DISSERTATION

DIASPORAS OF DIFFERENCE: TURKISH COMMUNITIES IN GERMANY, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES

Submitted by

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

DIASPORAS OF DIFFERENCE: TURKISH COMMUNITIES

IN GERMANY, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES

This dissertation is about the cultural and socioeconomic experience and assimilation of Turkish immigrants and their descendants in three countries: Canada, the United States, and Germany. In these countries, the Turks form diaspora communities. Describing Turkish immigrant communities as diasporas attributes to them the capacity for reproduction through generations, maintaining themselves as minority groups. To maintain distinctive cultural identities within the larger environment of the host society—at individual and community levels—depends upon the cultural and structural conditions imposed by the dominant hegemonic group, as well as the community's own internal affiliations and resources. The main question in this work is whether and how Turks culturally and structurally assimilate into the host societies. The three countries provide a frame for comparative understanding of the process.

It uses a multi-method approach to investigate Turkish experiences. Primary materials were collected by 80 in-depth interviews in the Vancouver British Columbia and Seattle Washington regions, and the extraction of statistics from census data files in

Canada and the United States; whereas my study of the Turkish German diaspora was based on secondary materials which are plentiful. My aim was to contribute an original basis for the study of the North American diasporas, which is not otherwise available, and to make comparisons with the better-known Turkish German diaspora.

The results show that in all three Turkish communities, Turks are currently cultural hybrids. Their assimilation is not yet complete. They learn English and eventually use it as their home language. They intermarry within their host societies. However, Turks still maintain a Turkish identity heavily influenced by their proud Turkish cultural heritage. They still experience some economic and cultural exclusion and discrimination (more so in Germany and the least of all in the United States). Finally they form ethnic organizations for religious, cultural, political, and economic purposes in the diaspora. Based on this research, most Turks are expected to continue to strive for assimilation within the societies where they live; but also to continue the celebration of their ancestral origins and contemporary Turkish culture.

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Dedicated to Fred Shorter

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Research Problem

This work describes the cultural and socioeconomic experience of Turks and their descendants in North America. North America is understood here to be Canada and the United States, excluding Mexico—for the simple reason that very few Turks have emigrated to Mexico. The Turks of North America form a diaspora, by which I mean an ethnic community whose members have been dispersed from their original geographical location by migration, and who remain ethnically distinct in their present host societies.[1] In this dissertation, I use a diasporic description of Turks in North America to investigate how their culture changes as they interact with the cultures of their host societies. For comparative perspective, I also include the Turkish immigrant experience in Germany.

Some traditional perspectives on ethnicity, such as cultural pluralism, explain immigrant behavior and the way immigrants do things by reference to their background socialization, and assume that the same traits are transferred to succeeding generations through socialization (Zhou 1997:981). Thus, cultural pluralism focuses on the structural and cultural persistence of an ethnic group. Other theories, such as assimilation theory in

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[1] See also *Random House Dictionary* (1996:548), Tölölyan (1991:4), Connor (1986), and Safran (1981:83).

its original version (Park and Burgess 1921 reprinted 1969; Gordon 1964) argue that immigrant behavior is reshaped over time by the social, economic, and cultural structures of the host country to the extent that immigrants eventually cut all ties with their native societies and cultures (Rumbaut 1997:925). Neither original immigrants nor their offspring, argues assimilation theory, are able to sustain a diasporic community. These approaches are two extreme perspectives—and as we shall see, between the two lies fruitful ground for investigation. This includes attention to the structural and cultural constraints and opportunities migrants experience.

My research examines the Turkish experience in North America and underscores the importance of looking for evidence of interaction of cultural and structural forces that reshape the lives, experiences, and identities of the first and later generations of immigrants. Looking at the interplay of structural and cultural factors allows us to offer some explanation for the dramatically different outcomes for Turks in Europe and North America. Turkish communities in the United States are, overall, better off in terms of basic measures of well-being than are the Turkish communities in Canada or in Germany, relative to their host countries; and these measures are further supported by my ethnographic work in Canada and the United States. Both cultural and structural factors account for these differences, but as I will demonstrate, the constraints and opportunities

presented by receiver states and host societies[2] to immigrants are vital to the success of the immigrant community.

Looking at the assimilation experiences of Turkish immigrants in different communities, I argue that identity is a cultural resource that immigrants use to negotiate with the macro-structures, including the state, where they live and work.[3] Identity is a subjective phenomenon in its representation (Hall 1997:49). However, it is socially formed by individuals through processes of interaction.[4] As a result, surrounding cultures and structures are reflected in the identities immigrants construct. Fernandez Kelly and Schauffler (1996) suggest that representation of identity is a way to say, "Here I am. This is the way I feel and think in my particular environment." How much Turks feel at home in their host societies shows in the self/other characterizations that they express.

Little is known about Turkish migrants in North America by the public, policymakers, or academics. Empirically, Turks are one of the least studied ethnic groups in North America. My being Turkish and my knowledge of the Turkish language are personal reasons that make the study of Turks attractive to me.

Current knowledge of the Turkish diaspora comes mainly from research based on the European experience of Turkish immigrants, especially from the Turkish German

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[2] I refer to receiver states to indicate the state with its authority as an actor, and to host countries (or societies) as the countries (or societies) as a whole. The same distinction is made when I refer to sender states, different from native countries (or societies).

[3] Concerning cultural resources, see Fernandez Kelly and Schauffler (1996).

[4] On these processes of interaction, see Giddens (1984:3-4).

experience.[5] As my research demonstrates, however, there are significant differences between Turkish diasporic communities flourishing in North America and those in Germany.

Global Labor Flows and the Wider Socioeconomic Context

Turks are one of the many peoples affected by current global changes. International migration (as distinct from internal urbanization and local inter-regional movements) has become a major force in making the current world. Based on a report of UNESCO's World Commission on Culture and Development, Homi Bhabha (1997) has stated that recent decades have seen greater movement and settlement across national frontiers than ever before. According to a recent report of the United States National Research Council (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000:157),

> In 1965, the world's stock of international migrants—those born in one country but resident in another—totaled roughly 75 million. By 1990, their numbers had risen to nearly 120 million. In just the 5 years between 1985 and 1990, the total stock of migrants increased by 15 million, or 2.6 percent annually, a rate of increase higher than the annual rate of natural increase in the [world] population.

International migration is absolutely central to the dynamics of population growth in many countries, some of which depend upon immigration to grow in size and maintain

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[5] See, for example, "Identity Crisis of Turkish Migrants: First and Second Generation," by Nermin Abadan-Unat (1985).

labor force when natural increase—births minus deaths—is low or negative, as is the case in the United States and Canada. The millions of displaced peoples, dislocated cultures, and fractured communities of the global South are the sources of these labor movements and recently-created diasporas (Hall 1993: 362). The Turkish population is now part of this process.

Turks are moving to Europe, especially Germany, and to Australia, Canada, and the United States, using the channels of either economic immigration or family unification. Relatively higher salaries, social benefits, and political freedoms in these countries are the main attractions for Turks. After 1961, Germany initially attracted several hundred thousand adult working-class Turks—more men than women, and all under the age of forty—because they were offered specific jobs, better income, and no requirement of more than primary-school education at a time when macroeconomic structural changes in Turkey offered little to them. When the era of temporary economic migration to Germany for specific manufacturing and mining jobs ended in 1973, the diaspora continued to grow, reaching two million today, because the community was attractive to relatives who could enter the Turkish German diaspora without severe demands for cultural change. Natural reproduction at rates higher than the German ones continues to build the diaspora, which has reached two million today.

Ever since the 1970s, the United States and Canada have appealed to young middle-class Turks who could obtain better incomes with their already-acquired higher education, or could add to that education by graduate professional study in North America. The attraction of the information technology and engineering sectors was

particularly strong compared to job opportunities that were unstable and unpredictable in Turkey. With the founding of families and reunification by bringing close relatives, these modest-sized diasporas—totaling about one hundred thousand members in the two countries—could now, like Germany's diaspora survive on family unification and reproduction alone, even without additional economic migration.

Theorizing Globalization, Culture, and Ethnicity

A simple version of globalization theory, much like assimilation theory, foresees the eventual construction of a world culture, including economic and political structures, that would be quite European and North American in nature (Tosti 1999). As Overbeek (1995:22) writes, globalization is described as a consistent and systematic process of structural transformation of the world economy. Globalization is seen as an advanced stage of functional integration of finance, production, consumption, and communication networks (Dicken 1992). This version of globalization theory anticipates that the immigrant communities will ultimately be assimilated into the European and North American cultural and economic systems once they have interaction with them (Tosti 1999; Johnson 2001:149).

There are many who challenge this world view. Immigrant groups commonly resist assimilation into the industrial countries where they have come to live, or they face exclusion not of their own making. There are many examples of such communities—the Mexican community in the United States (Muss and van Dam 1996), the Chinese and South East Asian groups in Canada (Wong 1997), and Caribbean people living in

England (Gilroy 1991). In many industrial countries, migrants live on the margins of society, either in physically clustered spaces or in social and cultural exclusion. The migrant communities and their cultures are seen by some critics as evidence of the failure of globalization, because they are not absorbed smoothly into the global order (Van Hear 1998: 165-87).

Globalization, according to these critics, has not destroyed all the specific structures and identifications of the more localized communities (Hall 1993: 353). In addition, many corners of the affected societies—both Third World and Western—have not yet been drawn in. The process is incomplete and chaotic, rather than continuous and monolithic. Bauman (1998:57) calls this process the "new world disorder." Robertson (1995) names it "glocalisation." Globalization is much more a matter of the melding of diverse particularities than of imposing a so-called single and homogeneous life form with a Western value system and consumption habits (Woodiwiss 1996:806; Featherstone 1990:6). For this reason, as Featherstone (1995) suggests, it is important to examine how the power struggles between nation-states, blocs, and other collectivities gradually become globalized as more and more parts of the world are drawn into the competing configuration of interdependencies and power balances.

There are similarities between simple globalization and assimilation theory. Each one anticipates movement toward both local and worldwide cultural integration, despite the many opposing structures and cultural heritages. But there are so many particular exceptions, deviations, and failures to successfully account for empirical realities that both theories appear to require a richer and more flexible framework. For Robertson

(1995), "glocalisation" offers a starting point for such understanding. As I examine Turkey's absorption into global systems, particularly in relation to Europe and North America, I find that the results are partial, more relevant to certain classes and locations of the country, and contradictory by raising living standards for some groups while depressing others (White 1984; Keyder 1987; Göle 1997; Öniş 2000; Sandıkçı and Ger 2001). Turkish emigration to Germany, Europe, and North America could not have happened without such partial incorporation into the global system. Turkey's own experience of globalization has been "segmented," which is a concept that also applies particularly well as a modifier to "assimilation."

Segmented assimilation theory rejects the assumption of a relatively linear unidirectional process of identification into the dominant group ethnicity (Rumbaut 1996:126). It says that there are distinct modes of immigrant adaptation corresponding with social/structural contexts of reception; accordingly, it is unrealistic to talk about one homogeneous and hegemonic culture—whether global or national (Rumbaut and Portes 2001:5-6). This theory contends that the assimilation process is likely to produce different ethnic identities and new ethnic groups which subsequently assimilate into other ethnic subcultures (Alba and Nee 1997: 863; Portes and Zhou 1993:81; Portes 1995:249-275; and Rumbaut 1996:126; Portes and Rumbaut 2001:44-69). While accepting segmented assimilation theory's acknowledgment of heterogeneity, my work indicates that the immigrant Turkish experience may be better understood as a case of partial assimilation to the mainstream while retaining ethnic group identities of their own. Thus, there is a

process of construction of a hybrid identity of their own—similar but distinct from other ethnicities.

Hybridity is a concept that illuminates the process of cultural insertion into host societies. It describes a state of being in the process of assimilation. Hybridity may be defined as a cultural subjective platform processually constructed by bilingual and bicultural people out of their life experiences in societies where they have lived and are now living.[6] The concept of hybridity emphasizes that individuals are in constant negotiation with the national and cultural structures of both host and native countries, being challenged by both (Bhabha 1993, 1994, 1997). Hybridity helps us to better understand the personal identities of those within diaspora cultures not totally assimilated into their host societies (Hall 1989, 1990, 1993,1997). As I shall show, individuals in the Turkish North American diaspora take some parts of the culture of their host and native societies and create new identities for themselves which are hybrid—both alike and different from the cultures of the host societies.

I use ideas from assimilation theory, along with the related concept of hybridity, in an attempt to understand the structural and cultural roles played by the sending state, receiving states, and the Turkish immigrant communities as the relationships among them change through time. Turkish emigration, in terms of when it happens, from what classes—demographic as well as educational—and by what means, depends upon the structural and cultural conditions in both native and host countries. Sometimes one is

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[6] This is my definition based on Bhabha's works and is further elaborated in chapter two.

more important than the other, but both are relevant. For example, Turks initially moved from Turkey to Germany after labor market conditions in the two countries were assessed by the respective governments and acted upon by intergovernmental agreements for temporary labor. What appeared to be straightforward employment ultimately evolved into limited structural assimilation patterns and cultural segregation that correspond with the cultural and structural factors encountered by immigrants.

In North America, the recruitment and admission policies of the United States and Canada differed greatly from one another during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In the United States, immigration was tightly linked to private-sector employment offers, while in Canada entries were filtered through the state's own perceptions of what qualifications would lead to successful employment after arrival. I shall argue that modes of insertion and outcomes in the two countries differed precisely because of the role of the state.[7]

This study shows that states are not neutral in the formation of ethnic identities and individual belonging to diasporic communities. My research contributes to understanding how state policies on such issues as immigrant residency status, options for citizenship, conditions of eligibility for professional positions, language teaching, and educational opportunities may improve immigrant lives. The questions posed and findings of this study also provide a framework of options for comparative analysis and exploration.

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[7] State is understood here to mean "an organization controlling the principal concentrated means of coercion [governance] within a delimited territory and exercising priority in some respects over all other organizations within the same territory (Tilly 1995: 369)."

Considering the Turkish Case

The creation of Turkish diasporas in North America came late when compared to the history of other diasporic communities in Canada and the United States. Until the 1960s, very few individuals emigrated from the Turkish Republic (Akgündüz 1998). On the heels of Turkey's many wars, ending with independence in 1923, working-age laborers of all types were in very short supply (Shorter 1985). Turkey took many years to recover demographically, so initially unemployment was not a problem. In addition, the Turkish government professed occasional concerns about losing talented workers to the "brain drain" immigration experienced by other Third World countries (Oğuzkan 1975, 1976).

In the 1960s, Turkey's perspective on the world, or more precisely on Europe, changed. The well-known population explosion that hit so many Third-World countries as their death rates declined was in full swing, rebuilding Turkey's labor force and finally outrunning her need for labor (Shorter 1995:9-16). In Europe, the opposite was happening, as the dynamism of post-war economic expansion demanded a much larger labor force (Kolinsky 1996:78). West Germany in particular began seeking temporary workers from Mediterranean countries, eventually including Turkey, using bi-lateral government agreements. A cooperative effort of state-sponsored migration organized by the Turkish and West German governments started during this period (Kolinsky 1996). Though initially conceived of as temporary, with prescribed obligations of return, it eventually became emigration. This migration of guest workers set a precedent: new mind-sets about the advantages for both individuals and for the state helped to relax

Turkish policies that restricted emigration. But the travel subsidies and guaranteed jobs offered by the German government did not, in the long run, result in an economically advantaged Turkish population; indeed, the Turkish-German immigrants are today the least advantaged of these three Turkish diasporic groups. The reasons for this will be discussed in chapter 4.

Meanwhile, events and immigration-policy changes in Canada and the United States were shifting in response to their own economic and political dynamics. Both countries found that their preference for immigrants of European origin could not be met, precisely because those countries themselves were also short of labor as their economies grew steadily. Eventually, the need for labor in North America undermined the old preference systems, and new policies were enacted in1965 in the United States and in 1967 in Canada that opened the doors to immigrants from Turkey and other Third-World countries. Because of continuing restrictions on emigration by the Turkish state, and the absence of pre-arrangement of jobs and travel subsidies, however, migration of Turks to North America was slow to develop.

The breakthrough in emigration to North America came in the 1980s, after a series of economic crises, military coups, and economic restructuring in Turkey stimulated the adoption of new economic policies that focused on national "openness" to global markets. As interaction and linkages with the outside world increased, many urban people in Turkey became aware of opportunities for education, jobs, business, and tourism in North America, especially in the United States. This was facilitated by improved global communication and the cheaper cost of travel. As international contacts

and movements increased, what was initially a small flow of permanent immigration and conversions to permanent residency status by visitors to the United States and Canada rose steadily. The volume of officially documented personal visits by Turks to the United States is estimated at over one hundred thousand visaed entries in 1999.[8] Those achieving permanent residence in the late 1990s, according to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (USINS), numbered about three thousand annually (USINS 1999; 2001). In Canada, about seven hundred landed immigrants were admitted annually (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1999: Tbl 1M1).

The complexities negotiated by Turkish immigrants to gain permanent residency status, which makes an immigrant eligible to live and work in the United States indefinitely, were in many instances extraordinary. Their arrival was often followed by years of uncertain temporary status in the United States. In Canada, immigrants more often received the immediate status of landed immigrant, which is similar to permanent residency. However, my ethnographic research reveals that, unlike immigrants to the United States, Canadian immigrants usually faced long periods of unemployment and underemployment. The importance of these differing structural constraints and their socioeconomic outcomes will be addressed in chapter 5.

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[8] Immigration data for non-permanent entries such as students or temporary workers are not published separately for Turks in either Canada or the United States; they are buried in broader categories. An investigative reporter looked into the detailed INS data and made the estimate shown here for the U.S. which seems to be plausible (Trowbridge 2001). No data for Canada.

Outline of the Dissertation

My research on Turkish immigrants in Germany, Canada, and the United States reveals profound differences, as well as similarities, among the communities. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant perspectives on immigrant cultures. It outlines how assimilation theory, along with the concept of cultural hybridity, can be used to assess the economic and cultural integration of these communities into host societies and their complex perceptions of identity. In this way, I establish the basis for exploration of the structural and cultural constraints that influence immigrants' desires and choices regarding assimilation.

Chapter 3 looks at the role of the sender state, Turkey, in the immigration process. Turkey has at different points forbidden and encouraged emigration, with consequent effects on the emigrant flows. Other Turkish policies have had major effects on the political and economic environment, as well. These contextual developments are part of the explanation for particular emigration patterns by class and demographics. The chapter also looks at the construction and dissemination of a national Turkish identity which is a cultural component of the subsequent incorporation of immigrants into the receiver countries.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide an overview of the host countries studied: West Germany (later Germany) in chapter 4, and the United States and Canada in chapters 5 and 6. All three states have and continue to enact very different policies for immigration and resident ethnic groups. The policies of these states, along with those of the Turkish state, have affected the composition by class and gender of their Turkish diasporic

populations, and they continue to affect how and to what extent Turks are willing to assimilate in the host country.

In these chapters, I analyze four primary factors that affect the opportunities and constraints experienced by immigrants and their descendants. The first is the state's role as a recruiter and regulator, which may be seen as a structural condition. The second, also structural, consists of the economic and political factors that affect employment opportunities in the host country. The third is cultural, referring to the extent of cultural integration of immigrants and their children as indicated by language, mixed marriages, and intra-familial relations. The fourth factor is also cultural, consists of the creation and representation of hybrid identities among individuals and the collective diaspora. These factors are explored through statistical and ethnographic data in chapters 5 and 6 for North America, and compared with the Turkish Germans discussed in chapter 4.

An understanding of the interaction of these factors is crucial to predicting where and how immigrant communities succeed. In Germany, for example, the country's initial structural support for Turkish immigrants was outweighed by its extreme reluctance to include them socially or to educate them or their children beyond the blue-collar skills for which they were initially recruited. Canada and the United States, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6, present completely different pictures of significant structural and cultural constraints. Immigrants are expected to become a permanent part of the host society, and are expected accordingly to utilize educational and other cultural opportunities which in turn result in better immigrant assimilation.

Chapter 6 goes on to explore the most important partners in the creation and sustenance of a diaspora in North America—the immigrants and their descendants themselves. While extensive materials—statistical, historical, and analytical—are available concerning Turkish Germans, the same is not true for Canada and the United States. Accordingly, I constructed a statistical data set for each North American country from census and immigration sources; along with this material, I present excerpts from interviews of eighty men and women in Canada and the United States[9] to examine issues of generation, age, gender, family structure, marriage patterns, education, occupation, and income.

The ethnographic data illustrate the struggles of immigrants to both assimilate and simultaneously retain aspects of traditional cultural identities. In addition, certain issues such as the ways in which family dynamics, inter-generational relations, and gender affect assimilation—topics not easily studied with census data—can be more clearly seen with the aid of ethnographic material.

This study of the Turkish diaspora suggests that, while every immigrant diaspora is unique, there are nonetheless similar constraints and resources faced in both native and host countries. My research on immigrant reactions suggests that assimilation theory and the concept of hybridity, particularly when combined with an analysis of state policy, may indeed prove useful to a better understanding of how and why immigrant communities succeed.

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[9] The methodology of the dissertation is discussed in the appendix on methodology.

Chapter Two

IMMIGRANT CULTURES AND IDENTITIES

Exile

First, you feel light,

Think that you shrugged all the problems away,

Feel satisfied.

Then, when your Turkishness is known,

You observe strange gazes on you.

They start murmuring. . .

Do you miss the family in the old country?

Children begin putting their feet against the table.

They start using four-letter words,

Like their friends.

As time goes by,

You miss the crowdedness in Kızılay

Open-air bakery and confectionary shops

Soccer news,

And the dishes of Konyalı

When you hear Turkish on the street, you feel nostalgic

You want to sing a Turkish folk song

Yet nobody understands the lyrics. . .

Your sufferings.

Sevim Önen (1982), Canada[10]

The woman who wrote this poem captures the feelings of many immigrants. Just when she feels that she has conquered all her troubled feelings related to moving away from her homeland, something happens to bring them all back. Somebody may attempt to put her down for being non-native. Someone belittles her for missing her family at home. Her children begin to act in new ways. It is then that she again starts to yearn for the sights and sounds of the country that she left behind, and remembers that she is a foreigner. For her, home is a nostalgic place where she was brought up, a place associated with certain experiences that she cannot replace easily in her new country.

As the poem indicates, immigrants miss a part of their culture and the lifestyle in their home countries. Immigrant lives are located between the new and old worlds, cultures, loyalties, and human interactions. As Bhabha (1994:157) states, immigrant discourses reveal the "antagonistic in-between . . . of presence and proxy." My understanding of Bhabha's notion is that feelings of proxy, alienation, and

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[1] My translation. For original, see Önen (2001)

marginalization make immigrants uneasy as they pursue their ambition for success and economic security which requires gradual structural assimilation and integration into the host country.

Immigrant lives are complex and fractured in that they are fully a part of neither their home nor host countries; they feel themselves to be partial members of both cultures. My study indicates that individuals are integrated into the host society by their professional and public lives. At the same time, however, they retain a cultural identity which is primarily Turkish, even though it is hybridized (or, as some would say, contaminated) by the culture of the host country.

Such immigrants do not rapidly assimilate and "disappear" into the culture of the host society. They become part of a growing diaspora population and form a distinctive portion of the host society. For immigrants, being part of a diaspora affects their own identity, and becomes part of the means by which they negotiate a place in the host society. The diaspora population's structure, culture, and identity, therefore, are worthy of sociological notice and study. With appropriate concepts and theory we may attempt to understand the cultural and structural spaces of immigrant groups both individually and comparatively.

The Meaning of Diaspora

The term diaspora originally had a very specific meaning: the exile of the Jews from their historic homeland and their dispersion throughout many lands (Tölölyan 1991:4; Soysal 2000:2). In recent decades, this narrow meaning of diaspora has been enlarged to include people who left their homelands voluntarily, often seeking improvements in their economic or environmental situations (Safran1991:83). Diaspora as a concept is helpful to address the enduring character of migrations and the transformation of immigrant groups into self-reproducing, distinguishable minority groups such as those seen in most Western and North American countries (Sheffer 1993; Van Hear 1998; Radhakrishnan 1993).

The global, continuous improvements in the technologies of transportation, communication, and international job networks have contributed to the rise of migration (Portes 2001). "Transnational communities" has become a buzz word among many scholars who refer to immigrant groups in this changing global capitalist context (Kivisto 2001). Ong (1999:4) uses the term "transnationality" to indicate how global corporate strategies facilitate an environment of "cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space," while acknowledging the importance of state as an integral part of the world order.[11] In this study of Turkish transnational diaspora communities, I stress the importance of state and its policies in making difference in the creation of diasporas.

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[11]Also see Donald Nonini and Ong (1997:9-15), Ong(1998). and Louisa Schein (1998).

According to Portes (1997:812, 1995:8-12), transnational communities are dense networks across political borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement or social recognition. He further states that through these networks, an increasing number of people are able to lead dual lives in their host and native countries by maintaining social contacts and economic assets in both locations. As a result of nourishing these networks, such people are often bilingual, move easily between the different cultures, own homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political, and cultural interests that require visits to their home countries.

Roberts (1995:67) warns against using only economic activities, such as saving and sending remittances back home, as required indicators of ongoing transnational relationships, since such actions might not be undertaken by second- and third-generation descendants, who are nonetheless transnational. In Seattle and Vancouver, for example, I found that older members of the diaspora had passed through such an economic phase earlier in their lives, and then stopped such transactions when their parents back home in Turkey passed away. Nevertheless, they and their children remained in touch with Turkey. Other factors, such as social and cultural contacts may prove more reliable indicators of a transnational dual identity.

As Portes notes (1997:813), many diaspora communities retain strong links to and identifications with the traditions and places of their origin, even after the early economic phases. This is increasingly accomplished through satellite TV broadcasts in native languages, global networks of personal communication, and annual visits to "home" countries. Recent surveys, for example, show that though the majority of Turkish

immigrants in Germany see Germany as their permanent place of living (Goldberg 1996:3 cited in White 1997:755), satellite TV viewing of Turkish broadcasts is increasing. Children are growing up with Turkish TV shows and documentaries, even though they may lose direct communication with their ancestral origins. Perhaps it is not necessary for face-to-face links to continue for the group to survive as a diaspora. Clearly, technology and ease of travel are part of what is allowing communities to maintain their diaspora and dual identities. Earlier European immigrant communities in North America, for example, lacked these technological options; this may be part of the reason for a relative lack of evidence of strong diasporic links.[12]

As Safran states (1991: 83), well-known contemporary diasporas include Cubans and Mexicans in the United States, Pakistanis and Asian Indians in Britain, Maghrebis in France, Turks in Germany, Corsicans in Marseilles, the Greeks, Poles, and Palestinian Arabs in North America, and Asian Indians and Armenians in various countries. Examining these groups, he defines diasporas as "expatriate minority communities" that have the following six characteristics: (1) they are dispersed from an original home center to at least two remote new places; (2) they maintain a "memory, vision or myth about their original homeland"; (3) they "believe they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host country"; (4) they see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; (5) they are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and (6) group consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this

[12] However, those who were refused integration by the host societies, such as the Chinese, kept their diasporic characters.

continuing relationship with the homeland (Safran 1991:83-84; Cohen 1996:26; Clifford 1994:304-305). According to this definition, the main features of a diaspora are its history of dispersal, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity that is importantly defined by this relationship. In Safran's view, the saga of return, no matter whether attainable, serves to solidify ethnic consciousness and solidarity even when religion can no longer do so, when the cohesiveness of the local community is weak, and when family as an institution is threatened with disintegration.

Safran, however, does not deal with the possibility that some expatriate communities may not be committed to the idea of return. For this reason, James Clifford (1994:306) disagrees with Safran. He says that decentered, lateral connections, such as history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistence may be as important as those formed around a theology of origin/return. Thus, in keeping with Clifford's definition, the African diaspora, as a particular example, may be viewed as reproducing itself based on the common experience of slavery and racism.

In *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, Gilroy (1991) talks about black music as a common ground which connects the members of African diaspora. Music, in Gilroy's analysis, is a means of communication that creates a common culture in diverse locations. Returning to the poem at the beginning of this chapter, we see that the poet wants to sing a Turkish folk song which will tell of all her "sufferings." This statement indicates the significance of music, especially folk music, in Turkish culture as an important connective tissue and a medium of communication for the members of the Turkish

diaspora in both Europe and North America. Turkish soccer is another reinforcement, as Turks worldwide follow the country's teams in international competitions.

In some situations, in immigrants' minds, homeland can continue to live as a mythic place which is a part of the common history (Brah 1996:192). The people of diaspora may even accept that they will never return in any literal sense of the word, or that the places to which they return will have changed beyond recognition (Hall 1993:362). While I believe that the existence of a story of a homeland is culturally and politically important as a component of identification and identity construction, my definition of diaspora is not contingent upon the retention of actual ties to the homeland, nor upon a belief in the possibility of eventual return.

Looking at diasporic communities, it is clear that over time they are transformed into new communities which are different from the communities at home—an apt illustration is the African diaspora in Britain, the Caribbeans, and the United States. Another clear illustration is the Turkish diaspora in Germany, which is called *Almancı* (Germaners) by the Turks in Turkey, a word that signifies this partial transformation. In that sense, Hall (1993:362) is right in saying that "there is no going home again."

Since I am interested in how these new identities are created and represented by members of the immigrant community, I do not define membership in the diaspora by origin or purity of the group, as suggested by Tölölyan (1991), Safran (1991), and Cohen (1996); rather, I use a definition of diaspora based on formation of a common ethnic identity involving a complex process of negotiation and reconstruction between individual actors—the ethnic community and its culture—and larger structures—the

dominant society and its culture. If we apply this definition of diaspora to the Turkish case, we begin to see a more complex and nuanced picture of how Turkish people act and become part of their host societies. This process is the subject of theorizing immigration.

Theorizing Immigration: Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and Segmented Assimilation

The current population of the United States is composed primarily of the remnants of immigrant migrations. Consequently, much of the literature on immigration has focused on these groups. The assimilation perspective, which attempts to interpret these earlier immigrant experiences, has dominated much of the sociological thinking in America for the larger part of the twentieth century. According to Portes, Parker, and Cobas (1980:202), the core of the assimilation perspective is a focus on culture and on the process of consensus building among dissimilar populations. The assimilation perspective, Rumbaut and Portes (2001:4-5) write, assumes that there is a natural process by which diverse ethnic groups come eventually to share a common evolving culture and gain equal access to the opportunity structure of society. This process consists of gradually deserting old cultural and behavioral patterns in favor of new ones; once set in motion, immigrant groups move inevitably toward assimilation (Zhou 1997:977).

Assimilation, according to Sayegh and Lasry (1993:99), implied a unidirectional process of change, as immigrants were absorbed by their host country. A linear, bipolar scale was used to describe cultural change going from the heritage culture to the host culture. This is clearly an inadequate conception of how immigrant cultures interact with

host cultures, since we can easily attribute certain recent changes in United States majority culture to immigrant influences—food, music, fashion, and the organization of teams in the workplace, to mention only a few. Clearly, influences run in both directions.

The centrality of assimilation for the scientific understanding of immigrant behavior may be traced to the Chicago School of the early twentieth century and especially to the work of Park, Thomas, and their collaborators and students (McKee 1993; Alba and Nee 1997). In 1921, an early definition of assimilation was provided by Park and Burgess (1921 reprinted 1969:735): "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life" (as quoted in Alba and Nee: 1997: 828). Affected by competition, communication, and cooperation, according to Park and Burgess, diverse immigrant groups from "underprivileged" backgrounds are eventually expected to abandon their old ways of life and melt completely into the mainstream through residential integration and occupational achievement in a sequence of succeeding generations. In their view, this was as much a political vision of what to hope for as a sociological critique of prospects.

The next major effort to conceptualize the notion of assimilation was made by Gordon in 1964. His book, *Assimilation in American Life,* provided a systematic dissection of the concept. He proposed a structural dimension of the assimilation process as a supplement to the cultural dimension suggested by Chicago School scholars. By structural assimilation, Gordon meant large-scale entrances into cliques, clubs, and

institutions of the host society, on the primary group level (Kazemipur and Halli 2001:1133). The group would then proceed, according to Gordon, to more advanced phases of assimilation: marital, identificational, attitude receptional, behavior receptional, and civic assimilation. Gordon hypothesized that once structural assimilation occurred, all of the other types of assimilation, including cultural assimilation, would naturally follow (Alba and Nee 1997:830). He concluded that prejudice and discrimination would decline (if not disappear), since intermarriage would be common, and the minority's separate identity would wane.

While it may be argued that such a level of structural assimilation has been reached by some white immigrant groups that arrived in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Gordon's vision has certainly failed to come to pass in all of its cultural aspects for other groups—especially those of diverse Third-World origins. Furthermore, some recent studies show that ethnic identification, even among the descendants of the white diasporic communities that Gordon studied, has increased rather than declined (Alba 1990; Waters 1990; Kivisto 1989; Bakalian 1993; and Nagel 1998). Hence, we can say that structural assimilation, or being seen as part of American society by others, gives these communities the freedom to highlight their cultural heritage and ethnic identity if they want to for a particular political or cultural reason. This research shows the complexity and fluidity of identity construction and representation.

Gordon was correct, however, in his assessment that structural factors are an important component in understanding immigrant groups. It is clear from my study that the structural changes in United States immigration law in 1965 (discussed in chapter 5),

for example, have greatly altered the composition of immigrant groups. The Turkish immigrants in my 1990 United States census and 2000 ethnographic samples almost all speak English, have high levels of educational attainment, and are well placed in professional occupational fields. Even having achieved these elements of structural assimilation, however, many Turks—irrespective of their current class location—maintain their ethnic ties and identities. They do this by sharing their home country's culture through travel, telephone, internet, television, and print media; and by coming together in social clubs and cultural associations. This duality is part of a process of immigrant adaptation within the "global village" that did not exist in Gordon's time.

Furthermore, the issue of identity construction is not simply a matter of self-choice and self-identification. It is also a matter of how other people see Turkish immigrants and react to them—as our poet says, "Then, when your Turkishness is known, you observe strange gazes on you. They start murmuring . . . Do you miss the family in the old country?" In such situations, Turkish identity is reinforced by the wider society. Though a person may wish to hide her identity, she may be overtly reminded of her status as a Turk, a Muslim, or a woman from the Middle East. Assimilation theory should be reinterpreted to provide a complex and nuanced understanding of ethnic identity formation among immigrant communities. Meanwhile, assimilation theory has been challenged by other perspectives, one of which is multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism

Beginning in the early 1970s, multiculturalists forcefully rejected the assimilationist assumption of a unified mainstream culture. Scholars from the multiculturalist perspective view United States society as composed of a heterogeneous collection of ethnic and racial minority groups (Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Handlin 1973 cited in Zhou 1997). From the standpoint of multiculturalism, as discussed by Zhou (1997), pre-migration cultural attributes inherent to ethnicity are not assumed to be inferior traits which should necessarily be absorbed by the mainstream culture of the host society; rather, these primordial characteristics are carried in immigrant subcultures. Under cultural pluralism, the retention of ethnic attachments may actually become an asset rather than a liability, yielding economic benefits for minority-group members because of resources created by minority business enterprises, and also awarding non-economic benefits because of higher ethnic self-esteem (Reitz and Sklar 1997:234).

The multiculturalism perspective fits well with the 1960s immigration laws of the United States and Canada. Under these laws, both countries finally accepted immigrants from all countries without national or racial preferences.[13] Further impetus came from the United States civil rights movement, which demanded greater equality for minorities. Though the multiculturalist perspective is now criticized by United States scholars as theoretically inadequate (Portes 2000:243), it remains a popular political concept in

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[13] Previously, Canada restricted immigration to certain preferred countries of origin (no numeric quotas); the United States had numeric quotas that effectively barred Asians and immigrants from other Third-World countries, excepting the Americas. See chapter 5 for details.

Canada, touted as the foundation of current immigration policy and inter-ethnic relations.[14]

Concerning the United States, Portes (2000:243) writes:

> Ethnic groups created by European immigration and internal migration from the south and from the island of Puerto Rico did not become plain, unhyphenated Americans, but neither did they reproduce over time the traits and language of their respective first generations. Instead, something different took place—they each became Americans in their own way, an interaction effect between what the group brought to New York City by way of skills, cultural norms, and disadvantage and what it encountered in the big metropolis.

Furthermore, Portes (*ibid*) asserts that the problem is to explain how and in what directions ethnic cultures change. The perspective should fully accommodate the observed present-day dynamics.

My own analysis agrees with that of Portes, and indicates that immigrants do not absorb or reject the new culture completely. Rather, they participate in some parts of the host country's cultural life through their own experiences or through others in their community. They also often purposefully avoid aspects of the host culture in favor of their home culture.

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[14] The Canadian multiculturalism policy was put in place as national policy in 1971, followed in 1988 by the "Act for the Preservation and Enhancement of Multiculturalism in Canada."(Esses and Gardner 1996).

The current scholarly critique of immigration theories underscores my own findings that the multidimensionality and complexity of immigrant experiences require a more open and dynamic approach that stresses the processual construction of identity. As Gilroy (1991:155) suggests, we need to focus on "cultural syncretism" in order to understand how different cultures merge in the diasporic experiences of immigrants. A useful theory of ethnic integration of immigrant communities should therefore help us to explain the process of assimilation and its outcomes, based on different structural and cultural factors through generations of immigrant actors. With these requirements in mind, we turn to a discussion of segmented assimilation.

Segmented Assimilation

Segmented assimilation says that the assimilation process may produce different outcomes which may be assimilation into the dominant culture, or into other ethnic subcultures, corresponding to distinct modes of immigrant adaptation and social contexts of reception (Rumbaut 1996:126; Alba and Nee 1997: 863). The best-known illustration of immigrant adaptation into American subcultures, rather than into the mainstream middle-class white culture, is the assimilation of Haitian children in Miami into American Black culture (Portes and Zhou 1993:81; Portes 1995:249-275; and Rumbaut 1996:126; Alba and Nee 1997:863-4)

Through their study of recent second-generation immigrants in inner-city areas, Portes and Zhou (1993:82) find that assimilation has become segmented. The question is, then, into what segment of society does a particular immigrant group assimilate? Portes

and Zhou (1993), Zhou (1997), and later Portes and Rumbaut (2001:45-46) lay out some of the structural and cultural factors that determine the path of assimilation or mal-assimilation. According to these authors, the most important cultural factors influencing immigrant adaptation are those related to exposure to United States society, such as education, economic aspiration, English-language ability, place of birth, age upon arrival, length of residence in the United States, and presence or absence of a strong receiving co-ethnic community. Structural factors include presence or absence of racial discrimination, family socioeconomic background, and the location of a residence in or away from poor inner-city areas. While many of the same factors are specified by assimilation theory, the contribution of segmented assimilation theory is the crucial distinction that neither cultural nor structural factors are, in and of themselves, decisive. Instead, it is the interaction between the two sets that results in different paths of assimilation (Zhou 1997:984).

The joint empirical work of Portes and Zhou (1993) and Zhou (1997) use these cultural and structural determinants to show at least three distinct structural forms of adaptation with different consequences in terms of economic class mobility and retention of home culture. Portes and Zhou (1993:82) write that of the immigrant cultures they examined,[15]

> One of them replicates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class; a second

[15] Among those studied, each in a particular locality, the following are represented: Mexican, Haitian, Punjabi-Sikh, and Carribean youth.

leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity.

Segmented assimilation theory is valuable to the extent that it broadens the debates of assimilation and multiculturalism by introducing a new outcome for ethnic groups. Unlike older theories that equate increased assimilation solely with improved economic and social status, segmented assimilation theory suggests that interactions between cultural and structural factors may result in a wide spectrum of results, including a path that "leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass (Portes and Zhou 1993:82)."

While segmented assimilation theory gives us three possible assimilation outcomes, it does not answer the question of why Turkish communities in diaspora actively seek to identify themselves with other Turkish groups and maintain networks to reinforce their Turkish identity. It fails to explain why a largely common Turkish identity is shared across Turkish diaspora populations, irrespective of country and class. The missing element is to identify the process by which assimilation—segmented or otherwise—occurs.

This preservation of Turkish identity was evident during my fieldwork among first- and second-generation Turkish immigrants in North America. In the Seattle region, for example, there are a number of families whose breadwinner(s) are associated with information technology and aircraft engineering industries, including Microsoft and

Boeing. This community represents a variant of Portes and Zhou's first type of structural assimilation, "parallel integration into white middle-class." In terms of structural characteristics, both the parents and children are highly educated, many with graduate professional degrees.[16] They show strong aspirations for economic advancement, and have high English-language ability. Intermarriage with Americans also occurs. The immigrants in this community were mostly born in Turkey, but raised in settings with strong globalization ties that included the United States, and immigrated in the post-1965 period. Their children were native-born, or if not, faced assimilation pressures as youth. The structural characteristics include relatively weak racial discrimination since most are light skinned—some blue-eyed—and arouse no more than the initial anti-immigrant attitudes here and there (though it should be noted that this fieldwork was conducted before September 11, 2001). Family backgrounds are middle-class, both for the immigrants and the children. They reside typically in better income neighborhoods, not in poor "inner city" areas.

The insertion of these Turks into middle-class, mostly white Seattle society,[17] while at the same time preserving, and making good use of, the resource of a strong co-ethnic community supports my critique of assimilation theory as failing to explain these

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[16] Finding that the children of this group "follow in their parent's footsteps" with regard to the value placed on education, already shows the strong connectivity of parents and offspring so typical of inter-generational relations among middle-class Turks in Turkey and now in the United States. Furthermore, in chapter 5, I am able to show that the native-born maintain the exceptional educational attainments of Turks in general in the United States, above those of the host population.

[17] Asian background is also common in the Seattle area and among co-employees where these Turks are employed.

behaviors.[18] They have organizations that bring them together and represent them whenever ethnically based political action is required. The economic job and cultural networks are dense over social space, not seriously weakened by living in scattered clusters rather than all in one neighborhood. The co-ethnic community creates a dynamic of similar values among families regarding the importance of being Turkish, of using Turkish as well as English, and looking after the education of offspring. Denial of their Turkish background by offspring simply does not seem to occur. The second generation, while not a carbon copy of their parents, has also failed to drop their historical culture and insert themselves into another—American—identity. They actively belong to both cultures.

Another example comes from my interviews in Richmond, Vancouver, where there are a number of working-class Turks who originally immigrated in the 1960s and early 1970s. Most of them left Turkey and arrived by way of Germany, after initially living in that country as guest workers. Subsequently, they brought their relatives and are now living in a close spatial and social community. They work principally in trades, as painters or mechanics, and in the service sector as hairdressers and taxi drivers. Neither the immigrants themselves nor their children have more than high school educations. There are other ethnic groups also living in Richmond, which is one of the places where non-white people settle in Vancouver, but Turks do not mix with them. These Turks are

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[18] For the importance of subjective identity construction and its effects on immigrant experience in more objective terms such as school and work performance, see Rumbaut (1996: 126).

working class and they keep their Turkish identity; thus, they do not fit any of the Portes and Zhou (1993:82) categories of segmented assimilation.

As these examples show, both structural factors—who these people are in terms of class and socioeconomic characteristics before and after immigrating—and cultural factors, such as their acceptance by the host society and willingness to participate, contribute to significantly different outcomes. What the segmented assimilation theory has not answered, however, is why Turks across class backgrounds maintain and reinforce Turkish cultural identity.

Identity and Diasporic Communities

As "immigrants separately engage in purposeful acts" (Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1996:31) to signify their uniqueness and similarities to others, immigrant identities are always part narrative and part representation (Hall 1990:222; 1993:362). They are shaped by experiences, and culturally constructed through social relations (Brah 1996:123). For Hall and Brah, immigrant identities are products of structural and cultural processes that shape the experiences and social relations of individual actors. Identities are a series of "new beginnings" rather than a blueprint (Bauman 1997:53).

Hall (1990:223) discusses ways of thinking about identity, starting with "cultural identity," which he defines as

> . . . one, shared culture, a sort of collective 'one true self', hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves' which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common. Within the terms of

this definition, our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as 'one people', with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history.

Applying Hall's (1990:223) idea of cultural identity to the Turkish diaspora, Turkishness is the common identity among Turks in Germany, the United States, and Canada. Yet, the research findings in the forthcoming chapters show that Turks in each of these countries represent themselves differently, as persons and as groups, reflecting corresponding differences in the macro-structural opportunities and constraints they face. Hall (1990:223) deals with such difference by asserting that what may appear on the surface to be a single cultural identity may well have divisions and fissures beneath the veneer—just as my research findings confirm. Hall further suggests that immigrants often do not think about or emphasize their commonness, but instead may emphasize the differences within the group for a variety of political, social, and cultural reasons. It is this constant fluidity that makes a durable characterization of identity difficult and perhaps ultimately inaccurate.

Cultural identity is the outcome of negotiations of difference between the agencies of immigrants and the structures enclosing them (Hall 1990:223–4; Hall1997:47).[19] Immigrants fluidly reinvent who they are and with whom they identify themselves as they experience the vicissitudes of cultural norms in their host countries. This complements

[19] Also see Giddens (1984) and Papastergiadis (1997:257) who have the same view.

Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler's (1996:31) conception of immigrant identity as a resource in the process of assimilation.

If I apply this idea of continuous re-identification and negotiation of identity to the Turkish case, we see that a Turk in the diaspora might be a female, a leftist, a second-generation immigrant, and a student all at the same time. Whether she chooses to represent herself as Turkish, leftist, student, female, or a combination of these identity categories depends on the political dimensions of identity, and is related to how others will position themselves vis-a-vis the categories with which she identifies. By defining themselves in different ways, individual actors demand different rights and opportunities for themselves, and they themselves may hold different kinds of prejudices against other groups.

As Hall (1990:235) puts it, diaspora identities are heterogeneous, diverse, different, and hybrid in their formation; yet, this diversity and heterogeneity of identities does not weaken the collective immigrant group. To the contrary, these differences give it greater political strength when relating to other groups (Lowe 1991:32; Werbner 1997b:249). According to Lowe, the way individuals choose to manipulate these identities by affiliation, disaffiliation, and reaffiliation with certain groups and social causes create opportunities of empowerment and resistence against the demands of the dominant cultures of their host countries. These ideas are explored in the current literature on "hybrid" forms of identity.

Hybrid Identities and the Process of Assimilation

The word "hybrid" is used today to refer to animals and plants, as well as identity, all of which may be heterogeneous in origin or composition (Stross 1999). In his 1999 article, Stross explains that the idea of a cultural hybrid comes from a metaphorical broadening of the biological/botanical definition; namely, the offspring of mating by any two unlike animals or plants. For him, the concept of a cultural hybrid can be embodied in a person as the result of the blending of diverse cultural traits.

The concept of hybridity was born as a consequence of long-lasting attempts by scholars to bridge the dichotomies of structure versus culture, and objectivity versus subjectivity, in order to understand human behavior and cultural process of reproduction. If one explores earlier literature in American sociology, one finds the term "cultural hybrid" used by Stonequist (1937) and by Schutz (Schutz in Anthias and Kelly 1996:347), both former students of Park, whose work on assimilation is discussed previously in this chapter. Stonequist (1937:54) gives this view of how cultural hybrids emerge:

> Some cultural hybrids are a consequence of culture diffusion; or, more exactly, of a certain type of culture diffusion: that where a whole culture system moves, not merely some fragmentary traits. Others are a product of migration, especially the migration of persons or groups into a strange land where they must make a new cultural adjustment.

In Europe in the 1980s, without reference to earlier American theorizing, a new wave of thought about hybridity took root with Bahktin. For Bahktin (1981:358),

hybridization is a mixture of two languages, an encounter between two different linguistic consciousnesses. He developed the ideas of both organic and intentional hybridization. Organic hybridity is an unintentional, unconscious hybridization which happens when new images, words, and objects are integrated into language or culture as the individual actors contact other languages and cultures (Bahktin 1981). Bahktin (1981:360) says,

> . . . the [organic hybrid] mixture remains mute and opaque, never making use of conscious contrasts and oppositions . . . [Yet] such unconscious hybrids have been at the same time profoundly productive historically: they are pregnant with potential for new world views, with new 'internal forms' for perceiving the world.

Applying Bahktin's idea of an organic hybrid to culture and society more generally, we may say that cultures evolve in part through unreflective borrowings, exchanges, and inventions. According to Bahktin (1981:360), the opposite of the organic hybrid is an intentional hybrid. The intentional hybrid is first of all a conscious hybrid, that is, an encounter between two socially and culturally different linguistic consciousnesses (Bahktin 1981:360). Therefore, Bahktin concludes that intentional hybrids are built in order to shock, change, challenge, revitalize, or disrupt through deliberate and intended mixing of unlike social languages and images.

Bahktin's distinction between an organic and an intentional hybrid is useful to understand the simultaneous coexistence of both cultural change and resistence to the kind of change imposed by the dominant group. When we discuss the experience of Turks in Germany in chapter 4, we will see that many Turks organically absorb certain aspects

of German culture, such as parts of the language; and at the same time, that literary Turkish intellectuals in Germany intentionally incorporate Turkish words and phrases into their German prose, challenging their German audience to understand how Turks think and feel.

For Bhabha, all hybrid forms, whether intentional or not, blur the existing structures of authority and hegemony through negotiation and translation (Bhabha 1994). Negotiation as an act "conveys a temporality that makes it possible to conceive of the articulation of the antagonistic or contradictory elements" (Bhabha 1994:25). As far as Bhabha is concerned, the result of hybridity is a new political object, or aim, or knowledge, not simply a mirror image of an *a priori* political principle or theory.

Drawing on Bahktin's and Bhabha's ideas, I use the term hybridity to mean a subjective platform processually constructed by bilingual and bicultural people out of their life experiences in societies where they have lived and are now living. Hybridity connotes neither isolation nor assimilation. It refers to the process by which assimilation occurs. Along the way, people in diasporas constantly rearrange their cultural hybridity as they experience the new and peculiar ways of their host cultural and social environments, and they keep some parts of their past culture with them, such as certain traditions, institutions, manners, and beliefs, which themselves may be modified over time (Hall 1993; Bhabha 1994).

As immigrants selectively assimilate certain parts of the newly-encountered culture based on macro-structural constraints and opportunities, they create new cultural platforms, which authors such as Bhabha (1993; 1994:36-39) refer to as third or in-

between spaces, or connective tissues between cultures. They acquire hybrid identities through this process, an explanation which is not very different from Stonequist's (1937:54) early ideas of how cultural hybrids emerge.

Immigrants assimilate into host country ways processually, not all at once. There are contradictions of ethnic presence and solidarity that occur at the same time as assimilation. In studying immigrants and ethnic groups it is important to look at these contradictions, and the concept of hybridity is helpful to understand them.

Assimilation, as a complementary force shows itself through a number of factors that indicate conformity or integration with the dominant culture. I study these factors through the characteristics of migrants and their descendants, such as income, education, profession, language, marriage, and family systems including gender roles and intergenerational relations. I look at the structural and cultural factors that produce these characteristics. I also study the extent to which migrants and their descendants keep a Turkish identity by looking at cultural factors they bring with them, the forms of resistence or exclusion they encounter in the host society, and the organizations for religious, social, and political purposes that they form.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the concept of diaspora—a group of people bonded by shared experiences and identity living in spaces away from their original homeland—can be used to examine many different communities. Describing the Turkish immigrant community as a diaspora attributes to it the capacity for reproduction through generations, maintaining

itself as a minority group. This capacity to survive with separate cultural identity within the larger cultural environment of the host society depends upon the cultural conditions imposed by the dominant group, as well as the community's own internal affiliations and resources. Based on my fieldwork, I do not subscribe to the notion that the Turkish diaspora is being assimilated into the mainstream culture so rapidly as to disappear anytime soon. Rather, this study exemplifies why and how Turkish identity is maintained, though continuously modified, over generations in diasporic communities.

As we examine the structural and cultural factors that influence the outcomes for different groups of immigrant Turks, we will see that members of the diaspora relate to the host society in various ways. Turkish individuals do structurally integrate in some fashion with the dominant cultures studied—Germany, United States, and Canada—but have not abandoned their distinctive identities until now. My interview data from Canada and the United States indicate that individuals retain fundamentally hybrid identities. Exploration of their hybridity is therefore crucial to a more complete understanding of how interactions between cultural and structural factors in native and host countries affect immigrant identity. In the chapters that follow, I apply the concept of hybrid identity within the overarching theories of assimilation.

Chapter Three

THE BACKGROUND IN TURKEY FOR EMIGRATION

Introduction

This chapter outlines the political, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions in Turkey that enable and motivate Turks to become emigrants. I first consider the Turkish state as a controller of emigration, examining its policies and their effectiveness. I also explain the creation of Turkish self-identities that emigrants carry with them, which I argue has had a fundamental impact on the culture and identity of emigrating Turks.

The Turkish state played a considerable role in bringing Turkey into the global framework of labor movements. These labor movements are much more than micro-level processes of individuals maximizing personal gain by going for higher income to contribute to family welfare. They are part of a multi-faceted structuring of opportunities and inducements by the state and the local Turkish economy. Thus, Turkish labor emigration is best understood by a "synthetic" theoretical approach that brings individual and wider structural factors together (Massey 1999:47). For this approach, there is a need to know about the state and its policies (Portes 1999:31; Zolberg 1999:71-73).

Following the Second World War, Turkey's own economic development and Westernization policies benefitted from the U.S. Marshall Plan, a large assistance

package intended to make Europe more secure militarily and prosperous. The aid fed the building of Turkey's transportation infrastructure and the mechanization of agricultural production (Pamuk 1999:105). An unintended consequence was that a large portion of Turkey's rapidly growing population was diverted from rural areas and flooded the cities, creating a serious unemployment issue for the Turkish state (Pamuk 1999:117).

This surplus labor force was attractive to German industry, and with agreement from the Turkish state, large migration flows to Germany were set in motion. Close Turkish-German relationships at the state level supported emigration; and for the migrant workers themselves, a completely new cultural encounter occurred. At the individual migrant level, West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s was no more than a good place to work and to make money; the migrants were unskilled or semi-skilled members of the working class ignorant of German culture, which they had little interest in acquiring.

Following the burst of emigration to Germany, there was a second smaller and more selective stream of migration to North America that commenced in the 1980s. Turkish state policies in relation to emigration, economy, and education, especially at the university level, were major structural factors that came into play, each with direct linkages to North America. The Turkish educational system eventually graduated significant numbers of professionals eligible to become highly skilled emigrants.

From the earliest years of the Republic, Western-style nation-building projects and the educational system produced a strong sense of national identity among Turks. Once emigration began, the emigrants' own self-perceptions of a Turkish identity interacted with the social and cultural values they encountered upon arrival in host

countries, beginning the process of hybridization and assimilation. There was an additional effect of the Western orientation of the nation-building projects: they prepared the ground for cultural-ideological linkages between Turkey and North America that made emigration to North America at the end of the century by urban professional and middle-level business persons an attractive option. Also, it equipped them to find a place when they arrived.

To explain and expand my arguments in this chapter, I use ethnographic materials as well as literary sources. These materials illuminate the effects of structural conditions in Turkey on individuals, and individuals' perceptions of these conditions.[20]

The State as Controller of Emigration

Official Prohibition of Emigration: 1923-1960

The policies of the Turkish Republic from its founding in 1923 onward were strongly influenced by the conditions of its establishment. The founding of the Republic was preceded by three years of military struggle against four other national occupier/claimants—Greece, Britain, Italy, and France (Ahmad 1993:47-48; Zürcher 1993:158-173; Shaw and Shaw 1977:340-372). As a result, the population of Turkey stood at around thirteen million at the end of 1924, a staggering decrease of nearly twenty-five percent from the previous decade (Pamuk 1998:11; McCarthy 1983: 117-144). As the majority of the casualties were young men, the labor force was decimated

[20] One caveat: I studied the perceptions of Turkish immigrants who remained in North America. Naturally, the perceptions of those who returned to Turkey, or those who never left, might be quite different.

(Shorter 1985, 2000). Despite vast human losses, however, the land area was not diminished by the peace treaty, and the lack of use of modern warfare methods such as land mines meant that arable land lay waiting for the resumption of cultivation just as fast as laborers could be added to the population (Shorter 1985, 2000).

Faced with devastated human resources, the new state tried to prevent all emigration and sponsored the in-gathering of Turks from the Balkans, from lands north of Turkey, and even from America (Akgündüz 1998). In the 1920s and 1930s, the Turkish Republic brought thousands of Turks living in America[21] back to Anatolian Turkey via patriotic inducements, even paying steamship fares for some (Ahmed 1993: 40-41, 85-86; Akgündüz 1998: 105-106).

From Labor Shortage to Labor Surplus: The Beginning of Emigration

After the Second World War, Turkey's isolationist stance began to soften as threats from Russia drove Turkey toward an alliance with the Americans—notably via the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan for Turkey, which together provided extensive economic aid (Hershlag 1960:183; Ahmad 1993; Zurcher 1993; Pamuk 1999). During the following decade, as a result of this new alliance, many young, educated urban Turks had contacts with the outside world, mainly the United States, through civil and military education programs and through the visits of foreign experts to Turkey (Ahmad

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[21] An initial diaspora was formed prior to the Second World War. Ahmed (1986: xvii, xx-xxi) claims that between 1876 and 1915, approximately 45,000 Ottoman ethnic Turks went to the United States, smuggled out of Anatolia by French steamers, and then from Marseilles where they started their journey across the Atlantic. He notes the many localities where they went to work. Another source (Akgündüz 1998:105) mentions 22,000 Turkish-speaking immigrants arriving in the United States, mostly illiterate male laborers, many of whom returned soon afterwards.

1993:125; Zürcher 1993:250). Some of the Turkish immigrants who came to the United States in the 1950s told me that they or their parents were first sent to the United States on special technical training programs, or on purchase missions, and that this experience helped them to make the final move for emigration. Contacts with Americans inside Turkey also helped Turks realize and act upon emigration opportunities.

An elderly female informant in Seattle told me that she was invited to the United States in 1952, to complete her university education. The invitation came from a retired American couple who had worked with her father in Turkey. She subsequently stayed in the United States with their sponsorship. In another instance, a young naval officer on an official visit to Seattle met and married an American, and is today a senior member of the Seattle Turkish community.

The exchange programs and close contacts with people outside of the country were priceless opportunities for many urban youth to improve their talents and increase their skills. Some of these individuals managed to become exceptions to official policy prohibiting emigration. Nevertheless, the migration policy persisted until the early 1960s, re-enforced by a pro-natalist population policy that attempted to prevent the practice of birth control—a policy that proved more successful in rural areas than in large cities (Fişek 1965; Duben and Behar 1991:159-193; Angın and Shorter 1998). The results of these population policies were, however, successful enough: by the 1960s, the size of the labor force had reached new heights and unemployment was severe.[22] Overall population growth rates were near three percent per year.

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[22] More than one million, complained the State Planning Organization (1963:24).

At the same time, thousands of tractors bought with foreign aid were releasing human labor from the fields with no hope of local employment (Kıray 1982). Mass migration from the countryside to towns and cities began in earnest. According to Zürcher (1993:237), over a million people left the land before 1960. When West Germany proposed to Turkey bi-lateral arrangements for the recruiting and placement of Turkish workers in Germany, the state agreed with alacrity (Şen 1993).

In 1961, the Turkish state took charge of the process of recruiting and sending workers first to West Germany and later to the other European countries (Keyder 1987:186-187). Some effort was made by the Turkish state to spread the recruiting around Turkey by opening recruitment bureaus in small towns, as well as in the main urban centers (Wilpert 1992). Those who could qualify on grounds of good health and some skills were eligible to be chosen by these bureaus. By 1973, seven hundred thousand Turks had gone to Europe as temporary workers, most of them to West Germany (Şen 1993:20, 84; Köksal 1986:56).

This opportunity for ordinary working people served the political as well as economic interests of the state in the 1960s and 1970s. Though overseas workers' contributions to Turkey's economic progress were not always acknowledged, they were immense (Keyder 1987:85). According to Keyder, the remittances sent back home, as well as the lowering of unemployment levels as Turkey's economy faltered, were critical. The flow of remittances from Germany was sufficient to cover Turkey's entire trade deficit during the years 1971-1973. In addition, a stream of visits and eventually retirements also brought a flow of commodities into Turkey (Keyder 1987:85).

Though worker migration was welcome, the Turkish state nevertheless continued to resist the emigration of middle-class and skilled professionals for fear of a "brain drain" (Oğuzkan 1975). The state regulated foreign currency withdrawals and imposed tough criteria for issuing passports and travel permits (Oğuzkan 1976). As before, however, evasions were always possible.

In Canada, I interviewed a Turkish man working for the government of British Columbia who had been a final-year law student in Istanbul when he found a way to emigrate. In 1969, he arranged for a six-month language course in France and asked the university to give him leave to accept that opportunity. Upon reaching France, he migrated immediately to Canada, where he was admitted as a landed immigrant. In Canada, he took a political science degree and settled down with a government job. His case illustrates that for those with money, smarts, and readiness to take risks, emigration was feasible.

Economic Crisis and Professional Emigration

During the second half of the 1970s, middle-class professional emigration gradually became more readily possible, first as "exceptions" to the rule and then more generally. The state explained some of its reasons for liberalizing emigration by stating in *The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1985-1989)* that in order to ease the pressure on the country's employment problem, it was necessary to use employment opportunities abroad (Şen 1993: 120). There were added benefits from extending the professional networks of Turkish companies abroad; and in a different vein, in letting those who were politically troublesome at home emigrate.

Öniş (1986) writes about the economic stabilization and restructuring package in 1980, showing how it produced a much more open financial system, including convertibility of the Turkish lira. Further, Öniş says that production was re-oriented toward export markets, and the free market itself became the principal guide to internal resource deployment. Such changes incorporated the international movement of labor and professionals as part of the new policies of openness. From then on, the state enabled, rather than opposed, individuals to migrate on the basis of their own resources and contacts so long as they could persuade receiver countries and employers to take them(Şen 1993:120).

In the 1980s, the emigration environment in Turkey changed rapidly under the political and economic policies were restructuring the economy. These state policies, as determinants of the structural environment, are the subject of the next section.

Structural, Political, and Economic Factors Promoting Emigration

The structural factors enabling and promoting emigration to Germany and the U.S. may be best understood within Sassen's (1988) theoretical framework. The conditions necessary to induce migration are a "*combination* of poverty, unemployment, or underemployment *with* the emergence of objective ideological linkages . . .(Sassen 1988:9)." Unemployment was clearly present, as noted earlier. For the Turkish-German relationship, "objective ideological linkages" emerged at the state level, but not for individual workers. Linkages between the Turkish state's own elite and Europe were rooted in the long history of Westernization in Turkey and collaboration with Germany in

military and economic projects before the Second World War. The U.S.'s post-war financial aid to both Germany and Turkey under the Marshall Plan added to the connections, and the establishment of NATO carried the state-level "ideological linkages" further. Emigration was then organized by the two states, and Turkish workers, facing poor economic prospects in Turkey, did not hesitate to join the stream moving to contract jobs in Europe.

Within Sassen's (1988) framework, emigration of middle-class and professional labor to the United States was also built upon "objective ideological linkages," in this case involving both individuals and the state. A crucial structural factor was the maturation of the Turkish system of higher education into Western-oriented and well-financed universities where Turkish youth could become suitable recruits for U.S. and Canadian industry. The presence of Western affiliate companies also gave experience and encouragement to middle-level professionals. There was foreign investment in Turkish companies, most particularly in patents and unique inputs, and marketing in Europe and the Middle East as well as in Turkey. University-level networks of exchange of faculty and graduate students developed, and many cultural commodities such as movies, print media, restaurants, fashion and home decor were distributed. All of this created "objective ideological" conditions for selective emigration from classes already incorporated into these global processes (Sassen 1988:1-25).

Migration to North America began in earnest in the 1980s. The particularities of how and when the flow was established are found in the economic and political events of the 1970s. The mid and late 1970s saw a series of severe economic crises in Turkey,

starting with the international oil crisis in 1973, that ended a long run of economic progress since the Second World War—indeed, during the decade before the crisis, the GNP was growing at seven percent per year (Öniş 1986:18). Economic crisis, coupled with continuing political turmoil, brought the country to the brink of an urban civil war in 1980 (Zürcher 1993:279).

By 1976, frequent power cuts diminished industrial output and interrupted daily life. Declining capacity to import goods meant widespread shortages of even the most basic items (Pamuk 1998: 115). Street violence erupted frequently. Among the ethnographies I collected, four referred vividly to this period. When I interviewed Seher in Vancouver, she told me that they had been happy with their lives in Istanbul until the late 1970s.

> I do not know whether you remember that there was no heating oil in 1979 in Turkey. It was one of the most important reasons why we decided to come here [Canada]. We put a Gypsy firebox inside the living room. We found a small chimney. We closed the doors. The radiators were not functioning, and we all lived in the living room with our two small children. No way you could go to the kitchen. Istanbul was colder then. . . . What can you do? Okay, we had money, but there was no oil to buy. We lived through days when we had to wait in lines even to buy a cooking gas cylinder or some cooking oil. . . When the situation was like this I had to say, "Okay, let's go." Hami [her husband] told me that we should consider

the option of emigrating, because there is only one way for the wise. Let's go and try it until Turkey recovers.[23]

The Turkish military took power on September 12, 1980. All political parties were banned and their leaders taken into custody (Zürcher 1993:292). The principal concern of the 1980 military junta was the political and institutional restructuring of the country (Yeşilada 1987: 37-38). They were determined to de-politicize the urban youth who had formed left and right factions that were fighting each other and the state, frequently with violence. Significantly, the universities lost their autonomy (Ahmad 1993:185). Furthermore, according to Ahmad, the government established a new central authority to control the number of students in universities, appointments of faculty and staff, curricula, and budgets. This control of university education by the government continues today.

After the 1980 coup, one immediate benefit for urban people was that the violent student movement which had often made city streets and public places dangerous was disbanded (Ahmad 1993:190). Fear of violent attack among the urban middle-class subsided. But growing misuse of police power and undercover operations targeted individuals and groups whenever they were perceived as threats to the hegemony of the

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[23] Buraya gelmemizin en büyük sebeplerinden bir tanesi bilmiyorum sen hatırlar mısın bir sene yakıt olmadı Türkiye'de. Hiç yakıt olmadı 79'da falan. Bir Çingene sobası kurduk salonda. Allah'tan bir soba şeysi vardı. Deliği bulduk. Kapıları kapadık. Kaloriferler yanmadı ve biz iki küçük çocuklan salonda yaşadık yani. Mutfağa falan gitmene imkan yok. Çokta soğuk olurdu o zaman İstanbul içinde. . . . Tamam paran var ama yakıt yok yani ne yapacaksın. Yağ kuyruklarının, tüp gaz kuyruklarının biz bunların hepsini yaşadık yani. . . . Tabi yani o zaman Hami gidelim yani böyle bir imkan çıktı dediği zaman aklın sesi bir gidelim deneyelim diyorsun. O zamana kadar belki burası düzelir.

military and the homogeneous nation that they claimed to be upholding (Zürcher 1993:294).[24] Thus, civil society could not develop freely, and those in minority groups faced recurring problems.

The military put together a new constitution to restructure political life. It came into effect in 1983, and was more authoritarian than the previous constitution (Zürcher 1993:295). Zürcher writes that the new constitution severely compromised the free press, freedom of the trade unions, and the rights and freedom of individual citizens. The usual formal democratic rights and liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of association were included in the constitution, but with conditions. The constitution stipulated that these freedoms could be annulled, suspended, or limited on the grounds of a whole series of considerations, including national interest, public order, national security, danger to the republican order, and public health (Zürcher 1993:295-296). The military retained the option to decide when a person, an association, or a newspaper was a threat to national security or national order. All these curtailments in rights and freedoms suppressed and strictly controlled civil associations, preventing the emergence of grass roots citizen organizations.[25] These changes created a new class of Turkish emigrant: the political dissident.

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[24] Zürcher (1993) writes that 11,500 people were arrested in the first six weeks, and by the end of 1980, 30,000 had been arrested. Still later, the number rose to 122,600.

[25] The law of associations requires that all associations must register with the police, and none are allowed to engage in political campaigns or support political parties. Their aim is to prevent the re-establishment of bodies that speak for youth, women, or workers (Mepham 1987:22).

Following the 1980 coup, thousands of people who were marked by the military junta as politically troublesome left the country, while those who stayed risked economic discrimination or jail.[26] Among them were university faculty and journalists. Those who left usually went to European countries where entry was quicker and easier, such as Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Often, they did so by slipping across the border or disappearing on touristic or business trips, and had to regularize their status abroad or back in Turkey many years later. The United States and Canada were other options for those who already had in hand the necessary visas, passports, contacts, and funds.

Sedat, a journalist I interviewed in Seattle, came from Ankara in 1985. Though of modest background, Sedat was able to enter a college in Ankara to train as a public school teacher. During his first year of college, he became involved in the leftist movement and dropped out of school. In 1980, the same year as the military coup, Sedat decided to go back to school to study journalism and graduated in 1984. While studying, he continued to work at a leftist newspaper which was eventually shut down by the military. Upon graduation, he looked for jobs in other newspapers as a journalist—but all the leftist newspapers were by then defunct. Other newspaper owners were hesitant to employ people who had worked at leftist agencies, for fear of government harassment.

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[26] Zürcher (1993:293) writes that ". . . regional and local [military] commanders under martial law were given very wide ranging powers. They were put in charge of education, the press, chambers of commerce and trade unions, and they did not hesitate to use their powers. Especially in Istanbul, the centre of intellectual life and of the press, this led to a continuous series of closures of newspapers and arrests of journalists and editors."

Sedat said that many of his journalist friends went to Europe as refugees. He chose the United States because he was invited and sponsored for immigration by his uncle.

Under Turkey's new constitution, with its focus on state building and a unified Turkish society, Muslim ethnic minorities found it difficult, sometimes impossible, to express their views and live in traditional cultural styles.[27] Minorities were excluded from many opportunities, and discrimination was sometimes encouraged by the state, even financed clandestinely, in the name of eradicating cultural differences. While Turkish minority ethnic groups, including Christians and Jews, have always been potential sources of emigrants (Akgündüz 1998), the emigration of Muslim ethnic minorities is recent and due largely to the Kurdish-Turkish civil war in the East.

Among those belonging to the "other" in Turkish society was Melih, whom I interviewed on Vancouver Island in Canada. If Melih had not told me, I would not have known that he was a Kurdish Turk. He grew up in an industrial town not far from Istanbul in a family that had moved from eastern Turkey and spoke Kurdish at home. In Turkey, he had learned how to live in two cultures, but could not acknowledge his Kurdish heritage without jeopardizing his engineering career and life in Istanbul. Now in Canada, with his Turkish wife and small child, he says that he does not have a problem living

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[27] Among the more important ethnic minorities are the Laz, Circassians, Kurds, and Alevis. Forty-seven distinct ethnic groups are enumerated by Andrews (1989). Turkish Kurds are the most famous internationally, their militant wing, PKK, being the object of civil war in eastern and southeastern Turkey. Kurds are frequently targeted in Istanbul and other cities as well as the east (Kirişci and Winrow 1997; Chaliand 1992: Ciment 1996: Gunter 1990; Mönch-Bucak 1990; Rugman and Hutchings1996).

among people who are not Kurdish, and he is happy with the situation. His memories of Turkey, however, are telling.

> In the family we always discussed what was going to happen to the southeast or to the PKK [revolutionary group fighting for independence]. What was going to happen to the people living there? In comparison to other parts of Turkey, the southeast is so poor. In addition, due to the war between the PKK and the state, many people were harmed. Many innocent people from my extended family were jailed for nothing. People were beaten with clubs. These, of course, are not pleasant things. They do not leave kind impressions in one's mind about the state. Hence, when you look at the Kurdish people, they do not have good relations with the Turkish state.[28]

During the 1980s and the 1990s, the Turkish state tried to assimilate the Kurdish minority by forcefully suppressing the Kurdish insurgency. Successive Turkish governments did everything within their power to deny the existence of Kurds as a distinctive ethnic group (Kasaba 1997:17) For Melih, the solution was to emigrate to Canada. He had the credentials and money to make the choice, unlike many others of the

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[28] Mesela biz ailemiz etrafında her zaman konuşurduk. Güney Doğunun durumu PKK'nın durumu ne olacak. İşte oradaki insanların durumu ne olacak? Şimdi Türkiye'nin diğer yerlerine göre Güney Doğu çok fakir. Ondan sonra bu oradaki şeyden dolayı, PKK ile devlet arasındaki savaştan dolayı aşağı yukarı bir sürü insan zarar gördü. Benim ailemden bir sürü insan suçsuz yere hapislerde yatmak durumunda kaldı. Ondan sonra insanlar dipçikle dövüldü. Bunlar hoş şeyler değil tabiki. Bunlar insanın kafasında hoş şeyler bırakmıyor tabiki devlete karşı. Dolayısı ile Kürt insanlara baktığınız zaman Türk devleti ile aralarında pek iyi ilişkiler yoktur.

same minority. Once he gains Canadian citizenship, he plans to visit Turkey, probably to do a short period of compulsory military service and thereby retain his dual nationality.

For young men, emigration is a way of reducing military service to an acceptable duration and location. If a Turkish man lives abroad for three years, he may satisfy the requirement by returning for a three-month period of military service. Otherwise, all men must serve for 18 months, and may be forced to fight against Kurdish rebels in eastern Turkey or northern Iraq. For a number of my informants, not just Kurds, this factor was an important reason for emigration.

On the economic front, an austerity package—the most severe ever undertaken—was announced by the Demirel government in January, 1980, but could not be implemented until the military took over later in the year and selected Turgut Özal as their proxy responsible for the economy (Ahmad 1993:178-179). The new policy package profoundly changed Turkey's socioeconomic structure and polity through the 1980s and 1990s until it, along with everything else, came apart amidst the economic and political collapse at the end of the 1990s (Boratov 1994; Derviş 2001). The new direction abandoned the inward-oriented economic policies of the previous twenty years that had relied on an import-substitution-industrialization strategy (Pamuk 1998:110-117). Instead, the new policy package was intended to create an outward-oriented export economy (Kazgan 1985). To make the change, it was necessary to suppress real agricultural incomes and urban wages, thus abandoning consumer demand as the engine

of growth and replacing it with an ability to compete for export markets (Şenses, 1996:72; Pamuk 1998:124).[29]

In the absence of effective labor unions, all negotiations of wages and prices were managed by the strong military-backed government (Zürcher 1993:311-312). The process of restructuring the economy put urban wage and salary earners through a long period of impoverishment (Köse and Yeldan 1998:72-77). This was compounded by high inflation rates, reaching triple digits in 1994 (Akat 2000).

Income inequalities grew and people were shuffled among class positions (Zürcher 1993:311). The old state-oriented elite was broken up. The new elite now works for transnational corporations at executive levels, or as middlemen for their trading in commodities, services, or finance. According to Zürcher, they are often the owners and CEOs of wealthy Turkish construction companies and consulting firms working in Middle Eastern countries and the Central Asian countries that have split off in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The new elite, like the old elite before them, enjoy a luxurious life-style and have the economic power to consume imported products. The increasing number of night clubs, restaurants, five-star hotels, and super shopping malls in big cities provide opportunities for this class to enjoy its wealth (Filiztekin and Tunalı 1999: 77-106; Öniş 2000: 289). This is evidence of widening income disparities, as well as the creation of a significant upper-middle class.

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[29] Pamuk (p.251) presents an index (1950=100) for urban real wages which shows a decline from 216 in 1977 to140 in 1987 as a result of the strategy of wage repression.

After the mid-1980s, a new urban mid-level middle class also came into existence. In Istanbul, I observed that the new middle class work in Turkish or transnational private companies in lower management positions. They are nevertheless better off than those in government jobs, and they are also better English speakers, thanks to a major expansion of universities teaching in English in the 1980s and 1990s (Doğançay-Aktuna 1998). In addition to the prestigious Boğaziçi and Middle East Technical Universities, five English-speaking private universities were founded with strong departments relevant to business, engineering, and science.[30] Youth backed by parents with sufficient money and determination can follow the track in English through elite high schools and gain admission to one of the popular university departments now existing in Turkey. For students and parents alike, connecting to the global networks of business and educational institutions expands their options whether they remain in Turkey or eventually emigrate.

One of a number of ethnographic interviews showing the results of the expanded educational and employment track was with Belma, in Seattle. Belma graduated from Middle East Technical University. She did her undergraduate work in the department of industrial engineering, and then went to Britain for a one-year MBA with a scholarship from the British Council. After coming back to Turkey, she started to work for Coca Cola Turkey.

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[30] The five are: Bilkent, Koç, Sabancı, Bilgi, Yeditepe (Hatiboğlu 1998:403-404). Computer sciences and other departments of engineering are famous as tracks for eventual placement at home or abroad, either for further education or for immediate recruitment into jobs.

While working in Istanbul, she learned that she had been selected by the Green Card Lottery[31] to which she had applied a year before. After she received her green card, she decided to remain in her small apartment in Istanbul for a while and continue her old life with friends and family. Meanwhile, she was coming and going to the United States to retain her permanent residence status. During a visit in 1999, she saw a job opening at Microsoft advertised in the paper. She thought that the qualifications fit her credentials, sent her resume to the company, and was invited immediately to an interview. During the interview she was offered a position. She says that she accepted the job offer without even thinking what it meant for her life, because Microsoft was the company of her dreams.

> I am fascinated by everything done in Microsoft. In that sense I am in the right place. When I got the job, there was nothing else to think about. . . . I had only one week [to return to Turkey and move to Seattle]. I resigned from my job over there. I said goodby to a few people. I packed two suitcases and got onto the plane. When I was on the airplane, I understood what I just did. Until that moment I did not even think what I was doing. I knew well that this was the right thing. I remember when I was on the airplane I was wishing for a breakdown of the plane, so I could stay in Istanbul a little longer. I wished this with all my heart. It shows that one

[31] In chapter 5, there is an explanation of this method of gaining admission to the United States.

still carries some internal fear and nervousness. It is such a powerful feeling to belong to somewhere.[32]

Although Belma jumped at the idea of becoming a part of corporate America, she says that she did not fully realize what immigration would mean. Her parents supported her decision, because it meant upward mobility for her. She is happy in Seattle and receiving promotions.

Like Belma, most of the Turkish immigrants to North America today are graduates of English-language university tracks.[33] While their financial and educational means enable them to look for opportunities outside of the country, they are directly affected by both global and local economic crises, and they are personally more vulnerable to layoffs in Turkey than public-sector employees (Neyzi 2001:423). Most of them identify themselves as secularist and modernist, and this outlook is evidenced in the ways they socialize, choose professions, and dress (Neyzi 1999).

Neyzi (2001) writes about the post-1980 generation of urban youth who appear to be apolitical consumers struggling for their own personal spaces. The recent generation of

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[32] Beni büyülüyor Microsoft'ta yapılan her şey. O anlamda da çok doğru yerdeyim şimdi. İşi bulunca hiç düşünülecek bir şey yoktu. Kalktım geldim. . . Bir hafta vaktim vardı. İstifa ettim işte oradaki işimden. Bir iki insana Allahaısmarladık dedim. İki bavul topladım çıktım geldim. Uçağa bindim. Uçağa bindiğim anda ne yaptığımı anladım. O ana kadar yani oturup doğru dürüst düşünmemiştim bile. Doğru olduğunu çok iyi biliyordum bunun. Onun için uçağa bindiğim anda şey diye düşündüğümü hatırlıyorum yaa bir ağrıza yapsın şu uçakta İstanbul'da inse. Yani bütün kalbimle onu söyledim yani. Demek ki insanın içinde o korkumu tedirginlik mi hani bu o kadar doğru olduğunu bilmeme ramen onu yaşamak. Ne kadar güçlü bir şey demekki o ait olduğun yer duygusu.

[33] The ethnographies show that the professional immigrants almost all come through the elite English-language educational track, and the statistical analysis in chapter 6 confirms the high proportions of individuals with BA and higher degrees.

youth and young adults is much more interested in making choices that will lead to education, professional employment, and eligibility for emigration than was true of previous generations. She further states that due to a general feeling of pessimism and a lack of future opportunities in Turkey, young Turks look abroad. They know there is large-scale corruption in Turkey and that money does not often trickle down to ordinary people like themselves. They are therefore conscious that they may not be able to make it inside Turkey through hard work. Some of them are afraid of being targeted because they belong to a minority group. Many also do not want to be drafted as foot soldiers for the Kurdish war in eastern Turkey. Finally, there is no civil society that offers them a way to participate in making a better country. All of this has led to a potential flow of migrants that is no longer stemmed by Turkish state policy, but regulated by state immigration policies in Europe and North America. This flow of migrants can be seen as a direct consequence of globalization of "production sites through foreign investment"as Turkey adopted export oriented economic policies of the 1980s under the military dictatorship and promoted English language and pro-western education policies (Sassen 1988:2). While Turkish policy no longer directly constrains emigration, it still deeply affects the culture of all Turkish emigrants through its nationalist and pro-Western stance.

Turkish Westernization and Secularism

Every Turk who emigrates to another country, irrespective of class, carries a sense of national and cultural identity that contributes to the definition of individual hybridities and the cultural diaspora. In the early days of the Republic, the state played a

very powerful role in creating a national Turkish culture—a particularly successful example of imagining a "community" in Anderson's (1983) sense. After eighty years, the original cultural and patriotic ideals of a Turkish nation are strong, even though the state itself has not yet become a well-articulated modern institution. How these ideals were created and sustained is contained in the history of Turkish nationalism.

The founding elite of Republican Turkey in 1923 was composed of young military officers and some civilian officers from the Ottoman administration who had been educated in the few European-style, modernized schools of the empire (Mango 2000:32). They were influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and the rationalist, liberal thought of the French Revolution.[34] They called themselves *aydınlar,* which literally means "illuminated ones." They imbibed the ideals of the Enlightenment and made them a part of Turkish nationalism (Kasaba 1997: 27). Their self-defined duty was to disseminate these ideals to the rest of the country.

Turkish modernization took its inspiration directly from Europe (Keyder 1997; Mango 2000:433-467). Atatürk's own statements about modernization make his meaning clear: according to one of his state mottoes, "People who are not civilized are sentenced to live under the feet of civilized people."[35] Modernization was seen as the process by which to become civilized, like the European nations of the West. It could only happen by

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[34] The pre-Republican development of modernist ideals, carrying over to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the elite that governed following independence, is laid out in detail by Şerif Mardin (1962; especially pp. 360-384, 404)

[35] In Turkish, "Medeni olmayan insanlar medeni olanların ayakları altında kalmaya mahkümdurlar". My translation to English.

adopting cultural and social ways of civilized European countries in matters of governance and in the way Turkish people dressed, socialized, were educated, and consumed printed media such as books and newspapers.[36]

In pursuit of modernization, ties with religion were cut (Zürcher 1993:181). Within a decade the state abolished the Caliphate and exiled the Caliph, who had been the spiritual ruler of the Sunni Muslim world (Poulton 1997:98). The tumultuous changes of the 1920s are explored in numerous books (Ahmad 1993:79-80; Zürcher 1993:173-183; Mango 2000:361-467). The Republic adopted the Latin alphabet for all written Turkish. Arabic and Persian words were purged from the language. New words were adopted from European languages. The population was effectively cut off from its Ottoman and Islamic written history.[37] The metric system replaced traditional weights and measures. The Republic discouraged traditional clothing, and replaced religious schooling with a national system of state schools that gave no religious education. The population's traditions of worshiping in mosques and carrying out such necessary ceremonies as preparing the dead for burial were not entirely forbidden, but supervised closely by state-appointed preachers (imams). Swiss, French, and Italian laws were enacted with slight modifications to replace those Ottoman laws that had been partly based on Islamic

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[36] Edward Said (1995) writes of the "orientalist" perception that persons living in the occident have of the orient. Long before Said, Atatürk and the *aydınlar* had themselves felt the brunt of those perceptions and wanted to bring Turkey onto an equal footing with the occidental peoples.

[37] Universities stopped teaching the Ottoman script and its literature. It was only much later, in the 1970s, that new history and language courses began to appear as Turks thought about recovering knowledge of their own past.

religious law. The intent was to get rid of Islam, which was understood to be the main characteristic of "the backward Orient," so that Turkey would become like the West (Yavuz 2000:21-27).

Even so, Turkish secularism never became the same as secularism in America with its constitutional separation of church and state. Turkey's *laiklik* translates as laicism (secular or lay), but with its own particular meaning. Religion, meaning Islam, was firmly rejected as a source of legal principles for incorporation into law or for guidance of state jurisdiction. Thus, though Turkey is a country of many inhabitants who profess to be Muslims, it is not an Islamic country. Under *laiklik*, the state has the right to control all religious institutions and their financial resources. The state is secular in the sense that its governing functions are not influenced by religion, but state and religion are not totally separate. The state itself regulates religious organizations and their activities.

The ruling elite had strong centralist tendencies, and a desire to bury the dynastic and semi-theocratic past. The Ottoman era and everything associated with it were condemned or discounted in official history books (Ergil 2000:50), and a new Turkish history—based on long forgotten pre-Ottoman, pre-Islamic sources reaching to the steppes of Central Asia—was written to describe the origins of the new nation (Pope and Pope 1997: 51; Poulton 1997:101-109; Kasaba 1997: 29).[38] Unlike the Ottoman Empire, which had been a decentralized state with different jurisdictions for different religious ethnic groups, the new state was based on the one-nation, one-state idea (Zürcher

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[38] Examples abound of other countries that try to consolidate a national image by re-writing history and incorporating the results in national education systems. See Anderson (1983: 34) and Chatterjee (1993).

1993:12; Shaw and Shaw 1977:375-378). The new state aspired to eliminate ethnic conflict by claiming one national identity, and in so doing become sovereign over all its citizens and territories (Pope and Pope 1997: 59).[39] An exclusive Turkish language was, the leaders felt, the glue that would hold it together.

In the 1930s and afterwards, national education became a major enterprise (Poulton 1997:114-129). It incorporated all of the foregoing reforms and nationalistic perspectives of the Republic. School children were taught to be proud of their Turkish ancestry. These practices of indoctrination and maintenance have largely been successful; for proof, one need only look at the organized celebration of national holidays and the organization of Turkish language classes for second-generation children that continues today among Turkish residents of Germany and North America.

This new Turkish identity was intended to eliminate ethnic and cultural differences and produce a homogeneous population (Kasaba 1987:28-29). However, this program eventually led to coercive assimilation strategies and denial of the existence of minorities in Turkey (Mardin 1987:70-71). Pre-existing Muslim minorities were granted "Turkishness" even when they spoke different languages at home such as Kurdish, Arabic, or Laz—a dialect of Georgian (Poulton 1997:122-3). Accordingly, new groups were invented: the Kurds, who are the largest non-Turkish Muslim minority in Anatolia, became "mountain Turks" (Ergil 2000:51).

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[39] The national boundaries encompassed the geographic area of Asia Minor (Anatolia) and some parts of European Thrace (west of the Bosphorus up to Edirne).

The Turkish modernization movement, while unifying the top strata of society, created a deeply fragmented structure with many underlying layers that opposed the hegemonic culture of the early republican elite (Ergil 2000). Religious and ethnic attachments continued to define people's identities and resulted in many episodes of resistance against the state, most of which were ruthlessly suppressed. Modernization in Turkey created a fragile social system, one ill-equipped to hold the state and the subaltern levels of the people together.

The administrative, economic, and cultural reforms intended to change society and, among other things, to facilitate secularism, were most effective in urban centers—the same places from which emigrants to North America would originate. The urban population was originally only a small fraction of the whole country—less than 18 percent—until after 1950, when the urban population rose dramatically. (State Institute of Statistics 1995:45-47). The second half of the 1950s saw the start of mass migration from the countryside to towns and cities. As mentioned earlier, over a million people left the land before 1960 (Zürcher 1993:237). These migrants built their houses on unused land on the outskirts of towns and cities. Whole satellite towns of *gecekondus*, literally meaning "landed at night," sprang up alongside the vegetable gardens that revealed their rural origins (Karpat 1976). The Turkish identity, as it had been tailored by the revolutionary elite, was challenged by these newcomers, many of whom would later emigrate to Germany carrying their religious values with them. The urban *aydınlar* increasingly felt that their cities were being invaded by peasants and their traditional values.

By 1985, half of the country's population was urban. In the cities, modern nationalism permeated most aspects of social life (Ahmad 1993:115; Pope and Pope 1997: 89).The secularist and nationalist education initiated during the first fifteen years of the republic continues today, and decades of indoctrination have created a deep sense of pride among young urban Turks (Güneri, Sümer, and Yıldırım 1999). A volatile gap between urban and rural remains to this day as ". . . the new and the old, the modern and the traditional, East and West, the secular and the anti-secular, and the rich and the poor lived side by side with few points of contact" (Ergil 2000:51).As we can see, then, the exodus of rural laborers to Germany in the 1960s was not solely a product of structural political and economic constraints—it was also evidence of the deep cultural divide between rural and urban inhabitants.

The self-representation of "I am a Turk,"[40] with its nationalist connotations, is part of the identity that emigrants carry with them, but it is complex. How migrants choose to represent their Turkishness may change when they leave home and move abroad. In Germany, for example, Turkish workers more openly associate themselves with different Islamic practices of worship, Kurdish and other languages.[41] Kurdish and Alevi minorities sometimes campaign in Germany for pressure on the Turkish state to improve human

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[40] The educational system in Turkey, secular holidays and celebrations, from early in the Republic to the present "hammers" this identity into every person as they grow up. (Pope and Pope 1996:7-20) Military service for every male is a further identity-forming experience which I found again and again during the life-history interviews.

[41] Lesthaeghe (2000) shows how emigrants handle their religious dimension in Belgium, not unlike their variety of religious identity constructions in Germany.

rights.[42] These differences of representation abroad could be interpreted as a way of using the more democratic civic structures of difference available in Germany.

Similar changes of representation occur among Turks moving to North America—recall Sedat in Seattle, and Melih on Vancouver Island in Canada. However, the selection of immigrants moving to North America is narrower in cultural terms—mainly well-educated, secular, urban, ethnic Turks—and smaller in numbers—not millions, but thousands—so that the immense variety of representations seen in Europe is not seen in North America. Nevertheless, there are interesting differences in the way Turks who came to the United States and Canada at different time periods define themselves and attempt to influence how the diasporic community represents itself.

I first encountered such differences in two public meetings about current Turkish politics held in 2000 in Seattle and led by Cengiz Candar, a prominent Turkish columnist. He argued, among other things, that the current involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish politics is an obstacle to further democratization in Turkey. In the discussion—which I followed up later during interviews with the participants—three divergent reactions were found.

Those immigrants who had come before 1980 were, in most instances, furious. They still believe in the doctrine that the army is the founder and guardian of the state as it was created out of the Turkish revolutionary struggle. Saying anything negative against

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[42] Leggewie's "How Turks Became Kurds, Not Germans," shows the positioning of Turkish Kurds vis-a-vis both their native country and Germany with a political, activist twist (Leggewie 1996).

the army is treason. A second response came from those who emigrated during the 1980s right after the military coup. They were openly critical of the army and what they perceived as human rights abuses inside Turkey. Finally, those who immigrated in the 1990s, taking jobs in the booming high-tech industry, voiced concern about speaking openly of Turkish problems in public. They wanted to avoid a negative image of Turkish people in North America. They preferred to emphasize the positive aspects of Turkey and Turkish people; thus, they followed Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler's (1996) notion that identity is a cultural resource for dealing with macro-structural constraints. These immigrants wanted to use Turkish identity as a positive resource while dealing with their North American colleagues, friends, and neighbors.

These differences in viewpoints are grounded in the human aspect of Turkish social, political, and economic policies in different periods. Turkish identity and the way it is defined is a subject of constant debate among the members of the Turkish diaspora. This is part of the complexity and fluidity that makes up hybrid identities.

Conclusion

Those who emigrate from Turkey come from a background of structural and cultural factors that, at various points in time, constrained, enabled, or even encouraged them to go abroad. Those who did emigrate carried with them their particular constructions of Turkish national identity and culture.

Turkey's own nation-building project was powerful and consistent with regard to the elite and urban populations, but less pervasive in the countryside and at working-class

levels. There are fissures in the singular Turkish identity that was propagated, often related to class background, minorities, issues of democratization, and religious continuities and revival. The Turks who emigrate, therefore, are by no means a homogeneous population.

This chapter illustrates the importance of understanding the political, economic, and cultural factors that lead to emigration. Changes in the Turkish state, as well as in the global system of production and labor flows, have greatly changed the demographics and volume of Turkish migration from the 1960s to the present.

The Turks who went to Germany were initially part of the rural classes of Turkey, many of whom had recently migrated to the cities to work as wage labor. This immigration flow to Germany was created in a very early stage of Turkish economic and military global contacts, and its characteristics were shaped by Germany's demand of working-class labor. Immigration to North America, on the other hand, should be studied in terms of the current global context and the decisions by states in this context to promote trade and exports by opening their doors to the transnational companies and foreign investment and investing in human resources which could be employed in these globally connected sectors of local economies.

While the sender state is an important actor, creating conditions for different kinds of labor migration, the receiver state is equally important, for it creates much of the context for adjustment to life in the host countries. These structural and cultural conditions in the host countries of Germany, the United States, and Canada are discussed in the following two chapters.

Chapter Four

THE TURKISH DIASPORA IN GERMANY

Self Portrait

My life's contradiction is not worth talking about.

It does not support me.

I did not want to flee.

If I could have stood, a standing place would have been enough.

I do not need a floor to lie on.

To sleep I rest myself next to another human being.

Should I not find another person, I still have space enough.

Zafer Şenocak 1997 [43]

Şenocak, a prominent Turkish-German poet, evokes in his work feelings of loneliness and alienation. To judge by his popularity, his feelings are readily understood by others. The Turkish-German diaspora, consisting of some two million people, is widely recognized as an important case in migration and diaspora studies (Safran 1991:83; Clifford 1994: 303 and Tölölyan 1991). It is a fascinating and well-documented

[43] Translation from German by Rangit Shorter. Source: Şenocak 1997.

example of migration, and illustrates clearly the processes and issues of a diaspora over a period of more than forty years. The well-documented history of the German case[44]—the crucial roles that history, place, and circumstance have played—offer an important model against which to contrast the more recent North American diasporas.

The fragmentary ways in which assimilation occurred initially, and the more focused sequels later in time, are studied in this chapter—in the same manner as they will be in the chapters on Canada and the United States—by looking at particular characteristics of the immigrants and their descendants: income, education, occupation, language and family relations. The process of assimilation, including setbacks by returns home and unfavorable changes in the macro-environment, meanwhile created strong hybrid Turkish identities; they are studied by looking at the forms of exclusion or resistance that Turks encountered in Germany, cultural factors that these particular immigrants brought with them, and the organizations for religious, social, and political purposes that they formed.

The Turkish diaspora in Germany is a somewhat tragic case. More than half of its members were born in Germany, yet they largely remain part of an economic underclass and are not socially or culturally included in German society. In terms of economic gains and cultural integration, the Turks living in Germany today are the least well off among the three diasporas I studied.

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[44] I use research studies in English and Turkish, selected from among the literally hundreds of scholarly works on the subject.

The immigrants, who are now mostly older members of the diaspora, did well at first in factory jobs when compared with their poor economic prospects in Turkey (Şen 1993), but then remained in Germany amidst ambivalence on both sides as to whether they would be permanently welcome. German economic recessions hit Turks hard, since they were at the bottom of the labor pool and the first to be let go. Economic instability, combined with poor access to schooling and other cultural factors, together maintained the isolation of Turks in Germany. Thus a niche was created, one still inhabited by Turks today.

Recent trends in democratization and the beginnings of social inclusion in Germany give some hope to ethnic minorities, though the Turkish population is particularly large and therefore slow to be accepted. The diaspora's size, power of political negotiation, and internal leadership has combined with faltering European political steps toward liberalization to bring about increased access to German citizenship. The hybridity of being many things, including both Turkish and German, is not yet recognized by the state.

Studying the Turkish Germans reveals a number of issues that help to explain the current situation. The German state, in its capacity as recruiter and regulator of immigration, plays a critical role in this story. Global economic and political conditions have also affected employment opportunities, and these swings have led to both migration and hostility toward immigrant populations. In Germany, more so than in North America, lack of language skills and rigidly enforced social isolation have kept Turks from

mainstream society. These factors have had a profound impact on the collective Turkish-German psyche.

The German State as Recruiter and Regulator

During and after the Second World War, Western countries, including Germany and the United States, used temporary migrant labor to boost their booming economies. The United States began the short-lived *Bracero* program to recruit temporary labor from Mexico (Muss and van Dam 1996:42; Zolberg 1999:76-77). The term *Bracero* literally meant a traveling journeyman, or short-term contract employee, very similar to the idea of *Gastarbeiter* ("guest worker") in Germany. Unlike Germany's program, however, the U.S. *Bracero* program ended in 1964.

In the German case, the booming postwar economy led to full employment in the country by 1960, and job vacancies outnumbered applicants. As German companies looked for ways to recruit unskilled and semi-skilled industrial labor, starting with the Eastern Mediterranean countries, the German government stepped in to organize the process. Italians, Spanish, Portugese, Greeks, Moroccans, Tunisians, Yugoslavians, and eventually Turks were recruited, forming the *Gastarbeiter* of Germany. Recruitment bureaus were established by the German government in these countries (Kolinsky 1996: 79). A number of German officials were sent to investigate qualifications, including the health of the applicants, before the German employment bureau in Turkey completed contracts person by person (Ansay 1991:834). By 1973, some 400,000 *Gastarbeiter* were working in Germany by contract renewals or by rotation from Turkey. In Turkey,

dramatic social and economic changes were causing large numbers of unemployed agricultural workers to stream into urban areas; they joined small-town dwellers who were ready to work for comparatively high wages as unskilled and semi-skilled laborers.

Germany's *Gastarbeiter* program was an exceptionally rigid labor recruitment plan, implemented through an elaborate bureaucratic procedure. Foreign workers were recruited on the basis of permits which combined the rights of residence and work (Muss and van Dam 1996: 20). Under the German Alien Act of 1965, a resident permit was usually granted for a definite period of time under certain conditions, such as to live in a certain location or to work at a specific firm. For many years, residence permits were linked to work permits. Without a work permit, the residence permit of a foreigner was not renewed; and if a person had no residence permit, he could not get a work permit. The cancellation of a residence permit was possible for several reasons, including minor offences such as a traffic rule violation or a traffic accident (Ansay 1991:835; 1975:15; Franz 1975:54).

Despite these restrictions, thousands of Turkish workers arrived on temporary contracts, without family, and with every expectation that they would be going home. They saw no need to learn the language or in any way to become part of German culture. But then circumstances changed.

In 1973, the oil embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries precipitated a severe economic depression in Germany, and caused the recruitment of *Gastarbeiter* of all nationalities to come to a halt. Germany officially prohibited all work-related immigration, a prohibition still in effect in 2002. Turks were

given a choice of leaving with financial rewards, or staying if their employers continued to issue them contracts. After proving their means of support, including employment, about half of the original *Gastarbeiter* stayed—around 200,000 Turks. Those who stayed were allowed to bring spouses and other family members.

The spouses, usually female, who came to Germany through the family reunification program faced unusually difficult circumstances. Under the terms of family reunification, they were not allowed to find employment for four years after their arrival (Münscher 1984: 1231; Kolinsky 1996: 90). Family reunion, therefore, meant that spouses of workers were barred from employment and remained financially dependent on the "breadwinner" who initiated the reunion. The higher cost of living in Germany for dependents often turned family reunion into social and economic hardship.[45]

Much later, in 1991, a revision of the 1965 German Alien Act[46] came into effect. It allowed migrant workers who had been in Germany for at least a decade to be re-registered as immigrants, not *Gastarbeiter*, with permanent residency. Thanks to criticism by pressure groups such as churches, labor unions, and foreign workers' organizations, more precise definitions were issued on matters such as the right to obtain a residence permit, the right of family members to emigrate to Germany, and the precise grounds for

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[45] The United States has a similar regulation for spouses of temporary workers on H-1 visas, such as many of the high-tech employees recruited from abroad. The wives of temporary workers in the United States face a similar problem.

[46] This was the first major revision and update. Small changes had occurred earlier as for example in the 1980s when talented and studious migrant workers were allowed to establish businesses of their own, as exceptions to the prohibition in most residence permits against operation of such independent businesses.

expulsion from Germany. These new acts brought more stability to the lives of Turkish immigrants.

Access to citizenship was also improved. Until 1991, Germany's citizenship regulations consisted of the original citizenship law of 1913, enacted during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II. This law was based on a fixed idea of blood ties and the assertion of cultural unity irrespective of national borders (Kolinsky 1996:73). For this reason, people of German blood, no matter where they resided, were considered to be German nationals and enjoyed automatic citizenship. However, people of other nationalities living in Germany were considered to be foreigners temporarily present; this included both the Turkish *Gastarbeiter* and their German-born children. Under the German Alien Act of 1965, Turks could apply for citizenship only if married to German nationals.

The 1991 law made naturalization possible on a case-by-case basis for second-generation Turks born in Germany, and for those who had lived in the country for more than ten years. Important criteria included evidence of acquaintance with and acceptance of a German cultural life-style and demonstration of linguistic fluency. Most importantly, those who met the conditions for naturalization had to abandon their Turkish citizenship (Kürşat-Ahlers 1996:119). This requirement in particular made the citizenship option unattractive to Turks, and few were naturalized (White 1997: 759). Instead, most Turks chose to become legal permanent residents, another status created by the 1991 law. Thus, they became *ausländische Mitbürger* (foreign co-citizens) in the eyes of German society.

Now permanent residents, the Turkish-German population continued to agitate for the right to dual nationality. In 1999, the German citizenship law was completely

rewritten, opening more possibilities for naturalization. As of 2000, children born of foreigners in Germany are granted automatic citizenship, and allowed to remain dual nationals until the age of twenty-three, when they must choose a single nationality.[47] Another change is that foreigners who have lived in Germany longer than 30 years, or are aged sixty or more, may obtain dual nationality (German Press Agency May 1, 1999). Though this is seen as an improvement, it still falls far short of the continued demands for unrestricted access to dual nationality. Legal recognition of hybridity under German naturalization law has been slow to come.

Economic and Political Conditions Affecting Employment

The first generation of Turkish workers, as we have seen, were primarily manual laborers contracted for low-skill or unskilled jobs in the manufacturing industry. Other men were employed in similar low-end jobs, such as mining; women were employed in domestic work, cleaning, and other services (Abadan-Unat 1985:3; Münscher 1984:1234). Since this generation saw themselves as purely temporary hired labor, they spent most of their days at work, striving to save as much money as possible to raise their family's standard of life back in Turkey. The quotation below tells us how one *Gastarbeiter* thought about living and working in Germany:

> I feel close to my family, and I am proud of what we are accomplishing. I was a teacher in Turkey, but here I am a worker, making many times more

[47] Since 1991, a citizenship option for German-born children had been available up to age 18, which was now enlarged.

> money. All I do is work, eat, sleep, and send money home. I would like to go home after one more year, but my daughter [in Turkey] wants to study medicine and my younger sons want to go to school. Maybe I will stay here three more years, maybe five, but I want to go home (Davis and Heyl 1986: 187).

In this manner, the *Gastarbeiter* lived singly in Germany, usually in immigrant enclaves alongside other non-German nationalities. After 1973, the process of family unification for those workers who stayed in Germany had the unintended consequence of setting in motion long-term dramatic growth in the Turkish-German population. Fertility rates among Turks were double the general rate in Germany—an average of 2.6 children per woman as compared to 1.3 children per woman among Germans (Kolinsky 1996:89). The Turkish population reached two million people by the end of the century. Most of the Turks living in Germany today are second- and third-generation offspring of immigrants.

Although Turks were initially employed almost entirely in the manufacturing and mining industries, the Turkish labor force did restructure gradually to include construction, trade and commerce, and private services. However, diversification of the Turkish labor force lagged far behind changes in the structure of the German economy. Turks continued to depend on manufacturing even when that sector—notably metal-working and automobiles—drastically declined. Figures from 1993 show 56% of the Turkish work force in manufacturing, compared with 38% for the German work force.[48]

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[48] "German" excludes minorities in these data. Compiled by Kürşat-Ahlers (1996:127) from official statistics for 620,000 workers. I use her compilations for unemployment and income as well, although the interpretations are mine.

Nevertheless, Turks have made some gains in skill levels: during the eight years from 1984 to 1992, the proportion of all Turkish workers classified as unskilled dropped from 37% to 21%, while skilled workers rose from 13% to 22%; semi-skilled workers remained at 42% (Kolinsky 1996:95). Overall, the blue-collar characteristic of the Turkish labor force in Germany remained high, at 87%. By comparison, in 1992 the German work force (excluding all minorities) was 36% blue-collar, 42% white -collar, and 12% self-employed.

In 1980, unemployment among Turks in the labor force was 6.3 %, compared to 3.5% for the entire labor force. By 1994, Turkish unemployment was even higher, 18.9%, as compared to 8.8 %. Clearly, Turks remain much more vulnerable to structural and cyclical unemployment, and their lack of diverse work experience and poor language skills makes finding new jobs particularly difficult.

Not surprisingly, Turkish household incomes suffered in the 1980s and 1990s. Incomes remained relatively stable for those able to keep their blue-collar jobs in the manufacturing sector, because the German unions insisted on their own standards for everyone—Turks included—in order to avoid competitive labor-market losses for Germans.[49] But jobs in manufacturing were shrinking rapidly while Turks were absorbing new family members. In 1989, Turkish household income stood at DM 2,921 per month,

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[49] This is a good example of Sassen's (1988:47) characterization, "Immigrants are part of the working class in the receiving country and are subject to the same conditions that shape wage levels of national workers. The powerlessness of immigrants, rather than low wages *per se*, and the consequent possibility of using them for undesirable jobs and of exercising considerable control over them makes immigrants a distinct category within the overall labor supply."

and for Germans it was DM 3,235. While these amounts do not differ greatly, it is important to note that household size among Turks by then was 4.3 persons and rising, while among Germans it was 2.5 and falling. According to Kürşat-Ahlers (1996:122), the Turkish diaspora is the poorest group among all the non-German ethnic groups. She claims that in 1989, using comparable cutoffs for income, 38% of Turks lived in poverty, as compared to 17% for other non-Germans, and 11% for Germans.

The original, first-generation *Gastarbeiter* were ill-prepared in terms of education and training to adjust flexibly and competitively to the changing conditions of employment in Germany. The younger generations, born in Germany, represented a possibility for increased economic opportunity. But the employment trends among offspring are mixed, revealing additional barriers to economic achievement.

The cycle of poor economic achievement for these generations begins at school. Most Turkish families still speak Turkish at home; thus, when Turkish children first enter school, they lag behind in German language skills, and they cannot easily get extra help either from their teachers or their parents. This handicap condemns many to the *Hauptschule* (vocational school leading to blue-collar jobs) or causes them to drop out.[50] Turks are currently four times less likely than their German classmates to attend *Gymnasium* (academic track), and eight times less likely to attend university, although the

[50] In the German education system, after fourth grade, children are separated into three types of schools: the *Hauptschule* for future laborers, *Gymnasium* for the university bound, and *Realschule* for certain trades and professions (Kahn 1993). In principle, selection is based on academic promise. Nevertheless, this can be hard to predict so early, especially for slow starters or those from disadvantaged backgrounds, such as Turks.

rates of continuation to higher levels are improving (Kahn 1993; Faist 1994; Davis and Heyl 1986:185-186).

In Germany, the *Realschule* (trades and professions) and *Hauptschule* students attend apprenticeship programs, which are different from college education in the United States. They receive a vocational education, working part-time in different sectors of the economy while receiving training. Since Turkish youths are most likely to graduate from the *Hauptschule,* not the *Realschule,* they are among the most likely to be excluded from prestigious apprenticeships (Faist 1993:313). Particularly striking is the absence of Turkish and other non-German men and women in white-collar apprenticeships (secretarial, clerical, banking) (Faist 1993:323). This fact can be explained by employer preferences for Germans, who usually have better language and social skills. Most of the young Turks in Germany, therefore, find themselves in the manufacturing sector or in other low-paying, low-status blue-collar jobs—following a path not much different from that of their parents.

Faist (1993) has asked whether Turkish youth have begun to form a distinct underclass as they struggle to gain qualifications and enter the labor market in a discriminatory environment.[51] His considered answer is that this did not happen during the 1980s. In his opinion, then, some systems of access and advancement do exist for the

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[51] He says (p. 309) that "despite the high public responsibility for vocational education and job training of school leavers, there has been persistent inequality between Turkish and German youth in access to training slots. Discrimination against Turkish school leavers is not direct; rather, it works through informal and institutional processes of access to training and jobs."

Turkish population; whether these systems of access will result in significant gains for the disenfranchised remains to be seen.

Social Exclusion and Retention of Turkish Identity

Given their political and economic position in German society, it is not surprising that, as assessed in the mid-1990s, Turks are the least integrated minority group in terms of jobs, education, housing, intermarriages, and other platforms of interaction (Kolinsky 1996). There are many important reasons for this lack of integration, which has in turn reinforced their low economic class position .

As discussed, under the *Gastarbeiter* program, workers were chosen for their immediate labor-force value, not as settlers. This non-German labor force was made up of persons who did not intend to integrate in terms of housing, schools, family provisions, leisure pursuits or cultural background.

The first-generation *Gastarbeiter* did not have German language skills. At the time, it was assumed by employers that Turks did not need to have any cultural contact with Germans, because they were there only temporarily for work. Turks accepted this relationship; indeed, it was attractive to enter a localized social enclave where minimal cultural adjustment was necessary. A survey showed that, even in 1980, 29.5% of Turkish adults did not posses any knowledge of German, and only 13.5% had attended a language school (Abadan-Unat 1985:6). They depended on their children to communicate with the German society.

From a Turkish perspective, the major reason for this lack of linguistic proficiency was the temporary nature of work and residence in Germany. Until the legal reforms of 1991, the unsettled nature of immigrant status led many Turks to feel that it was only a matter of time until they would be deported. They perceived Germans solely as their bosses at work, or the owners of their housing tenements.

The same attitude was true of German society. The economic downturn after 1973 caused increased discrimination against Turks, particularly as they sought accommodations for their expanding families. Many private landlords and managers of housing associations preferred not to have Turkish tenants.[52] (White 1997: 760; Kemper 1998). Some landlords took advantage of the situation and charged higher rents from Turks. As a result, Turks converged on run-down apartments in inner-city areas (Kemper 1998). These apartments were mostly 34 to 40 square meters, with a small kitchen, bath, and one room for living, eating, and sleeping (Davis and Heyl 1986:186).

The eagerness of both ethnic groups—Germans and Turks—to remain disengaged created ghetto-like communities in German industrial cities completely detached from German civic life. Turkish communities have everything from political interest groups to social clubs, mosques, newspapers, and television stations (White 1997: 755). The ghettoes have enlarged over the years, but the basic segregation of communities has not changed. Religious and ethnic institutions, and in some cases street gangs, became the

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[52] During my interviews of immigrants in Seattle, I came across an example of this. The interviewee stated that, in the late 1990s, he was refused by a German landlady. He was a Turk raised in Germany with a university education and a middle-class white-collar job in Microsoft-Germany.

major local social spaces in which Turks gathered and formed their local cultural identities. Within these ghettos, there are enclaves of Kurdish Turks, Alevi Turks, and Sunni Turks. Religious organizations, such as Koran schools and mosques, have also become community centers of sorts, ministering to both spiritual and social needs. Mosque complexes usually have a tea house or a dining hall, a library, stalls for traders, a *halal* butcher (similar to Kosher), and a hall for funeral ceremonies (Doomernik 1995:48). In addition, many Islamic community centers have support facilities and offer vocational training for young people (Tan and Waldhoff 1996:142). Followers of Alevi Islam, which is a liberal branch of Shi'ite Islam, are also beginning to develop similar organizations in their communities. Some Turkish minorities have more flexibility in Germany than in Turkey. Leggewie (1996:79), for example, describes how Kurdish Turks in Germany have become assertively visible, though maintaining their distance from Germans and other Turks.

Turks often characterize Germans as cold, cynical, and materialistic. White (1997:758) states that "A common theme among Turkish Germans is the observation that 'a German even lends money to her mother with a signed piece of paper.'" The collective Turkish identity is idealized as the opposite, as trustworthy and ready to help. This is part of the process of maintaining self-respect while confirming a separate identity from the "other."

Germans are no less stereotypical. Popular conceptions of Turkish society as conservative and patriarchal mean that Turkish men and women are generally portrayed,

even by well-meaning spokespersons, as silent victims who are unable to adapt to modern German society without external help (Fischer and McGowan 1996:12).

Despite the irritations and inconveniences of exclusion, the option of returning to Turkey is not attractive to most—and for some, impossible due to the circumstances of their original departure. Those who do return after living ten, fifteen, or twenty years in Germany are generally economically better off in Turkey than before they migrated (Şen 1993:55). Nevertheless, they are not accepted as legitimate members of the Turkish middle-class (Davis and Heyl 1986:194). They are *Almancı* ("Germaner") in their home country, considered by their fellow citizens to be different and "Germanish" in some of their manners. Turks in Turkey think of *Almancı* as less educated, mostly peasantish people, showy and newly rich with German money.

Perhaps in response to this social ostracism, particularly when combined with Turkey's declining economic fortunes, the number of Turks who want to go back to Turkey has fallen sharply in recent years. In a 1994 survey, 83% of respondents indicated that they were no longer considering a return to Turkey (Goldberg 1996:3 cited in White 1997:755). These sustained patterns of economic ostracism and the maintenance of cultural and social barriers have created a problematic and uncomfortable hybrid identity for younger generations.

Hybridity in the Process of Stalled Assimilation

While younger generations have the ability to speak both German and Turkish, and to negotiate social networks that include Germans and Turks, it is not easy for them

to live in these two cultures simultaneously. A second-generation Turkish student describes his situation as follows (Meier-Braun 1980 cited in Abadan-Unat 1985:8):

> Each day I travel from Turkey to Germany. In the morning, when I leave the house of my parents, I actually quit Turkey. I then go to my work place or to my friends and am then in Germany. In the evening, returning home, I am again in Turkey. At home I never tell anything that has happened at school or with my friends. I just act in accordance with the expectations of my parents.

This difficult duality begins when Turkish children are sent to school. School is emblematic of the constant struggle of refusal and acceptance between the Turkish community and German society. Even while trying to establish good relationships with the teachers, schoolmates, and other Germans, children are simultaneously being asked by parents to behave like Turks with proper Turkish values—values that have been frozen in time since their parents migrated to Germany in the 1960s.[53] The value of individuality among German youth, for example, comes into direct conflict with Turkish family values of conformity and respect. Turkish children are expected to exchange favors with others on the basis of reciprocity, not because of immediate payment or formal obligation. Many first-generation parents consider German friends to be dangerous and believe that they will tempt their children into the "free and immoral" ways of German life. Accordingly,

[53] Similar experiences are noted for other second-generation ethnic group members in North America in different historical periods. For example, Abu Laban and Abu Laban (1999) discuss it for the Arab diaspora in Canada, and Ueda (1992) talks about the second-generation experience of Russian Jews and the second-generation Japanese at the beginning of the twentieth century.

family honor, including virginity for girls, become focal points of concern (Tan and Waldhoff 1996:140). Anxiety is created when a young Turkish person wants to be a good German as well as a good Turk.

As a result, second-generation Turks negotiate their own culturally hybrid *Almancı* identity, becoming uniquely different from their first-generation parents. The *Almancı* identity of the second generation is characterized by a mixed language pattern in which either Turkish or German may be dominant. This linguistic practice reflects the wide variety of ways in which the Turkish and German life-styles overlap to constitute the social environment for that generation. Concepts, ideas, and emotions from the two spheres merge to produce their own peculiar mix of linguistic symbols and expressions. This applies to grammar and phonetics, and even to pitch, breathing, and intonation. Tan and Waldhoff (1996:145) capture these developments in their research, reporting as follows:

> Some people prefer to use only Turkish to express certain experiences or feelings, using German for a different set of purposes. Many, for instance, who are fluent in German switch to Turkish when it comes to counting, whereas they will continue to speak German in a political debate, even if the topic is wholly specific to Turkey. Others think and write in German but opt for Turkish when caressing their children, partners, or pets. Others again will change language on specific occasions, for instance switching to Turkish at dances and musical events, banquets and drinking sessions, or

in situations such as states of fatigue, intoxication, intense joy, mourning, anger or rage.

The young generations of Turks in Germany have their own distinct ways of life and culture which do not easily fit into those of either their parents, their German peers or their contemporaries in Turkey. Karakaşoğlu (1996:162) quotes from a young Turkish man, "On holiday in Turkey, people constantly call me *Almancı*, but in Germany, I eat like a German, walk like a German, and I still remain a Turk."

In the course of struggling for social, economic, and political rights, Turkish identity in Germany is undergoing major changes. Turks in Germany are becoming more vocal about their identity and their problems in German society. This is most apparent in artistic expressions such as music, dance, theater, film and literature. I consider myself very fortunate to have access to some of these artistic works, because they illuminate much about the hybrid culture that exists among Turks in Germany.

Turkish-German writers, in particular, offer a view of the progress of Turkish-German relations. In the 1960s and 1970s, literary texts written by Turks tended to focus on the experience of encountering Germany in all its foreignness and were written in Turkish. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the emphasis shifted toward a representation of personal identity in the foreign land. These works are written in German for an audience that includes second- and third-generation Turks as well as native Germans (Tan and Waldhoff 1996:150).

The poet Şenocak, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is a good example of the German-speaking literary avant-garde. Şenocak himself was brought to Germany by

his worker parents when he was nine years old. He was luckier than many of his Turkish peers, for he learned German fluently and was able to establish a middle-class life in German academia. He has used his position to convey to a German-speaking audience his culture and identity as a person of Turkish origin living in Germany.

Another current Turkish name in German literature is that of Emine Sevgi Özdamar. Her works emphasize that her identity as a Turk is not fixed or homogeneous; rather, identity evolves through changing landscapes and generations. Özdamar is known for her use of Turkish words in her texts, as well as for translated Turkish metaphors, speech patterns, and expressions that are hybridized with German. Native speakers of German say that they are often overcome by a feeling of foreignness when they read her work (Fischer and McGowan 1996:15; Ghaussy 1999:5). Özdamar asserts that the foreignness manifested in her use of language is an expression of her identity, located between two cultures. At the same time, her work reflects the socio-political changes in Germany; the mixture of languages stands metaphorically for the interaction and mixture of cultures in Germany (Wierschke 1997: 186-87 cited in Boesenecker 2000). Creative hybridization of Turkish and German is found almost everywhere nowadays, loosening the boundaries of both German and Turkish identity, and encouraging an expansion of cultural understanding.

Two major Turkish-German films also illustrate the situation of Turks in Germany:[54] *40 m² Deutschland* (Forty Square Meters of Germany) (1986) directed by

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[54] The first viewed in Turkey and the second viewed on tape purchased in the United States.

Teyfik Başar, and *Berlin in Berlin* (1994) directed by Sinan Çetin. In *40 m^2 Deutschland*, a Turkish *Gastarbeiter*, Dursun, brings his wife to Germany, the strange new world he has promised her. But the next morning, she finds that he has left for work—and she is locked in their apartment, forty square meters, to protect her from what he calls "the vice that creeps outside." Eventually the wife, Turna, having found the key, summons up courage and ventures down the stairs. She meets nothing but blank stares. In the final scene, when she knocks on doors seeking help, the only response is, "I don't understand you. I've only just moved in. I don't know anyone here. I'm an old lady." The neighbor's words are in this case an expression of the suspicion, anxiety, or plain indifference that characterizes German dealings with Turks.

In an interview, Başar defined his theme in the movie as the "helplessness of human beings where two cultures 'collide' without speech" (Coulson 1997:164). His film remains the most radical exploration of Turkish ethnic alienation in recent years. It portrays the vulnerability of the newcomer on foreign soil, and also presents the dilemma of those stranded at the periphery of traditions and identities that fail to provide answers for new experiences.

The very title of *Berlin in Berlin* evokes the mingling of worlds. On one level, the repetition of "Berlin" refers to the city within a city; most of the film is set in Berlin-Kreuzberg, the largest Turkish community in Germany. But the plot transforms the typical minority-majority relationship by inverting it. Here, the alien element is a German who crosses the threshold into that internal Berlin and has to remain there, in changing degrees both prisoner and guest. In this environment, the language, customs, and in fact

the conditions for his survival are dictated by his hosts. The focus of the film thus becomes the Turks, and the way they see the intruder and themselves.

These two movies explore the Turkish migrant experience from the perspective of the Turkish diasporic community in Germany (Coulson 1997:162). Both movies portray a hopeful future in which Turkish and German communities may yet accept and benefit from increased heterogeneity.

Conclusion

The case of Turks in Germany is in many ways a study of false expectations and unfortunate changes in circumstance. Forty years ago, in the early 1960s, the German economy outgrew the supply of blue-collar labor on which manufacturing and other industry depended. To sustain the "economic miracle"of the new Germany, industry and government joined forces to bring contract labor from Mediterranean countries, including Turkey. The assumption was that a short-term labor solution could be managed without compromising the blood-based foundation of German citizenship and culture. Workers would be labor, nothing more, and could be rotated continuously in and out of Germany. The arrangement temporarily brought income to both German industry and Turkish families, but the social, cultural, and family needs of workers were ignored.

The downturn in both the German and Turkish economies in the 1970s precipitated the crisis that no one had expected—a large foreign labor pool that was unwilling to leave Germany. Clearly, the short-term solution had left long-term questions unanswered. Turkish integration into the Germany economy, along with cultural issues of

inclusion, family life, and state responsibility for a rapidly growing minority population became problems that remain unresolved today.

At present, there is still a Turkish society within Germany, separate and supportive of Turkish Germans. From this point of view, a strong Turkish diaspora exists in Germany. Because the members live outside German society to such an extent, one might think that they would be less "contaminated" by German culture and view themselves purely as Turks. When they visit Turkey, however, they are rejected and reminded of their hybrid status through the label of *Almancı*. There is truly no return to Turkish identity possible for the new generations, and their own identities, evoked in the literature and films we have discussed, are hybrid and fluid. Their identification as both Turkish and German plays a crucial role in their negotiation for space and acceptance within a country that is slowly coming to terms with its own hybridity.

From this examination of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, we have a basis for comparisons to the diasporic groups in Canada and the U. S.: Turkish incomes relative to those of Germans, their educational and language proficiencies, occupations, family customs, and the retention and use of local Turkish institutions for religion, social welfare, and communications. In the following chapters, we shall return to the Turkish-German experience to assess how very different the processes of assimilation are, and hence the hybrid characters of the different diasporas.

Chapter Five

TURKISH IMMIGRATION TO NORTH AMERICA

Introduction

Turks began arriving in North America in numbers worthy of note in the 1960s, and have continued to increase steadily thereafter, as shown in figure 5.1. By the year 2000, 91,000 Turks had emigrated to the United States, and 21,000 had relocated to Canada.[55] This chapter explores the conditions and outcomes of the recent Turkish migrations to the United States and Canada.

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[55] When results from the 2000 census (United States) and 2001 (Canada) become available in appropriate detail, the actual number of immigrants living in the two countries on those dates can be learned. It is only through the census counts that we will know definitely how many immigrants remained after re-emigration or death.

Figure 5.1. Turkish Immigrants to Canada and the United States by Decade, 1931-2000 [56]



Looking at the Turkish diaspora in North America, it is clear that two primary factors affected the opportunities and constraints experienced by the immigrants and their

[56] The data are for "immigrant arrivals" defined as individuals who entered with visas for permanent residence plus those already present who adjusted their status from temporary to permanent resident; thus, temporary admissions are excluded. Turkish immigrant arrivals are defined as persons whose "last residence" was Turkey. Christian and Jewish minorities having previous Turkish residence are included. Data sources: Canadian immigrant arrivals (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1999: Table IM7) with a projection for the last three years to 2000; United States immigrant arrivals (US INS (1999, 2001:Table 2) with a projection for the last two years to 2000.

descendants: the policies of the United States and Canada as both recruiters and regulators of specific immigrant populations, and the underlying conditions of economic development and growth that supported these policies. Turkish migration is recent because it is only in the last few decades that Canada and the United States have permitted immigration from Turkey, and only in recent decades has Turkey produced people who meet these countries' present selective requirements. An analysis of these factors illuminates many of the reasons for the comparative success, both economic and cultural, of the North American Turkish diaspora, particularly in comparison to the Turkish German diaspora..

The Politics of Immigration: States as Recruiters and Regulators

The U.S. and Canada initially developed through settlement and investment by migrants from Britain and Western Europe, and later (in the 19th and early 20th centuries) by peoples from eastern and southern Europe (Jones 1960:6-38; Dinnerstein and Reimers 1988:11-15; Buckner 1993:48-54).Both Canada and the United States promoted European settlement at various points in their histories (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1988:5-6); in addition, the practice of slavery led to a small African population in the United States (Daniels 1990:53-65; Jones 1960:31-35). Both countries preferred not to recruit or admit immigrants from Asia, except as labor for particularly backbreaking or dangerous jobs—the California gold rush, the building of the transcontinental railroad, and farm labor (Boyd and Vickers 2000:3; Dinnerstein and Reimers 1988:321).

Turks were classified as Asians by both Canada and the United States based on perceptions of their race and religion. In the United States Immigration Act of 1917, Asians were targeted by a long and specific list of exclusions (Yang 1995:12; Zolberg 1999:76), which had the effect of restating the historic exclusion of Turks. The U. S. Asian Exclusion Act continued in force until 1952, when exclusion of Asians was finally dropped, but only minuscule quotas were available (Heer 1996:52). In Canada, Turks were excluded until 1967 by a system of preferred countries that placed "undesirable classes" on the bottom rung: they included Asians, Greeks, Armenians, Turks and other minorities living under the Ottoman Empire; blacks from the Caribbean and Africa; and some others (Kaprielian-Churchill 1990:103). In addition to these policies, middle-class Turks faced domestic laws prohibiting emigration of the "brain drain" type, as discussed in chapter 3. Changes in the policies of all three states paved the way for the recent Turkish migration—but the foundation rested upon economic conditions in the receiving state.

Figure 5.2. Immigration from All Countries to Canada and the United States, 1852 – 1996[57]



As figure 5.2 shows, immigration from all countries to the U.S. and Canada has been clearly affected by economic swings in the two countries—for example, both the long depression of the 1890s and the great depression of the 1930s substantially reduced immigration. Periods of war, such as the Civil War in the United States, and the First and Second World Wars, also reduced immigrant flows; reasons included the lack of

[57] The data are "immigrant arrivals" from all countries coming to the United States and Canada. Unusual spikes are caused when a large number of individuals already in the country on a temporary basis adjust their status to permanent resident. Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada.1999:Table IM7; US INS. 1999:Table 2.

transport, the uncertainty of travel, and state prohibition of immigration from enemy countries.

Figure 5.2 also reflects the effects of numeric quotas established by the United States in the1920s (Zolberg 1999:74-76), and attempts by Canada during the same period to avoid admission of immigrants from Asia and the "less preferred" countries of southern and eastern Europe. Both policies suppressed immigration during the inter-war period as seen in the figure.

In the 1950s, after the Second World War, Canada admitted a large number of immigrants from former British colonies, the United States, and Britain itself, but these sources quickly dried up, and thereafter, Canadian immigration slowed. Current Canadian immigration patterns reflect a relatively steady flow of people from Asia and other non-traditional sources. In contrast, increased immigration to the U.S. began as soon as immigration restrictions were loosened in the 1960s and has continued to climb. The United States, like Canada, now receives the majority of its immigrants from non-traditional, i.e. non-Western, origins.

The United States's Immigration Policy

By the early 1960s, American attitudes toward ethnic minorities had become increasingly tolerant (Yang 1995:14). The Civil Rights movement culminated in passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As overt racism was increasingly challenged in the public sphere, the racist nature of the prevailing

immigration laws became more controversial. In the face of continued postwar prosperity, fear of economic depression faded and opposition to immigration lessened (Yang 1995).

In this atmosphere, the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was signed into law and took effect on July 1, 1968 (Heer 1996:55). This act abolished the discriminatory quotas by national origins (Zolberg 1999:79). For the first time, an annual limit of 120,000 was imposed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. Applicants were to be admitted on a first-come, first-serve basis (Yang 1995:15). For the Eastern Hemisphere, an annual limit of 170,000 was set, with a maximum of 20,000 immigrants from each country regardless of its size.

Family reunification became the cornerstone of the United States immigration policy; accordingly, immediate relatives are deemed not subject to hemispheric or country quotas (Yang 1995:15). Immediate relatives include spouses, minor children, and parents of United States citizens sponsored by children over the age of twenty-one.

The U. S. Immigration Acts of 1990 and 1995 modified and expanded the existing immigration system.[58] The most salient feature of these acts was a significant increase in the yearly number of legal immigrants: 700,000 per year for three years, and 675,000 people annually as of 1995. The mechanism for selecting immigrants is very complex, but all immigrant admissions have at least one of three bases: family unification, employment, or humanitarian need. Family immigration, however, still occurs in principle without numerical limit. The other categories are subject to the cap, after deducting the number of unrestricted admissions, which are mostly family unification.

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[58] Information released on the U.S. Department of State's web site, 1999.

Temporary admissions—for example, J and F visas for education—are not counted toward the cap. Turks presently enter the United States under all these categories, though very few enter as humanitarian refugees.

After 1990, Turks were subject to the annual country quota of 20,000 immigrants—if the worldwide quotas were not already used up. Limited additional chances for immigration to the U.S. were offered through the worldwide "diversity lottery," first held in 1995.[59] Once a Turkish immigrant is admitted, a foothold for subsequent family unification is gained.

Turks with high-level skills, and those companies who employ them, have also gotten around the country quota via the temporary-worker category (H-1), enacted in 1990 and first implemented in 1992 (Lowell 2000:4). The "temporary" nature of the category allows employers to recruit skilled workers from abroad for professional "specialty occupations"—computer programmers, engineers, medical professionals, and others—without having to prove a lack of American workers (Espenshade 1999). These visas may be renewed for up to six years and, if sponsored by their employers, visa holders can eventually adjust their status to permanent resident (Hagan and McCollom. 1996; Lowell 1996; Papademetriou 1996). Caps on these categories are generous and have been raised by Congress in response to industrial pressure.

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[59] Without need of sponsorship and without a pre-arranged job, limited numbers of resident visas were given through "diversity lotteries," so called because they are for applicants from countries—there are many—that had less than 50,000 immigrants over the previous five years. Turks participated in the "Schumer" lottery, named after a congressman, with an annual pool of 55,000 visas (Lobo and Salvo 1998:262).

Turks are no longer identified in the law by race even when public perceptions of them after entry can still involve racial and ethnic stereotyping. In essence, it is clear that the U.S. immigration system has changed from one of racial discrimination to one of ability discrimination. By 1980, Turkey was in a good position to take advantage of this shift. English-language universities in Turkey have contributed by training young people to become members of a highly skilled Turkish middle-class labor force. Many of these professionals are destined for the globalized networks of firms and labor recruitment from the West. Turkish manpower, with its high skill levels and low cost, contributed to the technological competitiveness and cost controls of firms located in the United States.

Fahri, who came to the U.S. under the H-1 visa system, is a good example of the Turkish professional as export commodity. Born in 1970, he earned his degree in computer engineering from Istanbul Technical University, and worked in Turkey for two years in a firm that distributed software products made by Microsoft. In 1994, a Turkish-American high-tech company operating in Connecticut offered him a job on an H-1 visa basis, which he accepted. In 1996, Fahri received an offer from Microsoft in Seattle, with a promise to sponsor him immediately for permanent residence. When I interviewed him, he and his Turkish wife had just received permanent residence status, and his wife was preparing for the medical board exams to qualify for a hospital internship.

Turkish labor has, therefore, fulfilled similar functions in the U.S. and Germany by meeting the particular requirements of specific industrial sectors. Immigrants who came to the U.S., however, were better prepared by their prior cultural and language experience to integrate socially than those who went to Germany. For emigrants and their

families, as well as for the receiving U.S. economy, the migration permitted by current U.S. laws has been beneficial.

The Canadian experience with Turkish immigrants has many similarities to the U.S. experience, but there are also a few crucial differences. Canada accepts migrants via a general "merit system" rather than by the more direct system of specific job placement. Thus, potentially greater numbers of Turks can qualify for settlement, but there are fewer assurances as to economic success. Hurdles of accreditation and inexperience arise more often in Canada, aggravated by the prevalence of unemployment across all ethnic groups and a national culture of job protection. Insertion into a well-paid, middle-class job in Canada is often more difficult, even when the immigrants have qualifications similar to those who migrate to the United States (McDade 1988).

Canada's Immigration Policy

Canada, like the United States, allowed immigration from preferred countries without quotas until 1967 (Akbari 1999). According to this system, the preferred countries of origin were Britain, the United States, and northwestern Europe.[60] Canada also accepted some immigrants from the "second choice" countries of southern, southeastern, and eastern Europe; but very few immigrants from the "unfit" and "undesirable" classes of countries were granted entry (Kaprielian-Churchill 1990:103).

[60]Information released on website of the Department of Justice Canada, 2000.

In 1962, a paradigmatic shift in Canadian immigration policy began and was formalized in the Immigration Act of 1967. The changes resulted from a general scarcity of labor both in Europe and North America as national economies regained momentum in the post-war period. The new policy was implemented to keep immigration flowing—prior to the policy change, immigration had stalled almost completely, as can be seen in figure 5.2. The 1967 act created a new system that did not discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or culture (Berdichewsky 1994; Gwyn 1995, cited in Esses and Gardner 1996:147).

Similar to U.S. immigration laws, the cornerstones of the new Canadian policy were labor market requirements, family reunification, and humanitarian issues. Currently, two categories are used, sponsored and independent immigrants. Sponsored immigrants include immediate family and nominated relatives. Immediate family is defined as close relatives and intended spouses who enter Canada based on personal ties to Canadians. They are admitted without numeric restriction. Nominated relatives, also called assisted relatives, include distant relatives who are assessed under the point system like independent immigrants, but who are given additional points based on their relationship to the Canadian sponsor.

Independent immigrants, those applicants without Canadian sponsorship, are assessed according to their potential labor-market performance and the concurrent likelihood that they will not burden Canada's social welfare system (Day 2000). This assessment involves "points" assigned to such characteristics as age, education, work experience, occupation, pre-arranged employment (though not required, certain

employment adds points) and knowledge of Canada's two official languages, English and French.

In the last 20 years, as is evident from figure 5.1, more Turks migrated to the U.S. than Canada; Canada is a smaller country, the U.S. economy was stronger in the 1980s and 1990s, and opportunities to participate in graduate study and research in the engineering and technology sectors were more plentiful (Carter and Sutch 1999:330). In addition, the U.S. system of H-1 visas greatly facilitated pre-immigration job contracts. During my ethnographic work, Turkish immigrants often expressed preferences for the U.S. on professional grounds, though no cultural preference was noted.

Economic and Educational Factors Affecting Income and Employment

The movement away from racial discrimination that supported more egalitarian immigration policies carried over to economic adaptation and success both in Canada and the United States. Turks, though modest in number, have played a significant role in the growth of the professional North American labor force.

The process of incorporating immigrants into different economic sectors in Canada is discussed by Anthony Richmond (1992), and his analysis is equally applicable to the United States. Richmond notes that immigrants tend to join the fastest growing sectors of the economy. He uses a model of "segmented structural change" to explain immigrant insertion into the Canadian labor force. As immigrants arrived from non-traditional countries of origin, they were incorporated into the economy differentially by gender, ethnicity, and period of immigration. Richmond observes that immigrants

avoided slow-growing sectors of the economy, preferring those with rapid growth. Over the 15-year period of his study (1971-1986), primary industry grew 6%, secondary (which includes manufacturing) 17%, and tertiary 67%. Though women more often entered manufacturing, men typically entered the tertiary sector where the biggest growth components were wholesale/retail trade, health/welfare, and accommodation/food. (Richmond 1992:1203).

Overall in Canada, the total share of immigrants in the labor force has risen dramatically, from 20% in the 1960s to 71% in 1996 (Denton *et al.* 1997:38). Turks, along with many others, contributed to this structural change. Turks have concentrated in specific employment sectors; 20% of the Turkish-Canadian labor force is located in manufacturing, whereas the overall Canadian labor force was committed to manufacturing only to the extent of 14%.[61] Another 20% of the Turkish-Canadian labor force is located in wholesale and retail trade, compared with 17% of the overall Canadian labor force.

In the United States, as Richmond's model predicts, Turks have entered the most rapidly growing sectors of the U.S. economy. However, the U.S. economy is more oriented toward specialty professions, including not only science and engineering, but also such professions as medicine and even law. Among all occupations, 39% of Turks work in "Managerial and professional speciality occupations," while the figure is 26% for the whole United States population (1990 census data). Among other immigrant ethnic groups in the U.S., certain ones are even more concentrated in the managerial and

[61] From the Canadian census of 1996.

professional specialty occupations: Asian Indians 48%, Taiwanese 47%, Iranians 42%, Hong Kong natives 41%, and Japanese 39%. Overall, Asian ethnic groups (12 of them separately recognized by the census) exceed the general population's 26%: a small African contingent reaches 37%, while all the rest—Latin America including Mexico—are less.[62]

The next highest occupational category among Turks is "Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations" where the shares are 32% for both Turks and the United States population. The number of Turks employed in service occupations, farming, and blue collar occupations is quite low. In Germany by comparison, the occupational insertion of Turks in the labor force was completely different: Kolinsky (1996:95) estimates that 87% of Turks were in blue-collar jobs in 1992.

Immigration into the high-end sectors in the United States can be seen as a "social response to structuring and restructuring processes operating at the levels of local and national society and at the level of the international economy (Mac Laughlin 1997:9)."[63] The international division of labor increased the demand for high-end services that are produced primarily for transnational firms because of the "increased complexity of transactions" (Sassen 1997). "Producer services such as management consulting, finance, legal services, accounting, product development and design, and advertising are . . . located in the advanced economies where transnational corporations are headquartered (Lobo and Salvo 1988:266)."

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[62] By place of birth as compiled from the 1990 census by Bacon (1996:10).

[63] See also my Chapter 3.

This scenario is played out clearly in science and engineering, where Turks are among those involved. The professional specializations in science and engineering (S & E) branches of the U.S. labor force led economic expansion in the 1990s. The total number of scientists and engineers grew from 2.0 million to 4.9 million between 1970 and 1997; during this time period, the foreign-born component doubled from 7.6% to 14.8% (Espanshade 1999:Table 1). For computer scientists alone, the expansion was from 233 thousand to 1,383 thousand. Foreign-born almost tripled from 13% initially to 33%.[64]

In my 1990 census data for Turks,[65] there were 1,900 engineers (240 in aerospace) and 550 mathematical and computer scientists. Based on the ethnographic data from the Seattle area, it appears that the inauguration of H-1 visas caused a further jump in the figures after 1990.[66]

Many of the ethnographies I collected emphasize the importance of a university education in science at a top Turkish university, and sometimes additional graduate professional education in the United States, to become part of this population. Esin is one such example.

Esin is from Izmir, Turkey's third largest city, located on the Aegean coast. She spent some of her childhood in Greece, since her mother was sent there by the Turkish

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[64] Rafael Alarcón (1999:1381-1397) shows the same disproportionate contributions coming from other foreign-born ethnic groups: Asian Indian and Mexican professionals in the Silicon Valley.

[65] My census data for Turks in the United States were extracted from the 1990 *Public Use Microdata Samples*: see the appendix on methodology.

[66] It would be interesting to know the number of H-1 visas issued to Turks in particular, but that information is not separately available from the INS sources.

government as a teacher for the Turkish-Greek minority. She went to a special high school for children with high aptitude in the natural sciences. Then she was off to Middle East Technical University in Ankara, where she met her future husband. Her major was electrical engineering. After graduation, Esin worked as a software engineer in a joint venture between the Turkish Central Bank and the Japanese postal service, while her boyfriend went to the United States to do his PhD at Georgia Tech. While Esin was working in Turkey, she applied to U.S. universities. She was accepted by Georgia State University's MBA program and given a teaching assistantship. She and her husband were married during the summer of 1995, on the eve of her matriculation at GSU.

During her MBA studies, Esin worked part-time for the Coca Cola Company thanks to her F-1 student visa, which does not restrict a student's employment in the United States. After two-and-a-half years, she and her husband finished their degrees and moved to Seattle. Esin worked at Microsoft on an H-1 temporary work visa. Eventually, the company where her husband works—also hi-tech—sponsored both of them for permanent residence, and they are now waiting for the adjustment of status. In many respects, her immigration story is typical of many high-tech workers immigrating from Third-World countries.

As Turks joined the U.S. economy, they added to the quality of the labor force—their educational qualifications were, on the whole, higher than their peers in the United States. The educational data from the 1990 census show that 80% of immigrant Turks have a high school education or above; for Turks born in the U.S., the figure is

88%.[67] Only 75% of the U.S. host population met this standard. At the university level and beyond, the percentages for immigrant and native-born Turks holding degrees were 44% and 38% respectively, as compared to 20% of the host population.[68]

Such education differentials are also common between other immigrant ethnic groups and the host U.S. population: Asians, excepting only Laos and Cambodia, were all above the general U.S. population; and foreign-born Iranians, Asian Indians, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong natives exceeded the levels of Turkish immigrants. Latin Americans and Mexicans were far below (Bacon 1996:9).

Comparisons with the Turkish German diaspora show very low levels of educational attainment among Turks, referring to both offspring and immigrants: Kürsat-Ahlers (1996:130) writes that 44% of Turkish pupils leave school with the lowest educational qualification, *Hauptschulabschluß*, while only 6% of Turks pass the *Abitur* that gives them the right to study at university level, compared with 28% for Germans.

In Canada, too, immigrants make a contribution to the quality of the labor force. As in the U.S., the Turkish-Canadian population is better educated than the general Canadian population. The census data show the percentage of Turks with a high school diploma (or equivalent) at 68%; for Canadians it was 63%. Turks with university or higher degrees (including professional schooling) were at 22%; Canadians, 13%. This

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[67] The United States sample data for Turks are split between immigrants and native-born to make this comparison. See the appendix on methodology.

[68] Statistics on educational attainments in the United States are not directly comparable to those for Canada. For university achievement, they are bound to show somewhat higher numbers, because the former refer to population aged 25 and over, and the latter to population aged 15 and over.

apparent contribution to the quality of the Canadian labor force is not reflected by Turks' earnings in Canada—indeed, Turks' median personal incomes from all sources were 20% lower than those of the Canadian population.[69] We return below to this paradox and some of its possible reasons.

Incomes of Turks in the United States and Canada

To obtain a picture of the overall distribution of income for Turks in the United States, 1990 census data were used to make figure 5.3, which compares Turkish family incomes to those of the entire U.S. population. The families are arranged from the lowest income to the highest income. The income brackets are shown on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis lists the percentage of families in each income bracket.

[69] These are the median personal incomes in 1995 for persons with income aged 15 and over, according to the 1996 census data. The differential between Canadians and Turks was approximately the same for males and females.

Figure 5.3.

Distribution of Families by Family Income in the United States Population and Turks in the United States, 1989[70]



As figure 5.3 shows, there are fewer Turks—in percentage terms—at lower incomes, and more making higher incomes. In fact, Turks outearn the combined U.S. population in the income brackets above $50,000. In 1989, the median income for Turkish families was $47,200, compared to $35,225 for the United States population. This difference was about the same when the income data were examined to see whether second-generation Turks (native-borns) were doing as well as the immigrant generation—in fact, they showed a slightly greater difference from the general U.S.

[70] Source: U. S. Census 1990, Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 48; and Microdata Samples 1990, Turks. For more details see the appendix.

population than the first-generation immigrant generation.[71] Thus, it appears that Turks in the U.S. have sustained their economic advantage.

Frank Levy (1995:35-36) states that the poverty cutoff point in the United States in 1989 was $9,893 for a family with three children (5 persons), and $12,674 for a family with four (6 persons). He estimates that 12.8% of the overall United States population was living in poverty in 1989 (Levy 1995:36). The comparable figure for Turkish families in the U.S. was approximately 6%.[72] Details for other ethnic and race groups show Asians 11.6%, Hispanic 22.3%, Black 23.9%, American Indian 27.0%, and White 7.0% (Harrison and Bennett 1995:195). Clearly, Turks in general are surviving well economically in the United States.

In the course of my interviews, I met some of the people in the small group of low-income Turkish Americans. Ender was one such case. In 1992, Ender came to Seattle on a tourist visa to help his father, who was undergoing intensive cancer therapy for leukemia. Before the therapy ended, his father passed away. However, Ender did not return to Turkey; he married an American girl, and adjusted his immigration status to permanent resident.

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[71] Such division of the data between immigrants and native-born is possible when using the United States Microdata Samples (appendix). Personal incomes rather than family incomes were used to make this last comparison by immigrant and native-born.

[72] Estimated from the US Microdata Samples, 1990 (appendix).

When I interviewed him, he was already divorced. He was trained in Turkey as an environmental engineer at one of the Turkish-language universities.[73] He did not have any English when he immigrated, and he had no prior connection with any global education or business networks, so he was unable to look for engineering jobs or further his education as a graduate student. Ender now works in the produce department of a grocery store. He says he is satisfied, because he makes more money than his brother, a chemical engineer who works in Turkey for an American company.

In Canada, there are no agreed criteria for identifying the proportion of the population living below a poverty line. Nevertheless, data for men's incomes can be used as an indicator of the income distribution and its extremities:[74] 17% of Turkish men had yearly incomes below $5,000,[75] whereas it was 12% for all Canadians. 24% of Turkish men had incomes of $40,000 and higher, while for all Canadians it was 26%. Thus, the disadvantage of Turks shows at the bottom of the income distribution. The result is median personal income of only $19,500 for Turkish Canadians, whereas it is $25,300 for all Canadians. When compared to the Turkish American population, these numbers reflect two aspects of Canadian immigration that differ: Canada admitted a larger number

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[73]While some of these universities have good departments, they are oriented to training for the local Turkish job market—government sector or small business enterprises.

[74] The Turkish profile data on income distribution are presented only for individuals by sex, not families (Statistics Canada 1999).

[75] In 1992, Statistics Canada declared $8,274 to be the "low-income" line in the case of a lone-parent mother (Canadian Council on Social Development 1996). Certainly, therefore, men at $5,000 or below are in poverty.

of working-class immigrants in the early years of Turkish immigration who lacked the extensive education and specialized employment experience; and some of those qualified at middle-class professional levels had to accept lower level jobs.

In a district of Vancouver, I found some of the working-class Turks, most of them with very modest incomes. This Turkish group originated in Germany and then resettled in Canada. Prior to the 1967 Canadian immigration law that firmly established the point system, Canada advertised in Germany for skilled Turkish workers. A number applied and obtained landed immigrant visas immediately. Most of these Turks settled first in the industrial east of Canada where Bilge Ataca (1998) found them during her research in Toronto. In her study, she noted that this group is isolated from middle-class Turks and Euro-Canadians. I noticed the same situation in Richmond, Vancouver.

Among those who moved west in this early group was Mehmet, the older brother of Ziya, who re-migrated from Germany to Canada. Back home in Turkey, Ziya operated a heating-stove repair shop in a small town near Istanbul. Neither Ziya nor any of his relatives had more education than primary school, nor any knowledge of English. Yet Mehmet persuaded his Canadian employer to sponsor Ziya for a landed immigrant visa as someone with a scarce skill not otherwise available in the Canadian labor market.[76] In this way, Ziya, his wife, and his two children became immigrants, bypassing the English-language and educational requirements normally imposed. They now live in Richmond, in the same neighborhood as many other working-class Turks.

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[76]The law about scarce categories of foreign labor was not as strict then as it is now.

Although Ziya has been in Canada nearly twenty years, he has accumulated no personal assets and he is still a renter. Moreover, the Istanbul earthquake of 2000 destroyed the modest house he still owned in Istanbul. He is currently a non-union worker in a spring factory. He literally lives on the edge of poverty, and he knows that once he retires in four or five years, he and his wife will have to live on his five- to six- hundred-dollar monthly government pension. Ziya's pension is the result of his Canadian citizenship—a status denied to his wife and children due to poor language ability.

Nevertheless, Ziya says he is happier in Canada. In Turkey, he could buy 150 grams of ground beef only after careful budgeting, whereas in Richmond he can buy meat as a staple, though he is still careful about expenses. He also does not want to give up the free medical service he gets in Canada.

Overall, it is clear that the ability to progress economically in North America depends upon English-language skills, appropriate educational credentials, and job experience. Immigrants who lack any of these may be able to remedy their deficiencies after arrival, but they will face severe consequences if they fail to do so. For most Turks in North America, the selectivity of the immigration requirements ensures at least the possibility of economic success and eventually cultural assimilation. Nevertheless, forms of exclusion or resistance can interfere with structural economic assimilation in both countries, temporarily or indefinitely. Discrimination in employment would be one such factor, which is considered in the next section.

Ethnic Discrimination by Employers

The question raised in this section is whether discrimination against ethnic immigrant groups—and against Turks in particular—could be slowing the process of Turks' economic assimilationin Canada or the United States. General comparisons of the labor-force quality of Turks, using education as the criterion for quality, show that Turks are better endowed than the host population in both countries. While incomes in Canada are not as high as they are for locals, the opposite is true in the United States. This suggests the need for further exploration of this apparent paradox. paying particular attention to the Canadian case.

In Canada (and also in the U.S.) immigrants generally face an initial "entry effect" that allots them lower incomes than the native population, but the gap is gradually eliminated over time. An econometric study based on three censuses in Canada, 1971 to 1986 (with a comparison to U.S 1970 to 1990 data) shows an earnings disadvantage at entry[77] followed by a long period of "wage catchup" that is called the "assimilation effect" (Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1994:15). The study paid particular attention to the time sequence of immigrant cohorts from pre-1956 to 1981-1986. As time passed, the extrapolation for "years to equality" (assimilation) rose dramatically—from 14 years to 137 years in Canada. It was similar in the U.S., but at much lower levels; from 8 years to 40 years (Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1994: Table 1).[78] Although this study shows

[77] In Canada , "immigrants arriving between 1981 and 1986 (years marked by Canada's longest and deepest recession since the 1930s) earned 34 percent less than did comparable Canadian-born men" (Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1994:13). Earlier the disadvantage was less. For the U.S., the entry effect is not reported, except to say that it was also negative.

conclusively that immigrant economic assimilation is a serious problem and became worse between the 1950s and the 1980s, it does not explain why.

During this period, the new rules of immigration policy came into effect (in both countries) allowing immigration from Third-World countries and by family members and other sponsored relatives. Turks benefitted from these rules along with other ethnic immigrant groups. The policy question was whether the rules caused a deterioration in immigrant quality. For Canada, Akbari (1999) shows that there was, in fact, no deterioration in educational qualifications of immigrants (including the new categories for family and relatives). In comparison to the general Canadian population, from 1956 to 1994 the educational superiority of the immigrant population from all sources actually increased. Though we have no trend data for Turkish Canadians, they have an educational advantage similar to the larger pool of immigrants.[79]

In the United States, not all immigrant ethnic groups show educational advantages over the average for Americans—for example, Mexicans and Hispanics are lower. Averaging over the rest, however, there is clear a advantage (Bacon 1996:9). Once again, Turks are among the superior educational groups of ethnic immigrants.

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[78] These empirical results are for men. In Canada, the results for women are similar, but for the U.S, the statistical results concerning women are ambiguous.

[79] Among Turks, there is a poorly educated sub-group—the working-class immigrants who came in the early years of 1950s and 1960s, discussed elsewhere. They pull down the average educational standard shown in my census data for 1996: they could even be responsible for a time trend from lower to higher education of the Turkish-Canadian population.

The structural and cultural environment for immigrant entry and assimilation changed markedly after the 1960s. There was a shift from mainly European sources to mainly Third-World sources of immigration.[80] From then on, the host economies had to assimilate immigrants who were different culturally and in many instances marked as different by their visual phenotypes (Reitz and Sklar 1997). Though Turks almost always claim themselves to be White, obtaining jobs appropriate to their qualifications and expectations is not as simple as that. Canadians usually see Turks as "different." Official documents such as the census require Turks to indicate that they belong to the population group, "Arab/West Asian" which is one of the "visible minority groups" in official Canada.[81] As the following example shows, job discrimination by the state and by employers should be considered as potentially contributing to delays in economic assimilation.

Hüseyin immigrated to Canada under the independent immigrant point system with his wife and children in 1991, during the Gulf war. Hüseyin's background includes attending a French Catholic high school and a B.A. in civil engineering from Yıldız Technical University in Istanbul. He is fluent in French and English. After graduation from Yıldız, he worked in England in a construction project for two years, and also on projects in several North African countries. During the 1980s, Hüseyin had his own

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[80] A similar shift occurred in the U.S. with Asian sources becoming important; however, the U.S. always had an open immigration policy in the Western hemisphere, so that large immigrant flows of Mexicans and Hispanics was not new (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1988: 107-134)

[81] From Question 19, Population Group, on the 1986 census.

construction firm in Turkey. His sister, who lived in Canada, told him about the opportunities for engineers. He decided to immigrate, hoping for an economically better and more stable future for himself and his children. Thanks to his education, language abilities, and work experience, he was granted a landed immigrant visa within a year.

After moving to Canada, Hüseyin experienced economic difficulties common to immigrants. He could not find a job for a year, and was told repeatedly by potential employers that he was rejected because he did not have "Canadian experience." Finally, he also realized that being classified as non-white in Canada, along with the resemblance of his name, Hüseyin, to that of Saddam Hussein were negatively affecting his job search. He changed his name to Shane, and soon after found a seasonal job in a Yukon gold mine as an explosives technician. For the last eight years, he has been working in a small engineering firm on Vancouver Island as a technician; his Turkish engineering degree is not adequate for certification as a professional engineer in Canada. When I interviewed him, he was in the process of upgrading his certification to engineer on the basis of examinations, experience, and interviews—though he may still be required to return to university for certain courses. His greatest complaint is that he had to work for years as a technician just to be eligible to apply for certification as an engineer.

In her study of barriers to the recognition of immigrant credentials in Canada, Kathryn McDade (1988:18) states, "in British Columbia foreign-trained [engineering] graduates . . . of universities that are not recognized [by the Canadian Council of Professional Engineers] must have eight years of satisfactory practical experience, even after they have successfully completed all examination requirements." Canadian locals

must have two years following their degree; foreigners from CCPE-recognized foreign universities—mainly American and European universities—need three years (McDade 1988:18). For Hüseyin, graduation from a high-quality engineering school in Turkey counted for nothing.

Recognition of credentials is also an issue for those in trades, but it is not as challenging. "In general, tradespeople trained outside Canada are required to have worked in the trade for one year in excess of the time required to complete a provincial apprenticeship" (McDade 1988:10). Tradespeople such as electricians, painters, and carpenters can practice without the benefit of full certification, which initially gives them access to better jobs. The working-class Turkish tradespeople whom I interviewed in Vancouver benefit from this lower threshold, though they are living with lower incomes, less job stability, and lower levels of assimilation in other respects.

Another of my respondents, Aysel, explains the problem of getting started in Canada and accepting lower-than-expected levels of employment:

> In three months my husband found a job. We were lucky. Of course, it was because of my husband's American experience [degree]. At the beginning [in Canada], many Turkish immigrants have to accept work that is not related to the occupations for which they are trained. In order to survive, they work in temporary jobs. I do not know whether you interviewed other Turkish people here, but it is so hard to find a job. We see how difficult it is whenever a new friend comes. It is hard without a certificate from a Canadian college, some work experience in Canada, or a BA diploma

from a Canadian University. This is not official, but when you look for a job you observe it. . . . I think they [the Canadians] find American education more trustworthy [than Turkish education].[82]

Another informant was Hülya, an economics graduate from Turkey's prestigious English-language Middle East Technical University. Prior to emigrating, Hülya had worked for the Peugot Company in Izmir as an executive secretary. In Canada, Hülya was not able to find a job. Like her husband, she was told that she did not have any Canadian work experience and, furthermore, ought to seek more education in Canada. Her high educational qualifications and language abilities in both English and French were devalued in the job market, even though the Canadian government valued them for immigration purposes.

Hülya's options for Canadian education were limited, because there was only one college within reach on Vancouver Island (Nanaimo's Malaspina College) and it had no graduate programs. Canada's universities, in any event, accept very few students for graduate work compared to U.S. universities. As a mother of two young children and the wife of a high-maintenance breadwinner husband, Hülya's time was already restricted by her domestic duties. Nevertheless, she obtained a two-year certificate in bookkeeping.

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[82] Üç ayda eşim iş buldu. Yani biz çok şanslı idik. Eşimin Amerikan tecrübesinden dolayı tabi. Yani normal bir iş buldu kendi mesleğinde kendi şeyinde. Çoğu gelen kimseler ilk başta kendi meslekleri ile ilgili olmayan işler yapıyorlar. Geçici işler geçimlerini sağlıyabilmek için. Bilmiyorum burada başka Türk'lerle görüştünüz mü ama iş bulmak çok zor ilk başta gelince yani gelen bir sürü arkadaşımız var. İşte Kanada sertifikası olmadan tecrübesi olmadan eğitimi olmadan çok zor. Böyle bir şey yok resmi ama iş aramaya basladığınız zaman görüyorsunuz bunu. . . . Daha herhalde güvenilir buluyorlar Amerika eğitimini.

She now works in this field, though her initial professional qualifications would have supported better jobs.

Many immigrants work in jobs below their qualifications, even though they were admitted by the Canadian government based on their education and prior work experience in Turkey. Aysel told me that there is a discrepancy between the criteria the government uses in selecting immigrants under the point system and what the employment market needs in Canada. Almost all the middle-class Turkish immigrants I interviewed in Western Canada were frustrated by the Canadian job market.

In the United States, similar issues of accreditation and proof of experience arise, but I found fewer complaints among these Turkish informants. One reason is the advent of the H-1 visas discussed earlier. Reporting on a study of employers who use the H-1 visas, Lowell (2000:2) says that these employers "hire the most qualified workers, regardless of birthplace. Although all utilize nonimmigrant visas, only a minority of employers report that their most important reason for hiring foreign workers is to fill temporary rather than permanent positions." Thus, the immigrants, including Turks, come to jobs which require their particular skills with an uncertain possibility of becoming permanent, which requires sponsorship by the employer for adjustment of status. Turks who arrive in this way know that their future in the U.S. is not certain, but the positions usually pay well and offer experience that will recommend them if they later return to Turkey. Knowing where they stand appears to reduce frustration, disappointment, and initial reluctance to assimilate culturally. Furthermore, many H-1 visa holders find ways

to remain after many years of renewal, even if they must leave their original employers—for example, via another employer, marriage, or the Green Card Lottery.

One such example, Esra, entered on an H-1 visa. When she thinks about her decision to leave Turkey, she says that immigrating has been a positive change both for herself and for her work career, even though she was not sure about it at the time. In fact, her employer eventually did sponsor her for permanent status. Her parents were initially unhappy about her decision; later, however, her mother told me that she changed her mind after visisting Esra in Seattle. Her mother was actually so enthusiastic that she persuaded her son to do his MA. at the University of Washington. Esra primarily talks about the positive aspects of her life in the United States. She says that she would not be able to achieve the same standard of living in Turkey.

Overall, my informants found that immigration to Canada—with respect to obtaining jobs commensurate with their degrees and experience—was more difficult than immigrating to the U.S. In Canada, Canadians are preferred over immigrants for most positions, not due to visa restrictions for employment, but because of a culture of old-fashioned protectionism. On the other hand, Canada typically grants landed immigrant status (similar to the U.S. status of permanent residency) faster than the U.S., guaranteeing immigrants the right to remain in Canada regardless of their employment status. In the U.S., an economic downturn may result in refusals to renew work visas, sending immigrants home. Immigrants reduce that risk by trying to adjust their status as early in their stay as possible, but they are not always successful.

A major frustration for Turkish immigrants in Canada is that they must often accept jobs below their level of expectations or qualifications (Aycan and Berry 1996:241). Perhaps for these reasons, Turkish Canadians seem to integrate culturally more slowly than Turkish Americans. Of course, this difference is small in comparison to the lack of cultural assimilation and discrimination seen in Germany, where the obstacles to upward mobility and good jobs are far greater.[83]

Even second-generation Turkish Canadians are reminded of their difference and ethnicity, and this can be a deterrent to gaining the same level of economic integration as other Canadians. Tosun, aged 45, was brought up in Canada, with good schooling and a graduate degree in urban planning. He speaks excellent English with no accent, and he is fair-skinned. He does not practice Muslim rites. Except for those who know that he has a Turkish name, he would pass easily as a native-born Canadian with no special difference. He is now employed by a Vancouver school district as a planner for new schools. He complains nevertheless that he has been skipped over for better jobs because, he believes, of unspoken preferences for Canadians without his kind of difference. He says,

> There is increasing prejudice against Muslim culture. For example, they notice that your name is Muslim and react saying "Oh we are not against Islam," but there is definitely something behind it. . . . They see us as Arabs.[84] They don't know. They even think that the Turkish language is

[83] Discussed in chapter 4.

[84] Tosun is right about Canadian tendencies to discriminate against Arabs. This is documented in Ibrahim Hayani's study of Arabs in Ontario (Hayani 1999:298-301).

Arabic. In other words, this is pure ignorance. How do you overcome this ignorance? How can we demonstrate our Turkishness?[85]

This kind of subtle self-awareness of difference also exists among second-generation Turkish Americans. As Portes, Parker, and Cobas (1980:200) conclude in one of their studies, ". . . greater familiarity with the culture and language and some economic advancement can lead to greater consciousness of the reality of discrimination and a more critical appraisal of the host society." The following is from a second-generation Turkish American who explains how she felt intimidated when working with American colleagues and customers at a bank.

> After a while you realize certain discriminations and unfairness. In any case, my name is Zeliha. Americans cannot pronounce the name. When someone cannot pronounce your name, he is intimidated and you are intimidated. The relationship breaks at that moment. If I had the name Mary McNeil, maybe everything would be different. If I had changed my name, everything would have been better for me. No one would discriminate against you. The people I dealt with in those days were educated professional people. Those kinds of people have great self-confidence. For instance, if you go to the office of the bank manager, he says okay, Ms.? and stops. How do you say your name? He feels that he

[85]Yanlız prejudicism daha artıyor Müslümanlığa karşı. Mesela senin ismin Müslüman ismi yani. Diyorlar, ohh ya Müslümanlığa karşı değiliz diyorlar ama altında muhakkak bir şey var. . . . Arap diye görüyor. Bizi Arap, bilmiyorlar yani Türk dilini Arap dili zannediyorlar. Yani o kadar ignorance yani cahillik var. O cahilliği nasıl yeneceksin? Yani ne kadar temsil etsen?

can not pronounce your name, he gets a little bit intimidated but not defensive. He does not want to pronounce my name again. He does not want to see my face again. Then automatically, he thinks that there may be a language barrier. Since my name is different, maybe I do not understand English as well as some other American person. That way he becomes even more intimidated. This is my opinion. It may be wrong I don't know. . . . One way or the other you are not just regular American for them. If you are in your own friendship circle, on the other hand, it may be attractive to be exotic.[86]

Thus, the issue of "being different,"which seems no longer critical in relation to Irish, English, Italian, Jewish and other historic white ancestries in North America, continues with Turks in both countries. Intensities differ, as dothe effects on finding and keeping jobs. For all new ethnic streams of immigrants since the 1960s, ethnic and

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[86] Ondan sonra bazı dışlamaların bazı haksızlıkların farkına varıyorsun. Ne kadar olsa ismim bir kere Zeliha. Adam ismini söyliyemiyor. Yani ismini söyliyemeyince onda bir şeylik oluyor sende bir şeylik oluyor. Her şey o anda kopuyor. Yani bir Mary McNeil olsa idi ismim belki her şey cok daha değişik olucaktı. Belki ismimi değistirse idim her sey cok daha iyi olucaktı. Dışlamıyor belki ama intimidate oluyor. Benim o zaman deal ettiğim insanlar okumuş yazmış belli yerlere gelmiş insanlardı. O tür insanların kendilerine güvenleri çok fazla tabi. Mesela banka müdürüne gidiyorsun, okay Ms. diyor ve kalıyor mesela. How do you say your name? He feels that he can not pronounce your name, he gets little bit intimidated but not defensive oluyor adam. Bir daha benim ismimi söylemek istemiyor. Bir daha da benim yüzümü görmek istemiyor. Then he automatically thinks that there may be a language barrier. Since my name is different, maybe I do not understand English as well as some other American person. That way he becomes even more intimidated. Bu benim görüşüm. Yanlışta olabilir bilmiyorum. . . . Ama one way or the other you are not just regular American for them whether it is good or bad. Arkadaş çevresinde iseniz exotic olmak good aslında.

religious differences are a marker with varying consequences in public life that affect even the second and later generations.

The prevalence of unemployment, which has been more important in Canada than in the United States during the period of my study, is one more condition that discriminates against immigrant ethnic groups.[87] Immigrants are hard hit by the "last hired, first fired" process. Additionally, however, discrimination based on ethnic difference can be an underlying reason that shows itself at such times; thus, the depression impact is not the same for all those "last hired." I do not try to disentangle all the relationships of macro-structural economic conditions to Turkish economic assimilation, but stick to the one that seems to be most important—job discrimination. It affects cultural assimilation as well, and reinforces certain Turkish diaspora identity outcomes.

Conclusion

The ability of the Canadian and United States economies to attract Turkish individuals of high educational achievement will no doubt continue, because rules in both countries emphasize strong qualifications for economic migrants, even though marriage and other "loopholes" somewhat weaken this tendency. There is also some possibility of dilution of immigrant quality due to the relative ease with which family members and other close "sponsored" relatives may follow migrants under the rules of family

[87] The list of those pointing to economic conditions, and particularly the unemployment cycle, includes Aycan and Berry (1996), Akbari (1999), and Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson (1994).

unification. Most of these chain-linked relatives, however, are usually of similar human capital quality.

Immigrants' success in finding their expected level of employment is by no means automatic or simple. My interview excerpts in this chapter show many of the twists, turns, and hurdles that immigrants negotiate. So long as the economies of the United States and Canada are vigorous, there are growth edges—areas that experience a fluid need for labor—and Turks tend to successfully join the labor force in those places. This is evident in the high-end sectors of the United States.

Canadian immigration rules emphasize even-handedness in making choices—as evidenced by the point system—but sometimes do not match immigrants well to the current labor market, which leads to disappointment and frustration. The U.S. rules that tie each economic applicant to specific opportunities are not so much "fair" as they are a better prescription for success for those selected. In both countries rules are frequently adjusted, so it is difficult to predict the future success of immigrants. The impact of September 11 and the ongoing "war against terror" with regard to possible discrimination against applicants of Middle Eastern origin, including Turks, is not yet clear.

Similar to the U.S., the German immigration strategy in the early years of Turkish worker migration tied every decision specifically to contracting companies in Germany so that mismatches were rare. The main difference lay in their recruitment of Turks on a supposedly temporary basis, and in their indifference to workers with little language ability or schooling, and relatively inflexible work skills. When Turkish workers faced dismissals in the post-1973 depression and refused to leave, they were unable to relocate

in the changing economy, and unemployment and disappointment became endemic. The superior skills of Turkish workers in the U.S. make this a less likely outcome for this population.

Turks as an immigrant ethnic minority often face initial disappointment in the job levels that they can achieve, and fuller economic assimilation thereafter may take a long time. This is particularly true in Canada; less so in the United States where high selectivity and strong economic conditions—during the period of this study—made for fairly rapid and successful economic assimilation. The explanation for disappointing assimilation in Canada in particular appears to be due to a structural condition of job protectionism and ethnic discrimination. Nevertheless, most Turkish Canadians do eventually find places for themselves and remain in Canada.

Unlike the German situation, in both Canada and the United States Turkish immigrants are exposed to all aspects of North American culture, without facing extreme isolation and exclusion. Thus, they accept being Turkish Canadians and Turkish Americans more readily than do the Turkish Germans. How this happens, and how they see themselves and define their identities, is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Six

WHO ARE THE TURKS?

HYBRIDIZATION AND ASSIMILATION IN NORTH AMERICA

Where Do I Belong?

Age is fifty five

Twenty eight is there, twenty seven is here

Over there is Turkey, here is Canada

. . .

My tongue is rolling slowly in my Turkish

My English is good, even with the accent

Immigration is living in two worlds

Immigration is to become a whole from two halves

Mother is there, daughter is here

Home is there, home is here

Istanbul the city I can sacrifice myself for its soil

My friends, my garden, my work, I am of Toronto

My Black Sea, my Lake Erie

Am I Turkish or Canadian or what?

Aysan Sev'er (2000), Canada[88]

"Where do I belong?" and "Who am I?" are common questions in immigrants' minds. As Sev'er describes her feelings about living in Canada after twenty-seven years, she finds that her life is scattered between Turkey and Canada, between past and present, and between old loyalties and new fealties. By asking "Am I Turkish or Canadian or what?" she implies that perhaps she is neither Turkish nor Canadian. Indeed, her impoverished Turkish and her accented English suggest to natives of both countries that she is a foreigner. Her world is, by now, an established hybrid mixture of cultures. There are many Turkish persons with similar immigration experiences and subsequent hybridization in the North American diaspora in the process of assimilation. The Turkish culture of their past is contaminated by the more recently encountered culture of their host countries.

And then there are the offspring, born in North America, socialized in the hybridities of their parents, and defining their own patterns of assimilation. They are all members of the diaspora. In the previous chapter, I explored the extent of Turkish structural assimilation, drawing on data regarding education, jobs and professions, and income. . This chapter looks at additional, primarily cultural, factors influencing assimilation and hybridity, including language, marriage, and family gender roles and intergenerational relations. There are also forms of resistance to assimilation to consider.

[88] My translation. For Turkish original, see Sev'er (2001).

Resistance may be based on cultural factors that immigrants bring from Turkey—as discussed in chapter 3—or be a response to forms of economic exclusion/discrimination, as discussed in chapter 5. Finally, I will examine the ethnic organizations for religious, social welfare, and political purposes that serve as mediators in the maintenance of the hybrid diaspora identity.

In addition to other materials, this chapter uses ethnographic material from Turks interviewed in Canada and the United States—see the appendix. These interviews show how Turks represent themselves, their culture, and the macro-structural constraints around them. Over the course of these interviews, several dominant themes arose, including becoming an immigrant, notions of privacy, defining gender lines, and inter-generational relationships. These are the issues, insights, and tensions that arose repeatedly during the ethnographic encounters. These issues are explored in detail in this chapter, for they show the "fault lines" where Turkish and American culture intersect, and where assimilation starts.

I begin with a simple demographic description of the Turkish population in North America. This configuration is the result of structural and cultural factors that determine the age and gender of immigrants, the extent of their familial reproduction, and therefore how they compare with the host population. The diaspora's cultural and structural behavior is affected by its demographic membership.

Demographic Characteristics

The population of Turks in the United States is described by age and sex in figure 6.1, alongside a figure depicting these characteristics for the entire United States population. The most striking feature of the diaspora population is the relatively large concentration of people within the central working ages of 25–44. This is due to the relatively recent origins of this population, and to the immigration policy that selects them precisely because of their ability to support themselves and dependents while contributing to the overall economy.

The diasporic populations of Turks shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2 include not only immigrants—those who have arrived, remained, and not died or re-emigrated—but also native-born individuals. The native-born are an important part of the diaspora. Among the native-born are children either recently born and still at young ages in the figures, or born earlier in North America. These figures show the entire diasporas in the U.S. and Canada.

Figure 6. 1. Age and Sex Distribution of the United States Population and Turks in the United States, 1990 [89]



[89] Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993:Table 15; and tabulations of Turks from PUMS (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992a). Graphics by HPN Technologies.

Even the national United States population shows some of the same tendency toward a large "waist" population, not because of high birth rates 25-35 years ago, but because it is constantly being fed by new immigrant members with the same age concentration. In the Turkish population, there is a slight excess of males over females—118 males per 100 females—which is also traceable to the age-sex distribution of immigrants. This is a typical pattern for the in-migration process (Preston, Heuveline, and M. Guillot 2001:208-209; Carter and Sutch 1999:326). One can predict that as the Turkish population gets older and larger relative to the immigrant flow, it will look more and more like the United States distribution. This happens as children are born, adding to the number of people ages 0-14, as family members age, and as family reunification takes place. All of these processes have been occurring. Nevertheless, as long as the immigration flow remains large relative to the size of the diaspora, the large population waist will continue to appear in each census.

For the Turkish diaspora in Canada, the demographic characteristics are similar, only they are for a smaller population—see figure 6.2. The basic patterns discussed above also hold true for Canada.

Figure 6. 2. Age and Sex Distribution of the Canadian Population and Turks in Canada, 1996 [90]





[90] Note that Canadian data have different (top) age intervals: 75+ and 65+.
Sources: Statistics Canada 1997 and 1999. Graphics by HPN Technologies.

Immigration flows continuously add to the pyramids shown in the "snapshots" above. To see how they adding to some age groups more than others, the yearly immigration flow is broken down by age and sex in figure 6.3. The immigration statistics are for Canada, but the age and sex distribution pattern is similar for the United States (US INS 1999, 2001).

Figure 6.3. Age and Sex Distribution of Turkish Immigrants to Canada, 1996[91]



Figure 6.3 shows that immigrant ages are highly concentrated from the early 20s up to about 40. These are the ages when individuals are most mobile in pursuit of career and work and so become migrants (Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2001:208-209). Both

[91] Citizenship and Immigration Statistics Canada 1999: Tbl. 1M1

males and females are included, the breadwinners most often being males and secondary breadwinners or spouses immigrating at similar ages. Older individuals in the migration stream are usually the parent dependents of younger adults—bringing parents to North America singly or as couples is typical of the Turkish diaspora family system. Of course, some immigrants arrive already married and with young children, as evidenced by children in the lower age ranges of figure 6.3.

Ethnographic data provide insight as to these demographic characteristics. The following four examples illustrate how different Canadian and U.S. policies affect family immigration and birth patterns in the diaspora—in particular, they demonstrate that Canadian policy leans more toward admitting families, while U.S. immigration policy favors single workers.

The first example is that of a young couple who married in Ankara following university graduation, and emigrated to Canada in 1994 with their four-year old son. They settled in Vancouver; when interviewed in 2000, the father had established a career in accounting. They have had no further children.

A second Canadian immigrant, Serdar, originally worked for Turkish Airlines in Turkey as an engineer. He came to Canada in 1990 to take a job with a contractor/supplier of Boeing located in Canada. He emigrated with his wife and one-year-old son. Serdar had done graduate study in France, which no doubt aided his entry to Canada. After three years of residence in Canada they all became Canadian citizens and immediately sponsored their parents for landed immigrant status—which created official

entries in the immigration statistics. However, after receiving Canadian residency, both sets of parents decided to remain in Turkey, and were still living there in 2000.

Illustrating immigration patterns for the U.S., Yasemin graduated in 1974 from Boğaziçi University with an MA in linguistics and English literature. In 1979, she met and married her husband in Istanbul. He had been in the States since 1963 as a student, but had returned to Turkey in 1978 for military service. He brought Yasemin to the States and started his journalism career at a local Seattle TV station. They have two daughters born in the States, aged 13 and 16 in 2000. Yasemin's father died 6 months before the interview in 2000, so her mother now lives with them in Seattle. This example illustrates chain family migration; it started with one person, but eventually extended to five people of different ages.

A final example is Faruk, an early immigrant who came to the United States thirty-six years ago as a graduate student in engineering at Colorado State University. Since 1966, he has worked at Boeing. As soon as he started working, he returned to Turkey where he met a young Turkish woman of only junior high school education, whom he married and brought to Seattle. Since then she has learned English and completed high school and college. They have two sons who were born in 1971 and 1975; the oldest recently married a Korean woman. Both sons obtained engineering degrees at the University of Washington. Faruk brought his brother from Turkey in the early years, and the brother became a jeweler, but is now retired. This, then, is another example of family chain migration.

As these stories illustrate, Canadian cases are often comprised of families from the start, with or without children. During the period I studied, Canadian policies awarded extra immigration points to men or women already married with children, and to those with previous job experience in Turkey. The Turkish Americans, by contrast, were more likely to arrive single, often to start graduate professional schooling or to gain immediate middle to high-level technical employment. This pattern of chain migration, with subsequent marriage and families, means that members of the Turkish American diaspora are likely to have a higher proportion of their children after migration.

Most couples I interviewed had one or two children; only one family had more, four children. My standard of comparison, Istanbul, had middle-class fertility levels below a population-replacement level in 1990; that means an average of less than two surviving children per woman (Turkey State Institute of Statistics 1995:Tables 3.6, 9.6). In North America, therefore, Turkish fertility does not seem to be very different than it is in Istanbul, though it might be even lower.[92] By comparison, in Germany the Turkish German fertility rates were higher—an average of 2.6 children per woman (Kolinsky 1996:89).

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[92] An indirect indication of "below replacement" is that the age distributions for Turks in the United States and Canada—figures 6.1 and 6.2—show smaller numbers of (female) individuals in the horizontal bars for children—age 0-15—than the sum of the bars for their (female) parents at higher ages—age 25-40. This means that the offspring will not be enough to replace their (female) parents as the whole population becomes older; therefore fertility is "below replacement." When data on birth rates for a population are not available, this kind of rough judgement is made by indirect reasoning. See the techniques for such indirect measurement in United Nations Manual 10 (1983:Chap 8).

Marriage and Family Households

To have a standard of comparison for marriage and family life in the diaspora, I used information from Istanbul. Turkey's largest city is home to many people with class and education levels similar to those who migrate to North America. In Istanbul, 92% of individuals live in family households, a percentage that reveals the effects of strong inter-generational ties and family relationships (Aytaç 1998; Gökçay and Shorter 1993:61; Turkey State Institute of Statistics 1995:112). Among Turkish Canadians and Turkish Americans, the proportions living in family households are somewhat lower—90% and 86% respectively (Statistics Canada 1999: Turkish Profile; United States Bureau of the Census 1992b:PUMS). Individuals not in family households are living in non-family groups or alone, as is common for students or newly arrived single immigrants. These data may indicate a slight trend away from the conveniences and value-ties that keep Turks living together in family households in Istanbul, or it may simply be due to immigration policies, particularly in the U.S., that favor solitary immigration.[93]

Nevertheless, practically all Turks marry at least once, whether they live in Turkey or the U.S. The evidence indicates that only 2% of those over age 45 have never married (State Institute of Statistics 1993:47; PUMS tabulations)[94].

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[93] The national populations of Canada and the United States show slightly lower proportions—both are 87%. For the United States, unmarried partner couples are included.(Statistics Canada 2001:Profile; United States Bureau of the Census 1993: Table 16).

[94] Turks younger than 45 are not included, because their life story of marriage is not yet complete. Data for the Turkish Canadians on this point was not available.

Apart from the question of "whether" most Turks marry, there is the question of "with whom." Intercultural marriage exists in Turkey, but is not so common as it is in more heterogeneous societies. For emigrants, intercultural marriage may happen just before emigration, or after arrival in the diaspora. Some of my male informants met Canadians or Americans in Turkey, or during temporary visits to North America, and then married. For them, marriage was often mixed with other strands of the decision and ability to gain permanent residence in North America. Turks, both male and female, who have already immigrated may also meet non-Turkish partners. The circumstances of study, jobs, and social life in North America increase the likelihood of such marriages.

The statistical data on the ancestries of Turks, gathered on the Canadian and United States censuses, give us some idea as to the frequency and patterns of intercultural marriage. I used the ancestry responses to determine who to include as "Turks" in my statistical work, including all individuals who specified Turkish as their only, or one of two, ancestries.[95] A respondent who gave a second non-Turkish ancestry was presumed, for the purpose of my analysis, to be referring to the ethnicity of one of his/her parents, though it is true that there is no way to tell whether this answer refers to an earlier intercultural marriage. A tally of these responses shows that, while 11% of immigrant Turkish Americans reported additional ethnic ancestries, the number jumps to 62% among U.S.-born Turks.[96] These percentages presumably indicate a high rate of

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[95] See the appendix for details of the questions and my use of the results.

[96] It would be interesting to compare the intermarriage trend from first to second generation for other ethnic immigrant groups, but I have no such data sets. Neither do I have intermarriage data for Turkish Germans.

intermarriage by the immigrant parents of these native-born Turkish Americans.[97] This conclusion is also supported by my ethnographic data; among my informants in the Seattle region, for example, 30% of the couples interviewed had intercultural partnerships.[98]

The respondents I interviewed had married or lived with Far East Asian and Latin American partners, as well as ethnically white Canadians and Americans. The statistics on Turks in the diaspora with non-Turkish origins—second ancestries—confirm this diversity: 80% reported European ancestry—meaning Russian, German, Polish, Greek, Irish, French, and English—while the remaining 20% reported a wide variety of ethnicities: Mexican, American Indian, Jewish, and more (Statistics Canada 1999: Turkish Profile; United States Bureau of the Census 1992b:PUMS).

The general conclusion is that intermarriage is an important part of the cultural adjustment process for Turks, even though the ethnographies revealed a relatively low survival rate for such marriages.[99] The process is elegantly described in Weberian theory

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[97] For Canada, the data do not separate the native-born, so the meaning of second ancestries among Turkish Canadians—42%—is not very illuminating except perhaps to show that the overall proportion is similar to that in the United States—39%.

[98] In the Vancouver region, 20% of couples interviewed had intermarried. Clearly intermarriage is common, even though quantitative assessment is not precisely done through the ethnographies which are not claimed to be statistically representative of the diaspora populations.

[99] Some of the marriages were in fact "marriages of convenience" for immigration purposes.

using his notion of status-group closure:[100] intermarriage creates interactions across group boundaries and demonstrates that members of different groups accept each other as peers. As a consequence, children of the mixed marriages identify less with a single cultural group, and the parents more likely shed negative attitudes toward other groups. This kind of assimilation process with hybrid intermarriage is shown in some of my ethnographies.

Velih came to the United States to do his engineering masters degree. While he was a student he married a Catholic woman, in part because he thought that her family values would be like his. He has lived with her for the last 17 years in Seattle, and they have a 16-year old daughter. Their home language is English even though the wife learned some Turkish; his wife is responsible for taking care of their daughter. Velih says that they respect each other culturally: he goes to church with her whenever there is a Catholic holiday event, and when they go to Turkey together, she respects his very traditional village family.

I found Sezgin in Canada. He was one of the few first-generation informants I had who insisted on giving most of the interview in English, but he spoke in Turkish when he talked about his feelings for Turkey. He married his British wife in England twenty years ago, and they moved to Canada together thinking that such an intercultural marriage would not easily survive in England due to cultural prejudices against Turks. They decided to follow neither Islam nor Christianity, and derive their shared identity from a secular common ground. They have two teenage children. They speak only English, and

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[100] The relevance of intermarriage or its opposite, assortative mating, for group closure and cultural assimilation is discussed by Nikolai Botev (2002:681) and in Matthijs Kalmijn (1998).

represent themselves as Canadians. They have visited Turkey together only once. Thus, a critical component of cultural adaptation—found in the intercultural marriages—is knowing and using the language of the host country.

Language

The language spoken by immigrants at home is a strong indicator of retention of cultural ties with the origin country and new ties of assimilation in the host country. One language at home does not necessarily preclude others, since my interviews showed that good-to-excellent practice of multi-lingual skills goes on at home as well as in the outside society of the workplace or neighborhood. Table 6.1 shows languages spoken at home by Turks in Canada and the United States.

Table 6.1. Language Spoken by Turks at Home in Canada and the United States[101]

Language	Turks in Canada (all ages)	Turks in United States (age 5 +)
English (and/or French in Canada)	51.6	49.0
Turkish	38.3	38.0
Others	10.1	13.0
All languages	100.0	100.0
Number of individuals	17,500	72,600

Close to one-half of Turks in North America speak English at home (and/or French in Canada), according to table 6.1. Turkish is the domestic language in almost 40% of homes; however there is a difference between generations. To estimate this difference, the United States' data are split between immigrants and native-born to represent first and later-generation respondents in table 6.2.

[101] Statistics Canada 1999: Profile; Tabulations of Turks from PUMS (United States Bureau of the Census 1992a).

Table 6.2. Language Spoken by Immigrant and Native-Born Turks at Home in the United States[102]

Language	Immigrants	Native-Born
English	13.5	81.1
Turkish	67.5	11.3
Others	19.0	7.6
All languages	100.0	100.0
Number of individuals aged 5 and over	34,500	38,100

It is abundantly clear from the statistics in table 6.2 that immigrants hold onto Turkish as their language at home—68%—whereas the native-born are much more likely to live in homes where English is the primary language—81%.[103] Speaking Turkish at home does not necessarily indicate linguistic isolation, since the home is a private domain. Most, though not all, Turkish immigrants who hold onto Turkish at home say that they can speak English outside the home.[104] In Canada linguistic ability is similar;

[102] For individuals aged 5 and over. Source: Tabulations of Turks from PUMS (United States Bureau of the Census 1992a).

[103] It would be interesting to have comparative data for second-generation immigrants of other ethnic groups in America. For example, the Vietnamese ability to speak English "very well" increases from 34% in the first generation to 51% in the second generation (Bacon 1996:9; Zhou 2001:200).

[104] The figure is 86% for Turkish American immigrants who do not speak English as the home language—58% "very well" plus 28% "well." The census question asked for a self-assessment (or assessment by whoever filled out the questionnaire): "Very well," "Well," "Not well," and "Not at all."(Tabulations of Turks from PUMS, United States Bureau of the Census 1992a).

combined data for the two generations show that 97% of Turks can speak English and/or French.[105] Those who cannot speak English satisfactorily outside the home are typically dependents—a few wives, parents, or grandparents.[106] Thus, multi-lingual ability among Turks is strong in Canada as well as the United States.

The ability to speak English "very well," irrespective of the home language, varies among other ethnic immigrant groups in America. For Turks, it is 58%; other immigrant groups with higher percentages include those from the following areas: Asian India 73%, Philippines 68%, Iran 61%, Panama 65%, Africa 77%, Guyana 98%, Jamaica 98% and Trinidad-Tobago 98%. Other large groups of immigrant residents report lower English-language ability levels; among them are Mexico at 29%, and China with 28% (Bacon 1996:9). In Germany, such records were not available, but all evidence indicates that the Turkish ethnic immigrant minority had very little competence in German.[107]

For immigrants, learning language is a never-ending process. After 27 years, one informant says that she still hears new idioms in English whose meanings she cannot guess. Her latest example is "granola woman," which she interpreted at first as a woman who is as boring as the food granola—Turks don't think much of granola for breakfast.

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[105] As assessed by the 1996 Canadian census which asked, "Can this person speak English or French well enough to conduct a conversation?" Answers: "English only; French only; Both English and French; Neither English nor French" (Statistics Canada 1999: Turkish Profile).

[106] Findings from ethnographic interviews in Canada and the United States.

[107] I could not find statistics for the first generation in the English-language literature. Tan and Waldhoff (1996:143) say that migrants had arrived from "rural or impoverished urban milieus, . . . [and] had never gone beyond a restricted colloquial level."

Then, she realized it meant a woman who is a health nut. Immigrants have a perpetual feeling of not quite conquering the language of their host country.

The inter-generational move from Turkish to English as a home language, seen in table 6.2, demonstrates that linguistic cultural integration increases from generation to generation. This linguistic shift is illustrated in the ethnographies.

Among my informants, Turkish parents of young children almost all chose to speak Turkish exclusively at home even though they themselves knew English or French. They said their reason was that they wanted their children to acquire the local language outside the home so that the accent would be correct. In several homes where only Turkish was spoken, the parents employed nannies from neighboring Turkish families rather than risk the introduction of English through baby sitters.

For the children themselves, the first days at school were in some cases traumatic. For example, Ayfer's son came home from his first day in pre-school soaking wet and terribly upset: no one understood or responded to his pleas of *çişim var* (I need to pee). The progress of these children in English is primarily dependent upon schools and peers, with limited assistance from parents. To be bi-lingual was considered by the families to be a great asset which they strived to maintain, though not always successfully, as the children grew older.[108] When the child came home and wanted to ask questions or converse in English, parents would answer in Turkish. I witnessed good communication between children and parents involving two languages back and forth. Occasionally, the

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[108] Some parents send their children to weekend Turkish language schools organized by the Turkish cultural associations in Vancouver and Seattle.

child would insert Turkish words into his/her otherwise English language speech, but parents would try rigorously to avoid that kind of linguistic corruption.

In homes where the parents were from different linguistic backgrounds, the choice of home language was usually English, because that was typically their common language. In one instance, a Japanese mother attempted to teach some Japanese to the child and the Turkish father did likewise with Turkish. English, however, won out as the child grew older and went to school.

For Turkish parents with older children, the home language was more flexible. I experienced conversations in the home that switched between the two languages showing multi-lingual competence in both generations. A nearly complete loss of Turkish was seen in some teenagers of mixed parentage.

We have been discussing factors that contribute positively to the assimilation process. However, assimilation is seldom complete. Some resistance to assimilation is seen in the religious and civic organizations that Turks create. These organizations not only support better standards of living, but also encourage respect for their Turkish identities.

Religious and Secular Organizations

The diaspora is a collection of individual lives and representations of individual identities. It also has social spaces where Turks come together and show solidarity and support for common causes: representation of a positive social and cultural image of Turks to North Americans, facilitating assimilation of new diaspora members, job

networking and resource pooling. As of mid-2002, there were fifty-four such organizations registered in the United States under the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), founded in 1971 in Washington, DC. In Canada, there are plans to establish a similar assembly, but its affiliates will be fewer in number. Three local organizations whose activities I followed were: the Turkish American Cultural Association (TACA) in Seattle, the Turkish Canadian Society in Richmond, Vancouver, and the Vancouver Island Turkish Canadian Friendship Society in Victoria.

In North America, Turks are organized around these secular Turkish American and Turkish Canadian cultural and ethnic associations rather than around mosques, as is more common in Germany (Doomernik 1995:48). In chapter 4, we explained how mosques serve many functions in Germany for Turkish workers and their families—not unlike the role that was historically played by churches and synagogues in North America for many other immigrant ethnic groups.[109] Yet, for Turks in North America, the mosque is not a center for such services. Except for religious holidays, middle-class Turks seldom visit mosques, which in my research were situated in Arab, not Turkish, locales—a factor that no doubt discourages additional participation. The preference for secular civic institutions is probably due to at least two factors: first, that the Turkish immigrants in North America are drawn from a strongly secularist urban stratum of Turkey—see chapter

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[109] P.G. Min (1992:1374) describes the extensive role played by ethnic churches and synagogues in America, providing "immigrant/minority members not only with fellowship, ethnic identity and social services, but also with social status." Kivisto (1995:448-449) mentions ethnic Korean churches.

3; and second, that the local scale of Turkish settlement in most areas would not support sufficient attendance at such institutions.

The civic secular organizations that Turks form are mainly cultural institutions with a touch of welfare activities and charity—for example, earthquake relief. Turks come together, sometimes with American friends as well, for recreational and cultural activities: pot-lucks, picnics, and meetings with prominent Turkish guests from Turkey or from other cities, and celebrations of Turkish holidays (religious and secular). From time to time, they also make representations to the North American political leadership concerning Turkish North American issues. They also work at local levels with community resource directories to provide local information about certain Turkish or non-Turkish services. Recently, a Turkish investors advisory group was established by TACA (Seattle).

ATAA is a national umbrella organization for all the local Turkish-American associations in the United States. In a personal communication they stated, "The main objectives of ATAA are two-fold. One is to create an informed national Turkish-American community that can help foster US-Turkish relations and take an active part in promoting a balanced and truthful picture of Turkey in the US. The other is to educate Americans in government, the media and the public at large about Turkey and issues that concern us as Turkish-Americans."

Since 1989, the assembly has published an English bi-weekly newspaper, *The Turkish Times*. According to an article published in the Canadian *Dergi Merhaba*

(1999)[110], the circulation of the ATAA newspaper is over eight thousand. Its content shows that until recently ATAA's mission was primarily that of a lobby organization. Almost every issue carries at least one article about the Armenian or/and Greek lobbies in the United States, or articles about Turkish Greek and Armenian relations. The Culture and Art section is basically a promotional page for Turkish tourism. New features include the "Helping Hands" section, which contains practical information for Turkish immigrants about issues such as how to buy and sell real estate and how to make long-term investments. Buying the first house and saving for the future are two important economic components of almost every immigrant's plans.

In late 2002, ATAA announced a major project to strengthen economic services within the Turkish community in the United States. The organization is also setting up a legal assistance service for US immigration. The target group is Turks living in the United States under temporary visas, and they are using e-mail lists to communicate personally. Another project is an employment service that will network between major American corporations and Turkish applicants. These new projects will increase economic solidarity in the Turkish-American diaspora.

Turkish organizations are important resources for communication among Turkish immigrants, and they give the community a coherent voice when it is required for political or social issues. The economic projects these organizations undertake

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[110] *Dergi Merhaba* is a publication of a Turkish weekly radio program in Toronto. It is a nice-looking glossy magazine. Its main reader group is in eastern Canada co-terminus with its broadcast region. However, it covers Turkish events and publishes letters from readers all over Canada and the United States, and maintains a national Canadian yellow page directory for Turkish businesses on their website.

demonstrate that they are responding to needs that Turks feel they can meet more quickly and effectively than they could using non-ethnic organizations.

Each Turkish person in the diaspora experiences significant events that deeply affect their new identities; these are the processual events of identity creation. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the formative experiences of Turkish Americans and Turkish Canadians as they socialize, relate to colleagues, enter the labor market and become consumers.

Acquiring an Immigrant Identity

Every immigrant is dramatically affected by encounters with local culture after arriving in North America. Since each person's background and previous experiences are different, however, a particular "immigrant experience" is difficult to identify. Nevertheless, many immigrants face similar challenges.

Even when settled, immigrants still remember their homes in the old country. Some of the Seattle respondents and others in Vancouver and on Vancouver Island told me that being surrounded by water reminded them of Istanbul. They even renamed localities with the names of neighborhoods and small towns along the Bosphorus. Immigrants have their own hybrid worlds, made of images, smells, and tastes taken from the places of both their native and host countries. It is a hybrid reality which brings the past into the present and helps the immigrants to recover from the trauma of being uprooted and subsequently transformed by life in a different society.

Most immigrants must first come to terms with the feelings of alienation and loneliness they experience upon arrival in a new cultural environment. I heard this from almost every respondent, even from those with high education and previous mobility. Moving to a new culture is more challenging than changing localities within one's own primary culture. A single professional woman went so far as to define the different kinds of solitude she felt upon moving.

> . . . When one decides to change, one experiences bad solitude. There is good solitude too. Maybe, I was solitary in Istanbul as well. I was living alone there, too, but there is also bad solitude. Bad solitude is being alone when it is not your own choice; good solitude when it is your choice. . . . In time, you learn three cafés. You make five friends. You know whom you can call at what time during the day. It is okay once you learn the habit of such things.[111]

According to this woman, the act of immigration brings out an involuntary feeling of loneliness until one learns something about the new environment and establishes new relationships. For some immigrants, this sense of "bad solitude" could become a permanently marginalized state; this informant, however, appears to have moved successfully through this stage.

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[111] . . . .onu değiştirmeye karar verdiğinde, kötü yanlızlığı çekiyorsun. Güzel yanlızlıkta var. Belki İstanbul'daki yanlızlığımda da bu kadar yanlızım ben aslında. Tek başına yaşıyan bir insan olarak o yanlızlığı yaşıyorsun. Orada tek başıma yaşıyordum ama birde kötü yanlızlık var. Kötü yanlızlık ise yani senin tercihin ile yanlız kalmak değilde aslında tercih etmediğin halde yanlız kalman. . . Zamanlan üç tane kafe öğreniyorsun. Beş tane arkadaşın oluyor. Günün hangi saatinde kimi arayabileceğini biliyorsun. Bunlar oturdukca tamam. İlk başta onlar yok işte.

Other immigrants learn host country customs and gain new relationships in time, but they may be uncomfortable adopting the new ways. They may avoid intercultural encounters in order to maintain their own customs, even at the cost of remaining somewhat socially isolated. This behavior may also reinforce stereotyping of Turks by members of the host culture. The clash of cultures can take small and seemingly petty forms, though the personal uneasiness is nevertheless real. As one Turkish man explained,

> [Talking about American family culture] First of all, they do not have a family culture. Whoever comes first eats first. They do not have the culture of having a family supper. They do not have the culture of keeping clean houses. As far as I am concerned they [the Americans] have so many things I cannot accept. I do not usually go to houses of the Americans for supper, because I cannot feel comfortable in their houses. That is the only reason. I prefer to go after supper or I suggest eating outside if we have to have a meal together. In fact, the Americans do not usually invite for supper. In general, they meet outside and that is better for me. . . . If you look at their lives, they live in filth. If you get in their cars, they are filthy. It is not appropriate to say it, but they go to the men's room. It is so simple, but restrooms are all filthy. For example, they step on pee drops, They go home and walk around with the same shoes. Later their toddlers

shuffle around on the floor. The people who do not care about such things worry whether they can drink tap water in Turkey.[112]

Stereotyping by the citizens of the host country can also lead to distance. Many questions asked openly or by observation cement these feelings of difference: You don't look like a Turk. Are you Muslim? Do you eat pork? Do you drink alcohol? What about harems in Turkey? Among Turks in my ethnographic sample, most of whom do not represent these historic characterizations of Muslim Turks, the perception is that they are seen as different from other Americans, especially in social life. Such encounters are commonly experienced by second-generation Turks who keep Turkish names and represent their heritage in public. In the formation of individual hybrid identities, such events contribute to a sense of difference and of Turkishness that must be defended and negotiated again and again.

When immigrants socialize outside the Turkish community, they tend to seek out other immigrants. This happens through work environments, schools, and their children's

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[112] Adamların bir kere aile kültürü yok. Eve gelen yemeğini yer. Bir beraber akşam evde oturup yemek yeme kültürü yok. Evini temiz tutma kültürü yok. Bana şahsen karşı gelen kafama yatmayan bir sürü olayları var. Yani ben genelde yemeğe gitmem Amerika'lıların evine çünkü ben rahat edemiyorum onların evinde. Tek neden odur. Gidersem eğer yemek sonrası giderim veya yemekli bir ortam olucaksa dişarda buluşup yemek yemeğe çalışırım. Zaten Amerikalı'larda pek yemeğe davet etmezler. Genelde dışarda olur ki benim için gayet iyi yani. Ben pek rahat etmiyorum yani. Adamlar yani burada bakıcak olursanız yani pislik içinde yaşıyor. Arabalarına binseniz arabaları pis. Ayıptır söylemesi tuvalete giriyor. Bu kadar basit yani tuvalete giriyor. Her yerde yani pislik var yani. Bu adam afedersiniz sidiğin üzerine basıyor. Mesela o ayakkabı ile geliyor ve bazen ayakkabısını bile çıkarmadan yatağın üzerine atıyor kendini. Buraya geliyor ayakkabısı ile dolaşıyor. Sonra bebeğide olsa orada emekliyor yani. Ağzını sürüyor. Yani buna dikkat etmeyen adamlar ondan sonra Türkiye'de yok işte su içilir mi diye sorun yapıyor.

activities. I noticed a preference among the middle-class Turks to become friends with European-origin Canadians or Americans, whereas working-class individuals were sometimes also friends with residents of Middle-Eastern origin. Chinese immigrants, or South or Southeast Asians, though numerous in this region, were generally not sought out; this may be due to an element of racial prejudice among Turks.

Once past the initial difficulty of finding social partners, Turks expressed many compliments about the way Canadians and Americans treat people. The smiling faces of those who serve—in stores, banks, restaurants, even plumbers or garbage collectors—make a big impression, because this is not common in Turkey. One informant said,

> In Turkey, you feel as if you are her [the service person's] servant, and they try to topple you. You have such a psychological fight [in Turkey], even with the person who serves you at a restaurant. These kinds of things are unnecessary indeed. In other words, [in North America] there is no way that I could think that a waitress is a person socially inferior to me. [113]

Beyond the civility of service interactions, however, informants also told me of the great difficulty they sometimes had in understanding the meanings and manners of new friends. Interpretations that came automatically to them based on their Turkish

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[113] Yani işte nebileyim servis sektöründe insanların ne kadar güler yüzlü olması falan. Türkiye'de sanki sen onun uşağı imişsin gibi hisseder ve senin üzerine çıkmaya çalışır. Böyle pisikolojik bir çatışma olur en basitinden lokantada servis yapan kişi ilen bile. Gereksiz aslında bu tür şeyler. Yani şey yaratmıyor lokantada çalışan waitress benden sosyal statü olarak daha düşük birisi diye düşünmüyorum hiç bir zaman.

background were sometimes totally inappropriate or even offensive, as this example illustrates:

> We were going to a business meeting. I gave a ride to somebody in the group. . . . While coming back, she asked me how much money she could contribute for gas. I smiled and thought she was joking. Then, I realized she was not joking. I smiled again and said no money is necessary. She thanked me a lot. Later on her car broke down, and I gave her another ride to her home. The next day she brought a sweatshirt to me and I was put in a situation where I had to take it, because it had to be some kind of barter. If I had not taken it, I would not have done as expected and would have made her feel badly about herself. You never know to what extent it is friendship or something else.[114]

It takes time to learn the subtleties of a new culture, and to internalize new patterns of conduct. There are many stories about the way Turkish people feel when they think their value system is violated by the value system of the host culture, such as the following:[115]

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[114] Toplantıya gidiyoruz. Ben gruptan bir kişiye ride verdim. . . . Dönüşte benzin parasına ne kadar katkıda bulunayım diye sordu. Ben güldüm espiri yapıyor sandım. Baktım espiri yapmıyor. Ben güldüm yok gerek yok falan dedim. İşte çok teşekkür etti. Sonra yine aynı kişi hatta birgün arabası bozulmuştu evine getirdim. Ertesi gün şey getirdi bana bir tane sweatshirt getirdi ve yani öyle bir olduki ben onu almak zorundayım çünkü orada bir alış veriş yaptık biz. Ben almazsam orada üstüme düşeni yapmayıp onu kötü durumda bırakacağım. Almam lazım o şekilde oldu. Nereye kadar samimisin bilmiyorsun.

[115] From a paper she presented at a professional meeting and gave to me during our interview. No citation to preserve anonymity.

[The first year I came to the U.S.] my husband and I were talked into giving a potluck dinner to our folk-dance friends. First of all, the idea of potluck was extremely strange to me. I was used to cooking all the food for friends I invited to my house for dinner. But, I was willing to be culturally sensitive and flexible! In Turkey, you only bring food to a party if you are a very good friend. You do not ask if you should bring something or what you should bring because you would be told not to bring anything, that the hostess would not like to impose on you. If you choose to bring something, you leave it with the hostess without asking if you should or not. Before the party, everyone called me to ask what they should bring. I mumbled something between "You don't have to bring anything" and "Whatever you would like to bring." They all took charge and told me what they would bring, as I struggled to hide my feelings of shame. This was quickly turning into a bizarre experience. One of our friends brought some Chinese food she had cooked which was delicious. As she was getting ready to leave, she asked me if I wanted any of the left-over Chinese dish. I was surprised because I was expecting her to leave the whole thing and do it without asking me. In my confusion I said, "Oh, you should take it home," CLEARLY indicating "I loved it please leave it." To my complete bewilderment, she said "OK" and walked off with it without insisting that I keep it. I could not figure out what had just happened. What could possibly have gone wrong when I had tried so hard to understand

this very odd American custom and accommodate to it? As far as I was concerned my friend's behavior was rude and crude!

This anecdote is not just about personal humiliation, even though many Turks would have interpreted such an event that way. Many informants said that North Americans can be cold, materialist, and superficial people who only know how to say "Hello" and "Goodbye," people who have no knowledge of personal intimacy and friendship. These comments show a deep divide between Turkish and American cultures and customs. Turkish culture is an indirect one, in which the rules are flexible and learned over time, but rarely stated directly. It is also a culture of reciprocity, where exchange is expected to happen slowly, rather than on the spot. In Turkish culture, for example, good manners dictate that you must say you are not hungry if somebody asks you whether you are hungry or not. Your true desire becomes known to the other person through *ısrar*, which means "insistence." If you agree that you are hungry after the third time you are asked, then your friend will know that you mean it. In contrast, if a North American person is asked three times about some kind of food, she may feel coerced into eating something she does not want to eat. When an American person says no the first time, it means no—but when a Turkish person says no, it might mean no, yes, or maybe.

These examples illustrate how cultural differences, rather than a lack of common language, result in misunderstanding and miscommunication. In a way, the English words become "opaque" in Bhabha's (1994) sense when they are attached to both North American and Turkish meanings. Learning a language is a continuous process and does not mean only that one learns vocabulary, but also that one learns about world views of

others in the host society. An example of acquiring understanding is to learn how North Americans handle privacy.

Notions of Privacy

Although privacy might seem to be a normal and basic practice among North Americans, it is handled differently in Turkish culture. Encounters in this seemingly small domain are an excellent example of how Turks assimilate, making real changes in their behavior.

When I started my interviewing, I thought it important to learn about economic circumstances, so I asked the first respondents about their incomes. In Turkey, there are no "secrets" about such things. People share information about salaries, purchases, and any economic details one cares to ask about. However, I found that Turks in Vancouver and Seattle, even recent arrivals, reacted poorly to my question. "Privacy" as a concept does not really exist in Turkey or the Turkish language. In English, there is a definite idea of privacy and language for it. Turks learn about privacy, including notions of "space" or physical privacy, almost immediately upon arrival in Canada or the United States. A Turkish businesswoman explained social relations with American customers while speaking with her Turkish colleagues as follows:

> You should know about their personal space zones. You should never enter into their personal space. You must be very close up to a point, but you have to give them their space. If you pass their *kıta sahanlığı* (territorial water boundaries), you are in trouble with them. In other words,

you should not ask them what they did on their dates the night before. You have to balance it, and one learns in time. We do not have such things in Turkish culture.[116]

Notions of privacy are a good example of the process of assimilation. They show how individuals empower themselves to be good colleagues and neighbors by internalizing what they have learned from the host culture. The consequence is that they form a new culture where personal boundaries exist that did not exist before.

Turks learn this and internalize privacy boundaries so as to be successful in their business and social relations, which is yet another step towards structural assimilation. This goes so far as to make it embarrassing to drop in socially on another person without advance notice, even though they would do so in Turkey. However, this particular informality is often retained between close Turkish friends. Informants told me that for this reason they preferred to see other Turks socially, as it was more comfortable.

Eventually, however, privacy creeps into the relationships among Turks as well. An example of how Turks themselves internalize aspects of privacy from the dominant culture was told by an informant as follows:

Do you know how it happens? A Turkish family comes here. For instance, they meet another Turkish family who lived here for three or five years.

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[116] Personal space alanlarını bileceksin. Personal spacelerine hiç bir zaman girmeyeceksin. Bir yere kadar çok yakınsın belki ama onun personal spaceini vermek zorundasın. Hiç bir zaman onu aşmaman lazım aşamıyorsun. Iste o kıta sahanlığını geçtin mi you are in trouble with them. Yani akşam dateinlen ne yaptın diye sormaman lazım. Yani o dengeyi yapmak zorundasın. O da burada ne kalma senelerinin uzunluğuna bakıyor yani. Birazda biz Türklerde öyle şeyler yoktur.

They ask the older family how much they paid for their house and then they understand from the reaction that they asked the wrong question. The old family already living here hem and haw. After experiencing such a conversation the new family understands. I passed through the same kind of experience. When I first started working here, I asked the few Turks I met in the company about their salaries. It was a mistake. Everybody learns it this way. You ask it once. When the answer is not friendly, you understand that it is different here. After that you yourself become like that. When you are asked about your income, you say that it is private and keep it to yourself.[117]

When individuals encounter strong cultural norms, a new cultural platform is created, one that would not be recognized among Turks in their native country. I was told by Turks that they felt strange on visits home when asked the normal questions about their salaries, prices of homes or cars, and other "private" matters.[118]

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[117] Çünkü nasıl oluyor? Bir Türk ailesi buraya geliyor. Mesela burada üç beş yıldır oturan bir Türk ailesi ile tanışıyor. Ya evi kaça aldınız diyor ve böyle zaten anlıyor verilen tepkileri. İnsanlar böyle bir kem küm ediyor. Ya boş ver falan diyor. Böyle bir ortamlan karşılaştıktan sonra onlarda anlıyor. En çok dikkatimi çeken şeylerden biri bu idi. Bende çünkü o şeyden geçtim. Bende mesela ilk işe girdim ve hemen aynı şirkette tanıştığım bir kaç Türk'e sizin maaşlarınız ne kadar dedim. Böyle bir soru sorma gafletinde bulundum. Herkes öyle öğreniyor demekki. Bir kere soruyorsunuz. Bir terslenince anlıyorsunuz demekki burada böyle. Ondan sonra sizde öyle olmaya başlıyorsunuz. Sonra size soruldu mu sizde bu olay birazcık özel diye şey yapıyorsunuz.

[118] In the German literature, I did not find a discussion of differences between German culture and Turkish culture concerning notions of privacy.

Defining Gender Lines in the Family

It is usually men who initiate migration, with women accompanying them as spouses or after becoming engaged. I found only one case among all my interviewees where a Turkish woman had come alone, on the basis of her education and pre-arranged employment. There were also two exceptional cases of Turkish women who had refugee status in Canada, and a number of others who were separated from their husbands by divorce after settling. Thus, any redefinition of women's gender roles occurs almost entirely within the sphere of marriage and the family. My interviewees included a number of women who possessed or subsequently acquired sufficient credentials to adopt professional roles outside the home, in addition to their house duties. Others, particularly those of low education, never left that more traditional status—nor would they have done so in their native country. To be housewives in their new culture nonetheless involved many changes in their roles and perceptions of themselves, as they interacted or observed their new society. For middle-class women, the differences are striking, and due primarily to a loss of the support systems normally available in Turkey. This Turkish housewife is a somewhat extreme example:

> If I were in Turkey, I would have more comfort. For example, I had a lady coming for house cleaning. We were living in an apartment building with a doorman who did all our personal shopping. [Middle-class] women have more advantages in Turkey. Mother was close by to babysit my children. The first year in Canada was very hard for me. It is still hard, but I am more used to it now. Shopping, cooking, cleaning, and carrying children to

their activities are all my chores. My husband leaves home early in the morning at seven. He comes back at six. I have to do everything at home. That is difficult. That is why I want to go back.[119]

Women frequently decide that they will sacrifice themselves for their children's future, saying that educational opportunities are much better here, and that this is the most important issue. Some families choose their neighborhoods based on school districts. For these women, the contexts are certainly different from those in Turkey, but their gender identities are only minimally altered.

Other women choose to go to school to improve themselves and find jobs, which I noticed was easier in the United States because of the diverse educational options available. They do this to overcome the disadvantage of being, in most cases, less well-educated than their husbands—common in Turkish culture. I found dependents who went on to a PhD in the United States and others who finished high school education or a college BA. These are things they would not likely do in Turkey. This can lead to dramatic changes in familial roles, particularly if these women use their new educational status to gain employment outside the home.

When Turkish women combine professional or business lives outside the home with their marriages, more changes on the part of the husband are usually demanded than

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[119] Türkiye'de olsam daha konforlu. Nebileyim ev işine yardımcı kadın geliyordu. Apartmanda oturuyorsunuz. Kapıcı alış verişinizi yapıyor. Bir takım kadınlara daha kolaylıklar var Türkiye'de. Anneniz yakın çocuklara bakıyor. Benim için çok zor oldu ilk sene. Hala öyle ama alışıyor insan. Alış veriş, yemek, evin temizliği, çocukları oraya buraya taşıma hepsi bana bakıyor. Eşim sabah erken yedide çıkıyor. Akşam altıda geliyor. Bütün olup biten benim üzerimde. O tabi zor. Ondan birazda hani yeter artık diyorum.

would be the case in Turkey. One of my respondents, divorced, had this to say about Turkish gender relations:

> For example, I had a few boyfriends in Turkey after I was divorced. I was repelled by them. I am repelled by all the men in Turkey. After years of living here [in the United States], one's mentality changes. I have my own rights. I can run my own business. I can go on business trips. I can make my own investments. Do you know what I am saying? Or if he comes home before me, he could prepare the supper. I am looking at the family dynamics of people in Turkey, and I don't know. . . . There is a difference. Actually, I am not an extreme supporter of female rights and equality between men and women. If I work like the way I am working now, I am afraid that I would have problems with men in Turkey.[120]

More independent women, whether Turkish or North American, often expect this quality to be reflected in their marriages. Some men resist such a transition. One of my male informants, divorced from his North American wife, explained his feelings as follows:

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[120] Mesela ben Türkiye'ye gidince tanıştığım bir kaç erkek arkadaşım oldu boşandıktan sonra. Onlarıda yadırgıyorum ben. Türkiye'deki Türk erkeklerini yadırgıyorum mesela. Yani ne kadar olsa burada kaldıktan sonra kafa yapın birazcık değişiyor. Daha yani benimde haklarım var. Bende kendi businessimi run edebilirim. Bende business triplerine gidebilirim. Bende paramı istediğim gibi invest edebilirim. Do you know what I am saying? Yada eve benden önce geldiğinde sende yemeği hazırlayabilirsin. . . . Türkiye'deki insanların aile yapısına bakıyorum ve I don't know. . . . Arada fark oluyor. O kadarda çok değilim hani illa ben kadınım ve senlen eşitim kargaşasındada değilim yani. Ama yani bende böyle calışıyorsam Türkiye'deki erkeklerlen biraz problem olur gibime geliyor.

> It is about the socialization [of North American women] and their different notion of family. In our culture the man is known to be the head of the family. Decisions are always open for intra-family discussion, but when there is a disagreement, men have the right to the last word in our society. . . . They [North American women] are not feminine. They are not feminine in their behavior or in their dressing. For example, an Asian women can be quite feminine. A Korean, Chinese, French, or Russian woman can be feminine. However, these [North American] women in no way have any femininity. . . . Many of them are unskilled. As I say, they know neither how to cook nor how to mend a button.[121]

It is hard to believe that this informant had as miserable a marriage life as he depicts in retrospect; nonetheless, it is clear that he did not find with his partner the kind of married life that he envisaged in the more traditional Turkey of the 1960s. For the last twelve years he has been living with a Brazilian woman, and he says that he is happier with her.

Overall, Turkish men are changing and becoming more and more egalitarian in their families in the diaspora. However, it will take some time for them to see women as

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[121] Tamamen dediğim gibi yetişme şartları ve aile mefhumu çok değişik. Bizde daima aile reisi erkek olarak bilinir. Gerektiği zaman tabiki eşler arasında anlaşarak karar vermeye çalışırlar ama fikir ayrılığı olduğu taktirde genellikle son soz erkeğe aittir bizim toplumumuzda. . . . Feminine değiller. Davranışları giyimleri kuşamları feminine değiller. Mesela bir Asyalı kadın çok feminine olabiliyor. Bir Koreli, bir Çinli, bir Fransız veya bir Rus çok feminine olabiliyor. Ama bunlarda katiyyen femininity yok ne davranışlarında ne konuşmalarında. . . . Ee çoğu vasıfsız. Dediğim gibi bir yemek yapmaktan tutun bir düğme dikmesini bilmiyorlar.

equals in terms of decision making. The idea that men are the heads of households is still powerful in the minds of Turkish men in the diaspora, though these sentiments are no longer supported even by Turkish family law, much less by the laws and mores of their new countries.

Many women in the diaspora are more assertive about their workloads at home. Even though Turkish men are reluctant to help their wives with household chores, they actually do more than men in Turkey. Second-generation men are more in favor of women's rights in general, and they accept sharing some of the housecleaning and child care activities. While interviewing a second-generation Turk, his Turkish-born wife interrupted to ask him to change the baby's diapers—which he went and did with no apology. Such open assistance is inconceivable in Turkey.

In Germany, the relationships of men and women in the family reflect the particular circumstances of immigration and economic opportunities. Gender roles are more similar to those in Turkey unless pushed into other patterns by circumstances, as this report by Davis and Heyl (1986:193) shows:

> Except in West Berlin, probably no more than half the Turkish wives in West Germany now work outside the home, but apparently more would like to. Many husbands have asserted their authority and kept their wives home . . . One returnee, interviewed in Turkey in 1983, has had his family with him during his entire seventeen years in Germany. He explained that he did not allow his wife to work outside the home because 'we wanted to preserve our old customs.'

Economic circumstances have played a large role, not causing assimilation into German ways, but modifying gender relations among the largely segregated working-class Turkish Germans (Davis and Heyl 1986).[122] In both Germany and North America, Turkish families are reproducing and raising their children to be members of the diaspora. These intergenerational relationships create additional tensions.

Inter-Generational Relationships

The two generations considered here are Turkish parents and their children living at home in North America. I deliberately selected this group because it reveals a powerful story of hybridization. Second-generation sons and daughters experience immigration without emigrating. They face all the challenges of the society into which they are born, while simultaneously being pulled into their parents' native culture. This makes childhood both a migrational and inter-generational experience, and contributes to the construction of a gendered, second-generation identity which is neither completely North American nor Turkish.

Parents themselves establish a perspective on the assimilation process that reflects their own hybrid identity in the host society. Parents who are least assimilated into the host society often try to maintain Turkish values as best they can, and have serious problems trying to pass those values onto their offspring who are in school with peers of completely different backgrounds. In Richmond, Vancouver, many working-class

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[122] It was not possible within the limits of the present study, to investigate gender relations in other ethnic immigrant groups in North America.

families make a great effort to provide their children with socialization into Turkish language, manners, and customs. One young woman from this area was sent to Turkey after primary school to obtain her high school education there. She was told to learn Turkish culture and to improve her Turkish, and was sent to a high school that teaches in English in a small central Anatolian town, Eskişehir (pop. three hundred thousand at the time). The informant said it was a disastrous experience:

> After all, the school I was in was the school of rich people. They never accepted anybody from lower classes. . . Everybody looks at you saying "ugh, this girl or kid is so different," namely her clothing. We were dressing normally such as in denim pants and sneakers, but others were wearing designer jeans and all-leather shoes. Again different. In other words, looking different. . . . Even though you were born here [Canada] and raised here, you are not considered a hundred percent Canadian in the eyes of the [Canadian] public. When you go to Turkey you are not acknowledged as a Turk. Even though you have a Turkish national identification, you are not Turkish, since you were born abroad. You are not close to being Turk. You do not know where you can go or where you can belong.[123]

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[123] Ondan sonra bulunduğum okul zenginlerin okulu idi. Hiç bir zaman alt tabakadan gelen birini kabul etmediler. . . Ondan sonra oğretmenleri cok değişikti. . . Ondan sonra yurt dışından geliyorsun. Her kes bakıyor aa bu kız ne biçim kız yada bu çocuk ne biçim çocuk hani giyimleri şeyleri falan. Normal giyiniyoruz kot pantolonumuzu keslerimizi falan ee onlarda kot pantolon kösele ayakkabı yani gömlek falan. Gene değişik. Yani değişik kaçıyoruz. Şimdi burada öyle bir şey varki ne kadar burada doğup büyümüş olsan bile. . . genede yüzde yüz şey sayılmıyorsun, Kanada'lı

I learned during interviews with middle-class as well as working-class parents that they were all concerned about peer group relations between the genders as they became teenagers. One father who owns a boutique and sells prom dresses told me that he cannot accept the idea of his own thirteen-year-old daughter someday wearing one of those dresses. A middle-class mother in Seattle said that she wanted to go back to Turkey before her daughter becomes a teenager, because she does not want her daughter to go to a prom and lose her virginity.[124]

Among most Turkish families, sleep-overs are a definite no-no, irrespective of class, unless parents know the other parents personally. This affects children's relations with other children at school, and often makes them even more rebellious. Despite these problems, many Turkish mothers insisted that if they had been successful in raising their daughters, it was because they did not leave their children with local baby sitters, and because they did not let them sleep outside of their own homes or go to summer camps. One mother in Vancouver said:

> Do you know what they are doing here after children start schooling? There is camping. They send kids every year. How would you know what kind of people are over there, for instance? We did not trust. We did not

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sayılmıyorsun milletin gözünde. Türkiye'ye gittiğin zaman Türk olarakta kabul.edilmiyorsun. Ne kadar Türk nufus cüzdanın olursa olsun, sen.yurt dışında doğdun sen Türk değilsin. Türklüklen alakan yok. Nereye sığacagını nereye kaynaşacağını bilemiyorsun..

[124] See also Chaichian (1997) for the discussion of virginity among Iranian immigrants in the United States.

send our children. We took our children to Northern Cyprus. Once in every few years we bought seven tickets to go to Cyprus.[125]

When told from the standpoint of the teenage youth themselves, it often looks a bit different. This young girl says she had a "fight" with her mother about having a boyfriend, but that it was resolved:

> . . . She is not saying anything, because she knows that I will eventually have a boyfriend. Because of this reason, she was not furious about it, but she did not say anything approving of it either. Nowadays girls at my age in Turkey have boyfriends or girlfriends. She does not say much because my cousins are doing the same. If the ones in Turkey are doing it, then the ones here can do it too.[126]

While raising a female child in the diaspora, what is acceptable in Turkey for girls is frequently the main criterion that determines permissible activities. Some girls are luckier than others, because their parents are aware of current norms in Turkey; other parents use their own childhood as a reference.

Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban (1999:123-4) found similar kinds of parental restrictions on young Arab females in Canada, and pointed out that even young male

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[125] Şimdi burada ne yapıyorlar okula başlarken çocuk. Camping vardır. Her sene bırakıyorlar. Oradaki insanların kim olduğunu ne bileceksin mesela? Biz trust yapmadık. Bırakmadık çocukları. Bizim çocukları biz hersene topladık Kıbrıs'a. Her bir kaç senede bir yedi bilet alarak Kıbrıs'a gittik.

[126] . . . işte demiyor çünkü biliyor yani yinede erkek arkadaşım olur. Ondan bir sey demedi ama fazla bir sey söylemedi, çünkü şimdi Türkiye'deki kızlarında falan benim yaşımdaki onlarında erkek arkadaşı kız arkadaşı falan var. Ondan bir sey demiyor yani kuzenlerimde yapıyor diye. Eger Türkiye'dekiler yapıyorsa buradakilerde yapabilir.

adults are not immune from parental control. Bacon (1996: 201-222) finds that the issue of how much freedom should be given to children of Indian immigrants (both boys and girls) in the Asian Indian context of Chicago is an important topic within the community, since families are concerned about how to prevent their children from being "spoiled" in their American environment. For children, keeping their parents happy while establishing a lifestyle suitable to their own social surroundings is a continuous balancing act.

Even though Turkish parents are typically less worried about their sons dating American or Canadian girls, this balancing act is also performed by Turkish boys. It is hard, for example, for boys to have their own separate living quarters if they are not married. Sons as well as daughters are expected to live with their parents if they study or work in the same city. One mother in Seattle says that her college-graduate working son mentions from time to time that he wants to leave her house. She knows he is facing peer pressure to have his own place:

> Yes, words are coming to us. His friends are asking if he still lives with his mother even though he is grown-up man. . . Yes, it looks strange here. As if he cannot take care of himself.[127]

So far, she is successful in keeping him at home. One way to keep Turkish adult sons with their parents is to continue subsidizing them financially and spoil them by doing their daily chores, such as cleaning, laundry, and cooking. Mothers usually volunteer to do these chores for their sons.

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[127] Tabi geliyor bize laflar. Arkadaşları koca adamsın hala annenlen mi . . .Tabi burada garip karşılanıyor. Acaba bir eksikliği mi var gibi.

Büyüğe saygı (showing respect to elders) is another important issue for Turkish children whether they are boys or girls. Families become even more concerned about *büyüğe saygı* in the diaspora environment where the culture is known to be casual in terms of inter-generational relationships. Parents use *büyüğe saygı* as a traditional tool to maintain authority and influence over their children. In addition, parents think teaching their children *büyüğe saygı* is the only way to sustain inter-generational communication between their children and their own elderly parents in Turkey. Parents' success at raising children in the diaspora is usually measured by grandparents according to the extent to which young children are properly respectful in the Turkish way. A grandmother from Turkey wrote the Canadian magazine *Dergi Merhaba,* (Ottawa, September 1999) complaining about the manners of Turkish children:

> We are Turkish and Muslim. We want children to cherish Turkish cultural manners. Children address men who are as old as their fathers and women as old as their mothers by their names. This is inconceivable. At least they should use the proper seniority titles such as *amca*, *teyze*, *abi*, to address Turks.[128]

One informant went further, describing the concept of *büyüğe saygı* as not only addressing an elder with the proper seniority title, but kissing the elder's hand to show

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[128] Türküz ve Müslümanız. Türk terbiyesini korumalarını istiyoruz. Çocuklar babalarının yaşındaki büyük amcalarına, annelerinin yaşındaki teyzelerine isimlerini söylüyorlar. Bu akıl almaz abes bir şey. Bari Türk olanlara amca, teyze, abi, yaşına göre hitap etsinler.

respect, not speaking without being spoken to, not crossing your legs, never lying down in the presence of an elder, etc.

Turkish children in the diaspora are expected to be compliant in front of their elders. This creates a generational tension among grandparents, parents, and children who are exposed to local cultural values that respect individuality and self-expression. As Ajrouch (1999: 130) paraphrases from Elkholy (1981:154-5), ". . . the parents are products of . . . the Middle East, where the past is revered, there is emphasis on stability and conformity, and the elderly are held in high esteem because of their life experiences. Their children are growing up in the technological, industrial culture of America. For them the focus is on the future, not the past. Youth have higher status than the elderly, and emphasis is placed on personal achievements, rather than accumulated life experiences. Growing up in America, the children are faced with both worlds and both cultures."

Conclusion: New Hybrid Identities in Canada and the United States

This chapter illustrates how immigrants retain important elements of their native-country Turkish identity while absorbing cultural practices from the new country. To retain some aspects of Turkish culture, but at the same time to become American or Canadian, is a balancing act and a learning process for both immigrants and offspring.

Among the factors that facilitate structural assimilation and cultural integration are the immigration rules themselves that screen in favor of Turks who are already disposed to accept the North American culture. This predisposition is a product of the

cultural linkages that already exists between North America and Turkey, and it minimizes major (negative) surprises. Immigrants to Canada, it seems, are more often initially disappointed by their employment options, having assumed access to economic opportunities similar to those in the United States.

Another important factor in these assimilation trends is that immigrants come expecting to settle permanently, though sometimes there are waiting periods in the United States as immigrants pass through student or work visa stages. This intention/expectation is completely different from that of workers in the German diaspora. Starting out with an intention to settle permanently in Canada or the United States causes immigrants to search for ways to integrate into jobs and communities.

While there are some working-class immigrants in both Canada and the United States, the majority come from well-educated middle-class backgrounds and have educational and language skills that help them find comfortable niches fairly quickly. Nevertheless, being working class is not always a problem, though incomes and the tools for upward mobility are fewer. The situation for working-class immigrants is closer to that of the German immigrants, but with the important difference that Canadian and American societies do not appear to isolate the Turkish population to the same extent.

Learning how Turks faced their first and then subsequent encounters with the manners and customs of the host countries was a fascinating part of the interview process. Notions of privacy and individual space were particularly puzzling for Turks. Nonetheless, they told me how, over time, they understood and even adopted some of the behaviors themselves. Their stories illustrated many of the points seen in the literature

about the meanings of language and everyday behavior—for example, the redefinition of gender roles and the changes evident between generations.

From a theoretical standpoint, Turks in the diasporas have partially assimilated and may be best described as hybrid. The cultural aspects of assimilation examined in this chapter show that Turks are becoming more and more assimilated. The inter-generational differences with regard to language competence and the use of English (or French) at home show increases in assimilation. Intercultural marriage is now an established option, taken by more Turks in the second than the first generation. More liberal gender role relations and intergenerational relations exist in second-generation homes. These trends all indicate the prospect of greater assimilation over time—with no apparent reversals. Secular civic Turkish organizations, however, bring Turks together as a diasporic community and strengthen their ties internally and with Turkey. The retention of these ties to a strong Turkish identity demonstrates that most Turks live intentionally as cultural hybrids.

Chapter Seven

CONCLUSION

Assimilation with a Difference

This work has examined the cultural and socioeconomic experience and assimilation of Turks and their descendants in three countries: Canada, the United States, and Germany. In each of these countries, Turks form a diaspora population.

In its classical usage, diaspora was a normative model for Jewish history and experience. Lately, however, it has been widely used as an analytical category in the vast migration literature on the global dispersion of migrant populations, as discussed in chapter 2. Diasporas are ethnocultural formations that constitute foreignness within other nations and ethnicities. Describing Turkish immigrant communities as diasporas attributes to them the capacity for reproduction through generations, maintaining themselves as minority groups. This capacity to maintain a distinctive cultural identity within the larger environment of the host society depends upon the cultural and structural conditions imposed by the dominant hegemonic group, as well as the community's own internal affiliations and resources. I have used a diasporic conception of Turks to explore how their culture changes as they interact with the cultures of their host societies.

From this research, it is clear that neither cultural pluralism nor classic assimilation theories fully explain the behaviors of these Turkish diasporas. Contrary to the ideas of cultural pluralism, which argues the structural and cultural persistence of an ethnic group, there are dramatic and significant changes evident between generations. Culture is not a static article that can be transferred in its entity. At the same time, however, assimilation theory does not explain the continued presence of ethnic organizations and their increasing membership—particularly by those who have not experienced heavy measures of economic or social integration. It appears that while many Turks could assimilate further in North American culture and society, they choose not to do so. Turks' adaptation to their host countries, and their construction of identities, turns out to be more complex and fluid than what is assumed from the perspective of structural assimilation alone.

As early as the 1930s, Stonequist (1937) demonstrated the usefulness of hybridity in dealing with this complexity. I combined his initial concept with Bhabha's (1993, 1994) definition of hybridity to describe identity construction in new environments. This study incorporates hybridity as a useful addition to assimilation theory, one that encompasses many aspects of change in the lives and self-identity of Turks.

Based on this research, I identify assimilation as a process. Turks do, indeed, assimilate to the host cultures in many ways, especially those that involve education, jobs, and incomes. Nevertheless, I also found that Turks retained their Turkish identities; a particularly apt representation of this are the Turkish organizations that create alternative venues inside the diaspora to negotiate economic and cultural needs. Assimilation

happens over time; it is partial and processual in many respects. The concept of hybridity defines the space within which Turks combine elements of both their former and host countries.

Turks may, judging from current trends, fully assimilate in time and cease to be a distinct diasporic minority. But we do not know how much time and how many generations must pass for this to occur. After forty years of existence in Germany and twenty-five years in North America, the diasporas are strong and functionally valuable for Turks. Indeed, it is possible that the increased ability to communicate and travel internationally may contribute to a more permanent fluid identity for many immigrants who can more easily retain ties to their original societies while also contributing to the culture of the host country. Discrimination is another factor that may contribute to the maintenance of the diaspora: Turks, like most of the non-European minorities admitted as immigrants since the 1960s, presently face varying degrees of stereotyping and exclusion even in North America.[129]

What, then, are the problems of immigration—and what are the mechanisms for dealing with these problems from the standpoints of the state, the society, and the diasporas? At the micro-level of the diaspora, we need to understand what people do, and the reasons for their feelings of success or failure. For many, success depends on the game and politics of representation.

Immigrant integration has many levels. Because people have multiple ways of interacting with both their origin and host cultures, they can choose when to represent

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[129] See the section on ethnic discrimination by employers in chapter 5.

themselves as foreigners, or locals, or diasporic minorities.[130] We should also not forget that accepting host-country ways does not always mean permanent assimilation. Immigrants and their offspring, especially those with distinctive phenotypes, always run the risk of being singled out in response to world events. This sudden "othering" can be seen in reactions to Middle Eastern immigrants in the U.S. after 9/11, as well as in the internment camps run by the U.S. and Canada for Japanese Americans during World War II. The complexities of adaptation and assimilation reveal themselves through qualitative cultural research, particularly when the results of such analysis are compared with structural and statistical information.

In all three diaspora communities I examined, qualitative data were used to probe particular problems and human reactions within those communities. For example, in the German diaspora, qualitative data gathered from movies, poems, and music, along with second-hand individual accounts, illuminated serious issues of alienation, marginalization, and anger against the state. The situation was entirely different in Canada and the United States, where original ethnographic data revealed significantly lower levels of alienation, marginalization, and criticism of the state's policies. On the other hand, the evaluation of income—also a critical factor in the equation for immigrant success—depended on quantitative information. Without a quantitative baseline,

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[130] A fine example is that of Donald, which is his name in the professional world of aerospace engineering in Seattle. He also has a Turkish name, and that is what he is known by in the Turkish community where he is an important leader in the Turkish American Cultural Association. He even represents himself as American when his status is officially that of a temporary visitor from another country where he holds both Canadian and Turkish citizenship.

qualitative comparisons of material welfare and expectations would be impossible to interpret. Bringing qualitative and quantitative perspectives together enables social research to more accurately reflect "the multiple perspectives on social reality."[131]

This dissertation research relied on a careful examination of the structural and cultural factors affecting Turks in their respective diasporas. For Canada and the United States, I obtained extensive life-history interviews, to which I added original statistical work based primarily on census data. The result is a unique contribution to the nearly non-existent literature about Turks in North America. In order to compare this migration with the earlier Turkish German diaspora, I relied on secondary sources in English, which are abundant, as well as Turkish-language sources created by the Turkish German population. The steps to accomplish this within a multiple-method framework are fully outlined in the appendix.

Turkish Migration Flows to Germany and North America

The starting point of this investigation was to identify the flows of Turkish migration to Germany and North America, and to establish a framework within which to interpret them. The structural and cultural conditions that initiated the two distinct migration streams and continued thereafter are best understood within the global framework theory of international labor and capital movements (Sassen 1988; Massey

[131] Quoted from Peter Leigh Taylor (1999:26); also see Robert G. Burgess (1984:144).

1999:47). Grounding this macro-level explanation in the many particularities of Turkish migration is very important, for it allows us, in some ways, to test the utility of the theory.

The migration flow to West Germany from the early 1960s to the present is consistent with Sassen's (1988) point about necessary conditions. As discussed in chapter 3, Turkey had both "poverty, unemployment, or underemployment . . . [and] objective ideological linkages" with Germany (Sassen 1988:9). The Turkish state had a long history of cooperation with Germany in military and economic projects before the Second World War. When West Germany sought unskilled and semi-skilled labor in the southern Mediterranean region to support its rapidly growing industry, state to state contract labor agreements were quickly organized. Turkish workers from the urban poor and the countryside, facing poor economic prospects in Turkey, accepted contract jobs in West Germany—and some of the other European countries—with alacrity and in great numbers.

The migrant flow to the United States is also explained by Sassen's (1988:1-25) theoretical structure.There was a buildup in Turkey of business, educational institutions, and a professional middle class that was "objectively and ideologically linked" to the U.S., and by association to Canada as well. A crucial structural factor was the transition of Turkish institutions of higher education into Western-oriented and well-financed universities where Turkish youth could become suitable recruits for U.S. and Canadian industry. They were also eligible for Turkey's own growing modern business sectors—indeed, a number of the universities were founded by leading industrial figures who wanted more home-grown, world-class MBAs, computer scientists, engineers, and

other professionals. But recent political and economic factors in Turkey, as discussed in chapter 3, have combined with aggressive recruiting by U.S. companies and the young graduates' own ambitions to encourage widespread migration.

Linkages with the U.S. and Canada have also become cultural at an individual level, because the environment in Istanbul and other strongly Westernized centers has itself been Americanized. As the theorists of cultural globalization suggest (Bauman 1998; Woodiweiss 1996; Featherston 1990, 1995), the uneven and chaotic nature of globalization drew in the highly educated urban middle-class, while leaving behind the majority of Turks living in small towns or lower class neighborhoods of cities. For these urban middle class people, emigration to North America became attractive as they learned about the symbolic ingredients of "imagined lives" and modes of material self-empowerment outside of Turkey through the global entertainment, business, and educational channels (Smith 1994:16).[132]

Once communities were established in North America and West Germany, legal economic immigration was not necessary to sustain and grow the diasporas, because family members could gain entry. Family migration alone caused a rapid increase in the Turkish German diaspora in the late 1970s and 1980s, making it one of the major international diasporas (Safran 1991). According to Penninx (1982:789), the increase was due to migration of family members, natural reproduction (births), and a decrease of return migration to Turkey. In North America, economic immigration continues, and is augmented by natural reproduction and family reunion. Once individuals are qualified to

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[132] See chapter 3 for more details; also Appadurai (1990:296)

use the economic safety nets of unemployment and other services in Canada and the United States, there is very little incentive for most immigrants to return to Turkey, even in times of economic adversity.

Diasporas of Difference: Structural Comparisons

Who constitutes the diasporas in the three countries is determined right from the start by the rules for legal immigration, and these differ significantly. In the 1960s, Germany admitted only single Turkish workers, strictly for contract periods. Later, in 1973, after stopping all further economic immigration from Turkey, immigration rules nonetheless admitted spouses, children, older family members, and even sponsored close relatives if economic support or pre-arranged employment could be demonstrated. Subsequent generations, born in Germany, added to the diaspora without needing to negotiate the immigration rules.

In Canada and the United States, settlement, rather than temporary stays, was the primary basis for immigration. Unlike Germany, where the state clung to the principle of blood descent as a basis for permanent residence and nationality, the New World built its legal categories around the principle of settlement. To be sure, in the U.S. many Turks have entered on temporary visas for education or work, but the procedures nearly always permit those with persistence and jobs to adjust to their status to permanent residence, and many are becoming citizens. Canada has admitted Turks most often on a landed immigrant (permanent) basis by evaluating individuals' ability to succeed according to its

"point system." The U.S. is more cautious, usually passing economic immigrants through a stage of temporary residence with pre-arranged employment or university admission.

Although neither the U.S. nor Canada specifically restricts admission to middle-class professional applicants, there is a strong bias toward such immigrants because they satisfy higher educational and economic criteria. More working-class immigrants were directly admitted to Canada than the U.S. in the early years of Turkish migration, a fact directly related to the labor force requirements of that time. Data from the 1990s concerning educational backgrounds confirm that North-American Turks come mainly from privileged urban middle-class backgrounds. Thus, the segment of the Turkish population that immigrated to North America is quite different from the laborers who went to Germany in the 1960s, most of whom had no more than a primary school education.

Following immigration, integration into the host country's economy was the most important structural issue. How well Turks succeeded was evaluated by looking at income, education, and occupational insertion, which are three structural dimensions of the process. Generally speaking, the inhabitants of all three diasporas fulfilled their expectations of higher incomes and are better off than they would be in Turkey. Success may also be attributed to a certain self-selection by immigrants themselves, since those who were patently unsuccessful most likely returned to Turkey.

Each diaspora has a particular relative relationship to the host country population in terms of income, which is assessed in the composite table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Comparison of Turkish Incomes in the Diasporas to Incomes in the Host Country Populations

Country and Date	Indicator *	Turks' Incomes
United States 1989	Median family incomes	34% higher
Canada 1995	Median personal incomes	20% lower
Germany 1989	Median household incomes	10% lower than Germans

* Note: Data with identical definitions were not available for all three countries, so the best available indicator was selected country by country. The comparison for Germany is made to "Germans" only, not to the entire population as in the other two countries. Sources and definitions for this composite table are shown in chapters 4 and 5.

Income among Turks in the United States is significantly higher than in the total population—34% higher, and in Germany and Canada, Turkish incomes are lower. Table 7.1 shows the specific indicators for evaluating relative positions. Turks in Germany are, in fact, worse off than the 10% lower indicated by the comparisons in the table, because household size among Turks was an average of 4.3 persons, while among Germans it was 2.5 persons. Thus, the poor showing for Turkish Canadians—20% lower—is probably no worse than for Turkish Germans. Differences in the type of data available country by country pose a problem for direct comparisons; nevertheless, they clearly indicate much greater success for Turks in the U.S. than in either Germany or Canada so far as income levels are concerned.

The explanation for the differences between the three diasporas lies in structural factors that themselves differ among the three countries. For Germany, the state's role in selecting only unskilled and semi-skilled workers for contract labor established a diaspora associated with lower-than-average income-producing capacity. As time passed, Turkish

families failed to gain access to educational opportunities for offspring that might have contributed to upward mobility in the second and third generations (Faist 1993, 1994). Isolated from German society, Turkish adjustment and integration to the dynamic changes in Germany was limited. When the structure of industrial employment shifted—reducing the role of the automobile, metal working, and mining industries—Turks' limited experience and low educational training did not equip them to re-locate within the job market.

Turkish Canadians have, overall, arrived with more flexible skills and better prospects. The earliest worker immigrants were not much different than those who went to Germany, but many primarily middle-class professionals followed. Current immigrants and their offspring have higher educational attainments than the host population. Despite this apparent advantage, numerous barriers to finding employment commensurate with their formal qualifications indicate a protectionist environment in Canada. Employers often require previous Canadian work experience, and there is typically no recognition of credentials obtained in Turkey. Many jobs require a license obtainable only through lengthy Canadian certification procedures (McDade 1988; Richmond 1992:1208-1209; Aycan and Berry 1996:241). Those immigrants who come to Canada aware of these problems usually try to enter Canadian universities as a first step, but professional departments are few, and the higher education system is not particularly oriented toward foreign students. Despite these difficulties, I did not find Turks individually thinking of

re-emigrating to Turkey—though there were a few cases of individuals re-emigrating to the United States on NAFTA[133] work visas.

The high income performance of Turks in the U.S. is explained by structural reasons such as a preference for emigration to the U.S. among many Turkish professionals, educational levels, pre-emigration employment, and the generally strong U.S. economy in the years covered by this study. The U.S. immigrant selection process does a reasonably good job of matching economic immigrants to jobs, especially in the engineering, aerospace, and information science sectors, primarily via H-1 work visas.[134] Because U.S. academic credentials are widely accepted, Turks also often enter the U.S. for higher education. Thereafter, many are able to find ways of converting their academic stay to permanent residence if that is their choice. As discussed in chapter 5, Turks are occupationally distributed primarily along the growth edges of industrial sectors and occupations where their skills were in high demand.

Of course, there are also Turks who fall to the bottom of the distribution of income, as discussed in chapter 5. In the U.S., about 6% of Turks are below the poverty line—for the U.S. as a whole, it is 12.8%. Lower percentages of Turks are in poverty than other ethnic and race groups: Asians 11.6%, Hispanic 22.3%, Black 23.9%, American Indian 27.0%, and White 7.0% (Harrison and Bennett 1995:195). In Canada, the measurement of poverty is more ambiguous, because the statistics do not define it clearly;

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[133] North American Free Trade Association.

[134] Sassen (1997) explains how the new international division of labor increased the demand for high-end services that are produced primarily for transnational firms in proximity to Western metropolitan centers.

however, the percent of Turks at the bottom level of incomes is significantly higher than for Canadians generally.[135] Lower-income families are a mixture of those just arrived, the temporarily unemployed, and the genuinely long-term unsuccessful. In Germany, low-income is a particularly serious problem among Turks. Kürsat-Ahlers (1996:122) estimates that the poverty rate for Turks rose from 30% in 1984 to 38% in 1989, while for Germans—excluding minorities—it declined from 13% to 11%.

Much of the research literature on Germany is related to the issue of "inclusion-exclusion." The problem arose initially because of the intended temporary nature of Turkish immigration; there was no need for linguistic or social inclusion. As that reality disappeared, and as the number of Turks in Germany increased, social inclusion became a major issue. The study of the Turkish German diaspora shows that both sides culturally excluded one another such that what began as voluntary discrimination created a mutually reinforcing circle. As immigrants remained longer and became families, discrimination perpetuated disadvantage in terms of low economic and social status, while making social advancement harder.

Discrimination equivalent to that in Germany did not occur either in Canada or the United States. Nevertheless, in chapter 5, I have considered whether economic or job discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race could be a factor slowing the process of Turks' economic assimilation—and eventually cultural assimilation—in Canada or the United States.

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[135] Ethnic group data for income distributions in Canada were unavailable. As explained in the appendix, I purchased ethnic group data from Statistics Canada only for Turks; the expense of including all the other ethnic groups was prohibitive.

Turks as an immigrant ethnic minority often face initial disappointment in the job levels that they can achieve. This is particularly true in Canada; less so in the United States, where high selectivity and strong economic conditions—during the period of this study—made for fairly rapid and successful economic assimilation. The explanation for disappointing results in Canada appears to be the less favorable Canadian structural and cultural conditions. When Turks seek recognition of their credentials and professional experience, Canada responds with numerous time-consuming professional and educational barriers. Furthermore, there are many fewer educational training opportunities in Canada to overcome such deficiencies. Lastly, Turks are officially assigned to the West Asia/Arab "visible minority," though they are considered to be White in the United States—an image problem. Taken together, these problems suggest structural conditions of job protectionism and ethnic discrimination in Canada. Nonetheless, most Turkish Canadians do eventually overcome these difficulties and remain in Canada. How they eventually settle themselves depends on the assimilation process, which requires the construction of new fluid hybridities and identities.

Cultural Assimilation with Transient Hybrid Turkish Identities

Cultural assimilation depends upon structural assimilation, since one supports the other. In chapter 2, I enumerated the personal characteristics of the ethnic immigrant minority that should be studied to understand assimilation patterns. In chapters 5 and 6, I studied conformity/integration with the host society by looking at factors such as income, education, profession, language, and marriage. I also compared the same characteristics in consecutive generations, and examined comparative host country data to assess the intensity of assimilation. All my results indicate that Turks have "high" structural assimilation to their North American host societies.

Cultural assimilation of Turks is also happening, but not quickly, with variations by country. In chapter 6, I related the example of privacy to illuminate how Turks adopt North American cultural ways. Informants commonly discussed their problems of learning how to place privacy boundaries around subjects they previously considered to be open, such as personal finances. Turks change their internal boundaries, becoming more like Americans or Canadians, and then begin to deal with other Turks in the same way. On visits home to Turkey they feel foreign as they nonetheless practice the new rules of privacy. I also observed cultural assimilation through the ways in which gender and generational relations have changed in the family lives of some Turkish immigrants.

My conclusion is that assimilation is continuing in North America, but is by no means complete, and that Turkish identities are therefore best described as hybrid at present. Against the structural factors that favor immigration lie the other factors that stall the assimilation process. First, Turks may encounter resistence or exclusion in the host

society, as discussed in the previous section. Second, there are the cultural factors that Turks bring with them, including a strong sense of national and cultural heritage. Finally, there are the organizations for religious, social, and political purposes that they form—which may be important ethnic alternatives to the civic structures of the host societies.

The resilience of Turkish the cultural heritage was discussed in chapter 3. The Turkish state's Western-style nation-building project in the1920s and 1930s, and its continuation thereafter, has created a strong sense of national identity among Turks, especially among the urban middle-class. As a result,Turks are typically unable to accept the premise— often found in Germany, but also in some circumstances in North America—that they are not White and similar to Europeans, but are from Arab or Asian backgrounds, particularly when this classification is used to imply inferiority. This cultural pride leads them to affirm aspects of their Turkishness in their new identities.

We also see Turks establishing and using formal cultural organizations, as discussed in chapter 6. These organizations help them to ensure that Turkish culture is publicly understood, and passed on to the next generation. They also improve cohesiveness among Turks by adding spaces for social interaction. Whenever Turks need to represent themselves to the host society, associations provide a convenient means to do so—and they act as "watchdogs" to make sure that public misunderstandings about Turkish culture are quickly addressed. In recent years, they have also contributed to economic solidarity and networking. These alternative avenues of civic life are particularly strong in Germany, but also important in Canada and the United States.

Because assimilation occurs under different structural and cultural conditions in all three diasporas, there is no single path from being Turkish in the native country to becoming German, Canadian, or American. Fluid, multi-dimensional hybridities are constructed, taking many forms along the way.

Looking ahead, tracking the experience of Turks through generations of descendants will be essential to a better understanding of how hybridities change over time, and to test in particular how, or whether, a Turkish identity is retained and represented. Based on this research, I expect most Turks to continue to strive for assimilation within the societies where they live, but also to continue the celebration of their ancestral origins and contemporary Turkish culture. The premise of the hybridity concept anticipates that fluidities and fusions will occur to produce an enduring identity that is distinctive and compatible with the social formations within which it exists. This is the foundation for diasporas such as the Turkish one.

Implications of the Research

My research was undertaken primarily with an academic audience in mind, but there are other potential audiences for this research. The Turks themselves who were the subjects of this research could potentially benefit from this study, as could policy makers and others concerned with state responses to immigration.

There is, for me, an ethical obligation to provide feedback to those who have contributed to the ethnographic part of the research. This study may help individuals to see how their experiences have been shared by other Turks. As such, this research makes

an unique contribution to the collective history of Turks in North America, and could potentially provide a broader, more analytical understanding of their evolving relationship with their host cultures.

Within the field of academic ethnic studies, the present research is an original contribution. There is no comparable study in quantitative and qualitative depth of the Turkish diaspora in North America, nor is there a study that contrasts this diaspora with the existing scholarship concerning Germany.

The present research establishes a framework that can be adapted to studies of other immigrant ethnic groups that have peopled North America since the immigration reforms of the 1960s.[136] This model combines a careful assessment of structures—state laws, immigrant selection, economic outcomes, and education—with a cultural exploration of the accounts of success and/or marginalization, and issues of adaptation in the host country as told by the diasporic members themselves. Such research reveals not only how national and local immigration policies produce selective immigration flows and subsequent adaptation problems, but also what policies work well and not so well from the perspective of those directly affected. If heeded, the results of such studies could help states to modify policy in ways that enhance satisfaction among immigrants and their neighbors, and avoid anger, alienation, and negative political/social relations at the wider

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[136] Certainly, as Charles Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind (1999:1-10) argue, long-time perspectives are needed to avoid biases that short-period observation may engender; however, that requires continuing observations—a prescription for future research.

community level. What is learned may therefore potentially benefit both states and immigrants.

This work shows how a comparative look at particular policy issues, such as matching immigrant labor with available jobs, can illuminate the different outcomes of different solutions. Another issue is how origin states should manage educational policy and set criteria for permitting emigration.[137] To the extent that education can be "organized" in the few elite universities in Turkey, or even in American and Canadian universities, the present research indicates that a stronger job-entry platform leads to more successful emigration—and this applies to spouses of breadwinners as well. Policies that permit immigration before full qualifications are attained would fit this pattern by encouraging both continued education and acculturation.

Receiving countries should have policies that encourage continuing education and reward it by adjusting visa status or removing any other obstacles that prevent satisfactory integration. The difficulties in Canada of gaining recognition of education credentials and of requirements for so-called Canadian experience are examples of obstacles that could be removed. The Canadian education system itself offers fewer options to foreigners for graduate and professional education. And of course, increasing educational opportunities for Turks in Germany remains a largely unrealized goal.

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[137] As Turkey learned, relaxing obstacles to a so-called brain drain benefitted the country by the return flows of resources and knowledge of highly qualified professional emigrants. High education became a kind of export industry with good returns. Further discussion is found in chapter 3.

These examples of policy implications show how rich the findings of comparative study can be for assessing policy alternatives and outcomes. The state with the right kind of knowledge and expertise can, perhaps, create better policies and thus serve its inhabitants well.

Another important research objective is to enable political leaders and their constituencies—by spin-off media, education, or other communications—to better understand the foreigners who live among them. This extends to all aspects of cultural identity and difference. This research shows that attitudes and customs do differ from host to immigrant populations, but that differences such as privacy and family values are rarely insurmountable, and are best overcome through a process of mutual understanding.

Understanding, dialogue, and removal of social barriers clearly fosters the creation of more flexible and friendly societies. While there are many uncertainties in the field of ethnic immigrant studies, one thing is certain: immigration is here to stay, and the challenges will continue.

Appendix

METHODOLOGY

My methods of research included ethnographic field research and analysis of census data sets. In addition, I used historical and contemporary documents. All of these methods, of course, have particular strengths and weaknesses; I drew on the strengths of each to look at issues more broadly than a single approach could do, and compared results to attain greater validity whenever possible. Burgess (1984:144) remarks that multiple strategies should be used "in order to overcome the [validity] problems that stem from studies relying upon a single theory, single method, single set of data and single investigator." By following this advice, I attempted to produce a more rounded, nuanced, and valid account of Turkish immigration to North America.

This appendix explains the two kinds of data sources—ethnographic field materials and census data—that I relied upon, and the steps I followed in creating my analysis.

Qualitative Methods: Ethnographic Data

The qualitative framework used in this dissertation attempts to capture the narratives of Turkish diaspora experiences and identities in North America. It focuses on

personal biographies of Turkish immigrants and their offspring. These biographies are later analyzed within the larger historical and structural context (Mills 1959).

Accordingly, unstructured in-depth interviews averaging approximately two hours each, conducted during 2000 and 2001, were used to study the personal lives of informants and capture their feelings, perspectives, and self-accounts (Marshall and Rossman 1999:108). I also collected written narratives created by Turks—such as academic or journalistic articles, collections of poems, and other materials published by the Turkish cultural organizations and lobby groups.

Whenever possible, I conducted the interviews in the informants' own settings, so that I could observe "class" conditions and life-styles while listening to self-representations. I recorded the interviews on tapes after seeking permission of the informants, and later transcribed these tapes for the final analysis. In some cases, I visited the same informant more than once. The first part of a visit was usually used to collect biographic data, the story of immigration to the United States or Canada, and other self-expressions of identity. Then in a second part, or if necessary another visit, questions were asked about more sensitive issues, such as the experience of being an immigrant or the offspring of one, the particular problems they feel that they face as Turks, and the ways in which the informants manage to circumvent certain difficulties they encounter.

Altogether I studied 80 cases, 40 informants each in the United States and Canada. In some cases, other family members were included to obtain a better understanding of intra-family relations and certain nuances of identity construction with respect to gender and generation. The interviews were conducted either in Turkish or in English depending

on the language preference of informants. Turkish was the principal language selected. Seventy-six cases used only Turkish during the interviews. Only one second-generation informant who was raised by an American single mother did the interview primarily in English. Three first-generation cases used Turkish and English interchangeably. They spoke Turkish when talking about past experiences related to Turkey, and switched to English when speaking about post-immigration experiences in the English-speaking host country.

The field research took place in the Seattle metropolitan area in the United States and the Vancouver metropolitan area, including Vancouver Island, in Canada. There is a broad texture of immigrant cultures in both areas. The choice of two countries was fortunate, since it offered comparative dimensions of the socioeconomic and political structures and cultures. Thus, a general point of the work was reinforced: diasporas are not homogeneous across the world, or even across spaces that are fairly proximate.

I used snowball sampling to choose informants, so that the selectivity of limited frames such as Turkish association lists would not bias the study. Snowball sampling is one way to reach a network of people if the real sampling frame is not known (Babbie 1998:195-196). Selection began with member lists of the Turkish associations. Early on, it became evident that many Turks were not members of their local Turkish-American (or Canadian) Association. By asking informants whether they knew other Turks, I located additional respondents. Eventually, a broad range of informants was found.

The interviews were supplemented by other sources such as documents available in the personal archives of informants, and academic and literary publications, such as

magazines, newspapers, and other written materials in Turkish and English circulating within the Turkish community. Such materials mirror the joys, sufferings, and struggles of immigrant communities. Among these resources are two newsletters and a magazine that circulated among Turks in western Canada, another magazine and newspaper circulating among Turks in the Seattle metropolitan area, and some essays and a book of poems written by resident Turks.

The process by which I went from interviews, field notes, and media materials to analysis involved six steps, and finally the integration of the qualitative analysis with the quantitative results, as discussed below. Robert Burgess (1984:177-178) formalized the process of reporting by stages, which I followed broadly.

First, I chose certain topics that I would include in each of my interviews. These topics included a socio-demographic profile, incorporating education, work, and personal/family life in Turkey; the circumstances surrounding emigration; observations about life as a Turk in North America; adjustment issues; and plans for the future. All topics were open-ended, since I hoped to learn unexpected things and to continue the interviews in additional sessions if they seemed productive. I adjusted the format as I learned how to handle rapport, conversational tactics, and different types of personalities.

Second, as the interviews accumulated, I formulated and adjusted categories and concepts that would be used later for analysis across interviews. I further refined my themes concerning the experiences that immigrants had after settling in their new country. I realized, for example, the importance of privacy and inter-generational relations for nearly all of my respondents.

Third, I read all of the interviews several times—first during transcription from tapes to text, and then again as I investigated different individual life-courses and topics. I correlated the results with media materials and my personal observations written following each interview.

Fourth, I tried several ways of organizing and presenting materials. I wrote some initial life histories emphasizing recurring issues. The results, however, were voluminous—and not particularly helpful in isolating and analyzing issues that applied to many individuals. Finally, I re-organized my data to produce the current cross-individual, theme-oriented analysis and presentation.

Fifth, the mechanical aspect of analysis involved how to search for and bring together materials on each issue. I used the computer to search interviews for keywords, and then copied segments by themes into temporary files. This was successful, even though most of the texts were in Turkish, because I transcribed only with Latin letters—no special Turkish characters.

Sixth, I made counts of individuals and families according to a few characteristics such as types of marriage, language of in-home conversation, education, occupations, and impressions of income/wealth. Some of the separate statistical analysis dealt with the same variables. I wanted to know whether what I found by one method was echoed, and possibly expanded, by another, or whether there were contradictions that needed to be assessed. Some qualitative findings, such as those about privacy, were counted across interviews to decide whether they were common or rare issues in the perceptions of Turks.

Finally, I brought the whole analysis together within the multi-method approach by integrating qualitative and quantitative results.

Quantitative Methods: Census Data

While using census data, I did not have any control over data definition and collection (Brewer and Hunter 1989:44-47). I was dependent on preexisting variables in the censuses of both Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, whatever shortcomings exist, this study stands as the first comprehensive presentation of demographic, social and economic characteristics of the Turkish diaspora in North America.[138]

The first, and most important, characteristic of both the Canadian census in 1996 and the United States census in 1990 is that each one provides the same basis for identifying Turks in the data. My definition is any person who self-identifies their ancestry as being Turkish. This is the operational definition of ethnicity used by the census authorities in both Canada and the United States.

In both countries, the census asked an ancestry question which is the basis for the identification of Turks that I use. The questions asked in the long-form questionnaire for the United States (1990), and for Canada (1996) are reproduced exactly below, including the instructions that accompanied them. The ancestry given as an answer could be single or multiple: note the instructions in paragraph two for the United States and the wording on the Canadian questionnaire.

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[138] In Canada, the psychologists Ataca and Berry (2002) and Aycan (1998) made statistical studies based on their own small survey samples of Turks. So far no socio-demographic studies of Turks in the United States have yet appeared.

Self-Declared Ancestries in the United States Census, 1990

Census question # 13.

What is this person"s ancestry or ethnic origin?
(See instruction guide for further information)

(For example: German, Italian, . . . Lebanese)

Intstruction for question # 13.
Print the ancestry group. Ancestry refers to the person's ethnic origin or descent, "roots," or heritage. Ancestry also may refer to the country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States. *All* persons, regardless of citizenship status, should answer this question.

Persons who have more than one origin and cannot identifywith a single ancestry group may report two ancestry groups (for example, German-Irish).
. . .

Source: "Your Guide for the 1990 U.S. Census Form"
Facsimile of Respondent Instructions and Questioinnaire Pages

Self-Declared Ancestries in the Canadian Census, 1996

Question 17.

To which etnic or cultural groups did this person's **ancestors** belong?

For example, French, English, German, Scottish, Canadian, Italian, . . ., etc.

Specify as many grooups as applicable

Instructions:

Question 17 – Ethnic Origin [excerpts]

This question refers to the ethnic or cultural origins of a person' ancestors. An ancestor is someone from whom a person is descended and is usually more distant than a grandparent. Other than Aboriginal persons, most people can trace their origins to their ancestors who first came to this continent. Ancestry should not be confused with citizenship or nationality.

[Do not write] language. . .. For example, report . . . "Austrian" rather than "German."

Sources: 1996 Census Questionnaire; 1996 Census Guide.

Statistics Canada coded up to two responses as a first and second ancestry, the same as the United States Bureau of the Census. Neither census gave a hierarchy to multiple responses. For example, Irish and Turkish did *not* mean more Irish than Turkish attachment or identity. If the order of entries were reversed, no implication of primacy for Turkish and something less important for the second ancestry was implied. The United States documentation states that, "The intent of the ancestry question was not to measure the degree of attachment the respondent had to a particular ethnicity. [That could vary from total involvement to] only a memory of ancestors several generations removed from the individual."[139] The declaration of two ancestries presumably refers in most instances to the lines of descent of father and mother. For my statistical calculations, I accepted as Turks all those who declared Turkish as one of their ancestries.

Additional data used for Turks in the United States came from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), based on the long-form questionnaire of the 1990 population and housing census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992b). The questionnaire was administered to a sample of approximately 20 percent of all households. The PUMS data are a stratified sample which gives higher probabilities of selection to groups (strata) that might otherwise be represented less well due to their small numbers; for example, older persons are over-sampled. Personal weights (expansion factors) are assigned to each person record and used during data processing to compensate, thus making the overall weighted tabulations representative.

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[139] PUMS documentation, Appendix B. *Definitions of Subject Characteristics,* "Ancestry." See below for information about PUMS.

I prepared the data file for this study by extracting from the entire national PUMS file all individuals who declared Turkish as one of their two ancestries, or as the only ancestry.[140] Birthplace was not the criterion. A person with an ancestry such as Kurdish, even though born in Turkey, was not included if the only ancestry declared was Kurdish. The individual was theoretically eligible for inclusion if both Turkish and Kurdish were declared; however, no such cases were found in the PUMS data. Thus, self-declared ethnicity was my criterion for inclusion in the sample.

The universe for the 1990 United States census was all persons living in the country, excluding those who usually live abroad, such as tourists or business visitors. Turks who are working on temporary visas and students are included. The questionnaire asked for place of birth and whether the individual was a citizen (if not born in the United States). It did not ask non-United States citizens about their immigration status, whether permanent, temporary, or undocumented.

The census data enabled me to define an immigrant as any person born outside the United States, excepting those born to American citizen parents while outside. If a person was not defined as an immigrant, then that person was defined as native-born.

One reason for making a distinction between immigrant and native-born was to make comparisons between first-generation and second-generation members of the Turkish diaspora. However, exact sorting between generations is not possible, because there is no information on the individual census records to associate (link) parents and

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[140] Access to the national PUMS files and assistance with setting up an extraction procedure at the Center for Statistical Social Science Research of the University of Washington is gratefully acknowledged.

children. Nevertheless, assumptions can be made. If the persons are native-born with Turkish ancestry, there is a good chance that the immigrant population of Turks represents their parents, although it is always possible to have a few exceptions: for example, parents may have re-emigrated or died after giving birth to a child, or a Turkish immigrant woman might return to Turkey temporarily to give birth, resulting in a child that will not be classified as native-born, even though both may return to the United States.[141] In these ways, or by entering the United States as child dependents, some of the second-generation escapes census identification as such—indeed, they are mixed into the immigrant category that is taken as representative of parents.[142] Thus, though I use "immigrant" and "native-born" as separate categories to represent first and second—or later—generations respectively, I must emphasize that this is only a proxy classification.

Extensive national tables, including selected cross-tabulations that are published by the Bureau of the Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993) use the same variables that appear in the PUMS data for Turks alone. For my data, I made frequency counts and tables, including cross-tabulations, using SPSS statistical software to construct accurate comparisons of Turks with the host population.

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[141] However, a child born outside the U.S. to a mother who is a citizen would be classified as native-born in our tables.

[142] An elegant example of working around the limitation to study only those young second-generation children who are still at home—hence included in the block of records for the household—is found in Jensen and Chitose (1994). Charles Hirschman (1996:54,80) offers his criticism of the Census Bureau for choosing not to ask about parentage in the 1980 and 1990 censuses when census information about generational change could be so valuable.

Canadian census data for 1996 are similar in most respects to the United States data; therefore, I mention here only a few specific differences that affected this study. After pricing various ways to access a Canadian micro-data sample similar to the United States PUMS, I found the cost prohibitive for a dissertation. A good alternative was available in the form of a "Profile" for a target group. The purchaser specifies the target and a pre-formatted report is obtained by purchase from Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada 1999). It has a few cross-tabulations by age and sex, but is mainly a list of characteristics. Unlike case data, the report could not be manipulated using one's own table definitions. For example, the distinction between immigrant and native-born, according to selected characteristics, could not be made.

For the target Profile population, I specified "Canadian citizens and landed immigrants of Turkish ethnic origin, single and multiple responses."[143] Therefore, for the Canadian analysis, the definition of a Turk is identical with that for the United States, because it is based on the same ancestry question. There is a small difference in the universe, because Canada, unlike the United States, does try to identify those persons living in the country who are temporary by asking for specific information about their immigration status. According to Statistics Canada, only about one percent of the

[143] The document, received on floppy diskettes, is described by Statistics Canada as *Profiles* GO0366, Table 1. Canadian citizens and landed immigrants of Turkish ethnic origin, single and multiple responses, 1996 Census, 20% sample.

population falls into the non-permanent category—outside the universe specified for the Profile—though this might differ by ethnic groups.[144]

Profile data for the whole population of Canada are published on the Internet in the same format and with the same variable definitions with a few exceptions as those in the Profile for Turks. Thus I could compare Turks with the host population variable by variable.

Statistical Analysis

I extracted information from the two national data sources, and occasionally used comparable information from the 1990 Turkish census on such topics as age and sex, marital status, households, language, ancestry, income, occupation, and education. I also split the data between native and foreign-born Turks in the United States. Although many tables and counts were made, I tried to reduce the results as much as possible for presentation in the text of the dissertation. I often used both statistical and ethnographic data together in the analyses of a particular topic. In large part, the statistical analysis supported my ethnographic results, increasing my confidence that I captured at least some facets of the complex process of immigration.

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[144] I discovered the "fringe" of non-permanent persons in Canada during my field work. It was indeed small-— two individual refugee claimants living on temporary "minister's permits" while awaiting decisions. My ethnographic sampling did not turn up any students on temporary visas from abroad, but I learned from teachers of foreign students in my research area that there were a small number at the university. None of these types of individuals were part of my Canadian census universe.

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