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DISSERTATION

“MICE CAN ROAR”: SMALL ISLAND STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Submitted by

Eric Yoichi Shibuya

Department of Political Science

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, Colorado

Spring 1999

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COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY

December 9, 1998

WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE DISSERTATION PREPARED
UNDER OUR SUPERVISION BY ERIC SHIBUYA ENTITLED MICE CAN ROAR:
THE SMALL ISLAND STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING IN PART REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Committee on Graduate Work

Aue Ellen M. Charlton

Michael Hay

James P. Oast

Don. Stavis

Adviser

W. Paul

Department Head

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

MICE CAN ROAR: SMALL ISLAND STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

This work investigates the question, “how do the small island states influence international environmental policy?” The cases examined are the work to develop the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and the efforts of the island states in arguing for a strong international agreement to alleviate climate change. I argue that the greatest impact the small island states can have upon international environmental policy is at the pre-decision, agenda setting stage. The agenda setting framework developed by Kingdon (1984), is the one which forms the backbone of my study.

I argue that the greatest influence of the island states occur in the development of the construction of the problem. Some problems make the option of waiting for more information a viable policy alternative, while other problem constructions insist on immediate, decisive action. In this effort to influence the definition of the problem, the island states attempt to gain the aid and support of the middle powers, a tactic that has advantages and drawbacks. The advantages are that the support of the middle powers gives the island states’ proposals greater weight. However, a potential drawback is that the middle powers may dilute the stance of the island states by modifying the agreement. Also, international factors beyond the immediate influence of the island states (elections, regime changes, and changes in the international structure) can provide favorable conditions for the island states to push their point of view, or close off an avenue of action.

With some modifications, Kingdon's agenda setting framework, originally designed and applied to the United States government, holds up surprisingly well when extended to an international issue and incorporating many states. The major modification occurs in the problem stream and the issue of problem definition, which I argue does not stand apart from Kingdon's other streams, but must be filtered through those other streams. This framework has tremendous utility for advancing our knowledge in international relations.

Eric Yoichi Shibuya
Political Science Department
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523
Spring 1999

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Wow, I can't believe this is done. There were times when the completion of this project looked as viable as my successfully climbing Mount Everest; and other times when Everest looked much more inviting. Nevertheless, as I stand atop my personal mountain, I can now reflect on this endeavor and thank those who lent a hand along the way.

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In July of 1997, the city of Fort Collins was hit with a devastating flood. Lives were lost, a fact which makes the decimation of much of the university's library seem trivial in comparison. Nevertheless, the loss of the entire journal collection, as well as the political science section of the library would have been a crippling blow to my research had it not been for the stellar work done by the Interlibrary Loan staff. They were beyond helpful even in the flood's immediate aftermath. It is no exaggeration to say that this work would not have been completed without their aid.

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For Karen

There is no price I would not pay,

no risk I would not take,

no battle I would not enter,

to keep you

in my world,

my arms,

my heart,

my love.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (military alliance)
AOSIS	Alliance Of Small Island States
ATOM	Against Tests On Moruroa
C3I	Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence
CARICOM	Caribbean Commission
CFC	Chlorofluorocarbons
CH ₄	Methane
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Cl	Chlorine
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
COM	Congress of Micronesia
COP	Conference Of Parties
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
FANG	Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group
FCCC	Framework Convention on Climate Change
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
G-77	Group of 77
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGOs	Intergovernmental Organizations
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI	Joint Implementation
JUSCANZ	Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
N ₂ O	Nitrous Oxide
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCND	Neither Confirm Nor Deny
NFIP	Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
NFZ	Nuclear Free Zone
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
O ₂	Oxygen
O ₃	Ozone
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PBT	Partial Ban Treaty
RMI	Republic of the Marshall Islands

SPC	South Pacific Commission
SPF	South Pacific Forum
SPNFZ	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
SWCC	Second World Climate Conference
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
UMP	Union of Moderate Parties
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
VP	<i>Vanua 'aku Pati</i> (Our Land Party)
WCC	World Climate Conference
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WG	Working Group
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WRI	World Resources Institute
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact)
WWII	World War II

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Setting the Stage

Islands have long captured the fascination of writers, artists, and dreamers everywhere. A mythology of sorts surrounds islands; they are paradises, the home of the “noble savage,” and even the Garden of Eden rediscovered. Because of this image, the merest hint of discord in the Pacific is seen as extraordinary, as the veritable second fall from grace. Reporters and even researchers are quick to employ the shorthand of “Trouble in Paradise,” or to note that the Pacific is no longer pacific.

It is arguable, however, as to whether the Pacific was *ever* the tranquil paradise of legend. Sailors will tell you that, contrary to its name, the ocean itself is hardly a peaceful one. Contact with the outside world brought disease, death, and eventually colonial rule. Even the history of the last half century has been more than tumultuous for the small island states. The islands were used as stepping stones by both the Japanese and the United States during World War II (WWII), and later were the site of the testing of nuclear weapons by the US, Great Britain, and France. Emerging concern over the possible ramifications of climate change have brought to the islanders perhaps an even greater threat.

The islands are both the idealized and the forgotten members of the international community. They are fantasy images of sun, surf, and sensuality, but in the hard realities of international politics, they are dismissed with little thought. Since the time of Thucydides, it has been argued that “the strong do what they can and the weak accept what they must,” and the island states are the weakest of the weak. In the late 1960's, Henry Kissinger is said to have commented about the South Pacific, “there are only about 90,000 of them out there. Who gives a damn?” (McHenry 1975). Indeed, such sentiment, overall, was probably the norm for the leaders (and even the citizenry) of the larger nations of the world.

In the face of such indifference, the island states forced themselves onto the world spotlight. Belau, a part of the Trust Territory held by the United States, crafted the world's first antinuclear constitution, standing against the pressure brought upon it by the military interests of the United States. While the bulk of international press focused upon the new antinuclear policy of New Zealand, Belau's constitution preceded New Zealand's policy by five years. The nascent antinuclear sentiment in the South Pacific had begun to crest. Even Australia, the unquestioned power in the region, had some apprehensions as to what consequences a nuclear free zone agreement would have for its domestic interests and military alliances. This led Australia to take a preemptive role in the nuclear free zone discussions in the region. From this discussion, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty emerged. For at least a moment, people did “give a damn” about the island states.

Nearly a decade later, people stood up and took notice as the island states united to highlight the danger their homes faced from the potential consequences of global climate change. Not just in the Pacific, but island nations from the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean came together and amplified their individual voices by working together. Their efforts contributed to the development of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). How these issues came into the spotlight, and how the island states inserted themselves into these issues are the subjects at hand here.

Theoretical Framework and Argument

I argue that small island states can have an impact upon international environmental policy, and that their greatest impact is at the pre-decision, agenda setting stage. The influence of the island states on setting the agenda is greatest in those areas wherein they are active (i.e., they have mobilized their admittedly scarce resources), and can define the problem at hand so that their position is strengthened. For instance, a regional issue may be easier for the island states to affect (especially if they can get support from middle powers) than a more global one. A problem that is perceived to have devastating consequences will get more attention than a problem that is viewed as a minor inconvenience. The island states are active not only in the definition of the problem, but also in putting forth policy proposals to address the situation. This is certainly not a debate exclusively between the island states and the great powers; middle powers can also play an important role here. The middle powers may provide a conduit for the island states to get to the international arena. This of course means the island states have to negotiate with these middle powers, or the middle powers may prove to be one more obstacle for the

island states to overcome. Activism in pushing one's point of view, success in the battle of problem definition, and work to gain an alliance with middle powers are all factors which the island states can work at in affecting the agenda.

The agenda setting framework, specifically the one developed by Kingdon (1984), is the one which forms the backbone of my study. While the primary focus here is on the creation of an agreement, it is important to note that sometimes what is not decided can be as important as what the actual decision is. An item is placed on the "Agenda" when it has become a proposed agreement. By the term "problem definition," I mean those characteristics which are produced by how the issue is perceived. What is understood to be "at stake" influences the possible responses to that problem, what decisionmakers (and/or the public) are willing to risk. In this usage, problem definition is a socially constructed phenomenon, and can therefore be manipulated. Problem definition is separated from the concept of "issue area," which deals with either the metatheoretical, "objective," or deep core parts of the issue at hand. These are the unargued, unquestioned aspects of the issue; they form the common ground from where discussion begins. In the cases at hand, there was no disagreement that the nuclear free zone debate was a regional question while the climate change issue is an international one. By "activism," I refer to not only the work of the island governments in articulating their desired policy, but also their efforts to define the entire scope of the debate. To argue over whether something is a "problem," or whether an unproven issue requires "more study" are all potential outcomes of the problem definition debate.

An examination of the dynamics of agenda setting in the international arena is an exceptionally good match in taking a theoretical construct into a new context. On agenda setting, Cobb and Elder (1971: 900) note, “while modern theory directs our attention to the ubiquitous nature of elites...it fails to specify the points in the system at which the masses may participate in the shaping and determination of...policy issues.” Because any system, any organization, holds an inherent bias for those who benefit most from the system (Schattschneider’s (1960) observation that “organization is a mobilization of bias”), Cobb and Elder (1971: 912) argue that the masses can have their greatest impact at the pre-decision, or agenda setting stage, since “by its very nature, participation in the agenda building process is open and widespread.” (At least, such is the case in the United States. One of the points of the present investigation is to examine just how “open and widespread” the agenda building process is at the international level).

The dominance of the Realist paradigm in international relations has led to an emphasis on power. This is especially the case when examining interactions between small actors and larger states. However, this emphasis overstates the position of those major states. Indeed, it gives them an impact and ability that their policymakers no doubt wished they really had: the ability to dictate international agreements. This overemphasis fails to consider the notion that even the major powers can be constrained by the context presented them by the international system. By contrast, when the literature focuses upon decision making by and between the major powers, it does recognize that there are constraints upon their possible choices (notably in the works on “interdependence” such as Keohane and Nye 1989). Also, scholars often overlook the idea that an issue may be of

high importance to domestic interests in the small islands (and perhaps, less so for the great powers), and this may produce greater mobilization from the island states than the great powers. There can emerge, then, a congruence of circumstances that may give the small islands greater “power” than would otherwise be expected (or could be measured on some objective, non-issue specific scale). Such an arrangement of both focused domestic action in the islands along with changes in the international arena can lead to increased visibility and impact by the small island states on the international level. Finally, the literature often considers the island states as individual entities, and does not place enough value on the amplifying nature of their acting together via regional organizations or organizations of common bond (such as the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and the Alliance Of Small Island States (AOSIS), respectively). Indeed, these organizations are probably the greatest vehicle for empowering the island nations in the international system.

Because there are too many island states to analyze all of them, I will focus upon those states which have been most active in the cases at hand. Vanuatu’s experiences will serve as an example of the domestic issues within the island states that can have an international impact. Vanuatu was arguably the most “radical” of the island states in the early antinuclear debates, and its representative to the UN had a major role in developing the visibility of the island states in the climate discussions up to and including the 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio. However, a change in administration led to a much different political stance from Vanuatu in both areas. For the antinuclear case, the positions and policies of Fiji, Belau, Vanuatu, and Tonga will be examined. Certainly, a discussion of the actions of these South Pacific island states would be incomplete without noting the actions

of Australia and New Zealand, both of which acted as help and hindrance for the island states.

The major works on agenda setting (Cobb and Elder 1971; Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976; Kingdon 1984) have primarily focused upon the domestic arena. However, the idea that there is no central authority to define an issue as a “problem” and that there are competing versions of what is at stake (and subsequently, what is to be done) is at the heart of the agenda setting process. It is also the essence of international politics in general. It seems, then, that there is much heuristic value to be gained by taking the agenda setting literature and applying it at the international level.

Significance of Study

The significance of this study is three-fold. First, there is an internal significance; one case has a bearing on the other. This is a comparison of small state activism and impact in international negotiations. Despite the fact that one is a regional and the other a more global problem, the evolution of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone can possibly serve as a lesson and potential model for the small island states on the issue of global climate change. The SPNFZ agreement was recognized as being rife with shortcomings from its inception. Still, the SPNFZ was also seen as a significant first step towards disarmament, a foundation upon which to build and improve. Most scholars and policymakers doubted that the Western powers would ever sign the SPNFZ Protocols, and now the prospect of agreement over a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty seems possible

(the resistance of India and Pakistan notwithstanding).¹ Despite the slow-going progress on these issues, can the development of the nuclear case have some expanded applicability for other issue areas?

The second and larger contribution this study makes is in wedding agenda building models to international issues. The pre-decision stage is the most open point in the policy making process, there is no central authority deciding the stakes and the rules of the game. Such a situation is the general atmosphere of international relations. It is possible that some of the same dynamics found in setting the agenda within the state will be found in agenda setting between states.

Finally, beyond its intrinsic importance to the small island states, my work addresses some larger issues in the study of international politics. There is the chronic question of how to understand “power” in political relations. How do the small and “weak” get the large and “strong” to listen and, perhaps, even change their policies? It is too easy to simply accept the idea that power is the determining factor and that international agreements will have no force (or will not even be made) without the backing of the great powers. Under certain circumstances (and in certain issue areas), theoretically “weaker” actors can have a significant impact on the discussion and formulation of international agreements. We are often too quick to point to constraints that the “powerful” place on the “weak” while forgetting that the former are not omnipotent. The “weak” can influence decision makers in more “powerful” countries, probably not to the

¹On October 15, 1996, National Public Radio reported that Fiji had become the first nation to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

extent that the weak states would like, but certainly more than the decision makers in the larger states would care to admit. Also, we need to understand that how issues are structured can lead to different approaches and decisions. Some decisions are easier to make because the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs (or can be articulated as such), while other decisions may offer immediate (and difficult) costs now for an uncertain (and possibly a counterfactual) benefit in the future. The decisions of the latter nature are much more difficult for policymakers to initiate as well as justify to their constituents. There is an even deeper question here. Because of the high importance states place on security issues, it is almost a given that international agreements on national security issues are very difficult to obtain. What has not been addressed is that questions of the environmental costs of economic development may prove even more controversial than national security issues because they require confronting questions of the consequences of industrialization, which goes to the heart of the modernization project itself. By focusing on these underlying theoretical issues, a seemingly atypical pair of cases involving small island states can be used to shed light on fundamental aspects of international politics.

Outline of the Dissertation

The general plan of the work will proceed as follows. Chapter One begins with a statement of the problem, my goals, and the significance and organization of the study.

Chapter Two will provide a review of the literature of agenda building and bring that literature into the international arena. I will also detail the theoretical connections between activism, problem definition, issue areas, and agenda building. Which categories

of actors are involved and at what point or points do they insert themselves into the agenda building process will be noted here.

Chapter Three will establish the context of the antinuclear movement in the South Pacific. I will present a short history of the post WWII experience in the Pacific, from the trusteeship system to the establishment of nuclear testing sites in the region by the great powers. I will then describe the efforts of those in the region to resist this “nuclearism,” noting in special detail issue area characteristics and the activists involved in the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The factors that led to the crafting of the Treaty, and the events that led to its acceptance both within the region and the nuclear powers will be detailed.

Chapter Four will use Kingdon’s agenda setting framework to highlight the points where the island states influenced the creation, modification, and eventual acceptance of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

Chapter Five will present a general history of the issue of climate change and how it came to international political attention. The development of the climate change issue through the various national and international conferences (scientific and political) that have addressed the issue will be traced. The special interest that climate change has had for the small island states and how those island states have banded together to make their interests known on the international scene will also be noted.

Chapter Six will focus on how the issue of global climate change has been shaped and how key actors have worked to affect the International Framework Convention on

Climate Change. Kingdon's framework will be used to illustrate how the island states have inserted themselves into these negotiations.

Chapter Seven will proceed with a focused comparison of the two cases. I will point to what lessons can be taken from the SPNFZ negotiations to the discussions on global climate change. An examination will be conducted on how the issues were constructed by both the island states and the other actors involved, and how those constructions influenced what policy alternatives were given the greatest weight. The role of the problem of uncertainty and scientific knowledge will be looked at. Also, the island states may have had possible secondary goals which played a role in the constructing of the antinuclear and climate change issues, and these will be discussed. A comparison of the roles of the middle powers in each debate will be done, as well as a look at the larger, structural factors that entered into each case, either as a constraint, or as an opportunity to initiate discussion.

Chapter Eight will draw some general conclusions and discuss possibilities for further investigation. The usefulness of the agenda building concept for international relations will be commented on generally, as well as an evaluation of the effectiveness of Kingdon's framework on increasing our understanding on this issue. Some general comments on the use of comparison in international relations will also be raised, detailing some of the problems and prospects in the use of comparison for the study of international politics.

CHAPTER TWO

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Agenda Setting: The “Dependent Variable”

The application of the agenda concept to the international arena is not terribly new, although the use of Kingdon here is somewhat different. Vasquez and Mansbach (1983) have argued for approaching changes in the international realm via an agenda concept. They develop an issue cycle that goes from *genesis* to *crisis*, to *ritualization*, to *decision making* (or *dormancy*), and then either to *removal* from the agenda or an *authoritative allocation* and then removal from the agenda (1983: 261). They argue that the phenomenon of global political change can be viewed in terms of a “process by which issues emerge onto the agenda of a political system, become the objects of contention, and then are removed,” and that “even in the absence of a formal global government, it is possible to identify an agenda or set of agendas and, occasionally, authoritative allocations of value” (1983: 258).

Vasquez and Mansbach point out that the framework most usually employed in the analysis of international change stems from the realist paradigm, which they find deficient for the following reasons:

First, the realist explanation is at best incomplete. Once change is observed, previous or ongoing changes in power are said to have been the source of the change [post hoc analysis]. No detailed theoretical explanation is given about the process through which change actually occurs. Second, the

realist paradigm treats global interactions in a unidimensional manner, as if everything or at least every important thing could be reduced to a struggle for power (1983: 258).

While Vasquez and Mansbach only focus upon issues that strictly concern just the major powers, their issue cycle can be used to incorporate concerns of the less powerful states as well. They point out, “as the Cold War wanes, [the] ‘superpowers’ increasingly react to issues raised by others” (Vasquez and Mansbach 1983: 265, emphasis added). Both the antinuclear and global warming issues are ones that concern both the major and not-so-major powers.

By taking their issue cycle all the way through to an authoritative allocation and removal from the agenda (in effect, the formulation or nonformulation of policy), Vasquez and Mansbach’s issue-cycle goes further than simply agenda setting. Their cycle does not, however, offer much specificity in how the issue moves from stage to stage or why some issues fall into dormancy while others are subject to what they call an authoritative allocation. This last point raises a question: Isn’t the lack of an authoritative allocation—a nondecision, as it were—an authoritative allocation in and of itself? Vasquez and Mansbach themselves note that they have not fully addressed this point (1983: 269, 270 [n20]), and that it is a viable avenue for further research. Indeed, there is a growing literature on the concept of agenda denial.²

There are many conceptualizations of the agenda setting process. The early literature examined the agenda setting process in the United States. In their famous work,

²The literature developing on the idea of agenda denial is extremely recent. See Roger W. Cobb and Marc Howard Ross (eds.), 1997. *Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Due to the relative youth of this concept, I chose to use the more established work on agenda setting.

Cobb and Elder (1971) have argued that there are actually two “agendas” that must be studied. There is the systemic agenda, when an issue is recognized as a problem, and there is the institutional agenda, when institutional actors recognize and discuss an issue and its policy implications. Cobb and Elder note four observations about modern democratic theory that have a larger applicability than simply domestic politics. Those observations are as follows:

- the distribution of influence and access in any system has inherent biases;
- the range of issues and alternative decisions that will be considered by a polity will be restricted;
- in any system there is a strong bias in favor of existing arrangements and agenda questions, and the legal machinery of that system is designed and operates to reinforce and defend that bias;
- the pre-political, or at least, pre-decisional, processes are often of the most critical importance in determining which issues and alternatives are to be considered by the polity and which choices will probably be made (Cobb and Elder 1971: 901-903).

Recognizing that there is always a lag time between an issue being placed on the systemic agenda and its being placed on the institutional agenda, Cobb and Elder (1971: 902) point out that the viability and adaptability of a society depends upon its level of tolerance for this lag time. Although Cobb and Elder focus on agenda building in the United States, this observation would seem to hold whether the “community” is the domestic populace or the international arena.

Following on the earlier work of Cobb and Elder, Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976) also analyze agenda building, but do so as a comparative process. They distinguish the different dynamics that the agenda setting process can take in different governmental

systems. Distinguishing between a “public” (systemic) and “formal” (institutional) agenda, they develop three different models of agenda building, as follows:

—*Outside Initiative model*: the process through which issues arise in nongovernmental groups and are then expanded...to reach first, the public agenda, and finally, the formal agenda.

—*Mobilization model*: issues which are initiated inside government and consequently achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. Often, though, it is required that the issue be placed upon the public agenda as well.

—*Inside Initiative model*: issues which arise within the governmental sphere and whose supporters do not try to expand them to the mass public. In this case, the initiating groups do not want the issue on the public agenda (Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976: 127-128).

Despite their intriguing and accurate observations, Cobb and Elder unfortunately do not offer much in the way of insights for the analysis of the agenda setting process. What gets some items onto the agenda and not others? Why do some issues get further (in terms of policy proposals) than others? Cobb, Ross, and Ross, on the other hand, articulate categories of the agenda building process, but do not go very far in pointing out the internal dynamics of each type.

Kingdon’s (1984) dynamic model of the agenda setting process is perhaps the seminal piece in the general area of agenda setting theory. Kingdon asks what makes people in and around government address some subjects and not others? Further, in the consideration of these subjects, why are some alternatives considered while others are not? Kingdon notes that politicians often frame policy options, even policy matters, as an “idea whose time has come” (1984: 1). Kingdon’s model seeks to understand just how an idea’s time arrives.

Kingdon defines the “agenda” as “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (1984: 3). There must first be established the context where the agenda will be set, making note of such antecedent variables such as sociocultural beliefs and constitutional structures. He further separates the factors that affect agenda setting into two categories: participants and process (1984: 16). Participants are obviously the players of the game, government officials and those close to them. Also, the media, interest groups and academics could be participants. The process of setting the agenda and the discussions of alternatives is further divided into three “streams”: the problem, the policy, and the political. The problem and the political streams are more closely related to bringing an issue onto the agenda, the policy stream is where the various alternatives to address the problem arise. Kingdon argues that issues have the best chance of making it onto the agenda when they converge together, in a policy “window,” via a policy entrepreneur, or spillover effects from other issues. Figure 2.1 is a graphic representation of Kingdon’s model.

Although Cobb, Ross, and Ross’s analysis gives us the most specific categorizations of the type of agenda building process that one can see, Kingdon’s work offers us a model with which one can more closely examine the internal dynamics of placing an issue upon the agenda and the evaluation of policy alternatives. In other words, Kingdon’s problem, policy and political stream appear in any one of the three models identified by Cobb, Ross and Ross. Of these works, then, it is Kingdon’s approach which




Figure 2.1: The Dynamics of Agenda Setting.
Source: Adapted from Kingdon (1984), as illustrated in Lester and Stewart (1996: 67).

will be most stressed in my study, since it brings the most specificity to the analysis of the components of the agenda setting process.

The Participants in the Agenda Setting Game

The actual creation of the SPNFZ and the continuing debate over climate change are difficult to explain by merely focusing upon the more powerful states. The usual discussions of the international impact of small states too often focus upon their limitations rather than on what these states can in fact do. The paradox comes when one observes that discussions of the abilities the great powers to get exactly what they want in the international arena end up stressing their being limited by the international system (see the writings on “interdependence,” such as Keohane and Nye 1989). Both instances are not mutually exclusive, a point which most scholars understand, even if it does not appear (or appears only in passing) in the literature. There may be circumstances such that the great powers are not able to influence the small island states. At that point, these small islands have their impact upon the international stage. These circumstances benefit the islands, though, only when the island states take advantage of the situation presented to them. Change does not occur without an agent attempting to affect such change.

Which agents are important in the international agenda setting debate? We understand states as being the principal agents in the international arena. Of course, when we say “states” are being active, we are really looking at the representatives of those states and their work in international meetings. In the cases at hand, there are some “usual suspects” of actors who will play a role in developing the agreements. There are, of course, the major powers, who have greatest access to the theoretically relevant

instruments of power (wealth, military force, prestige, etc.). There are, on the other end of the “power scale” from the major powers, the island states. Between them lie the regional powers of Australia and New Zealand. Finally, we see roles played by both International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the South Pacific Forum (SPF), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) and Greenpeace. Perhaps the most influential work in this area has been the literature on “epistemic communities,” as exemplified by the work of Peter Haas (1989, 1990, 1992). Epistemic communities are groups of “experts” in a particular issue who come together to express their concerns and opinions. This community is a transnational one, and is usually composed of scientists, as the issues that epistemic communities traditionally coalesce around are technical ones.

While I concede the point that scientific experts have been and remain major forces in international negotiations, I find the basis for their legitimization to be suspect, as I have explained in the previous section on issue area and problem definition. Boehmer-Christiansen (1997) accurately points out that the notion of “consensus” has more to do with politics than it does with scientific debate. This does not take away from the point, however, that there are ways for actors (even non-state ones) to enter into the international debate.

For my purposes, the main “activists” that I am concerned with are those agents who are (to use Kingdon’s term) “policy entrepreneurs”; those who are striving to place an issue upon the agenda. Kingdon describes policy entrepreneurs as “advocates who are

willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (1984:188). They do not necessarily need to be individuals; IGOs or even governments can be identified as “activists” and “policy entrepreneurs.”

“Independent Variables”: The Problem Stream: Issue Area and Problem Definition

Of Kingdon’s three streams, the problem stream is the least “systematic” and most difficult to analyze. However, due to its nature, it is usually the most highly visible point in the agenda building process. Kingdon argues that many things may highlight a problem: indicator change (such as a rise in temperature), focusing events or a crisis (such as a plane crash), feedback from other matters, budgetary constraints, and problem definition. What all of these things have in common, however, is that they all must be interpreted. A change in temperature must be connected to something (such as human activity) for it to be a problem. Focusing events and feedback must also be connected and interpreted. Kingdon himself says, “indicators are not simply a straightforward recognition of the facts.... Interpretations of the data transform them from statements of conditions to statements of policy problems” (Kingdon 1984: 99). Kingdon makes much the same point later in regards to focusing events, arguing that they require “accompaniment” to focus attention (Kingdon 1984: 103-105). It therefore seems possible to collapse these categories of the problem stream into points of common ground versus points of debate.³

³For an international issue, the question of budgetary restraints is seen within the policy stream, where various national governments must debate what resources they are willing and able to mobilize.

Here, then, the problem stream is broken into two subsets—issue area characteristics and problem definition. Issue area characteristics can either be patently obvious, or unquestioned core values. In either case, they come as close to being universally agreed upon points as there are. Is the problem a regional or global one? Does it require a regional agreement or an international one? Is this a “simple” problem, or one that cuts to fundamental aspects of how we understand and live our lives? They form the common ground of the discussion. The second component of the problem stream is problem definition, the discussions and judgments of what is “at stake.” The two categories relate and feed back into each other. The more one is able to control the definition of the problem, the greater control one has in the articulation of potential solutions (Schattschneider’s (1960) observation that the control over the articulation of alternatives is the “supreme instrument of power”). However, if one does not extend a little common ground, some generally agreed upon points of discussion, then negotiations fall apart because opposing parties have no incentive to listen.

Rocheftort and Cobb (1993) note that despite the important role problem definition plays in the policy process, it remains a fairly immature analytical construction. They note that the identification, categorization, and definition of “problems” may well be “the most fundamental source of ‘nonrational’ political phenomena...the intersubjective nature of social experience and its impact both on issue initiation and policy formulation” (Rocheftort and Cobb 1993: 57). An issue moves to a place on the agenda after a crisis or “focusing event” (Kingdon 1984: 99), which captures the attention of the policy maker

either directly or indirectly by capturing and bringing about public action (electoral concerns of the policy maker). As Kingdon notes:

There is a difference between a condition and a problem. We put up with all manner of conditions every day: bad weather, unavoidable and untreatable illnesses, pestilence, poverty, fanaticism.... Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them. Problems are not simply the conditions or external events themselves; there is also a perceptual, interpretive element (1984: 115).

Since the matter is highly subjective, there is significant room for activism in the matter of problem definition, as individuals and groups strive to define or frame the situation for their understanding and, possibly, to their advantage. Rochefort and Cobb (1993) point to significant questions as to how problems are identified and conceptualized. How severe is the problem? How novel is the situation? How immediate are the consequences of doing nothing or of doing something drastic? What solutions or ideas are available and/or feasible (both technically and politically)?

Kingdon puts forth the general proposition that the more highly visible the policy domain, the less important crises are for putting new issues on the agenda (1984: 100). Kingdon cites the example of health policy, arguing that because health is of concern to all of us, it is a policy domain that is followed very closely, and is “naturally” on the agenda most of the time. (Issues of military security probably fit in this category as well). On the other hand, the policy domain of transportation is usually not so visible, and requires something like a plane crash or a shutdown of a major transit system to gain the notice of the public and/or the policy maker. (Environmental issues, such as climate change, may fall here). Kingdon argues that problems in and of themselves only rarely carry an issue to

the public agenda. What usually occurs is that a crisis focuses attention onto an issue that was already "in the back of people's minds" (Kingdon 1984: 103). As such, Kingdon also includes within the problem stream, although less "drastic" than a crisis, such things as public feedback on existing programs, to see whether the recognized problem is being adequately addressed with the program currently being implemented.

What the issue area is, indeed, how it is constructed, is perhaps the most important area in our discussion. The strategic construction of an issue has the ability to bring an issue to the agenda, and it can also determine which actors have access (or even privileged access) into the discussion. It is the one stream in which the island states are most likely to have the greatest influence. There is clearly an interactive relationship between issue construction and agenda setting. Although the island states may be able to affect the political stream, it is much less likely that they will be able to do so on the level that would be noticed by the major powers. The island states (and even the regional powers such as Australia and New Zealand) did not bring about the end of the Cold War, for example.

The understanding of what the problem is, and what policy should be enacted to solve the problem, is often depicted as a logical, rational sequence of events. Yet continually there are cases which dispute this proposition. To wit:

Not only is there a degree of arbitrariness about what is taken to be a serious problem, but controversy often surrounds how a given issue will be understood. As Dery (1984: xi) has written, "problems do not exist 'out there'; they are not objective entities in their own right" (Rochefort and Cobb 1993: 56).

Problems are not objective phenomena in their own right, then, but rather, they are framed. Nelson and Kinder point out, "Frames are more than simply positions or

arguments about an issue. Frames are *constructions* of the issue: they spell out the essence of the problem, suggest how it should be thought about, and may go so far as to recommend what (if anything) should be done” (1996: 1057, note omitted, emphasis in original).

How an issue is understood will have a great bearing on what kind of attention it will receive. How severe the problem is, what solutions are available, and what kind of time horizon is available for action are all a part of this discussion, and every facet can be subject to debate. “What one group sees as a problem of insufficient legislation, another may consider a consequence of the distribution of power in society” (Dalton 1994: 144). This is the “problem” inherent in Kingdon’s “problem stream”—where (and who) we are has great bearing on what we see (or how we interpret what we see). Goffman (1974) refers to this as “issue framing,” while Chaloupka refers to the struggle over the “power of definition” (1992: xii).

The power of symbols and imagery in the political realm has long been recognized. Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* discusses the use of banners and images to disconcert the enemy. Edelman’s (1967) work was probably the first major work on the matter within political science. Additionally, a great deal of work on problem definition has gone on in the field of sociology. Goffman’s (1974) work has already been mentioned. More recently, there are the contributions by Robert Benford and Scott Hunt, both alone and in collaboration. Although their work focuses upon how social movements frame issues within the movement itself (Benford 1993a, 1993b), it is noted that success in controlling the “power of definition” within a movement influences how effective the movement will

be in defining the issue versus the society at large (Benford 1993a: 680). Benford and Hunt (1992) point out that social movements can be looked at as little “dramas,” staged to give the movement greater advantage in framing the issues being debated. They argue that “movement outcomes hinge in part upon how well activists employ these techniques [of performance] and manage various emergent contingencies and tensions” (Benford and Hunt 1992: 36), and indeed, in the battleground of interpretation over what is at stake, images and symbols are the weapons of choice.⁴

The socially constructed nature of problem definition makes it one of the most intriguing and also perhaps the most exasperating issues in policy analysis. The debate can and often does descend to the foundational, ontological level of discussion, where what is at the heart of the problem is exactly that—what is. We are arguing over critical issues in the interpretation of the very reality wherein we interact. What is “security”? What does “safe” or “clean” mean? These terms, these issues, need to be defined, and they achieve political meaning in that construction. Dery suggests that

the question of how much “freedom” one is willing to sacrifice in order to save “human life,” for example, is meaningless unless it is posed through action or proposals for action. One would need a certain balance between these two competing values (they become competitive only in the context of action) in order for them to be considered meaningful in guiding action (1984: 9)

Rochefort and Cobb (1994) suggest that problem definition can be placed under the two major perspectives of “instrumental” and “expressive.” An instrumental construction of an issue points to the logical, pragmatic assessment of the policy at hand,

⁴This struggle for the power of interpretation may be even more important in “social movements” such as terrorist attacks, as I have noted elsewhere (Shibuya 1994).

i.e., “will this policy solve the problem?” An expressive construction appeals to the meta-level, moral discussions that all people go through, i.e., “is this the right thing to do?”

Rochefort and Cobb analyze instrumental and expressive constructions in AIDS policymaking, from needle exchange to condom distribution programs, finding that the tactics of both supporters and opponents of these programs use either instrumental or expressive constructions of the issue, and at certain times, both. They leave us with four concluding observations:

1. The adoption of instrumental and expressive policy definitions can exhibit strong independence across political issues.
2. Instrumental and expressive policy definitions can be counterposed or combined.
3. Instrumental and expressive policy definitions can become entangled with, and influenced by, preexisting social and ideological cleavages.
4. No point of view is intrinsically favored in the political struggle between instrumental and expressive policy definitions (Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 176-177).

We will see whether the instrumental vs. expressive categorizations are useful ones in the construction of the issues of nuclearism and global warming.

How an issue is constructed also has implications on the forming of alliances; indeed, it defines the “sides” of the issue. The question of who is “for” or “against” can be explained by what is “at stake.” A study by Nelson and Kinder (1996) suggests that the framing of issues that focuses on the beneficiaries of a policy increases the positive attitudes citizens possess toward those groups. When policies are framed in ways which deflect attention from those beneficiaries, sentiments about those groups are seen to

decline (Nelson and Kinder 1996: 1055-1056). This general conclusion is dependent on the perceptions about the group under discussion. Groups deemed morally “innocent” or “worthy” (such as women and minorities) are able to gain greater sentiment for themselves than groups which are perceived as “guilty” or “perverse” (such as homosexuals in the United States). This conclusion in and of itself would be self-evident to the savvy politician; but we should also add the fact that the verdict upon a group as being worthy or not is hardly self-evident and must be constructed. As the authors say, “The power of group sentiment hinges importantly on the political setting; on how, we would like to say, elites choose to define public issues” (Nelson and Kinder 1996: 1072).

It is true that in the antinuclear case, the alliances formed are regional ones. The United States security interests and the French testing programme most clearly affect those in the South Pacific, large or small, allied or not. As such, we see that not only are the small island states involved internationally, but also New Zealand and Australia. The issue is geographically and regionally placed. In the case of global warming, however, the small islands have turned to “supra-regional” organizations such as AOSIS. The issue is not one that can be regionally isolated, but rather is isolated in consequences. The small island states have different concerns than Australia and even New Zealand. Although Australia had originally been supportive of the small islands’ cause at Rio, they began to back away from their commitments to lower emissions soon after Rio (Garrett 1994). In fact, Australia used its influence at the South Pacific Forum meeting just prior to the Kyoto conference to preclude a strong statement by the islands endorsing definite targets and timetables for cuts in greenhouse emissions (“Australia in Hot Water Over Global

Warming Stance” 1997; Lees 1997). Unlike nuclear testing, global warming does not affect everyone in the same region, large or small, equally.

Australia’s desire to protect its economy is not particularly surprising, and the “economics vs. environment” dichotomy should not be an unusual construction of this argument. Perhaps, though, it would better serve to title it “development vs. environment.” One of the frequent critiques coming from the “Third World” has been that environmental issues are simply another tool of the First World to keep the lesser developed nations from “catching up” to them. It is a telling commentary (and one that is usually avoided rather than confronted in debate) that had the developed nations not polluted the environment while industrializing first, there wouldn’t be the current environmental problems, much less the ones which loom over the horizon. The Third World uses this argument to justify their industrialization projects, which can be placed under the umbrella statement, “it is our turn to pollute.” While the anti-nuclear movement may be able to present more of a “united front,” the question as to whether one should attempt to industrialize (or simply develop, “sustainably” or otherwise) or not could prove more divisive. Indeed, there were divisions observed as the Third World split into differing factions at the Earth Summit over the very issue of environmental protection vs. increased development (Djoghla 1994, Hyder 1994). One of the major elements of this division was the split between AOSIS and the rest of the G-77, most especially the larger developing states, as well as the oil-exporting nations.

Another point that needs to be touched upon in the discussion of problem definition is the role that science has to play. The issue of global climate change is a

difficult one for policy makers to handle due to the high degree of scientific uncertainty combined with the certainty of high social costs that would result from any deviation from the status quo. Indeed, if the consequences of global warming strike at the heart of the modernity project itself, then questions of science are the least of our worries. While getting a commitment for a nuclear free zone requires the nuclear powers to avoid a consequence that they do not want to occur (nuclear oblivion), the costs of doing so are fairly small and not very immediate, at least for some of the nuclear powers (France being somewhat excepted here).

In the case of global climate change, however, it is difficult to find a “palatable” international agreement that will have a significant impact on greenhouse emissions. There still remains much scientific uncertainty as to the severity that greenhouse emissions will have, and (at the other extreme) there are some arguments that it may already be too late to save some of the island states (Lefale 1991; Connell and Lea 1992). There have also been some arguments that there may be some benefits to some climatic changes in some regions of the world (Gleick 1989, Pernetta and Elder 1992), although none of these benefits extend to the small island states (or even to the low-lying coastal areas of larger states). What is certain, however, are the high social costs that will occur if an attempt to curb greenhouse emissions takes place on an international level. What policymaker is willing to ask the populace to consume less, to develop less, so that tiny islands in the ocean can remain above water? What benefit could be articulated that would justify such costs to both the policymaker and the populace? The debate over global warming is one that the islands are uniquely situated to enter on the international stage. They are among

the smallest contributors to greenhouse emissions into the atmosphere, and yet are among the most likely to be initially affected negatively by climate change.

How one constructs an issue also affects the time horizon and assessments of risk that are judged to be acceptable. When dealing with questions of a technical or scientific nature (as the global warming issue is usually framed), it seems that the response of “we need more information, we need more proof” is more acceptable than in military issues. There are different concerns for risk-taking in both issues. In the case of national security or military issues, not having “enough proof” doesn’t seem to hinder the initiation of decisive action. Secondly, discussions of “proof” may be constructed and understood as scientific ones, but one of the observations made from the small island states is that proof of sea-level rise could mean the disappearance of the small island states altogether. Such a consequence is much less “clinical” than simply a scientific discussion of the possibility of sea-level rise as a general concept and such a vision has been used to some effect in international negotiations by the small island nations. Also, for scientific and technical issues, discussions over “proof” can have a political use—it is a useful delaying tactic. The United States has blocked several environmental agreements on the basis that there was not enough scientific consensus to justify the costs of the actions to be taken (the more far-reaching proposals in the global climate change convention, for example). The United States has also used scientific data to argue for environmental actions that it favors. Ozone depletion is a clear example of this, with the United States calling for action with the knowledge that industries in the United States had developed viable substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Susskind notes, “When we prefer to take a different political

course, we attack the available data as insufficient, regardless of the strength of the worldwide scientific consensus” (1994: 65). Of course, the United States is not the only nation which has found political benefits to scientific uncertainty. Several of the oil-producing nations resisted the global climate change convention with much the same argument.

Science does indeed have a contribution to make in the development of international environmental policy, but this contribution can sometimes be made problematic. There are certainly some scientific arguments for a delay in strong action in the greenhouse debate, but it should not go unnoticed that those delays also have a political benefit in the US, for example. It can prove very difficult to distinguish between doubt within the scientific community and the politicization of scientific disagreement. The presence of scientific doubt does not necessarily imply that no action should be taken. Science and scientists have in many ways meshed with policymakers (especially in the global warming case) in a community of “mutual construction” (Shackley and Wynne 1995) which may be closing off other areas of investigation. As Litfin (1994) has observed in the case of ozone depletion, science is not created independently of political or policy goals and is then added on (or “applied”) to those goals later. Boehmer-Christiansen (1994a, 1994b, 1997) has argued the point that the IPCC has been coopted by a specific branch of climate scientists, namely global modelers, and as such has pushed its own interests rather than the pursuit of “truth.” Boehmer-Christiansen’s work is problematic in itself, as there seems to be an underlying belief in a purely “objective” scientific proof which is being clouded by political agendas. We should always be aware that it is politics

which is the real force behind what the policy will finally end up looking like. Gibbons says about climate change:

the facts...play a critical role in policymaking—especially to the extent that they narrow the debatable issues. But disagreements over current values (traditional economic values vs. new environmental values) and over issues of equity (global, regional, and intergenerational) inevitably drive the debate (1992: 231, emphasis added).

While it may be the case that there is a greater contribution to be made by scientists in the formulation of environmental policy, this should not be taken as meaning that scientists will have (or even should have) the final word on what the specific policy should be. The high degree of uncertainty in the global warming issue asks of science questions that science in and of itself cannot answer, and should not be expected to. Rochefort and Cobb observe that the “growing reliance on specialized experts, even on questions whose broad value implications outweigh their technical nature, unnecessarily restricts participation in the identification of problems and their solutions” (1993: 69). I am not arguing that scientists don’t have a role to play, or that their contributions are to be dismissed, but rather that we can no longer view any group of “experts” as holding a privileged position in the discourse, especially when that position derives from a claim of objectivity which is suspect. Contrary to popular belief, science, in and of itself, is not enough.

“Independent Variables”: The Policy Stream: The Articulation of Alternatives

Kingdon’s policy stream deals primarily with the determination of alternatives to address the problem. Within the policy stream, competing interests attempt to have their views heard, pushing forth their potential solutions. Internationally, this can take the form

of a state adopting a national policy that can be held up as an example for other states to follow, of how things “should be done.” In the antinuclear case, Belau, New Zealand, and Vanuatu adopted strong antinuclear policies, and in fact there was significant concern from the US and Australia that such policies could diffuse through the Pacific region. Which alternatives receive greater attention than others is dependent on many factors, including technical feasibility, value acceptability (whether the proposal coincides with the value structure of the policy community), fads and knowledge, and the availability of another, acceptable alternative (Kingdon 1984: 138-151). Questions of fads and knowledge (what’s the “hot topic” for the moment) implies that sometimes policy communities deal with issues that may not be the most important, but simply the most popular. Kingdon recognizes that because of a overall inclination to focus on “interesting” issues and avoid “boring” ones, there is a tendency for policy advocates to oversell their position, since qualifying one’s work can cause others to lose interest (Kingdon 1984: 134). The presence of a generally acceptable alternative serves to “soften” the issue, allowing for avenues for compromise within the policy community.

Questions of values or fads reveal how much a policy’s viability is based on subjective factors. As such, the question of how the problem is defined (or framed) is important in our understanding of what constitutes an “acceptable” policy. The “public” is willing to accept more drastic policy alternatives if they perceive that some kind of radical change in current behavior is necessary.⁵ For example, sacrifices that would be

⁵ How the issue is framed is especially important in the global warming case, both because of the high uncertainty within the issue itself, as well as the forum within which it must be dealt with. The international arena has not only a split between the North and the South, but the divisions within those groups

inconceivable in times of peace are made with little hesitation during times of war.

Differing alternatives are debated within the policy community, and its members learn from each other. Some ideas gain greater attention and acceptance. How an alternative gains prevalence, then, is not a byproduct of power, but ideas, timing and effort of skillful actors. This can allow “weaker” states to seize the moment.

Krasner (1985) implicitly, at least, notes the importance of activism by the “weaker” states to get their point across in international relations. He argues that underlying the disagreements between the First and Third Worlds is the latter’s belief that the international system itself is biased against them (the dependency argument). He further goes on to say that if one cannot find satisfaction within the present system (if indeed, one views the existing arrangement to be illegitimate), then change only occurs by changing the system itself. Krasner notes that

[the] degree to which developing countries have succeeded in altering international regimes has been a function of three variables: the nature of existing institutional structures, the ability to formulate a coherent system of ideas which set the agenda for international negotiations,...and the attitude and power of the North, especially the United States, toward the demands of the South and the forums in which they are made (1985:7, emphasis added).

Therefore, the behavior of the great powers or a shift in the international system (Krasner’s third variable) is not the only determining variable in whether small states will have a voice in the international arena. The small states must take advantage of the circumstances afforded them and move into action, and they must do it well (Krasner’s

as well.

second variable). A favorable atmosphere, or open “window of opportunity” means nothing if it is not used. Windows do not stay open forever; the moment must be seized.

Beyond questions of technical feasibility, the factors which influence a proposed policy’s viability can be highly subjective. How the problem is defined gives some proposals greater weight than others. Policies unthinkable in one context can be viewed as necessary in another. Some proposals prove more viable at one point in time because they happen to catch the popular imagination at that moment. Questions of how much a proposed policy coincides with the values of the policy community (and those outside it) illuminates how much policies are dependent upon outside factors, such as public opinion or the opinion of elected officials. These last factors help comprise the political stream of Kingdon’s analysis.

“Independent Variables”: The Political Stream: Outside Factors

The political stream are those events which lead to a general atmosphere conducive to the addressing of the problem, such as the mood of the national populace (and its subsets, public opinion and the input of interest groups) (Kingdon 1984: 153). This stream also includes electoral outcomes or regime changes which lead to new participants and priorities. Different actors have different worldviews; different senses of what issues need to be addressed. Also, questions of jurisdiction and building consensus are included here. In the international sense, the political stream more generally can be understood as those factors which are outside of the immediate influence of the actors in the policy stream, such as the preferences and shifts in those preferences of other nations. In the cases at hand, the most important outside actors are of course the major powers,

but the roles played by middle powers. In fact, the middle powers play an important role in our discussion—they can serve either as facilitators between the major powers and the small island states or as another obstacle that the island states must overcome.

In the cases here, Australia and New Zealand are the most easily identified of the middle powers, as they are the regional powers in the Pacific. Both Australia and New Zealand shared the island states' concern in some aspects of antinuclearism, but there were also some points (especially for Australia) that did not coincide with the interests and concerns of the island states. In the climate change debate, not only do the island states make their appeals to Australia and New Zealand, but also attempt to craft alliances with other members of the developing world, such as China and India. Regime changes (due to elections) in Australia and New Zealand in the early 1980's, for example, changed the political atmosphere for a regional nuclear free zone agreement.

Beyond the middle powers, there are other factors to be considered in the political stream. There are the structural problems such as the division between the developed and developing countries, and their differing interests and preoccupations. Most significantly, some changes in the international system can lead to an entirely novel situation, where nothing can be taken for granted. Some events, such as the end of the Cold War, may bring about a veritable “new world order,” and such drastic shifts in the world will certainly have an effect upon whether an issue will get on the agenda.

The “Intervening Variables”: Policy Windows, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Spillovers

Kingdon argues that issues have the greatest chance of getting on the agenda when all three streams converge, creating a “window of opportunity.” A problem is identified,

along with a plausible solution, and this coupling comes about at a favorable political moment. Kingdon argues that there are two types of windows, one from the political stream and the other from the problem stream. Some windows open predictably (when a new administration enters office after a successful election, for example) while some appear suddenly (a new problem is identified) (Kingdon 1984: 176). An open window only suggests that something should be done, but not what. At this point, an agent will try to take advantage of these favorable conditions to push for a favored policy proposal. Kingdon refers to this agent as the “policy entrepreneur,” an actor who is willing to invest time and energy in order to place the issue onto the agenda. Once the issue is on the agenda, the policy entrepreneur continues to play a role, attempting to articulate how he or she hopes the issue will be addressed. Although Kingdon identifies policy entrepreneurs exclusively as individuals, it is possible that the “entrepreneur” could be a group, IGO, NGO, government agency, or even possibly a whole government. An important note should be made here that getting the issue onto the agenda does not in any way guarantee (or even indicate) that the issue will be addressed and policies will be developed that will satisfy the policy entrepreneur. The policy entrepreneur of course has some opinion and input, but getting the issue on the agenda does not mean that the proposed solutions of the policy entrepreneur will be heeded. For example, the developing nations brought their vision of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) before the United Nations, but this was never adopted.

Finally, Kingdon notes that windows of opportunity can open due to spillover effects from other policies. What happens in one arena can increase the likelihood of action being taken on a related issue.

A Note on the Comparison

A question may be raised as to the effectiveness of the comparison of these two cases. At first glance, there doesn't seem much in common between a regional nuclear free zone and an international convention on global climate change. On further examination, however, there are many things that can be drawn by these two cases which make their comparison not as inappropriate as would be initially considered. Both cases are ones wherein the island states have played especially active roles internationally. Even in the climate change case, which involved island states from all over the world, the Pacific island states were the group that expressed the greatest overall concern and exerted the greatest amount of activity. Although the SPNFZ Treaty only dealt with a certain region of the world, it extended beyond those borders due to the concerns of the major powers, especially the United States, who felt that the SPNFZ could be a catalyst for more zones to arise. Also, while the issue areas are different (one regional, the other global), the negotiation dynamics are the same for the island states: deal with the middle powers, form a coalition to amplify their voices and get heard by the major powers.

Beyond the highly visible role of the island states, the evaluation of gains and losses are similar in these two cases, a point which makes the antinuclear case a better

basis for comparison than the ozone regime, which has been most usually held up as a “model” for the climate change negotiations to follow.⁶

While the ozone regime has been seen as a potential model for global warming (Munavvar 1989, Stewart and Wiener 1992), the antinuclear case may offer a better comparison. There is the high visibility of the island states in both global warming and the nuclear free zone issue, as well as the avenues the island states have taken to define both issues. Also, there are already many reasons that the ozone regime may not be the best model for climate change to follow. Most notably, the lack of political and scientific consensus, as well as the certainty of higher social costs for global warming bring into question whether the model of negotiation over ozone depletion could be easily transferred to global warming (Miller and McFarland 1996). Like the antinuclear discussions, climate change is still seen as a zero-sum game for the major powers. However, once substitutes for CFCs are developed and viewed as economical, the ozone discussions are no longer seen as zero-sum for the major powers. It would be the major corporations (such as DuPont) who would manufacture these substitutes, and this would give the developed world an advantage. Hence, beyond simply the protection of the ozone layer, the developed world (and the US in particular) understood that it would benefit economically from stringent international limitations on CFCs. For global climate change, however, the situation still looks like a zero-sum game. As things stand currently, the goal for the climate negotiations is a reduction in greenhouse gases, which is different and more difficult than a replacement of said gases. In other words, the major corporations see

⁶ A brief discussion of the ozone regime is presented in the Appendix.

decreased business instead of different business (Rowlands 1995: 137). This discussion is much more similar to the nuclear testing debate. If France cannot test in the South Pacific, it has to go somewhere else or not test at all. If the US is barred from transit through the SPNFZ, then it loses that area and gets no benefit (that is, beyond the good will of the islanders). Of course, neither ban was really enforceable, but there would have been serious public relations problems for France internationally and for the US in the Pacific, where the US has traditionally had very good relations. What the position of the islanders in both the nuclear testing and climate change debate require from the major powers (and possible allies such as the middle powers or larger developing states) are potentially drastic changes in behavior, and these concessions could prove incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to make. This is the major reason that resistance was so entrenched in the nuclear debate (and why it remains so for climate change) and why it shifted more easily in the ozone negotiations.

Jumping Into the Fray: How Does This All Fit?

Although it is possible that the participants in the agenda setting debate can appear in all three streams, it is more likely that certain participants are more visible in some streams than in others. Island states and the middle powers are more prevalent in the problem and policy streams, while major power governments are more visible in the problem and political streams. NGOs appear in the problem stream, and IGOs are most prevalent in the policy stream.

I have chosen to use a case-study approach in my investigation. The case-study method lends itself well to the examination of agenda setting. Since the case comparisons

are international rather than intra-national, they do not fall within Przeworski and Teune's (1970) categorizations of "most similar" and "most dissimilar systems." As to how the cases are used, Eckstein (1975) identifies the possible ways that case studies can contribute to building theory. This taxonomy reads as follows:

1. Configurative-Ideographic: This form of the case study is the dominant form in political science. It allows "the facts to speak for themselves," and relies on intuitive interpretation to draw conclusions.
2. Disciplined-Configurative: Theory-based, interpretations rest on general laws, used to determine if those laws are valid.
3. Heuristic: Used to stimulate the imagination toward discerning problems and possible theoretical solutions. "Building block" technique, researcher identifies a theoretical construct in one case and refines it in another.
4. Plausibility probes: pretests of candidate propositions, see if they are worth the expense of more rigorous testing.
5. Crucial case studies: "Falsification" along the lines of Karl Popper's work. A single case falsifies (invalidates) a theory.

I situate my research here as either "Configurative-Ideographic," "Disciplined-Configurative" or "Heuristic." Good arguments could be made for either "Configurative-Ideographic" or "Heuristic," but I prefer the latter. The narrative surrounding these case studies could easily "let the facts speak for themselves," but there is greater theoretical rigor here (with Kingdon's framework highlighting points of discussion) than that. As for "Disciplined-Configurative," I am uncomfortable with considering Kingdon's framework to be "general laws" and my extension of his framework to be a test of its "validity," especially since I am using Kingdon in a context beyond that for which it was created. Certainly, this is not a test of Kingdon. Rather, Kingdon's breakdown of the agenda

setting process into distinct streams is a useful intellectual construct which best highlights those junctures in the agenda setting process wherein the island states have their greatest impact, and why they have that impact at that point. Kingdon's framework here is used as a heuristic device to look at and illuminate the phenomenon of agenda setting.

In examining the cases, the agenda building framework will be used to pinpoint the conjunctures wherein the island states were able to bring the antinuclear issue to the world stage, as well as play a leading role in working toward an international agreement on global climate change. There is a convergence of issues and actors during which an issue is able to make it onto the agenda. Such a convergence is not spontaneously conceived, the small island states must work to bring it about. In issues of great concern for both the island states and the developed (or larger developing) states, the small island states can have an impact on the international agenda if they are able to reframe the debate in ways that advantage their argument. In the cases at hand, this reframing has been accomplished in a debate over the term "security."⁷

Figure 2.2 illustrates what the three streams of agenda building look like in an international setting. I have excluded antecedent variables for two major reasons. First, those contextual variables are not the major focus of Kingdon's work and not the area where the model focuses. Secondly, in an international setting, the contextual variables are

⁷While I will pursue this issue further later, there is one interesting point to note here. There has been an expansion (at least by policy makers if not by political scientists) of the concept of "national security." National security can, in this increasingly interdependent world, now include issues of economic development and growth. The global warming issue, though, puts the issue of economic "security" for some states in conflict with the physical security of others, a situation which will be increasingly difficult to reconcile. In the nuclear case, the debate over security is one of security as military safety and protection of the nation-state (via the nuclear deterrent) versus security as absence of threat; while in the global warming case it is an argument over security as economic development versus security as territorial integrity.

too widespread and vague to be of any value to list. Kingdon's problem stream has been divided into issue area and problem definition components. The policy stream now also includes the possibility of unilateral action by a state in the policy community to "set an example" for other states to potentially follow. There seem to be some avenues through which the island states may be able to influence international environmental policy.

However, such influence will not come about easily, especially if the island states are attempting to confront the major powers. How do the island states, then, work to get their voices heard? Where should they focus their activity? What avenues for action are available in terms of defining the issue, what is at stake? How does the presence of middle powers (and whether they support or oppose the island states' position) affect the agenda setting process or the tactics of the island states? We will now see how these dynamics play themselves out in the issues of antinuclearism and global climate change.




Figure 2.2: The Dynamics of Agenda Setting, Revised.
Source: Adapted from Kingdon (1984)

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONTEXT OF THE ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC⁸

Introduction

This chapter outlines the development of the antinuclear movement in the South Pacific. It details the post World War II experience in the region, the construction of the strategic trust by the US for its military interests, and the legacy of nuclear testing in the region by the US, United Kingdom, and France. The debate over the establishment of a nuclear free zone is traced, along with the final acceptance of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty in 1996. It highlights and illustrates both the factors affecting the perceptions of the island states on the nuclear testing issue, as well as the outside political factors that influenced the perceptions and policies of the major powers.

Early History: World War II and the Emergence of the Cold War

World War II was the first conflict that truly deserved to be called a “world” war. No part of the globe went unaffected, either by the war itself or its legacy. The term “holocaust” was brought into our lexicon, and the destructive power of the atom was unleashed. With the unveiling of this force capable of ending life on a greater scale than had ever been imagined, the international system would never be the same.

⁸This Chapter is drawn extensively from Shibuya (1993), *Sovereignty From the Bomb: The Antinuclear Movement in the South Pacific*, M.A. Thesis, Political Science, University of Oklahoma.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor left an indelible mark on the American psyche. Up until 1943, more Americans fought in the Pacific than in the Atlantic theatre, and 53 percent of Americans polled that year believed Japan to be the primary enemy (Hayes, Zarsky, and Bello 1986: 18). For the Japanese, the attack proved to be brilliant in terms of execution and a disaster in terms of result. The Japanese bombs struck obsolete battleships and cruisers, while missing the ships that really would matter in the Pacific War—aircraft carriers (the carriers *Lexington* and *Enterprise* were out on maneuvers on December 7). Perhaps more importantly, the direct attack on American soil ended any ideas of the US remaining isolated from the conflict (Hayes et al., 1986: 16). Politically, at any rate, there was no longer any choice but to enter the war. Whether it had wanted it or not, the war had come to the United States; and the United States had to respond.

Although no one would have ever considered it such at the time, the attack on Pearl Harbor signaled the beginning of United States dominance in the world. With the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor, the United States adopted a strategy of island-hopping across the Pacific, wresting the islands away from the Japanese in bloody battles (Hayes et al., 1986: 16). While the Allied forces were battling the Nazi threat in Europe, the US was almost single-handedly defeating the Japanese forces in the Pacific. Victory in the Pacific theatre was punctuated with the detonation of atomic bombs on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9). The United States had entered the war as a rising, albeit somewhat reluctant, major power and exited it as the world's first superpower.

The Atlantic and Pacific Theatres Compared

The experience of the United States in the Pacific was quite different from that in the Atlantic theatre. The Pacific was a naval war; sea and air power carried the day, while ground forces were the real story in the Atlantic (more conventionally referred to as the European) front. While the Atlantic/European front saw the defeat of the Axis at the hands of the Allied forces, the United States practically stood alone against the Japanese. (There were contributions made by Chinese armed troops and by Korean guerilla forces, as well as from Australia and New Zealand, but they pale in comparison for sheer numbers when stacked next to the American presence in the Pacific war). In terms of the Cold War conflict that was to come, while the Soviets could claim victory over countries (or parts of countries) in Europe, no country truly capitulated to the Soviet Union in the Pacific theatre. North Korea and the four Kurile Islands of Japan were essentially areas given over to the Soviets as an alternative to what the Soviets probably wanted—the Japanese island of Hokkaido (Galtung 1989: 22). The Pacific remains even to this day, very much an “American Lake.”

As the Cold War emerged, other countries chose sides, willingly or otherwise, in this bipolar conflict. In Europe, the Cold War crystallized into two opposing multilateral alliances—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), also known as the Warsaw Pact. The prevailing view of this arrangement (at least in the West) was that the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviets, held a conventional military advantage over NATO. NATO was, then, seen as a strictly defensive alliance established to deter any thoughts of attack on the part of the Soviets and their

satellite states. The security arrangements are somewhat less clear in the Pacific. Unlike the relative balance between NATO and the WTO in Europe, the United States has been the unquestioned power in the Pacific. As such, the US had no real impetus to develop a multilateral security arrangement in the Pacific. Rather than a multilateral alliance along the lines of NATO, the security picture in the Pacific is marked by mostly bilateral, and to some extent, trilateral alliances. This lack of an organized, multilateral alliance structure allowed the United States to arrange the Pacific security picture to its liking. While the philosophy of the United States was still one of containing the Soviets, this doctrine took on a different form in the Pacific. Since it is the United States that holds military superiority in the region, containment in the Pacific amounted to a strategy that might be called “offensive defense.” As Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall said:

It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And peace can only be maintained by the strong (quoted in Hayes et al., 1986: 20).

Secretary of State James Byrnes put this somewhat more directly, saying “What we must do now is not make the world safe for democracy, but make the world safe for the U.S.A.” (quoted in Hayes, et al., 1986: 20). Now that the United States was established as the strongest of the strong, the question of how to both exhibit and maintain that position, especially in the Pacific, needed to be addressed.

Trusts and Trusts Betrayed: The United States establishes “Outposts” in its “Lake”

Victory over Japan left the United States with military bases scattered about the Pacific. The US Navy had been quick to understand the immeasurable value of these bases

in this essentially naval battleground. Of the Navy's eighteen "major" bases in 1945, fifteen were located in the Pacific (Hayes et al., 1986: 19). Emotions ran high in Washington over the matter of these islands after the war. The victory over Japan had proven their strategic value and the military, especially the Navy, was loath to give them up. Many felt that the US had a right to these islands, having already paid for them with the blood of American soldiers. Other nations also held possessions in the Pacific (see Table 3.1), though perhaps only France sought to hold onto them as strongly as the US did. Micronesia "belonged" to the United States by right of conquest, and arguments were made for its outright annexation. US Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, crystallized much of this sentiment when he said:

Acquisition of [Micronesia] by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonialism or exploitation. Instead, it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies, they are outposts (quoted in Kiste 1993: 69).

Despite such calls, there were other members of the Washington community who saw the inherent political contradiction in the United States adopting a stand against colonialism while at the same time absorbing new territory. Most particularly, the State Department argued against annexation, fearing that such a precedent could encourage other countries (i.e., the Soviet Union) to follow suit (McHenry 1975: 32). The State Department argued that the islands instead be placed under the trusteeship arrangement being set up by the United Nations. The trust arrangement originally envisioned by the

Table 3.1: Island States of the Pacific

<u>Name</u>	<u>Year of Independence</u>	<u>Last Colonial Power</u>
Belau	1994	USA**
Cook Islands	1965	New Zealand*
Federated States of Micronesia	1986	USA**
Fiji	1970	Great Britain
Kiribati	1979	Great Britain
Nauru	1968	Australia
Niue	1974	New Zealand*
Papua New Guinea	1975	Australia
Republic of the Marshall Islands	1986	USA**
Samoa	1962	New Zealand
Solomon Islands	1978	Great Britain
Tonga	1970	Never Colonized***
Tuvalu	1978	Great Britain
Vanuatu	1980	France and Great Britain

* = Free Association with New Zealand; internal self-rule, but New Zealand has authority over foreign affairs.

** = Free Association with the USA, as described above

*** = From 1900-1970, Tonga was a protectorate of Great Britain.

UN, however, was unacceptable to the military. Some kind of compromise needed to be found, although the end result hardly seemed a compromise for the United States.

Most of the disagreements between the State Department and the military subsided when assurances came from the UN that the United States would be able to unilaterally define its trust relationship with Micronesia (Wilson 1995: 25). The resulting negotiations led to the development of two categories of UN trusteeships: one which would incorporate the original plan for the trust arrangement, and a second category of “strategic trusts,” to comply with the United States military concerns (McHenry 1975: 32). The strategic trust relationship by the United States over Micronesia was approved by the UN Security Council on April 2, 1947 and by President Truman on July 18, 1947 (McHenry 1975:32). The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) was created.

The trust arrangement over the TTPI was the only one to be designated a strategic trust. Unlike the other eleven trusts set up by the UN (which included such Pacific entities

as Nauru, Western Samoa, and New Guinea), which were under the jurisdiction of the UN General Assembly, the TTPI was under authority of the Security Council. While all other trust relationships were dissolved by the General Assembly at the point of each trustee achieving self-government or independence, the TTPI had to be granted its independence via a resolution from the Security Council. Thirdly, Article 15 of the strategic trust barred the agreement from being “altered, amended, or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority” (Firth 1987: 52), thereby giving the United States literally a “double veto” (Article 15 as well as its veto in the Security Council) over any matters that could affect or alter the TTPI arrangement. Also unique in the trust arrangements, the TTPI agreement contained no real provisions regarding the procedures for termination of the trust (McHenry 1975: 45). No other trustee relationship gave such overarching authority to the administering power. Indeed, the trusteeship has been referred to as “de facto annexation, papered over with the thinnest of disguises” (de Smith 1970: 128). Such control was viewed as necessary by the United States, given its vital strategic interests in the region. This was exemplified first by the military bases established there, and would later expand as areas of the TTPI would become a test site for nuclear weapons.

As overarching as the strategic trusteeship arrangement was, it could have been even more extensive had the United States gotten all it wanted. The original United States proposal included a statement that the territory could be administered as “an integral part of the United States,” which was deleted at the insistence of the Soviets (McHenry 1975: 32). There was also no mention of a goal of independence for the islands in the original American proposal (Wilson 1995: 25), although the United States grudgingly acquiesced

to the Soviet proposal to include wording similar to that in the other trust arrangements which put the US under the same obligation as all the other trustors

...to foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the trust territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned...to promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and...to promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants (quoted in McHenry 1975: 33).

Although the United States accepted this amendment, it also made clear that any “self-government” or “independence” for the TTPI would be a long time coming, if ever. Before the UN Security Council on February 26, 1947, US Ambassador Warren Austin stated, “The United States feels that it must record its opposition, not to the principle of independence, to which no people could be more consecrated than the people of the United States, but to the thought that it could possibly be achieved within the foreseeable future in this case” (quoted in R. Alexander 1994: 93). Roy Smith noted the inherent contradiction in the US stance:

On the one hand the United States has offered an education and a model of liberal democracy and self-determination. On the other hand when Micronesians attempted to fulfil this model themselves they found their efforts resisted by the very authority which was supposed to promote their moves toward political autonomy (1997: 47).

Kiste (1993) divides the United States’ administration of the TTPI into three different eras: from the end of World War II to the early 1960’s, from the Kennedy administration to the late 1970’s with the onset of self-government, and the third era beginning with the self-government of the region. The two themes prevalent throughout these eras, though, are “the primary US interest in the territory has been...strategic [and]

American values and assumptions have consistently been imposed upon Micronesian societies” (Kiste 1993: 70).

The first era of the trusteeship has been described as a time of “benign neglect.” Most Americans did not even know that the United States had jurisdiction over the islands and there was very little public concern for a region thousands of miles away from the American mainland. The region was cordoned off and even American citizens required security clearance to enter the territory (Kiste 1993: 71). Although this was ostensibly to preserve the traditional cultures of the islanders, the primary concern for the United States was its military interests. Nuclear tests were conducted in the region at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls, and Kwajalein Atoll was developed into a major testing site for missile delivery systems. Without considering their appropriateness for isolated societies with subsistence economies, the United States established universal education, health care, and governmental institutions within the TTPI—all patterned after the American model. Teachers and health workers were given minimal training and orientation before being sent out into the most remote areas of the region (Kiste 1993: 71).

The second era began in the early 1960's, when President Kennedy denounced colonialism in a speech before the UN General Assembly. Ironically, in the same year, a UN report was highly critical of the United States' administering of the TTPI. Criticisms were even appearing in the popular press such as the *New Yorker*, the *Saturday Evening Post*, and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. Some of these stories were inspired by American officials who thought that such publicity would lead to improvements in the administration of the trust, which was being referred to by such terms as “Our Bungled Trust,” “the Rust

Territory,” “Showcase of Neglect,” and “Trust Betrayed” (McHenry 1975: 14). In light of such criticism, President Kennedy sought to improve the situation. The appropriations to the region (which averaged \$1 million annually from 1947 to 1952 and \$5 million from 1947 to 1963), were raised to \$15 million in 1963 (McHenry 1975: 15). Congress had previously placed a \$7.5 million maximum on appropriations to the territory (Kiste 1993: 71).

With the Johnson Administration, the TTPI traveled the road paved with “good intentions.” Concerns such as Vietnam and the launching of the “Great Society” took precedence over the TTPI. Assuming that the “Great Society” programs designed for urban Americans would work for the islanders, Congress amended legislation and made these islanders eligible for several programs:

By the late 1970's, the \$35 million federal welfare dollars resulted in 166 separate programs in Micronesia. There was no coordination among them, and they included such culturally inappropriate measures as large-scale food subsidies for the impoverished (with a subsistence economy, most islanders fall below the dollar-income level that defines the American poor); financial, food, and housing aid for the elderly (in societies that traditionally honor and provide for the aged); and employment training programs designed for urban America.

The programs were culturally and socially destructive, and along with the enormous territorial budget, Micronesians became hopelessly dependent on the U.S.... Most everywhere, Micronesians flocked to administrative centers...with the hope of obtaining jobs, education, and the benefits of the federal programs. A massive welfare state had been created (Kiste 1993: 72).

At the district level, the local legislatures had been given considerably greater power by the 1960's. In 1965, this trend was expanded to the territorial level with the establishment of the popularly elected Congress of Micronesia (COM) to further the

political development of the region. Still, much of the political power in the trust was held by the High Commissioner as well as the US Secretary of the Interior (Colbert 1997: 55). In 1967, the COM established the Micronesian Political Status Commission (chaired by Lazarus Salii, who would later become the second President of Belau), which examined the various political arrangements in the Pacific and the Caribbean and selected free association (a new political status developed just that year between the Cook Islands and New Zealand) as the best option available to the islands at that time. Negotiations with the United States began in 1969 but were stalled with the United States rejecting free association in favor of commonwealth status (i.e., integration into the US) to maintain its hold on these strategically valuable islands (Kiste 1993: 73). This would be the beginning of a long series of talks between the US and the TTPI. In essence, the TTPI wanted maximum independence along with maximum financial support from the United States, while the United States hoped to preserve the possibility of military use of the islands (Colbert 1997: 56).

Apart from the strategic concerns of the United States, another stumbling block in negotiations was the assumption that the TTPI would achieve independence as a single unit. However, the TTPI was a colonial construction, a grouping established more for convenience of the administering power than any sense of community within the TTPI. Indeed, even during the administration of the TTPI, the US divided the TTPI into six distinct districts, and it was clear that some of those districts were more valuable to the United States than others. Most notably, the Northern Marianas group (sometimes simply referred to as the Marianas) were the most westernized of the districts, due to a long

history of contact with the West (actually the longest in Micronesia). The island of Saipan in the Marianas served as TTPI headquarters (Colbert 1997: 58), and was even used as a training ground for Nationalist Chinese troops by the CIA (McHenry 1975: 130; Kiste 1993: 71). The people of the Marianas felt themselves superior to the rest of the TTPI, and in 1971 the Marianas broke away from the rest of the TTPI in an effort to negotiate a more favorable arrangement from the United States on the termination of the trusteeship. After this break, the United States, which had previously called for "Micronesian unity," changed its position and offered to enter into separate negotiations, with free association being one of the possible outcomes. The rapidity of this policy switch did prompt some charges of US involvement in the separatist movement, though it must be said that such separatist tendencies were quite strong among the Marianas (Colbert 1997: 58).

Attempts by the COM to keep the whole TTPI united failed. The fear within the COM, rightly, was that without the Marianas the rest of the TTPI would not get as good a deal in the negotiations with the United States. Furthermore, the breakaway of the Marianas only served to highlight the differences between the other districts of the TTPI. Micronesian unity was not helped when the US Department of Defense indicated in 1972 that it wished to retain some rights to areas in Belau, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Marianas. The Marshall Islands then announced it would be entering into separate negotiations with the United States (McHenry 1975: 134). Belau followed suit soon after. Since any further splits in the TTPI would be a logistical nightmare for the United States, and because there was no benefit to be gained by the islanders in further

splits, the rest of the TTPI (Ponape⁹, Truk¹⁰, and Yap) negotiated as one unit, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).

The Marianas chose to enter into commonwealth association (virtual incorporation and integration) with the United States in 1975. The Compact was approved by both houses of the US Congress on December 16, 1985 (Lutz 1986: 21), and the Marshall Islands (now the Republic of the Marshall Islands or RMI) and the FSM formally entered into free association with the United States in 1986. The situation of Belau, ostensibly decided in the mid-1990's, remains an unsure one. For all practical intents, Belau is freely associated with the United States. However, there remain today legal questions as to the compatibility of the Compact's military and security provisions with the antinuclear clause in Belau's constitution, a point which we will examine in greater depth further in this chapter.

The Compact of Free Association grants the United States wide latitude in its activities in the islands, most especially in matters of defense. The Compact grants the US "full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to" the island states and gives the US authority to conduct "within the lands, waters and airspace" of the islands "the activities and operations necessary" for the US to carry out its objectives and obligations in matters of security (Kiste 1993: 74). The Compact is to last for fifteen years and the United States offers a tremendous amount of financial subsidies (the sum reported for the FSM and the RMI together is \$2.5 billion, with \$1 billion for

⁹Now known as Pohnpei.

¹⁰Now known as Chuuk.

Belau) (Kiste 1993: 75). In return, the US would have the right to close off areas of the islands for security purposes. This is highly important for the US in regards to the Marshall Islands, where Kwajalein Atoll is located. Kwajalein is perhaps the United States' most important range for the testing of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for it is into or nearby Kwajalein lagoon that ICBMs fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base splash down (Johnson 1986: 30; Firth 1987: 65).

The third era of the TTPI has only recently begun. Acceptance of the free association arrangement came in 1986, but since the TTPI is the only strategic trust ever established, some questions remained on whether or not the trusteeship was actually dissolved. The United States had discovered the edge of its own sword. It had established a strategic trust so that it would be able to hold on to the region via its veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council, but when it had found a way to relinquish the trusteeship without sacrificing its strategic objectives, the US discovered that the Security Council could be a hindrance as well as help. The Soviet Union also held veto power and had always argued that the Compact was simply a thinly disguised form of neocolonialism. By exercising their veto, the Soviets could forever label the United States as "the last colonial masters." The Cold War, it would seem, would continue to block these islands from achieving independence, keeping them merely pawns in the superpower game. However, the world-shaking changes in the Soviet Union in the late 1980's opened the door for these islands. Confronting their own need for reform and improving their international image, the Soviet Union was willing to drop the matter of Micronesia, agreeing finally to what was by then basically a *fait accompli*. In 1990, with the exception

of Belau, the TTPI was formally dissolved (Scherer 1991b). In 1991, both the RMI and the FSM were given seats in the UN General Assembly and both are also full members of the South Pacific Forum and the Alliance Of Small Island States.

Despite entrance into this third era, the legacy of not just the American presence in the region, but the presence of other major powers remains a strong one. Indeed, in terms of the nuclear testing policies in the region, parts of that “legacy” remain very much in recent memory. It is this issue which has long been the greatest source of dissension between the South Pacific region and the great powers, and it is to this issue that we will now turn.

Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific: The United States: “Number One with a Bang”

The atomic bombs that struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled not just the end of the war with Japan, but also the beginning of a new era of international conflict. There was no turning back. The nuclear genie had been let out of the bottle and it had struck with a vengeance. With the detonation in 1949 of the first Soviet atomic bomb, the world entered an age where the balance of power became overshadowed by the balance of terror.

The military advantages of the atomic bomb were readily apparent to the United States, and during the brief period where it enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it continued to make plans to further develop its nuclear potential. President Truman said, “We should not under any circumstances throw away our gun, until we are sure that the rest of the world can’t arm against us” (quoted in Firth 1987: 1) An area was therefore

needed for the United States to conduct its tests. The relative isolation of the islands in the South Pacific made the islands a perfect stage for the testing of nuclear weapons. Along with the isolation of the islands, the region was also perfect for the conducting of tests due to its warm climate (which granted year-round access to the area), its small population which could be relocated as needed by the US, and the fact that the region was under the control of the United States. The military strategists of the US finally settled on the Bikini atoll as the site for the site of nuclear tests. This required the relocation of the indigenous population of the atoll, which numbered 166 in 1946 (Firth 1987: 3). Later, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), not officially a military organization but set up to develop atomic energy with “the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security” (Firth 1987: 9) chose Enewetak Atoll as the site of the Pacific Proving Ground for the testing of nuclear weapons. Bikini was also included as part of the Proving Ground. From 1946 to 1958, approximately sixty-six nuclear tests were conducted on Bikini and Enewetak, all of these tests taking place in the atmosphere (Hayes et al., 1986: 72). Nuclear testing by the US was moved underground in 1962, but by that time the AEC had authorized 232 explosions overall, with the most powerful taking place in the Pacific (Firth 1987: 7).

In what seems odd in hindsight, the first nuclear tests in Bikini were conducted with much media fanfare. Some 42,000 spectators (reporters, photographers, along with representatives from the military, scientific community, and even some Congressmen) gathered for a show of the power of the atom; a power belonging (then) to the United States alone (Firth 1987: 5).

“Able,” the first nuclear explosion on Bikini took place on July 1, 1946, with “Baker” following on July 25. The levels of radiation produced by the explosions were staggering, and a scientific report issued in August 1946 recommended that “no fish, mollusk, or other marine animal taken within 100 miles of Bikini lagoon be used as food” (Firth 1987: 7, emphasis added). At the time, however, the military still considered nuclear weapons as merely another facet of conventional warfare and little stock was placed in the idea of some invisible danger called “radiation.” Sailors were put to work scrubbing down the decks of ships that had been doused by water that had been lifted into the air (and subsequently contaminated) by the explosions. The scrubbing proved ineffective against the radiation (Firth 1987: 7). If this radiation could affect ships that had only experienced it as fallout, what could be said about the effects where the bombs were detonated, the islands that the relocated islanders called home and hoped to return to? Those answers would be a long time in coming. Right now, the United States had other concerns than the welfare of their trustees.

“Pawns in the Game”: The Relocation of the Bikini and Enewetak Islanders

With their preoccupation with the containment of the Soviet Union as well as their faith in technology, the United States considered the relocation of the Bikinians and Enewetaks a small price to pay. The military governor spoke to the islanders before their relocation, telling them that these tests were “for the good of mankind and to end all world wars” (Firth 1987: 27). Chief Juda of Bikini is reported as replying:

If the US government and the scientists of the world want to use our island and atoll for furthering development, which with God’s blessing will result

in kindness and benefit to all mankind, my people will be pleased to go elsewhere (quoted in Firth 1987: 27).

With much pomp and circumstance, the 166 islanders of Bikini were relocated to Rongerik Atoll, a smaller atoll east of Bikini. The expectation of the islanders was that this relocation was to be temporary. (Admittedly, the United States also believed that this would be the case). When it became apparent that a return to Bikini was not possible in the foreseeable future, it also became evident that Rongerik Atoll did not have sufficient resources for the islanders. The islands were smaller and had fewer coconut trees and the lagoon was smaller, holding fewer fish. A 1947 report stated that the Bikinians were suffering from malnutrition and by 1948 the situation had become nearly critical. As a temporary solution, the islanders were transferred to the military base on Kwajalein Atoll, where they were exposed to the “good things” in American life— “movies, cokes, candies, and ice cream” (Firth 1987: 29). Some of the islanders were crowded onto Ebeye island, where they lived in unsanitary conditions, only a few miles away from the middle-class lifestyle of the Americans based on Kwajalein (Johnson 1986).

Eventually the Bikinians were moved to the island of Kili. The new location was a very different environment for the Bikinians, and not one that would be easy for them to adjust to:

[F]rom thirty-six islands with over two square miles and a tranquil lagoon to a single island located 475 miles south with less than one-half square mile of land and no lagoon. For Micronesian fishermen, the new location meant an unaccustomed struggle with the pounding waves of the Pacific in order to get the fish which were an essential part of their diet. They became increasingly dependent on supplies brought by Trust Territory ships which, however, could not approach the island four months of the year because of high wind and waves (McHenry 1975: 58).

In 1968, President Johnson announced that the Bikinians would be repatriated after a clean-up of the island and by 1978 some 100 Bikinians returned to their island home. However, the radiation levels in the ground water were discovered to be much too high and in August 1978 the Bikinians were moved back to Kili, where the bulk of the population remain today, almost completely dependent on aid from the United States. The Bikinians remain strangers in their own land, living in squalor while the US military and the civilians attached to the Kwajalein Base have special privileges in terms of cheaper food, better housing, and even higher pay for the same menial labor jobs that the islanders do (Friend 1997).

The Enewetaks fared slightly better than the Bikinians. They were relocated to the Ujelang Atoll, a familiar environment as well as an area where the Enewetaks had some historical ties. When the increasing population began to strain the resources of the Ujelang Atoll, however, the Enewetaks began to call for a return to their home, a call that increased in 1968 when it was announced that the Bikinians were to be repatriated. Cleanup of Enewetak was also ordered and over 100,000 cubic meters of radioactive metal and soil was deposited on Runit island and topped with a huge concrete dome, off-limits to human beings for the next 24,000 years (Firth 1987: caption on illustration page 3). The Enewetak that the islanders returned to was hardly the home they had left. Today the Enewetaks too are nearly completely dependent upon food and aid from the United States, as the fruits growing on the northwest islands of the atoll are still contaminated with radiation.

Disappointment and disenchantment turned to anger with the United States, but at the time the interests, concerns, and even the welfare of the islanders had little weight against the problem of containing the Soviet Union. What would become apparent was that nuclear weapons were not just an extension of conventional warfare. Clearly, nuclear weapons belonged to a different category, and the military men who controlled them moved to make these deadly weapons even deadlier. Atomic bombs were to turn into hydrogen bombs and once again the Pacific was chosen as the site to test these weapons.

“Bravo”: Unstoppable and Unforgotten

On March 1, 1954, the sky over Bikini was lit up in a show of destruction that caused one atomic scientist to ask “Isn’t that fireball ever going to stop?” (quoted in Firth 1987: 15). The test, codenamed “Bravo,” was the largest nuclear device ever detonated by the US and would become a symbol of the death and destruction that such weapons were capable of. The test was a step in the race against the Soviets to develop hydrogen bombs that could be delivered against an enemy, as the first hydrogen bombs were large and unwieldy objects. To the east of Bikini, Japanese fishermen on a vessel called the *Fukuryu Maru* (“Lucky Dragon”) saw the glow over Bikini as the power equivalent to a thousand Hiroshimas was unleashed (Firth 1987: 15). This display would not be the only legacy that Bravo would pass on to these fishermen or the islanders in the region.

As the mushroom cloud produced by Bravo continued to rise, the winds began to slowly push this radioactive cloud east, toward the fishermen, as well as the US ships gathered to watch the test, and the islanders. Radioactive ash soon began to fall from the sky. The US ships made a rapid exit to escape the fallout. The US servicemen that were

positioned on Rongerik Atoll saw their geiger counters go off the scale and were evacuated by aircraft a day later. Meanwhile, the crew of the *Fukuryu Maru* worked for five hours in the falling ash and the eighty-two inhabitants of Rongelap Atoll were only evacuated two days after the Bravo explosion, during which children played in the falling “snow” and adults wondered if the US were dropping the ash to kill mosquitoes (Firth 1987: 16). In all, 28 servicemen and 236 islanders were evacuated to the military base at Kwajalein after the Bravo explosion (Firth 1987: 18).

After Bravo, the AEC issued a statement saying the evacuation was purely precautionary and that though the islanders had been unexpectedly exposed to some radiation, there were no burns or other ill-effects and they would be returned to their homes after the test’s conclusion. Despite these assurances, it soon became apparent that many of the islanders were suffering from radiation exposure, and the US had to admit that a mistake had been made. In 1982, the official statement on Bravo had transformed a routine nuclear test into “without question the worst single incident of fallout exposures in all the US atmospheric testing program” (Firth 1987: 19).

The behavior of the US in the Bravo affair has led to accusations that the islanders were deliberately exposed to the radiation in order to give American scientists a group to study the effects of radiation on human beings. Australian filmmaker Dennis O’Rourke’s 1986 film *Half Life* found that this belief is shared not only by several of the islanders, but also by some of the servicemen who were on Rongerik Atoll during Bravo and were evacuated a day after the explosion. O’Rourke’s documentary points to the fact that there was foreknowledge of the easterly wind direction and a delay in the evacuation of the

islanders while the servicemen were rescued one day after the blast. Also, on the day of the test, the destroyer *Gypsy* was at the entrance of Rongelap lagoon and measured the radiation level being experienced by the islanders before leaving (the USS *Phillip* picked up the islanders two days later). The 1954 report makes no mention of the presence of the *Gypsy* at Rongelap (O'Rourke 1986, Firth 1987: 20).

Skeptics of this conspiracy theory point out that the force of the blast was beyond anyone's expectations and that the ships that the scientists were on to monitor the test were also located directly in the path of the fallout. Although they were equipped with materials for washing down the ship in the event of a fallout emergency, would they really have knowingly put themselves in such danger? As for the delay in the evacuation of the islanders, skeptics point to the natural hesitancy of the military in dealing with unexpected situations without direct orders (Firth 1987: 20).

It was actually the Japanese fishermen who brought the legacy of Bravo into the world spotlight. Arriving back in Japan, doctors immediately recognized the signs of radiation exposure. With Hiroshima and Nagasaki still fresh in their minds, the Japanese people took to the streets in protest and demanded an inquiry into the matter. When Aikichi Kuboyama, radio operator of the *Fukuryu Maru*, died in September 1954, the Japanese government stated the cause of death to be radiation sickness, but the United States insisted that Kuboyama died of jaundice. The US later admitted responsibility and paid compensation after another wave of protests (Firth 1987: 22).

Bravo has left a legacy that remains powerful in the psyche of the islanders. The emotional scars may be even more permanent than the effects of the radiation in the area.

Pacific Nuclear Free Day is today observed on March 1, the date of the Bravo test. For the US, Bravo is simply a test gone wrong, but for the islanders, it brings to question just who is made “secure” by the testing of nuclear weapons.

The Last US Tests in the Pacific: Christmas and Johnston Islands

The final series of atmospheric tests conducted by the United States in the Pacific occurred between April and July 1962 on Christmas (now Kirimati) and Johnston Island. The total number of announced tests by the US is twelve at Johnston and twenty-five at Christmas Island (cited in R. Alexander 1994: 296, n14). One of the more remarkable tests, codenamed “Starfish,” actually altered the Van Allen radiation belt around the earth itself (Hayes, et al, 1986: 240) and led to the discovery that nuclear blasts in the high atmosphere create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which will produce a sudden power surge in electrical conductors (R. Alexander 1994: 34-35). Transistors and computer technology are particularly vulnerable to a sudden EMP. The efforts to “harden” modern microelectric technology against the EMP cannot be tested, as most of this technology was created after the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (also called the Partial Ban Treaty or PBT), which banned atmospheric tests (R. Alexander 1994: 35). The only way to know, then, whether these new measures actually work is to fight a nuclear war.

Nuclear Testing in the Pacific: The United Kingdom: “The Last G(r)asps at Empire”

The United States is not the only country for whom the Pacific has been an area for the testing of its nuclear weapons. Great Britain began its nuclear research soon after the end of World War II, inspired by a feeling that a nuclear arsenal was necessary both to

deter a nuclear armed enemy (the Soviets had detonated their first nuclear device in 1949) and also by a sense that Britain “as a great power must acquire all major new weapons” (R. Alexander 1994: 39). The once-great empire of the United Kingdom had clearly declined, but the development of nuclear weapons capability would return its status to the great power (if not the superpower) level. If a state commits to the creation of a nuclear arsenal, however, there has to be some place where one can test those weapons. Great Britain has little open land on its own territory to establish a feasible nuclear test site. Also, being a coastal nation, Britain would be primarily concerned with the effects of nuclear weapons on coastal regions. An area had to be found that would at least approximate these elements (not to mention being relatively uninhabited) for the British nuclear program to proceed.

In light of this problem, Britain turned to Australia, one of its fellow members of the Commonwealth, and the Menzies Government proved all too glad to help. Britain became the third nuclear power in the world on October 2, 1952, with the detonation of a nuclear device on the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia (R. Alexander 1994: 40). Subsequent agreements between the two countries allowed the British to conduct their tests on Emu Field near Woomera and in Maralinga, the “Field of Thunder,” located in the Great Victoria Desert in South Australia (R. Alexander 1994: 40). Seven tests were conducted at Maralinga and two at Emu Field between 1953 and 1957 (Lippman 1988: 111). Of the Maralinga tests, two were in the kiloton range (R. Alexander 1994: 41).

While it is the case that Great Britain did ask the permission of the Australian government before it initiated its nuclear testing program on Australian soil, in many ways the behavior and attitude of both the British and Australian officials show even less concern for the people “on the ground” than the United States or the French have in their nuclear tests in the Pacific. While the Americans at least recognized that the safety of the islanders was a concern and relocated them, the British and Australians showed a tremendous indifference to whether there was anyone in the testing area at all, especially those people of a different skin color. At the time of the 1952 Monte Bello test, the British estimated the population within 150 miles of the test to be 715 people “excluding full-blooded aboriginals” (quoted in Firth 1987: 70). Aboriginals were not even counted as part of the Australian census until 1968 (R. Alexander 1994: 40), although Firth notes that had the British bothered to ask, the Western Australia government in 1952 could have given them the number of 4538 Aboriginals moving through the area near Monte Bello (1987: 70). Signs posted saying “Warning. You are approaching a radioactive area. Read all notices” (quoted in R. Alexander 1994: 41) were meaningless to the Aborigines. A warning sign for a British test in 1957 was posted “in English, Italian, Greek, French, Spanish, and Arabic. The only people who might have seen the sign were Aborigines, for whom there was no warning” (Pilger 1991: 133).

The tremendous amount of secrecy around the British nuclear tests in Australia means that very little is known about the exposure of the Aborigines to radioactive fallout. Indeed, there wasn’t even an organized program of collecting information on fallout until 1955 when the Menzies Government set up the Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee

(Firth 1987: 71). Even then, the system of measuring fallout was severely flawed, for both technical and political reasons. The committee established sampling stations using sticky paper and air filters to measure fallout. However, measuring fallout by having it adhere to paper is highly ineffective, especially in measuring the amount of radiation in rainwater. The rain washed away what fallout was previously on the paper, and of course, the paper was no longer sticky after the rain fall (Firth 1987: 71). Politically, the committee was not independent of the British government; British officials had the right to veto prospective members of the committee (Firth 1987: 71).

Despite its seeming remoteness and emptiness, the truth of the matter was that the Great Victoria Desert was being continually traversed by the nomadic Aborigines, although actually finding them in the vast expanse of South Australia was more difficult than the proverbial “needle in the haystack.” A proposed survey of the Aboriginal presence in the Prohibited Zone never took place, and it is fairly certain that Aborigines were within the Zone when British bombs were tested in 1956 and 1957 (Firth 1987: 75). The Safety Committee lied to the Menzies Government, claiming that strict air and land patrols would ensure that no Aborigines would enter the Zone (Firth 1987: 75). In fact, those air patrols were more for the sake of favorable publicity than actually insuring the safety of the Aborigines:

Since “the country was too vast to cover on a grid basis,” the reality of air searches was that the plane “really just flew up the road and not over the country.” To have been seen, Aborigines would have had to be on the road or close by, rather than following traditional routes determined by the presence of water and food. Royal Air Force crews, ignorant of Aboriginal ways of life and told simply to look out for smoke by day and fire by night, were in any case travelling [sic] 150 metres above the ground at speeds of

400 or 500 kilometres per hour. The chances of finding individual Aborigines on the desert below were almost nil (Firth 1987: 76-77).

From documentation and testimony now available, it is highly questionable as to whether the British really did want to know if their test site was inhabited. The discovery or admission of Aboriginal activity within the testing zone was not the way to ingratiate oneself with those in charge of the test program. To wit:

When a member of the Australian Radiation Detection Unit stationed at Mt. Wooltarlinna said he had seen hunting fires which were probably in the Prohibited Zone, he was asked if he realized “what sort of damage” he would be doing “by finding Aborigines where Aborigines could not be.” The damage to be avoided, of course, was to the British test program, not to the people being injured by it (Firth 1987: 76).

Near the end of the British testing program in the region, a series of tests were performed on Christmas Island in 1957 and 1958, the same island that would be used by the United States in 1962. The general public will probably never know exactly how many detonations were included in this final series, for these tests were conducted but not announced. At least two tests were held between May and July 1957, and the bomb that was exploded on May 15 was Britain’s first thermonuclear device (R. Alexander 1994: 43). Britain announced seven nuclear tests in 1957, and it is known that three of them were conducted at Maralinga. It is quite likely that the others took place on Christmas Island (R. Alexander 1994: 43). The entire story of the British testing program in Australia may never be known.

Great Britain stopped its atmospheric nuclear tests (along with the US and the Soviet Union) with the signing of the 1963 Partial Ban Treaty (Firth 1987: 11-12), and no

longer conducts test in the Pacific. Most recently, Great Britain had conducted its underground nuclear tests at the United States testing site in the Nevada desert.

Despite the great concerns over the relocation and exposure of the islanders by the American tests and the effects on the Aborigines by the British tests, neither of them have stirred the same kind of outrage as the last nuclear state to be considered. Unquestionably, the most contentious nuclear testing program in the Pacific (as well as the most recent) has been that of France.

Nuclear Testing in the Pacific: France's "*force de frappe*"

Although France has long been in possession of territories in the South Pacific, it had been conducting tests of its "*force de frappe*," or striking force, at the Reganne test site in the Sahara Desert. This practice ended in 1962 when Algeria gained its independence from France (Firth 1987: 12). In need of a new location for its testing program, France identified and established its testing facility in the Pacific. The first French nuclear tests in the Pacific took place in 1966 and, in defiance of the 1963 Partial Ban Treaty, were atmospheric tests (Robie 1989: 145). (France was not yet a signatory to the PBT). In 1973, Australia and New Zealand filed twin suits against France before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), citing as a major fear the threat of nuclear fallout from such tests (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1973). France withdrew itself from the jurisdiction of the ICJ and officially ignored the proceedings, though the ICJ did not let the matter drop. While it was hearing the case, the ICJ issued a declaration for "interim measures of protection," meaning that neither France nor New Zealand or Australia should do anything to

aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court or prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision the Court may render in the case; and, in particular, the French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fall-out on the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue, or the Tokelau Islands (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1973: 7).

Although France had already withdrawn from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, it still felt the pressure of international opinion. France announced that it would cease its atmospheric testing and sign the Partial Ban Treaty. In light of this announcement, the ICJ declared both the Australia and New Zealand cases moot in 1974. However, the issue of nuclear testing was obviously not over for the region. Although it had ended atmospheric tests, France initiated a program of underground tests at Moruroa Atoll in French Polynesia in 1975 (Glebbeek 1990: 4). Of course, this would spark another uproar between France and those in the region, as well as a young organization known as Greenpeace, which would confront the French head-on by sailing ships into the international waters that France would unilaterally declare as “danger zones” during its tests (McTaggart 1979). If the ships were caught, they were boarded by the French military and many of the crew were beaten. Pictures of just such an incident were smuggled out by a female crewmember, and their publication severely hurt France’s image in the region, though it did not stop them from testing (McTaggart 1979). It would not be the last time Greenpeace and the French would cross each other on the issue of nuclear testing in the Pacific.

France’s testing program has been the target of the greatest protest within the region. There are two major reasons for this. First, the French nuclear testing program

was the most intensive of all ever conducted in the region. A February 1989 study by the Washington-based Natural Resources Defense Council states that the number of tests carried out by France in the Pacific had been over 50 percent the total conducted by the US and 40 percent that of the Soviet Union, a disparity placed in even greater light given the total number of French nuclear weapons being less than 3 percent that of either of the superpowers (Mack 1989: 329). Secondly, the tests by the US and Britain came during an era where the decolonization movement had not yet crested and the scientific understanding of radiation and the environmental risks of nuclear testing were not as clearly understood. The US, via its strategic trust, had virtual *carte blanche* with its testing program in the Pacific, and Britain did ask for permission to conduct its tests from the Australian government. (That the Menzies Government cared more about pleasing the British than protecting the Aborigines is another question). In contrast, France's tests in the Pacific begin when the scientific risks of radiation and fallout were becoming more clearly understood, and at a time that the Pacific islands were becoming independent. This latter point posed two major problems for the French. There is first the concern that the independence movements in the Pacific will spread to the French territories. Moreover, the newly independent Pacific states are now able to present their case at international forums (such as the United Nations), standing as technical equals to France as "fellow states" (Henningham 1996: 81).

The nuclear testing program in the South Pacific was seen by the French as a necessary facet of their independent nuclear deterrent. The French have long viewed their nuclear force as necessary to their security as it is their belief that the United States is an

unreliable ally that would be willing to sacrifice Europe for its own safety (Firth 1987: 109). France's nuclear arsenal is also a symbol of its independence from both superpowers. Critics of French testing in general, however, have raised many objections to this policy and the reasoning behind it.

Despite having the third largest nuclear force in the world, the disparity between the nuclear forces of France and the Soviet Union is so great as to make even the thought of a French first strike inconceivable. In the event of a Soviet first strike, however, practically all of France's Command, Communication, Control, and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities would have been destroyed. The best the French could hope for in this case would be a retaliatory strike causing the destruction of several Soviet cities. Critics of the French insisted that the capability for such retaliation already existed and therefore nuclear testing was unnecessary. While there are some arguments that improvements may need to be made of the French delivery systems, the testing program at Moruroa had little if anything to do with that aspect of France's nuclear capability (Mack 1989: 329-330).

Even with arguments that support the necessity of an independent French nuclear deterrent (and therefore nuclear testing), it was not necessarily the case that these tests should have been conducted in the Pacific. One of the reasons the British ended their testing program in the Pacific was a concern that coral atolls were not stable areas to conduct underground nuclear tests, which bring to question the French assertion that their underground tests at Moruroa are completely safe. This assertion prompted an Australian ambassador to note (ironically, given Britain's tests on Australian soil) that there should then be little reason that the tests not "...be conducted in the home territory of the

metropolitan power” (Mack 1989: 330). The Australian government announced in 1986 that it had surveyed sites in France and found the Gueret area, Margeride, and Corsica as suitable sites for testing (Robie 1989: 145). France, however, both disagreed with those findings and also justified the continuation of testing at Moruroa since France had already set up the facilities there. Interestingly, France “also implied that since the tests are widely perceived as dangerous, such a transferral [to France’s home territory] would be politically unpopular” (Aldrich 1993: 313, emphasis in original). Also, France had reportedly been offered, as the British have, the use of testing sites within the United States. Submitted testimony before Congress by Greenpeace mentions most notably a May 1989 article in *Foreign Policy*¹¹ by Richard Ullman, which pointed to covert cooperation by the US in the French nuclear testing program, including the offer by the US for the French to use the Nevada test site (US Congress, House, 1995: 75). French officials have denied that such an offer had been made (Mack 1989). The rumor of the US offer remains unsubstantiated, although it has appeared in many places. Stephen Solarz, then Chair of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives, asked whether the US had offered France the use of the Nevada testing site at a hearing on September 25, 1986. It was reported back that the US has never made such an offer (US Congress, House, 1986: 64). Greenpeace has also accused the US of complicity with the French testing program by allowing French military planes bound for Moruroa to overfly US airspace, quite possibly carrying plutonium (US Congress, House, 1995: 77). It is illegal for fissile materials to fly over US airspace without clearance, but

¹¹The testimony incorrectly names the journal as *Foreign Affairs*.

accurate verification of what the French are carrying is doubtful.¹² What ties, if any, exist between the US and the French in regards to the nuclear testing program in the Pacific remain a mystery, but several questions remain unanswered.

The French nuclear testing program and the protests surrounding it experienced a major flashpoint on July 10, 1985 when French agents bombed the Greenpeace flagship *Rainbow Warrior* while it was docked in Auckland Harbor, causing the death of Dutch photographer and Greenpeace crewman Fernando Pereira, who drowned while attempting to retrieve his cameras. (Danielsson and Danielsson 1986; Sawyer 1986; Lange 1990; “And who stopped the French?” 1992). France had announced an upcoming series of nuclear tests and Greenpeace declared that the *Rainbow Warrior* would be there, playing cat-and-mouse with the French Navy in the “forbidden zone.” Once France’s guilt in the matter became apparent, what was originally Greenpeace’s most devastating setback became the source of its greatest publicity and produced an increase in Greenpeace’s international image and reputation, causing its membership to jump to 5 million worldwide (“And who stopped the French?” 1992). France’s reputation, in contrast, emerged from the matter seriously bruised, at least insofar as the people in the region were concerned. Among the French, however, very few viewed the incident as something for which France should apologize for. The consensus of both the left and right in France was that the

¹²It can be argued that this last accusation by Greenpeace is a bit duplicitous, or at least, somewhat hypocritical. The US overflies many areas of Europe without declaration of the materials or technology on board. Like US approval of French overflights, this is done on a case-by-case basis. Such actions are more in tune with the “day-to day” business of international relations than somehow being a unique “complicity” between the US and France over nuclear testing.

testing program was necessary to protect France's interests. Therefore, the action against the *Rainbow Warrior* was proper and acceptable (Firth 1987: 89).

The *Rainbow Warrior* affair certainly intensified anti-French sentiment in the region, and the attitude that the French took on the matter only served to stoke the flames of resentment. France put enormous economic pressure on New Zealand, whose economy depended quite heavily on its exports of dairy products into the European market. In the end, the two French agents who were apprehended in New Zealand were convicted of manslaughter but did not serve their full sentence, instead being repatriated to France in direct violation of the agreement struck between France and New Zealand (Lange 1990). France's action only served to confirm for the people in the Pacific that they were viewed as second-class citizens in the world community. British author Michael Szabo noted a double standard in how France treated New Zealand in particular and the Pacific more generally:

If a Libyan bomb blows up an American civil airliner and France, among others, demands the extradition of the suspected bombers...then for France or other countries to have sought to prevent one of the suspects in the *Rainbow Warrior* terrorist act being extradited is a double standard ("And who stopped the French?" 1992).

France's concern with security (the perceived threat of the Soviet Union as well as viewing the United States as an unreliable ally) served to support the notion that the nuclear testing program was necessary. The policy established by de Gaulle has continued—France is a global power and as such must have a military force worthy of such a power (and permanent member of the UN Security Council), which in this day and age means a capable nuclear force.

Angry over the clear disdain with which France held the interests of the people of the Pacific, the governments of the region struck back. Via the South Pacific Forum, the region lobbied against France in the United Nations, attacking not only the nuclear testing program, but France's presence and authority within the region. Some have argued that France's presence in the region is simply an extension of the colonization of the region, this time via "nuclearism."¹³ In December 1986, under heavy lobbying by SPF members, the UN decided to reinscribe the French holding of New Caledonia (known as Kanaky to the indigenous population) onto the list of nonself-governing countries (in essence, officially naming France as a continuing colonial power) (Barrie 1988: 69). Coupled with the *Rainbow Warrior* incident, it was a stinging blow to the French and served notice that the Forum should be regarded as a serious organization that could have significant impact (Chand 1993: 61). It was not the first, and would not be the last time that the Pacific would connect issues of anti-nuclearism to sentiments of anti-colonialism, a connection we will investigate in further depth later.

"Buying Friends and Influencing People": France's Continued Presence in the Region

Like the United States, France continues to be a major presence in the Pacific. In an effort to increase its prestige and support for its policies, France has poured an enormous amount of financial aid into the region. French appropriations in 1980 were Aus\$286,000 to Papua New Guinea, Aus\$96,000 to Tonga, Aus\$20 million to Vanuatu, Aus\$92,000 to Western Samoa, and Aus\$572,000 to regional institutions (Aldrich 1989:

¹³The term was coined by Father Walter Lini (later Prime Minister) of Vanuatu.

97). Financial disbursements continued to increase in the wake of the *Rainbow Warrior* affair. Aldrich lists direct French aid to the region as Aus\$25-30 million annually in the late 1980's (1993: 337). Not an exorbitant sum, to be sure, but extremely valuable in such lightly populated areas. Indeed, these numbers are insignificant when compared to the some Aus\$1450 million sent to the French holdings in the Pacific every year (Henningham 1989: 7). The French colonies are highly subsidized by the French, and are able to boast the highest per capita incomes in the region (Fraser 1990: 14). Employment in the French colonies is almost completely for the French government, either directly as part of the nuclear testing program or indirectly in some civil service capacity for the territorial government, most usually in public works and infrastructure construction. In 1983 a census revealed that 80 percent of the workforce in French Polynesia was employed in some form of construction or commerce capacity for the government (Finney 1992: 83). The massive influx of monies into the region had been viewed by the French as the price necessary for maintaining the nuclear testing program in the Pacific and conversely many islanders viewed the testing program as the price for their affluence. Per capita income in the region in 1985 was greater than New Zealand's and only 18 percent lower than that of France itself (Finney 1992: 84). Along with wealth, modernization has come to the region with all the technological advances—automobiles, Western style housing, and television to name but a few.

Money can not buy everything, however, and even in French Polynesia voices were growing against not just French nuclear testing, but questions of continued metropolitan influence in the region. Modernization in French Polynesia has brought with it the same

problems it did in the TTPI, including the fears and dangers of the mushroom cloud hanging overhead. For the French, the nuclear program is part of their national security interests, but for the islanders, the question is simply put: If the tests are so safe, then why not test in France? The French response that testing in French Polynesia *is* testing in France obviously only serves to inflame the argument further.

In 1992, France announced a moratorium on its testing programme. The celebrations and announcements that this moratorium signaled the end of nuclear testing in the region proved somewhat premature, however. The moratorium was established only for the year (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994: 26), and the announcement stated that if other countries did not follow France's example, then France would resume testing ("France Puts Its Nuclear Test Program On Hold" 1992: 9). The French maintained their moratorium on a year-by-year basis. Then, in 1995, France gave the Pacific the equivalent of a "good news-bad news" situation. On June 13, President Chirac announced that France would resume testing, and announced that eight tests would take place between September 1995 and May 1996 ("No to nukes" 1995: 13). a month after the first scheduled test, France announced jointly with the United States and Britain that all three would finally sign the SPNFZ Protocols (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1996: 26-27).

The resumption of France's program was met with tremendous protests in the region and international disapproval from almost every corner of the world. In the aftermath of the first test on September 5, Australia withdrew its ambassador from France, and French products were boycotted across Asia and the Pacific (Shenon 1995: A1). On

Tahiti, the main island of French Polynesia, there was an uprising of some of the indigenous people, resulting in the airport building at Faa'a being set ablaze (Williams 1995: 14). The promise that Chirac would sign both the SPNFZ Protocols and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the conclusion of this series of tests was small consolation for the islanders. Despite the statement of Greenpeace's Stephanie Mills, that "President Chirac cannot ignore the strength of international opinion against a resumption of testing" ("France Defies World Condemnation," 1995: 7), France had been willing to stand against near unanimous international disapproval for its actions, and showed little if any concern for the protests of the states in the region.

Antinuclearism in the South Pacific: Variations on the Theme

While the region was generally united in resistance to nuclear testing, there were other aspects of the nuclear cycle that did not have such universal opposition. Questions of peaceful transit of nuclear armed vessels through the region's waters, or Australia's uranium export economy, for example. Furthermore, while the opposition to nuclearism was a general sentiment, there was no overall agreed upon policy to crystallize this sentiment. Indeed, some established (and emerging) countries developed their own national policies to address this issue. These national policies would hasten the push for a regional agreement on the nuclear issue, and would also be seen as potential models to be followed for that regional agreement. The first, and most tumultuous, proposal came during the development of the constitution of the US trust territory of Belau.

Belau¹⁴: “The Mouse that Roared”

The island of Belau can perhaps be considered the flagship of anti-nuclearism in the South Pacific. This very small island group at times isn't even identified on maps of the world, yet for a time it stood against a superpower.

Belau was one of the territories that fell under the control of the United States after World War II. The capital, Koror, had been the base for the Japanese colonial administration when it controlled Micronesia. With the Japanese defeat, Belau was placed under the United States as part of the TTPI. As the process went underway to dissipate the strategic trust, Belau separated itself from the rest of the trust territories and negotiated with the United States as an independent entity. The US military, in particular, still had some interest in Belau. During the Cold War, Belau was viewed as one link in the chain of possible fallback locations for the United States in the event of a loss of base privileges in the Philippines (the latter situation becoming a reality with the eruption of Mount Pinatubo). The late John C. Dorrance, a US State Department Pacific specialist, had stated one possible scenario that illustrates the strategic value of Belau:

...loss of access to facilities in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, the strategic importance of not only Palau [sic], but also of Guam and the Northern Marianas, would increase as possible sites for the relocation of some US military operations presently at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base.... In the event of war, the US might need to utilize contingency rights in Palau to provide protection of sea lanes running north-south between the Philippines and Palau (quoted in Firth 1987: 63).

¹⁴The use of “Belau” over “Palau” is often a political statement in and of itself. It is used as an expression of support for the indigenous population over what is seen as the imperialism of the West. However, both Wilson (1995) and Leibowitz (1996) note that the names seem used almost interchangeably in most conversations among those on the island (Wilson notes this especially). Belau will be used throughout this text, with exceptions made for direct quotations.

The people of Belau, however, proceeded to complicate the strategic map of the United States when they drafted their first constitution in 1979. That constitution included a unique clause relating to the matter of nuclear material. To wit:

Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom shall not be used, tested, or stored, or disposed of within the territorial jurisdiction of Belau without the express approval of not less than three-fourths of votes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific question (quoted in Robie 1989: 169).

The constitution, anti-nuclear clause and all, was put before the people of Belau and approved by 92 percent of the electorate. The world's first nuclear-free constitution was established as "an inspiration and hope from nuclear holocaust" (Robie 1989: 163). Such an inspiration, however, was quite clearly in conflict with the strategic interests that the United States had in regards to Belau and the Trust Territory High Commissioner refused to certify the result of the vote (Robie 1989: 169). a revised constitution was drafted without the anti-nuclear clause but garnered only 31 percent of the vote (Leibowitz 1996: 35). a third vote on a draft of the constitution nearly identical to the original received 78 percent of the vote and was instituted as the law of the land (Robie 1989: 169).

If the question of the constitution were not confusing enough, Belau also had to address the issue of free association with the United States. In voting on the Compact with the United States, the people of Belau found themselves at an interesting crossroads. The first vote on the Compact came on February 10, 1983. The Compact included a clause giving the United States the right to store nuclear weapons, materials, and port

nuclear-powered ships in Belau. On this first vote, 53 percent of the voters chose to accept this specific clause of the Compact, while 62 percent proceeded to accept the Compact as a whole (Robie 1989: 172). Belau reasoned that since the vote on the nuclear clause of the Compact did not exceed the 75 percent vote required by Belau's constitution, the Compact as a whole was rejected. Contrarily, the United States argued that only the nuclear substances provisions of the Compact had been defeated due to the 75 percent requirement. The US argued that the 62 percent vote on the whole Compact indicated that it had been accepted; the vote on the nuclear clause was an internal matter. It was therefore up to Belau to revise its constitution to coincide with the terms of the Compact. a suit was filed in the Supreme Court of Belau arguing that the Compact in its entirety was disapproved on February 10, 1983. On August 4, 1983, the Compact was declared invalid by Judge Robert Hefner. The Reagan Administration did not take this decision well, and continued to assert that the vote on the Compact was a "valid act of self-determination" (Leibowitz 1996: 40). The US finally abandoned that position as untenable, though it would not be its last word on the subject. The game of nuclear cat-and-mouse was underway.

The United States continued to force the issue, dangling the bait of financial aid before the islanders in return for a "yes" vote on the nuclear clause and the Compact. Such bait, however, would seem to be poisoned upon closer examination. The 1990 financial offer of US\$5.5 million for military access to Belauan lands averages to about 2 cents per square meter, in contrast to the going local rate of US\$165 per square meter (Wypijewski 1990). Financially, Belau had been almost completely dependent upon the

United States, as financial aid from the US amounts to about 90 percent of Belau's annual budget (Wypijewski 1990).

Because of the stalemate over the Compact and the nuclear clause, Belau remained the last remnant of the trust system, a political embarrassment for the US. From 1979 to 1989, Belau held ten referendums on the nuclear clause since 1979 and the Belauan Supreme Court has ruled four times that the Compact is in violation of Belau's constitution unless the Compact receives 75 percent of the vote (Robie 1989: 175). The second vote on September 4, 1984 gained 66 percent of the vote and President Haruo Remeliik (who chaired Belau's constitutional convention that produced the nuclear-free document) declared the Compact approved, even getting approval from Belau's House and Senate. The US, however, had already been burned once and was unwilling to do so again. The US would wait until the Compact received 75 percent of the vote or Belau amended their constitution (Leibowitz 1996: 44).

Belau had been in turmoil over the costs of "free association." President Haruo Remeliik was assassinated on June 30, 1985. Conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination abounded, including accusations of involvement by the FBI and CIA (Robie 1989: 163-164). Such insinuations were even covered by the US news program "20/20." Still, the theory proved untenable.¹⁵ Despite Remeliik's antinuclear stand and his being chair of the constitutional convention, he had been an ardent supporter of the Compact

¹⁵One of the things that lent credence to the theory was that the CIA had, in 1975 and 1976, wiretapped the rooms of the Micronesians negotiating the Compact with the US. Leibowitz says, "since that time, almost all unusual events in Micronesia, especially in Palau, have been attributed to CIA intervention" (1996: 66).

during his tenure as president (Leibowitz 1996: 65). The crime has yet to be solved. Lazarus Salii, Remeliik's successor and a strong supporter of the Compact, was still not able to gather the necessary 75 percent to approve the Compact and the nuclear agreement. a snap referendum on August 4, 1987 gathered a 71 percent vote in favor of overturning the nuclear clause in the constitution. It was also the lowest turnout ever for a referendum (Robie 1989: 174). a little over two weeks later, on August 21, 1987, under the provisions of this disputed constitutional amendment, the Compact achieved 73 percent of the vote (Robie 1989: 174; Parmentier 1991: 151). However, the traditional elders of Belau, most of them women, challenged Salii in the Belauan courts. The elders had the constitution on their side; 75 percent is what is required for the constitution to be amended and to accept the nuclear clauses of the Compact, that had yet to be achieved. Although the Compact was approved in the US Senate on March 28, 1988, the Belauan Supreme Court nullified the Compact vote as being unconstitutional (Parmentier 1991: 151). On August 20, 1988, Salii was found dead due to a gunshot wound to the head in his home. Though the coroner concluded Salii's death was suicide, rumors and accusations abounded in the early aftermath of his death (Leibowitz 1996: 172). Salii's successor, Ngiratkel Etpison, was also a strong supporter of the Compact, military clauses and all.

Belauans have struggled long and hard on both sides of the Compact debate, and it has been a major source of strain on the society. As Roman Tmetuchi, a traditional chief, says, "There is no more pride in being a native Palauan....Young Palauans have lost their hopes...[and] are just living like animals....All people under colonial rule are like that"

(Goodstein 1990). Gabriela Ngirmang, one of fifty Belauan women elders who stood against Salii, articulates the alternative to the Compact and all that it entails thusly: “We must protect our constitution and our land....It is the only place on earth we can express our right to be Belauan” (Robie 1989: 174). President Etpison had been negotiating with several foreign investors to develop Belau’s tourism industry, but such a focus could cause as many problems to Belau’s traditional culture as the Compact. Tourism, however, may be the only option available to the Belauans if they hope to survive without the aid held out to them in the form of the Compact, and there were indeed questions as to how long the Compact offer would remain open.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought a new international situation to the fore. The idea that Belau would be used for military purposes, even for strategic denial, became more and more remote. In addition to that, the mood within Belau changed as well. The Belauans themselves recognized the changes in the international system, and understood that their “bargaining power” in regards to their strategic location was changing with the international changes. There were certainly some problems and issues surrounding the Compact that needed to be addressed, but everyone in Belau understood that the financial benefits under the Compact were better than no benefits at all.

Domestically, there were other changes. Etpison lost his reelection bid and Kuniwo Nakamura became the newest president of Belau. Though Nakamura had long opposed the Compact (his older brother was actually the author of the nuclear ban in the Constitutional Convention), he changed his position, understanding the changed situation

and acting in what he felt was for the good of the majority of Belau (Leibowitz 1996: 203). Belau amended its constitution (by less than a 75 percent vote, but this nuance was not raised this time), allowing for a simple majority to approve the Compact. Also, for the first time, the United States agreed in writing to take no land except for the Malakal and Airai airports. Further, the US would be responsible for the cleanup and damages of any nuclear accident in Belauan waters (Leibowitz 1996: 202).

On November 14, 1993, the Compact was accepted with 68 percent of the vote. Nakamura announced that October 1, 1994 would be Belau's first Independence Day. It was an incredibly risky political move by Nakamura. There were still three lawsuits on the Compact yet to be resolved (one filed in the Northern Marianas, one in Belau, and one in Hawaii). The Marianas case was quickly dismissed, the court stating that it was a local suit to be filed in Belau. The case before the Belauan Supreme Court was withdrawn by the plaintiffs under intense pressure. The Hawaii case was expected to be a long, drawn-out affair, but to the surprise of everyone, the suit was withdrawn on September 19 (Leibowitz 1996: 211-212). Belau would be independent.

Belau's struggle was only one manifestation of antinuclear sentiment within the region. Another island state, Vanuatu, was also pushing a strong antinuclear stance and positioning itself as one of the more radical states in the region.

Vanuatu: a Radically Different History

The island nation of Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides, had a colonial experience, and a subsequent decolonization experience that was quite different from those of its neighbors in the South Pacific. The New Hebrides were colonized by both

Great Britain and France. While neither was willing to annex the New Hebrides outright, they also did not want the other country to gain an advantage in the region. To deal with this situation, a “condominium” form of administration was developed between Britain and France, a pact that was consolidated formally in 1906. For those who had to live under its arrangements, the administration was referred to as the “pandemonium.” Dual institutions were established, most notably separate police forces and education systems. Beyond the dual institutions, the condominium arrangement actually meant that there were three sets of official laws in New Hebrides—the British, French, and those set up by the Joint Administration (Sope 1980:17).

This redundant arrangement would bring about much confusion and difficulty as the New Hebrides would seek its independence during the wave of decolonization that began in the 1960's. While Britain sought to release themselves of any ties in the Pacific, France had other ideas. It was feared that independence for New Hebrides could trigger the dreaded “domino” effect. First the New Hebrides, then independence for New Caledonia, and eventually French Polynesia, where it could threaten France's nuclear testing program. As France had already lost one testing site with the independence of Algeria, it was certainly loath to the possibility of losing another. Hence, France initiated efforts to hang on to the New Hebrides. Some of its tactics were not in and of themselves destructive. For example, in an effort to encourage more Francophone education, discrimination against “ni-Vanuatuu” (native Vanuatuuans) was ended in the early 1970's (Robie 1989: 71). The primary idea was to establish a Francophone majority on Vanuatu that would feel loyal or at least somewhat beholden to France (hence, a group that could

potentially be manipulated). France aided in the development of a coalition of French speaking parties which would eventually coalesce as the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). The UMP opposed immediate independence and stood against the Anglophone New Hebrides National Party, which would become the *Vanua'aku Pati* (Our Land Party) (VP), led by the Anglican priest, Father Walter Lini. Lini was a driving force behind the movement towards Vanuatu's independence, and a tireless speaker against colonialism and neocolonialism.

The labor pains of independence were probably greater for Vanuatu than for any other Pacific nation. Strong expressions of secessionism were found on the islands of Santo and Tanna, and there was doubt as to whether Vanuatu could remain together, or, like the TTPI, would split before it had even become independent. Despite these concerns, the VP, led by Lini and running on a platform of immediate independence, took 62 percent of the vote and two-thirds of the National Assembly (with a 90 percent voter turnout). More significantly, the VP won majorities on every island, including Santo and Tanna (Robie 1989: 76).

The secessionist movements continued, however, with two outside sources of financial and moral support. The two sources were the Phoenix Foundation, a right-wing American organization that sought to create a free market haven untainted by "socialist" ideas (of which the VP was guilty, espousing something called "Melanesian Socialism") (Premdas and Steeves 1989: 1), and the French government, which hoped that a secessionist movement would destabilize the VP on the road to independence. Lini argues, though, that the differing ends of the French government and the Phoenix

Foundation brought them to a crossroads as to the timing of it all. The secessionist movement forced the breakaway before the VP took power and the New Hebrides was officially independent. This was inconvenient for the French, who had hoped that the break would occur after independence, thereby proving that the New Hebrideans were not ready to govern themselves (Robie 1989: 77).

Under the growing spotlight of the international media (which fell upon the clichéd but effective “Trouble in Paradise” motif), Lini, now deputy-minister-elect, pressured the British and French governments to squelch the rebellion before they left. Failing to get the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force, Lini and the VP gave consideration to bringing troops in from another Pacific nation, perhaps Papua New Guinea. In the meantime, the public in the New Hebrides was becoming increasingly convinced that France was only interested in maintaining its influence in the new nation, while Britain sought to exit the scene with as little fuss as possible (Smalles 1980: 14). Troops from both Britain and France were sent in, under the direction of a French colonel, and did little to end the rebellion. In fact, on the day before they were scheduled to leave, several soldiers (subsequently court martialed) took part in looting and random destruction (Robie 1989: 79). In contrast, the small contingent of troops from Papua New Guinea acted quickly and efficiently, putting down the rebellion within thirty-six hours, something that the British and French had failed to do in over a month. The New Hebrides—now officially named Vanuatu—was finally independent.

Vanuatu thus achieved its independence, one of two South Pacific nations—Belau is the other—to have to survive a violent conflict on its path of decolonization. Such an

experience has made Vanuatu, at least under Anglophone rule, one of the most outspoken critics of colonialism and neocolonialism in the world. Vanuatu has strongly advocated the independence of New Caledonia from French rule, and was the first Pacific nation to join the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, Vanuatu was one of the leading lights in the antinuclear movement in the South Pacific. Vanuatu's antinuclear policy has been the most stringent in the Pacific, and its refusal to admit two US warships into its waters due to the US policy to "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons onboard its ships occurred in 1982, becoming the law of the land in 1983. This was a year before the Labour Party with its much publicized antinuclear policy was brought to power in New Zealand (Robie 1989: 80). Indeed, Lini's subsequent refusal to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was founded on the argument that the treaty did not go far enough, and had been watered down by the United States through the efforts of the Australian contingent (see Stevens 1988).

While led by Lini and the VP, Vanuatu situated itself as one of the more radical island nations. Robert Van Lierop, Vanuatu's then-Ambassador to the UN, would be play a major role in the coming climate negotiations. We turn now to the case of Fiji, the first island state in the region to undergo a military coup d'état.

Fiji: Antinuclearism and Ethnic Politics

Fiji gained its independence from Britain in 1970. While under British rule, many laborers were imported from South Asia for the sugar cane industry. Today, Fiji is essentially a bicultural country, consisting mainly of ethnic Fijians and Indians, with the Fijians as the numerical minority (46.2 to 48.6 percent of Fiji's population of 715,375 in

1986, the remainder being made up mostly of Europeans) (Kaplan 1993: 53, n2). Still, ethnic Fijians have been the dominant political force in society. From independence until 1987, Fiji's government was governed by the predominantly indigenous Alliance Party with Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, a senior statesman of the region, as prime minister. However, the Fijian Indians have made great inroads into the business and market sector, and their success in the marketplace has brought them not only financial benefit, but also an increasing desire for a greater political voice. In April 1987, a coalition of the National Federation Party and the Labour Party, with grass-roots support from both ethnic Fijians and Indians, was able to end the rule of the Alliance Party (Ghai 1990: 13). Timoci Bavadra led this coalition and took his place as Prime Minister of Fiji. His initial cabinet was a symbol of the multiracial support of the coalition, consisting of six Fijians and seven Indians (Kaplan 1993: 48).

After the election, however, the Alliance Party seized upon racism as a weapon to destabilize the coalition. Within a week of the election, the *Taukei* Movement ("*taukei*" is the word for ethnic Fijians) which counted among them several key Alliance Party members, encouraged fears that ethnic Fijians would soon become disenfranchised in their own land (Robie 1989: 216). April 24 saw 4000 Fijians gathered in protest against the Bavadra government, bearing signs such as "Fiji for Fijians," "Fiji now Little India—Say No!" and demanding a change in the constitution that would guarantee political control for ethnic Fijians (Robie 1989: 216-217). Bavadra refused to back down, calling for understanding the "Pacific" way. In a radio broadcast, Bavadra said, "let us not tarnish

the image of tolerance and goodwill for which Fiji is renowned” (Robie 1989: 217). This was not to be.

On May 14, 1987, democracy ended in Fiji. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, a coup was staged against the Bavadra government. Rabuka’s stated justification for his action was to ensure the political paramountcy of the ethnic Fijians in the face of the growing challenge of the Fijian Indians (Ghai 1990: 13). Rabuka’s coup ostensibly returned the rule of Fiji back over to its “Great Council of Chiefs,” who were advising Rabuka on his rule. This illusion of “traditional” legitimacy was shattered in a second coup by Rabuka in September 1987. This time, Rabuka seized total control, appointing himself “interim” head of state, suspending the 1970 constitution, and withdrawing from the British Commonwealth (Alley 1990: 45). In 1990, a new constitution was approved by the high chiefs, a constitution that denies to the Fijian Indians representation proportional to their population and requires that the two highest offices, President and Prime Minister, must be filled by ethnic Fijians (Kaplan 1993: 35).

What is most interesting for our discussions about the coups are the international consequences and assumptions that arose in their wake. Fiji has had a long standing grass-roots antinuclear movement (as old as independent Fiji itself), and the Fijian government had also had a fairly strong stand against nuclearism (Naidu 1988). The government position was reversed on July 29, 1983, when Mara announced that US nuclear-armed and powered ships would be allowed into Fiji’s ports. The Bavadra coalition ran on, among other issues, an antinuclear platform. This position was a concern of the United States, as was noted at a congressional hearing (US Congress, House, 1989: 6). This was made

moot by the deposing of the Bavadra government. Fiji would not be moving to the antinuclear or more nonaligned stance that was anticipated by the Bavadra government (US Congress, House, 1989: 6). The Bush Administration was, understandably, quite pleased with this turn of events.

Of course, the occurrence of the coups in the atmosphere of, among other things, the troubles of Belau led to charges and concerns that the coups included involvement by foreign powers (Anthony 1988: xiii). Suspicions surrounded the presence of William Paupe, who arrived in Fiji in 1982 as director of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Paupe was with USAID in Vietnam when USAID trained Vietnamese intelligence forces and worked with the CIA (Robie 1989: 245). Paupe's arrival coincided with rising antinuclear and anti-US sentiment in Fiji. Evidence of US, and more specifically, CIA involvement in the coups remains circumstantial, but should not be dismissed out of hand. Such actions would not be inconsistent with past CIA actions or agendas (Robie 1989: 247).

Although in the final analysis the major reasons for the Fiji coups are more likely to be found in domestic issues of ethnic identity and indigenous chiefly rule, the international consequences of the coups should not be ignored. For whatever reason or reasons, a more stringent antinuclear stand did not come about in the Pacific, and a presentation of another alternative of "security" in the region was presented stillborn.

While the general sentiment among the island states in the region was to redefine their security interests as different from those of the major powers, at least one island state, Tonga, took the opposite point of view.

Tonga: Conservative Kingdom

Tonga is one of the few surviving monarchies in the world. Although it is technically a constitutional monarchy along the lines of the British model, the king and other hereditary nobles actually wield a significant amount of political power. Of the island states, only Tonga maintained a semblance of sovereignty during the colonial period. In 1900, due to serious financial problems, Tonga's King George II requested the protection of Great Britain, which gave Britain control over Tonga's defense and foreign affairs, but left most of its domestic processes untouched (Colbert 1997: 25). Tonga's position and experience as a protectorate of Britain therefore made its "colonization" experience rather mild. The relative lack of penetration into the domestic realm experienced by Tonga has meant that it has remained one of the most "traditional" and conservative states in the region. It has also meant that Tonga has in general been quite deferential to the major powers, and quite supportive of the ANZUS alliance. Tonga allowed the visit of the *U.S.S. Bainbridge*, a US nuclear-powered cruiser in 1978. During the late 1970's and early 1980's, Tonga received increases in financial and military aid from Australia, New Zealand, and the US (Hamel-Green 1990: 97).

Tonga's stance on the SPNFZ negotiations was that the treaty compromised US military interests, and therefore jeopardized the stability of the region. While Tonga opposed nuclear testing and waste dumping in the region, it felt that the US should be able to station or store nuclear weapons in the region, especially in wartime. Because of these objections, Tonga declined to participate in the SPNFZ negotiations and did not sign the treaty (Hamel-Green 1990: 97).

Overall, Tonga has kept a very low profile in the international scene, and while its disapproval of the SPNFZ Treaty was noted, there has been little made of it. Tonga does allow visits by the US Navy. Though such visits are infrequent, the fact that they can and do occur would bring to question the real effectiveness of an “islands-only” nuclear free zone that was so feared by Australia. Australia may have preempted a movement that was more hollow than its rhetoric made it seem. More likely, however, is that Australia felt that only having Tonga on its side would still leave Australia isolated in the region.

The Development of Cooperation in The South Pacific

Many of the island states proudly claim that their tradition of cooperation (referred to as “the Pacific Way”) goes back to precontact times, though the assertion may be more for present consumption than based on any historical basis. Much of the patterns of cooperation between the island states in the South Pacific can actually be traced back to the post WWII era, and the work of the metropolitan powers in establishing a South Pacific Commission (SPC or “the Commission”). As Boyce and Herr note:

The islands’ leaders refer to the process by which they achieve consensus and compromise at home, conduct their intra-regional affairs, and amicably resolve regional problems as the “Pacific Way.” a European might translate the term as a sense of community based on a relationship that can only be described as brotherly. Fostered and nurtured over two decades of South Pacific Conferences, the Pacific Way is now an essential element in all intra-regional contacts.... [B]ecause the older states have been mainly responsible for creating this new ethos, they espouse it more enthusiastically than the newcomers. The South Pacific Conference has played a central role in the emergence of the Pacific Way (quoted in Corkran 1976:123, emphasis added).

Much of the conflict in the Pacific theatre of WWII centered around areas technically governed by the United Kingdom but actually under Japanese control (M. Haas

1989:31). The primary Allied forces in the Pacific were Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Most Americans did not even know that the United States had jurisdiction over these islands and there was very little public concern for a region thousands of miles away from the American mainland. This led the regional powers of Australia and New Zealand to consider new arrangements to fill this vacuum. Impressed with the model of the Caribbean Commission (CARICOM) set up in 1942 (Corkran 1976:105, M. Haas 1989:31), a South Seas Conference of the administering powers¹⁶ in the region gathered to set up a Pacific equivalent to the CARICOM. This meeting would lead to the establishment the South Pacific Commission (SPC).

The SPC (or simply “the Commission”) was inaugurated in 1947 in Canberra, Australia by those powers which were administering territories in the region, namely Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is headquartered in Noumea, in the French territory of New Caledonia. In 1962, the Netherlands withdrew from the SPC after relinquishing control of Netherlands New Guinea (later incorporated into Papua New Guinea) to the United Nations (Corkran 1976:107). Originally, only the administering powers could attend meetings of the SPC. Representatives of the island states met triennially in a “South Pacific Conference,” where they could comment upon the work of the Commission. The meetings of the Conference were scheduled in different times and places as the SPC, and most of the “commentary” that they offered was obviously after the fact. In 1967, the cycle for the Conferences was shortened to once a year and the meetings of the Conference and the Commission were

¹⁶ Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands.

scheduled together (M. Haas 1989:32-33). By 1974, the distinction between the Conference and the Commission had effectively disappeared, with the Commission meeting simply as a committee of the South Pacific Conference, although the administering powers still held very important budget and administrative responsibilities (Corkran 1976:149). Despite this change, however, there continued to be growing dissatisfaction and problems with the SPC.

Specifically, the spectre of politics became more prominent. With the rise of decolonization, the dilemma of what was to be done with those islands which had gained independence needed to be addressed. Should these new island nations be given a seat on the Commission or were they to forever be observers there, having voice only in the Conference? The original attempt to answer this question (Western Samoa in 1964) was to give the new independent states both a seat on the Commission and allow them to remain members of the Conference (Corkran 1976:107). Such an arrangement quickly brought with it a concern raised by the metropolitan powers that this could possibly encourage the remaining islands in trust to push for independence “too soon” in order to secure full membership on the Commission (Corkran 1976:143). The Commission was more and more being viewed as antiquated, a legacy of colonialism. Indeed, the very focus of the SPC precluded discussion of the matters that those in the region began to view as the most important.

The Commission’s charter focused explicitly on “such matters as health services, communications, education, anthropological investigation, native production and in material development generally” (Corkran 1976:106). The question became, “was there

any use in retaining an organization devoted to technical, economic, and social cooperation when...the great concerns of the less developed lands are political?" (Corkran 1976: 157). The presence of the metropolitan powers at the meetings of the SPC meant that some criticisms were not going to be voiced, including questions of nuclear testing. There needed to be an organization that would be composed exclusively of members within the region which would also deal specifically with political questions. In 1971, the first of what were to become annual meetings was held between the heads of government in the region, and the South Pacific Forum was born. Today, the Forum boasts sixteen members (See Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Current Membership of South Pacific Forum

Australia*	Niue
Belau	Papua New Guinea
Cook Islands*	Republic of the Marshall Islands
Federated States of Micronesia	Samoa*
Fiji*	Solomon Islands
Kiribati	Tonga*
Nauru*	Tuvalu
New Zealand*	Vanuatu

*= Founding Member

Unlike the SPC, there is no formal constitution for the Forum; no definitive charter of aims has ever been formulated (M. Haas 1989:94). In 1972, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) was established under the auspices of the Forum and in 1975 SPEC was designated to serve as the Secretariat for the Forum (M. Haas 1989:94-95). The Forum holds an annual meeting attended by the heads of government from each member nation, out of which emerges a communique of general concerns and aims of the region. Since its establishment, it has been via the Forum that the island states

have been able to exert their greatest voice internationally, and one of the Forum's most notable accomplishments was the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

On August 6, 1985, the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, the SPNFZ treaty was signed by eight members¹⁷ of the SPF on Rarotonga in the Cook Islands and entered into force in December 1986. The treaty is not the first attempt at a nuclear free zone in the Pacific region. Indeed, previous articulations and attempts at producing such an agreement provided many lessons learned that led to the composition of the treaty put forth at Rarotonga. SPNFZ represents the third of three waves of interest in the South Pacific on the nuclear free zone concept. The first arose in 1962-1963, against the background of US and British atmospheric testing in the region and involved proposals by the opposition Labour parties in both Australia and New Zealand for a nuclear free zone in the region. These proposals were opposed by the ruling conservative governments as well as by the Kennedy administration in the US. (Hamel-Green 1991: 60). (It should also be noted that during this period most of the islands were not independent and therefore had no voice as states in the international arena. There were, however, grass-roots movements against nuclear testing in the region).

The second wave occurred in 1974-1975. There were the ICJ cases which at least indirectly brought about the end of atmospheric testing by France in the region. Furthermore, the Labour government of New Zealand gained strong support at the 1975 Forum meeting to bring a resolution for the establishment of a nuclear free zone before the

¹⁷ Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa.

United Nations. The draft proposal co-sponsored by New Zealand, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea was adopted by 110-0-20 vote in the UN General Assembly, the abstentions including the US, USSR, Britain, and France (Ogashiwa 1991: 26). The elections of conservative governments in both Australia and New Zealand in late 1975 killed the initiative (Hamel-Green 1991: 61).

The third phase emerged in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Grassroots movements such as the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) network linked such groups as Against Tests on Moruroa (ATOM) and the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG) and continued to encourage their respective governments to push for a regional nuclear free zone. The more "radical" states of Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomons, along with the Labour Party in New Zealand, began to revive and promote the nuclear free zone concept (Hamel-Green 1991: 61). The US trust territory of Belau drafted the world's first nuclear free constitution in 1979. This phase came to a head in 1983 as a response to a series of nuclear tests in French Polynesia (Fujita 1987: 4). Australia officially proposed the SPNFZ initiative at the annual Forum meeting, a proposal which was endorsed at the August 1984 Forum meeting, negotiated through the year via a Forum Working Group chaired by Australia, and signed at the 1985 Forum meeting (Hamel-Green 1991: 61).

The SPNFZ (sometimes referred to as the Rarotonga Treaty or simply "Spinfizz") is one of two regional nuclear free zones established in an inhabited area, the other being the 1967 Latin American Nuclear Free Zone signed in Tlatelolco (Hamel-Green 1991: 59). SPNFZ is also the first nuclear free zone to be established since the Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) entered into force (Goldblat 1990: 49). SPNFZ seemed to go further than its Latin American predecessor in that while both SPNFZ and Tlatelolco prohibit the signatory parties from acquiring or using nuclear weapons, SPNFZ also bans the dumping of radioactive waste or other radioactive materials, as well as the peaceful use of nuclear explosions (Mogami 1988: 412). In addition, SPNFZ expresses its strongest opposition to the idea of continued testing of nuclear devices in the region.

The SPNFZ Treaty itself was only open for signature to members of the SPF, but the Treaty included three Protocols to be signed by each of the five nuclear powers. (No provision has ever been made to expand the SPNFZ Protocols to other nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, or Israel). The first Protocol is meant for those nuclear powers that have dependencies in the region (USA, United Kingdom, and France) and asks that they apply the precepts of the treaty to their dependencies. The second and third Protocols are open to be signed by the five declared nuclear powers and request that no nuclear weapons be used on a signatory to the treaty and that the nuclear powers do not test nuclear devices in the region. France refused to sign, rightly seeing SPNFZ as incompatible with its nuclear testing program. Britain, following the lead of the United States, had also refused to sign the Protocols, stating that to do so would compromise its national security. The USSR and China signed the Protocols in 1986 and 1987 respectively, scoring a propaganda coup in the region. The Soviets, though, issued some conditional statements and understandings along with their signing of the Protocols, statements that served to make their signing of the Protocols next to meaningless (Mack 1989: 327). However, while the Soviet's signature of the Protocols was conditional, its

ratification in April 1988 was not (Thakur 1990: 33; US Congress, House 1989: 5).

Finally, the US also refused to sign the Protocols, and this refusal was the cause of much dismay among the members of the SPF, most especially Australia, which had worked so hard to construct an agreement that did not infringe upon United States security interests in the region. Australia's role will be examined in much greater depth in the next chapter.

The SPNFZ Protocols Signed At Last

The long-awaited signing of the SPNFZ Protocols by the three Western nuclear powers on March 25, 1996 brought with it feelings of both satisfaction and disenchantment. The Protocols were finally signed, and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) seemed imminent, but at the cost of France's resumption of its testing programme one final time. Although the emergence of the CTBT on the horizon was a policy which the island states supported, they were not happy over the final series of tests. In the end, the last scheduled test was canceled and France, amid much pomp and circumstance, joined the United States and United Kingdom in signing the SPNFZ Protocols.

In the midst of the celebrations and congratulatory statements were also reminders of how far there was to go. In the decade between the adoption of SPNFZ by the South Pacific region and the signing of the Protocols by the US, UK, and France, there were continuing arguments that SPNFZ was an important "first step" in denuclearizing the South Pacific. Now that this step has finally been taken, the limitations of the treaty are again clearly illuminated. Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea and Chair of the SPF

Julius Chan said during the signing of the Protocols that a more comprehensive agreement would have been preferred:

We would have preferred an agreement that does more to limit the risks nuclear-related activities pose to our region, and indeed to the world.

The export of uranium, the presence and transit of nuclear-powered vessels, the testing of delivery vehicles, and inadequately protected nuclear power generation—these dangers may not be accompanied by a mushroom cloud but they are nonetheless very real (Foster 1996: 6).

How the island states situated themselves into the debate over the creation and construction of the SPNFZ Treaty is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

AGENDA BUILDING AND ANTINUCLEARISM

Agenda Building and the Antinuclear Movement: The Problem Stream

To most, if not all policymakers in Washington D.C., Moscow, London, Beijing, and Paris the logic of nuclear deterrence is self-evident. It has been the nuclear deterrent that has kept the peace between the superpowers, ensuring that the Cold War does not heat up; nuclear weapons and the security umbrella they provide contribute to the whole concept of deterrence which keeps the world safe from global conflict. Such an understanding underlies the statement of then Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) Admiral Ronald Hays when he argued that “nuclear weapons are for peaceful purposes,” a peace maintained through deterrence (Stevens 1988). However, the question could be asked, is it possible that there may be places in the world where the fear of global conflict is not so pervasive? Is it possible that the same policies that contribute to deterrence (and, by extension, to security) in some regions of the world in fact create an atmosphere of increasing insecurity in others? In other words, how is the issue of nuclear deterrence (and what comprises it) constructed? The battle becomes one over the power of definition; at the heart of it is the question, do nuclear weapons keep us safe? Hays further argues that the people in the Pacific want “peace and stability,” and that this was achieved via a posture of deterrence, an element of which was comprised of nuclear

weapons (Stevens 1988). While most of the Pacific region would agree with the first part of that statement, the second half of it is almost certainly debatable, and that is the heart of the matter. The perspectives of the nuclear powers are not necessarily those of the Pacific region, and vice versa. Hence, both must be taken into account. As Roy Smith notes:

At the most basic level [the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement has] to do with perceptions. This refers not only to the way in which the people of the Pacific region saw themselves and the rest of the world. It also involves the world-views of other international actors, notably the superpowers and the colonial powers. No matter what the people of the Pacific intended and how they behaved, the way in which this was perceived by other actors must be taken into account (1997: 28).

For those in the region, despite the assertion of Admiral Hays, there seems little security to be gained from the nuclear umbrella, as Alexander observes:

Japan is far enough away from Moruroa that the effects of the French tests are not immediately visible, while Hiroshima and Nagasaki are near at hand. Thus [in Japan] there is more time for education now and action later. For the Pacific peoples, there is no time. While nuclear holocaust tomorrow is certainly a concern, it could easily be preempted for the Pacific Islands by a mishap with French testing, something which would make nuclear holocaust seem merely redundant (1994: 146).

A nuclear explosion kills friend and enemy alike; nuclear fallout salutes no flag. As New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange put it, “there’s only one thing worse than being incinerated by your enemies, and that’s being incinerated by your friends” (Lange 1990).

This dispute over what it means to be “secure” (how one defines the issue of security) is the heart of the disagreement between the nuclear powers and the South Pacific region, and it was disagreement on this basic level which hindered progress and communication between the nuclear powers (especially the United States) and the region.

It was not that the South Pacific region was free from threat, rather it was a disagreement over what that threat was.

The United States, the self-styled “leader of the Free World,” viewed the security picture as a global one, with concerns and interests everywhere in the world. Quite literally, the US interest in containing the Soviet Union was based upon the “Big Picture.” With such a point of view in mind, the initial refusal of the United States to sign the SPNFZ Protocols should hardly be surprising.

In stark contrast to the conceptualization of security held by the United States, the islanders understand *their* security quite differently. Several writers (Ball 1991; Bates 1990; Ferguson 1991; Henningham 1991; King 1991, Kiste 1989; Kiste and Herr 1986; Kotobalavu 1989; Payne 1993; Siaguru 1989; Smith 1993) have addressed the understanding of security in the Pacific region. Insecurity due to military threats is hardly in the foreground, especially among the island states. Rather, concerns of economic concerns and viability, and now growing concerns with environmental issues, are the central threats. As such, questions and issues of security are articulated differently in the islands than in the major powers; they take different considerations into account. A concluding statement delivered at a 1984 colloquium in Wellington on the security needs of small island states put it this way:

South Pacific Island states do not see the risk factor for them from great power rivalry and conflict as being as great as in other regions. The South Pacific is not a primary area for such conflict at this time, although all participants agreed that the situation could change, perhaps quickly, in the future. Nor do South Pacific states feel physically threatened by any of their neighbours. They do not perceive any imminent threat or military

intervention or interference by a power from either within or outside the region (quoted in Payne 1993: 111).

As it turned out, the situation would change, but these changes would serve to highlight the concerns of the islanders and give the major powers (especially the United States) pause to reevaluate their security picture.

“Security” simply defined in military terms, however, is not the only thing at stake for the island states in the nuclear debate. The island states had connected the issue of nuclear testing to the issue of colonial oppression. The fight of the island states against the nuclear powers was also constructed partly as a struggle for independence and building a nation.

Antinuclearism as Nation-Building: The Decolonization Experience in the South Pacific

One of the significant differences between the antinuclear stance of the island states and the policies of Australia and the nuclear powers is that the island states viewed the nuclear policy of the major powers as an extension of colonialism. a stand against nuclearism was therefore a stand for independence. Practically all of the island states in the Pacific region achieved their independence rather late in the decolonization process, and with the exception of Vanuatu¹⁸ (which we will examine in greater depth later), this move towards independence was achieved relatively peacefully and nonviolently.

However, there were still some problems that these newly independent states would have

¹⁸We may also want to place the experience of Belau in this category of “unpeaceful” transitions to independence. Tonga’s situation, which will be addressed later, is also especially unique in that Tonga was not technically “colonized.”

to face. Bertram notes two distinguishing features of the decolonization experience in the South Pacific:

The first is that decolonisation [sic] was colonial policy: the process of increasing the political “distance” between New Zealand and its dependent territories, or between the UK and its colonies, was promoted and designed more by the metropolitan powers than by local initiative. This is not to say that the latter was absent; simply that it was neither a *necessary*, nor the dominant, driving force in the process.

The second feature is that the emergence of self-governing political entities in the South Pacific coincided with a sharp increase in the extent to which Island [sic] economies and societies were integrated with the metropolitan growth poles of the region—New Zealand, Australia, and the western coast of North America (Bertram 1987: 16, emphasis in original).

Ironically, the lack of a violent struggle for independence proved to be a small obstacle for the building of a “nation” within these new states. Decolonization brought about more, not less, interaction between the islands and the larger powers. Revolution and the fight for freedom against the colonial masters has often been the force that binds; the experience that unites and brings from the group a sense of “imagined community” that is at the heart of a nation (Anderson 1983). Without such a revolution, the building of nationhood in the Pacific occurred after the establishment of the state (as political entity) rather than before it.¹⁹ As an example, Campbell notes the experience of Papua New Guinea, which wanted to be a “nation,” but had differing conceptualizations of what that “nation” should be (1989: 204).

The issue of nuclear testing provided an effective focus to rally not only the individual island states, but really the region as a whole. In combating nuclear testing, the

¹⁹Nation-building remains a chronic problem in the developing world. The presence or absence of a violent break from colonial rule seems neither necessary nor sufficient in leading to a stable “nation.”

island states get the “fight against colonialism” that they did not have when gaining their independence. The antinuclear movement also aided in nation-building in that it identified an “outside” enemy (nuclear testing) and did not create problems for the individual states which may otherwise have to focus upon differences within their borders:

In the early seventies, as the Pacific Islands began preparing for independence, they were confronted with the task of building a “nation-state” out of multiethnic societies which had little or no historical contiguity and no “national” identity in a modern sense. They were thus in need of a rallying cry to fill the role of nationalism without creating excess difficulties for the states in question. In this context, the call for a nuclear-free Pacific, and particularly for a nuclear-free and *independent* Pacific, can be interpreted as being a variety of nationalism or perhaps nation building. (R. Alexander 1994: 133, emphasis in original).

The fight against nuclear testing in the South Pacific is more than just a fight against radiation or environmental hazards, but is connected to larger concerns of neocolonialism and oppression. “The subjugation of the right to self determination of Pacific peoples to the nuclear security of the colonial powers, symbolized by nuclear testing, has led not only to an infringement of their basic human rights, but also to a fundamental linking of nuclear free and independence issues in the region” (R. Alexander 1995: 3). The grass-roots movement fighting against nuclear testing in the region officially changed its name from Nuclear Free Pacific to Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) in 1983. (Appropriately, this change took place at the NFIP conference in Vanuatu, which was beginning to stretch its muscles as one of the more radical states in the region). More than just a name for a loose coalition of groups, though, the NFIP has often worked closely with the governments of the region and the term “Nuclear Free and

Independent Pacific” has been used more to symbolize a regional sentiment than an organization.

Admittedly, formal independence is not a sufficient condition for becoming nuclear free, as Britain’s tests in Australia show, but it was certain that a Pacific which is not independent would never be nuclear free. Unlike the antinuclear concerns of the Pacific rim countries (such as Japan), which focused more on general environmental dangers and arms control issues, the concerns of the Pacific basin are comprised of issues of human survival and political viability; these struggles are interconnected:

It is the uncertainty of whether a holocaust will occur, coupled with the certainty that if it is as bad as we think it might be, there will be no second chance, which makes the rejection of nuclear weapons so complete in antinuclear movements. Both the movements of the Pacific Rim and those of the Pacific Basin share this view of uncertainty; the difference is that they employ a different conception of time in their frame of reference. The difference [is that the] movements in the Pacific Basin equate a nuclear-free situation with survival today, not tomorrow, defining their own sovereign right to self-determination and independence in terms of freedom not from the *threat* of nuclear holocaust but from the *realities* of dependence and nuclear colonialism. (R. Alexander 1994: 137, emphasis in original).

The connection between antinuclearism and anticolonialism led to the varying expressions and intensity of antinuclear sentiment within the region. Differing colonial experiences (or the relative lack thereof for some actors) lead to different levels of anticolonial sentiment. This connection between antinuclearism and anticolonialism is clearly higher for Vanuatu and Belau than for Australia and New Zealand, and it is because of this that the problem construction would primarily focus upon a singular aspect of the nuclear issue—nuclear explosion and fallout.

The major focus of the discourse from the antinuclear side is not on colonialism and oppression, but the spectre of the mushroom cloud. The fears are for the coming nuclear holocaust, the concerns focus on the dangers of fallout and radiation sickness. These concerns, of course, were the ones that were shared between the island states and Australia and New Zealand.

Agenda Building and the Antinuclear Movement: The Policy Stream

There are different ways to construct a nuclear free zone. It is within the policy stream that these various alternatives are put forth and debated. It is here that some nations put forward (or are perceived as doing so) their own national policies as examples to be followed.

The United States is not against nuclear free zones as a matter of general policy. The US has even articulated seven principles for nuclear free zones which it would find acceptable. These principles are:

1. The initiative for the creation of the zone must come from within the region.
2. All important states in the region must participate in the zone.
3. Adequate measures for verification must be provided by the zone.
4. The zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security.
5. The zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or possessing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose.
6. The zone cannot attempt to impose restrictions on international rights of sea and aerial navigation recognized under international law, in particular freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right of innocent passage.
7. The zone should not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny to other states transit privileges, including port calls and overflights (US Congress, House 1987a: 77-78).

Merely fulfilling these requirements, however, does not guarantee US support. The zone must also “have a positive value in enhancing international stability and security” (US Congress, House, 1987a: 78). The SPNFZ Treaty fulfills the seven official requirements (Donnelly 1987: 4), but it is this last point that formed the major basis for the US refusal. How did the SPNFZ Treaty infringe upon the interests of the United States? The US cited several reasons, but at the heart of it, the US feared the “demonstration effect” that the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific could have in other regions. In other words, it is not a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific that is the problem, but rather the potential for other zones to follow in its path. On the face of it, this position is at least understandable, if not justifiable (the fear of “followup” zones did not stop the US from signing the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967). Looking under the surface, however, raises questions as to how understandable this argument is.

First of all, as previously noted, the SPNFZ Treaty fulfills all the requirements put forward by the United States for an acceptable nuclear free zone. The agreement does not (and could not) bar the right of peaceful transit through international waters in the zone (although NGOs like the NFIP expressed such a clause in their People’s Charter). Since the Treaty leaves it up to each state to determine the level of “welcome” in terms of visits by nuclear-armed or powered vessels, it does not in and of itself infringe upon the military alliance between the US and Australia.²⁰ The SPNFZ Treaty therefore does not violate principles 4, 6, and 7 of the US requirements for an acceptable nuclear free zone, the only

²⁰The SPNFZ Treaty technically doesn’t infringe upon the military relationship between the US and New Zealand, either. It is only New Zealand’s strong antinuclear policy (their domestic expression of the SPNFZ Treaty) which was the subject of dispute between New Zealand and the US.

principles that the Treaty came close to bringing into question. Also, when the South Pacific Forum passed the resolution to establish a regional nuclear free zone, many Forum officials traveled to the five declared nuclear powers in an effort to develop a zone that they would find acceptable. At the very least, it was hoped that four of the five nations would accept the zone, as France was expected not to agree to any type of zone. In a US Congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll (ret.), argued in his prepared statement, "The establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) in no way impairs the efficiency and effectiveness of US armed forces to carry out their missions in Asia or elsewhere" (US Congress, House, 1987a: 13). Carroll later underscored his point:

If every region of the world outside of the continental United States became a nuclear free zone under the same terms as the Treaty of Rarotonga, the US deterrent would still be intact. US deterrence depends on the capability of our bombers and ICBMs, based inside the US, and ballistic missile submarines roaming the high seas. The SPNFZ Treaty does not affect any aspect of this triad (US Congress, House, 1987a: 19).

Such sentiments were echoed by many at the hearing, including Ambassador Paul Warnke, a former director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It seems the precedent set by the SPNFZ Treaty would be one that the United States should not have any objections to. Still, others argued that the United States was correct in its refusal to sign the Protocols, arguing that the zone would be a detriment to US interests. For example, J. Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that the refusal to sign the Protocols was based upon the conclusion that the US was not able to isolate concern for regional views with larger issues (US Congress,

House 1987a: 50). The other major objection was that the SPNFZ Treaty hindered the military alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the US (the so-called ANZUS alliance). This second objection was in many ways a byproduct of the timing of the SPNFZ Treaty and New Zealand's antinuclear stand.

The debate over the creation of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone coincided with the election of a Labour Government in New Zealand. The Labour platform promised to ban nuclear armed and powered vessels from New Zealand. Indeed, the institution of the Labour Government's policy into law was connected to New Zealand's ratification of the SPNFZ Treaty. Since the SPNFZ Treaty left it up to each individual country to decide on its policy over ships docking and transit through their territorial waters, New Zealand's stance was one of the stronger expressions of antinuclearism in the region. However, that stance was not a byproduct of the SPNFZ Treaty, but only one possible manifestation of enacting the Treaty. New Zealand under the Labour Government led by David Lange would have instituted its antinuclear policy regardless of whether the SPNFZ Treaty was created. Australia and the US argued that New Zealand's antinuclear policy was incompatible with the ANZUS agreement. Lange argued that ANZUS was a conventional military alliance, and that while nuclear weapons could be accepted, in this case they would not be, since they were unnecessary for New Zealand's security. In fact, the Lange Government's position conformed to a great extent with that of the island states, which felt that the nuclear umbrella increased their insecurity rather than making them feel safer.

The timing of the split in the ANZUS alliance²¹ and the rise of the SPNFZ proposal caused SPNFZ and New Zealand's actions to be inexorably linked, especially by the US. Ware notes that "had the timing of the enactment of the New Zealand policy been better, international attitude toward the SPNFZ Treaty may have been better, and obtaining ratification of the Protocols may have been easier" (1989: 128). Australia has by contrast tied its security picture much more closely with that of the US, nuclear arsenal and all.

With such different considerations of security separating the major powers and the island states, it shouldn't be any wonder that as the Pacific states began to articulate their own security policies, they presented alternatives (one might even say threats) to the unquestioned dominance of Western (particularly US) interests in the region. These alternatives presented a new way of looking at and understanding security in the region, a challenge to the idea that the only way to be secure was to fall under the nuclear umbrella, and a realization that those in the region had paid and continued to pay a harsh price for the "protection" granted by the nuclear arsenal. Whether these national policies could really be the basis of an international agreement could be questioned, but there is no doubt that the fear of the "spread" of policies like those that follow were a cause of great concern to the major powers, especially the United States and France. This concern also touched upon some of the middle powers, most especially Australia, which had its own interests to consider as well.

²¹The dispute over the ANZUS alliance and its eventual demise is covered in greater depth in the Appendix.

Australia is the unquestioned power in the South Pacific, and its influence in the region should not be understated. Despite the sense of “unanimous compromise” and “Pacific Way” of negotiations, Australia has not been afraid to use its position in the region to push its policies. In this case, Australia’s role in the SPNFZ negotiations was one of giving on the one hand while taking away with the other. As Glebbeek says, “Although [SPNFZ] clearly bears the characteristics of a compromise between the divergent positions adopted by the South Pacific nations on the nuclear issue, it also seems to have been heavily influenced by the Australian position” (1990: 19). While it might seem ironic at first that the country that takes the lead in drafting a treaty against nuclear weapons should be the country most closely related to a nuclear power, Australia’s action does not seem like such a paradox upon closer examination. It is likely that Australia’s motivation for initiating a regional nuclear free zone agreement was to preempt a more comprehensive agreement being drafted by some of the more “radical” islands in the region (Hamel-Green 1990, 1991), one that would either undermine the ANZUS alliance (and, as a sidelight, Australia’s uranium exports) or leave Australia isolated in the region if it did not agree to the zone. Australia therefore stepped to the forefront in the drafting of an anti-nuclear agreement in order to produce an antinuclear agreement that it would be comfortable with (Ogashiwa 1991: 94). Australia did this by targeting the discussions on the SPNFZ Treaty on the issue of French nuclear testing rather than the activities of the United States (i.e., transit through the zone, port visits, and the testing of missile delivery systems) (Hamel-Green 1989, 1990, 1991). This point was even conceded by then Australian Defence Minister Kim Beazley (Thakur 1988: 261). Even the boundaries of the

treaty are drawn to include the French territories in the Pacific but not the Micronesian territories connected to the United States (Hamel-Green 1990; R. Alexander 1994). The backing of the United States was perceived as essential for SPNFZ to gain international credibility, and Australia, via its position as chair of the working group, watered down the document to make SPNFZ compatible with the strategic interests of the United States in the region (Coulombe 1991: 15). The restrictive framework taken by the working group is seen in the principles adopted during the discussions. Two principles in particular were that:

- (1) South Pacific countries retain their unqualified sovereign right to decide for themselves, consistent with their support for [the objectives of the Treaty], their security arrangements, and such questions as the access to their ports and airfields by vessels and aircraft of other countries.
- (2) The particular importance of the principle of freedom of navigation and overflight and the treaty obligations of Forum members [is recognized] (Mogami 1988: 418).

Hence, Australia's relationship with the United States results in some "hidden nuclearism" in the SPF and SPNFZ, which may result in a lack of any further progress towards a stronger antinuclear agreement in the region (Mogami 1988: 418).

While Belau, Fiji, and even New Zealand presented alternatives to the conception of security presented by the United States, it should be noted that antinuclear sentiment varied between island states, and some actors even chose to side with the major powers, especially the US. Certainly Australia felt it was more in its interests to maintain a military alliance with the United States, a point which will be elaborated upon in the next section. However, the island state of Tonga also found itself on the side of the major powers, though this point received very little international (or even regional) notice. If a regional

agreement on a nuclear free zone was ever to develop, it would have to find a way to take these varying degrees of antinuclearism into account and craft an agreement that as many states in the region would be able to accept.

Agenda Building and the Antinuclear Movement: The Political Stream

There are clear justifications for Australia's stance in the antinuclear debate. There are the domestic concerns for the uranium industry and the potential impact that a uranium ban could have on Australia's economy. Secondly, there are the concerns Australia has in the possibility of destabilizing its military relationship with the United States. Despite its being the unquestioned power in the South Pacific/Oceanic region, Australia feels less secure in its place in the Asia-Pacific region. While Australians have proudly proclaimed themselves "an outpost of European civilisation [sic] in the southwest Pacific" (quoted in F. Alexander 1967: 169), there was little question that being an "outpost" also meant it was also relatively isolated. This isolation was especially emphasized after World War II. Australia had long depended upon British fleet for its regional security, but the rising power of Japan (coinciding with the UK's preoccupation with the War in Europe), led Australia to turn its hope toward that of the other Pacific power, the United States. This perceived need for the protection of the United States only grew stronger during the Cold War. The possibility of a nuclear free zone agreement in the South Pacific that did not include Australia, or one that would infringe upon the military relationship between Australia and the US, was therefore something that needed to be prevented.

Despite its being hailed as a major strike against nuclearism, then, critics have argued that SPNFZ is hardly what its proponents claim it to be. There is the

aforementioned influence of Australia in the drafting of SPNFZ, influence that can clearly be seen in such points as the boundaries of the zone and the issue of transit of ships through the region. SPNFZ puts no restriction on the passage of nuclear-armed ships through the region. It must be conceded that such a ban would be legally and logistically impossible in terms of international waters within the zone (Fujita 1987: 6), but SPNFZ also does not in and of itself put any restriction on the visiting of nuclear-armed ships in the region. The ban on the stationing of nuclear armed vessels in the zone is vaguely defined. There is no clear delineation in the SPNFZ Treaty that says at what point a nuclear-armed ship is no longer “visiting” a port but can be said to be “stationed” there. On the other hand, just as SPNFZ does not prohibit transit or port visits by nuclear-armed ships, though, it also does not restrict individual states from imposing their own limitations of ship visits and transit through their territorial waters. On this issue we see illuminated the delicate tightrope on which the SPNFZ has been crafted; an attempt to develop an agreement that everyone in the region could ascribe to (Ogashiwa 1991: 64). This attempt at a middle ground has brought dissatisfaction from both fronts. Tonga refused to sign, arguing that the treaty was too restrictive (McMillan 1992: 2). On the other side, Vanuatu, perhaps the strongest opponent of nuclearism at the time and the only nonaligned island nation in the region, refused to sign the treaty until it was more restrictive (Hamel-Green 1990: 92, Robie 1989: 153).

Indeed, SPNFZ in and of itself does not in any significant way hamper the strategic plans of the United States in the region. Even then-Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) Admiral William Crowe stated that it was doubtful that “Washington would

find anything objectionable in the South Pacific Forum's nuclear-free concept" (quoted in Fry 1985: 18). Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), who held office from 1974 to 1992 and was chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, had long been a supporter of the treaty and even introduced a resolution calling for its acceptance (US Congress, House 1987a).

Even with these endorsements, the Reagan Administration (and the Bush Administration that followed it) refused to sign the Protocols, which caused tremendous disappointment not only in Australia, but also from the islands in the region, which had hoped that the United States' signing of the Protocols would increase the international pressure that the treaty was already placing upon France (Hamel-Green 1991: 78). The development of the treaty in and of itself was a serious blow to France's image. If the treaty were endorsed by the other Western Powers, it would have been a tremendous embarrassment. Indeed, one of the factors that the United States considered in regards to signing the Protocols were the possible consequences such an action would have on France. The US chose to side with France as its nuclear testing program in the Pacific "makes [the French] able to participate as part of the deterrent" against the Soviets (quoted in Mogami 1988: 421).

SPNFZ has come under attack from both sides of the political spectrum, the right saying the treaty limits too much, the left saying it does not limit enough. What is often missed in the debate, however, is that the formation of the SPNFZ Treaty is in many ways an example of the negotiation style and flavor of the region. The Treaty has been seen as a quintessential example of the "Pacific Way" (M. Haas 1989) of negotiations. Under the

precept of “unanimous compromise,” SPNFZ is an example not of a definitive statement against nuclearism (Belau’s anti-nuclear constitution and New Zealand’s anti-nuclear law are better examples of that) but rather an example of negotiations where everyone gets a little and gives a little—no one is left out. And of course, with everyone supposedly giving and getting, it usually means that everyone leaves somewhat dissatisfied. It is pointed out that there are some critics (Tonga for example) who are suspicious of the nuclear free zone in principle, and would have preferred no agreement at all. On the other hand, those who support the nuclear free zone concept have argued that SPNFZ is a hollow agreement, and some have said that it might be better not to have an agreement at all instead of this pseudo-nuclear free zone. Thus SPNFZ is seen as an agreement crafted in the spirit of “unanimous compromise.” Those who support SPNFZ argue that “far from the shortcomings of [SPNFZ] being a product of unawareness, they were a product of conscious choice” (Mogami 1988: 418). Prime Minister Lange said about the 1984 SPF meeting in Tuvalu, where the SPNFZ agreement was fully developed:

There was little or no discussion of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, but then there was actually little discussion of any country’s policy. This was just as well, given the differences between us. New Zealand and Vanuatu were nuclear-free. Australia and Fiji accepted visits from American nuclear ships. Australia also played host to elements of the American system which gave early warning against nuclear attack. There was never any possibility of reconciling those differences and it was understood from the start that the limits of the nuclear-free zone would be drawn at what we *could* agree on (Lange 1990: 170, emphasis in original).

The agreement is merely a start in the struggle against nuclearism, not a final product. Calling itself a “nuclear-free zone” may be considered presumptuous, but the fact that there is something that can be considered a nuclear-free zone in the region, however

limited, serves notice to the world that the end of nuclearism is the goal of the signatories to the treaty.

All that being said, however, there are those (Hamel-Green notably among academics, Vanuatu's former Prime Minister Lini among policymakers) who have argued that the SPNFZ Treaty is far from an example of the "Pacific Way." Rather, the influence of Australia in shaping the agreement illustrates the corruption of the precept of "unanimous compromise." Australia forced the agreement that it wanted for its interests and the interests of its allies, promising the support of the US in bringing pressure upon France's testing program. Simply ending France's testing in the region was not enough (even if it had happened) for more radical countries such as Vanuatu. Vanuatu's Deputy Prime Minister Sethy Regenvanu stated:

Vanuatu is not seeking only a nuclear-free Pacific. We are seeking a Pacific...free of every last remnant of colonialism. But freedom and independence will have no meaning if our very existence is threatened by the constant fear of total destruction (quoted in Robie 1989: 147).

Yet, even if SPNFZ could be viewed as a first step in the end of nuclearism and neocolonialism in the region, it is difficult to see how one builds upon SPNFZ to get to the second step. There is the fact that to amend (to strengthen) the SPNFZ agreement requires a unanimous decision by the signatories to the treaty (not by the signatories to the Protocols), an exceedingly high standard which grants effective veto power to any signatory (i.e., Australia).

The issue of nuclearism in the Pacific obviously goes beyond the region itself. There are actors and situations which also have a bearing on the situation. Without

question, the most significant change in the international situation from the initiation of SPNFZ to its conclusion over a decade later was the end of the Cold War. The events surrounding the end of the bipolar world system touched the Pacific first with a surprising and welcome announcement by France. The initial joy, however, would soon be clouded over.

France's Testing Programme: Moratorium, Resumption, and Renunciation

One of the major changes in the international setting came with France's announcement of a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992 ("And Who Stopped the French?" 1992: 39). Of course, this was met with cheers and celebration throughout the South Pacific. Jeremiah Tumbai, the secretary general of the SPF, stated that the South Pacific had been persistent in lobbying against testing and could claim some of the credit for the moratorium (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, July 8, 1993: 57).

In an almost surreal situation, though, Vanuatu, the country that under Walter Lini a decade ago refused to sign SPNFZ because it did not go far enough was now the one island nation that was out of step with the rest of the protests in the region. The coalition led by the Francophone Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) did announce that it would review Vanuatu's stand on SPNFZ, though it did not give the matter great priority at first (Henningham 1995: 85). While Vanuatu has since become a signatory to SPNFZ, Vanuatu's Prime Minister Maxim Carlot Korman has been increasingly viewed as France's "Monsieur Oui" in the region, and was even reported to have said that he did not consider French testing in the region to be especially dangerous (Grynberg 1995: 8). Such statements led some to question whether Vanuatu was "really" a part of the Pacific

(Decloitre 1995a). It should be noted that Vanuatu does enjoy the highest French aid to another country on a per capita basis, a sum of over US\$8 million for its 160,000 inhabitants (Decloitre 1995a: 10), and Carlot was awarded the French distinction of Grand Officer in the order of the Legion d'Honneur (Decloitre 1995b: 13) by his close friend, President Chirac.

The veritable 180-degree turnaround in policy that occurred with the change from the Anglophone Lini Government to the Francophone Carlot Government is hardly a unique situation among relatively young countries such as Vanuatu, especially when one considers the continuing division between Francophones and Anglophones that remains in the country. We will encounter this division and its associated problems again when we discuss Vanuatu's role in the international climate change negotiations.

Agenda Building: The Intervening Variables

Both the problem stream and the political stream create an open "window of opportunity" in the nuclear case. The rise in public opinion and antinuclear groups in the South Pacific increased concern that something needed to be done. Australia, especially, hopes to maintain its military alliance as well as protect its uranium export business, but it does not want to be isolated in the region if the island states create their own nuclear free zone agreement. Therefore, Australia opens the possibility of a nuclear free zone that it will accept, with the implicit promise that this zone will also gain the acceptance of the United States.

It is not a sufficient condition for the time to be right for an issue to make it on the agenda. Policy Entrepreneurs must take advantage of this open window of opportunity. In

this case, we can identify policy entrepreneurs for “both” sides of the issue. Because of the small size and population of the island states, there is relatively little distance between popular sentiment and movements and members of government. Hence, it is much more difficult for policymakers to isolate themselves from that popular sentiment. The statements and People’s Charter for a Nuclear-Free Pacific developed at the NFIP meetings were difficult, if not impossible, for the leaders of the island nations to ignore. Walter Lini noted, “It is the governments who have difficulty in declaring [a comprehensive nuclear free zone treaty], not the people of the South Pacific” (Stevens 1988). The NFIP had in fact developed the “People’s Charter for a Nuclear Free Pacific” in 1979 and 1983 (Nuclear Free Pacific Conference 1979; NFIP 1983), the preamble to which had been worked on since the first Nuclear Free Pacific Conference held in 1975 (R. Alexander 1994: 141). The charter goes much further than the final version of the SPNFZ Treaty, prohibiting even transit of nuclear weapons through the zone as well as requiring that all “peoples and governments within the zone will withdraw from all mutual defence alliances with nuclear powers” (NFIP 1983: 11). The Charter is an expression of popular sentiment and hope, though hardly one of political practicality and feasibility. Still, such sentiment can be a powerful tool, and a difficult opponent to face.

Furthermore, the antinuclear movement gained greater international exposure with the presence and voice of Greenpeace. The daring of the Greenpeace members sailing into the international waters that the French unilaterally declared off-limits during their nuclear tests (McTaggart 1979) and the international uproar surrounding the *Rainbow Warrior* incident only increased the focus on the nuclear issue on the international arena. Like the

NFIP, Greenpeace is a non-governmental organization, and as such is able to articulate and put forth a position that has more to do with normative goals than political possibility.

Had a more “radical” version of the SPNFZ Treaty been put forth beyond the venue of a non-governmental conference, a version more in line with the People’s Charter, there is probably little chance that it would have been acquiesced to by Australia, the major power in the region. However, had such an agreement gone through, Australia would have been placed in the tenuous position of having to side with either the island states or with its major ally, the United States. While an “islands-only” nuclear free zone would still not have included Tonga (and thus Australia would not have been completely isolated in the region), having only Tonga on its side was apparently not enough for Australia. Certainly, Australia shared the goal of ending French nuclear testing in the region with the island nations, but did not wish to break its alliance with the US or hinder its uranium exports. Openly siding with the US would certainly have cost Australia much goodwill in the region, but doing nothing could also leave Australia in the cold, so the Australian Government took another route. By taking a leadership role in the SPNFZ negotiations, Australia was able to craft the agreement. In exchange, Australia promised (implicitly at the very least) that it could obtain US support for the zone, thereby adding to international pressure on France. Conversely, the island states were faced with the dilemma of putting forth a strong agreement (similar to the People’s Charter) that would probably not be taken seriously, or allowing Australia’s influence to “tone down” the agreement in exchange for Australia putting its weight behind it (and expecting to get US approval). The SPNFZ Treaty was the alternative that offered a compromise position for

the island states that most could accept. Ironically, even this toned-down version was too strong for Tonga.

Summary

How we construct the antinuclear issue and how this plays out in each of the different streams generates different alliances between the various actors. Both the major powers and the antinuclear movement framed the issue most in expressive terms, i.e., in the conflicting definitions of “security” and “safety.” The nuclear arsenal was a major factor in making the major powers feel secure from attack by other major powers (most notably the communist states), but this security came into conflict with the safety of those in the Pacific region. Backing this expressive construction of the issue, however, both sides also used instrumental types of defenses, most notably in the form of scientific reports on either the danger of radiation or the relative safety of the nuclear tests in the region. The fact that much of the latter reports by France were not subject to independent review and examination hurt that part of its argument.

Although the island states (and NGOs such as the NFIP and ATOM) expanded the notion of the nuclear “problem” to an issue of neocolonial oppression, the major expressions of concern focus upon nuclear testing, fallout, and the fear of radiation (even when the tests move underground). The spectre is that of the mushroom cloud, although other problems like nuclear dumping and energy were also points of concern. While the island states found in the nuclear issue a device that aided in developing a sense of community within their borders (and even between the island states), the connection between antinuclearism and anticolonialism had no resonance with Australia, or even to

New Zealand. Therefore, the problem construction steadily narrows to focus upon nuclearism as explosion. This is a powerful image, of course, but it is also a limiting one.

Because the antinuclear issue is geographically and regionally placed, regional politics, especially those involving the middle powers, play a critical role. Pressure by antinuclear movements as well as the island governments (including New Zealand) put Australia in a quandary. Australia could ignore the antinuclear sentiment and risk being isolated in the region, or it could attempt to take a role in crafting an antinuclear zone that it (and its major ally, the US) could accept. Australia's role in the development of the SPNFZ proved both a blessing and curse for the small islands. It was a blessing because Australia's position as regional hegemon and middle power in world politics was able to channel the antinuclear sentiment of the region and bring it greater visibility. On the other hand, Australia's role could be considered a curse in that it channeled that antinuclear sentiment in ways that diluted it.

In terms of the three streams, the differing conceptualizations of "security" found in the problem stream led to a conflict between the South Pacific region and the major powers, notably the United States and France. The South Pacific region had been the nuclear testing ground for the major powers for too long. Grassroots movements such as the NFIP movement spark the initial protests against testing. As more of the region attained independence, it finds some common ground in the stand against nuclearism in the region, articulating alternatives to the idea of the "nuclear umbrella." Although the island nations individually may be too small to have much influence in the international arena, even the smallest of voices can be united and amplified.

In the problem and policy streams, the two regional powers diverge in terms of their positions. New Zealand sided with the island nations and developed a strong antinuclear stance. Australia, concerned with being isolated in the region and fearful of jeopardizing the ANZUS alliance, stepped to the fore to craft an antinuclear agreement that would satisfy the region and still keep the ANZUS alliance secure. Although New Zealand did take a strong antinuclear stance itself, it did not push for a strong regional agreement, choosing instead to compromise with Australia and leave decisions of national nuclear bans up to each individual state. The SPNFZ Treaty is the compromise agreement, and the holdout of the major Western nuclear powers from signing the Protocols was a bitter disappointment. Only over a decade later, with the bipolar world at an end, do we finally see the signature of the Protocols by the United States, United Kingdom, and France.

The policy stream reveals differing alternatives presented by the island states as well as grass-roots organizations. On the antinuclear side, we have focused upon the policies of Belau, Vanuatu, and Fiji, but we should not forget that these ideas do not just spring from nothingness. Belau and a pre-coup Fiji (and also New Zealand) present stringent antinuclear policies as new visions of security, new alternatives to how one constructs an antinuclear agreement. Vanuatu connects the nuclear issue strongly with that of neocolonialism, arguing that the nuclear issue is just another form of oppression. Although we find it convenient analytically to discuss these policies as separate from the international scene, politics are never so clear and distinct.

The major change in the political stream brings the major powers into agreement with the Pacific region. The end of the Cold War changes the international calculations over security and opens the window of opportunity for this debate to be continued. The acquiescence to a nuclear free zone (and the possibility of an international comprehensive test ban treaty) now enhance the security of the major powers as well as the South Pacific region.

In many ways, the initiation of the SPNFZ Treaty in 1985 brought the issue of nuclearism in the South Pacific to the agenda before the nuclear powers were ready to address it. The point that sparked concern within the region is the problem stream—the debate over what it means to be secure. This debate took place within the region as well, with most of the island states (Tonga excepted) and New Zealand on one side, and Australia on the other. The SPNFZ Treaty is an attempt by the region to do two distinctly different things: to increase its security by releasing it from the threat of nuclear weapons, both in the future (a future nuclear conflict) and in the present (nuclear testing), and to develop a collective identity as a region (regional powers included). However, the major nuclear powers only acquiesce to the SPNFZ Protocols once the global situation has changed with the end of the Cold War (the political stream). During the eleven years between ratification of SPNFZ and the signing of the Protocols however, we see continual pressure placed upon the Western powers by the South Pacific region. The question before us now is whether this same dynamic plays itself out in the matter of global climate change.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE “PROBLEM” OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Greenhouse 101: The Basic Science

When sunlight strikes the earth, approximately two-thirds of that radiation is absorbed by the earth itself. The rest is bounced back upwards in the form of infrared or longer wave radiation (Burns 1996:2). On the way back up, some of that radiation is absorbed by gases in the atmosphere. The main gas is water vapor; more than 90% of the total observed warming of the atmosphere is attributed to it (Bolin 1997:85). Other gases also play a part, the key ones among them being carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), and ozone (O₃).¹⁹ This trapping of radiation in the atmosphere has made the surface temperature of the earth approximately 33 degrees centigrade (°C) warmer than it would be otherwise (Fermann 1997: 20). This warming means that water will remain liquid on the earth’s surface and makes it possible for life to exist here (Mintzer and Leonard 1994:6). In no small way, the greenhouse effect means life.

However, it is important to note that two things can be meant by the term “greenhouse effect.” The first is the “natural” or “background” greenhouse phenomena described above which has always occurred. The other effect is the “enhanced” or

¹⁹Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), of which more will be said in the discussion on ozone depletion, is itself a greenhouse gas. However, due to the fact that it also destroys ozone in the stratosphere, its net warming effect has not yet been precisely determined (Bodansky 1994: 71, n7).

“additional” greenhouse effect, which is the consequence of human activity. Although human activity has no direct effect on the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere, this does not mean that human activity does not have an effect, or that effect is insignificant. A brochure jointly produced by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on common questions regarding climate change describes the interconnection between human activity, water vapor, and the enhanced greenhouse effect:

[T]he amounts of the various greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere remained relatively stable until a few centuries ago, when the concentrations of many of these gases began to increase due to industrialization, increasing demand for energy, rising population, and changing land use and settlement patterns. Accumulations of most of the human-made greenhouse gases are expected to continue to increase, so that, over the next 50 to 100 years, without control measures, they will produce a heat-trapping effect equivalent to more than a doubling of the pre-industrial carbon dioxide level.... While human activities do not directly add significant amounts of water vapor to the atmosphere, warmer air contains more water vapor. Since water vapor is itself a greenhouse gas, global warming will be further enhanced by the increased amounts of water vapor (Hamburg et al., 1997:21).

It is unquestioned that the natural greenhouse helps sustain life on this planet. The question that is being asked, however, is whether the enhanced greenhouse is literally too much of a good thing?

History: As We Look to the Skies

Although it has captured the popular imagination only in the last two decades or so, study and concern of the human effect upon the atmosphere is not particularly new. Grove actually traces the discussion of artificial climate change to the writings of Theophrastus of Erasia in ancient Greece (1995: 1). In 1273, the city of London passed

the world's first air pollution law to deal with the problem of smoke from domestic fires (Rowlands 1995:65). The term "greenhouse effect"²⁰ itself was first coined by the French mathematician and scientist Jean Baptiste Fourier in 1827 (Brown 1996:12). British scientist John Tyndall would further develop the theory, measuring the absorption of heat by CO₂ and water vapor in 1860. Tyndall may have been the first to suggest that the loss of CO₂ from the atmosphere for some reason in the past may have weakened the natural greenhouse effect, thus bringing about the ice ages (Gribbin 1990:31). The next step would be taken in 1896, when Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius measured the possibility of major increases of CO₂ in the atmosphere. Arrhenius posited that such an increase would occur as a result of the increased use of coal in Europe since the Industrial Revolution. His prediction that a doubling of CO₂ in the atmosphere would result in an increase of the global temperature by 5-6 degrees centigrade comes remarkably close to the predictions given by current scientists today (Brown 1996:13, Gribbin 1990:32), albeit a bit on the high end of the scale. Then, British meteorologist G.S. Callender argued in 1938 that his measurements from 200 weather stations around the world showed a rise in average global temperatures from the 1880's to the 1930's. His argument before the Royal Society that this was caused by increased CO₂ in the atmosphere did not receive much support (Brown 1996:13). The prediction by Arrhenius and Callender's findings remained relatively unnoticed since there was yet no definitive proof as to whether or not

²⁰We should probably note here that the greenhouse analogy is not scientifically accurate, since greenhouses work by blocking convection while in the atmosphere warm air rises and moves the heat to other areas in the atmosphere (Fermann 1997: 21, n20). The term has gained such popular usage, however, that to change it now would no doubt lead to unnecessary confusion. Also, although the terms "greenhouse effect," "global warming," and "climate change" are used at times interchangeably, it is this last term which has become preferred in international discussions, due to its being considered the most politically neutral.

atmospheric CO₂ concentrations were actually increasing. It was argued that the CO₂ was being absorbed by the oceans in sufficient quantities as to not cause a problem (Fermann 1997: 21). It also seemed as though the increasing atmospheric turbidity would overcome the CO₂ emissions with the end result being an overall cooling of the atmosphere (Kemp 1994:151).

Into this debate came the Swedish journal *Tellus*, which in the late 1950's was edited by Bert Bolin. Bolin would later go on to chair the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Fermann 1997: 21, n22). The first blow was struck in a 1957 article by Roger Revelle and Hans Suess, which showed that the oceans were not as effective a “sink” (absorbent) of CO₂ as was originally believed (Bodansky 1994:46; Fermann 1997: 21). This generated a great amount of followup research that pointed to rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Also in 1957, a study released by the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in California stated that humanity was “engaged in a great geophysical experiment” (Flavin 1989:11). The major push in research on the climate in 1957 was not an accident; 1957-1958 had been declared “International Geophysical Year” and the first steps to measure atmospheric CO₂ were begun as part of that declaration (Børsting and Fermann 1997:54). The Scripps Institute established a monitoring station at Mauna Loa in Hawaii in that year, and measurements from this station have continued virtually without break until today. By the early 1960's, there was fairly clear scientific evidence that CO₂ concentrations in the atmosphere were rising (Fermann 1997: 21), though how much of a threat this posed to humanity was still being

debated. Indeed, it was argued that the enhanced greenhouse may in fact save humanity from the next ice age, an argument which would have its heyday in the next decade.

The 1970's were a period of major focus on the environment. In 1972, the environment took center stage on the international arena as the United Nations convened a major conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. Institutionally, the conference's main accomplishment was the establishment of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP). But while Stockholm would raise the environment as a subject of international political attention for practically the first time, concern over the atmosphere and climate change specifically were relegated to a lower priority than other issues. Indeed, the Stockholm Conference would prove stronger in more pressing areas such as marine pollution, depletion of natural resources, and population growth (Brown 1996:15). Studies issued just prior to Stockholm considered climate change a long-term threat and a potentially serious problem, but not a pressing one that required action in the immediate future (Bodansky 1994:46).

So, while concerns about the possibility of human-induced climate change were expressed at Stockholm, they were not a major focus of the meeting. There was a general apprehension over what human activity was doing to the climate, but in what direction humanity was changing the climate was still a matter of debate. In fact, as referred to earlier, one of the major debates of the 1970's was whether the "enhanced greenhouse" effect was even happening, and if it was, was it really a threat to humanity? Average global temperatures had dropped from 1945 to 1970 and concerns over the next ice age were a major issue (Rowlands 1995:68). Concerns over declining global temperatures were the

subject of a US House Committee on Science and Technology report in 1976 (US Congress, House, 1976). Soon, however, the debate would switch quite literally to the other extreme. Additional studies published in the early 1980's would show that scientists had severely underestimated the speed at which the greenhouse effect was intensifying as well as what kinds of consequences this was having on the environment (Kemp 1994:151). Indeed, by the 1980's, the problem of “global cooling” would be left in the cold and major concern would be focused upon the consequences of an increasingly warmer climate.

The 1980's: The Greenhouse Debate Heats Up

The first step actually occurred in February 1979, with the convening of the first World Climate Conference (WCC) in Geneva. The WCC marked the first intergovernmental meeting where climate change was recognized as a serious problem (Børsting and Fermann 1997:55). It was, however, primarily a scientific conference, rather than one focused on political action. The conference report did call upon nations to unite on this issue, but that call was primarily to work together on research efforts on climate change, with only a secondary emphasis on planning for potential effects and responding to them (Morrisette and Plantinga 1991:164).

The scientific evidence would continue to mount. a major contribution came from James Hansen and his team at the National Aeronautic and Space Administration's (NASA) Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Their analysis of the global temperatures showing an overall warming trend was published in *Science* Magazine in August 1981 (Gribbin 1990:15). Hansen and his team followed up their work and responded to their critics in another article in *Science* in May 1983. Another major contribution to the




Figure 5.1: Carbon dioxide levels in atmosphere (parts per million) 1960-1992
Source: http://ingrid.lidgo.columbia.edu/SOURCES/KEELING/MAUNA_LOA.cdf/

greenhouse debate came from Charles Keeling of the Scripps Institute. Away from most of the “background noise” of industrial activity, Keeling’s measurements at the Mauna Loa station showed an increase in CO₂ concentrations in the atmosphere from 315 to 351 parts per million in the time period from 1958 to 1988 (Flavin 1989:11; Gribbin 1990:92). As Figure 5.1 shows, despite seasonal variation, the absolute numbers have continued to rise, from 320 to some 360 parts per million in the time from January 1960 to 1992.

While scientific concerns over anthropogenic changes to the climate were on the rise, there remained little connection and outreach to politicians and policy. There were major changes in 1985 in this matter, both for climate change and for the atmosphere more generally. First, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was opened for signature in March, but the publication in May of the discovery of a “hole” in

the ozone layer over Antarctica (a phenomenon unpredicted by scientists) illuminated the inadequacy of the Vienna Convention.²¹ The next event came in October with the Villach Conference, which issued the first statement offering some proposals for action that governments could initiate to mitigate climate change (Børsting and Fermann 1997:55; Morrisette and Plantinga 1991:164). Still, these proposals were rather broad in scope:

While some warming of the climate now appears inevitable due to past actions, the rate and degree of future warming could be profoundly affected by governmental policies on energy conservation, use of fossil fuels, and the emission of some greenhouse gases (Quoted in Morrisette and Plantinga 1991:164, emphasis added).

There would be followup conferences in September-November 1987 in Villach, Austria (science-oriented) and Bellagio, Italy (policy-oriented). Their major significance is that the 1987 conferences signal the first time politicians and scientists called for the consideration of developing an international agreement on the atmosphere as a global commons (Børsting and Fermann 1997:56). There was even more to come.

The Montreal Protocol, which placed definite cuts and timetables on the elimination of CFCs was signed in 1987. Also, 1987 saw the publication of the World Commission on Environment and Development's (WCED) report to the UN. That report, entitled *Our Common Future* (and frequently referred to as the Brundtland Report, after the Commission's Chair, Gro Harlem Brundtland), brought international attention to many global environmental issues, including climate change. The Brundtland Report concluded that too often environmental problems were approached as isolated issues and that

²¹The literature on ozone depletion often highlights the significance of this discovery for galvanizing international action (McCormick 1989; Morrisette 1991), but an insider to the ozone negotiations disagrees (Benedick 1991).

national institutions were too fragmented to deal with these problems. As such, the institutions focused more on handling the effects rather than the cause of environmental problems, and indeed the environment was usually accorded secondary status, after economic, trade, or energy concerns (McCormick 1989:193). (It should be noted that the Brundtland Report's concern was itself primarily economic, in that the focus was on how to achieve "sustainable development," a term that has become nearly ubiquitous in its use but very rarely defined with precision).

The time period of 1987-1988 saw major events for the climate debate. The Brundtland Report, the Montreal Protocol, and the Villach and Bellagio Conferences all focused attention on the environment in general and the atmosphere more particularly. The month of June 1988 was especially noteworthy. A conference on "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security" convened in Toronto, Canada. Its major recommendation was for a 20% reduction of CO₂ from 1988 levels by the year 2005 (Bodansky 1994:49), a goal referred to as the "Toronto Target."²² James Hansen pushed the debate to another level when in the hot summer of June 1988, testifying before the US Senate Energy Committee. He stated that he was "99 percent certain" that the warm temperatures of the 1980's experienced in the US were not chance occurrences, but a result of global warming (Rowlands 1995:73).

²²This goal of a 20% reduction would later be adopted by the Alliance of Small Island States at the first Conference Of Parties (COP) in Berlin and would be called the "AOSIS Protocol." Also, Bodansky (1994: 71, n15) rightly points out that the 20% target was a global target and that the Toronto statement did point out that as developing countries would probably be increasing their energy use, this would mean that advanced countries would have to reduce their emissions by much more than 20% to make up for the increase from the developing nations.

In 1988, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN World Meteorological Organization established the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Rogers 1993:186-187). Professor Bert Bolin of Sweden was elected its chair, a position he has held until 1998, with the announcement of his retirement. Within the IPCC, three working groups (WGs) were established to address an aspect of climate change: Working Group I on science, Working Group II on impacts, and Working Group III on response strategies. The Working Groups were chaired by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States respectively. The mandates of the Working Groups would be modified after the first assessments were published, with WGII dealing with assessments of impacts and policy options (responses), and WGIII now dealing with socioeconomic implications of climate change (Bolin 1997: 101).

Drawing Up Sides on the Road to Rio

The first assessment reports from the IPCC were presented in May and June 1990, in time for the Second World Climate Conference (SWCC) in November. The largest international meeting on climate change until Rio, SWCC marked two significant points in the climate debate. The first was that the SWCC, unlike the previous WCC in 1979, included a political component and was not just a scientific meeting. Secondly, the SWCC marked the first time that developing nations came in on equal footing with the developed nations to discuss the problem of climate change (Bodansky 1994: 57-58). Prior meetings had included usually only developed nations or were devoted to the “special issues” faced by developing nations, but with the SWCC, global warming quite literally went “global.”

The full internationalization of climate change at the SWCC brought the spotlight back onto the division between the developed (“North”) and developing (“South”) countries on the issue, but it also revealed the schisms within the Southern states.

Bodansky notes:

First, it became obvious that the climate change negotiation would not be simply about the environment, but about the linked issues of environment and development. Second, at the SWCC the differences among developing countries began to show. On the one hand, the oil-producing states emerged as a major voice...questioning the science of climate change and arguing for a “go slow” approach. On the other hand, small island and low lying coastal states—who feared the adverse effects of sea level rise—argued for strong response measures, and organized themselves into the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) (1994:59).

Despite the divisions, however, much of the tone of the conference was upbeat. It was recognized that the negotiations at the SWCC were to feed into the process of developing the United Nations Conference on Economics and Development (UNCED) to meet in Rio De Janeiro in 1992, and the SWCC called upon countries to devise strategies, studies, hold meetings, and prepare timetables on climate change and emission records in preparation for UNCED. Spurred by the IPCC and SWCC, as well as the growing international excitement for the forthcoming “Earth Summit,” the UN established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to construct a framework convention on climate change that would be ready for signature at Rio. To have such a major international agreement ready in so short a time was practically unheard of, but such was the high concern and attention that this ambitious target was placed in front of the nations of the world.

Positions became clearly drawn in the run up to Rio. Global warming was one of the major issues at the 1991 South Pacific Forum (Scherer 1991a) and the SPF's Communique stated in no uncertain terms that it considered global warming and sea level rise "the most serious environmental threats to the Pacific region. The cultural, economic, and physical survival of Pacific nations was at risk" (quoted in Hay 1991:3).

Rio de Janeiro, 1992: The "Earth Summit"

The gathering of delegates from 178 countries with 118 heads of state and/or governments in Rio for two weeks in June was greeted with international fanfare. Although formally known as the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the gathering at Rio was universally considered the "Earth Summit." In the twenty years since Stockholm, the world had drastically changed. The collapse of communism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany had all occurred, bringing a new focus on some old problems. Optimism was high that attention could be turned to and resources would be released to deal with problems such as the environment now that the Cold War was over (Grubb et al., 1993: 25). With the opportunity to host such an important international conference, Brazil put together a veritable extravaganza. And of course, recognizing that the world would be watching, Brazil put its "best face forward," as it were. Brown writes:

The prostitutes, muggers and street children had been cleared away from Rio's famous beaches so that the delegates were not troubled, and the journalists staying in the hotels were not tempted to write about them. The crime rate for the two weeks of the conference plummeted because of the massive presence of soldiers but the starving street children still begged for leftovers at the beach restaurants and wolfed them down before the police

could catch them. It was a useful education in itself for first-time visitors to the developing world (Brown 1996:40).

However, there were some questions that were going to be dealt with at Rio, and simply removing them from view would not be enough. Most importantly, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and Convention on Biological Diversity, both binding agreements, would be opened for signature. There would also be three important nonbinding documents, the “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,” a convention on forest management, and the massive “Agenda 21,” which purported to turn the idea of “sustainable development” into a reality (Grubb et al., 1993: 9). But even at the outset, major obstacles arose.

First of all, while the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism certainly meant that attention could be turned from the bipolar conflict to other issues, this did not mean that the environment would be the foremost issue considered. The European Union continued to work on increased unification and harmonization. East and West Germany reunified to much celebration but not without some problems. Certainly the economic cost of such rapid reunification kept Germany more focused on this issue than the global environment. For Japan, domestic concerns were such that then-Prime Minister Miyazawa was unable to attend the Earth Summit (Grubb et al., 1993: 24). And of course in the US, focus was on the upcoming presidential elections. President Bush, who had seemed unbeatable in the aftermath of the Gulf War, now found himself in a close race against Bill Clinton. With the election barely six months away, there were some doubts as to whether President Bush would attend Rio at all (O'Neill 1992: 17).

The “Greenhouse Effect” and the “White House Effect”: The US Blocks Progress

When George Bush campaigned for the presidency in 1988, he declared, “those who think we’re powerless to do anything about the ‘greenhouse effect’ are forgetting about the ‘White House effect’. As President, I intend to do something about it” (quoted in Griffin 1993: 68). Yet Bush’s later attempts to paint himself as the “environmental President” during the 1992 campaign proved ineffective. There had already been the small embarrassment when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) confirmed on May 8, 1989 that it had altered James Hansen’s 1988 testimony before Congress, weakening it to suggest that immediate action was not necessary (Rowlands 1995: 76). Although it is within the OMB’s authority to review testimony of all federal employees to check for consistency with presidential policy, the resulting notoriety of the matter did not cast a favorable light on the White House. According to the White House press secretary, the Hansen’s testimony had been altered because the ideas he had presented were not necessarily those of all scientists who had studied the matter (Colgazier 1991: 62). Indeed, even if it was not the view of all scientists, it is arguable whether the OMB should have altered the scientific aspects of Hansen’s testimony. Notably, Hansen’s assertion that global warming would lead to “drought intensification at most middle-and-low-latitude land areas” was changed to include that “these changes should be viewed as estimates from evolving computer models and not as reliable predictions” (quoted in Newton and Dillingham 1994: 175). However, the OMB was within its jurisdiction when it changed Hansen’s assertion that policies for reducing carbon dioxide growth rates “would” make economic sense. The OMB changed that to say such policies “should” make economic

sense, as Hansen was clearly giving policy advice outside his area of expertise (Colgazier 1991: 67). Even this episode was only a small piece in the huge domestic debate in the US prior to Rio.

The major obstacle within the administration was undoubtedly John Sununu, President Bush's Chief of Staff. Sununu feared that any policy that sought to reduce greenhouse emissions would prove detrimental to the US economy. Sununu was apparently strongly influenced by the unrefereed report "Scientific Perspectives on the Greenhouse Problem," published by the Marshall Institute in 1989 (Colgazier 1991: 63). The Marshall Report concluded that there were far too many uncertainties in climate research to justify any action as drastic as definite targets of greenhouse reductions. Peter Rogers and Myron Fiering of Harvard also argued that "the models that prompt many to warn that 'the sky is falling' are still deficient; they are too far off the mark to justify any changes in policy at this time" (Rogers and Fiering 1989: 6). The Marshall Report has been dismissed as a political document not subjected to peer review and was even called "noisy junk science" by Jerry Mahlman of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (quoted in Colgazier 1991: 63). Had the climate debate been simply a domestic issue, perhaps Sununu could have blocked any progress from happening at all. The Earth Summit was an international venue, however, and there were tremendous pressures upon President Bush to attend. (Of course, the domestic pressure of the upcoming election should not be discounted, not the least because the Democrats, led by then-Senator Al Gore, had every intention of making their presence known at Rio).

Bush's attendance at Rio did not come without consequences, however. The Framework Convention had to be watered down significantly, removing any mention of targets and timetables for reductions in emissions before President Bush would sign it. Although it did not get as much publicity, Bush had also refused to sign the Convention on Biological Diversity, arguing that to do so would hurt the US economy. Things could have gotten even worse had the US pushed to reopen some sections of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration that had already been agreed to. Most specifically, the US had concerns over the sections on protecting the water resources of "people under occupation." Most observers saw these concerns as part of the United States' support of Israel (Rogers 1993: 54). In the end, the US did not push too hard on this issue, going with a compromise where the references were removed from most of Agenda 21 but kept in the Rio Declaration. It was also recognized that any debate over occupied peoples could potentially raise the question of Native peoples in the US, something the US government most certainly did not want to deal with.

In the end, the actions of the Bush Administration before and during the Earth Summit were one factor for the lack of hard decisions made at Rio. Timetables or reduction targets were absent from the FCCC, and the US did not sign the Convention on Biological Diversity. The US was not, however, the only obstacle at the Earth Summit. Indeed, divisions arose among even long standing groups.

Factions at the Earth Summit

There was little question at the outset of the Earth Summit that there would be major differences between Northern and Southern nations. While the developed countries

wanted to talk about such “environmental” issues as ozone depletion, climate change, and deforestation, the developing states intended to discuss the connection between economic policies of the developed nations and the (lack of) economic growth in the developing world (Miller 1995: 9), and the link between the issues of environment and development. The ability to articulate this connection in an international forum outside of the context of the Cold War gave the developing countries a tremendous opportunity, one they approached with both fear and hope:

The fear was that environmental issues would intrude in the form of new constraints on their development, and new conditions on aid received from rich countries: the intrusion of Northern concerns on the Southern priorities of development and poverty alleviation. The hope was that these Northern concerns about the potential environmental implications of Southern development at last gave the South some real leverage in global politics: if the North wanted them to change their future behavior and development paths, they would have to meet Southern demands (Grubb et al., 1993: 26).

Questions of the environment had to be inextricably linked to questions of development, but a critical point on this matter was missed:

[T]here was a fundamental paradox in the fact that UNCED participants almost universally interpreted the “D” (development) to mean the process of poor countries getting richer, along an economic path similar to that followed by the industrialized countries, whilst the whole point of the “E” (environment) was to encourage such countries to “leapfrog” that path of development to a wealthy but sustainable state. If the end-point is supposed to be so radically different from the current resource-intensive pattern of industrialized countries, a central question has to be how the already industrialised countries are supposed to develop towards such a state. Sporadic attacks by some developing countries on the consumption patterns of the North, and the need to encourage cleaner technologies, did not amount to any clear vision of alternative paths for *Northern* development—such questions were simply not addressed in detail. There seemed little recognition of the fact that the UNCED agenda was incoherent unless “development” was broadened to include questions about

the future development of industrialised countries (Grubb et al., 1993: 32, emphasis in original).

Beyond the unasked questions of Northern development and the general split between the North and South, UNCED also highlighted schisms within those two very diverse groups. As noted above, the US stood on one side of the climate negotiations, emphasizing the lack of scientific certainty on the matter. On the other side, countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and France pushed for an ambitious Convention, even calling for the negotiation over Protocols to begin before the Framework Convention had been completed (Borione and Rippert 1994: 83).

Things were not much more “unified” for the South, either. If anything, the splits were even more divisive. Although some of the developed European nations were pushing for a stronger climate agreement, they were at least careful to avoid an agreement that they knew the US would not sign. For the developing nations, the question between competing groups among them was whether there should be a climate agreement at all. Clearly the most polarized division was between the oil-producing nations and the Alliance of Small Island States (Borione and Rippert 1994: 83; Dasgupta 1994: 136). The splits within both the North and South had at least one important consequence for the climate debate: it meant that factions would organize around different goals than just economic development or environmental protection. UNCED would see the rise to prominence of a special international organization of common bond, the Alliance of Small Island States, or AOSIS.

The Developing Nations (and the Small Islands) Find Their Voice

The global warming issue caught the attention of practically everyone, even the smallest of the developing nations. Recognizing their special vulnerability to climate change, the island nations at the September 1988 meeting of the South Pacific Forum expressed serious concerns with the prospect of global warming and the consequent rise in sea level that could follow (Brown 1996:19). Climate change and sea level rise would become a major focus of discussion among the island states thereafter.

To increase the contribution by the developing countries on international discussions on climate change, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Resources Institute (WRI) cosponsored the Tata International Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change in New Delhi, India, in February 1989. This first international conference devoted to the unique concerns of developing states on climate change articulated the views of the developing nations on the matter, highlighting the split between the developed and developing states that continues to be one of the major schisms in the climate debate. The conference statement

(1) made it clear that the industrialized countries had to bear most of the responsibility for human-induced climate change; (2) acknowledged that developing countries should participate in an international response to climate change, but not at the expense of economic development; and (3) emphasized the importance of research and training in developing countries (Børsting and Fermann 1997: 58).

While the Tata Conference articulated the views of the developing countries, the small island states were not recognized as a special concern. Certainly, the small island states would find (and do find) the second point of the conference statement problematic. This

illuminates the increasing difficulties in categorizing “developing nations” or “Third World” as a single bloc (Miller 1995: 12). This may be especially true in the environmental debate.

Other conferences on climate change would follow, with the developing world becoming both a consideration to be aware of as well as a force in these negotiations. Recognizing their distinct vulnerability to even a relatively moderate rise in sea level, a Conference on Climate Change and Sea Level Rise convened in July 1989 in Majuro, Marshall Islands. At the conference, it was noted that global warming could have potentially catastrophic effects in the region, and that the responsibility for the problem could be laid upon the industrialized countries, most of whom were not in the South Pacific (Taplin 1994: 273). (Australia and New Zealand being the clear exceptions). It was also pointed out that considerations of definitive scientific proof of climate change may not be in the best interest of the islands. It was succinctly observed at the Majuro Conference, “we don’t have time to wait for proof. The proof, we fear, could kill us” (Buckley 1992: 35). This point would be raised again and again in future discussions on climate change.

Two major meetings convened in November, the first in Noordwijk, Netherlands. This Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution highlighted the point that climate change was still being viewed as an “environmental” issue with little connection to other facets of policy. This can be seen in the strong statements made at Noordwijk, statements which later would be much more reserved (even swinging to the other extreme) as some of the consequences of a stringent climate policy began to become more clear. For

example, at Noordwijk, the representative of Saudi Arabia stated that there is “no argument” that carbon dioxide is the major force in global warming and that there was a definite need to move to reduce emissions as well as develop alternative forms of energy. By the end of 1990, however, Saudi Arabia would be stressing the scientific uncertainty and be opposed to the establishment of targets for emission reductions (Bodansky 1994: 72, n24).

The second major meeting in November was the Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise, held in Malé, Maldives. The ministerial-level conference drew representatives from 14 island nations and observers from several larger nations (Pernetta 1992:29). The “Malé Declaration” which emerged called for the establishment of an “action group” made up of the small island states from all over the world to coordinate a joint approach in international negotiations on climate change. The first Action Group consisted of Kiribati (South Pacific), Malta (Mediterranean), Maldives (Indian Ocean), Mauritius (Indian Ocean), and Trinidad and Tobago (Caribbean) (Heileman 1993: 55). This Action Group was the precursor to the Alliance Of Small Island States (AOSIS), which would form in the coming year.

AOSIS: “The International Conscience”

Formed at the SWCC in 1990, AOSIS would play a major role in the development of the FCCC in the run up to Rio and at Rio itself. It is a remarkable organization in that it is unified more by common interests and concerns rather than geographical location. AOSIS now numbers 42 members and observers from nearly every geographic region in the world (see Table 5.1). The coming together of AOSIS gives these states a greater

Table 5.1: Membership of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) grouped by region (1998)

Source: <http://www.aosis.org/country.htm>

Pacific Ocean	American Samoa*	Nauru
	Belau	Niue*
	Cook Islands	Papua New Guinea
	Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)	Solomon Islands
	Fiji	Tonga
	Guam*	Tuvalu
	Kiribati	Vanuatu
	Marshall Islands	Western Samoa
Caribbean	Antigua and Barbuda	Netherlands Antilles*
	Bahamas	St. Kitts and Nevis
	Barbados	St. Lucia
	Belize	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
	Cuba	Suriname
	Dominica	Trinidad and Tobago
	Grenada	US Virgin Islands*
	Guyana	
	Jamaica	
Atlantic Ocean	Cape Verde	
	Guinea-Bissau	
	Sao Tome and Principe	
Indian Ocean	Comoros	
	Maldives	
	Mauritius	
	Seychelles	
Mediterranean	Cyprus	
	Malta	
South China Sea	Singapore	

* = Observer Status in AOSIS

voice than they ever had previously. However, since the UN system is one of geographical representation, these states have not often been placed in positions of authority in the UN system, that honor going to the more “economically important” states of each region (Heileman 1993: 55-56). As Heileman points out, “even though small island states make up close to a sixth of the votes in the United Nations system, they are rarely

involved in any significant way in the decision-making process. Ironically, these countries once grouped constitute a potentially significant trans-regional geopolitical entity which can contribute positively to the decision-making process” (1993: 56). Djoghlaif considers AOSIS “the most important group of developing countries which emerged as an actor in the INC process” (1994: 105). AOSIS was chaired at the time by Robert Van Lierop, Vanuatu’s ambassador to the UN, who proved to be an exceptionally effective leader. (More will be said about Van Lierop’s role in the climate change negotiations later). AOSIS would be a major voice for the island states in the climate negotiations, not just in Rio, but in the meetings that would follow. Near the end of the Earth Summit, Resio Moses, Micronesian Secretary of External Affairs, said, “Micronesia is grateful that the grim prospect [of climate change and sea-level rise] is recognized in the Climate Change Convention (Williams 1992a: 25). Now that they had gotten started, AOSIS would continue to push for more in the meetings to come.

Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island States

UNCED had noted the special needs and position of the various small island states not just in terms of the climate debate, but also in the larger question of sustainable development. To address that point, a conference on the needs of small island states was one of the institutional recommendations of Agenda 21 that was subsequently enacted by the UN General Assembly (Grubb et al., 1993: 19). The meeting was scheduled for April 1994, in Barbados. In a major political step, AOSIS had been granted the full authority of the Group of 77 and China to negotiate a separate agreement in preparation for this

meeting (Davis 1996). Although Van Lierop was no longer chairing AOSIS, the members of the Alliance looked forward to the Barbados meeting with some optimism.

The world had changed in the two years after Rio. The meeting came at a time when other problems and crises took attention away from Barbados. Problems in Rwanda, Somalia, and closer to Europe in Bosnia dominated the headlines, and the small island states were not viewed to be in dire immediate need. The new AOSIS chair, Ambassador Annette des Isles of Trinidad and Tobago, did her best to put an upbeat spin to the results of the conference, which admittedly was somewhat difficult:

The donor countries did not honour their pledges at the Rio Conference to put new and additional resources towards the small island developing states. On the other hand, they did not explicitly repudiate them. It was pretty much as though they had been handed an IOU that they had signed two years before, and instead of ripping it up, had reendorsed it—but still not put any date or amount on the promise to pay (Williams 1994: 6)

Perhaps the biggest achievement of the conference was the second summit meeting of AOSIS, which coincided with the Barbados Conference. This meeting served to increase the cohesion of the alliance. Ambassador de Isles affirmed, “we have become a family, and we intend to remain one” (quoted in Williams 1994: 8).

Berlin: The First Conference of Parties (COP1)

The entry of the FCCC into force in March 1995 meant that a Conference of Parties (COP) could be organized to “ratchet down” states’ obligations in regards to climate change. Fresh from the Barbados Conference, AOSIS seemed ready to push for making the promises of the FCCC into a reality. While the change in leadership of AOSIS just prior to Barbados was somewhat disappointing for the Alliance, they nevertheless

redoubled their efforts towards Berlin. Ambassador des Isles delivered “one of the most effective speeches in the history of the climate negotiations when she introduced the AOSIS protocol” (Davis 1996). Beating the official deadline to submit proposals for protocols to the FCCC by just days, the AOSIS protocol was placed on the official agenda for Berlin. As noted earlier, the AOSIS protocol is a variation of the earlier “Toronto Target” (ironically, by COP1, Canada itself had already announced that it could not meet the Toronto Target) calling for a 20 percent reduction (now from 1990 levels) by the year 2005. This reduction was (and remains) politically impossible, but is really only a tentative step in alleviating the problem if the IPCC statements are to be believed. In his opening address to COP1, IPCC Chair Bert Bolin stated that a 60 percent cut in global emissions would be required to stabilize the gases already in the atmosphere (Heidenreich 1995, emphasis added). Acceptance of the AOSIS protocol was seen as a crucial first step, a litmus test of the dedication of the developed world to confront climate change. The threat that climate change could pose to the small island states was also mentioned the first day of the Conference by German Environment Minister Angela Merkel (Baxter 1995).

Those small island states would continue to work together in Berlin. Ambassador Tuiloma Neroni Slade of Western Samoa, then vice chair of AOSIS, led the Alliance at Berlin and was able to forge an alliance with some of the larger G-77 countries (including China) in support of the AOSIS protocol (Davis 1996). (Ambassador Slade is now chair of AOSIS). Despite that support, however, AOSIS was unsuccessful in getting backing from the US, which instead sided with the oil producing countries to block any targets or timetables on emission reductions. The change in administration from George Bush to Bill

Clinton had yielded just more of the same in terms of delays and refusal to support any binding agreement, despite earlier optimism and expectations.

Indeed, most developed nations were expected to be hard pressed to even meet the pledge of a return to 1990 levels, let alone a 20 percent reduction from that. Although eight industrialized countries did make national commitments to reach the 20 percent cut (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Slovakia) (“The Berlin Climate Summit” 1995), it remains highly doubtful that these countries will reach that goal. Australia, for example, had already begun to distance itself from its 1990 pledge to the Toronto Target even before Berlin (Garrett 1994: 41). Perhaps the only positive outcome of the Conference’s official statement, the “Berlin Mandate,” was a pledge for an agreement for binding reductions in emissions to be developed and discussed by COP3 in December 1997. Expressing his disappointment with the results of Berlin on behalf of AOSIS, Ambassador Slade stated that “we will continue to play with passion our reluctant role as Earth’s early warning system, to continue to raise the alarm, and to raise the heat, on this process” (“Atmosphere and Climate” 1996).

Geneva: COP2

With the pledge for a binding agreement on greenhouse emissions scheduled for COP3 to be held in Kyoto, COP2 in Geneva could very well have been a forgotten conference. However, the events at Geneva did show some progress in climate negotiations and some changes that would insure COP2 would not be forgotten. COP2 was considered the “halfway point” between the platitudes at Berlin and what was hoped

to be a binding agreement at Kyoto. Thus, it was a time to gauge how far the international community had gotten in drafting a binding protocol on greenhouse emissions.

The biggest news from COP2 was without question the declaration of support by the United States for legally binding targets rather than voluntary goals on greenhouse emissions (Harrison 1997: 90). Without this endorsement, there is little doubt that COP2 would have been a disaster in the effort to reduce greenhouse emissions. Undersecretary of State Tim Wirth denounced the “naysayers” who were trying to undermine the work and credibility of the IPCC and called for a binding protocol to be prepared for adoption at Kyoto, making clear that “delay and denial were no longer an option” (Newell and Paterson 1996: 730). The shift in the US position increased the optimism that COP3 would actually produce a significant international agreement. However, a pledge of emission reduction is something quite different than an actual reduction. Also, despite the euphoria over the shift in the US position, it was clear that the US was still far from endorsing or pledging anything near to the AOSIS protocol. Timothy Wirth’s statement was that the US would support reduction targets that were “realistic, verifiable, and binding” (quoted in Begley 1996: 435A). It was the “realistic” part that remains the source of much international disagreement.

Kyoto: COP3

Tremendous anticipation surrounded COP3 in December 1997. Would there finally be a protocol? And would that protocol have real “teeth”? Bill Clinton, who as a presidential candidate attacked George Bush’s stand on the environment as “reactive, rudderless and expedient” with “short-term trade-offs between jobs and the environment”

(O'Neill 1992: 17) was now in the position of protecting the economic concerns of the US. The major source of disagreement this time around stemmed mostly from the North-South division. Clinton's stance on the science of climate change (influenced no doubt by Vice President Al Gore) was less skeptical than that of President Bush, but that did not mean that Clinton was necessarily willing to sacrifice the "economic security" of the US to stave off any consequences of climate change. (This point should not be all that surprising, considering the major focus and slogan of Clinton's 1992 campaign—"It's the economy, stupid").

The original proposal from Washington was the most conservative one put forward, calling for a reduction of the developed world's emissions back to (but not below) 1990 levels by the year 2012 (not 2005 as most other proposals suggested). Soon after the opening ceremonies at Kyoto, however, the US announced that it would be willing to consider "differentiation," which would allow the setting of different reduction targets rather than a uniform target for the industrialized world ("Nations Begin Global Climate Talks" 1997). This was a major step in the negotiations, although this step could be double-edged. Japan, for instance, certainly favored some form of differentiation since it was already fairly energy efficient compared to other industrialized countries and therefore might not have to pledge as much of a reduction. What this all hinged upon, of course, was how "differentiation" was defined.

Beyond the question of differentiation between industrialized countries, Clinton also entered Kyoto looking to confront the developing world. Clinton stated that the US would not submit to a binding reductions target unless the developing world did so as

well. This demand was also repeated by the US Senate, which declared it would not ratify a treaty that placed no obligations on the developing world. Note that Clinton was not requiring that the developing nations commit to the same amount of reductions, or even to reductions at all, only that they would be bound to some agreement (probably an upper limit to their increase of greenhouse emissions). This debate highlighted something that was clear from the beginning of the climate negotiations. Although the requirements of the FCCC and the Berlin Mandate were voluntary, there was at least some effort to address the situation of greenhouse emissions in the developed world. In contrast, the requirements (even voluntary ones) placed upon developing states in regards to emissions were virtually nil. At Kyoto, however, demands grew stronger for there not only to be binding requirements on the developed world (who were still the major emitters of greenhouse gases) but also the developing world, whose emissions potential, if ever realized, could have disastrous ramifications. Indeed, China has already moved into second place (behind the US) in total carbon dioxide emissions.²³ When one measures per capita CO₂ output, however, China still lags far behind the bulk of the industrialized world.

Clinton's image suffered at Kyoto, much like Bush's at Rio. In fact, Tim Wirth, who had been a powerful voice calling for a strong binding agreement, announced his departure from the State Department a month before COP3. Although Wirth did plan to be at Kyoto (he left his position at the State Department to handle Ted Turner's billion dollar donation to the UN), it was questionable as to whether he would play a major role

²³ If one measures the CO₂ output of all the countries of the Former Soviet Union, their total output would be greater than that of China.

at the proceedings. Christopher Flavin of the Worldwatch Institute suggested that Wirth's departure could have been evidence of his frustration with having to defend the weak US proposal (Allen 1997). After not pledging any cuts and to only stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by sometime between the years 2008-2012, the US did pledge a 2% cut in emissions. This was derided and was eventually followed by a pledge of a 6% reduction. By the end of COP3, the US had agreed to a 7% reduction of greenhouse gases from 1990 levels by the year 2012. The EU pledged an 8% reduction, Japan and Canada a 6% reduction, and Australia agreed to a maximum 8% increase.

The US pledge was a major political breakthrough in the climate negotiations, but the US also got something in the bargain. The US successfully included the idea of emissions trading (placed under the rubric of "joint implementation" or JI) with other countries. JI meant that if developed countries could aid the developing countries in reducing their emissions, those reductions would be partly credited to the developed country. JI was opposed vehemently by China and other developing nations, which felt that it would allow the developed nations to avoid reductions (and the associated difficult political decisions) at home.

The island states, even united under AOSIS, play a very small role by the time we reach COP3. As the world moves past the agenda setting stage and closer to the policy formulation stage, the moral weight of the island states' claims diminished. Now, the government representatives had to make decisions that would have serious effects upon their electoral aspirations and image at home.

As tremendous as the promises made at Kyoto were from a political standpoint, they are far from powerful in terms of actually solving the problem of climate change. Note also that these promises also have to be ratified in many instances, and at least as far as the US case goes, it is highly doubtful that the current Republican Senate will ratify the pledged 7% cut. There has been little support for the Kyoto Protocol even among Democrats within the Senate, and the Clinton Administration has yet to submit it for ratification. With the cloud of possible impeachment hovering over President Clinton, it is doubtful that any treaty, much less one with the ramifications of the Kyoto Protocol, will be presented to the Senate during the remainder of President Clinton's tenure in office.

Buenos Aires: COP4

As slight as the contribution made by the island states were at COP3, they dropped even further at COP4, held in Buenos Aires, in November 1998. The conference hoped to continue the momentum built up at Kyoto, but such progress was incremental at best. Certainly, the influence of the island states had dropped significantly as the decisions on real emissions cuts and what sacrifices would have to be made took center stage. AOSIS continued to call for a definite timetable to implement the Kyoto Protocol. The Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Tuvalu, along with the CARICOM states and Algeria, expressed concern that a mechanism that allowed for flexibility in implementation of the Protocol would be a way for some states to avoid domestic responsibility ("Report of the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change," 1998: 11). Despite such calls, the contribution by the island states has unquestionably dropped since their early influence on the climate change issue.

The United States remains the major block in the North, but its intransigence is not just hubris, but a recognition of the incredibly difficult political decisions that would have to be made to address climate change, decisions that would drastically affect the lifestyle of many US citizens and consequently have significant electoral ramifications as well. Although energy use in the US dropped during the early 1980's, consumption has begun to rise again (Myerson 1998: A1). Germany and the United Kingdom have been the most vocal supporters of the major countries in Europe of a strong protocol, but their advocacy of such a protocol is certainly influenced by their special circumstances. Germany will easily cut their emissions even further than the 8% pledge since with reunification the less efficient factories of the former East Germany are being phased out. In the case of the UK, their switch from coal and oil to the cleaner natural gas for most of their energy use has cut their emissions relatively painlessly. Such options are clearly not available for the United States or even for other countries. Australia, for example, which had stood by the Pacific islands and even declared that it would try to reach the Toronto Target, had discovered just how difficult it was to live up to its rhetoric. The promises it made could not be kept in the face of economic and domestic demands, most notably the coal industry in Australia. In July 1997, Australia had already announced that it would not accept any Forum communique that called for binding emission reductions, a point it reiterated at the 28th SPF meeting in September (Hussein 1997b: 11). Similarly to statements by the US, the issue was said to be "a matter of paramount economic concern to Australia" (Hussein 1997b: 11). The clash between the economic concerns of the larger

nations and the survival of the island states would be the major schism over which the battle for definition of the issue of climate change would be fought.

CHAPTER SIX

AGENDA BUILDING AND CLIMATE CHANGE²⁴

Agenda Building and Climate Change: The Problem Stream

Small islands and the developing nations are not the only ones for whom a crisis can trigger the agenda setting process. All countries face moments of crucial decision at one point or another. Kingdon's analysis itself was originally developed in the study of the United States. As another example, Reed's (1981) deviant case study of environmental policy in Japan shows to good effect the strength of the problem stream in placing environmental concerns upon the formal agenda. Reed uncovers the assumptions that subsequently lead to the erroneous conclusion that environmental policy in Japan should be "weak." In reality, Japan has one of the stricter environmental policy regimes in the world. For example, one assumption is that environmental legislation is one of those issue areas that move against the general bias towards economic growth and development; especially in business-oriented, trade-driven society such as "Japan, Inc." Furthermore, Japan is said to be a haven for "nondecisions," where consensus is valued more than adversarial debate. Reed argues that these assumptions are, in fact, borne out by observation when one is speaking generally about policy making in Japan. Where this

²⁴This Chapter is a revised and updated version of Shibuya (1996-97), "Roaring Mice Against the Tide: The South Pacific Islands and Agenda Building on Global Warming," *Pacific Affairs*, 69:4 (Winter 1996-1997):541-555.

general observation falls short however, is in its failure to take account of the ever present *ceritus paribus* clause. All things being equal, Japan's propensity towards economic growth and trade and its valuing of consensus over "mavericks" would lead to the issue of environment getting very little attention on the formal agenda. However, all things are not equal, and in this instance, the severity of the problem in Japan has required policy makers to address the situation. The environmental problem in Japan is one of great severity and of a different type (or better put, the issues are constructed differently) from that, say, of the United States. The issue of the environment in the United States is usually framed as an issue of preservation and/or restoration, of keeping the "natural beauty" that exists relatively free of human intervention or returning damaged areas to their "natural state." At the very least, one tries to create the image that these areas are free of human intervention by tactics such as placing tall trees along a path to block the view of a landfill or housing development on the other side. In Japan, the environmental issue took the form of "pollution diseases," directly affecting the well-being of members of the populace. Trees and mountains have a political voice only indirectly, but fishermen suffering from radiation or mercury poisoning, or other citizens confronting the effects of water pollution, are a lobby that must be taken into account in the game of electoral politics. Issues of health (especially human health) have greater sway than issues of preservation and beautification.

Examining the issue climate change, the problem stream was clearly different for the island nations than it was for the developed world. If climate change was a problem that only had implications for the island nations, then it is highly doubtful that there would

ever have been an international summit on the matter. However, the issue of human actions and the climate had already been something the developed world has looked to address on an international level, at least in passing, since Stockholm 1972. Subsequent discussions and conferences noted in chapter five culminated in the formation of the IPCC. The IPCC's first report, published in 1990, argued that there was building evidence that the earth was growing warmer due to human activity. Actions noted in particular were the large scale burning of fossil fuels, as well as the clearing of forests which absorb much of the CO₂, the "major" greenhouse gas.²⁵ The prospective consequences of the continued warming of the earth included rising sea levels and the possibility of flooding low lying islands and coastal areas (Rogers 1993: 187).

This prediction of sea level rise placed the problem of climate change at a crisis point for those low-lying islands. A report in late 1991 from the National Task Force on Environmental Management and Sustainable Development of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) highlighted 11 environmental concerns, placing sea level rise as the top priority (Harding 1992:142). When the RMI was admitted to the United Nations in September 1991, President Amata Kabua's address to the UN highlighted global warming as his nation's greatest threat, saying "[the RMI can] do nothing to alleviate the problem itself, other than continue to raise the issue in the international community" (quoted in Connell and Maata 1992: 1).

²⁵This has already discussed in Chapter Five, but bears repeating. While water vapor is the most powerful greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide is the main gas emitted via human activity. This distinction is, unfortunately, not always made clear in either the popular or academic literature on climate change.

Climate change as a top priority was not the case for most of the developed world (or even some of the larger developing states), however, despite the fact that most of them do indeed have some vulnerable regions. Hence, the problem of the “problem stream” arises—how is one to identify and define what the stakes are in this discussion? Because climate change had not (indeed, it still has not) reached a crisis point for the developed world, the problem was defined as one of economics versus the environment. President Bush’s (ultimately successful) efforts at the Rio Summit to dilute the FCCC were based on two arguments: that there was not enough scientific evidence to warrant drastic legislation, and secondly that such legislation would put an undue strain on the US economy (Rogers 1993: 188). a version of this argument would be raised by Australia as well (Hussein 1997a). The debate of “economics vs. the environment” is one that cuts deeply in regards to global climate change because, unlike other pollutants (such as CFCs), CO₂ is an unavoidable byproduct of the consumption of fossil fuels (Thacher 1991:43). Therefore, “better technology” cannot fix this problem.

Rather than questions of technology or economics, the island states viewed the climate change problem quite differently. The sense of an impending apocalypse for the small islands was a powerful motivation for action, as well as a source of political discourse against both economic concerns and scientific uncertainties. The literal drowning of a country made economic hardships and the lack of definitive answers by scientists seem practically trivial in comparison. Former president of Kiribati Ieremiah Tabai noted in 1988, “if what the scientists say now is going to be true, in 50 or 60 years my country

will not be there” (quoted in Connell and Lea 1992:295). Rogers notes such passionate pleas made at the Rio Summit itself:

The fourth speaker was Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, president of the Republic of Maldives [in the Indian Ocean]. His primary concern was with the Convention on Climate Change, and why all targets and timetables had been omitted from it. His [sic] said the issue of the greenhouse effect did not get the attention it deserved, and that he, coming from a small island-nation, was particularly concerned. “a one-meter rise in the level of the ocean threatens our survival as a nation,” he exclaimed. “We are but a small nation and maybe our voice does not have much weight.... But do not let our voice go unheard, for if you do, it might be forever” (Rogers 1993: 166).

Such imagery was hard to dismiss, and indeed, the power of that imagery may have much to do with how the islanders were able to frame the issue of climate change in the international arena. As clichéd as it might be, the islands, especially the Pacific islands, carry a myth and image of being a “tropical paradise.” From the paintings of Gauguin, the legend of the *HMS Bounty*, to the musical *South Pacific*, there has always been an exoticism and fantasy about the islands, and the image of these island “paradises” disappearing from the face of the earth may be a tool that can, at the very least, get the attention of the developed nations. But these images are hardly unproblematic. Indeed, contradictory images abound over the Pacific islands as preserved “Edens” isolated from “civilization” (implying a mythical comfort of being “away from it all”), but said isolation can also bring about a lack of concern for those who live every day on the islands. The savage, whether “noble” or not, or the sexually available “island girl” are all part of the contradictory imagery and mythos of the islands, culminating with the sexually provocative garment, the bikini, which was named after the atoll where the atomic bombs

were tested (see Teaiwa 1994). Overall, as the issue of climate change rises in the international arena, this attention and imagery of the islands may be a double-edged sword, as Brookfield notes:

The developed world loves the stable Pacific it has created through its own mythology, powerfully aided by many Islanders themselves in modern times. Brilliant blue lagoons, white beaches, palm trees, and smiling, gaily dressed people twanging sugary music on imported guitars are the key elements of an image loved from Tromsø to Dunedin. When disaster strikes it is a disaster in Paradise, and the image has been a great asset to the island countries since it has helped fund a flow of aid that on a per capita basis tops the world list.

The affluent, developed world is not going to like the idea of its Pacific Islands dream being invaded by the sea; in the short term it might conceivably show more concern about this than about greatly increased flooding in the coastal regions of Asia. However, it is going to be distinctly more perturbed by the cost of raising Dutch dykes or helping second-home owners in Florida protect their investments.... In a human-made disaster that creates huge adaptation costs in many parts of the world, damage done to the Pacific dream will not rank high for long (Brookfield 1989: 14).

Apocalyptic visions may be an effective tool to get an issue onto the public and formal agenda, but such cries do not make for a basis of discussion on the formation of policy. At COP1 in Berlin, for example, the South Pacific representatives were especially eloquent:

[AOSIS vice chair and ambassador of Western Samoa Tuiloma Neroni Slade] said, "the strongest human instinct is not greed, sloth or complacency. It is survival. We will not allow the world to barter our homelands, our cultures, for short term economic interest." The delegate from Papua New Guinea added, "We care, not only for our children, but for all children." Hence, said the delegate from the Marshall Islands, "We will not rest until there is a firm commitment for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions." (Heidenreich 1995).

Eloquence is one thing, but real answers (both in terms of alleviating the problem and being politically viable) are quite another. Indeed, even the island states have had to make

concessions, as their limited resources makes it incredibly difficult to attend all the meetings. Even with AOSIS, the representatives of the islands cannot be everywhere. Shameem notes that the lack of an organized structure for AOSIS has hindered its efforts to increase its influence, but also recognizes that this loose organizational structure allows the AOSIS members to gloss over the differences within the alliance. For instance, it seems that the Pacific islands are more concerned with climate issues, while the Caribbean bloc is more interested in questions of development and ecotourism (Shameem 1995: 134). It is telling that Ambassador des Isles, then Chair of AOSIS, did not attend COP1 at Berlin but rather was busy with another UN committee in New York (Shameem 1995: 134).

Science and (or versus) Politics: What Questions are We Asking?

a caveat before proceeding. What is often forgotten in the discussion over global climate change (indeed, this can be said about many environmental issues) is the fact that science and policy have different goals to meet, and by extension different questions to answer. What science can or cannot tell us will often be at odds with what the policymaker “needs” to know in order to make a decision. In the case of climate change, for example, there is a difference between the knowledge that the concentration of carbon dioxide is increasing in the atmosphere (generally acknowledged by scientists on both sides of the global warming debate) and the conclusion that this increase is leading to observable warming on the earth’s surface. There is also a difference in noting that the earth is warming and the argument that it is human activity which is causing it. Just because a

change or trend is detected is not to say that a cause for that change can be attributed (in this case, to human activity):

Studies that aim to identify human influences on climate attempt to separate a human-caused climate-change factor (the signal) from the background noise of natural climate variability. Such investigations usually consist of two parts: detection of an unusual change, and attribution of all or parts of that change to a particular cause or causes.

The concepts of detection and attribution may be understood in terms of a simple medical analogy. Measurement of a body temperature of 40°C (104°F) detects the presence of some abnormal condition or symptom, but does not in itself give the cause of the symptom (Hamburg et al., 1997:9).

a second difference between science and politics has to do with the time horizons politicians and scientists consider to be relevant. In the study of the earth, analyses that cover years, decades, even centuries may not be adequate to get a full picture of the phenomena one is observing. Democratically elected decisionmakers, however, have to consider electoral pressures as a major consideration. The ability to attribute, or perhaps even confirm, the detected increase in the earth's temperature to human activity (or anything else) is currently beyond the capability of science. Connected to this, the questions of how long before science will be able to answer that question (if at all), and how long can we afford to wait before political action "must" be taken are also questions that fall beyond the auspices of science. Because of these conflicts, it is possible that an authoritative decision will be made before the science is definitive. It is also possible that the political decision will not be as far reaching as the science would dictate, not necessarily because of a lack of certainty in the science, but because political leaders

cannot take the tough measures necessary to alleviate the problem. These dynamics are evident in the climate debate.

Even now, with the issue of climate change on the formal agenda for nearly every country in the world, the problem stream and the debate on how one is to frame the issue remains. Now, however, it is more often a question of how one identifies policy alternatives rather than pushing a “nondecision.” Note also that the furor and fever pitch of the climate negotiations has died down somewhat. Some resisting coalitions still exist (notably the OPEC nations), as well as a vocal group of “contrarian” scientists who have questioned the findings of the IPCC, but even leaving these groups aside, one can only worry about the end of the world, as it were, for so long. In fact, when addressing the consequences of climate change today, the issue of rising sea levels is more a long term concern, with questions of increased frequency and intensity of storms seen as more pressing matters. Sharma summarizes a report, saying “average temperatures will rise by only 1.5 centigrade during the next 70 years, a fraction of the increase feared by early scientists and experiments” (1992:26). Although the scientific debate recognizes that much of the influx of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere is produced naturally (Hamburg et. al, 1997), the human contribution still may be significant, the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back (Mintzer and Leonard 1994: 9). Scientific debate and analysis are only part of the story, however. The questions relating to what one is to base policy on are as much political as they are scientific, if not more weighted toward the political side. Scientists have a role (and perhaps, obligation) beyond just that of the “objective” researcher, and that plays on both sides of the climate debate. On the one

hand, Penchuro Lefale, atmosphere/energy campaigner in the Pacific for Greenpeace New Zealand has said “we failed to heed the warning of ozone depletion in time and our children and our grandchildren will have to live with the consequences. The impacts of global warming pose even greater threats” (Lefale 1992: 8). Such sentiment is clearly outside of the “objectivity” of science, but it can also cut the other way. Certainly, the “objectivity” of those scientists labeled “contrarians” for their dispute of climate change has been challenged (See Gelbspan 1997 for a piercing exposé on the connections between the fossil fuel industry and some of the more prominent “contrarian” scientists).

With the most significant (and certainly the most heart-stopping) consequence of climate change being further and further pushed back for the islands, the question of time has political implications as well, as Gilbert points out:

The proof of whether the Policy Maker’s [sic] got it right or wrong, may not be seen until well into next century as opposed to the next hour or so. That’s the good news. The bad news is trying to convince people that they have to take action NOW [sic] to avoid something that mightn’t be evident until 2020 or 2050....

Most Policy work is directed at solving today’s (or even yesterday’s) problems rather than tomorrow’s. Economists like to translate costs and policy implications to “present values.” Business interests tend to concentrate on the balance sheets for the next one to five years. Politicians at all levels of government have their eyes on today’s results and tomorrow’s elections....

These sorts of issues [like climate change] where the effects may not be seen for decades—make life very difficult for Policy Makers. It’s very hard to convince people like politicians and business interests that they should change direction when there’s no visible evidence of a problem (1991:97-98).

Whether as merely another issue in the “economics versus environment” debate or a genuine threat to the very physical existence of one’s country, the issue of climate

change did develop a problem stream. The ominous indications of a warming earth, while perhaps not a crisis in and of itself, implied to the island nations possibly disastrous consequences; consequences which the islands could not survive. Recognition of the problem in this fashion stirred the policy community of the small islands to action, and was one of the more effective initial tools to combat those who would frame the problem as simply an economic one. There are also domestic political benefits in the focus on the most drastic consequences of climate change. Just as the antinuclear issue was tied to anticolonialism and nation building, the framing of the climate change issue could bind the island nations together, despite other differences.

Climate Change: Strengthening a Community?

For most of the South Pacific region, especially the island states, the major security threats after World War II have been understood to be economic rather than military in nature. Immediate questions of subsistence (and larger ones of sustainable development) are more likely threats to the well being of the islanders than military invasion. This is the major reason that most of the island states did not feel that the nuclear deterrent was a necessary part of their security picture, especially since France was testing their weapons in the region. This was not viewed as an enhancement by the island states to their security. Certainly, the memory of their islands being used as stepping stones during World War II remains a powerful memory among the older generation, but overall there is a general understanding that the new high tech weaponry and strategies of the next century make such island hopping tactics obsolete. As such, the islanders' perceptions of their primary threats are different from those in different situations (e.g., the major powers). This

assertion of disparate perceptions was the central argument in the antinuclear movement in the region. Although he is given more credit as a “leader” of this movement by those outside of the region rather than in it, New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange did articulate this point especially effectively:

Having placed the nuclear free policy squarely in the context of South Pacific security, I had no easy prescription to offer the rest of the world. I didn't see any way that New Zealand's solution could simply be adopted elsewhere in the world. The fact of it was that the majority of people in New Zealand felt secure without seeing any need to be defended by nuclear weapons.... Unlike the people of Western Europe, the people of New Zealand had no territory bordering that of an alien, incomprehensible power. We didn't feel suddenly defenceless [sic] when the nuclear umbrella was taken away from us. Many people in Europe, on the other hand, were genuinely alarmed by the thought that the United States might pack up and go home. Knowing this, I was never an advocate of sweeping measures of unilateral disarmament.... The whole point of our policy was that it was right for our circumstances. It was our judgment, based on our assessment of what we needed for our security (Lange 1990: 117, emphasis added).

Because the perception of threat was very dissimilar between regions such as Europe and the South Pacific, the range of acceptable defense options were also different from one group to the other. Such differences in the perceptions of threat (i.e., how that threat is constructed) also arise in the climate change debate. Just as different considerations of what it means to be “secure” lead to different policies in the nuclear situation, so too do divergent policies on climate change emerge from different ideas over what is “at stake.”

Although the island states certainly recognized the consequences of climate change as a real threat, there were several problems that needed to be overcome before they could bring their concerns to the international stage. It was going to be very difficult to articulate a position that would not be perceived as anti-development, anti-economic growth. (Of

course, the island states wanted to remain economically viable entities as well, which further complicated the discussion). The discussion would have to be framed as a search for “sustainable development,” a destination which is always the goal in international negotiations, but is almost never clearly defined. As noted earlier, it would not be enough to institute sustainable practices in the island states alone, or even in the developing world more generally. This was perhaps the greatest obstacle; unless and until the advanced industrialized states conceded that their consumption and development policies were unsustainable, there could be no effective agreement that would protect the island states and other low-lying areas from the worse consequences of climate change.

It was quite clear to the island nations that while they were among the least industrialized nations in the world, they were going to be among the first affected by the consequences of climate change, whether by the possibility of rising sea levels, or the more probable and impending threat of storm activity. The islands were not going to be able to solve the problem of climate change by themselves; this necessarily had to become an international issue. While there were some differences among the island states in the antinuclear case, there was greater harmony of interests in the climate change issue.

Agenda Building and Climate Change: The Policy Stream

Due to their small size and lack of resources, the island nations have found it very difficult to make much of an impact in the international arena as single units. Therefore, much of the work by the island states has been in the form of collaborative efforts. The Pacific island nations in particular are rather proud of their peaceful methods of dispute resolution and their emphasis on group consensus (M. Haas 1989). The similar

recognition of the problem of climate change by the various island states led to a desire to collectively address this problem. Conferences devoted to climate change and its consequences brought the island nations together against a common threat, much like the nuclear problem bound the South Pacific region. Unlike the nuclear issue, however, the island states did not initiate unilateral policies on climate change. Instead, the island states banded together and put collective support behind the AOSIS Protocol. a main reason to explain this situation is that the islands themselves have not completely shifted over to a purely environmental point of view and are part of the “frame” of economic development. Even at UNCED, it was “sustainable development” that was defined as the international goal, and who can really stand against developing, advancing in a “sustainable” fashion? However, until this is defined in real terms and hard numbers (if such a thing can actually be done), the concept of sustainable development will remain far too amorphous to be the basis for a complete shift in frames. Secondly, while perhaps an island state initiating a plan to stabilize or even cut its greenhouse emissions would have great public relations value, it may not have much more weight than that. Certainly, for all its industry, most island states remain barely past subsistence-agriculture economies.

While the island states recognized the greater force in working together, it was clear that regional organizations like the SPF and the Caribbean Commission (CARICOM) would be inadequate platforms to address climate change. The SPF was especially problematic with the presence of Australia and New Zealand as full members. Climate change thus brought forth an international bond, with the development of AOSIS to speak as the amplified, if not completely unified, voice of the small island states.

Agenda Building and Climate Change: The Political Stream

Within the political stream, the growing international mood had begun to swing in the direction that issues such as climate change and biodiversity needed to be addressed, and not solely within one's territorial borders. With this in mind, the Earth Summit held out the promise that there would be more than just talk. The end of the Cold War brought about a new and rising optimism, that with the East-West conflict gone, the North-South divisions could now be examined without the bogeyman of "National Security" around to cloud the issue. Such optimism, while still present through much of the summit, was lessened even before the meetings at Rio began.

Foremost among the obstacles was the fact that President Bush hesitated as to whether or not he would even go to Rio, which sparked much protest and criticism both domestically and internationally for Bush and the United States. It was recognized, especially in the matter of climate change, that any agreement that did not have the United States onboard would be next to meaningless—the US is the single largest producer of greenhouse gases (O'Neill 1992:17). Bush's hesitance to attend, as well as his reservations on both the biodiversity and climate change conventions, undermined his claim to be "the environmental President" and no doubt hurt his reelection hopes. Still attempting to ride high on his military accomplishment in the Gulf, President Bush received a rude awakening in Rio. US Representative George Miller observed, "When President Bush flies to the Earth Summit, he will find that the New World Order looks a lot more like Rio than did the Gulf War" (Rogers 1993:76). Miller later stated that he and the rest of the congressional delegation to the summit were particularly struck by the

palpable resentment towards the United States from both the developing and developed world at the summit (Rogers 1993:77). In such an atmosphere, with President Bush playing catch-up rather than leading the way, the vanguard role in the American contingent was taken up by then Senator (and soon to be Vice-President) Al Gore.

The Middle Powers in the Climate Change Debate

The role of the middle powers of Australia and New Zealand is less visible here, but no less significant, than in the antinuclear case. While both nations early on in the climate negotiations came out in support of major emission cuts (even endorsing the Toronto Target), when it came to actually instituting those policies, both nations found themselves unable to do so. By the time COP1 came about, both Australia and New Zealand found themselves part of the infamous “JUSCANZ” coalition (along with Japan, the US, and Canada), which was perceived as the major blocking coalition from the advanced world (with OPEC as the other primary blocking coalition). Australia especially angered the small island states in the Pacific when it used its influence in the region to prevent any statement of emission targets and timetables within the SPF’s Communique on the eve of COP3 in Kyoto. Australian Prime Minister John Howard had continually stated that he would not agree to any binding targets for greenhouse gas reductions for fear that Australian jobs would be lost (Hussein 1997b: 11).

New Zealand, in contrast to its visibility in the antinuclear debate, has kept a remarkably low profile in the climate negotiations. Of course, one reason is that New Zealand found itself resisting a strong climate agreement anyway. Also, while New Zealand’s break with the ANZUS alliance thrust it into the world spotlight (and meant it

would be perceived as a “leader” of the antinuclear movement by those outside the region), New Zealand took no strong stance in the climate negotiations.

The resistance of the two regional middle powers (as opposed to the nominal support received in the antinuclear case) to strong statements in regards to climate change meant the island states had to craft different alliances. While Australia could block a statement from the SPF, just as it had crafted a nuclear free zone in its favor, Australia could not stop the island states from making their concerns known via other avenues, most notably via AOSIS. This meant that, for the most part, the statement coming from the islands was relatively undiluted; it also meant that the island states did not have the backing of the regional hegemons. The island states also gain, at least initially, the support of the large G-77 countries, notably China and India. This support occurs only initially, however, in the early stages of negotiations because both the island states and China and India share the goal of getting the industrialized world to reduce its emissions. This alliance between AOSIS and the rest of the G-77 deteriorates soon after COP1 because the ultimate goal for the island states is a cut in all emissions, regardless of source, while states like China and India hope to increase their emissions in their continuing push to industrialize.

The Intervening Variables: Windows, Entrepreneurs, and Spillovers

There are two points in time that are significant for the climate change debate and the island states. First, there are the fears of sea level rise that come out of the initial reports on climate change. This event from the problem stream galvanizes action within the island states. Later, the end of the Cold War is the element coming from the political

stream that opens the window of opportunity for the small island states (a “political window” as opposed to a “problem window,” to use Kingdon’s terminology). The elimination of the bipolar conflict was supposed to mean that the international focus could now turn to questions of North-South development, and that questions of the environment (among other things) could be looked at without the stumbling block of the US-USSR rivalry being considered. As noted earlier, however, an open window of opportunity only suggests that something needs to be done, but not what. The end of the Cold War did mean that the developed countries focused more on economic and environmental issues, but it did not mean that this focus would automatically be to the benefit of the developing nations.

The climate change issue also benefited from the spillover effect of an increasing concern for the environment in general. Problems of hazardous waste, of ozone depletion, deforestation, and pollution were issues that every nation had to face. While problems such as deforestation and desertification were considered by many to be internal issues (within the border of a country), there was a rising belief that the environment was everyone’s concern, and that some problems (like global climate change) could not be confined to within states. Like the window of opportunity, this spillover suggested that something be done to address the climate change issue, but not specifically what. It is into this atmosphere that the policy entrepreneurs entered.

The threat of climate change linked the island nations closer together than anything had previously. Regardless of location, the low lying islands saw that they would be the first “tests” of the ramifications of climate change. a few individuals took special roles in

the debate. President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Maldives was a driving force in the creation of AOSIS. At the international conference on sea level rise held in his country, it was Gayoom who put forth the idea of an international group of island states coming together to influence international climate policy. Gayoom's inspiration would come together as the Alliance of Small Island States, and its first chair would have a significant impact on the climate negotiations to follow.

Robert Van Lierop, a lawyer of African-American descent, was recruited by Prime Minister Lini to serve as Vanuatu's UN ambassador. Van Lierop's efforts in pushing climate change on the formal agenda in the international realm placed him in the spotlight, and he made the most of that exposure. While all the island nations are concerned with climate change, the islands of Vanuatu are "high" islands. The direct threat of rising sea levels was not one that would confront Vanuatu in the next century even in the gloomiest of forecasts (though Vanuatu was concerned with the effects of climate change on storm activity in the region). Van Lierop, however, proved an effective leader in articulating the interests and concerns of all the island states.

Van Lierop's efforts began in 1990, at the Second World Climate Conference and the formation of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which he chaired. The AOSIS, under Van Lierop's leadership, was able to play an active role in the meetings leading to the Rio Summit, and was one of the few groups of developing nations that did play an active role in the negotiations for the FCCC (Djoghla 1994: 105). When the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) met in Geneva in 1991, Van Lierop was named co-chair to the Working Group II (WG II) which was to articulate the climate

change convention's institutional framework, such as reporting requirements and legal provisions including dispute resolution (Hyder 1994: 209). The appointment of Van Lierop to the position of co-chair reflected his position as chair of AOSIS and to recognize the increasingly prominent role of the island nations in the climate change negotiations (Djoghla 1994:106). There was increasing recognition that the island nations had gained greater voice at Rio. The representatives of the Maldives and Vanuatu were elected vice-presidents to the conference, and Japan and India stood down in their favor. Tuvalu and Nauru were invited to be the first to sign the FCCC as well as the Convention on Biodiversity (Taplin 1994: 277).

Van Lierop's position as co-chair of WG II increased his visibility and aided his efforts and his advocacy of a precautionary principle to climate change (Taplin 1994:276). Benefits also were gained by the island states, who now had one of their own in a position of international leadership. Van Lierop stood against not only the advanced world, but against the larger developing states if they blocked the efforts of AOSIS. Van Lierop staged a dramatic walkout of AOSIS members at a Geneva meeting of the Group of 77 and China when one oil producing country attempted to stall negotiations (Davis 1996).

AOSIS has continued to grow, now numbering thirty-six members and five observers. Their greatest influence, however, may now have passed, as the discussion moves from the agenda building phase towards the policy formation and implementation steps. This of course does not mean that AOSIS has dropped out of the picture. Indeed, it is at this point that the input of AOSIS is the most critical in terms of real results.

The Environmental Agenda and the Islands After Rio

Van Lierop and the AOSIS took a pragmatic view of the results of the Rio Summit, issuing a declaration which stated the “willingness of their governments to accept [the climate change convention as] what was achievable at this particular stage [rather than] what was desirable from the perspective of AOSIS” (quoted in Williams 1992b: 32). Article 4(8) in the FCCC specifically articulates that full consideration be given to those parties who are particularly adversely affected by climate change, particularly small island nations (Taplin 1994:277). That, however, was all that was accomplished at Rio. A proposal submitted by Van Lierop on behalf of AOSIS that would establish an international “insurance fund” that would compensate the small island nations for loss/damage due to climate change was turned down. The basis for the proposal was that the contributions for the fund would come from the industrialized countries according to their CO₂ emissions and their ability to pay. Not surprisingly, the developed nations were not very amenable to this proposed arrangement.

Despite this setback, many Pacific delegations to the Rio Summit noted that at least the FCCC provided a platform, a base from which regional organizations such as the South Pacific Forum, or the AOSIS, could ask for more (Williams 1992a: 25). Indeed, the greatest blow suffered by the AOSIS and the Pacific voice in the international environmental arena was something that was not the result of international forces at all. More precisely, the dismissal of Van Lierop as Vanuatu’s UN ambassador (with the subsequent loss of ambassadorial credentials) may be the most destabilizing obstacle that the island states have had to face as they try to exert some voice in climate change policy.

January 1992 saw the election of Francophile Maxime Carlot Korman to the position of prime minister of Vanuatu. Despite the feeling that Vanuatu had made a commitment not to change ambassadors until after the Barbados Conference, Van Lierop was dismissed in early 1994. Although the election was mostly centered on domestic issues and factional politics (Lini broke away from the VP and formed a coalition with the UMP), the timing could not have been worse for the AOSIS. The AOSIS had secured the conference in Barbados, and this followup was considered by many a real test of the commitments made at Rio.

Despite being part of a coalition with Lini, his erstwhile rival, it did not take long for the new prime minister to move into action. Besides the dismissal of Van Lierop, Korman himself made a strong statement on behalf of the small islands. Responding to statements as to how Van Lierop was missed, Korman claimed credit for Vanuatu and for Van Lierop being the first chair of AOSIS, and stated that although “internally we made a change... we feel AOSIS must continue” (“Korman Defends Small Islands” 1994: 9). Korman also inserted a complaint that the AOSIS press conference was to be held in English. Van Lierop’s replacement as UN ambassador, incidentally, was a Francophone, and did not follow in Van Lierop’s footsteps. Instead, he took a very low profile in regards to AOSIS and the climate negotiations (Shameem 1995: 133). As noted in Chapter Three, Korman’s election and subsequent policies have drastically changed Vanuatu’s position in the region. Rumblings of alleged French ties, and possibly influence, in the past election can also be seen as a continuing problem of nationhood. There is still some sense among the Anglophones that the Francophones are not “real” Vanuatians

(Miles 1994). Such polarization, when connected to the clientilistic relationships and dependence on single individuals has larger implications than simply the domestic.

Without Van Lierop as its chair, the AOSIS nevertheless continues to act. First under the direction of Ambassador Annette des Isles and subsequently Ambassador Slade, the AOSIS has continued to work in getting the voices and concerns of the small island states out into the international arena. The AOSIS played a prominent role at the Barbados conference, and the AOSIS itself was strengthened with its second summit meeting, held in concurrence with the Barbados conference. At COP1 in Berlin, AOSIS presented the strongest voice for timetables and target measures for climate change, and has even gained the support of developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil. Much to dismay of the island states, the United States sided with the oil-producing nations against strong measures. The AOSIS has developed a voice of no small import, and their efforts in the international sphere as a leader in agenda building, and possibly in policy formation, will be worth our taking notice.

Summary

This examination of the island states' actions in placing the issue of climate change on the international agenda suggests that the problem stream was most critical for mobilizing the islands towards gaining collective action on climate change. Because the issue of climate change was not a highly visible one for the developed nations, a crisis element was needed to increase the visibility of the issue. The disappearance of the low-

lying islands was a powerful motivating factor for organization as well as an effective image to use in the debate over the problem. However, while the problem stream may be the factor with the greatest weight for mobilizing the islands, it may be the political stream that is most crucial for the issue to reach and be discussed at the international realm, especially when one takes note of the self-evident power differential between the small island states and the advanced industrial states. Domestic factors in the small island states must be taken into account for the island states to take advantage of the situation (the international mood). Without a favorable political stream, the policy community can do very little to affect discussion. Although the South Pacific islands could not depend upon Australia and New Zealand to help amplify their efforts to get a strong international climate change agreement, there was initial support from other developing nations such as China and India. The support of the larger Third World nations was problematic, however. Certainly, the island states did get support insofar as AOSIS was calling for major cuts in greenhouse emissions from the advanced industrialized states. However, the ultimate goal for the island states would be an overall cut in emissions, and that would eventually mean that obligations would be placed on the developing nations as well.

The dependence upon policy entrepreneurs is perhaps felt most strongly by the traditionally weak states, such as the island nations. This overdependence on key individuals is a problem chronic to a large portion of the developing world. The strong sense of clientilism, the reliance upon single individuals is problematic in any society, but even more so in a region where changes in administrations can lead to drastic shifts in policy. Because of its highly polarized population (the French/Anglo division in Vanuatu

remains a significant one), Vanuatu suffers particularly in this regard. There are also other conflicts both within the island states (ethnic Fijians and Indian Fijians) and between them (Polynesia vs. Melanesia) that make the building of a “Pacific Community” difficult. These drastic shifts have consequences that extend beyond the domestic arena. The experience of Rio has also shown the crucial importance of formal organizations such as AOSIS to maximize the island states’ potential influence. a single island state may in and of itself not be viewed as significant, but a united front of the island states can cause a stir.

The problem of the island states in getting their voices heard in the international arena is a difficult one. It is not, however, impossible. Formal organizations such as AOSIS can amplify the voices of the island states. However, if it is the problem stream—the perception of crisis—that carries the most weight in getting the island states heard, then the impact of the island states on climate change legislation may be the best that they can do. Not every problem faced by the islands has available such imagery as islands washing away, and to attempt to make any (or every) international issue that concerns the island states a “crisis” could lead to the perception that the islands are merely “crying wolf” yet again.

CHAPTER SEVEN

COMPARISON OF THE CASES

How did the island states insert themselves into the antinuclear and climate change issues and what was it about these cases that gave the island states room to maneuver in the international realm? What lessons can be learned from the role of the island states in the antinuclear and climate change debates? What factors do the two cases have in common? Table 7.1 shows a comparison of the antinuclear and climate change cases broken down by the three streams of analysis, as well as an identification of what factors contributed to opening the “window of opportunity” that allowed action to take place.

Problem Streams: Competing Questions of “Security”

Both the antinuclear and the climate change case show a disagreement between the major powers and the island states over how one defines “security.” How the cases differ, however, is how the competing groups defined security in each case. This disagreement over what constitutes “security” has been a chronic point throughout our discussion. What it comes down to is that “Island leaders often say that they do not understand Western concerns with security and see security issues primarily in terms of the need to preserve national sovereignty over resources and promote economic development” (US Congress, House, 1989:5). “National security,” as constructed by the islanders during the nuclear testing debate, has more to do with fishing and other resource rights, the

Table 7.1 The nuclear testing and climate change cases compared

	Nuclear Testing	Climate Change
Problem Stream	Issue Area: Regional	Issue Area: Global
	Problem is defined along moral lines (“Do not poison us”), focus on fear of radiation. Problem also connected to issues of colonialism, though this is eventually dropped.	Problem is defined along moral lines (“Do not drown us”) and technical ones (“Science says global warming is happening”).
	Major powers define security in military terms; island states define security in economic terms.	Major powers define security in economic terms; island states define security in terms of territorial integrity.
	Scientific evidence <u>is not</u> trusted by the islanders	Scientific evidence <u>is</u> trusted by the islanders
Policy Stream	The island states push a radical position, then compromise	The island states push a radical position, then compromise
	An “acceptable” alternative is available for agreement (Australia’s proposal).	An “acceptable” alternative is available for agreement (Framework Convention).
Political Stream	Middle Powers (Australia, New Zealand) “help” the island states (modify agreement)	Middle Powers (China, India) initially help the island states, but then drop away
	Cold War ends, Major Powers accept zone	Major powers turn to economic concerns
Window of Opportunity	Problem window for island states (fear of fallout), Political window for major powers (End of Cold War)	Problem window for island states (fear of sea level rise), policy spillover (rising concern for other environmental issues) and political window for other states (End of Cold War)

development and maintenance of its economic viability, than concerns over territorial safety and integrity. But this is exactly the opposite of the debate going on in the climate change case. Here, it is the developed nations and the larger developing nations (as well as OPEC) concerned about their economic situation (which is framed as a “security” issue) with the island states concerned over their territorial integrity and viability, concerns

which fall under the more traditional considerations of “security.” In the antinuclear case we see the small islands argue for an expansion of the definition of security, while in the climate change case, the islands focus on the older definitions. This seeming switch is not as hypocritical or odd a stance as it may appear, but a byproduct of the construction of each problem. In the antinuclear movement, the island states never argued that nuclear weapons make no one feel secure; but rather that nuclear weapons (and nuclear testing in particular) didn’t make them feel particularly secure. William Bodde, Senior Adviser of the Pacific Basin Economic Council and former US Ambassador to the Marshall Islands accurately noted this distinction:

If you take a historical perspective, a) if you look at the blood and treasure that the United States and many islanders who were caught in the middle of that in the second World War shed and b) the need to build a credible nuclear deterrent, than [sic] the testing that we did, may not be justifiable to a Marshallese, but it is very understandable to a strategic thinker. I do not think there is any doubt about that. (US Congress, House, 1995: 27).

Despite this *post hoc* observation, it is clear that this is a nuance to the islanders’ argument, one that the United States, at least officially, seemed to either miss or ignore.

Using the “instrumental vs. expressive” construction of the issue seems to have little heuristic value here; the distinctions may be effective intellectual tools, but both types are used by either side (as Rochefort and Cobb (1994) themselves note) and they prove difficult to weigh against each other. This is especially true when looking at the instrumental arguments of the major powers. It seems the nuclear case finds both the island states and the major powers (especially the United States and France) using primarily expressive constructions of the problem. The patriotic defense of “national

security” or “*raison d’état*” is the foremost justification for the actions of the United States and France. The island states countered with a disagreement over the definition of security, arguing (and this is an instrumental rationale backing the moral rightness of the islanders’ claim) that the island states (New Zealand also) had greater concerns over economic viability than fear of Soviet invasion.

Again, both the major powers and the islanders use instrumental reasoning to back up their stance, though the arguments put forth by the former are still tinged with moralistic expression. The US and France did have real justifications and concerns to maintain their security interests in the region. The US viewed their security presence as a seamless whole, containing the global threat of the Soviet Union. The French viewed their overseas territories as an integral part of their republic. The islanders, by contrast, could even use the traditional definitions of security to make their point. If security is to mean freedom from threat, then being made a target of Soviet nuclear weapons (due to the US presence in the region) or being the site of French nuclear explosions does not in fact make the islanders feel safe. The islanders also held up the genuine legacy of nuclear fallout and radiation poisoning. These were experiences the islanders had already had, and regardless of assurances given them, did not want to take any chances that they would have them again.

In the climate change case, the islanders clearly use expressive constructions of the problem, with the use of heartwrenching images such as island “paradises” drowning beneath the ocean. The islanders do, however, back up their pleas with references to the weight of scientific opinion on the likelihood and ramifications of climate change. The

opposing coalition, on the other hand, highlights both the scientific uncertainty around the issue as well as the protection of economic interests. The latter is a mix of instrumental (limitations on greenhouse emissions will have a measurable, negative effect on the economy) and expressive (we need to protect American jobs) arguments. The question of scientific uncertainty and what constitutes “definite” proof is an expressive construction (we shouldn’t do anything about climate change until we know for sure what’s going on), and this issue will be investigated in greater depth in the next section.

Problem Streams: The Science Question

The cases do differ in how science is used and viewed by the participants. This difference reveals the problematic position that science plays in the political realm. Science and the nature of scientific knowledge is continually placed in a special position in political negotiations, and the basis of that privilege bears questioning, as Jasanoff notes:

Scientific knowledge enjoys a privileged place in current discussions of international relations because of the apparently boundless power of science to explain phenomena and offer solutions.... Not only are their knowledge and know-how deemed essential for managing our most pressing problems, but science, because of its claims to value-neutrality, seems to provide the only forum where nations can set aside their differences in favor of a common, rationalistic approach to problem solving. To “scientize” an issue is at once to assert that there are systematic, discoverable methods for coping with it and to suggest that these approaches can be worked out independently of national sectarian interests.... The yearning to resolve social problems by appealing to the apolitical authority of science persists, overriding the evidence that scientific knowledge is deeply embedded in politics and culture (Jasanoff 1996: 173).

It is clear that the understanding of radiation and the consequences of nuclear testing were unknown or unclear during the time of the US and British testing programs in

the Pacific. By the time the French program commenced, however, there was a fairly clear understanding of the dangers of nuclear testing, especially the danger of fallout from atmospheric tests. Even taking the tests underground at Moruroa, though, did not stop either the protests or the concerns. The French have repeatedly assured the region that the underground tests are absolutely safe, with no danger to the human population. Admiral Emile Thieureaut, head of the Moruroa program, has claimed that there has been no radioactivity found in the water or fish around Moruroa and that all research has been turned over to the UN (Stevens 1988). The French also frequently point to the teams of independent scientists (even from New Zealand and Australia) that have, since the early 1980's, been allowed to inspect radiation levels from the soil and waters of Moruroa. Most notably, famed scientist Jacques Cousteau led a French scientific mission to Moruroa in 1987. The findings of the Cousteau mission declared that the short and middle term risk of radiation poisoning were negligible (there was not enough evidence to draw a conclusion on long term effects). However, the Cousteau mission did find structural damage in the atoll, and pointed out that a coral atoll surrounded by water was the worst choice for containing radioactive leaks (US Congress, House, 1995: 4; Henningham 1996: 84).

In regards to the scientific missions, critics have also pointed out that the research teams have been highly restricted in terms of length of time and where they have been allowed to go on Moruroa. There are also other shortcomings in the investigations themselves. Cousteau's investigation of radioactivity in the water around Moruroa, for example, went only halfway down rather than to the actual depth of the detonations (US

Congress, House, 1991: 95-96). Questions have been raised as to the qualifications of the research team (US Congress, House, 1995: 30-31). Also, requests for followup investigations, even from Cousteau, have been denied (US Congress, House, 1995: 31). Notably, when Chirac announced the resumption of tests at Moruroa, Cousteau resigned from the French government's top environmental review panel (US Congress, House, 1995: 4).

Despite all assurances, the islanders remained unconvinced of the safety of the nuclear tests. There are too many reasons not to trust "official" statements. There is the legacy of political goals and expediency getting in the way of reporting of real results, as in the British testing program in the Pacific. There is the legacy of use of humans as guinea pigs. Although the accusations that the islanders were used as test subjects during the "Bravo" explosion are circumstantial, there are other instances to be drawn from, such as the exposure of soldiers to Agent Orange during Vietnam and the deliberate infection and nontreatment of African Americans with syphilis in Alabama in the 1930's to see what would happen to them.²⁶ The latter instance has returned to the news recently, with President Clinton's apology to the survivors in May 1997 (Owen 1997). Examples such as these, conducted by the US government upon its own citizens, have given the islanders justifiable grounds to be suspicious of the words of "scientific experts." Given this history of scientific studies and results being hidden from the general public or affected groups, it is understandable why some groups are suspicious of reassurances from scientists, but

²⁶ The premiere work on the Tuskegee syphilis experiment is Jones (1993). The work on Agent Orange is far too extensive to list here.

therein lies the rub for the island states, and indeed, for environmental action groups more generally. As Yearley points out, “green groups face a serious difficulty. They have good grounds for distrusting scientific authority, but have no other place to turn for universalistic, definitive answers” (1996: 176). The problematic position that science can take in the political arena is especially highlighted in the climate change case. The argument put forth by the islanders and environmental groups is that the “majority of scientific opinion” believe global warming exists and will have detrimental effects upon humankind. Such a stance is the exact opposite of the positions green groups have taken in the past (Yearley 1996: 182).

Recognizing that governments and interest groups have and will use scientific research to justify their positions on one hand, while denying the validity of science in other cases, highlights the fact that it isn’t science that drives these cases, but politics and the struggle over the power of definition. Science is a tool used by one side or the other (or both), competing for advantages over the “power of definition.” Jasanoff points out that “labeling an issue as either ‘science’ or ‘policy’ implicitly entails an allocation of power—the power to speak or be heard on the issues in question—and interest groups [and states] will fight over these labels” (Jasanoff 1996: 181). This does not mean that the information produced by science plays no part in the discussion, or else this discussion would not even occur. Questioning the privileged position accorded to scientific knowledge also does not mean that science is an illegitimate form of knowledge. It does mean that science’s role in providing “universalistic, definitive” answers is questionable. Scientists can, and often do, disagree.

The argument here is not to say that science is or should be irrelevant to policy making. To say that science and its role in public issues needs to be questioned is different than saying that it needs to be dismissed, as Irwin and Wynne point out:

To accept science as a key resource in public issues is radically different from accepting its automatic authority in *framing* what the issues are. Scientific approaches typically confuse these fundamentally different dimensions (Irwin and Wynne 1996: 8-9, emphasis in original).

The use of science as either resource or opponent brings to question the foundation upon which scientists base their legitimacy as speakers on issues (i.e., as producers of “value-free” knowledge). If we note that scientific knowledge is somewhat socially constructed and culturally interpreted, then epistemic communities can be seen as another kind of lobbying group rather than an agent that can offer up “The Answer” to the problem at hand. Understanding that science, like all forms of knowledge, is grounded in certain cultural and social norms also helps explain why even science and scientists have experienced difficulties speaking across cultures. “If interests and cultural biases permeate the way people perceive risk, then traces of such bias can be expected to surface as different organizations and cultures analyze the scientific evidence purporting to establish that risk exist” (Jasanoff 1996: 180). This increases the problem of the interpretation of scientific evidence, and what criterion exists that can separate honest disagreement and the use of disagreement to delay action.

Problem Streams: Political Benefits for Island Leaders?

There is one clear benefit that comes about in both the climate change and nuclear testing issues as they have been constructed. Both cases allow the islanders (especially the

island leaders) to “distance” their problems beyond their borders. In other words, the islanders were able to construct the antinuclearism issue not only as an environmental concern, but also as an anticolonial position. a consequence of this is that the islanders are able to avoid addressing issues and differences within the region or within the island states themselves. Likewise, a focus on climate change means that the islanders can at least play down more strictly domestic problems such as interethnic tensions, population pressures, and consumption patterns.

Also, while the antinuclear issue can be seen as part of the efforts to “imagine” a nation for the island states, the climate change debate offers the opportunity for those island states to strengthen their bond as a community of islands, something which occurs with mixed results. Both nuclear testing and climate change allow the islanders (and the region more generally) to form communities, to latch onto a threat or concern. It also means that they can avoid addressing the “hard questions.” Ronni Alexander (1994) notes that the antinuclear movement has covered up divisions within the region (Polynesia vs. Melanesia, Tonga vs. Vanuatu, Australia vs. New Zealand) and even within the islands themselves (Fiji, Vanuatu); and a similar point can also be made about climate change. Pacific specialists have noted that the clearest, most immediate threats to the islands come not from climate change, but more domestic issues such as increased population and consumption (US Congress, Senate, 1992). Both the focus on climate change by the islanders, and the earlier stance on nuclear testing, are issues that are politically palatable for the domestic audiences within the islands. It is easier to talk about global warming or rail against nuclear testing than to confront more pressing (and politically sensitive) issues

at home. This doesn't mean that this focus against nuclear testing or climate change is only a crass political form of denial; even if the islanders do implement policies on sustainable development and population control, it may all be for nothing if international action is not taken to curb climate change.

However, the position taken here is not without its problems for the island states, especially in regards to climate change. In the antinuclear case, only Australia has the capability to develop nuclear weapons in the South Pacific region; the island states could not do so even had they wanted to. In the case of climate change, the problem is that the island nations can and do want to develop at some level. Certainly, their contribution to the greenhouse picture is negligible in comparison to the rest of the world, but it does exist. In the oftentimes nonsensical world of international politics, this recognition detracts, however slightly, from the "purity" of the island states' position. The island states are certainly not in a position to argue that "we should develop, but the rest of the world should not," which is ironically a position that many in the developing world have accused the developed world of adopting (see most notably Agarwal and Narain 1990).

Policy Streams: Articulate a Radical Alternative, Push for the Maximum

In both cases, the island states initially put together a strong plan of action, plans that probably had no hope of being accepted by the rest of the international community (and they weren't). The island states focused on the most powerful images, the most drastic consequences, and therefore the most radical solutions. From this position, the island states slowly move to compromise when the opportunity presents itself. The SPNFZ Treaty would never have been accepted had it been a more comprehensive agreement

more similar to the People's Charter put forth at the NFIP Conferences. The AOSIS Protocol, while formally on the agenda for discussion since Berlin, was not given any serious consideration for adoption at Kyoto, but was continually held up as an example of what could be done. In both cases, the island states did not act in a way that is particularly confusing. The island states articulated a best possible scenario for themselves, attempting to maximize their negotiation room from which they could fall back upon. This is a basic point in negotiations, an attempt to get all that one can, but leave room for compromise.

In the antinuclear case, the first NFZ proposal put forth in 1975 was much more comprehensive than the SPNFZ Treaty accepted a decade later. The 1975 proposal called for a prohibition on testing and dumping, but also a ban on bases, ship visits, uranium mining, and nuclear reactors in the region (Stevens 1988). In the climate change case, AOSIS pushed for a major cut in emissions, as well as attempted to establish an international insurance policy funded by the advanced nations (the major greenhouse culprits) based upon their ability to pay. In neither case did the island states get everything they wanted, but they certainly played a bigger role than would have been expected from a strictly power-driven form of analysis. If anything, the SPNFZ Treaty can be seen as a reaction to the push by the island states for a nuclear free zone in the region. Placing the AOSIS Protocol on the table gave a vision of what could be "possible" in the climate negotiations, and the AOSIS also benefited from an alliance with several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that pushed for a strong agreement within their home countries as well as at Rio and the COPs that followed (Betsill 1998).

It should be noted that variations on addressing the nuclear issue isn't always an expression of antinuclearism. The island states hold various positions on the nuclear issue, with Vanuatu, Belau and Fiji (pre-coup) on one side and Tonga on the other. As such, perhaps the SPNFZ as it was actually crafted may have been the only way such a treaty could have been developed. Australia acted to craft a nuclear free zone in order to preempt the possible threat of an "islands-only" zone. Such a threat, however, may have been hollow.

On the climate change case, however, the differences between the island states are not so drastic. The island states seem generally united on the idea that climate change poses a real threat to their existence, and therefore there is a much stronger united front from the Pacific islands in the climate change case than there was in the SPNFZ negotiations.

Policy Streams: International Organizations

The role of the SPF as an amplifier of the voices of the island states has already been pointed out. The clear power differential between the island states and Australia makes for a problematic situation in the Forum, but it is clear that the island states have a greater impact via the Forum than they do alone. Indeed, much of Australia's actions in the antinuclear case can be seen as reactions to the activity of the island states. Because of the regularity of interactions and the high level of meetings (Head of Governments), as well as the general informality of the meetings, the Forum does provide an economically efficient way for the island states to meet with the regional powers (Australia and New

Zealand) as well as strengthen ties between each other. The bonds fostered among the Pacific islands through the Forum were a precursor to the formation of AOSIS.

As an organization, AOSIS is obviously much younger than the SPF, but it has already shown itself to be a force in international environmental politics, especially in the negotiations prior to and after Rio and up through COP1 in Berlin. Still, there is much growth that is possible which could strengthen the international impact of AOSIS. At the present moment, AOSIS is still a loosely united grouping with an informal infrastructure. This has meant it is difficult to get a lot of real work done. Also, resources are scarce among most of the members and it is difficult to contribute more time and funds to AOSIS. The richer members, such as Malta and Singapore, have kept a very low profile within the alliance. Singapore has not even ratified the FCCC (Shameem 1995: 156). Although all of the members share a common concern for climate change and the possible dangers to their homelands, it seems that there are varying degrees of this concern among the membership. The South Pacific members seem to take more interest in the alliance than the Caribbean members (Shameem 1995: 134, 155). There are other points of contention for the alliance. Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, are petroleum exporters, and oil refining is a major portion of Singapore's robust economy (Shameem 1995: 135). These points in and of themselves may not crack the alliance (while certainly important to their economy, Trinidad and Tobago's exports are negligible in terms of the world total) but could prove problematic in the long run. The major question confronting AOSIS is whether it can strengthen the bonds between its members and whether those members will be able to give more of their energy and resources to the alliance.

Political Streams: Role of the Middle Powers—Allies and Obstacles

In the Pacific, the question of exactly what states are part of the “Pacific community” is subject to debate, the major question being the status of the middle powers of Australia and New Zealand. Australia can be seen both as “leader” of the region and also as obstacle for the island states as they attempt to assert themselves in international policy (Smyth, Plange, and Burdess 1997). On the other hand, New Zealand has at times found itself more closely aligned with the island states:

Australia has the advantage over New Zealand of greater resources. New Zealand has the advantage that, not being the largest regional actor...it does not attract the same degree of suspicion or accusations of acting in a patronizing manner....

Australia has a larger and longer train of interests [than New Zealand]. Even while playing a macromanagerial role in the South Pacific, Australia tends to stand apart from the region in a manner that New Zealand policymakers believe is not possible for them. Australia and New Zealand therefore have parallel but by no means identical interests in the region (Thakur 1993: 89, 91).

Thakur argues that, “at its broadest, the goal of New Zealand’s policy is to ensure that the Pacific Islands remain well disposed, friendly, stable, and prosperous, and that they do not suffer serious environmental degradation” (Thakur 1993: 76, emphasis added). On this last point, the question is what cost is New Zealand willing to pay to achieve this goal. It should also be pointed out that while New Zealand may be closer in interests to the island nations than Australia, this does not mean New Zealand has never been accused of condescension or a heavy hand towards the island states. There was some grumbling from the island states during the SPNFZ negotiations that New Zealand and Prime Minister Lange had gotten major international attention with Lange’s Labour Party’s antinuclear

stance, but failed to support the islands in pushing for a more stringent SPNFZ Treaty, choosing instead to back off and support Australia's less comprehensive agreement (Stevens 1988). No matter how close New Zealand and the island states may be (and they certainly are closer than Australia and the islands), New Zealand's status as an advanced industrial nation, firmly entrenched in the Western liberal-democratic model (regardless of what the US said during and after the ANZUS split), puts them at a distance from the subsistence cultures of the island nations (Thakur 1993).

With Australia and New Zealand both a part of the region (a geographic reality), but not necessarily a part of the community along with the island states, the associated question becomes whether a community of island states, even one that spans different regions, can have a meaningful voice in international negotiations. Put poetically, can the mice of the international jungle roar?

A sequence of events for the antinuclear case could look like the following:

Antinuclear sentiment→Islands organize→Australia's influence→SPNFZ Treaty
Australia used its influence to channel the existing (and powerful) antinuclear sentiment in order to protect its interests as well as those of its major ally, the United States. As a result, what finally comes out of the SPNFZ Treaty is not as radical an expression of antinuclearism as the People's Charter, or even Belau's antinuclear constitution or New Zealand's antinuclear law.

A sequence for global climate change, however, looks more like this:

Fear of sea level rise→Islands organize→AOSIS Protocol

In other words, the middle powers (notably Australia) do not channel the concerns of the small islands in the climate change case as they did in the antinuclear situation. While AOSIS gains the support initially of the larger developing countries of China and India, these countries do not modify the AOSIS Protocol as Australia did in the antinuclear case. In both cases, strong initial proposals were put forth. Certainly, proposals such as the People's Charter or even Vanuatu or Belau's antinuclear policy would never have been accepted by Australia or the United States (France is not even a possibility), but could have been used by the Soviet Union as a major propaganda tool. An "islands-only" nuclear free zone agreement could have left Australia isolated in the region and hurt its prestige, as well as that of the US. The possibility that such a comprehensive NFZ could be established in the region raised quite specific concerns for Australia, both for its own economy (uranium industry), and also its defense relationship with the US. Clearly, then, it was in Australia's interests to play a role in crafting the SPNFZ; but what could Australia offer to the island states that would interest them? The answer to that is the twofold "stick and carrot"—Australia is the most important trading partner and aid donor in the region, and could threaten economic sanctions. On the "carrot" side, Australia offered (implicitly at the very least) to get US approval for the SPNFZ if the island states were willing to compromise, targeting the NFZ proposal against French nuclear testing rather than against both France and US strategic interests in the region.

Another difference between the alliances which developed is that in the antinuclear case, Australia and the island states were both pushing for an agreement that called for something that the major powers also wanted (i.e., to increase a sense of security).

although the Western powers disagreed that the SPNFZ proposal did increase this sense. In other words, at the heart of the nuclear/antinuclear argument is a common desire not to blow everything up. In the case of climate change, if the scientific predictions of the detrimental effects of anthropogenic greenhouse emissions are accurate, there is a wide difference between the protection of the island states and low-lying coastal areas and worldwide economic development. Indeed, as entrenched as the Western powers were in the nuclear discussions of the late 1980's and early 1990's, the current debate over climate change seems to match its intensity and adamancy.

Beyond the domestic motivations for both Australia and New Zealand to lend their support (however conditioned) for the nuclear free zone, there is also another difference between the middle powers' behavior here and in the climate change case. The issue of nuclear testing (which the region was universally against, the only thing that all members of the SPF could agree on) was viewed as a regional problem. The potentially hurtful effects of nuclear fallout due to the French atmospheric tests and other possible consequences of the underground tests could have affected the entire South Pacific region. The climate change problem, however, was not one that would have the same consequences for the island states and Australia and New Zealand. The middle powers are affected differently (at least in the foreseeable future) by climate change than the small island states and as such, their positions and goals are different. This accounts for the positions taken and alliances that arise in each case.

The antinuclear case sees the development of a regional alliance via the South Pacific Forum. It is via the SPF that the islands (and Australia) present their cases, and the

use of this regional organization both amplifies the voices of the island states, but also tempers them, due to Australia's membership in the SPF and the tradition of "unanimous compromise" that is the ideal strived for within the SPF. Because the climate change problem affects Australia and New Zealand differently than the island states, the island states looked elsewhere for allies.²⁷ The AOSIS encompasses various regions but these nations band together because of the common threat that climate change and sea level rise pose to these island states. Because Australia and New Zealand are not allied with the island states in the climate change issue, they do not amplify the voices of the island states as New Zealand, especially, did in the antinuclear situation. On the other hand, AOSIS did not have to compromise on its demand in the AOSIS Protocol to satisfy a regional hegemon such as Australia.

Whether having the middle powers on the side of the islands is a benefit or hindrance is difficult to assess in the cases at hand. The "consensus" achieved in the SPNFZ Treaty clearly favored Australia's interests, but supporters of the Treaty note that a nuclear free zone did end up being created. Still, one of the reasons that the island states did acquiesce to Australia's demands in crafting the SPNFZ was Australia's promise of US approval of the zone; a promise which went unfulfilled for over a decade. (And indeed, Australia played little role when the SPNFZ Protocols were finally signed by the Western powers). Within the region, Australia argued that the SPNFZ Treaty was developed in the

²⁷This is not to suggest that the island states ignored the SPF. Indeed, as noted in Chapter Six, an attempt was made by island members at the Forum meeting just prior to COP3 to issue a Forum communique that would call for definite emission targets and timetables, but this was vehemently opposed by Australia, who saw a strong greenhouse stance as detrimental to its economy. Somewhat ironically, this Forum meeting took place in Rarotonga, the site where Australia had previously used its influence to push the SPNFZ Treaty.

spirit of consensus and unanimous compromise. Even Prime Minister Lange of New Zealand argued that the zone was developed to satisfy every member of the Forum as much as possible, and that it was more important to get a realistic agreement than push for something that no one (particularly the US) would sign. This disappointed many who had hoped that Lange would truly take the leadership role in the antinuclear movement that had been attributed to him. Then-Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke noted that he could not have had a better supporter for Australia's stance in the SPNFZ negotiations than Lange (Stevens 1988). Hawke argued that while Australia was clearly the regional hegemon in the Pacific, it did not take advantage of that position. A little over a decade later, when Australia blocked any mention of emission targets or timetables in the SPF statement, Australian Prime Minister John Howard would state that the SPF statement was a byproduct of "consensus" (Hussein 1997b: 11).

Political Streams: The End of the Cold War

Arguably no single event has changed international politics in recent times than the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the bipolar international system. The rise of Gorbachev to power and the institution of the twin policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, with the goal of restoring the economic viability of the USSR and maintaining the union, instead brought about its fracturing. The end of the Cold War would ostensibly make the world a safer place.²⁸ Leaving that question aside, what the end of the bipolar

²⁸Ironically, of course, the two major acts of terrorism on US soil—the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings—occur after the Cold War. The rise of the likelihood of "nuclear terrorism," among other threats, also brings to question whether the end of the Cold War really made the world "safer." Whether or not the world really is more "secure" now is much too extensive a subject to go into here. For a general introduction into the argument, see Mearsheimer (1990) and Hoffman, Keohane, and Mearsheimer (1990).

system did allow was other issues to gain some prominence in international discussion. It proved to be the unforeseen political “window of opportunity” that opened. More specifically, questions of the environment and of economic viability can now be addressed without the overarching East-West conflict in the background. This is beneficial for the small island states (and the developing world more generally) in that their concerns now have a better chance to be addressed. The drawback is that the developing world can no longer play the competing blocs off of each other. Another significant problem is the increasing competition for international aid from the former communist states. While this major change in the world gave the developing world a major opportunity, it had also taken away some of its resources and negotiating tools, as well as brought more competitors for international attention from the former communist world.

Despite these problems, there is little question that for the two cases at hand, the end of the Cold War proved more beneficial than not overall. Without easing of tensions between the superpowers, it is highly doubtful that France would have instituted its moratorium on its nuclear programme in 1992, and even less likely that the SPNFZ Protocols would finally be signed by the Western powers in 1996. Indeed, the signature of the Protocols was seen as another example of the changing face of the world in the wake of the Cold War’s end. The debate and resistance at the Rio Summit was adamant as it was; had the East-West conflict still existed, the Rio Summit would have been greatly different than the gathering that did occur. At the very least, an UNCED under the cloud of the Cold War would probably have not garnered the media attention it did, and the

binding conventions would almost certainly have been even more watered down than they actually were.

Beyond these counterfactual arguments, it is clear that the end of the Cold War brought a different kind of political dynamic to the forefront. The usual ways of “doing politics” did not necessarily fit the new circumstances, and perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in the US political scene in 1992. President Bush caused a great deal of hard feelings and resentment by his resistance to the binding conventions at Rio. The bad press received by Bush during UNCED undermined what was to be his strength in the presidential elections—namely, his foreign policy expertise. While Clinton’s victory in 1992 had much more to do with domestic policy, particularly the US economy, Bush’s position at UNCED did not help his reelection hopes. Of course, there is some irony in considering the US economy as strictly a “domestic” issue. In fact, the foundation of the resistance on the part of the Bush Administration at Rio was that stringent conventions on climate change and biodiversity would have a detrimental effect on the US economy. The economic ramifications of cutting greenhouse emissions remain the major block in the United States. Although the Clinton Administration agreed to a minor emissions reduction at COP3 in Kyoto, it is doubtful that this will be approved by the current US Senate. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the Kyoto Protocol will be sent to the Senate anytime during the remainder of President Clinton’s tenure in office.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

An Introductory Note

Perhaps the descriptive title of this work is a bit disingenuous. It isn't the fact that "mice can roar" that is so notable, but rather the circumstances under which they are heard. There is nothing in the foreseeable future that will make the international system shake at the whim of a Fiji, Vanuatu, or even a New Zealand. Nevertheless, these small states do play a part on the world stage. They are more than simply "stepping stones" on the way to some other objective, and they are not the idyllic paradises of fable, "Eden" rediscovered. Under certain circumstances, the island states can play the role of the world's "moral conscience," an intriguing insertion of justice and morality claims in an "anarchic" system. When they are united, these smallest of states comprise one of the largest voting blocs in the United Nations, and if that institution has any international impact, then the island states may find some influence there. Of course, there are limits as to how far the island states can push their demands in international negotiation, but the same can be said of any state, even the most powerful. The real fascination lies at those limits, and what it is that defines those boundaries. To recognize that there even is a role island states can play in the international system is already a greater concession than has normally been made.

Clearly, the island states have their greatest impact at the beginning of the policy stage, when the agenda (what is at stake) is still rather amorphous. In the early part of the nuclear discussion, Vanuatu (and Fiji to some extent) pushed a strong antinuclear stance connected with an anticolonial position. Siaguru points out that this stance is not simply an environmental concern, but is politically underpinned by a disagreement over what constitutes “security” (1989: 20). The fear that such a movement would inspire an islands-only nuclear free zone in the South Pacific caused enough concern for Australia to take preemptive measures to make sure that if there was going to be a nuclear free zone, it would be one that would not infringe upon Australia’s (and its major ally’s) security interests. In the climate change case, the AOSIS plays its most prominent role in the run up to Rio, at Rio, and up through Berlin. By the time we reach COP3 in Kyoto, however, the AOSIS call for major cuts in greenhouse emissions, while technically on the table for debate, is not seriously considered to have a chance to be adopted. Williams notes another problem facing AOSIS as the alliance moves forward:

AOSIS was launched with an appeal based on the vulnerability of small islands to sea level rise. As the alliance gathered momentum, it expanded its horizons to address the whole complex of development issues affecting the islands, and to some extent lost the clear and emotionally grabbing focus on the physical obliteration of the islands (Williams 1994: 7).

Therein lies the significant limitation of the island states, of course. The graphic imagery of the cataclysmic drowning of the islands is both the islands’ greatest tool and most significant drawback. When the AOSIS expands its concerns to wider development issues, it loses its emotional focus; however, AOSIS must expand or else it will simply be ignored

by the rest of the international community as a “one-trick pony” that has not moved beyond a single issue.

The Problem of Problem Definition

The power differential between island states and their larger counterparts is not the only obstacle that the islands face in attempting to redefine the issue of climate change.

Being able to control how a problem is defined, how an issue is framed, is one of the most significant forms of power and influence in international politics (and in fact, in practically all forms of human interaction). Korsmo (1990) points out the difficulties in communicating definitions of “what the problem is” across cultures, an obstacle faced in the antinuclear and climate change cases presented here as well. In a study of meetings and discussions between the Alaska Natives and the US government, Korsmo concludes:

First, it is not at all clear that people, particularly those outside government and from other cultural backgrounds, think in terms of conventional problems. The Alaska Natives, for example, presented their current positions as historically situated and driven by necessity, an argument cynics would no doubt interpret as a cheap rhetorical device but, as I would insist, a conceptualization that needs to be taken seriously. Second, policies themselves do not always arise as a result of problem identification (Korsmo 1990: 304, notes omitted).

While being able to define the problem may not, as Dery (1984) argues, automatically bring with them the specific policies to address them, a specific framing of a problem does certainly close off some alternatives while giving others more prominence. Rochefort and Cobb point out that the “growing reliance on specialized experts, even on questions whose broad value implications outweigh their technical nature, unnecessarily restricts participation in the identification of problems and their solutions (1993:69).” At the very

least, some alternative solutions are viewed as “better” than others depending upon the frame of reference. As a crude example, people who see a stockbroker or financial analyst to decide how to invest their money are usually viewed as having done the “smart” thing, while those who went to see their astrologer or called the psychic hotline are not. It is also possible that, rather than framing a problem to imply a solution (or at least a selection of alternatives), one can also frame an issue in such a way that doing nothing seems the most prudent course, as some groups in the climate change debate have done. To view the climate change problem as a “scientific” one and that we need to “wait and see” seems to imply that sooner or later scientists will all agree on climate change, and this will mean that they have gotten it “right.” It is only after this point that politicians will institute national and international action.

The latter situation is rife with shortcomings, however. On the scientific side, there is the question over what constitutes “agreement.” Agreement over a problem does not necessarily mean agreement over the solution. Practically everyone agrees that war is a major international problem, but the proffered solutions range from unilateral disarmament to preemptive strikes. Secondly, it is not always through agreement that scientific knowledge advances. Majority rule does not always lead to the “right” scientific answer. Examples of “mavericks” who disagreed with what was the prevailing scientific opinion and were later proven “right” range from Galileo to Darwin to Einstein.²⁹

²⁹Most scientists would probably express some wariness with this last statement, noting, quite rightly, that for every Galileo or Einstein there are countless others who have disagreed with the weight of scientific opinion and were wrong. This does not take away from the original point, however. Scientific advancement does not always come from majority rule or opinion.

On the political side, there are other cases of uncertainty where it is not usually viewed as feasible for a government leader to argue that we should “wait and see.” Questions of military threat jump readily to mind as examples here. As Gibbons points out, “Public policy-making is frequently done in an environment of technical uncertainty. Other factors, such as public opinion, special interest pressures, and fear of alternatives generally dominate. The defense budget is full of enormous commitments to counter threats that are arguably much less certain—or damaging—than global climate change” (1992: 244). Technology in the form of spy planes or satellites can answer the question, “are the Soviets putting missiles in Cuba?” but cannot answer the question, “are those missiles necessarily a threat?” It is clear that military uncertainty is perceived differently than scientific uncertainty, but the question that bears further investigation is, why is this so?

Potential Criticisms

It may be argued that the major powers “let” the small islands get inside the international arena, and that they permitted their presence and role so long as the major powers could expect that the international agreement would be shaped to their liking. In the antinuclear case, though, this explanation only really works to explain Australia’s behavior, which wanted to protect its military alliance with the US. In fact, there were regional and domestic concerns (isolation in the region, uranium exports) that were as important in Australia as the maintenance of the ANZUS pact. As far as climate change goes, there was significant resistance to come to any agreement for climate change, as the major powers (and others such as the OPEC nations) stressed the scientific uncertainty of climate change.

The island states did their utmost to construct the problem of climate change as a security issue, which “should” have greater weight than economic concerns. However, some scholars have argued that such an expanding the notion of “security” to encompass environmental issues offers no real academic value. Mack argues, “it is quite possible for quite severe environmental problems to arise which have few or no implications for human societies. It is difficult to see why such problems, however important with respect to the natural environment, should be relevant to a discussion of *security*” (1993: 5, n7, emphasis in original). Two arguments can be made here. First, environmental problems which do (or may) have significant impacts on human societies are clearly relevant to a discussion of security. Secondly, while such an expansion may not offer much analytical value, a relabelling of what constitutes “security” has tremendous political value. Even Mack says in passing, “since ‘security’ is a value which is traditionally privileged by states, expanding its scope to include such problems as environmental degradation will ensure that these problems will be taken more seriously” (1993: 6, n8). Certainly, the major powers themselves found no dilemma in expanding the security concept to include economic issues when it suited them in the climate change case.

Another point should be made here. It is clear that more progress has been made on the nuclear issue than on global climate change. Why, however, should this be so? Even if we recognize that the nuclear issue is an older one and thus there has been more time to come to an agreement, aren’t there questions of military security in the nuclear testing case that would make this issue somewhat intractable? It is generally accepted that questions of national security (which focus for the most part on military concerns) are the

most difficult areas in which to obtain international agreements. This seems especially true when there is a significant power differential between the parties involved. I argue that there is a crucial difference between the issues here, and that discussions over global climate change may actually cut deeper than even national security questions. The distinction between “high” and “low” politics may no longer hold here. Problems of the international environment now have to deal with the consequences of industrialization and perhaps even the heart of the project of modernity itself. Such an observation does not lead to optimistic forecasts on global climate change legislation and the fate of the island nations. If what is required for significant change to occur is both strong domestic concern in the island nations as well as a shift in the international context, it is highly unlikely that the latter would change drastically enough for the island states to have a real impact on the discussion. In the discussions that took place at Rio, issues of environment were placed on equal level with issues of economics and “development.” (And note that such a designation was a step up for environmental issues). Even the followup conferences in Berlin, Geneva, and Kyoto, as well as the special conference on small island states in Barbados focused on how to achieve “sustainable development” while not harming the environment. Development, either continued or just beginning, remains a major goal (even, at some level, by many of the small islands themselves). Therefore, while it is eventually possible to gain agreement or at least acquiescence on a nuclear free zone (which for the most part asks the major powers not to do what they themselves would probably not wish to do—i.e., engage in nuclear conflict), it is much more difficult to induce decisionmakers to adopt a policy to produce less, to in fact develop less. This latter

point, of course, also needs to include those states who are not necessarily major powers, but who also aspire towards the goal of modernity. The “anti-nuclear club” may be a larger one than the “anti-modernity club.”

An Evaluation of Kingdon’s Model

Although this research has taken Kingdon’s model far beyond the domain for which it was first created, a great deal can be said about its use in our understanding of the dynamics of agenda-setting. Overall, the model holds up rather well. The visualization of three streams converging together to bring an issue onto the agenda is an effective and elegant image. The model recognizes that agenda setting is not always rational and that outside factors (either focusing events and crises or shifts in the political system) can impact on a policy system.

This study does reveal some points of departure from Kingdon’s original model. Figure 8.1 shows those revisions to Kingdon’s general model. The most important revelation from this study is that, while Kingdon argues that the problem stream may be able to bring an issue to the agenda all by itself (due to a focusing event such as a plane crash), this study does not really support this argument. Even Kingdon recognizes that problems are defined, that they are not objective entities in and of themselves. My study suggests that the problem stream does not and cannot bring an issue to the agenda by itself, but needs to be processed through the policy stream. The problem stream can enter the policy stream either directly (when a policy actor perceives something as a problem) or via the political stream (when elected leader(s)—perhaps responding to grassroots or




Figure 8.1: The General Dynamics of Agenda Setting, Second Revision.
Source: Adapted from Kingdon (1984)

other pressures—demands that an issue be looked into). Problems are only problems when they are defined as such. Four airplanes that crash in the same month is not in and of itself a problem, but must be defined as one. Four crashes due to four different reasons can be dismissed as a condition, not a problem. Even four crashes of the same kind of plane due to the same technical deficiency may be ignored, though that would certainly be more difficult. The island states argued that climate change was a serious problem, possibly of apocalyptic proportions. They pointed to the rising CO₂ levels in the atmosphere, the increasing frequency and intensity of tropical storms, and the potential disaster of the rising seas. The major states, for the most part, however, did not connect the events in the same way that the island states did.

Rather than independent unto itself, then, the problem stream therefore looks to be antecedent to the policy and political streams. It cannot bring an issue onto the agenda in and of itself, but must enter into the agenda building dynamic either through the policy stream or is filtered via the political stream. If a condition is interpreted as a problem within the political stream (by higher elected officials, for instance), then it may directly reach the agenda via public statements by those officials or it may be sent down to the policy stream with orders to “look into this situation and come up with some answers.”

The real weight of the problem stream is felt, therefore, when it is brought into the policy stream, when alternative interpretations and potential policies can be discussed and fought over. The policy stream is not a closed system, however, the outside factors of the political stream, most especially that of higher governmental officials and pressure from

the public will have a major influence on what alternatives are discussed, and finally, are chosen.

Kingdon's policy stream holds up rather well in this analysis, even expanded to include unilateral actions by some states. Certainly, the alternatives that are viewed as viable are the ones which are viewed as feasible and/or necessary. Such questions of feasibility and necessity are, however, conditioned by the perception of the problem. Budgetary constraints, for instance, matter less if the problem is viewed as a very serious one (national defense is a clear example in the United States). a problem considered to be of incredible magnitude could even make the consideration of a drastic change in lifestyle a viable one, but as the climate change debate shows, if the scope of a problem is not yet fully agreed upon, the best that can be expected are proposals of small, incremental changes. The presence of an acceptable alternative, a basis for compromise, also increases an issue's chance for agenda survival. In the antinuclear case, the compromise model developed by Australia was able to gain the support of most of the South Pacific Forum and bring about the creation of a nuclear free zone in the region.

Kingdon's consideration of the political stream is also useful internationally. The actions of other actors can have a serious impact upon the policy community. Changes in regimes (either via revolution or election) can lead to changes within the policy community itself. Structural changes can either lead to a more conducive atmosphere for an issue to reach the agenda or constrain it from view.

Another departure from Kingdon's model is the identification of windows of opportunity, policy entrepreneurs, and policy spillovers. Kingdon argues that the points

where the time is ripe for action to be taken (the “windows of opportunity”) emerge either due to changes in the problem stream (a perceived crisis) or the political stream (such as a change in administration). While this observation is certainly accurate, it may unfortunately be that this window, especially if it opens unpredictably, is identified only after the fact. In other words, it may not be possible to identify the window before it happens. This implies that the identification of “problem windows” may be mostly *post hoc* analysis, but it also means that unpredictable political events (such as the end of the Cold War) may only be understood as windows after they have been taken advantage of. It may be here that the new literature on agenda denial may have its greatest impact, in developing a framework that can help identify opportunities either blocked or squandered.

Finally, while the “windows of opportunity” are said to open only via events from the problem or political streams, the concept of policy “spillovers” may in fact be the opening of the “window of opportunity” from the policy stream. If a member of a policy community makes the connection that “if this kind of policy is being crafted for issue ‘a’ then perhaps a similar policy should be proposed for the similar issue ‘B’,” then this may open the window for issue “B” to be addressed. a policy spillover may be a specific type of policy window, one which comes from within the policy community rather than the problem or political streams.

Agenda Setting in International Relations

The concept of agenda setting can add great value to our study of international politics. The pre-decision stage is the most “open” point of negotiations since the conflict over the “power of definition” is still ongoing; there is no recognized authority to

determine what is at stake. Such a situation is understood as the norm in the anarchic international system. Kingdon's framework, somewhat modified, is an extremely useful analytical tool in comparing cases in the international realm. It allows us to bridge the gap between comparative politics and international relations. Kingdon's framework allows us to move beyond the conceptualization of states as atomistic "billiard balls" (Waltz 1979) and connect issues and actions across the domestic and international realms. While this situation is especially acute in the case of the small island states, where the boundary between domestic and international issues is not wide at all, it is in fact the case for all states. As Lamborn notes, "politics almost always involves linkages across multiple political arenas" (1997:196).

Comparison in International Relations

The use of comparing case studies occurs quite frequently in international relations. The causes of World War I versus World War II, for example. Unfortunately (at least, as researchers), there are only a small number of cases at hand, which make drawing larger conclusions tenable at best. Also, while the number of cases may be small, the outside factors that need to be taken into account can stretch into the infinite. No comparison will ever be ideal, as no two cases will ever be perfectly matched. With this recognition in mind, it may be of greater explanatory value to examine situations where the tactics of the actors are similar, rather than simply dismissing a possible comparison due to differences in the composition of the issue or the actors themselves. Despite the nuclear free zone proposal covering only a region and the climate change treaty covering the entire globe, those differences matter less than the similar actions and tactics that the

island states take in both situations. In both situations, the Pacific island states staked their claim to how the problem should be defined, attempting to gain the higher moral ground.

Alley notes:

In the South Pacific, a key objective has been to convince the international community about some inherent asymmetries facing this unique geographical setting. Major-power economic, military, and resource-extractive capacity has been of sufficient magnitude to lend moral weight to Oceania's appeals against vulnerability. This was evident through organized collaboration favoring decolonization, cessation of nuclear weapons testing... and calls for stronger curbs of global emissions (1998: 231-232).

Furthermore, in both cases, the island states attempted to work through the middle powers. The island states dealt with Australia and New Zealand in the antinuclear debate, and extended at least an early alliance with China and India in the climate change talks. Of course, the island states did initially appeal to Australia and New Zealand for aid in stressing their concern over climate change, but this was blocked by Australia. While the relationship between the island states and the two regional hegemonies has at times been problematic, their shared geographic location and membership within the South Pacific Forum does give the island states greater access into a middle power nation than most island states have.

Avenues for Further Research

There are several questions that bear further investigation. Initially, a more systematic application of Kingdon to international issues could also help highlight the connections between domestic concerns and international goals as well. There could also be a more formal application of Kingdon, perhaps to the nuclear issue and either Belau or Vanuatu (or even Australia). Kingdon's framework was originally designed and applied to

the United States. Does the presidential system of government create a different atmosphere for agenda building than the parliamentary system? How well does the formalized notion of Kingdon's policy stream explain the internal relations in a small, highly clientilistic system such as Vanuatu?

There should certainly be further investigation into the question and dynamics of problem definition and issue area manipulation. Is it possible to push past merely the setting of the agenda and into the formulation of policy? For example, Maoz's (1990) discussion of framing the national interest and the manipulation of group dynamics deals with framing an issue so that a particular policy avenue is chosen, a point which is beyond simply deciding what the problem is. How could supposedly "weak" states frame issues to maximize their potential impact on the decision to be made?

Almost certainly, the issue of problem definition and the social construction of knowledge implies that further investigation into the notion of epistemic communities needs to be conducted. How these communities of "experts" (and what constitutes that expertise) insert themselves into the political debate has serious consequences for international environmental policy. The assertion that epistemic communities are better able to arise in "nonpolitical" areas has usually been taken as the starting point in investigations of how experts are brought into the political process (P. Haas 1992: 7). However, what separates the "political" from the "nonpolitical" (and therefore, within the realm of "science") is a highly debatable area. To simply say that an epistemic community arose because the issue was considered "nonpolitical" while such communities do not emerge in "political" areas is a tautological argument. How is the issue constructed such

that scientists and the scientific community have greater influence in the issue of nuclear disarmament than say, the issue of international hunger? On the opposite side of the coin, more political considerations should also be examined. Why is the state, or the concept of sovereignty privileged (almost absolutely) in a discussion of military issues, but made more problematic in debates over deforestation or transboundary pollution?

On a more substantive level, there are certainly questions as to where and how AOSIS can evolve in the future. Can it strengthen itself as an alliance? At first glance, it is difficult to see how much further AOSIS can go as it is currently structured. It is also questionable whether the island states can strengthen the ties between them when one moves beyond the overarching threat of climate change and sea level rise. There still remain divisions within the island states that are in the same region (the Melanesian/Polynesian split in the South Pacific, for example) that there is currently not much cause for optimism that AOSIS will become a stronger organization and have a voice on issues besides climate change.

Finally, this framework may be applied to other issues. Although the international system is considered “anarchic,” whether or not this anarchy also implies that the system is also immoral is questionable. Certainly, the island states have found an avenue to insert questions of morality and social justice into an arena where “power” is said to take precedence. Can the island states do this in other issue areas? Could the island states affect the agenda on ocean politics such as fisheries, geothermal energy, or deep seabed mining, for example? An issue such as seabed mining or geothermal energy can be looked at in simply economic or environmental terms, but it can also be viewed as a moral, even a

religious issue. For example, a geothermal development plan on the Big Island of Hawai'i called for wells to be drilled along the slopes of *Kilauea* volcano, and the subsequent electric power would be transported to the islands of Maui and Oahu (Buck 1993:186). The development would, however, be at the cost of part of the Hawaiian rainforests, the only tropical rainforests within the United States. Also in the area are several species of flora and fauna that are found only in Hawaii. Much like the "spotted owl" controversy of the Pacific Northwest, the issue could have been framed as an "environment vs. jobs" issue. However, the focus by the Native Hawaiians involved was quite different. "We assert our religion, asking the American courts to protect our volcano god, Pele, from development, only to learn the government has plans to drill massive geothermal wells deep into her breast" (Trask 1993:270). This framing of the issue in terms of the Hawaiian religion has the effect of throwing those on the other side of the debate (state legislators, business interests, scientists) off balance:

When Hawaiians contest geothermal development on the basis of religion—when they take Pele from the realm of Hawaiian folklore and talk of her as a goddess that Hawaiians worship...Hawaiians move outside the boundaries of Western rational discourse, and this discourse of religion makes the majority of listeners uncomfortable. Such social institutions as the legislature, government agencies, and the courts are willing to make some concessions on the basis of Hawaiian culture—its protection and maintenance—but not on the basis of Hawaiian religion (Buck 1993:188).

Debating the geothermal project on the basis of whether or not it desecrates an important Hawaiian goddess is quite different than arguing over whether or not such a project is economically, or even environmentally, feasible.

Final Words

No one is suggesting that we are entering the “age of the islands,” with the island states on the verge of becoming the new hegemons of the international system. These small specks of earth in the middle of vast oceans are not as insignificant as they are usually considered, however, especially when they are working together. The power of the many to speak with one voice has a multiplying effect. The South Pacific islands, through the SPF, AOSIS, and the UN, will be able to get more of their concerns heard. As Jim Sanday says, “it is no longer realistic to consider [the South Pacific islands] simply as stepping stones to somewhere else” (Sanday 1991: 37). Even in a system that values power over all else, the smallest members of such a system can still achieve notice, given the right circumstances. Even mice can roar, and sometimes they can be heard, even by the lions.

APPENDIX I

THE ANZUS DISPUTE

ANZUS: The “Other” Alliance

While Belau’s antinuclear constitution was the flagship statement against nuclearism in the region, it was the breakup of the ANZUS alliance (Australia, New Zealand, United States) that first made the US stand up and take notice. The timing of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance coinciding with the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone also helped to sour the view of the US on the more moderate SPNFZ Treaty.

Unlike Belau, for which the strategic interest of the United States concerned possible future use, the ANZUS alliance was already an acting part of the United States’ global strategic network. Indeed, ANZUS had often been described as the “model” alliance, an example of how the ideal alliance should be run. Such statements, however, overlooked some of the shortcomings of ANZUS, shortcomings that would eventually split the agreement, and the alliance, apart.

The tremendous support of the ANZUS in Australia and New Zealand was due to the perception that the US saved these countries from invasion from Japan during World War II. The ties between the three nations have remained extremely strong over the years.

In fact, support for ANZUS has never dropped below two-thirds of the electorate in either Australia or New Zealand and was close to 80 percent in 1991 (Mack 1986:449).

ANZUS was in many ways a treaty arranged in afterthought. After the Japanese defeat in World War II, the United States sought to negotiate a treaty that would allow for some rearmament of Japan (with strict limitations, of course). Australia and New Zealand feared any type of resurgence of the Japanese military and would only accept such if the United States would guarantee their security, which was done when the ANZUS arrangement was signed in 1951. As Mack notes, “the [ANZUS] treaty helped assuage the concerns Australia and New Zealand had about Japan while drawing both countries into the growing network of anticommunist alliances that was becoming the mainstay of U.S. containment strategy” (1986:449).

The ANZUS arrangement is generally considered a weaker alliance than that of NATO. Unlike NATO, ANZUS involves “no common command structure, no permanent civilian staff, nor (as is the case in NATO) any U.S. combat forces on allied territory to act as a ‘tripwire’” (Mack 1986:450). Also, the language of the ANZUS treaty was much more vague than that of NATO. While the NATO agreement stated that an attack on one of the members of the alliance would be considered “an armed attack on all,” ANZUS only requires the member states to consult each other in the event of an attack and to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” (Mack 1986:450).

From the United States’ perspective, ANZUS had been an almost ideal alliance. Henry Albinski, one of the most respected American scholars on US-Australia relations,

has said, “ANZUS’...became a kind of code word, or shorthand, for a special working relationship....Its success was noted by friends and adversaries alike” (Tow 1989:119). Due to the lack of any US combat forces stationed in either Australia or New Zealand, ANZUS had been a relatively low-cost alliance for the US. Australia and New Zealand are more than capable of funding their own defense budgets and unlike Japan, are under no constitutional restraints for increasing its military. The United States did finance operations for joint exercises, but the soldiers all remained on their home nation’s payroll (M. Haas 1989:49). There was little, in the eyes of the United States, to object to in the ANZUS arrangement. This was soon to change.

In July 1984, the Labour³⁰ Party under David Lange was brought back into power in New Zealand. Labour had won on an explicitly antinuclear platform, including the banning of visits from nuclear armed and/or nuclear powered vessels.³¹ The United States rejected Labour’s stance, arguing that the ANZUS alliance obligated the member nations to accept United States’ ships, some of which are nuclear capable and may be nuclear armed, and some of which are nuclear powered (up to 40 percent of US combat ships, according to congressional testimony (US Congress, House, 1985: 13)). The United States restated its policy to “neither confirm nor deny” (NCND) the presence of nuclear weapons on their ships. Lange, on the other hand, has stated that his party’s policy is

³⁰New Zealand prefers the English spelling of “Labour” while Australia uses the more Americanized “Labor.”

³¹The distinction between nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels is not made clear, and Lange himself wanted to make this distinction. He was blocked, however, by protests from grassroots movements and within the party, as well as the media, the latter framing Lange’s stance as backtracking from being “really” antinuclear (Lange 1990: 32-34, 62-63).

anti-nuclear but not necessarily anti-ANZUS (and certainly not anti-American) and has used the vague language of the treaty itself to support this. Lange based his argument on the preamble to ANZUS, the purposes of which are “to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area...[and] to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security” (M. Haas 1989:42). ANZUS, in the eyes of New Zealand was therefore “not a nuclear alliance, [but instead] a regional pact rather than part of a global alliance system, and that New Zealand therefore has no obligation to contribute to strategic deterrence” (Ravenhill 1989:14).

On February 4, 1985, New Zealand refused the US request for a ship visit by the *U.S.S. Buchanan*, a ship which is conventionally powered but capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The United States had apparently had the impression that the *Buchanan* would be admitted and were furious when permission was refused. William Lane, US Ambassador to Australia, said in the wake following the *Buchanan* incident, that “New Zealand has been a bad boy and must be punished” (quoted in Mack 1989:321). Admiral William J. Crowe, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC) at the time, stated in a telex to US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger “it is difficult to see how my forces could seriously and realistically cooperate with the New Zealand military under [such] conditions” (quoted in Hayes, et al., 1986:288). The United States argued that there was only one US Navy, not a non-nuclear and a nuclear one, and that New Zealand’s policy was therefore a fundamental breach of the ANZUS agreement. Secretary of State George Shultz stated:

Our allies, of course, have an equally grave responsibility to help maintain the deterrent strength of the alliance. They must make the necessary effort to ensure their own security—and particularly in the area of conventional defense....They need not possess their own nuclear deterrent, but if they undermine ours, as New Zealand has, they weaken our own national security (Shultz 1985:2).

In December 1985, however, Lange's Labour Party looked to make its antinuclear policy the law of the land, issuing the Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Bill. The Bill was passed by Parliament on June 5, 1987 by a 39-29 vote (Tow 1989:110-111). By that time, New Zealand's status had been downgraded from "ally" to "friend" by the United States, and all security guarantees and arms export preferences from the US to New Zealand would be suspended by the US soon after (US Congress, House, 1987b). The "ideal" alliance was, for all practical purposes, defunct. There had been some apprehension in New Zealand (and some threats in the United States) to "punish" New Zealand for its actions by the imposition of trade sanctions or the dumping of US farm products into the world market. Ironically, while New Zealand did not suffer much (tourism and trade from the US actually went up after the *Buchanan* incident), Australia lost hundreds of millions from wheat and sugar sales due to the United States' farm export policies (Mack 1989:323). Selective trade discrimination against New Zealand, however, would be a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Mack 1986:467). In fact, even in the US, it was recognized that economic sanctions would not be helpful overall. While security reassurances and arms export preferences were removed from New Zealand with the breakup of ANZUS, no further economic sanctions were brought down upon New Zealand. As Representative Solarz noted, a military alliance is

not aided by bludgeoning one's allies to help, but via mutual understanding and cooperation (US Congress, House, 1987b).

Although New Zealand, unlike Belau, was already a member of a military alliance with the United States, it is still difficult to understand why the US chose to force the nuclear issue. Even in the global network of the United States' "security web," New Zealand is hardly militarily relevant. An oft-quoted description of New Zealand by an American official (sometimes attributed to Henry Kissinger) is that New Zealand is "a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica" (Mack 1989:321). The United States had long been the unquestioned superpower in the Pacific, and any incursion into the Pacific by the Soviets was certainly not going to take place in the South Pacific, but in the much more vital North Pacific region. Also, it would seem that the request for a port visit by the *Buchanan* had no significant purpose other than to test the resolve of the Lange Administration. There had been no ship visits for a period in the late 1960's to early 1970's (Mack 1989:322) and only 41 ship visits from 1976-1984 (Firth 1987:123), without any visible diminishing of the alliance or an increase in Soviet activity in the region. What then, was it about New Zealand's antinuclear policy that caused such apprehension in the United States and resulted in the eventual breakup of the "ideal" alliance? The answer would seem to lie not in New Zealand itself, but rather in the United States' strategic worldview and the threat New Zealand's antinuclear stance posed to it as an example of an alternative worldview.

While New Zealand in and of itself may have no military significance for the United States, the spread of its antinuclear policy could possibly have serious implications for the

US. If the US allowed New Zealand's policy to stand, it is argued, then it is possible (though highly unlikely) that Australia may consider adopting such a policy. Australia is of much greater strategic value to the US, as military satellite receiving stations are located in Australia. If New Zealand and Australia were allowed to go "non-nuclear," then it would be quite possible that Japan would follow in their footsteps. As Japan is the location of arguably the most important US naval bases on foreign soil, this possibility could not be allowed. With this new "domino theory" in mind, the United States was determined that this "Kiwi disease" against nuclearism should if not be "cured" in New Zealand, at least not spread to other countries. Ironically, if "Kiwi disease" had spread through the region, the United States would have had to take some of the credit for it happening. There was little notice when New Zealand first adopted its antinuclear policy. It was only in the wake of the *Buchanan* incident did the world begin to pay attention. David Lange was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and made a tour of the US talk show and lecture circuit, events that would probably not have happened had not the US forced the issue (Mack 1989:323).

The argument that New Zealand's antinuclear policy was an immovable obstacle to the sustaining of the ANZUS alliance is slightly questionable due to what seems the inconsistent application by the United States of its NCND policy. Other allies have adopted antinuclear policies that would be considered far more disruptive to US strategic interests without any of the reprisals or threats of reprisals that befell New Zealand. Egypt, for example, has had a long-standing (but often relaxed) policy of not allowing any nuclear-armed ship passage through the Suez Canal. New Zealand also argued that other

countries, such as Denmark and Japan, also have antinuclear policies similar to that of New Zealand's but were not "punished" for them as New Zealand was. This argument is at least slightly disingenuous. First, unlike New Zealand, the policies of Denmark and Japan remain just that, and are not the official law of the land. Also, despite this policy, Denmark allowed port visits from nine US frigates and two battleships on an NCND basis in 1985 alone (Tow 1989:132); and while Japan "requests" that ships entering its ports be free of nuclear weapons, it has never asked the US whether its ships were nuclear-armed and the US under NCND has never volunteered this information (Mack 1986:471, n1).

Indeed, this was a significant point for New Zealand, as Lange himself noted:

The Americans were also anxious about another possible threat to Japan's official complacency [with US ship visits]. After my meeting with [US Secretary of State] Shultz, the United States and New Zealand started to talk about a visit here by an American naval vessel. New Zealand, of course, asked that the ship be nuclear-free. The Americans, equally, would neither confirm nor deny that any named vessel was nuclear-free, but as a token of good faith they offered to bring a vessel to New Zealand directly from Japanese waters. If New Zealand rejected the vessel, the spell that bound Japan might be broken. Ersatz nuclear-free policies in the end satisfied only if all concerned conspired to make believe that the limitation was real (Lange 1990: 70).

Because of the press resulting from the *Buchanan* affair and the bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior*, New Zealand has ended up in the ironic position of being one of the leading proponents of antinuclearism. This position is an ironic one due to the fact that despite an indigenous population, New Zealand, like Australia, is predominantly an Anglo-Saxon culture and society. More and more, New Zealand has been developing a sense of its status as a member of a "Pacific Community":

Increasingly, New Zealanders have perceived themselves as living in a bicultural South Pacific country whose principal foreign policy concerns are to keep the region free from superpower conflict and from such environmentally damaging activities as French nuclear testing (Ravenhill 1989:12).

In 1987, Prime Minister Lange reinforced this regional identity, announcing a military buildup for regional defense and not the exporting of the military for international missions (Hinton 1992:102). Lange was most effective in expressing this connection with other peoples in the region, saying in September 1985, right after the *Rainbow Warrior* affair:

We are an enemy of the nuclear threat and we are an enemy of testing nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. France puts spies into New Zealand. France lets bombs off in the Pacific. France puts its President in the Pacific to crow about it. It is not the New Zealand or the Pacific way of doing things (Firth 1987:122, emphasis added).

This stand against nuclearism has now even transcended party lines. When Labour was forced out over the issue of rising unemployment, the more conservative National Party and its leader, Jim Bolger, campaigned on a promise that the antinuclear legislation would remain intact (Lange 1990; Richardson 1991).

The ANZUS alliance remains formally defunct, although relations between the US and New Zealand have continued to improve. Even Admiral Crowe, who fought so hard to keep New Zealand in ANZUS, has concluded that perhaps the relationship as it stands is for the mutual benefit of all concerned:

It is unclear to me why we still talk so hard about New Zealand coming back into ANZUS....I am not sure what the rationale would be today for a military relationship....We have fashioned a new relationship with New Zealand which is rather comfortable for both parties and we should leave it at that (Crowe 1993: 104).


APPENDIX II

OZONE AND OZONE DEPLETION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW


The ozone compound (O₃) was first discovered in 1840 and found in the stratosphere about 40 years later (Rowlands 1995: xiii). Much like research on the greenhouse effect, interest in ozone would remain relatively meager until the latter half of the twentieth century. The first significant data on stratospheric ozone would be taken as part of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-1958 (Rowlands 1995: 43). The ozone in the atmosphere blocks the earth from ultraviolet (UV-B) radiation. a decrease in the ozone layer could result in biological and environmental damage, including increased cases of skin cancer in humans (Morrisette 1991: 153). By the 1970's, concerns over the damage that could occur to the "ozone layer" were on the rise. First, there were fears that the supersonic transport (SST) planes which would fly in the stratosphere would release hydrogen and nitrogen compounds, both of which, it was argued, would break apart the ozone in the atmosphere (Rowlands 1995: 43). However, the lack of scientific consensus on these causes, connected with the termination of the SST programs in the US and USSR (with only France's Concorde program continuing), led the debate to subside.

In 1974, however, interest would be peaked on the question that possibly the ozone layer could be damaged by actions of humans "on the ground." The major suspect would be what was then considered the most unlikely of sources. Mario Molina and

Sherwood Rowland of the University of California, Irvine, hypothesized that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could end up in the stratosphere, where they would then be broken up by solar radiation, releasing free chlorine atoms (Cl). The free chlorine would then trigger the following chemical reaction, giving oxygen the chance to “break down” into its more usual dioxide combination:



However, chlorine monoxide (ClO) is not a very stable compound itself. It will easily bond with a free oxygen atom to form the more stable oxygen molecule, leaving the chlorine atom free to initiate this reaction with another ozone molecule:



Scientists estimate that a single chlorine atom could break apart perhaps as many as 100,000 ozone molecules before it is finally neutralized (Southwick 1996: 215). This was an unanticipated connection between CFCs and ozone depletion, and it was even more stunning for the fact that at the time, CFCs were considered to be a practically ideal compound. CFCs are nontoxic, noncorrosive, and most importantly here, they are relatively inert (i.e., they don't react to other chemicals easily) (Newton and Dillingham 1994: 157). These points made CFCs an extremely versatile compound for industrial use, from air conditioners and refrigerators to hair spray (Benedick 1991: 10). The incredible stability of CFCs are also what make them a problem, in that they are so stable they don't get “washed out” in the lower atmosphere, making their way up to the stratosphere to be bombarded with UV radiation, which can break them apart. The subsequent research would provide an eerie precursor to the climate debate, in that scientific models would

confirm the chlorine-ozone connection, but scientists could not definitely say that this reaction was in fact what was happening in the stratosphere (Benedick 1991: 11). Indeed, the state of knowledge on the issue was such that, even in 1981, several countries would respond to UNEP's request for data on their ozone layer and CFC use by saying that since they did not use CFCs, "their" ozone layer was not harmed (Parson 1993: 37, n29).

Although it first led the way on the ozone debate, the United States later stepped back somewhat. The US enacted a unilateral ban on CFCs in non-essential aerosols in October 1978 (Brown 1996:23), but the 1980 election quite literally changed the stance of the United States. There emerged a stronger lobby of CFC users and producers in the US, and the anti-regulatory Reagan Administration in the early 1980's was increasingly skeptical of further CFC bans (Parson 1993: 36). It seemed clear at the outset that no binding measures would be obtained at the upcoming meeting in Vienna in March 1985, and indeed, such was the case. The Vienna Convention only pledged nations to "cooperate in research and monitoring, to share information on CFC production and emissions, to pass control protocols if and when warranted, and to participate in a nonbinding dispute resolution process" (Parson 1993: 39, emphasis added).

The discovery of the "hole" in the ozone over Antarctica is often pointed to as the singular event which inspired action on ozone depletion (McCormick 1989:188; Morrisette 1991:154). It did certainly highlight the shortcomings of the Vienna Convention. However, Richard Benedick, the head of the US delegation to the Montreal meetings has noted that the negotiations at Montreal did not discuss Antarctica, dealing only with the atmospheric models and that the science was still unclear over what had

caused the ozone hole (Benedick 1991: 18-20). Benedick argues that the power ascribed to the discovery of the ozone hole was given to it more in hindsight than anything else. Still, even Benedick notes that this discovery increased the public's attention on the matter, which would further galvanize international action.

The Montreal Protocol

Adopted in 1987, the Montreal Protocol called for a 50 percent cut from 1986 levels of the five major CFCs by 1999, with interim measures for a freeze on CFCs in 1990 and a 20 percent cut in 1994 (Parson 1993: 44). It has been amended twice since then and now calls for the phase out of CFCs by all industrialized countries by the end of the century (although there were pledges made by some 13 countries to do so even sooner), as well as limiting other ozone-depleting chemicals (Brown 1996:26). The Protocol has been hailed as a major success in international policy, but it is clear that “success” is a relative term. As Brown points out:

One of the curious aspects of this protocol was that it called for a cut from the levels of use of CFCs in 1986 of 50 per cent [sic] by the year 2000. This was the sort of compromise that could only be reached by politicians. Clearly if CFCs were really destroying the ozone layer then only 100 per cent phase-out was credible. However, politics is the art of the possible and so that was the best that could be done in the circumstances (1996:24-25, emphasis added).

Although the science seemed rather definitive, political action was still incremental in comparison.

Increased knowledge on the state of the atmosphere as well as greater public attention (spurred by the ozone “hole”) led to the Montreal Protocol being amended in 1990 at a meeting in London. More groups of chemicals were placed under the Protocol's

jurisdiction, along with some other fine-tuning to make the agreement more equitable between developed and developing countries (see Benedick 1991: 163-198). Subsequent amendments in 1992 and 1995 have increased the pace at which CFCs and other ozone depleting chemicals are being phased out, not just in developed countries, but in the developing world as well (Soroos 1997: 167-168). At the conclusion of the London meeting, it was declared that the Montreal Protocol and its process would become “the model... for future environmental diplomacy” (quoted in Benedick 1991: 198). Most obviously, it has been put forth as a model for agreement upon a convention to combat climate change.

Certainly, there is little argument that compared to prior agreements, the Montreal Protocol deserves tremendous praise. It pulled together an important agreement in a remarkably short time, and probably achieved international reductions in CFCs that were greater than what would have been achieved by individual countries acting alone. In that sense, there is certainly much that negotiations on climate change could learn from the ozone discussions. However, the ozone regime fails as an effective model for climate change to follow for two major kinds of reasons. The first has to do with the significant differences in ozone depletion and climate change as specific issues, and the other has to do with the shortcomings within the Montreal Protocol itself, when evaluated on a different scale than that of past agreements.

Morrisette notes some major differences between the ozone depletion and climate change issues. He argues that the former benefited from 1) the political will to act (a byproduct of scientific consensus, support of the major actors, and public attention due to

an extraordinary event—the ozone hole), 2) manageability, and 3) relative obscurity from the public, as the rise in public attention came about after the signing of the Montreal Protocol (Morrisette 1991). Miller argues “because the ozone issue is primarily technological, it can be effectively addressed through the cooperation of the state and industrial sectors. Unlike other environmental problems, it does not require significant socioeconomic change” (1995: 83). Miller and McFarland (1996) also point to greater scientific consensus on ozone depletion than climate change, as well as noting that there are higher social costs involved for tough measures on climate change than there were for ozone depletion, a point which falls under “manageability” for Morrisette.

Although today there does seem to have been a greater scientific consensus on ozone depletion than climate change, this was not always the case. There were clearly some questions as to the certainty of the science and questioning of the models measuring ozone depletion. Corporations such as DuPont (the originator and world’s largest producer of CFCs) certainly questioned the certainty of the CFC-ozone connection. Indeed, while presenting testimony before Congress in 1974, a top DuPont executive declared “the chlorine-ozone hypothesis is at this time purely speculative with no concrete evidence” and “if creditable scientific data...show that any chlorofluorocarbons cannot be used without a threat to health, DuPont will stop production of these compounds” (quoted in Benedick 1991:12). This statement would come back to haunt DuPont and the industry in the next two decades. Ironically, the uncertainty of models on ozone depletion provide a precursor to the arguments on today’s climate change models, but with very different conclusions. As Benedick discusses the situation for the models on ozone:

The model projections underlying the control provisions of the Montreal Protocol had assumed a probable global average ozone loss of around 2 percent by the middle of the twenty-first century. Now it was revealed that more than this had already occurred, and, indeed, that ozone depletion appeared to be accelerating with increased accumulation of atmospheric chlorine. The existing models had proved incapable of predicting either the chlorine-induced Antarctic phenomenon or the extent of ozone depletion elsewhere over the planet. They were therefore probably underestimating future ozone losses.

Thus, the state of the science had fundamentally changed. a sense of uncertainty about the models' reliability made the future of the ozone layer seem even more precarious (Benedick 1991:111, emphasis in original).

How much of any scientific consensus is built through an overall agreement on the problem, cause, and solution (the "objective" science part) and how much of that consensus arises out of either a system of "mutual construction" (Shackley and Wynne 1995) with policymakers or because an issue is coopted by a specific scientific field (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a, 1994b, 1997) will probably never be answered with any definitiveness. The debate over the social construction of scientific knowledge is far too extensive to go into here. Note, however, that even in the ozone discussion, where "consensus" and "scientific certainty" are said to be high, there are questions as to the formation of that consensus (see Litfin 1994).

Beyond the problematic notion of scientific certainty, the ozone issue was certainly aided by its manageability and the support of the major actors (two points which are not mutually independent or exclusive). Although CFCs were highly useful, they were not a necessity. Substitutes had already been instituted in the US for nonessential aerosol use and by 1986, DuPont announced that substitutes for CFCs could be available within five years if market conditions warranted such action (Morrisette 1991:154). DuPont's "head

start” in this area changed the situation, leading DuPont to now lobby for an international CFC ban, recognizing that a strictly unilateral ban by the US would put DuPont at a disadvantage on the international market (Sebenius 1994: 290-291). An international CFC ban, however, would benefit DuPont, which could probably charge a higher price so long as it held a practical monopoly on CFC substitutes, a situation which would also benefit the US economically.

As for its relative obscurity, there is little question that being able to negotiate out of the glare of the international media and public attention allowed those at Montreal greater room to maneuver. On the other hand, the same could have been said about Vienna, where a weak agreement was produced. In any case, the increased public attention on climate change does place a demand on policymakers that something must be done.

Beyond the differences between ozone depletion and climate change, the Protocol also bears some shortcomings in and of itself. While Stewart and Wiener point to the Protocol as a significant precedent in what they refer to as the “comprehensive approach” to global climate policy (1992: 90) and one that could be applied to climate change, an analysis of the Protocol shows that it isn’t as comprehensive as they argue. The Protocol is comprehensive in that it bans a class of emissions (CFCs) rather than single gas (while CO₂ has been the principal anthropogenic greenhouse gas, it is not the only one), but it does not ban all ozone depleting chemicals. The second shortcoming is almost too obvious. Certainly the Protocol deserves praise when compared to agreements preceding it, but has the Protocol done what it was designed for, i.e., protect the ozone layer? On

that score, there are reasons to be greatly apprehensive as to the effectiveness of the Protocol (Parson 1993: 71). The ozone layer has continued to deteriorate at levels greater than predicted, and even if we acknowledge the lag between when CFCs are released and when they affect the ozone layer, one has to wonder how bad things are going to get before they get any better. As a parallel to climate change, this lag time could have consequences that are dire to say the least, and this does not even consider the political lag time to reach, ratify, and subsequently implement a decision. Whatever consensus that has been reached on the ozone issue, we should note that it was constructed over nearly two decades (Morrisette 1991: 159). The question remains for climate change, can we wait that long?

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