), but not so much so that they appeared to be measuring identical constructs.

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MC-SDS). The MC-SDS contains 33 statements related to personal attitudes or traits (e.g., “I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble”). Respondents decided whether each item was true or false as it related to them personally. Scores range from 0 to 33, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner. Crowne and Marlowe (1960) reported the internal consistencies of the MC-SDS to be .88 (Kuder Richardson 20) (current $\alpha = .76$), and test-retest reliabilities of 0.89. The MC-SDS is the most widely used and studied measure of social desirability in psychological research, and it is employed primarily as a means of assessing scale validity and as a tool for screening research participants (Beretvas, Meyers, & Leite, 2002; Evans, 1982).

Procedure

Participants signed up for one of six sessions through a website for their introductory psychology course. A brief description of the study as a project on attitudes toward security after the September 11 terrorist attacks was posted on the website. It stated that the one-credit study would take approximately 45 minutes to complete. Additionally, another one-credit study was available to participating students who involved at least one parent filling out a similar set of questionnaires and returning them through the mail. Interested students signed up for the study through the course website.

Each session accommodated up to 100 students. Upon signing up, participants were instructed to meet at a pre-arranged time in a classroom on campus. When the session began, two research assistants passed out two copies of an informed consent form to each participant (see Appendix B). They were instructed to read the form, sign and return one copy, and keep the second copy for their records. A research assistant then read instructions for participants from a script (see Appendix C), explaining to them that they were taking part in a study about attitudes toward security after the terrorist attacks of September 11.

Participants then randomly received the demographic questions followed by one of three counterbalanced versions of a packet containing the SCL, Right Wing Authoritarianism scale, Blind and Constructive Patriotism measure, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale, Liberalism and Conservatism measure, Trust in Government measure, and Threat Perception measure (see Appendix A). Each packet was labeled with only a code number and no other identifiers in order to ensure confidentiality. Participants were instructed to complete the scales in the packet according to the written instructions on each scale.

When the students completed the questionnaires, the research assistant explained the second part of the study, in which a packet of similar questionnaires would be sent to one or both parents of interested student participants. Participants were told that if at least one parent returned a packet, the student would receive a second research credit. Interested students filled out three additional informed consent documents (see Appendix D) for the second part of the study: one for their records, one for study personnel, and one to be included in the packet sent to parents. Students addressed the envelopes to be sent

to their parents. The students also provided their name, phone number and e-mail address on a sheet labeled with their code number. This was used to give each student credit when his or her parent returned a questionnaire packet and was then destroyed to protect confidentiality.

The parents' packets (which were sent via first class mail) contained a cover letter (see Appendix E), an informed consent document signed by the student, a self-addressed stamped return envelope, and copies of the demographic questions and counterbalanced packets containing the SCL, the RWA scale, the Blind and Constructive Patriotism measure, the Nationalism measure, the Liberalism/Conservatism measure, the Trust in Government measure, the Threat Perception measure, and the MC-SDS. The cover letter introduced the study, explained that the student had given permission for his or her parent's participation on the informed consent document, noted that the student would receive one of four required class research credits for the parent's participation, provided instructions for completing questionnaires and mailing them back, explained that all information gathered would be confidential, and indicated that the return of the questionnaire would be taken as evidence of the parent's consent to participate.

Each parent packet was labeled with the same code number as on the student's packet. This was done in order to match the parent packet with that of the student and ensure that he or she received the second research credit. Once the student received both research credits, the packets were stored matched only by the code number. A research assistant contacted student participants via telephone or e-mail if their parent had not returned a packet after four weeks. The research assistant let the student know that their

parent's packets had not been received and offered to resend the information at their request.

Chapter III

RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses

Four participants were excluded from data analysis due to their failure to answer two or more questions. In addition, 19 participants failed to answer one item. Their average response to similar items was calculated, and this number was substituted for the missing response.

To test for an order effect, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted using SCL total scores as the dependent variable and the counterbalanced order as the independent variable. No significant effect for version was detected, $F(2, 441) = 0.51$. Given that there was no order effect, instruments were collapsed across order for all subsequent analyses.

Internal consistency (Cronbach's α) was calculated for the SCL and each measure used; these are listed as "current α " with the descriptions of each measure in Chapter II. In addition, a principal components analysis (Kaiser, 1960) was conducted on the five items in the liberalism-conservatism measure to determine whether they form a unitary scale. The analysis yielded a single factor with an eigen value over 1.0. Item loadings on this factor are presented in Table 1. The α reliability of this factor was .92, and the factor accounted for 75.6% of the total variance. Inter-item correlations ranged from .53 to .90. Given that the factor weights and inter-item correlations indicated the five items formed a unidimensional scale, participants' summed responses to the individual items were used as a single "liberal-conservative" score.

Table 1

Items and Loadings on Single-Factor Liberalism-Conservatism Scale

Item	Loading
1	.85
2	.60
3	.69
4	.74
5	.89

A confirmatory factor analysis was also conducted on the SCL scale to determine whether a single-factor model remained the best fit for the data. The analysis yielded five factors with eigen values over 1.0. However, a scree analysis (Cattell, 1966) found only one significant factor, which accounted for 41.0% of the scale's total variance. Item loadings on this factor can be found in Table 2. Because the SCL emerged as a single-factor scale with a high internal consistency, a single SCL total score was employed.

Temporal Changes in SCL Scores.

An independent samples *t* test was conducted to determine whether students' SCL scores in the present investigation ($M = 93.32$, $SD = 26.32$) were significantly different from students' SCL scores in Byrne's (2003) study ($M = 96.31$, $SD = 27.01$). Results indicated no significant difference in SCL scores over time, $t(511) = 0.54$.

Gender and Cohort Effects

A 2 (Gender) x 2 (Parent/Student Cohort) MANOVA was conducted to determine whether gender and cohort had a significant effect on mean scores on the SCL, right-wing authoritarianism, blind and constructive patriotism, nationalism, liberalism/conservatism, trust in government, threat perception, and social desirability measures. Multivariate main effects were found for both gender, $F(9, 432) = 4.86$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.092$, and cohort, $F(9, 432) = 15.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.241$, but not for the interaction, $F(9, 432) = 0.62$. Subsequent univariate analyses indicated significant univariate gender effects (Table 3) for liberalism/ conservatism and threat perception scores, with females ($M = 23.45$) reporting more liberal attitudes and perceiving greater levels of threat ($M = 8.43$) than males ($Ms = 20.69$ and 7.45 , respectively). Significant univariate cohort effects (Table 4) were found for scores on the SCL, constructive patriotism, threat

Table 2

Items and Loadings on Single-Factor SCL scale

Item	Loading	Item	Loading
1	.580	19	.640
2	.617	20	.722
3	.687	21	.574
4	.655	22	.679
5	.540	23	.707
6	.672	24	.561
7	.752	25	.719
8	.553	26	.632
9	.750	27	.616
10	.592	28	.671
11	.505	29	.620
12	.523	30	.640
13	.587		
14	.419		
15	.580		
16	.595		
17	.647		
18	.582		

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties scale.

Table 3

Gender Differences in SCL, Blind Patriotism, Constructive Patriotism, Nationalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Liberalism/Conservatism, Trust in Government, Threat Perception, and Social Desirability Scores

Measure	Group				Univariate Gender <i>F</i> (1, 440)	Univariate Gender η^2
	Females		Males			
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
SCL	99.26	25.09	100.85	28.67	2.46	0.006
BP	36.89	9.74	37.68	11.02	0.88	0.002
CP	24.69	4.14	24.13	4.04	0.54	0.001
Nationalism	21.59	5.73	22.48	5.32	2.24	0.005
RWA	139.32	41.09	139.39	38.27	0.07	0.000
L/C	23.44	9.30	21.49	9.09	9.64*	0.021
Trust	12.64	3.10	12.68	3.10	0.11	0.000
Threat	8.44	2.36	7.33	1.44	25.35**	0.054
Social Desirability	17.14	5.33	16.95	5.04	0.04	0.000

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties Scale; BP refers to blind patriotism; CP refers to constructive patriotism; RWA refers to right-wing authoritarianism; L/C refers to liberalism/conservatism; Trust refers to trust in government; and Threat refers to Threat Perception.

Table 4

Cohort Differences in SCL, Blind Patriotism, Constructive Patriotism, Nationalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Liberalism/Conservatism, Trust in Government, Threat Perception, and Social Desirability Scores

Measure	Group				Univariate Cohort <i>F</i> (1, 440)	Univariate Cohort η^2
	Students		Parents			
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
SCL	93.32	26.32	108.47	24.63	38.81*	0.080
BP	37.25	10.17	37.20	10.50	0.05	0.000
CP	23.66	4.17	25.48	3.79	20.09*	0.044
Nationalism	22.22	5.52	21.64	5.63	0.66	0.001
RWA	136.22	38.09	143.39	41.81	3.36	0.008
L/C	24.20	9.12	20.56	9.04	22.70*	0.049
Trust	12.67	3.15	12.64	3.04	0.03	0.000
Threat	7.50	1.69	8.57	2.39	21.36*	0.046
Social Desirability	6.20	4.65	18.16	5.66	14.99*	0.033

* $p < .001$

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties Scale; BP refers to blind patriotism; CP refers to constructive patriotism; RWA refers to right-wing authoritarianism; L/C refers to liberalism/conservatism; Trust refers to trust in government; and Threat refers to threat perception.

perception, liberalism/ conservatism, and social desirability scales. Parents had significantly higher SCL scores ($M = 109.07$), constructive patriotism scores ($M = 25.43$), and perceived higher levels of threat ($M = 8.39$) than students ($M_s = 93.35, 23.66,$ and 7.49 , respectively). Students reported significantly more liberal attitudes ($M = 24.19$) and had lower social desirability scores ($M = 16.21$) than parents ($M_s = 19.95$ and 18.17 , respectively).

Relationships Between SCL and Other Measures

Pearson Product Moment correlations were calculated across all measures to determine their relationship to SCL scores and one another. Tests for difference between independent correlations (Bruning & Kintz, 1977) were conducted to detect whether there were gender effects in the correlations between measures for both the student participants and the parent participants. Given that multiple comparisons increase the risk of familywise error, a more conservative p value of .01 was employed to test for statistical significance. No significant differences gender differences existed in either the student or parent correlation matrices (Tables 5 and 6), and the matrices were thus collapsed across gender. Additional tests for differences between independent correlations across cohort found no significant differences between the students' and parents' correlation matrices. Therefore, data were collapsed across both gender and cohort and correlated (Table 7).

Results indicate a number of correlations between measures. Blind patriotism correlated positively with right-wing authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, and trust in government, and negatively with constructive patriotism. Blind patriotism also correlated positively with social desirability. Constructive patriotism correlated negatively with right wing authoritarianism, nationalism, and trust in government, and

Table 5

Correlations between SCL scores and Blind Patriotism, Constructive Patriotism, Nationalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Liberalism/Conservatism, Trust in Government, Threat Perception, and Social Desirability for Students

Measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. SCL	.58**	-.19*	.48**	.52**	-.48**	.41**	.10	-.02
2. BP		-.31**	.64**	.68**	-.61**	.49**	.01	.01
3. CP			-.21**	-.24**	.14*	-.10**	.07	.03
4. Nat.				.64**	-.46**	.42**	.05	-.06
5. RWA					-.69**	.49**	.05	.05
6. L/C						-.47**	.03	-.06
7. Trust							.03	.02
8. Threat								-.02
9. Social Desirability								

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties Scale; BP refers to blind patriotism; CP refers to constructive patriotism; Nat. refers to nationalism; RWA refers to right-wing authoritarianism; L/C refers to liberalism/conservatism

Table 6

Correlations between SCL scores and Blind Patriotism, Constructive Patriotism, Nationalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Liberalism/Conservatism, Trust in Government, Threat Perception, and Social Desirability for Parents

Measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. SCL	.58**	-.05	.36**	.54**	-.49**	.49**	.09	.09
2. BP		-.28**	.58**	.66**	-.58**	.48**	.07	.19**
3. CP			-.16*	-.24**	.16*	-.16*	.08	-.04
4. Nat.				.52**	-.41**	.34**	.09	.12
5. RWA					-.63**	.46**	.11	.09
6. L/C						-.47**	.03	-.03
7. Trust							.05	.17*
8. Threat								-.06
9. Social Desirability								

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties Scale; BP refers to blind patriotism; CP refers to constructive patriotism; Nat. refers to nationalism; RWA refers to right-wing authoritarianism; L/C refers to liberalism/conservatism

Table 7

Correlations between SCL scores and Blind Patriotism, Constructive Patriotism, Nationalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Liberalism/Conservatism, Trust in Government, Threat Perception, and Social Desirability for the Full Sample

Measure	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. SCL	.55**	-.07	.40**	.53**	-.51**	.43**	.15**	.08
2. BP		-.29**	.61**	.67**	-.58**	.49**	.04	.10*
3. CP			-.20**	-.21**	.10*	-.12*	.13**	.04
4. Nat.				.58**	-.42**	.39**	.05	.02
5. RWA					-.67**	.47**	.10*	.08
6. L/C						-.46**	-.02	-.08
7. Trust							.04	.09
8. Threat								.00
9. Social Desirability								

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties Scale; BP refers to blind patriotism; CP refers to constructive patriotism; Nat. refers to nationalism; RWA refers to right-wing authoritarianism; L/C refers to liberalism/conservatism

correlated positively with liberalism and threat perception. Nationalism correlated positively with right-wing authoritarianism, conservatism, and trust in government. Right-wing authoritarianism positively correlated with conservatism, trust in government, and threat perception. Finally, conservatism correlated positively with trust in government.

Scores on the SCL correlated significantly and positively with blind patriotism, nationalism, right-wing authoritarianism, trust in government, and threat perception scores. SCL scores correlated significantly and negatively with scores on the Liberalism-Conservatism scale, and did not correlate with constructive patriotism or social desirability scores.

Given the multiple correlations across measures, a hierarchical regression analysis was employed to determine the predictive effects of gender, cohort, blind patriotism, constructive patriotism, nationalism, right-wing authoritarianism, liberalism/conservatism, trust in government, threat perception, and social desirability on SCL scores. In order to determine the impact of gender and cohort on SCL scores, these variables were entered first. The personality/attitude variables were entered in Step 2. Interactions between gender and personality/attitude variables (e.g., gender x blind patriotism) and cohort and personality/attitude variables (e.g., cohort x blind patriotism) were entered in Step 3. Interaction terms were constructed by centering scores and multiplying them.

The regression model (Table 8) revealed significant main effects for cohort but not for gender, indicating that cohort contributed meaningfully to the overall variance in SCL scores. Parents had higher scores than students. Three variables in Step 2

Table 8

Hierarchical Regression on SCL scores with Gender and Cohort on Step 1 and Personality/Attitude Variables on Step 2 and Interactions Between Demographic and Personality/Attitude Variables on Step 3

Step	Variables Entered	β on Step	t for β on Step	F	ΔR^2 for Step
1	Gender Cohort	-0.07 0.29	-1.61 6.37***	20 .50*	.085
2	BP RWA Trust L/C CP Nat Threat SD	0.31 0.15 0.15 -0.10 0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.03	5.69*** 2.58** 3.48** -1.95 0.92 0.70 1.65 -0.81	36.21*	.370
3	Interactions			0.92	.019

* $p < .001$

Note. SCL refers to Security-Civil Liberties Scale; BP refers to blind patriotism; RWA refers to right-wing authoritarianism; Trust refers to trust in government; L/C refers to liberalism/conservatism; CP refers to constructive patriotism; Nat refers to nationalism; Threat refers to threat perception; SD refers to social desirability

contributed significantly to the overall variance of SCL scores. Higher levels of blind patriotism, right-wing authoritarianism, and trust in government were positively associated with SCL scores. Interactions between demographic (gender and cohort) and personality/attitude variables did not contribute significantly to overall variance in SCL scores.

Chapter IV
DISCUSSION

Limitations

Although the current investigation takes a step toward further understanding individuals' willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security, several limitations exist. Measures employed relied solely on participants' self-report, and thus may provide a limited picture of participants' actual beliefs. It is possible that these self-reported attitudes do not translate into behavior (e.g., voting behaviors, support for *in vivo* restrictions, etc.). Additionally, although student participants were administered instruments under standardized conditions, parent participants were not. Given that surveys were completed at the parents' homes, a variety of environmental confounds may have impacted parent responses. However, it is unlikely that this forms a systematic bias.

Interpretation of this study is also limited by the homogeneity of the sample, which was overwhelmingly Caucasian (88.7%). The absence of sizable numbers of ethnic minority participants may have significantly altered the results of this study, because ethnic minority groups have traditionally had different experiences with civil rights in the United States than Caucasians. The same might be true for religious minority groups, which were also under-represented in this sample. In addition, although participants represented two distinct cohorts (with *M* ages of 18.88 and 48.61), even older generations were not included in the sample. Participants who were alive during the Pearl Harbor attacks, for example, may have different attitudes toward sacrificing civil liberties than individuals in younger generations. Future investigations of the SCL

should include a more diverse sample, with participants from a variety of ethnic, religious, geographical, educational, and generational backgrounds.

The present study is also limited by the psychometric strength of the measures employed. Although several scales used are well-validated (i.e., the RWA, Nationalism, Social Desirability, and Blind and Constructive Patriotism scales), others have not been extensively validated and may be less psychometrically sound (i.e., the Trust in Government and Threat Perception measures). Attempts were made to account for this by calculating the internal consistency of each measure; α reliabilities of .70 and above are typically adequate. The Trust in Government scale had an internal consistency of $\alpha = .68$, which is marginal and could indicate that the items on the scale are not strongly related to one another and thus do not measure a single construct. Therefore, results involving this measure should be interpreted cautiously. In addition, the Liberalism-Conservatism scale employed was developed specifically for this study, and as such does not have previous psychometric data to support its validity. Further, one item was inadvertently deleted from the scale on survey packets. The item referred to attitudes toward social policy issues (“In terms of social policy issues, I consider myself to be...”), asking participants to rate the relative liberalism or conservatism of their beliefs. Thus, five items comprised the Liberalism-Conservatism scale rather than six, and as such the scale may not have tapped the full range of attitudes that determine liberal and conservative beliefs. Despite these limitations, however, the scale exhibited strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .92$) and correlated well with measures (i.e., the RWA, Blind Patriotism, and Nationalism scales) that have traditionally been highly correlated with other liberalism and conservatism scales.

Nature of the SCL

Results supported the notion that the SCL is a unidimensional scale. The scale contains 30 items that appear to measure a single construct with good internal consistency and without significant gender differences. These findings support the conclusion that the SCL is a meaningful scale that can reliably measure an individual's willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security. Counter to prediction, SCL scores among student participants in this investigation were not significantly different than SCL scores among participants in Byrne's (2003) study. Previous research (Sorrentino & Vidmar, 1974) suggested that support for civil liberties restrictions may be strong in the early aftermath of a crisis, but it recedes over time. However, Sorrentino and Vidmar's study was conducted in the context of the kidnappings of high ranking political figures in Quebec, Canada, and although a form of martial law was declared initially, the crisis resolved within several months. The final survey occurred after this resolution. The terrorist attacks of September 11, in contrast, have not had a resolution, with the U.S. government engaging in a global war on terror and continuing to investigate and prosecute individuals for alleged involvement in terrorist acts. It is possible that the ongoing nature of the September 11 "crisis" has led individuals to believe that increased security measures are continually necessary. In addition, participants in Byrne's (2003) study were surveyed approximately 18 months after the September 11 attacks, whereas participants in Sorrentino and Vidmar's study were surveyed immediately after the crisis occurred. It may be that support for civil liberties restrictions was higher in the acute aftermath of the September 11 attacks and had already decreased by the time of Byrne's (2003) investigation. Results of the current study indicate, however, that individuals'

willingness to give up civil liberties in exchange for security has remained fairly stable over the past three years, at least among college students. During this time, the United States has seen heated debate regarding the war in Iraq, the treatment of terror suspects and prisoners of war, and the renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act. It appears that students' attitudes toward increased national security measures have been largely unaffected by these debates.

There do appear to be significant cohort differences in individuals' willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. Parents were more supportive of national security measures than students, and the effect size was moderate. This is consistent with Davis and Silver's (2004) findings that younger adults were less willing to give up civil liberties in exchange for security than older adults. On some level this trend seems counterintuitive. With a mean age of 48.61 years, the adult cohort was one that lived through both the Vietnam War and Watergate, both periods of civil unrest and great suspicion of the government. One might predict that this generation developed a sense of distrust toward authority and may therefore be less willing than other generations to support increased government surveillance and security measures. However, the present study and Davis and Silver's (2004) investigation instead suggest that older adults are more willing to sacrifice their civil liberties in exchange for security than young adults. These findings may represent age rather than cohort effects, as research has suggested that attitudes become more conservative with age (e.g., Kerr, 1944; Thumin, 1972).

Other Cohort and Gender Effects

This investigation produced several additional differences between cohorts. On the Liberalism-Conservatism measure, parents tended more toward the conservative

end of the spectrum, whereas students were closer to the “middle of the road” area of the spectrum. The effect size was moderate. This is consistent with earlier research suggesting that liberalism decreases and conservatism increases with age (Kerr, 1944; Thumin, 1972), which could indicate that the present results represent an age effect rather than a cohort effect. Parents were also more likely to endorse socially desirable attitudes and behaviors, similar to findings from other studies (e.g., Klassen, 1975; Wall, 1973), which found positive correlations between age and MC-SDS scores. However, the effect size in the current study was small. Threat perception scores were also higher among the parent sample than the student sample, indicating that parents had slightly greater concerns about their own and the country’s safety from future attacks. This effect size was moderate. Previous research on threat perception is limited, but Davis and Silver (2004) did not report differences between age groups. Cohort differences in the current sample could be a reflection of the older cohort’s role as parents, who may tend to be more aware of potential threats than their children.

Parent participants also displayed significantly higher levels of constructive patriotism than students. The blind and constructive patriotism scales were validated using samples of college students (Schatz, 1995; Schatz & Staub, 1997; Staub, 1997; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999), and the authors did not report correlations with age or cohort. One might argue that older individuals would have higher scores on the constructive patriotism scale, because constructive patriotism includes an inherent level of critical thought regarding the government’s actions. Young adults may be traditionally thought of as somewhat lacking in critical thinking skills. Research on critical thinking ability, however, indicates that young adults tend to be better critical thinkers than older

adults (e.g., Denney, 1995). Blind patriotism, however, was uncorrelated with cohort, indicating that cohort was not a predictor of positive affective attachment and uncritical loyalty to one's country. Thus, although older adults may tend to be more constructively patriotic, young and older adults appear equally likely to endorse blindly patriotic attitudes. Additional investigation is necessary in order to better understand the relationship between blind and constructive patriotism, age, and cohort.

Right-wing authoritarianism was also uncorrelated with cohort, indicating that older adults and younger adults did not display significantly different levels of RWA attitudes. This is in contrast to studies of the psychometric properties of the RWA scale, which have found that parents consistently score higher on the RWA than students (Altemeyer, personal communication, 2006). Similarly, cohort and trust in government were also uncorrelated. Although they collected data on participants' ages, Davis and Silver (2004) do not report on the relationship between age and trust in government, nor did they divide their participants by cohort. Other research on predictors of trust in government (e.g., Bowler & Karp, 2004; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn, 2000; Keele, 2005) has primarily focused on attitudes, affective reactions, and political party as predictors of trust in government. Results of the present investigation suggest that cohort is not a significant predictor of trust in government.

Gender differences existed on the Liberalism/Conservatism measure and the Threat Perception measure, with women reporting both more liberal attitudes and greater perceived threat. Research on gender differences in liberalism and conservatism has been mixed, with some studies reporting no differences between men and women on global liberalism-conservatism measures (e.g., Thumin, 1972), and others reporting that

women are more likely to endorse liberal beliefs (e.g., Eagley et al, 2004). Female participants in this investigation also endorsed greater perceived threat, reporting that they felt less safe on an individual and sociotropic level. This result mirrors the findings of Davis and Silver (2004), in which women reported higher levels of perceived threat. This difference may in part be a reflection of gender socialization in our culture, as men are typically discouraged from admitting to feeling threatened or afraid. Differing emotional experiences may also drive this relationship. Women may tend to experience feelings of fear related to threatening events, whereas men may experience more externalized emotions such as anger. Indeed, Lerner and colleagues (2003) found that women were more likely to report feeling fear immediately after the September 11 attacks, while men were more likely to report feeling angry. Women in the study subsequently reported higher levels of perceived threat, both to themselves and the country as a whole. The authors found, however, that participants' initial self-reported emotion (e.g., fear or anger) accounted for 60-80% of the variability in their perceptions of threat.

The SCL's Relationship With Other Constructs

The present investigation sheds light on additional personality and attitude variables that are related to individuals' willingness to give up civil liberties for security. A greater willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security was associated with high levels of blind patriotism, nationalism, right-wing authoritarianism, conservatism, trust in government, and threat perception. This indicates that individuals who are willing to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security are also more blindly patriotic, more nationalistic, more right-wing authoritarian, and more conservative than liberal. In

addition, individuals who are supportive of increased national security measures are more trusting of the government and perceive a greater level of threat than individuals who are less supportive of these measures. Social desirability, however, was not related to SCL scores, indicating that individuals were not influenced by the desire to present themselves in a positive light when rating their willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. Constructive patriotism was also unrelated to SCL scores, indicating that constructively critical affective attachment to the country does not predict one's support for the United States' new security measures.

The personality and attitude measures were highly correlated with one another, however, raising the possibility that shared variance between the variables drove some of their correlations with the SCL. Regression models which take into account such shared variance showed that these variables accounted for 37% of the total variance in SCL scores. Three factors emerged as significant predictors of SCL scores (blind patriotism, right-wing authoritarianism, and trust in government).

The relationship between blind patriotism and SCL scores helps to further explain the link between patriotism and support for national security measures. Previous studies have suggested that patriotism is positively correlated with willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security (Byrne, 2003; Davis & Silver, 2004). The original study of the SCL (Byrne, 2003) found a correlation between SCL scores and individuals' self-reported levels of patriotism. However, the single-item measure did not set clear parameters for the term "patriotism," leaving room for interpretation on the part of participants. Research has demonstrated that there are multiple ways to define the construct of patriotism. As Schatz and Staub (Schatz, 1995; Schatz & Staub, 1997;

Staub, 1997; Schatz et al, 1999) proposed, some individuals may view patriotism as love for one's country and unquestioning support of its policies. Others may love their country equally but view patriotism as requiring a critical examination of their country's actions. The present investigation demonstrated that the former is related to support for sacrificing civil liberties in exchange for security, while the latter type of patriotism is unrelated. Thus, it appears that individuals who have positive national attachment *combined with* uncritical loyalty toward the United States are more supportive of the U.S.'s new national security policies. In contrast, constructive patriotism was uncorrelated with individuals' willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. This suggests that individuals with positive but critical national attachment are no more or less likely than others to support the post-September 11 national security policies. These individuals, in critically examining the actions of their country, are likely reaching varying conclusions about giving up civil liberties in exchange for national security.

These are intriguing findings, particularly given the degree to which patriotism has been linked to support for the government since September 11. Following the September 11 attacks, government officials made repeated references to the need for "patriotic" Americans to take action in protecting the country. The United States Congress appeared to emphatically promote this link by naming its major piece of homeland security legislation the USA-PATRIOT Act. Popular culture seemed to follow suit, with public figures like CBS News anchor Dan Rather remarking that a sense of patriotism prevented him from being openly critical of the U.S. governments' actions after the September 11 attacks (Associated Press, 2002 May). The country music group

The Dixie Chicks was accused of being enemies of the United States after publicly criticizing President Bush (“Fresh Dixie Chicks Row,” 2002). Slogans advancing national unity appeared on bumper stickers, T-shirts, and other commercial items. Patriotism, whether promoted, appealed to, or debated, has been prominent in all aspects of U.S. culture since September 11.

In the subtext of this phenomenon has floated the question of whether patriotism necessarily includes unilateral support for the government’s actions. Are “true patriots” those who agree with the United States’ post-September 11th policies? A related issue is the degree to which the media, government leaders, and other social forces have encouraged blind patriotism since the September 11 attacks. In their appeals to patriotic sentiment, some government leaders have encouraged nearly unquestioned loyalty to U.S. policies. Former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, for example, accused those who questioned the USA-PATRIOT Act of “erod[ing] our national unity” and helping the terrorist cause (cnn.com, 2001). The present study does not provide evidence for a causal relationship between blind patriotism and willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security; however, it does appear that the people who support such security measures are also likely to be those with patriotic attitudes accompanied by unquestioning loyalty toward the U.S. government. Appealing to these individuals may therefore be the most efficient means of establishing support for measures like the USA-PATRIOT Act. Research on Blind Patriotism has also shed light on the types of appeals that are most likely to reach blind patriots. Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999) reported that blind patriots are likely to give selective attention to pro-America media messages.

The positive relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and SCL scores mirrors the findings of earlier research on willingness to give up civil liberties (Byrne, 2003; Henderson-King et. al., 2004). As Byrne (2003) hypothesized, the link between right-wing authoritarianism and support for national security measures could be driven by two factors that form the foundation of right wing authoritarian attitudes: obedience to authority and aggression against perceived outsiders. The tightening of national security has been linked to both of these constructs, as citizens are encouraged to support the government by joining the “war on terror.” Terrorists, particularly from Muslim countries, are the clearly identified “enemy outsiders” driving the need for security restrictions. Thus, individuals with highly authoritarian attitudes may have responded positively to the underlying themes of obedience and aggression contained in the SCL.

Also consistent with previous research was the finding that participants’ trust in the government was correlated with their willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. Given that many of the items on the SCL involve government or law enforcement officials gathering information about citizens (e.g., monitoring financial transactions, reading personal mail), individuals who support such policies likely have faith that those gathering the information are using it appropriately. As Davis and Silver (2004) also found, those who do not trust government and law enforcement officials to “do what is right” are less willing to allow these officials access to their private information. The Bush administration has demonstrated acute awareness of this relationship, as government officials have repeatedly assured the country that new security measures will not violate the civil liberties of “ordinary” Americans. President Bush, in the most recent example, spoke out against criticism of the National Security

Administration's collection of personal phone records by insisting that the government was only seeking information about al-Qaeda and pledging that citizens' privacy would be "fiercely protected" (Associated Press, 2006 May). Results of the present investigation suggest that such assurances could be an important factor in individuals' support for new national security policies.

Several measures, although positively correlated with the SCL, failed to contribute unique variance to SCL scores. Nationalism and conservatism were highly correlated with blind patriotism ($r = .61$ and $-.58$, respectively) right-wing authoritarianism ($r = .58$ and $-.67$, respectively), and trust in government ($r = .39$ and $-.46$, respectively) (the negative correlation coefficients are a reflection of the fact that conservatism is indicated by a low score on the liberalism/conservatism measure). Nationalism is commonly thought to be comprised of two components: positive attachment to one's own country and derogation of other groups or countries (e.g., Feshbach, 1990; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). It is possible that the national pride component of nationalism was subsumed by the blind patriotism measure, while the derogation of other countries factor was subsumed by the aggression against outgroups component of right-wing authoritarianism. The finding that conservatism failed to significantly predict SCL scores demonstrates that this constellation of beliefs does not contribute unique variance beyond that already accounted for by blind patriotism, right-wing authoritarianism, and trust in government. Conceptually, the construct of conservatism shares several common factors with these three variables. Many of the political and social beliefs espoused in Altemeyer's RWA scale (1988), for example, mirror those expressed by conservative groups (e.g., the value of "traditional" thinking,

anti-gay sentiment, the use of the Bible as a guide for behavior). Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999) reported that blind patriotism was positively correlated with both political conservatism and Republican party identification. Political conservatives currently hold most of the positions of power in the government. Therefore, the relationship between blind patriotism and conservatism may be even stronger, as conservative individuals are likely to feel some loyalty toward government officials who share their beliefs. This sentiment may also be subsumed by the Trust in Government measure. Thus, it is possible that these secondary implications of conservatism (i.e., loyalty toward a conservative presidential administration, a belief in traditional and authoritarian thinking, trust that the current conservative government will “do what is right,”), rather than conservative values per se, drove this construct’s relationship with the SCL. Threat perception was a third variable that correlated positively with SCL scores but did not add meaningful predictive power. This may be due to the fact that the correlation between threat perception and SCL scores, although significant, was small ($r = .15$). In addition, threat perception was positively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism ($r = .10$) and was significantly impacted by cohort ($\eta^2 = 0.046$), with parents reporting greater perceived threat than students. It is possible that the relationship between threat perception and the SCL was subsumed by similar factors driving the SCL’s relationship with right-wing authoritarianism and cohort.

In summary, although a number of personality and attitude factors are correlated with individuals’ willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security, variables that offered unique and meaningful contributions to the prediction of SCL scores were blind patriotism, right-wing authoritarianism, and trust in government. A common factor

among these three constructs is that each makes reference to attitudes toward authority. Specifically, each includes a component of obedience, loyalty, or trust toward government authority figures.

Future Directions

The present investigation takes a step toward further establishing the SCL as a valid and reliable measure of individuals' willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for greater security. Further examination of the SCL's psychometric properties is recommended, however, integrating diverse samples from a variety of populations. Administering the SCL to older adults, to religious and ethnic minority groups, and to individuals from diverse educational backgrounds will provide valuable data on different groups' attitudes toward civil liberties and security.

Additional investigations could also assess the impact of recent world events on SCL scores. The present investigation found no significant change in SCL scores over a period of three years; however, it is possible that SCL scores may fluctuate in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack or related event. Should additional terrorist attacks occur, the SCL could be administered in the following days or weeks to evaluate the impact of the event. Although threat perception did not prove to be a significant predictor of SCL scores in the present study, the immediacy of a terrorist attack may nonetheless impact attitudes toward national security measures. Alternatively, the SCL could be administered shortly after media stories broke about invasion of the average citizen's privacy to assess whether such events might decrease scores on the SCL.

Future research on the SCL might also work toward further establishing the connection between blind patriotism, right wing authoritarianism, trust in government,

and willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security. The present study provided evidence that blind patriotism predicts SCL scores; additional investigations might shed additional light on this link by demonstrating whether directly appealing to blind patriotism might increase willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security. Participants might be exposed to messages promoting blind patriotism, after which they can be administered the SCL. These scores can be compared to those of a control group in order to determine the impact of the patriotic appeals. Similar studies could be conducted using messages that appeal to right-wing authoritarian attitudes and trust in government. The results of such studies would have major implications in the political arena. If direct appeals to blind patriotism, right-wing authoritarianism, and trust in government are successful in increasing support for national security measures, these techniques could easily be manipulated by government leaders to further their cause.

Further research on the SCL should also be conducted to determine what additional factors are important predicting one's willingness to sacrifice civil liberties in exchange for security. The personality and attitude variables in the present study accounted for only 37% of the variance in SCL scores; cohort and gender accounted for 8.5% of the variance. As individuals weigh their desire for civil liberties with a need for greater security, additional factors are clearly relevant in determining their decisions. Possible factors for future exploration include degree of personal impact of the attacks, degree of racist attitudes, or individual levels of fear, anxiety, or anger related to the terrorist attacks.

Five years after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the social and political landscape of the United States continues to reverberate. The U.S. government's new

national security policies have proven to be among the most far-reaching and polarizing of these changes. As law enforcement and government officials have greater power to investigate citizens, the relative roles of liberty and security in the lives of individual Americans are shifting. Although psychologists have extensively studied civil liberties attitudes, there is limited research available on civil liberties attitudes in the context of war and terrorism. An understanding of these attitudes is essential as Americans continue to make decisions regarding how much freedom they are willing to sacrifice in order to feel more secure. As the only known measure of post-September 11 civil liberties attitudes, the SCL can serve a unique and important role in psychology and the social sciences. The present investigation represents an important step toward further validating its psychometric properties and advancing the understanding of the factors involved in predicting individuals' willingness to give up civil liberties for security.

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APPENDIX A

This survey asks you a number of questions related to political, social, and personal beliefs and attitudes. Please respond to the questions on this survey as honestly as you can, and answer every question. Please do not put your name anywhere on this survey. We want your answers to remain completely anonymous, and at no time will your answers be traced back to you. Thank you for your participation in this study.

Your Age: _____ **Your Gender:** Male Female

Are You A United States Citizen? Yes No

Your Year in School: Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior

Your Ethnicity (mark all that apply):

- Native American African American Asian American
 Hispanic/Latino White non-Hispanic Other:

Your Religious Affiliation:

- Catholic Jewish Protestant Buddhist Muslim
 No religious affiliation Other:

Political Affiliation: Democrat Republican Independent No affiliation Other: _____

DIRECTIONS: In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the possibility of further attacks in the United States is a concern to citizens and government officials. Listed below are actual and possible actions that the U.S. government is taking to increase national security, in hopes of preventing additional acts of terrorism. Using the scale below, please indicate the degree to which you would support the government in taking the following actions:

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Oppose</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Slightly</u> <u>Oppose</u>	<u>Slightly</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Support</u>
1. Allowing undercover FBI agents to attend religious ceremonies in order to monitor potential terrorists	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. Allowing law enforcement officials investigating terrorism to place wiretaps on the telephones of people living in the United States	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. Allowing FBI agents to keep track of public library and bookstore records to monitor people who borrow or purchase suspicious books	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Slightly Oppose	Slightly Support	Support	Strongly Support
4. Giving law enforcement officials the freedom to detain individuals for questioning whether or not a crime has been committed	0	0	0	0	0	0
5. Establishment of an identification card for all Americans containing fingerprints, address, and criminal record	0	0	0	0	0	0
6. Monitoring the financial transactions of people in America for connections to possible terrorist groups	0	0	0	0	0	0
7. Development of a database to monitor the activities of people in America who have ties to the Middle East	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. Installation of video cameras in public places to watch for suspicious activity	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. Allowing law enforcement officials investigating terrorism to access email of people in America	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. Allowing law enforcement officials investigating terrorism to eavesdrop on conversations between attorneys and clients	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. Establishment of armed guards in public places to monitor suspicious activity	0	0	0	0	0	0
12. Allowing airlines, buses, and trains to deny services at their own discretion to suspicious-looking persons	0	0	0	0	0	0
13. Preventing suspicious individuals from working in "high security" jobs, where they might have access to chemicals, firearms, sensitive information, etc.	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. Limiting the ability of individuals to publicly question U.S. anti-terrorism policies	0	0	0	0	0	0
15. Allowing the government to restrict immigration and visas for individuals from Middle-Eastern countries	0	0	0	0	0	0
16. Allowing law enforcement officials to search an individual's home or office without notifying the individual first	0	0	0	0	0	0
17. Allowing law enforcement officials to seize documents, books, computers, or files from an individual's home or office if the materials are to be used as part of a terrorism investigation	0	0	0	0	0	0
18. Allowing law enforcement officials to conduct a physical search of an individual whether or not there is "probable cause" to believe that the individual is involved in criminal activity	0	0	0	0	0	0
19. Allowing undercover FBI agents to attend political rallies in an effort to identify potential terrorists	0	0	0	0	0	0
20. Allowing law enforcement officials to monitor Internet search engine activity (e.g., Google or Yahoo! searches) for suspicious-looking research	0	0	0	0	0	0

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Slightly Oppose	Slightly Support	Support	Strongly Support
21. Permitting airport security personnel to use “racial profiling” when deciding which passengers to search	0	0	0	0	0	0
22. Allowing undercover FBI agents to monitor Internet chat rooms for signs of suspicious activity	0	0	0	0	0	0
23. Allowing undercover FBI agents access to commercial marketing databases, such as those used by telemarketers, to search for information on potential terrorists	0	0	0	0	0	0
24. Allowing suspected terrorists to be tried in military courts, where no jury is present and proceedings are kept secret from the public	0	0	0	0	0	0
25. Allowing law enforcement officials to establish 24-hour surveillance of individuals who may be associated with suspected terrorists	0	0	0	0	0	0
26. Requiring businesses to report all suspicious-looking purchases/requests (e.g., flight lessons, biochemical substances, blueprints of buildings) to law enforcement officials	0	0	0	0	0	0
27. Allowing law enforcement officials to detain individuals for questioning in terrorist investigations without telling the public	0	0	0	0	0	0
28. Allowing law enforcement officials to search through the trash of individuals in order to gain information on potential terrorists or terrorist attacks	0	0	0	0	0	0
29. Allowing law enforcement officials to conduct a physical search of a person’s property whether or not there is “probable cause” to believe that the person is involved in criminal activity	0	0	0	0	0	0
30. Allowing law enforcement officials investigating terrorism to open and read mail of people in America	0	0	0	0	0	0

DIRECTIONS: Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. Mark “True” if it is true for you, or “False” if it is false.

	<u>True</u>	<u>False</u>
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates	○	○
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble	○	○
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged	○	○
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone	○	○
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life	○	○
6. I am sometimes resentful when I don't get my way	○	○
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress	○	○
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant	○	○
9. If I could get into a movie without paying for it and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it	○	○
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability	○	○
11. I like to gossip at times	○	○
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right	○	○
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener	○	○
14. I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something	○	○
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone	○	○
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake	○	○
17. I always try to practice what I preach	○	○
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, obnoxious people	○	○
19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget	○	○
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it	○	○
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable	○	○
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way	○	○
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things	○	○
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings	○	○
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor	○	○
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own	○	○
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car	○	○
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others	○	○
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off	○	○
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me	○	○
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause	○	○
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved	○	○
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings	○	○

DIRECTIONS: Please read each of the following statements and respond to them using the scale shown:

	Very Strongly Disagree	Neutral	Very Strongly Agree
1. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. It is wonderful that young people can protest against anything they don’t like, and act however they wish nowadays	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. People should pay <i>less</i> attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. What our country <i>really</i> needs, instead of more “civil rights,” is a good stiff dose of law and order	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is the head the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the better. The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
8. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
9. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10. There is nothing immoral or sick about somebody’s being a homosexual	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11. It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
12. Obedience is the most important virtue children should learn	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
13. There is no “one right way” to live your life; everyone has to create his <i>own</i> way	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
14. Once our government leaders condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
15. Government, judges, and the police should never be allowed to censor books	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
16. Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
17. In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Very Strongly Disagree	Neutral	Very Strongly Agree
18. Atheists and others who have rebelled against established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
19. Some young people get rebellious ideas, but as they get older they ought to become more mature and forget such things	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
20. There is nothing really wrong with a lot of the things people call "sins"	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
21. Everyone should have his own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes him different than everyone else	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
22. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back on our true path	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
23. Authorities such as parents and our national leaders generally turn out to be right about things, and the radicals and protestors are almost always wrong	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
24. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
25. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
26. The <i>real</i> keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
27. We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
28. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
29. Students must be taught to challenge their parents' views, confront authorities, and criticize the traditions of our society	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
30. One reason we have so many troublemakers in our society nowadays is that parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

DIRECTIONS: Please read each of the following statements and respond to them using the scale shown:

	Disagree Strongly	Agree Strongly
1. People who do not whole-heartedly support America should live somewhere else.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. The United States is virtually always right.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. I would support my country right or wrong.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. The anti-Vietnam war protestors were un-American.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. For the most part, people who demonstrate against U.S. policy are good, upstanding, intelligent people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. I believe that U.S. policies are almost always the morally correct ones.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. If another country disagreed with an important United States policy that I knew little about, I would <i>not</i> necessarily support my country's position.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	<u>Disagree</u> <u>Strongly</u>			<u>Agree</u> <u>Strongly</u>		
8. People should not constantly try to change the way things are in America.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
9. I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10. There is too much criticism of the U.S. in the world, and we its citizens should not criticize it.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11. It is un-American to criticize this country.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
12. We should have complete freedom of speech even for those who criticize the country.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
13. People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
14. If you love America, you should notice its problems and work to correct them.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
15. I oppose some U.S. policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
16. I express my love for America by supporting efforts at positive change.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
17. My love of country demands that I speak out against popular but potentially destructive policies.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

DIRECTIONS: Please read each of the following statements and respond to them using the scale shown:

	<u>Very</u> <u>Conservative</u>			<u>Neutral</u>				<u>Very</u> <u>Liberal</u>	
1. Politically, I consider myself to be:	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. In terms of religion, I consider myself to be:	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. In terms of economic issues, I consider myself to be:	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. In terms of military and national defense issues, I consider myself to be:	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. In general, I consider myself to be:	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

DIRECTIONS: Please read each of the following statements and respond to them using the scale shown:

	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Agree</u>		<u>Neutral</u>		<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u>	
1. In view of America's moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. The first duty of every young American is to honor the national American history and heritage.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. The important thing for the U.S. foreign aid program is to see to it that the U.S. gains a political advantage.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. Other countries should try to make their governments as much like ours as possible.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. It is really not important that the U.S. be number one in whatever it does.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	<u>Strongly Agree</u>		<u>Neutral</u>		<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
7. Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes America to do things in a big way	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
8. It is important that the U.S. win in international sporting competitions like the Olympics	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

DIRECTIONS: Please read each of the following statements and respond to them using the scale shown:

	<u>Strongly Agree</u>		<u>Neutral</u>		<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
1. Most of the time, I can trust the government in Washington to do what is right.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. I would say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests who look out for themselves rather than for the benefit of all people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. Most of the time, I can trust law enforcement to do what is right.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. Since the terrorist attacks, my confidence in law enforcement has increased.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

DIRECTIONS: Please answer each of the following questions about your feelings since the terrorist attacks on September 11th using the scale shown:

	<u>Very Concerned</u>	<u>Somewhat Concerned</u>	<u>Not Very Concerned</u>
1. All in all, how concerned are you that the United States might suffer another terrorist attack in the next three months?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. How concerned are you about flying on an airplane?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. How concerned are you about opening your mail?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. How concerned are you about the safety of food and drinking water?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. How concerned are you about going into tall buildings?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. How concerned are you about being in large crowds or stadiums?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

APPENDIX B

Consent to Participate in a Research Study Colorado State University

TITLE OF STUDY: Civil Liberties and National Security (Phase 1)

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Jerry L. Deffenbacher, Ph.D. (970-491-6871)
jld6871@lamar.colostate.edu

CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Alison J. Byrne, M.S., ajbyrne@holly.colostate.edu

WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? We are investigating attitudes of young adults toward civil liberties and national security after the terrorist attacks of September 11.

WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? Jerry L. Deffenbacher, Professor in the Department of Psychology

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government developed a variety of new laws to protect the country from future attacks. Some of these laws, however, may interfere with individual liberties. The purpose of this study is to investigate attitudes of young adults toward giving up civil liberties in exchange for national security. We are also interested in how different personal characteristics relate to attitudes toward national security and civil liberties.

WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? This study will take place in classrooms at Colorado State University and will take approximately 45 minutes.

WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO? You will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires regarding your attitudes toward giving up civil liberties in exchange for national security, your ideas about politics, your level of patriotism, and your concerns about the possibility of a future terrorist attack against the United States.

ARE THERE REASONS WHY I SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? If you are under the age of 18, contact Dr. Jerry L. Deffenbacher and arrangements will be made for your parents to review the project and provide their consent for you to be involved, if they give their permission to participate.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? Risks are minimal. All questionnaires are voluntary, and may be terminated at any time. We do not want our research to put you at risk. In fact, our research depends on honest, truthful responses. We protect you by the way the questionnaires are completed and materials are turned in. Do not put your name anywhere on the questionnaires so that they are anonymous. We think these procedures protect you and minimize risk so that it should not be a problem to respond openly and truthfully. It is not possible to identify all potential risks in research procedures, but the researchers have taken reasonable safeguards to minimize any known and potential, but unknown, risks.

WILL I BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? There are no known benefits to you.

DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Page__ of__ Participant's initials _____ Date _____

WHAT WILL IT COST ME TO PARTICIPATE? There are no known costs to participating, except for the time you take completing the questionnaires.

WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT I GIVE? This study is anonymous. Since your name or other personally identifying information are not on the questionnaire, this means that no one, not even members of the research team, will know that the information you give comes from you. Your information will be kept in locked, secure areas and will be seen only by research staff. We will keep private all research records that identify you, to the extent allowed by law. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. You will not be identified in these written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will keep your name and other identifying information private.

CAN MY TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in this study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

WILL I RECEIVE ANY COMPENSATION FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? You will earn one PY100 research credit for taking part in this study.

WHAT HAPPENS IF I AM INJURED BECAUSE OF THE RESEARCH? The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act determines and may limit Colorado State University's legal responsibility if an injury happens because of this study. Claims against the University must be filed within 180 days of the injury.

WHAT IF I HAVE QUESTIONS? Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please direct any questions you might have right now to the research assistant. Later, if you have questions about the study, you can contact the investigator, Dr. Jerry L. Deffenbacher at 970-491-6871 or jld6871@lamar.colostate.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact Celia Walker, Director of Regulatory Compliance, at 970-491-1553. We will give you a copy of this consent form to take with you.

WHAT ELSE DO I NEED TO KNOW? Hopefully, we have answered all of your questions, but if you have any questions, ask the research assistant or contact Dr. Jerry L. Deffenbacher.

Your signature acknowledges that you have read the information stated and willingly sign this consent form. Your signature also acknowledges that you have received, on the date signed, a copy of this document containing two pages.

Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

Date

Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study

Name of person providing information to participant

Date

Signature of Research Staff

Page__ of__ Participant's initials _____ Date _____

PARENTAL SIGNATURE FOR MINOR

As parent or guardian I authorize _____ (print name) to become a participant for the described research. The nature and general purpose of the project have been satisfactorily explained to me by _____ and I am satisfied that proper precautions will be observed.

Minor's date of birth

Parent/Guardian name (printed)

Parent/Guardian signature

Date

Page__ of__ Participant's initials _____ Date _____

APPENDIX C

Experimenter Script

Thanks for your participation in this study. My name is _____, and I will be running the study tonight. This is a study investigating your attitudes toward national security after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001.

There are two parts to this study. During the first part, you will complete a survey packet asking you a variety of questions about your attitudes and beliefs. This part will take about 45 minutes to complete, and you will earn one research credit for your participation. The second part of the study is optional. Those of you who are interested can have additional survey packets mailed to your parents. You will earn one additional research credit if one or more of your parents completes and returns a survey packet.

The first thing that I will do is pass out two copies of this informed consent sheet. This sheet describes the first portion of the study, the procedure that you will follow, and the credit that you will receive for your participation. You should read the sheet, initial the bottom of each page, and sign one copy. When everyone has finished, I will ask you to pass the signed copy of your sheet to the end of the rows, where they will be collected. You should keep the second copy of the informed consent sheet for your own records.

*Pass out **Phase 1 Informed Consent Sheets**. Wait several minutes for participants to read and sign the form.*

Please pass the signed copy of your informed consent sheet to the end of your row.

*Collect signed copies of **Phase 1 Informed Consent Sheet**.*

Next, I will be passing out a survey packet for you to fill out. You should complete each section of the survey according to the written instructions at the top of each section. Your answers to this survey will be anonymous -- do not write your name anywhere on the packet.

When you are finished, please sit quietly. When everyone is finished, we'll pass out a sign-out sheet for you to fill in and give instructions for the second portion of the study.

Wait for everyone to finish filling out the survey (while people are doing the survey, you can go through all the Phase 1 Informed Consent sheets, make sure they're signed, and sign the "Research Staff" lines). When people finish the packets, move on to the next step – DON'T collect the survey packets yet.

Now we're going to pass out a sign-out sheet and debriefing form. The sign-out sheet is very important – it's what we'll use to give you the research credit you earned by filling out this survey. The debriefing form further explains this study and provides you with

contact information in case you'd like to learn more about the study. Please fill in the sign-out sheet as you receive it. The debriefing form is yours to keep. When everyone is finished filling in their sign-out sheet, I'll have you pass them to the ends of your rows.

Pass out Sign-Out Sheet 1 and Debriefing Form.

Wait for everyone to finish, have them pass the Sign-Out sheets to the end of the row and collect them. Don't collect the original survey packets yet – people will need them for the 2nd phase.

You all have the opportunity to participate in the second phase of this study by having additional survey packets mailed to one or both of your parents. If one or more of your parents completes and return a survey packet, you will receive an additional research credit. The credit will be given to you when your parents' completed packet is received by us in the mail. If you are interested in mailing surveys to your parents, please remain seated – you'll spend a few minutes filling out additional consent forms and addressing packets to your parents. If you are not interested in participating, please bring your survey forms to the front of the room, and you'll be free to leave.

Collect survey packets from people leaving.

I'm going to pass out three copies of an informed consent form. This explains the second phase of the study, the procedure that you will follow, and the credit that you will receive for your participation. You should read the sheet, initial the bottom of each page, and sign ALL copies. When everyone has finished, I will ask you to pass ONE of the signed copies of your sheet to the end of the rows, where they will be collected. You should keep the other signed copies to mail to your parents.

Pass out THREE copies of Phase 2 Informed Consent.

Please pass ONE signed copy of the informed consent to the end of your row.

Collect Informed Consent sheets.

Now I'm going to pass out a second sign-out sheet. This will allow us to give you credit when your parents return the survey forms. You will need to know the code number on your original survey form to fill in the sign-out sheet. Please look at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of your survey packet: there should be a 3-digit code number at the top. On your sign-out sheet, there's a line in the upper-right corner for you to write in this 3-digit number. It's very important that you do this! If you don't, we won't be able to give you credit when your parents return the packets. Please raise your hand if you're having trouble finding your code number.

Assist anyone who needs help finding their code number.

*Pass out **Phase 2 Sign-Out Sheet** and give people a minute to fill it out.*

Now I'm going to pass out two envelopes containing copies of the survey form, one for each of your parents. The envelopes contain a copy of the survey packet, a cover letter explaining the study, and a stamped envelope for your parents to return the completed survey in. When you get your packets, there are three things you need to do:

First, pull out the survey packets from the envelopes and, in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of each packet, write in the 3-digit code number from your own original survey packet. This is what will allow us to connect you to your parents, so when they return the packet with your code number on it, you'll get the additional research credit.

Second, please place a signed copy of your informed consent sheet in each envelope – this lets your parents know that you consented to have this information mailed to them.

Finally, fill in your parents' address on the outside of the envelope so that it can be mailed to them. Address a separate envelope to each individual parent that you'd like to mail the survey to, even if they live at the same address. If you only want to mail it to one parent, you only need to prepare one packet -- leave the second envelope blank.

*Hand out **TWO Parent Survey Packets** to each person.*

When you're finished filling in the packets, please bring the packets, your original survey, and your second sign-out sheet to the front of the room. Thanks very much for participating!

*Before leaving, organize sign-out sheets (separate Phase 1 and Phase 2 sheets), informed consent sheets (separate Phase 1 and Phase 2 sheets), parent packets, and original survey packets all in **SEPARATE** piles/files/envelopes labeled with the date the data collection took place. Return all supplies to the research room.*

APPENDIX D

Consent to Participate in a Research Study Colorado State University

TITLE OF STUDY: Civil Liberties and National Security (Phase 2)

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Jerry L. Deffenbacher, Ph.D. (970-491-6871)
jld6871@lamar.colostate.edu

CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Alison J. Byrne, M.S., ajbyrne@holly.colostate.edu

WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? We are investigating attitudes of the parents of college students toward civil liberties and national security after the terrorist attacks of September 11. This part of the study asks your permission to have one or more parents or stepparents complete the questionnaires you completed and indicate their age, gender, and relationship to you. This will allow a comparison between your reactions and those with whom you grew up.

WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? Jerry L. Deffenbacher, Professor in the Department of Psychology

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government developed a variety of new laws to protect the country from future attacks. Some of these laws, however, may interfere with individual liberties. The purpose of this study is to investigate people's attitudes toward giving up civil liberties in exchange for national security. We are also interested in how different personal characteristics relate to attitudes toward national security and civil liberties.

WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? This study will take about 30 minutes in your parent or stepparent's home.

WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO? You will be asking your parents to complete a series of questionnaires regarding their attitudes toward giving up civil liberties in exchange for national security, their ideas about politics, level of patriotism, and concerns about the possibility of a future terrorist attack against the United States. A copy of this form, a letter explaining the study, a set of questionnaires, and a stamped return envelope will be sent to the person to whom you addressed the envelope for mailing. If that person agrees to participate, he/she will complete and return the questionnaires. When a set of questionnaires with your code number is received, you will be credited with an additional research credit. You are encouraged to send more than one set of questionnaires (e.g., to both parents), but will receive only 1 credit for any received.

ARE THERE REASONS WHY I SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? If you are under the age of 18, contact Dr. Jerry L. Deffenbacher and arrangements will be made for your parents to review the project and provide their consent for you to be involved, if they give their permission to participate.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? Risks are minimal. All questionnaires are voluntary and may be terminated at any time. We do not want our research to put your parent at risk. In fact, our research depends on honest, truthful responses. We protect you by the way the questionnaires are completed and materials are turned in. There is a code number in the upper right hand corner of your questionnaires. You will be asked to print that code number on questionnaires sent to your parent/stepparent. This number will be used to credit you when a questionnaire is returned. As soon as a questionnaire with your number on it is received, you will be credited for participation and your code number will be removed from the sign-out sheet. When this is done, your questionnaire and your parent/stepparent's will be anonymous

Page__ of__ Participant's initials _____ Date _____

since your name cannot be connected to either questionnaire. We think these procedures protect you and minimize risk so that it should not be a problem to respond openly and truthfully. It is not possible to identify all potential risks in research procedures, but the researchers have taken reasonable safeguards to minimize any known and potential, but unknown, risks.

WILL I BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? There are no known benefits to you.

DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

WHAT WILL IT COST ME TO PARTICIPATE? There are no known costs to participating.

WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT I GIVE? This study is anonymous, except for the short time before your parent/stepparent returns the questionnaires. During this time, your questionnaires will be stored in one locked room and your sign-out sheet in another locked room. Then, since your name or other personally identifying information are not on the questionnaire, this means that no one, not even members of the research team, will know that the information you give comes from you. Your information will be kept in locked, secure areas and will be seen only by research staff. We will keep private all research records that identify you, to the extent allowed by law. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. You will not be identified in these written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will keep your name and other identifying information private.

CAN MY TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in this study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participating at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

WILL I RECEIVE ANY COMPENSATION FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? You will earn one PY100 research credit for taking part in this study.

WHAT HAPPENS IF I AM INJURED BECAUSE OF THE RESEARCH? The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act determines and may limit Colorado State University's legal responsibility if an injury happens because of this study. Claims against the University must be filed within 180 days of the injury.

WHAT IF I HAVE QUESTIONS? Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please direct any questions you might have right now to the research assistant. Later, if you have questions about the study, you can contact the investigator, Dr. Jerry L. Deffenbacher at 970-491-6871 or jld6871@lamar.colostate.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact Celia Walker, Director of Regulatory Compliance, at 970-491-1553. We will give you a copy of this consent form to take with you.

WHAT ELSE DO I NEED TO KNOW? Hopefully, we have answered all of your questions, but if you have any questions, ask the research assistant or contact Dr. Jerry L. Deffenbacher. Your signature acknowledges that you have read the information stated and willingly sign this consent form. Your signature also acknowledges that you have received, on the date signed, a copy of this document containing two pages.

Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

Date

Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study

Name of person providing information to participant

Date

Signature of Research Staff

Page__ of__ Participant's initials _____ Date _____

PARENTAL SIGNATURE FOR MINOR

As parent or guardian I authorize _____ (print name) to become a participant for the described research. The nature and general purpose of the project have been satisfactorily explained to me by _____ and I am satisfied that proper precautions will be observed.

Minor's date of birth

Parent/Guardian name (printed)

Parent/Guardian signature

Date

Page ___ of ___ Participant's initials _____ Date _____

APPENDIX E

[Letter to be Printed on Departmental Letterhead]

Date

Dear Parent or Stepparent of an Introductory Psychology Student:

Your son or daughter is participating in a research project at Colorado State University. His/her name appears on the enclosed copy of a form he/she signed giving you permission to participate.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, increasing national security has been a primary concern of both government officials and the general public. In many cases, however, actions taken to increase security have the potential to infringe on our civil liberties. Some people may be willing to give up certain individual freedoms in order to receive greater protection against potential terrorist attacks. Others may not be willing to make such an exchange. The degree to which a person will give up personal freedoms in order to gain greater security is thus an important thing to understand. The questionnaires enclosed help us understand this important issue and the person's characteristics related to this issue. The research is also designed to explore reactions of college students and of adults and to see how they are similar or different.

The student has identified you as a parent or stepparent and has given permission for you to participate in part of this research. If you agree to participate, you will complete a set of questionnaires almost identical to the ones he/she completed. You are under no obligation to participate, but if you do, the student will receive one additional research credit for Introductory Psychology (PY 100).

Please look through the questionnaires and decide if you are willing to complete them. They take most people about 30 minutes to complete. You will notice a code number on your questionnaires. The questionnaires the student filled out had the same code number. This number will be used to match questionnaires and assist in giving the student credit for your participation. As soon as your questionnaire is received, the code number will be removed from a form that has the student's name and code number, and the student will be given additional credit. When this is done, your questionnaire and the student's questionnaire can be matched, but both of your questionnaires are anonymous since the student's name cannot be connected to either questionnaire. If you decide to participate, complete the questionnaires, being sure to answer all of the questions, and return them in the stamped envelope. By returning the questionnaires, you are acknowledging your consent to participate in this research. Please return the questionnaire as soon as possible so the student may be credited in a timely manner.

If you have chosen to participate, the student appreciates your involvement. However, we truly appreciate your assistance because it will help us understand people's attitudes toward national security and civil liberties. If you have any questions, please do not

hesitate to contact me at the above address or by phone (970) 491-6871 or by e-mail (jld6871@lamar.colostate.edu). Once again, thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Jerry L. Deffenbacher, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology