

DISSERTATION

WOULD-DO, COULD-DO, AND SHOULD-DO: COMPARISONS AMONG TYPICAL,  
MAXIMAL, AND FAKING PATTERNS OF PERSONALITY RESPONDING

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
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WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE DISSERTATION PREPARED UNDER OUR SUPERVISION BY KIMBERLY C. HASTEY ENTITLED WOULD-DO, COULD-DO, AND SHOULD-DO: COMPARISONS AMONG TYPICAL, MAXIMAL, AND FAKING PATTERNS OF PERSONALITY RESPONDING BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING IN PART REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY.


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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION  
WOULD-DO, COULD-DO, AND SHOULD-DO: COMPARISONS AMONG TYPICAL,  
MAXIMAL, AND FAKING PATTERNS OF PERSONALITY RESPONDING

Much research has examined the results of “faking” (i.e., presenting an overly favorable view of oneself) on personality measures used for personnel selection, but little research or theory-building has been done on the strategies that applicants use to fake their responses. It has been largely assumed that applicants lie to fake their personality scores.

However, a potentially powerful, but overlooked, strategy is that of responding with the level of a trait at which one is capable of reaching (i.e., using a *maximal personality* strategy). For example, when an applicant rates himself on the trait of Dependability, he may know that he usually runs late for work, but he also knows that he is capable of being on-time or even early for important meetings or conferences. Thus, when presented with such an item in a selection or evaluation context, this applicant may respond with a high score to represent his *capacity* for Dependability, rather than representing his low *typical* level of the trait.

The following paper advances a definition for a maximal personality response pattern, distinguishes it from the commonly-accepted concepts of typical personality and lying, and describes the results from a research study investigating the use of a maximal personality strategy as a response strategy.

Additionally, individual differences may largely affect the strategy that people use to respond to personality items. The concept and measurement of *traitedness* (i.e., the variance in an individual’s behavior across situations) is also a significant focus of this paper.

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## Dedication

This manuscript is dedicated to the two men in my life, my husband Mike and my son Owen. Again, a very special thanks goes to Mike for continually providing love, support, and leadership in every aspect of my life. I also thank our newborn son Owen for blessing our lives and providing an unspoken motivation that makes me want to be a better person.

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Personality measures have been shown to yield different results when used in different contexts. Specifically, scores on personality tests are consistently higher when given in a selection setting as compared to when the same measure is given in an “honest” condition, such as in the assessment of students or job incumbents (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). For example, Rosse, Stecher, Miller, and Levin (1998) found that across all of the Big Five personality factors job applicants had scores that were .65 standard deviations higher than job incumbents. Therefore, even though personality measures are designed to assess “typical behavior,” empirical examination and intuitive scrutiny of these measures suggest that examinees use strategies other than honesty when responding to personality items under conditions of high-stakes testing.

Overall, “faking” (i.e., portraying an overly positive image of oneself) has been overwhelmingly found to influence scores when personality measures are used for evaluative purposes, such as selection or promotion. However, little is known about the strategy that applicants employ to fake and increase their personality scores. The common assumption has been that faking is simply outright lying. Because applicants want to appear high on a trait, they simply respond in a way to receive high trait scores, regardless of whether their responses are true or false. With faking conceptualized in this manner, it would result in the addition of irrelevant error variance to all individuals’ test scores. Specifically, individuals would be artificially increasing their scores, in a manner not related to their actual trait standing or their

criterion performance. However, not all individuals score extremely high on personality inventories when they are used in selective settings. Instead, research has found that, across individuals, there is considerable variance in personality scores under conditions of faking; thus, not all individuals fake to the same extent (Lueke, Snell, & Illingworth, 2002; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Therefore, lying may be one strategy employed by fakers, but there may be others as well.

One potentially prevalent faking strategy is that of responding with a maximal mindset. With this approach, applicants would respond to each personality item based on their maximal trait capability, or with how they believe they could behave at their highest level. The nature of this type of faking would not be that of outright lying, but of reporting the behavior of which one is capable of exhibiting. The major distinction between these two types of responding is that a maximal strategy represents honest information about people (i.e., the highest behavior that they can actually achieve), whereas a faking strategy represents an attempt to look like the “perfect applicant” whether the information presented is true or false. Maximal responding would also look different from that of typical responses because the latter require individuals to aggregate across all possible situations and report their average trait behavior, while maximal responses simply reflect the highest behavior that individuals can reach for that given trait.

Another important focus of this research is in examining the effects of individual differences on the personality response set that individuals choose to employ. Specifically, the concept of traitedness (i.e., the variance in an individual’s trait behavior across situations) is discussed in this paper. Overall, it was largely expected that traited individuals (i.e., those who behave consistently across situations) would show different patterns of personality responses than untraited individuals (those who behave differently depending on the situation), and the

response sets (i.e., typical, maximal, and faking) were predicted to be used differently by these two types of respondents.

For the remainder of this section, I briefly review the faking problem, describe a model of faking offered by Levin and Zickar (2002), explicate a definition of maximal personality, and discuss previous research on maximal personality response sets. Based on limitations in the current model and empirical evaluation of faking, maximal personality is offered as a major response set utilized by examinees within high-stakes testing. Furthermore, traitedness and specific trait characteristics are hypothesized to be related to the use of maximal personality responding.

### *The Faking Problem*

The field of industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology has seen a recent resurgent use of personality assessments in employment contexts. Personality is considered to be an important part of I/O psychology research and practice, and it has been found to be related to meaningful job variables, such as absenteeism, employee satisfaction, leadership, and work motivation (as discussed in Hogan, 1991). There is little debate that employees can be characterized in terms of their personality traits and that these distinctions are important in the measurement of employee performance and organizational functioning.

However, there is debate centering on the use of personality inventories in making selection or promotion decisions (i.e., “high-stakes” testing). Unlike assessments of skills or abilities (i.e., objective measures of behavior), personality inventories are typically based on self-report of typical behavioral tendencies and are therefore susceptible to response biases, such as impression management or faking. It has been largely accepted that faking occurs in selection settings and that applicants are motivated to present themselves in socially desirable ways. In

fact, personality scores have been found to be at least .50 standard deviation units higher when given in high-stakes settings as compared to that of honest conditions (Hough et al., 1990; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Rosse et al., 1998). Examinees in incentive conditions have even shown the ability to raise their personality scores a full standard deviation or more above that of honest respondents (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Sackett, 1987; Thornton & Gierasch, 1980). Moreover, research has found this effect of impression management on scores of virtually every type of pre-employment self-assessment, such as personality inventories (e.g., Rosse et al., 1998; Topping & O’Gorman, 1997), interest measures (Kirchner, 1961), integrity assessments (Alliger & Dwight, 2000; LoBello & Sims, 1993), biographical inventories (Stokes, Hogan, & Snell, 1993), biodata questionnaires (Graham, McDaniel, Douglas, & Snell, 2002), self-assessments of skills and abilities (Anderson, Warner, & Spencer, 1984), resumes (Scott & Rowe, 2002), and job interviews (Stevens & Kristof, 1995). Individuals who have taken noncognitive assessments in employment settings have even reported faking their responses (Gilliland, 1995). Thus, research has overwhelmingly established that faking does occur across self-report assessment techniques.

#### *Effects of Faking on Validity*

There is much debate about the role that personality inventories should play within selection contexts. The crux of the debate focuses on the effectiveness of a faked personality inventory. Some researchers have concluded that personality inventories, even when faked, are still valid instruments to be used in the selection of employees (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Hough, et al., 1990; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). These researchers acknowledge that examinees *can and do* distort their personality responses, but argue that the construct- and criterion-related validity of the overall measure remain intact. Pertaining to construct validity, some research has

examined whether the factor structure of a personality measure changes when faking is included. For example, Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett (2001) analyzed a personality inventory for an honest group of respondents and for a group identified as responding in a socially desirable way. No differences were found among the correlations of the scales on the personality inventory between the two groups, suggesting that the factor structure (i.e., construct validity) of the personality instrument was not altered due to faking.

Likewise, researchers on this side of the debate also argue that faking does not significantly affect criterion-related validity. As an example, Zickar, Rosse, Levin, and Hulin (1996) used a simulation of applicant data to demonstrate that even extreme faking conditions did not significantly decrease criterion-related validity estimates. Additional research has shown that correcting personality scores for faking, inflation bias, or other socially desirable responding has little to no effect on the predictive validity of the measure (Christiansen et al., 1994; Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Ones et al., 1996). For example, a study by Cunningham, Wong, and Barbee (1994) found that, even when participants were given an incentive to score high on an integrity measure, their integrity scores still significantly predicted if they returned or kept a large amount of money that they were overpaid. The authors argued that, despite a significant amount of impression management figured into the integrity scores, the test itself was still a predictive measure of integrity and ethical behavior. This type of argument led Hogan, Hogan, and Roberts (1996) to conclude that measures of normal personality are valid predictors and should be used in any setting and with any occupation.

Others, however, have argued that faking does significantly impact construct- and criterion-related validity of personality assessments (Graham, et al., 2002; Rosse, et al., 1998; Topping & O’Gorman, 1997). First, Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow (2001) found

that the construct validity of the scales on the 16PF was adversely affected when comparing a nonapplicant group (i.e., honest responding) to an applicant group (i.e., faking). This finding argues against the conclusion proffered earlier that the factor structure of a personality measure always remains unaffected when fakers are included in the sample.

Additionally, several research studies have found that criterion-related validity estimates for personality measures are negatively affected by faking (Nguyen & McDaniel, 2000; Rosse et al., 1998; Weiner & Gibson, 2000). The use of “fake good” response sets have been found to decrease the validity on some of the most robust psychological measures, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Worthington & Schlottmann, 1987), the NEO-Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Caldwell-Andrews, Baer, & Berry, 2000; Topping & O’Gorman, 1997), and biodata questionnaires (Graham et al., 2002). In addition, Anderson et al. (1985) found that validity decreased when scores for job applicants (who have more motive to “fake good” as compared to job incumbents) included inflation bias, and test validity was enhanced after corrections based on the amount of inflation included in the scores were made. Thus, this line of research supports the claim that criterion-related validity may, in fact, be negatively affected when a personality measure is used with applicant populations or under other conditions subject to impression management.

Overall, regarding this validity debate, it is important to note that while some encouraging studies have found no effect of faking on validity, there is still a plentiful number of studies that have found a detriment in construct- and criterion-related validity when examinees fake their personality scores. Because of these latter studies, we cannot assume that faking is harmless and that it will not adversely affect the utility of a test.

#### *Effects of Faking on Selection Decisions*

Results of studies examining how faking affects selection decisions have been much more definitive than the results of studies examining the effects on test validity. Altogether, many recent studies have shown that even modest faking significantly affects the selection decisions that are made based on personality scores (e.g., Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Nguyen & McDaniel, 2000; Wiener & Gibson, 2000). Specifically, selection decisions tend to include more fakers in the final results than would be expected. This effect seems to be especially problematic at low selection ratios (i.e., when only a select handful of applicants are hired out of a large pool of potential candidates). For example, Rosse et al. (1998) found that at a selection ratio of .05, 7 out of the 8 (88%) candidates hired were applicants with extreme response-distortion scores (i.e., scores 3 or more standard deviation units above the incumbent mean score), whereas only 21 out of 146 (14%) candidates had extreme scores at a selection ratio of .90. Overall, faking seems to be quite advantageous for applicants when selection ratios are low because their high personality scores will put them in better contention for one of the few job offers.

While it may be problematic enough that low selection ratios tend to yield more fakers than honest respondents, this effect becomes even more problematic when investigating the performance detriment in those hired. Research using both computer simulation (Zickar, et al., 1996) and a student population (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003) have overwhelmingly found that subsequent performance levels of fakers were lower than that of honest respondents. The study by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) demonstrated that, at low selection ratios, fakers, when chosen, had mean performance levels that were .56 standard deviations lower than the mean performance of the honest group. Practically, applicants who use a faking strategy cause problems for organizational decision-makers who want to select respondents with the highest personality

scores but who also have the highest performance levels. Because this research has found that fakers do not tend to also have high job performance, it has been recommended that results from personality measures be used as a screen-out tool of bottom scorers, rather than a select-in tool of top scorers. Therefore, for the purposes of high-stakes testing, the use of personality tests themselves has been largely questioned due to the misleading and problematic results gained from fakers in the sample.

### *Conceptual Theories and Models of Faking*

The overwhelming majority of faking literature focuses on the consequences of faking. As reviewed above, many studies have concluded that faking is problematic because of its negative effects on personality test validity and on selection decisions made based on the test. However, at present, little research has focused on the definition of faking or the processes that fakers employ as they attempt to increase their personality scores. More specifically, this area lacks a unified theory or model of the mechanisms underlying faking.

### *Definitions of Faking*

For the most part, the definition of “faking” has been muddled inside the larger social desirability domain. Within this domain, there exists a pool of several similar terms, such as social desirability, self-enhancement, self-deceptive positivity, impression management, response distortion, positive malingering, and faking. All of these terms refer to an attempt by individuals to distort their self-report responses so as to portray themselves in a favorable way. However, while the above terms are similar in their positive portrayal, research has found that they should not be used interchangeably. Using factor analysis on commonly-used social desirability scales, Paulhus (1984, 1986) found two factors, which he interpreted as social desirability (i.e., the tendency to give favorably-biased but honestly-held self-descriptions) and

impression management (i.e., the tendency to intentionally give favorable self-descriptions to others).

The response strategy of faking, specifically, has been defined as belonging to the impression management factor, so that fakers are respondents who intentionally increase their self-report scores to leave a positive impression with the test users and decision-makers. Social desirability, on the other hand, is defined as a more innocent tendency to present a favorable view of oneself, a positive view with which an individual has deceived himself or herself as well. Furthermore, classical theorists delimited impression management as a within-situation behavior (e.g., used in selection settings), while social desirability was classified as a stable, cross-situational personality trait (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; Edwards, 1957).

Altogether, there is a clear distinction between these two types of responding. However, a common practice within this research is to define faking by using scores from measures of social desirability. As such, respondents with high social desirability scores are assumed to have faked, while those with low social desirability scores are assumed to have responded honestly. Based on the theoretical differences in the constructs of social desirability and faking, the practice of using social desirability scales to identify fakers is highly questionable. Instead, it would be highly beneficial to have a concrete model of faking and a way to identify its use in testing situations.

Paulhus, Bruce, and Trapnell (1995) offered a good start in this direction when they delineated six faking strategies. In their study, participants were randomly assigned to use one of seven response strategies: “Fake the best possible candidate,” “Fake good without arousing suspicion,” “Play up your good points,” “Respond honestly,” “Be somewhat modest in your answers,” “Fake bad without arousing suspicion,” and “Fake the worst possible candidate.” The researchers rank-ordered these strategies from 7 to 1, respectively, to represent the response sets

resulting in the most positive faking to those resulting in the most negative faking. Their results indicated that the majority of participants had no problems taking on these different faking strategies, and significant differences were found between each of the strategies and the honest condition, with the exception of the “fake modest” strategy. Overall, this study seems like an excellent demonstration that several response strategies may exist. However, more research is necessary to determine how the strategies are similar to or different from one another, to assess the precision of the rank-orders assigned to them, to examine how individuals choose among these seven possible strategies in different assessment settings, and to determine if individuals use only one strategy or if they switch between them in a single assessment. Overall, Paulhus et al.’s study offers a practical test of a faking classification, but it suffers from the same theoretical deficiency that has plagued the majority of faking research. A recently developed model of faking may help fill in these theoretical gaps.

#### *A Conceptual Model of Faking*

Levin and Zickar (2002) recently proffered a conceptual classification of faking strategies. This classification is organized as a four-stage hierarchical model of faking behaviors, which moves from more innocent impression management tactics at the bottom to complete phoniness or expediency at the top. The most innocuous stage within this faking model is that of *background social presentation behaviors*. At this stage, people engage in normal self-deception behaviors, in which subtle biases, embellishments, distortions, and omissions, all of a minor nature, converge to form a pleasant view of oneself (Greenwald, 1980). This deceptive or false self-view is then presented to others in social settings, so that the actor (somewhat unknowingly) positively manages the impressions that other people form of him or her. This stage is most

similar to “social desirability” (defined above), and is not limited exclusively to selection settings, but likely to be pervasive across all interpersonal contexts.

The second level of faking strategies is that of *situationally heightened self-presentation behavior*. Here, the situation (i.e., applying for a job) motivates the applicant to selectively present only positive *and* truthful information about oneself. As Levin and Zickar refer to this stage, it can be characterized by behaviors to “put one’s best foot forward” and focus on positive qualifications or experiences, while neglecting or hiding any negative information. In the study by Paulhus et al. (1995), this stage is perhaps most closely associated with the “Play up your good points” strategy. Similar to the first stage, behaving in this manner does a lot to manage the impressions given to others, but this stage is different from the first in that there is a specified intent or purpose of impression management.

At the third faking stage of *lying*, there is clearly no intent to tell the truth. Individuals employing this strategy present false information or omit pertinent negative information with the intent of making themselves appear better than they truly are. It is important to note that this stage only applies to information that can be verified as true or false. In cases such as these, lying is utilized as a strategy to avoid the consequences associated with telling the truth (i.e., not being selected due to lack of qualifications or unattractive work-related or personal history). This stage would most likely match the faking strategy labeled “Fake good without arousing suspicion” in the Paulhus et al.’s (1995) study.

The final stage postulated by Levin and Zickar (2002) is that of *expediency or bullshitting*. Within this level of faking strategies, honesty or dishonesty is no longer of concern. Instead, an applicant determines what is being sought for a new employee, and he or she actually becomes that person for the duration of the interaction. Again, referring to Paulhus et al.’s (1995)

faking strategies, this stage would map onto their strategy of “Fake the best possible candidate.” This stage is revealed by an applicant taking on a character, in which a persona is created and a context is faked. Therefore, this stage of faking has a larger scope than that of lying, in which an applicant may lie only with respect to a work qualification or previous responsibility level. Here, an applicant “does not limit himself to inserting a particular falsehood at a particular point...he is prepared to fake the context as well, so far as need requires” (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 130).

*Which Stage of Faking is Employed in Selection Settings? Levin and Zickar (2002)*

concluded that faking on personality inventories within employment settings is more similar to expediency (Stage 4) than lying (Stage 3). They claimed that personality information presented in a selection context cannot be identified as necessarily true or false, forcing the faking behavior into Stage 4 rather than Stage 3. In their discussion, they did not hypothesize a prevalence of situationally-heightened self-presentation behavior (Stage 2) or background social presentation behavior (Stage 1) within selection contexts. They instead limited their discussion to only the expediency and lying stages and then concluded that the faking strategy employed in selection settings is most similar to expediency behavior. However, I would argue that, while it is possible for a few “skilled bullshit artists” (term used by Frankfurt, 1988) to invade a selection setting, there are three reasons not to classify the most pervasive form of applicant faking behavior as that of expediency (Stage 4) or lying (Stage 3).

First, pertaining to Levin and Zickar’s discussion, the question should not regard what type of *false* information (outright lies or expediency) is being presented when faking, but what type of information is presented at all. Little research has investigated the actual nature of information presented during the selection process. What research (e.g., Hough et al., 1990) has shown is that applicant samples (i.e., samples in which faking is included) have about a .50 to .75

standard deviation increase in personality scores over that of incumbent samples (i.e., honest condition with minimal faking). However, no research has demonstrated that the cause of this increase is due specifically to lying or the presentation of blatantly false information or personas. Instead, this prevalent result simply indicates that people respond more positively when there is a potential reward available. Rather than answering as they most typically are (like the honest or incumbent samples), they are presenting themselves in a more positive light. But, we do not know if this positive presentation is the effect of lying, acting, or some other, less deceptive phenomenon.

The second argument against faking being classified as the presentation of false information is due to the nature of most preemployment settings. Practically, it would be rather risky for applicants to knowingly lie or exaggerate job-related information. Applicants are often informed that faking on personality inventories can be detected (through the use of social desirability or lie scales) or that lying about previous experience, job qualifications, or personal characteristics will result in disqualification. Therefore, realistically, it would seem that applicants would not likely risk a possible job opportunity by giving entirely false responses or creating a new persona substantially different from one's own. It may be the case that people would use lying or expediency if they knew or suspected that they would not be caught in any falsehoods. However, because most selection systems involve many steps to gather personal information (e.g., reference checks from others, questionnaires, and interviews), it seems unrealistic that a person would fake to such an extreme level.

The final argument here is that, even though increases in personality scores have been found to be so predominant in selection contexts, expedient behavior and lying *cannot* be so pervasive. First, not everyone is capable of utilizing lying or expediency as successful tactics to

receive a job offer. Previous research has found that there are individual differences in the ability to lie (e.g., Vrij & Graham, 1997). For example, Gozna, Vrij, and Bull (2001) found that people who are high on Manipulativeness and low on Anxiousness were more likely to be believed by the target of a lie within high-stakes scenarios. Tate, Warren, and Hess (1992) additionally found that it is difficult to “coach” individuals to tell successful lies. Thus, only some people can naturally lie, and it is a challenging task to teach others how to do it successfully. Moreover, Levin and Zickar (2002) readily admit that lying or expedient behavior would not be successful if it was used by everyone in a given selection context. Mainly, the effectiveness of this strategy depends on a large portion of the sample not scoring as high as the liar or actor. For example, if everyone in the sample used expediency to earn high personality scores, then the strategy would be ineffective in changing the rank order of applicants. However, when only a minimal number of applicants is skilled at using expedient presentation, the strategy has the potential of being extremely advantageous for those individuals. As Levin and Zickar state, “Expedient presentation behavior will therefore be the most potent form of faking, one that [may be] always present but never predominant” (p. 257).

Because of these arguments against faking as exclusively lying or expedient strategies, I would argue that the nature of faking may be closer to that of Levin and Zickar’s Stage 2 (situationally heightened self-presentation) for the majority of applicants. When responding to personality items, applicants most likely do not answer in accordance with the inventory’s directions that ask them to present themselves as they most typically are. Instead, similar to Stage 2 behavior, applicants may present themselves as they are at their best. Rather than trying to aggregate their behavior across many possible work situations (i.e., typical responding), intentionally stating falsehoods (i.e., lying), or trying to deceive employers with a new “perfect

employee" persona (i.e., expediency), applicants may simply report the positive behavior that they are capable of, without thinking about its frequency of occurrence. In comparison to the other strategies, this Stage 2 behavior would seem to be the faking strategy that most applicants could employ without much difficulty or detection. Overall, I believe that Stage 2 behavior can be reconceptualized and more thoroughly defined as maximal personality responding. In the next section, I discuss the notion of maximal personality, as distinguished from typical personality, summarize previous research done in this area, and explain the qualifications for a maximal measure of personality.

### *Maximal Personality*

According to common definition, an individual's personality is judged by examining his or her typical behavior. The instructions on personality inventories ask individuals to report how they typically think, feel, and act. These measures, therefore, are designed to assess the average behavior of individuals. As such, typical personality scores can be conceptualized as a mean score of an individual's self-reported trait behavior across relevant situations. Most importantly, typical scores are not concerned with the variation that may occur in an individual's trait behavior. For example, an individual may tend, across work situations, to be rather submissive, but there may be one time, such as when a 10% pay reduction was going to be implemented, that he may have approached his company's management demonstrating high levels of assertiveness. Thus, if we were to assign a typical Assertiveness level to this individual, it would be somewhere in the low to moderate range. However, this typical assessment does not take into account the variation that individuals may demonstrate in their behavior. Returning to our example, if we were to use the male employee's typical Assertiveness score to predict his behavior in the pay reduction setting, then we would have underestimated his potential to be assertive in certain

situations. Instead, the variation in an individuals' trait-related behavior offers important information above and beyond that of their typical behavior. The notion of how high or low a person can get their trait-relevant behavior to be is referred to as maximal personality.

#### *Definition of Maximal Personality*

Very little research has been done to examine responding with a maximal personality strategy. In fact, even less effort has been dedicated to building a conceptual framework for this process. Therefore, an important contribution of this study may be in the development of a nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) for the notion of maximal personality. The construction of this network may be achieved by clearly defining maximal personality, distinguishing it from typical personality, summarizing qualifications for its measurement, and setting boundaries for contexts where it may be found.

Primarily, maximal personality refers to the capacity at which an individual can perform behaviors related to a given trait. It has also been referred to as “response capability” (Wallace, 1966) and “a skills approach to personality testing” (Hofstee, 2001). In an important (but rather invisible) paper introducing the notion of maximal personality, Wallace (1966) stated that personality may be conceptualized as “a set of abilities—abilities which, with regard to acquisition, maintenance, and modification, share much in common with other abilities” (p. 132). In fact, personality may be measured in a way similar to ability. More specifically, standard ability items ask if an examinee is *capable* of responding correctly, and personality items may also be used to instruct (implicitly or explicitly) examinees to respond with their trait capability. Therefore, a maximal personality strategy refers to a response set an examinee may use to answer personality items. When a personality measure is administered, the examinee responds with answers that reflect what s/he “can do” or with behaviors that s/he is capable of, but does

not necessarily perform on an average day. Overall, examinees are simply asked to state the *intensity* level (either highest or lowest) at which they have behaved, while ignoring the *frequency* with which the behavior has occurred.

#### *Distinction between Typical and Maximal Personality*

Again, this definition of personality as maximal capabilities is not how personality measures are normally classified. Instead, personality measures are almost always conceptualized as typical measures of trait behavior, such that the distinction between personality measures and typical predictors is not even usually made because they are commonly defined as one in the same. In fact, Cronbach (1949), who coined the terms *maximal* and *typical predictors*, only defined cognitive ability and personality constructs in relation to this distinction. As such, cognitive ability measures were classified as measuring maximal behavior, while personality measures were assumed to measure typical behavior. Subsequently, tests of cognitive ability have been linked with maximal performance, while personality assessments have been forever united with typical performance. Hofstee (2001) described this distinction as suffering from the “salad-dressing syndrome,” in that intelligence (as a maximal predictor) and personality (as a typical predictor) seem to be constructs based in oil and vinegar that just don’t mix.

However, researchers have begun to mix up the constructs of intelligence and personality. As one example, a fresh line of research has begun to investigate the construct of “typical intelligence” (Goff & Ackerman, 1992). Measures of intelligence as typical reconceptualize the common assessment of “maximal” cognitive ability, which would be taken at one point in time to gain an understanding of the mental ability of which an individual is capable. Instead, typical intelligence refers to the extent to which individuals engage in cognitive tasks over time. An item typifying this construct is one such as “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve”

(Goff & Ackerman, 1992). The main distinction between typical and maximal intelligence is in the motivation individuals have to use their minds. Specifically, there may be individuals who have high intellectual ability (high maximal intelligence), but rarely employ it in everyday life (low typical intelligence). Therefore, motivational and temperamental factors differentiate between typical intellectual engagement (will-do) and maximal intellectual capability (can-do).

Similarly, personality measurements do not have to be restricted to typical assessments of behavior, as they are usually defined. In fact, Turner and his colleagues (Turner, 1978; Willerman, Turner, & Peterson, 1976) have argued that participants find it relatively easier to respond to maximal personality items than typical items. To use their example, consider the personality item “I am sociable.” When making the best *typical* response to this item, the good participant would need to consider all possible social situations they may encounter and mentally compute a weighted average of their intensity level and frequency of sociable behavior across all situations. However, maximal personality instructions ask the participant to answer with the sociability level at which he or she is most capable. It therefore only requires respondents to answer in regards to their highest or lowest intensity level of the trait behavior. In the end, a maximal personality response strategy does not require aggregation across situations and, overall, may be more resistant to errors due to memory and interpretation bias.

#### *Previous Research on Maximal Personality*

The limited previous studies on the use of a maximal personality strategy were conducted in the mid- to late-1970s. Very little work on this response pattern has been conducted subsequent to these studies. Mainly, this previous body of research investigated the predictive validity of personality measures (i.e., with typical or maximal instructions) within research conditions and for broad traits, such as happiness, anger, dominance, and aggression. While

many significant implications may be drawn from this work (discussed below), it has suffered from a lack of attention and respect. According to Hofstee (2001), the conceptualization of maximal personality is a rather useless one, since it “seems to preclude interpretations in terms of personality” (p. 44). His argument is that, in terms of situationally-broad traits like happiness and anger, maximal personality measures offer little predictive utility over and above that of the more prevalent typical measures. The example given by Hofstee relates to the trait of friendliness: He asks what purpose a dictator’s maximally friendly treatment of a child has when his typical behavior with the general population may be far less friendly. In this respect, I agree that typical measures of personality offer a more global usefulness. However, I also believe that maximal personality measures may be of particular value (and already being implicitly used) in high-stakes testing situations. It is in this regard that I contend maximal personality should continue to be studied and understood. Therefore, I turn next to summarizing previous work on the measurement of maximal personality.

The first allusion to a construct of maximal personality was presented in a theoretical paper in *American Psychologist* by John Wallace (1966). In this paper, Wallace argued that the field of personality psychology could benefit considerably from a broader definition of personality, specifically from a definition that includes an abilities conception of personality within its measurement. At one point, he stated that because psychologists have such a strong attachment to categorization, a definition of personality had been created and maintained that was somewhat “narrow and incomplete” (p. 132). Overall, Wallace gave an in-depth treatment of the concept of personality as ability or response capability, and he concluded by stating:

[W]hether we choose to search for man ‘as he really is’ or that ‘of which he is capable’ is of utmost importance. Construing personality as response capability reemphasizes the importance of the stimulus conditions under which behavior occurs—something which,

in my opinion, has been neglected by those interested in personality description, measurement, and development (p. 137).

The first empirical study of maximal personality appeared in 1976, when Willerman, Turner, and Peterson were persuaded by Wallace's argument and hypothesized that "at least some personality traits" (p. 483) could benefit from an abilities conceptualization. Their main argument was that, since other ability tests yield high predictive validity results, maximal measures of personality (thus, defined as trait capability) may also demonstrate higher predictive validity than that of typical measures. In their study, the traits of anger and happiness were measured with instructions for both typical and maximal personality. Participants first wrote stories describing their typical and maximal expression of anger and happiness (i.e., typical and maximal predictor measures), and then they acted out their typical and maximal behavior when receiving both angry and happy news (i.e., typical and maximal criterion measures). Their results indicated that maximal measures of anger were better than typical measures in predicting both typical ( $r = .48$  vs.  $.32$ ) and maximal ( $r = .59$  vs.  $-.03$ ) angry behavior. More explicitly, this finding means that a measure of one's anger capability (i.e., ranging from a calm discussion of anger to a verbal attack with the intent of destroying the target of anger) can predict both his typical anger behavior and his highest capacity for anger behavior better than a typical anger measure. For happiness, the typical and maximal measures were found to be similar in their predictive effectiveness of happy behavior. Therefore, their study demonstrated that maximal measures could act as predictors that are at least as effective as, if not more effective than, the largely-utilized typical measures.

In 1978, Robert Turner provided a follow-up study, using the trait of dominance. A similar methodology to the Willerman et al. study was employed, and the results again indicated that the maximal measure of dominance outpredicted the typical one for both typical ( $r = .44$  vs.

.20) and maximal ( $r = .47$  vs.  $.27$ ) dominant behavior. In addition, Turner investigated the effectiveness of the measures for people who are either situationally-consistent (e.g., behave similarly in most situations) or situationally-inconsistent (e.g., behave differently depending on the situation). He found that maximal measures predicted equally well for both consistent and inconsistent participants, while typical measures only predicted dominant behavior for consistent participants. Thus, typical predictors were ineffective personality measures for people whose behavior may vary substantially from one situation to the next, while maximal measures were effective predictors regardless of situational variation. This finding makes intuitive sense considering that typical personality measures ask respondents to assign a mean value to their trait behavior, which may be much more difficult for people who show large differences in that behavior. Assigning a maximal score, however, would not change depending on the amount of variation a person may show.

Finally, a study by Klesges, McGinley, Jurkovic, and Morgan (1979) again replicated the findings from the previous studies and offered more evidence for the predictive utility of maximal personality measures. In this study, participants were measured on the trait of aggression; and maximal measures were again found to be better predictors than typical ones for both typical ( $r = .45$  vs.  $.18$ ) and maximal ( $r = .69$  vs.  $.09$ ) aggressive behavior. In addition, Klesges et al. obtained peer-reports of the participants' typical and maximal levels of aggression. When the peer-reports were used as predictors, the maximal measure was again found to be superior to the typical one in predicting typical ( $r = .38$  vs.  $.19$ ) and maximal ( $r = .56$  vs.  $.30$ ) aggression in the participants. Based on these findings, Klesges et al. concluded that "it is quite clear that the maximal format for peer reports and self-reports more reliably predicts behavior than does the more commonly used typical format" (p. 404).

Altogether, these studies found that maximal predictors had more predictive effectiveness than typical ones for the traits of anger, dominance, and aggression and that they have equal levels of predictive validity for the trait of happiness. All of these authors argued that the explanation for the effectiveness of maximal personality measures is based on two factors: 1) they are easier for participants to rate and 2) they have higher levels of reliability. First, there is a discussion within each of the papers arguing that maximal measurements are easier than typical ones to make: They are less ambiguous, require less averaging of behavior, and ask raters only about the intensity of behavior while ignoring the frequency. It may be that maximal measures are more effective because individuals can more easily assess their own or their peers' trait capabilities. In addition, each study found higher reliability coefficients (i.e., internal consistency and test-retest reliability) for maximal predictors over typical ones. It seems, therefore, that people provided more consistent and stable representations of trait behavior when asked to rate maximal personality levels rather than that of typical. Overall, the results of these studies provide substantial support for the ease and psychometric effectiveness of maximal personality measures. Unfortunately, research subsided after the Klesges et al. (1979) study, most likely because a clear use or purpose for this type of measure was absent. Currently, I believe we should revisit the conceptualization of maximal personality, which may help in filling a gap specifically in the faking literature.

#### *Qualifications for the Measurement of Maximal Personality*

Up to this point, I have discussed the distinction between maximal and typical measures only as predictor variables. This distinction is consistent with Cronbach's (1960) original differentiation between ability ("can do") and personality ("will do") predictors. A growing amount of more current research has begun to extend the distinction to maximal and typical

*criterion* measures as well (DuBois, Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli; 1993; Ployhart, Lim, & Chan, 2001). In fact, in the first empirical test of the distinction between maximal and typical performance, Sackett, Zedeck, and Fogli (1988) listed three characteristics necessary for a criterion measure to be classified as a maximal performance measure: Understanding that one is being evaluated, accepting instructions to maximize task performance, and participating in a task of short enough duration that maximum energy can be sustained. These qualifications have been well accepted and cited as the defining features of a maximal performance measure. However, there are no standard qualifications set forth for making a distinction between maximal and typical predictors. Again, the distinction between these two constructs is simply delineated as the difference between ability measures and personality assessments. It is my intent to show, however, that the three characteristics defined as maximal performance can also reflect the process that occurs when using personality predictor measures within selection contexts. Thus, there may be certain evaluative contexts in which personality measures may act as maximal predictors rather than as their assumed role of typical predictors.

*Personality assessment as a maximal measure.* Pertaining to the first qualification for a maximal performance measure, an obvious characteristic of a selection setting in general is that of evaluation. Given that job applicants are competing for a valued position within the organization, it seems rather intuitive that they know they are in an evaluative setting and that their personality responses will be scored, interpreted, and used as a piece of information in the selection process.

Second, in order for a measure to be considered a maximal measure, applicants must also accept the (implicit or explicit) instructions to maximize their effort. Again, while it seems rather intuitive that applicants try their hardest when competing for a valuable job opportunity, research

findings provide additional empirical support for this phenomenon. Studies have repeatedly shown that job applicants are more motivated for and put more effort into employment tests than do job incumbents (e.g., Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & Martin, 1990) and that increased motivation is a notable characteristic of applicants (Montag & Comrey, 1990; Santy, Endicott, Jones, & Rose, 1993; Shankster-Cawley, 1997). This point that applicants are highly motivated has been so well accepted by researchers that applicant groups are commonly referred to as the “motivated to be hired” group, while incumbent or student groups are called the “motivated to obtain personal information for their own enlightenment” group (e.g., Thumin & Barclay, 1993). Additionally, as mentioned before, significant differences in personality scores are regularly found between these two groups. Much research has established that job applicants’ personality scores are at least .50 standard deviation units above that of job incumbents’ scores, largely suggesting that the former group has put more effort into attaining higher scores. Mainly, all of these examples provide support for the notion that applicants maximize their effort when filling out personality measures in selection contexts.

The final qualification for a maximal measure is that of a short measurement period. This time characteristic is an important one for a maximal measure because applicants must be able to sustain their level of effort and motivation for the entirety of the measurement process. If they are not able to maintain a heightened level of effort, then the measure will end up tapping typical performance as well. Personality measures are some of the quickest assessments that can be made of individuals. For example, the 16PF Fifth Edition contains 185 items, yields individual results on 16 personality characteristics, and takes, on average, 35 to 50 minutes for the paper-and-pencil version and 25 to 35 minutes for the computerized version (Conn & Rieke, 1994). In contrast, other assessment methods used in selection systems, such as structured interviews,

work samples, and assessment centers, can take substantially longer and yield results on a smaller number of work-related dimensions. Recommendations for assessment centers, for instance, are that they should take a minimum of a half of a day and could run up to three days, and that participants should be evaluated on no more than nine job-specific competencies (Thornton, 1992). Thus, because personality measures are relatively short assessments, examinees most likely are able to sustain high levels of effort and motivation throughout the administration process.

*Importance of the context in maximal vs. typical personality measures.* I am not disputing the notion that personality assessments are usually measures of typical behavior. The instructions commonly found within personality assessments ask examinees to respond as honestly as possible. However, my argument is that, within high-stakes testing situations, personality measures may operate more like maximal predictors. Therefore, the outcome of personality assessment may not be constant across situations, but can show dramatic differences depending on the setting within which it is being used.

#### *The Present Study*

At least three different strategies may be employed when responding to a personality inventory (i.e., respond honestly, respond maximally, and respond to look good). An empirical examination of these strategies is necessary to study how they are similar to and different from one another. The two main goals of this study are to examine the differences in personality scores when participants use different response sets and to evaluate the predictive validity of the inventory when each response set is utilized.

### *Personality Response Sets*

As discussed previously, two different lines of research have found 1) differences between honest and maximal personality responding and 2) differences between honest and faking response sets. However, no research has been conducted to investigate the differences (or similarities) between faking and maximal personality responding. The present study offers to add to the existing literature because it investigated the effects of using different instructions to induce all three response sets within one study. Comparisons were made between personality scores when examinees were instructed to respond with what they “would do,” “could do,” and “should do.” These three response sets were meant to map directly onto Levin and Zickar’s (2002) conceptual model of faking, and analyses were conducted to determine if they did truly differ from one another.

For this study, participants were administered a work-related personality inventory with three different instructions: 1) respond with what you normally do (typical personality predictor), 2) respond with what you are capable of (maximal personality predictor), and 3) try to look good to be selected for a job (faking predictor). It was expected that personality responses would look the most similar within the faking and maximal personality conditions because both of these response sets likely result in elevated personality scores. For this reason, scores from these two conditions were expected to be more correlated with each other than either one would be correlated with honest responding. However, consistent with Levin and Zickar’s (2002) model, I still expected that the faking condition (as one conceptualized as lying or expediency behavior) would produce the highest mean level of total personality scores. Thus, these first research hypotheses were proffered:

*H1a: There will be a stronger correlation between personality scores from the “faking” and “maximal personality” conditions than there will be between scores from the “faking” and “typical” conditions or between scores from the “maximal personality” and “typical” conditions.*

*H1b: Personality scores will have the highest mean within the faking condition, a moderate mean within the maximal condition, and the lowest mean within the honest condition.*

### *Performance Prediction*

These different instruction sets were not only studied for the effect they have on personality scores, but also for their effect on the predictor-criterion relationships. More specifically, I investigated the changes in criterion validity that took place for one personality measure, depending on the given instructions. For the criterion measure in this study, I asked participants to give self-reports of three types of their own job performance: 1) their average level of exhibited trait performance on the job (typical performance), 2) their maximal level of exhibited trait performance on the job (maximal performance), and 3) the most appropriate level of trait performance, but not necessarily a level that they can or do perform (faked performance). Each of the three response sets (i.e., typical, maximal, and faked personality) was used to predict these three types of self-reported performance (i.e., typical, maximal, and faked performance).

*Predicting typical performance.* Figure 1 presents an overview for the prediction of typical performance. Primarily, it was expected that scores from the “typical” instruction set would be most highly correlated with reports of typical performance. I expected these two measures to have a strong positive relationship because they both make assessments of behavior as averaged across situations. If an individual makes a self-assessment of his personality as being

highly dependable across work situations, then he most likely sees himself as performing highly dependable work behaviors as well. Furthermore, research has shown that personality inventories used in non-evaluative settings (i.e., honest responding and typical performance) reach moderate levels of validity (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Therefore, the following main effect hypothesis was offered for the prediction of typical performance:

*H2a: Of the three types of personality response sets, typical personality scores will be the best predictor of typical performance.*

Moreover, it was of interest to see how well typical job performance was predicted by scores from the maximal and faking instruction conditions. As discussed previously, past studies have indicated that maximal personality measures were highly predictive of subsequent typical behavior (Klesges et al., 1979; Willerman et al., 1976). Although the previous studies examined personality traits that were not specifically work-related (e.g., anger, happiness, dominance), I expected to find similar results in the current study. For the most part, knowing one's maximum level of a trait, such as Assertiveness, may greatly aid in predicting her average manifestation of the trait across time. More explicitly, her maximum Assertiveness score sets the upper boundary for how high her average assertive performance could be. So, while individuals' maximal personality scores may not be as closely related to typical performance as typical scores are, they were still expected to have value in predicting typical performance. Hence, the following hypothesis was put forth:

*H2b: Maximal personality scores will have moderate validity (i.e., positive significant relationships) in predicting typical performance; yet, validity here will be lower than it was for typical personality scores.*

Because the faking condition in this study was conceptualized as similar to the lying or expediency strategies proposed by Levin and Zickar (2002), I did not expect faking scores to be one of the best predictors of typical performance. However, as described in the introduction of this paper, much previous research has found that personality test validity remains intact (i.e., stays at the same level as for honest respondents or decreases but still remains significant) even when examinees have faked their responses. Therefore, while faked personality measures may not be as effective in predicting typical performance as the other two measures, their validity does not seem to go to zero even with faking included in the scores. For this study then, faked personality scores were expected to have small positive relationships (whether significant or not) with the typical performance criterion.

*Predicting maximal performance.* In work settings, it may also be useful to predict employees' level of maximal performance. Specifically, maximal performance scores may give information as to how individuals may behave during their first month on the job (Helmreich, Sawin, & Carsrud, 1986), during important work events where individuals need to be highly dependable and achievement-oriented, or during crisis situations in which they need to be highly stress tolerant. Overall, assessing the trait capabilities of individuals may be useful for some organizations, such as those with high amounts of change, or for specific jobs, such as sales which requires high levels of extroversion.

Figure 2 presents a diagram of the proposed relationships in the prediction of maximal performance. Primarily, I expected that a measure of maximal personality would be the most effective in predicting maximal performance. Asking people how highly they can perform should be the best predictor of their self-reported maximal performance at work. For example, similar to previous research (e.g., Turner, 1978), an individual's rating of his highest level of dominance

should be highly predictive of his maximal level of actual dominant behavior. Therefore, this second main effect hypothesis was offered:

***H3a:** Of the three types of personality response sets, scores from the maximal personality condition will be most predictive of maximal performance.*

Again, I was also interested in examining the relationships between the other two response sets (i.e., honest and faking) and maximal performance. First, measures of typical personality may not necessarily give information about the highest level at which an individual can perform. While typical personality scores represent an aggregate level of people's trait behavior, based on their intensity and frequency, maximal performance represents that trait behavior at its highest intensity only. As such, there may be an association between typical personality responses and maximal performance because knowing people's average trait behavior gives some information as to the lowest boundary of their maximal behavior. Previous research has found a low to moderate relationship between these variables (Klesges et al., 1979; Turner, 1978). However, this relationship was not expected to be as strong as that between maximal personality scores and maximal performance. Hence, the following hypothesis was proposed:

***H3b:** Typical personality scores will have moderate validity (i.e., positive significant relationships) in predicting maximal performance; yet, validity here will be lower than it was for maximal personality scores.*

Similar to typical performance, faking scores were not expected to be highly predictive of maximal performance. There may be some association between faked personality scores and self-reported maximal performance, mainly because both sets of scores result in elevated responses above that of typical conditions. However, there does not seem to be a strong

theoretical link between these two scores. So, again, faked personality scores were expected to have small positive relationships (whether significant or not) with maximal performance.

*Predicting faked performance.* Finally, in addition to typical and maximal performance, a personality measure may also be predictive of faked performance (see Figure 3 for a diagram of the predicted relationship). This type of performance represents behavior that cannot or generally is not performed by an individual, but is still understood by the respondent to be the most desirable form of job performance. For example, job applicants recognize that being early for work everyday is a desirable and highly dependable work behavior; however, most employees do not actually achieve this level of dependability. Previous research on the use of personality measures for selection has found a problem in that personality scores sometimes do not predict actual attainable job performance (e.g., Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Zickar et al., 1996). Specifically, researchers in these studies found that individuals who faked their personality scores ended up having lower than predicted actual performance levels. Therefore, these individuals did not actually achieve the level of job performance at which their personality score indicated they could perform. This phenomenon most directly relates to Levin and Zickar's (2002) two highest faking stages of lying and expediency, in which false information is presented and may not accurately represent true performance.

Because the expected levels of performance were not actually achieved by respondents, it would seem that some sort of falsehoods were included in their personality responses. Most likely, this type of faked performance represents respondents' perceptions of what is the "right" thing to do in a given work situation, but it is a level of performance that most people rarely achieve all of the time. Thus, it would seem that both typical and maximal personality scores would fail to predict this type of performance because they both predict behaviors within a

person's repertoire (either typically or maximally). The only type of response set that may be able to predict this type of highly desirable (yet largely unattainable) behavior is a faking strategy that includes lying or expedient presentation. Theoretically, Levin and Zickar (2002) made a distinction between these two stages (discussed previously); however, in terms of measurement, it may be close to impossible to see differences in personality scores. Specifically, respondents' personality scores will look similar whether they are outright lying or whether they took on a false persona when responding to the items. Therefore, a distinction will not be made in the current study between measuring lying or expedient presentation. Future research should be conducted to empirically tease these two constructs apart.

Overall, the only response set that I expected to predict faked performance was that of faking. For example, if a respondent lies or uses expediency to achieve a high stress tolerance score, then the only type of performance that this score should significantly predict is that of faked performance (i.e., a level of stress tolerance that would be difficult for a person to achieve and maintain on the job). Hence, this final main effect hypothesis was proposed:

***H4:** Of the three types of personality response sets, scores from the faking condition will be most predictive of faked performance.*

#### *Traitedness as a Moderator Variable*

An important consideration in this research is how much variability individuals show in their behavior. This variability in behavior may have a tremendous effect on the accuracy at which an individual's future performance can be predicted. For example, some individuals show little variation in their behavior (i.e., behave much the same across time and in different situations) and are, therefore, more predictable (Siem, 1998). Other individuals act very differently depending on the situation they are in. The prediction of future behavior for these

individuals offers more of a challenge to researchers and practitioners. Altogether, because of the effect that variability in trait behavior can have on the accuracy of performance predictions, this variable is offered as a moderator variable in this study.

This idea of trait variability was first offered by Baumeister and Tice (1988) as the concept of “traitedness.” By their definition, highly traited individuals are those that show little variability in trait behavior, while highly untraited individuals are those that show much variation in behavior. Limited empirical study has been done on this concept, but, of the research conducted, traitedness seems to be a viable personality dimension. Specifically, in 1989 (shortly after the introduction of the concept), Tellegen stated that “traitedness is a promising concept” (p. 621); and subsequently, research has shown that traited individuals respond quicker to self-descriptive trait words than untraited individuals (Siem, 1998), that there are reliable individual differences in the level of traitedness for the Big Five personality factors (Satterwhite, Fogle, & Williams, 1999), and that traitedness can act as a moderator of the trait-criterion relationship (Heidel-Schiltz, 1998). In addition, Turner (1978) conducted a study investigating the effect of behavior consistency (although he did not call it “traitedness” specifically, it is the same concept in theory and measurement) on both typical and maximal personality. He found that consistency acted as a moderator for only the typical personality-performance relationship. Thus, it is important to consider the effect that individuals’ levels of traitedness may have on the relationship between their trait scores and their actual performance. There may be a large difference between trying to predict future performance (i.e., typical, maximal, or faked) for individuals that do or do not show much variation in that behavior. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the effect that one’s level of traitedness for the five traits may have on each of the three types of performance and offer moderation hypotheses for each one.

*Predicting typical performance.* Typical personality scores represent an aggregate level of people's trait behavior. Thus, for people who vary greatly from one situation to the next (i.e., are untraited), they would have a lot of aggregating to do to arrive at their typical trait behavior. But for people who do not vary their behavior across situations (i.e., are traited), their typical personality scores would be close to the same in all settings. As stated above, Turner (1978) found that traitedness ("consistency," as he called it) moderated the relationship between typical personality and performance, such that typical personality scores only predicted typical performance for *traited* individuals. This invalid finding for untraited people seems to be explained by, first, the difficult task that untraited people have in summarizing their behavior across situations; and, second, the use then of an inconsistent measure to predict inconsistent behavior. Therefore, the following moderation hypothesis was offered in predicting typical performance (see Figure 4 for a diagram of these relationships):

***H5a:*** *Traitedness will moderate the relationship between typical personality scores and typical performance, such that the relationship will only hold for traited individuals.*

Pertaining to maximal personality scores, I do not expect traitedness to act as a moderator between maximal personality and typical performance. As discussed previously, past research has found maximal personality measures to be highly predictive of subsequent typical behavior, and this was true for both consistent (i.e., traited) and inconsistent (i.e., untraited) individuals (Turner, 1978). Therefore, since one's maximal personality score is the same regardless of whether she is traited or untraited, the variable of traitedness should not act as a moderator here.

Research on the prediction of typical performance when using a faked personality measure seems to be a bit more muddled. As stated earlier, some research has found that faking greatly decreases the validity of a personality measure, while other studies have found the

validity to remain at similar levels as when using an honest measure. With the current study, I expected traitedness to moderate the validity of the faked measure, such that faked personality scores would be valid predictors of typical performance only for *untraited* individuals. In fact, I expected that, for people who were highly untraited, faking and maximal personality scores would have similar levels of validity. This trend seems reasonable for untraited individuals because, from their range of possible behaviors, they may respond with their maximal capability when faking a personality inventory. Therefore, faking for untraited individuals may consist of using a maximal personality strategy. Because I hypothesized that the maximal measure would be predictive of typical performance, I expected the same of the faking measure for untraited individuals. On the other hand, for traited individuals, I expected that the faked personality measure would show low levels of validity, if any at all. When individuals do not have a range of potential behaviors, then their typical performance looks very similar to their maximal performance. In that case, individuals may be more likely to lie or use expediency (Levin & Zickar, 2002) as a faking strategy. I did not expect personality scores that included lying to have much predictive value. Altogether, the following moderation hypothesis was proffered:

***H5b:** Traitedness will moderate the relationship between faked personality scores and typical performance, such that the relationship will be stronger for untraited individuals.*

*Predicting maximal performance.* As Hypothesis 3a states, maximal personality scores are expected to be the best predictor of maximal performance. This relationship is expected to hold regardless of any effects due to traitedness. Again, one's maximal level of a trait will remain the same regardless of whether he is highly traited or untraited, so traitedness should not have an effect on the predictive utility of a maximal personality measure. Thus, maximal

personality scores and maximal performance were expected to be highly related for everyone in the sample.

A typical personality measure, however, was expected to have a different relationship with maximal performance based on traitedness. Again, typical personality scores represent an aggregate level of people's trait behavior, based on both their intensity and frequency of occurrence. Thus, untraited individuals would have a lot of aggregating to do and their typical score would not accurately represent their highest intensity level. Contrarily, traited individuals' typical personality scores would be close to the same in all settings and would actually be equal to their maximal personality scores (since their average score is the same as their highest score). Hence, it may be expected that typical scores (as being the same as maximal scores) would be predictive of maximal performance for these traited individuals. Altogether, typical personality scores may be predictive of maximal performance for traited individuals, but not for untraited individuals. (Figure 5 presents an illustrated overview of these moderation hypotheses for predicting maximal performance.)

***H6a:** Traitedness will moderate the relationship between typical personality scores and maximal performance, such that the relationship will be stronger for traited individuals.*

The validity of faked personality measures in predicting maximal performance is also expected to be moderated by traitedness. It may be the case that only untraited individuals may be able to use a maximal personality strategy to make themselves look better than usual when faking. These people have a large range of possible behaviors and, when faking, may try to represent themselves as performing at their highest level on average. Their faking scores, therefore, should be highly predictive of maximal performance, since that is the strategy they are using to fake their responses. On the other hand, people who do not have a large range of

potential behaviors (i.e., are traited) cannot make use of a maximal personality strategy when faking. Since their maximal personality scores are equal to their typical personality scores, they may not be representing themselves as favorably as they may like if responding with their typical/maximal scores. Therefore, faking for traited individuals may take the form of lying or expediency (discussed next). Again, please refer to Figure 5.

***H6b:** Traitedness will moderate the relationship between faked personality scores and maximal performance, such that the relationship will be stronger for untraited individuals.*

*Predicting faked performance.* As stated in Hypothesis 4, the only type of responding I expected to be related to faked performance is that of faking. I did not expect honest or maximal responding to show main effect relationships with faked performance, nor did I expect traitedness to act as a moderator in either of those relationships. Instead, I offered one final moderation hypothesis related to the prediction of faked performance with faked personality scores. (Please refer to Figure 6 for a diagram of this relationship.)

As stated above, I expected that untraited individuals may use a maximal personality strategy to fake their responses. Because they have a broad range of possible behaviors, untraited respondents may represent themselves in an overly favorable way by describing what they can do at their very best. Traitied individuals, however, do not have the option of using this strategy. Rather, they have a much more narrow range of possible behaviors and must use a different strategy than maximal responding to favorably represent themselves. Thus, I expect traitied individuals to use a faking strategy employing falsehoods, such as lying or expediency.

***H7:** Traitedness will moderate the relationship between faked personality scores and faked performance, such that the relationship will only hold for traitied individuals.*

### *Different Traits*

One final set of exploratory hypotheses was set forth for the current study. It may be the case that the job-related traits measured in this study demonstrate different levels of behavioral consistency (i.e., some traits may show more or less variance across situations). Because the traits themselves may show differing levels of variation, certain traits may be more susceptible to a maximal mindset than others. For instance, it may be that a trait like Assertiveness is more amenable to being measured in a maximal way than a trait like Achievement Striving. Overall, there may be much more variation in assertive behavior, such that individuals may show low, moderate, or high levels of assertiveness depending on the situation. Thus, when respondents answer a personality inventory in a selection setting, they may respond with the level of assertiveness they are most capable of, rather than trying to compute an average level of their assertiveness. However, for a trait such as Achievement Striving, there may not be as much variation in behavior. Specifically, Grote and James (1992) analyzed the amount of behavioral consistency on the Situation-Response Measure of Achievement Motivation (SRMAM) and found that there was a general achieving tendency that did not vary across situations. Additional research suggests that people have consistent tendencies toward how they engage in their work- vs. family-life (Steinberg, 1986). Therefore, because people's Achievement Striving behavior may not vary across situations as much as their Assertiveness behavior, it may be expected that Achievement Striving is not as amenable to faking by employing a maximal approach as that of Assertiveness. For Assertiveness, then, respondents may choose among their broad range of assertive behaviors and represent their maximal assertive capabilities; however, for the trait of Achievement Striving, respondents' behavior may not vary much and they may be forced to respond with their typical/maximal behavior or use a different faking strategy.

For the present study, I offer tentative hypotheses for each of the five work-related traits (i.e., Achievement-Striving, Assertiveness, Dependability, Extroversion, and Stress Tolerance) measured by the personality assessment based on their construct definitions. This link between trait variability and typical/maximal performance is an important one. For a trait that varies substantially depending on the situation (e.g., first week on a job vs. six months later), it is expected that applicants may respond with their maximal performance level in selection or other high-stakes settings. This process of answering with a maximal personality mindset would be their way of faking on a personality inventory. Overall, the faking process may be similar to that of taking a maximal personality strategy only for traits that have *large variation* in individuals' potential behavior (i.e., the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance in this study).

For this study, I first expected mean differences in reported levels of traitedness across the various traits, such that Dependability and Achievement Striving would be the most traited, Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance would be the most untraited, and Extroversion would be in the middle. Second, I expected that faking and maximal personality responding would be more synonymous strategies for the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance. For the traits of Dependability and Achievement Striving, I expected that people would show different response patterns in the faking and maximal personality conditions. Finally, I expected that the trait of Extroversion would not show clear patterns of a relationship between faking and maximal personality responding; some people may use similar strategies in both conditions while others may not. These different predictions about the process of faking for each of the five traits constituted this study's final exploratory set of hypotheses:

***H8a:*** *There will be mean differences in traitedness across the traits, such that*

*Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance will be the most untraited, Dependability and Achievement Striving will be the most traited, and Extroversion will be in the middle.*

**H8b:** *The correlation between scores from the faking and maximal personality conditions will be strongest for the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance.*

**H8c:** *The correlation between scores from the faking and maximal personality conditions will be weakest for the traits of Dependability and Achievement Striving.*

**H8d:** *The correlation between scores from the faking and maximal personality conditions will be in the moderate range for the trait of Extroversion (i.e., they will have a correlation in the middle of the other four trait correlations).*

## CHAPTER 2: METHOD

### *Participants*

Two hundred-sixty undergraduate students from introductory psychology classes were recruited to participate in this study. One hundred-sixty participants (61%) were female, 219 (84%) were Caucasian, and their average age was 19.6 years. Participants reported having an average of three years of previous work experience, only 38 people (14%) reported that they were not currently working, and everyone reported having some previous work experience (i.e., no-one reported never having a job). In addition, a wide variety of jobs was represented with this sample: 86 participants (33%) were in sales or customer service jobs, 49 (19%) were in food preparation or serving jobs, 23 (9%) were in administrative jobs, 7 (3%) were in managerial jobs, and 55 (21%) were in child-care, maintenance, health-related, or other types of jobs.

### *Measures*

*Predictor measure.* The Job Fit Personality Assessment (Lahti, Mueller-Hanson, Heggstad, & Hastey, 2001) is based on the Five Factor Model of personality, but was designed to assess a narrower set of job-related traits. The inventory contains 60 items, with 12 items mapping onto five job-related personality traits: Achievement Striving, Assertiveness, Dependability, Extroversion, and Stress Tolerance. Example items include “I seem to enjoy my work more when I work in a group” (Extroversion scale) and “I rarely get ‘stressed-out’ about things at work” (Stress Tolerance scale). A complete list of all 60-items is provided as Appendix A. In addition, the Job Fit Assessment also includes a “candidness” index, which attempts to identify respondents who may have exaggerated their self-report responses. This candidness

index uses 15 items (marked with an asterisk in Appendix A) that are high in social desirability to flag individuals who did not represent their typical personality. Most likely then, candidness scores do not indicate lying by respondents as much as they screen for elevated personality scores. Overall, the Job Fit Assessment has been tested extensively with both student and job applicant populations. Psychometrically, it has demonstrated adequate levels of reliability and construct validity, with internal consistency values ranging from .72 to .84, test-retest coefficients (over a three-month time interval) ranging from .75 to .80, and correlations with similar traits from the NEO-PI-R ranging from .58 to .72 (Hastey, Heggstad, Mueller-Hanson, & Lahti, 2001).

Two steps were taken to make the Job Fit Assessment satisfy the current research question. First, two additional *instruction sets* (i.e., maximal and faking instructions) were written for use in this study. Altogether, three instruction sets (see Appendix B) were used so that personality could be measured with all three strategies discussed in this paper. One set of instructions encouraged participants to respond honestly, while assuring them that their responses would be kept confidential (i.e., honest responding). The second set of instructions asked participants to think of behavior of which they are capable and to only respond with responses indicating behavior they could perform at their best (i.e., maximal responding). The final set of instructions asked participants to respond in a way to make themselves appear worthy of a valuable incentive (i.e., faking).

Second, several of the Job Fit personality items were edited to make them more amenable to a maximal strategy. For example, an item such as “I often run a few minutes late” (item #5) is not one that may be answered with a maximal mindset (i.e., responding with what one is capable of). Therefore, two types of *item modifications* were made to eliminate reference to frequency

and preference. First, any mention of behavior frequency was removed from the Job Fit items, so that, for instance, item #24 (“I regularly seek out extra training so I can do better at work”) was modified to read “I seek out extra training so I can do better at work.” Because a maximal strategy only asks participants to consider the intensity of their trait behavior (and not frequency), this type of modification allows a maximal mindset to be used, while the trait content of the item remains unaltered. The second type of item modification was that of changing questions of examinees’ preferences into questions of examinees’ actions. More specifically, Job Fit items were modified from asking about participants’ likes/dislikes or what they enjoy/get bothered by (e.g., item #60—“I have high expectations for myself at work”) into asking them about what they do (“I set high expectations for myself at work”). Again, this type of edit makes the item easier to answer with a maximal strategy, but should not alter the original item content.

After making both of these types of modifications, a panel of subject matter experts (i.e., upper-level I/O psychology graduate students) was consulted. They were asked to individually rate whether or not each item could be answered with a maximal strategy. Subsequently, we worked as a group to rewrite some of the items that they had difficulty answering with a maximal strategy. By the end of this meeting, the SMEs agreed that while all 60 Job Fit items could be answered with a maximal strategy, several of the items included on the Achievement Striving scale (e.g., My personal life is much more important than my work life) were more difficult to answer. Appendix C presents a summary of how several items were modified for use in this study. Finally, “reminder instructions” were added throughout the maximal survey so that participants would not resort back to a typical mindset. Statements such as “At my best possible work behavior...” were inserted into the maximal personality inventory after every 15 items.

*Self-reported traitedness measure.* The Traitedness Survey (presented in Appendix D) was written specifically for this study and includes 20 behavioral statements (4 statements related to each of the 5 traits). Participants were asked to rate how consistent or inconsistent they are with respect to each of the 20 behaviors. The behavioral statements were written based on prototypical behaviors associated with each trait (e.g., “Speak my mind when I disagree with others” for the trait of Assertiveness). The scale of options that participants respond with range from “very consistent” to “very inconsistent.” It is important to note here that the survey is not asking for an indication of participants’ intensity on the trait behavior (i.e., high, moderate, low), but asks instead how consistently participants would behave with one intensity level across situations. Therefore, pertaining to the sample Assertiveness item above, both a participant who responds that she always speaks her mind and a participant who responds that he never speaks his mind would answer “very consistent” on the item. On the other hand, participants who believe that they sometimes do and sometimes do not speak their minds would respond with “very inconsistent.” Altogether, participants received five traitedness scores, one for each trait.

*Empirical traitedness measure.* In the limited previous research on this concept, traitedness has only been measured as the standard deviation of participants’ responses to the items within a scale. Specifically, individuals with low standard deviations across the items on a personality scale were considered *traited* and individuals with high standard deviations across the items were considered *untraited*. In order to gather construct-related validity evidence in the present study, a comparison was made (using correlations) between trait scores that participants received on the traitedness measure and the standard deviation of the item responses to each scale in the honest personality condition. Because only *honest* personality scores could be used

for this comparison, maximal and faking scores were not reviewed here (i.e., the standard deviations of 165 participants' typical scores were compared to their traitedness scores).

*Criterion measure.* For this study, a concurrent methodology was used, such that predictor and criterion information were collected together. A concern in this study was that a broad personality inventory (such as the one used here) may not show a strong relationship with one self-rating of overall job performance or with a highly specific measure of job performance (e.g., typing speed or accidents on the job). Therefore, the use of a criterion measure that matches the dimensions measured by the personality assessment was very important. As such, a criterion measure that specifically assesses the traits measured by the personality inventory was developed for use in the proposed study. Overall, the goal was for the criterion measure to be sensitive to variation in the same personality traits measured by the predictor.

The criterion measure included an assessment of intended job performance that was developed specifically for this study. The Work-Related Scenarios Survey (see Appendix E) presented participants with job scenarios and asked them to indicate what they would do if they were in that situation. The survey includes 60 questions about intended reactions to situations presented in eight vignettes. The eight scenarios were written based on actual or simulated work situations featured in video clips from television news shows (e.g., "20/20", "60 Minutes"), assessment center training programs, occupational self-help videos (e.g., "Assertiveness Training"), and video supplements to a Business/Management course textbook.

The survey included 20 questions measuring typical performance (e.g., "How likely would you be to..."), 20 questions measuring maximal performance (e.g., "How capable would you be of..."), and 20 questions measuring faked performance (e.g., "How appropriate do you think it is for someone to..."). In addition, each trait (i.e., the same five traits from the Job Fit

Assessment) was measured by four different scenarios. The following matrix demonstrates which items measured each of the five traits:

<b>Scenario #</b>	<b>Assertiveness</b>	<b>Achievement Striving</b>	<b>Dependability</b>	<b>Extroversion</b>	<b>Stress Tolerance</b>
1	X	X	X		
2			X	X	
3		X		X	
4	X	X			X
5	X		X		X
6		X	X		
7				X	X
8	X			X	X

*Personality strategy measure.* Finally, a 5-item measure asked participants to indicate the strategy they would be most likely to use if they were applying for a job (see Appendix F). With this short assessment, an indication of the frequency of each type of response strategy (i.e., honest, maximal, faking, or some other strategy) that people report using could be attained.

#### *Procedures*

Prior to beginning the current study, pilot testing was conducted with sixty-four individuals to assess the measures created for this study. Mostly qualitative feedback was gathered from the participants to ensure that the instructions, items, and scenario descriptions were clear and appropriate for the target population (i.e., college students). Three scenarios (scenarios 4, 5, and 8) were described as difficult for the participants to relate to, mainly because they depicted work situations that the college students were not familiar with. These three scenarios were modified to reflect more age-appropriate content (e.g., scenario 5 was changed from an airline context to a video-store setting). In addition, the pilot testing led to the discovery of a few items with minor grammatical errors or confusing wording. Altogether, after making these minor revisions, reliability analyses yielded positive results for the surveys to be used, even with the small pilot sample size.

In the current study, six sessions were run consisting of groups of up to 50 participants. To begin each session, participants completed an informed consent form and were then given a packet including the instructions and items for each of the surveys. Before opening the packet, they were verbally instructed that the study would be self-paced and that they should carefully read each set of instructions as they began each new survey. In total, this study took about 50 minutes for participants to complete.

In their packet of surveys, participants were first asked to complete the Job Fit Personality Assessment twice: In either 1) typical and maximal conditions ( $n = 82$ ), 2) typical and faking conditions ( $n = 84$ ), or 3) maximal and faking conditions ( $n = 94$ ). The reason for this grouping of assessments was so scores on the Job Fit Assessment could be correlated across the different instruction sets. Across all of the research sessions, the conditions were counterbalanced, so that one group received the honest instructions and then the maximal instructions, while a second group received maximal and then honest. Altogether, there were six counterbalanced sessions. Participants were not asked to complete the Job Fit Assessment using all three instruction sets because a third administration of the Job Fit was not expected to yield as accurate of responses as the first two administrations. After responding to the Job Fit twice, participants may not be expected to adequately use a third strategy and respond to the identical items again.

After finishing the two personality assessments, all participants completed the Traitedness Survey, Work-Related Scenarios Survey, and Personality Strategy measure, in that order. When they finished responding to all of the surveys, they turned in their answer sheets and were debriefed.

## CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

### *Evaluation of Order Effects*

First, analyses were conducted to assess whether the order in which the three personality instruction sets were presented to participants had any effects. Specifically, there should be no differences between typical personality scores, for example, regardless of whether participants responded with the typical response set first or second. Table 1 presents the results of this analysis for total and individual trait scores. Overall, significant differences were not found between the mean typical or faking personality scores based on the order that these instruction sets were presented in. However, a significant order effect was found for maximal personality scores, in that participants tended to score higher when they responded to the maximal instructions second (i.e., after responding to either the typical or faking instructions). It seems though that this effect on the total maximal scores was largely driven by the traits of Dependability and Stress Tolerance, since these were the only traits in which the 95% confidence intervals for scores from the first and second administrations did not overlap.

It is difficult to predict what this order effect had on the overall findings from this study. After uncovering this effect, all of this study's analyses (reported next) were repeated using both the scores from the first and second maximal administrations individually, and very little differences were found between the results from either individual analysis and the results from the combined maximal scores (i.e., the results that are reported in the subsequent sections). Therefore, the results in this study do not seem to change based on whether maximal scores from the first, second, or combined administrations were used. However, it is difficult to truly control

for this order effect since the sample size was dramatically reduced. Future studies should investigate this order effect in more depth, since it is an interesting finding that individuals may perceive their maximal trait behaviors (especially those of Dependability and Stress Tolerance) as significantly higher after responding to items with their typical or faked behavior.

### *Reliability Analyses*

Reliability analyses were done to establish the internal consistency of the measures used in this study. Table 2 summarizes these reliability coefficients for each of the trait scales on the predictor (i.e., Job Fit Personality Inventory), criterion (Work-Related Scenarios Survey), and moderator (Traitedness Survey) measures. Additionally, evidence for the reliability of each of the three instruction sets is given for the predictor and criterion measures.

Pertaining to the predictor measure, the table demonstrates evidence of adequate internal consistency for all five of the traits within all three of the instruction sets. The coefficient alpha levels ranged from .71 to .87 for the individual trait scales. Overall, this reliability evidence indicates that the items are homogeneous within each instruction set for each trait. Interestingly, it is important to note that the maximal and faking instruction sets yielded consistently higher reliability values than those in the typical instructions. (The only exception was for the trait of Assertiveness: the reliability for the faking strategy was lower than the reliabilities for the other two strategies.) This finding seems to indicate that individuals can more consistently represent what they are capable of doing or what is most appropriate over that of representing what their average behavior may be.

Next, the criterion measure contained some values that were the lowest reliability coefficients from the study. These lowest values appeared for a few of the trait behaviors in the typical and faking instruction sets (i.e., typical Dependability, typical Extroversion, faking

Achievement Striving, and faking Extroversion). Altogether, the reliability coefficients for the trait behaviors ranged from .38 to .59 for the typical instructions ( $\alpha = .67$  for the total scale), .58 to .74 for the maximal instructions ( $\alpha = .87$  total), and .31 to .63 for the faking instructions ( $\alpha = .74$  total). There are two reasons that these coefficients may be lower than those for the predictor measure: 1) these scales are based on four questions per trait (20 items per scale), and 2) the scales were designed to assess a variety of behavior included in each trait description (e.g., the Extroversion scale included content regarding both ability to work in a team and sociability at a work party). Therefore, these trait scales were not as homogeneous as the Job Fit scales, which included several items of similar content. Overall, though, it is interesting that the reliability values for the maximal instructions were again consistently higher than those for the other instruction sets. Again, it seems that individuals may be able to represent their trait capabilities in a more consistent way than when representing their average behavior or what is most appropriate.

Finally, the Trainedness Survey seemed to demonstrate adequate levels of reliability. The coefficients here ranged from .54 to .75 for the traits (again with 4 items per trait), with a coefficient alpha value of .78 for the total twenty-item scale. The Dependability scale showed the lowest internal consistency ( $\alpha = .54$ ), which most likely was due to range restriction within the scale. Most participants reported being very consistent in their behavior related to the trait of Dependability; in fact, only 15% of participants had scores of 10 or lower on this trainedness index (out of a possible 20 points). Overall, while these reliability coefficients associated with trainedness are in the moderate range rather than high range, they are still at an impressive level for including only four items per scale. Future versions of this survey could benefit from the addition of more items measuring each trait.

## *Hypothesis Testing*

*H1a: For all five traits, there will be a stronger correlation between personality scores from the “faking” and “maximal” conditions than between scores from the “faking” and “typical” conditions or between scores from the “maximal” and “typical” conditions.*

Correlation analyses were used to examine this hypothesis for each of the five traits. These results are bolded in Table 3. Overall, this hypothesis was not supported for any of the five traits. Instead, a different pattern of results was found, indicating that individuals' typical and maximal trait scores (rather than their maximal and faking scores) were consistently the most highly correlated. This finding suggests that there is more of a relationship between individuals' response styles when they are reporting their own behavior (whether average or highest possible behavior) than between their own behavior (either typical or maximal) and faking behavior. Also noteworthy within this table is the finding that maximal and faking scores consistently showed the lowest correlations. In fact, for the trait of Dependability, the correlation between maximal and faking scores ( $r = .19$ ) is not even significant. This pattern of results may indicate that maximal and faking strategies involve very different processes, although both strategies result in elevated trait scores (see Hypothesis 1b).

Additionally, the remaining correlations in Table 3 (i.e., those not bolded) demonstrate some interesting effects. First, the correlations among the traits in the typical condition were almost identical to the trait intercorrelations found in the validation study for the Job Fit Personality Assessment (Hastey et al., 2001). Therefore, the typical instructions seemed to provoke honest responses from respondents, and these responses were similar to those given in other large-scale studies. Finally, it is interesting to note that, within each response set (i.e., typical, maximal, and faking), there tended to be fairly high correlations among trait responses.

This effect seemed especially true for the maximal and faking response sets, in which the trait correlations are all positive and significant (i.e., trait correlations ranged from .28 to .68 for the maximal condition and from .25 to .73 for the faking condition). Overall, respondents truly seemed to use the instruction sets given to them in each condition, since the typical condition yielded results similar to past studies and the maximal and faking conditions showed evidence of similar trait responses within both instruction sets.

In addition to these group-level statistics, follow-up analyses were conducted at the individual level to assess the change in participants' scores from each of the three response sets. Percentile rank differences analyses (see Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, under review) were used to examine whether participants' scores increased at a constant rate (e.g., from the honest to faking conditions) or whether their scores increased at varying degrees. Table 4 presents the percentile rank differences results. For this analysis, examinees were first assigned percentile ranks (i.e., one for each of the personality response sets they were administered) based on their personality trait scores in that condition. In the table, the values in the Mean column are the mean absolute values of the difference between examinees' percentile ranks across pairs of personality conditions (i.e.,  $\sum | \text{Rank}_{\text{Condition 1}} - \text{Rank}_{\text{Condition 2}} | / n$ ). Thus, larger values in the Mean column indicate higher average disparities in percentile rank order between the two conditions. The lower- and upper-bounds for the 95% confidence interval around the means are provided in the last two columns of the table.

Similar to the group-level results presented above, the most similar percentile ranks assigned to examinees seemed to be from the typical and maximal conditions. Therefore, examinees' percentile ranks changed the least amount when comparing personality scores from these two conditions. Greater differences in percentile ranks were found between the typical and

faking conditions and the maximal and faking conditions, especially for the traits of Achievement Striving and Dependability. When percentile ranks from these conditions were compared, the results indicated that examinees' scores showed much more of a discrepancy in rank order than when their typical and maximal scores were compared. This finding supports the notion (as reported above with the group-level statistics) that examinees' typical and maximal representations of themselves may be more similar to each other than either one is to their faked personality score.

*H1b: Personality trait scores will have the highest mean in the faking condition, the lowest mean in the typical condition, and mean scores between the other two groups in the maximal condition.* Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-tests were used to examine this hypothesis for each of the personality trait scores. The results are presented in Table 5.

Altogether, the means for all of the cases are in the postulated direction: Faking scores showed the highest mean values for the trait scales, maximal scores showed the next highest values, and typical scores showed the lowest values. For all of these cases, maximal and faking scores were similarly high, usually with a difference of about 1 to 2 points. While these two scores were sometimes not significantly different from one another, they tended to be significantly higher than typical scores: They were much higher than typical scores for the traits of Achievement Striving, Dependability, and Stress Tolerance, but in a closer range for the other traits (i.e., Assertiveness and Extroversion). In total, this hypothesis showed the correct pattern of results, in that personality scores resulted in higher mean levels when participants used a maximal or faking strategy, especially for the traits of Achievement Striving, Dependability, and Stress Tolerance.

Additionally, similar results were found when participants' "candidness" scores were examined. As stated earlier, the candidness index included on the Job Fit assessment is used to

flag individuals' scores that may be artificially inflated (i.e., higher scores on this index are flagged as inflated). So, in this study, respondents' candidness scores should be significantly higher in the maximal and faking conditions than in the typical condition. Descriptive statistics and paired samples *t*-tests for candidness scores are also presented in Table 5. These results indicate that participants did receive significantly higher scores on the candidness index when they were in the maximal and faking conditions than when they were in the typical condition. While maximal and faking scores were not significantly different from one another, they were similarly much higher than the typical scores.

#### *Predictive Validity Analyses*

Before examining the results for the next set of hypotheses, Table 6 presents the intercorrelations among responses to the criterion measure. For the most part, these correlations show similar patterns to those from the personality predictor measure. Specifically, within each trait, the typical and maximal responses tend to be highly related. Additionally, responses to the maximal instruction set are again highly correlated across traits. Thus, it seems that respondents' maximal responses are similar regardless of which trait they are answering questions about.

*H2a: Of the three types of personality, typical personality scores will be the best predictor of typical performance for all five traits.* Table 7 presents the correlations among all three predictor scores and all three criterion scores. The second column in the table can be used to assess the current hypothesis, as it demonstrates the relationships between the three sets of personality scores and the criterion of typical job performance. Altogether, this hypothesis showed some support in that the typical personality measure tended to have the highest correlations (in an absolute sense) with typical job performance for all of the traits except Extroversion. While this trend seems to hold across most of the traits, it is important to note that

many of the correlation coefficients were not very different from one another. For example, the trait of Assertiveness demonstrated similar predictive validity coefficients for the typical ( $r = .51$ ,  $p < .00$ ) and maximal ( $r = .49$ ,  $p < .00$ ) conditions. In addition, Extroversion provided partially significant results, since maximal personality scores were the best predictor of typical performance ( $r = .39$ ,  $p < .00$ ) and typical scores followed as a close second ( $r = .31$ ,  $p < .00$ ). So, while an obviously important predictor of typical performance may be typical personality scores, maximal and faking scores seem to have some predictive utility as well.

*H2b: For all five traits, maximal personality scores will have moderate validity (i.e., lower than typical scores, but higher than faked scores) in predicting typical performance.* The second column of Table 7 also presents these results. To support this hypothesis, correlations between maximal personality scores and typical performance would show the second highest values. Overall, it is again difficult to tell if this hypothesis is supported since many of the correlations presented here are similar to one another. Table 7 demonstrates that the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance had results in the predicted pattern. For the traits of Achievement Striving and Dependability, faking personality scores seemed to be the second best predictors (in the absolute sense), following typical scores. This pattern of findings is interesting because the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance were the traits expected to be the most inconsistent, while Achievement Striving and Dependability were expected to be the most consistent. Thus, if typical personality scores are unavailable, then a maximal measure may be a more valid indicator of typical performance for inconsistent traits, while a faked personality measure may be a more valid for consistent traits. (The consistency of individual traits is discussed in more detail for Hypothesis 8.)

*H3a: Of the three types of personality, scores from the maximal personality condition will be most predictive of maximal performance for all five traits.* For the next two hypotheses, the prediction of maximal performance is of central concern. Specifically, these correlation results were assessed to see which type of personality scores (typical, maximal, or faking) was the best predictor of maximal performance (see the third column of Table 7). Altogether, the results are a bit varied. Primarily, it seems that the only trait showing some support for this hypothesis (i.e., that maximal personality had the highest absolute correlation with maximal performance) was the trait of Extroversion.

For the other four traits, there again seems to be a pattern of similar results for the consistent traits (i.e., Achievement Striving and Dependability) and a somewhat different pattern for the inconsistent traits (i.e., Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance). The first pattern found for the consistent traits was that typical personality scores seemed to be the best predictor of maximal performance. This trend makes some sense in that typical and maximal scores will be quite similar when traits (such as Achievement Striving and Dependability) are manifested consistently across situations. Second, the pattern found for the inconsistent traits is that maximal and typical personality scores predicted maximal performance at very similar levels. Therefore, for traits that may manifest themselves differently across situations, typical and maximal scores may provide equally valid predictions of one's highest performance level. Finally, it is important to note that faked personality scores were significantly related to maximal performance for all of the traits. While these patterns seem to exist based on the absolute levels of the correlations, it is again difficult to determine which personality scores were the best predictors of maximal performance, since each of the three response sets were significant predictors of this type of performance for all five of the traits.

*H3b: For all five traits, typical personality scores will have moderate validity (i.e., lower than maximal scores, but higher than faked scores) in predicting maximal performance.* Like Hypothesis 3a, this hypothesis only showed some support for the trait of Extroversion, in that typical personality scores showed a smaller correlation with maximal performance than did maximal scores. However, for this trait of Extroversion, faked personality scores did not seem to be significantly different predictors of maximal performance than were typical scores. For the other traits, as discussed above, typical, maximal, and faked personality scores all seem to be equally valid predictors of maximal performance. Therefore, typical personality scores seem to be a more important predictor of maximal performance than was originally postulated. Similarly, faked personality scores also seem to provide useful information in this type of prediction. Overall, it may be that when individuals assess what they “can do” on-the-job, their assessment involves how they typically and maximally see themselves, along with how they judge the behavior as socially desirable or not.

*H4: Of the three types of personality, scores from the faking condition will be most predictive of faked performance for all five traits.* The results of the correlations between the three personality scores and this criterion of faked performance are presented in the last column of Table 7. All in all, the only trait that completely supported this hypothesis (i.e., that faked personality scores would be most related to faked performance and neither of the other scores would be related) was the trait of Achievement Striving. For the other traits, the results seem to show again that all three types of personality were significant predictors of this type of performance. Thus, while it was only expected that faked personality scores would significantly predict this criterion, it seems that individuals’ typical and maximal personality scores also give useful information as to what behaviors employees see as desirable in their workplace.

## *Traitedness Analyses*

*Construct Validity of the Traitedness Measure.* Primarily, analyses were conducted with the traitedness construct to compare the scores resulting from the unique Traitedness Survey designed for this study to scores obtained from using the standard deviations of individuals' typical personality responses (i.e., the method for obtaining traitedness scores in other studies). These correlation analyses were done for each of the five traits. The results are summarized in Table 8. Overall, there were not significant correlations found between the two methods of estimating traitedness. The only significant correlation resulted for the trait of Dependability ( $r = -.29, p < .00$ )<sup>1</sup>. The results from the other four traits indicate that different constructs are being assessed by each of the measures. For instance, a major difference between the two measures is that the Traitedness Survey used in this study utilizes a self-report format in which participants rate their own level of behavior consistency, while the standard deviation method assesses the variance in examinees' personality responses. This latter method supposes to measure traitedness, but it can really only be said to measure the range of examinees' *responses*, not their actual range of possible behaviors across situations. Therefore, based on the acceptable reliability values found for the Traitedness Survey (reported earlier) and the fact that this survey more pointedly measures behavior consistency, I contend that this measure is the more appropriate of the two in answering the proposed research questions. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the subsequent traitedness analyses reported in this section are based on the scores gained from the self-report Traitedness Survey

*Relationships between traitedness and the predictor and criterion variables.* As hypothesized in this study, traitedness was predicted to be a moderator of the relationship

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<sup>1</sup> It makes sense that this relationship would be negative, since a high score on the Traitedness Survey (i.e., for individuals reporting very consistent behavior) is similar to having *low* variation in typical personality responses.

between personality and performance scores. However, to gain a more complete understanding of the relationship that traitedness had with these variables, correlation analyses were first conducted between traitedness (as measured with the self-report survey) and the predictor and performance variables. These correlation results are presented in Tables 9 and 10. Altogether, the traitedness factor was found to have significant positive relationships with just about every personality and performance score. In fact, out of the 36 correlations, only three were not significant. Thus, these results indicate that the more traited individuals reported having higher levels of the personality traits and of the job performance factors. This finding was an unexpected one, yet it may help to shed light on the role that traitedness plays within personality testing.

Furthermore, personality and performance scores were also correlated with the standard deviation values associated with individuals' honest personality scores (i.e., the more common measure of traitedness). Positive correlations were also found for all of these relationships, indicating that individuals who were more traited (i.e., had lower typical personality SD values) scored higher on both the personality and performance measures. Although these correlations were not as highly significant as those found with the self-report measure of traitedness used in this study, they do help to establish this positive relationship between traitedness and personality and performance scores as a legitimate effect.

*Moderation analyses.* For the next five hypotheses (H5a to H7), relationships were assessed for moderation using regression analyses; thus, the contribution of the cross-product between personality scores and traitedness scores (as measured by the self-report traitedness measure) was assessed. If this cross-product term was significant, then traitedness was indicated as a moderator of the personality-performance relationship. This analysis is one of the most

robust in detecting moderation; however, in this study, the sample size for each individual personality-traitedness-performance relationship was about 150 people. Because this sample size may not be quite large enough to detect significance, many of the regression analyses were nonsignificant. Thus, to examine the pattern of some of the relationships (i.e., relationships that reached significance or close to significance), regression lines were plotted to illustrate the relationships between personality and performance at high (i.e., one SD above the mean) and low (i.e., one SD below the mean) levels of traitedness. These regression lines were investigated to see if the personality-performance relationship changed depending on the level of traitedness. A result indicating 1) that the cross-product term is significant in the second step of a stepwise regression analysis and 2) that traited and untraited individuals have different regression lines would suggest that traitedness may act as a moderator, but a larger sample size is necessary to truly see the effects.

*H5a: Traitdness will moderate the relationship between typical personality scores and typical performance, such that the relationship will be stronger for traited individuals.* The results of the regression analyses for this hypothesis are summarized in Table 11. Overall, it was expected that typical personality scores would be more predictive of typical performance scores for traited individuals. This type of pattern was found only for the trait of Dependability, in which the moderated relationship was close to significance (i.e.,  $p < .06$ ). Figure 7a demonstrates the relationship between typical Dependability personality and performance at high and low levels of traitedness. The reverse pattern (i.e., the relationship seemed to be more significant for untraited individuals) was found for the traits of Achievement Striving and Extroversion. These relationships are plotted in Figures 7b and 7c. No patterns of moderation were found for the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance.

*H5b: Traitedness will moderate the relationship between faked personality scores and typical performance, such that the relationship will only hold for untraited individuals.* These regression results are presented in Table 12. Only the trait of Stress Tolerance resulted in a moderated relationship that was close to significant ( $p < .10$ ). This pattern of results indicate that the relationship was reversed from that of the expected one (i.e., the relationship was more significant for traited individuals). Figure 8 illustrates this pattern. No moderation effects were found for the other traits.

*H6a: Traitedness will moderate the relationship between typical personality scores and maximal performance, such that the relationship will only hold for traited individuals.* Similar to Hypothesis 5a, it was expected here that the relationship between personality and performance scores would only be significant for traited individuals. As shown in Table 13, Achievement Striving again resulted in significant findings in the reverse direction (i.e., the relationship was stronger for untraited individuals). Assertiveness was the only trait to find significant results in the intended direction. Figures 9a and 9b illustrate these two relationships. Traitedness was not found to be a moderator for the traits of Dependability, Extroversion, or Stress Tolerance.

*H6b: Traitedness will moderate the relationship between faked personality scores and maximal performance, such that the relationship will only hold for untraited individuals.* No support was found for traitedness as a moderator of this relationship (see Table 14). In fact, it seems that the personality-performance relationships were significant for both traited and untraited groups alike for all five traits.

*H7: Traitedness will moderate the relationship between faked personality scores and faked performance, such that the relationship will only hold for untraited individuals.* Little support was found for traitedness as a moderator of this relationship (see Table 15). Specifically,

traitedness showed patterns of moderation in the intended direction only for the trait of Dependability. As illustrated in Figure 10, the relationship between faked personality and faked performance scores was significantly higher for untraited individuals than for traited ones.

Traitedness was not found to be a moderator for the other traits.

#### *Trait-Level Analyses*

*H8a: There will be mean differences in traitedness across the traits, such that Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance will be the most untraited, Dependability and Achievement Striving will be the most traited, and Extroversion will be in the middle.* While this hypothesis was the most exploratory, it seemed to render some of the most supportive results. Specifically, significant differences were found among the mean levels of consistency associated with each trait (as measured by the self-report measure of traitedness). Table 16 presents these differences. First, the five mean values of traitedness indicate that Achievement Striving and Dependability had the highest mean traitedness scores (i.e., they were reported as the most consistent across situations), while Stress Tolerance, Extroversion, and Assertiveness had the lowest mean scores (i.e., they were the most inconsistent). Second, the paired samples t-tests offer evidence that all but two of the mean differences were significant. Specifically, the mean traitedness scores associated with Achievement Striving and Dependability may be considered as equally high (i.e., consistent) values, while the scores associated with Assertiveness and Extroversion may be considered as equally low (i.e., inconsistent) values. Otherwise, the traits were found to significantly differ from one another, with the following range of traitedness scores from low to high: Assertiveness and Extroversion (both equally low), Stress Tolerance, and Dependability and Achievement Striving (both equally high). Although the trait of Extroversion was not

expected to have such a low mean traitedness value, these results provide much support for Hypothesis 8a.

*H8b: The correlation between scores from the faking and maximal personality conditions will be strongest for the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance.* In addition, a similar pattern of results was found when examining the correlations between maximal and faking personality scores for the five traits. The hypothesized relationships were that the more inconsistent traits (i.e., Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance) would show the highest correlations between maximal and faking scores, while the more consistent traits (i.e., Achievement Striving and Dependability) would demonstrate the lowest, or insignificant, correlations between the personality scores. As discussed with the next three hypotheses, the results were highly supportive of this pattern (see Table 17).

In congruence with Hypothesis 8b, the trait of Assertiveness demonstrated the highest correlation ( $r = .43, p < .00$ ) between these personality scores. The trait of Stress Tolerance also showed a significant correlation ( $r = .29, p < .00$ ) between the scores, although this trait did not yield the second highest correlation here. Instead, the trait of Extroversion (discussed below for Hypothesis 8d) demonstrated the second strongest relationship between maximal and faking scores. Overall, though, this hypothesis was mostly supported with people reporting more similar maximal and faking responses for both the traits of Assertiveness and Stress Tolerance (i.e., the more inconsistent traits or the traits showing a broader range of possible behaviors).

*H8c: The correlation between scores from the faking and maximal personality conditions will be weakest for the traits of Dependability and Achievement-Striving.* This hypothesis showed some support, in that both the traits of Achievement Striving and Dependability (i.e., the more consistent traits) demonstrated lower correlations ( $r = .27, p < .05$  and  $r = .18, p > .05$ ,

respectively) between maximal and faking personality scores. In fact, the correlation between the personality scores for the trait of Dependability was not significant at the .05 level. These findings tend to support the notion that individuals may not use very similar response strategies in maximal and faking conditions when they are answering questions related to their Achievement Striving and Dependability behavior.

*H8d: The correlation between scores from the faking and maximal personality conditions will be in the moderate range for the trait of Extroversion (i.e., they will have a correlation in the middle of the other four correlations).* Similar to the findings for Hypothesis 8a, the results pertaining to the trait of Extroversion suggest that this trait may be more similar to the “inconsistent” traits than to a trait that could be either consistent or inconsistent. Here, the correlation between maximal and faking scores was the second highest for the trait of Extroversion ( $r = .34, p < .00$ ). Thus, it may be the case that individuals use similar maximal and faking strategies when answering Extroversion questions.

#### *Supplementary Analysis*

*Reported Personality Strategy.* Finally, a frequency analysis was conducted to examine which personality strategy (i.e., honest, maximal, faking, or other) participants reported using in conditions of high-stakes testing. Participants were asked to indicate the strategy they would be most likely to use for each of the five traits. The results of the frequency analysis can be seen in Table 18. Overall, these results demonstrate that most participants reported intentions to use either an honest or a maximal strategy when applying for a job. Few of the participants (about 12 percent or less) reported that they would use a faking strategy. Moreover, for the traits of Dependability and Stress Tolerance (i.e., arguably, the two job-related traits on which it may be most important to obtain high scores), most participants reported using an honest strategy. These

results suggest two things: 1) most participants see themselves as honest and as most likely reporting their honest behavior, and 2) examinees can see the differences among these three response strategies, even if they do not admit to using a faking strategy.

## CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

Altogether, this study found two sets of results: One set of results that seems to be conclusive and holds many interesting implications, and another set of results that is confusing and needs additional research. In this discussion section, I will first review the more supportive research findings, along with the implications that may be drawn from them, and then I will discuss the more unsettled findings, along with research designs that could be used to study these relationships in the future. Finally, I will conclude by outlining some of the limitations of this research design and by summarizing how this study benefits this line of personality research.

### *Significant Research Findings*

#### *Differences among Personality Strategies*

One of the most important findings from this study is that the three personality response strategies studied here (i.e., typical, maximal, and faking) differed from one another. One way that this difference may be detected is by examining the *reliability* coefficients associated with each of the three instruction sets. Mainly, the same personality survey (i.e., 60 items) was administered, with the only difference being the instructions given or the mindset in which examinees were asked to place themselves. This simple manipulation demonstrated differences among the internal consistency values found for the three surveys. Overall, it seemed that participants answered the items in the most consistent way when using the maximal or faking mindsets and they showed more varied (although still highly consistent) responses when using the typical mindset. The differences in reliability were even more dramatic on the Work Related Scenarios Survey. On this criterion measure, participants were asked to describe their behavior

pertaining to one situation in three ways: what they would most likely do, what they could possibly do, and what they think is most socially desirable. Similar to the personality survey, the item content did not change across the three sets of questions; instead, the only difference among the questions was the framing or instructions given. By far, the items found to be the most consistent were those from the maximal instruction set (total alpha = .87). The scale reliabilities decreased to moderate (total alpha = .74) and low (total alpha = .67) values for the faking and typical instructions, respectively. These reliability results support the previous research findings by Turner (1978) and Willerman et al. (1976), who also found higher reliability values for maximal instructions over those of typical instructions. They both argued that participants have an “easier” task in reporting their trait capabilities over their trait averages, and that, in turn, their maximal responses become more consistent across items. The findings of the current study provide further support for this effect.

In addition, another way that the three personality strategies were found to differ was in their *mean values*. Specifically, maximal and faking scores were found to be consistently higher than typical scores. For the most part, maximal and faking scores did not differ significantly from one another, but the pattern of results showed that faking scores were still the highest of the three scores for all five traits. Therefore, these results demonstrate that examinees may have three strategies to choose from when answering a personality inventory. By using a faking strategy, participants may attain the highest trait scores. With a maximal strategy, participants may still attain high scores, but they will not be as artificially high as with the faking strategy. With the final typical strategy, participants may choose to report their average trait behaviors, which will lead to the lowest trait scores of the three approaches. No matter which strategy a participant may choose, the important point here is that he or she does have three strategies to

potentially use when responding to personality items. This finding provides some initial support for the conceptual faking model advanced by Levin and Zickar (2002). Specifically, the differences found among these three personality strategies offer support for three stages in the model, with the typical strategy as *background social presentation behaviors* (Stage 1), maximal as *situationally heightened self-presentation* (Stage 2), and faking as *lying or expediency* (Stages 3 and 4). However, since clear mean differences in personality scores were not established in this study between maximal and faking strategies, more conceptual and empirical work may be needed to further define these concepts. It may be the case that no difference in personality scores would be expected when using either of these strategies: According to Levin and Zickar's model, they may both be expected to produce similarly high personality scores. Moreover, additional research should investigate the differences between the strategies of lying and expediency, as they were not differentiated in the current study.

The final way that the three personality strategies were found to differ was in their *correlations* with one another. Here, correlations were computed among the three strategies for each of the five traits. While the other two results discussed in this section showed similar findings with the maximal and faking strategies (i.e., similar reliability and mean score values), these correlation analyses demonstrated similar relationships between the typical and maximal strategies. The strongest correlations were consistently found between these two instruction sets, with values ranging between .51 and .74. Relationships between typical and faking strategies and maximal and faking strategies were both in the more moderate range. These results suggest that individuals tend to show similar rank order patterns of responding when using both typical and maximal strategies. While they may not answer with the exact same responses, people tend to answer with their maximal trait scores as higher than their typical scores. This effect most likely

occurs because both types of strategies ask the respondent to answer questions about their own behavior. The faking strategy, on the other hand, may not result in such strong correlations because it asks respondents to think about the more abstract concept of what behavior they should do, instead of what behavior they actually do or can perform. Overall, while there seem to be similar patterns involved with both the typical and maximal strategies, it is important to note that they do not show perfect correlations. Instead, the rank orders of these two types of responses are similar, but not identical, indicating that they should still be considered to be two separate strategies.

#### *Empirical Support for a Maximal Strategy*

The differences found among the three personality strategies are important because they may establish the maximal strategy as a unique personality response set. Again, past research has overwhelmingly focused on the difference between typical and faking strategies, without fully defining how people respond honestly or how they fake their responses. This study offers a strategy in which people may answer honestly, but still earn elevated personality scores.

Altogether, the maximal strategy was found to achieve both of those purposes in this study: Maximal responses were highly correlated with typical responses, yet the mean score values for the maximal strategy were significantly higher than that of the typical and were closer in range to the faking strategy. Therefore, the findings from this study suggest that the maximal strategy may not simply be a theoretical notion, but one that is supported by empirical results as well.

Specifically, these research results suggest that a maximal approach to personality testing (i.e., responding with one's trait capabilities) is an understandable, useful, and distinct personality strategy. First, examinees showed no problems understanding the instructions or benefits of using a maximal strategy. In fact, they saw this strategy as highly appropriate in

situations of high-stakes testing, and they reported intentions of using this strategy differently than they may use a typical or faking strategy. Therefore, while past research has demonstrated that examinees understand differences among typical and faking response sets, this research showed that these participants could comprehend how and when a maximal strategy may be used as well. Second, the results indicated that a maximal strategy is useful for the purpose of raising one's personality scores. In all cases, the use of a maximal strategy significantly increased personality scores above that of using a typical strategy, and the former scores were found to be more in the range of a faking strategy but without using any type of deception or artificial response patterns. Finally, the maximal strategy provided unique results as compared to those from the other two strategies. When examining the relationships that each of the strategies had with each other and with the other variables, it was found that the personality scores gained from this maximal strategy had a unique pattern of results that did not exactly mirror either of the scores gained from the other two strategies.

#### *Consistent vs. Inconsistent Traits*

Another hypothesis that was largely supported by this study was that the five traits investigated here differed on their levels of behavior consistency or inconsistency. More explicitly, for two of the traits (Achievement Striving and Dependability), people reported being more consistent across situations, such that a person who acts highly dependable (or achievement motivated) in one situation would be expected to act highly dependable in many other situations. In contrast, the other three traits (Assertiveness, Extroversion, and Stress Tolerance) were found to be much more inconsistent across situations. Individuals, therefore, may exhibit high levels of any of these traits in one situation, while acting quite the opposite in other situations. The differences in the traits' mean scores were mostly significant, such that these two clusters of

consistent vs. inconsistent traits emerged. This finding is interesting because it suggests that some trait behavior may be expected to be consistent or variable depending on the trait itself, not on individual differences across the people sampled. Mainly, psychological research generally assumes that consistency or inconsistency in behavior depends on how consistent the individuals themselves are; whereas, this study indicates that, regardless of the individuals sampled, some traits will show more consistent behavior than others.

Another piece of supporting evidence for these two clusters of traits was in the correlations between maximal and faking personality scores associated with the traits. It was hypothesized that, if some traits were more or less consistent, then there would be different uses of the personality strategies for the different traits. Specifically, it was expected that examinees may show similar patterns of responding for both maximal and faking strategies when the traits are more *inconsistent*. For inconsistent traits, there is a larger range of behaviors from which to choose, so that examinees may represent themselves in a variety of ways when responding to personality items. A possibility, therefore, may be that their faking strategy is to represent themselves as they are at their best or their highest level of the inconsistent trait (i.e., use a maximal strategy). However, this possibility does not exist for the *consistent* traits because the trait does not include the varying range of behaviors from which to choose. Because one's average behavior on a consistent trait may not necessarily be high, using a maximal strategy to fake responses will most likely not be advantageous. For this study, then, significant correlations were expected between maximal and faking strategies for the *inconsistent* traits and lower correlations were expected for the *consistent* traits. The correlation results (as reported earlier) tended to support this hypothesis.

More research is needed to fully understand the differences among the traits and how these differences may affect predictions based on personality trait scores. It may be the case that the more inconsistent traits, since they involve more variable behaviors, are not as easy to predict. Overall, though, the conclusion can be made based on this study's results that these traits should not be considered to work the same simply because they all measure job-related personality characteristics. More explicitly, Barrick and Mount (1991) found that certain general personality traits more appropriately apply to job settings than others, and this study may extend those findings by suggesting that certain job-related personality traits may be more appropriate for certain goals than others. Altogether, we may assume that there are significant trait differences among these traits similar to the individual differences already well-accepted in psychological research.

#### *Traitedness*

As for the consistency associated with *individuals'* behavior, this study found that traitedness was positively related to personality and performance scores. This result indicates that people who reported higher levels of personality traits and performance scores also exhibited greater levels of consistency in their behavior across situations. This pattern of relationships was found using both the explicit and implicit measures of traitedness, so it is unlikely that it is due to social desirability or a response bias. More explicitly, it seems unlikely that this finding was due to error because 1) participants were instructed on the Traitedness Survey that neither consistent nor inconsistent behavior was more desirable, and 2) similar positive correlations were found using the standard deviation method, in which traitedness scores were not based on self-reported responses. However, there is still the possibility that the more inconsistent people in this study were simply more honest. Specifically, the inconsistent individuals admitted to both exhibiting

inconstant behavior and to having low levels of personality traits and/or poor job performance. Therefore, the overwhelming finding from this study was that positive relationships exist between traitedness and personality and performance scores, but more research is needed to determine the basis of those relationships.

### *Unsettled Research Findings*

I will now turn to the results from this study that provided more ambiguous or undetermined conclusions. Based on the analyses done in this study, I cannot state whether these hypotheses were clearly supported or unsupported, so few conclusions may be based solely on these results. In this section, I will describe some of these unsettled results, limitations of this study in examining these relationships, and possible ways to study them in the future.

### *Predictions based on the Personality Strategies*

One of the main goals of this study was to determine which personality strategy (i.e., typical, maximal, and faking) best predicted each type of job performance (typical, maximal, and faked). The results provide some interesting findings, but are not as clear-cut as were hypothesized earlier in this paper. In discussing these results, I will first explain what the predictive validity findings were for each of the three strategies, and then I will suggest research ideas that may make results of future studies in this area more straightforward.

*Predicting Typical Performance.* Of the three prediction hypotheses, the results for predicting typical performance seemed to have the most support. Specifically, typical trait scores tended to have significantly high relationships with typical performance, as postulated in Hypothesis 2a. However, it was not expected that maximal and faking personality scores would have similar relationships with typical performance as the typical scores. For example, faking scores were not expected to be as predictive of typical performance as they were found to be in

this study (i.e., there were significant relationships between faking scores and typical performance for all of the traits except Extroversion). But it is not an unusual finding for faked scores to be significantly related to typical performance. In fact, whether or not faked scores predict typical job performance is of central debate in the faking literature. As discussed in the beginning of this paper, some researchers argue that faked personality scores are still predictive, while others argue that these scores are useless in predicting typical performance. This study found some support for both of those arguments. Most likely, additional factors need to be taken into consideration when examining this relationship. For example, Hastey, Heggstad, and Chen (2003) argue that the type of work (e.g., sales vs. defined tasks) may be a crucial factor in whether faked personality scores hurt or actually *enhance* personality test validity. Clearly, more research is needed to fully understand how typical job performance may best be predicted.

*Predicting Maximal Performance.* Hypotheses 3a and 3b postulated that maximal and typical personality scores would be the first and second best predictors of maximal performance, respectively. The results for these hypotheses seemed to show the least amount of differences in the predictive utility of the three personality scores. For all of the traits, maximal performance was significantly predicted by all three response sets. This finding may be due to the nature of the “maximal performance” construct domain. Specifically, maximal performance may clearly be related to one’s trait capabilities (maximal personality), while still being related to one’s honest personality, since it still is based on actual performable behaviors, and faked personality, since it also results in elevated scores. Therefore, while it makes sense theoretically that maximal personality scores would be the best predictors of maximal performance, these empirical results indicate that the domain of maximal performance is much broader than originally hypothesized.

More research is needed here to fully delineate what maximal behaviors are and how they are different from the two more extreme behaviors of typical and faking behaviors.

*Predicting Faked Performance.* Hypothesis 4 (i.e., that faked personality scores would best predict faked performance) was the most exploratory of this set of hypotheses. Through my research on faking and social desirability, I have not found any previous studies that tried to empirically measure faked performance, or behaviors that are highly appropriate but not necessarily performable. In this study, measuring this type of “abstract” behavior was important in completing the full matrix of personality and performance contexts. With its addition, there were three types of personality scores crossed with three types of performance scores. So, while it may not be a goal of an organization to measure faked performance, it was important in this study to see if any of the three personality scores were highly predictive of this type of performance, rather than the other two achievable types of performance.

The results indicated that the faked personality scores were significantly related to faked performance for all cases, as hypothesized. However, what was not expected were the large relationships that typical and maximal personality scores also demonstrated with faked performance. This finding seems to indicate that individuals with high personality scores (both typical and maximal) may tend to see some work behaviors as more desirable than individuals with low personality scores. For example, the results for the trait of Stress Tolerance indicated that all three of the personality scores were significantly related to faked performance, which may be that of always remaining calm and level-headed regardless of the problems or difficulties being faced. Therefore, people with high typical, maximal, and faked Stress Tolerance trait scores tended to see this type of performance as more socially desirable than people with low trait scores. So, while it may make sense for these relationships to exist, more research is again

needed to understand this performance domain and how it may be useful in the field of personality testing.

Overall, while these results indicate that it is difficult to make clear-cut predictions based on the three types of personality scores, they do also suggest that the use of any of the three strategies does not result in unusable or meaningless scores. In fact, in all cases, the job performance scores were found to be predicted significantly by one, two, or all three of the personality scores. Therefore, these personality scores clearly offer predictive utility, but more research would help to understand when and how the different scores may be utilized in making selection decisions.

In future studies, I would recommend designing a study to use only one or two of the traits to study these relationships in more depth. For example, the trait of Assertiveness could be studied using both a personality inventory (similar to this study) and a behavioral exercise or assessment center design for the criterion measure. More specifically, an indication of individuals' honest, maximal, and faked levels of Assertiveness could first be gained by using a self-report personality survey. Then, an assessment center exercise could be used to assess how individuals actually exhibit their typical and maximal levels of Assertiveness. This criterion measure may work for assessing faked performance if individuals feel that they could act out the most appropriate level of Assertiveness within the given situation. Otherwise, participants may be asked to write a paragraph describing what this type of faked performance may look like. All in all, this type of methodology would provide a more detailed examination of the typical, maximal, and faking personality-performance relationships at the individual trait level. This type of focused analysis may prevent some of the confusion found from using too many traits at one time or from using the broad construct of total personality scores.

### *Traitedness as a Moderator*

Another area of this study that seemed to result in more questions than answers pertained to the role of traitedness. Similar to the discussion in the last paragraph, the effect of traitedness in this study may have seemed muddled because too many traits were being investigated at the same time. Overall, the results indicated that traitedness did not have the same moderating role across the traits or even across the personality-performance relationships (i.e., typical personality and typical performance vs. typical personality and maximal performance). As such, there is not a clear-cut conclusion that can be reached about the effect of traitedness in this study.

While traitedness does seem to play an important role in the personality-performance relationship, it is not clear exactly what that role is. As reported earlier, traitedness scores were significantly correlated individually with personality and performance scores in almost every case. For example, individuals' level of traitedness on Dependability was significantly correlated with all three types of personality scores (correlations ranged from .28 to .55) and all three types of performance scores (ranged from .23 to .37). These relationships were positive, indicating that the more traited individuals reported higher personality and performance scores than the more untraited individuals. Beyond these relationships, there is little to be concluded about the construct of traitedness. In this study, it was not found to be a unique predictor of performance after considering the personality predictors. Traitedness was also not found to be a clear moderator of the personality and performance relationship. However, the results did show it to be a significant moderator in some cases, but it is unclear whether a larger sample size is needed to see traitedness as a moderator in all cases, if it truly only acts as a moderator for some traits, or if Type I error (i.e., finding significant results when there are truly no effects) was an issue because numerous relationships were investigated. Altogether, the construct of traitedness seems to be an

important factor in this mix of variables, but more research is clearly needed on the construct itself, how it should be measured, and what role it plays in personality testing.

In future studies, I would recommend extending the findings from this study to more fully investigate how the traitedness construct should be measured and how it fits into the field of personality testing. First, the limited number of previous studies in this area have all measured traitedness as the standard deviation of examinees' typical responses to personality items. This study was the first to ask participants to report their level of consistency in trait behavior across situations. By definition, traitedness seems to be better measured as the variance in reported *behaviors* (i.e., the self-report method), rather than the variance in *item responses* (i.e., the standard deviation method). Altogether, though, these two methods were not found to be highly related, so more research is necessary to make final conclusions about which is the better measurement.

Second, more research is clearly needed about the role that traitedness may play in personality testing. For example, future studies could explore the traitedness factor as a systematic predictor, as a moderator, as a mediator, or even as a criterion variable. There is a lot of room for investigation into the nature of this personality factor, and the research may indicate (as it did in this preliminary study) that traitedness may take on a variety of roles based on the traits being measured or the type of personality strategy being studied. It may also be the case that traitedness is not as unique a concept as proposed in this study. Specifically, there seems to be quite a bit of redundancy between individuals' personality trait scores and their traitedness scores. For example, an individual scoring very high or very low on a trait necessarily must be traited. In these cases, knowing one's traitedness score may not add much information above and beyond his or her standing on the personality trait. However, a person scoring in the average

range of a trait may have either 1) responded with average scores to all of the trait items (i.e., be traited) or 2) responded with some high, average, and low scores to the different items (i.e., be untraited). In these cases, the addition of traitedness scores may be beneficial. Therefore, future research should focus on defining traitedness as distinct from personality scores and on finding its unique contribution to personality research.

### *Limitations of this Study*

Because this study was the first combined empirical analysis of all of these personality, performance, and traitedness variables, a laboratory study seemed appropriate as an initial investigation. As such, this study offered the types of standardization and control that were needed for making initial conclusions. However, there are limitations associated with this type of basic research, as opposed to doing applied research or a field study.

*The criterion measure.* First, a good addition to future studies would be to add more items to each of the traits assessed by the criterion measure. As it is now, this measure contains four items per trait per performance type (e.g., 4 items measuring Assertiveness as typical performance). The reliabilities associated with this measure were some of the lowest in the study. Although the reliability values in and of themselves do not indicate a problem, especially since the scales were meant to assess diverse sets of behaviors, it would still be beneficial to simply add more items, which may help to uncover the relationships that performance scores have with personality and traitedness scores.

In addition, one of the best modifications that could be made to the criterion measure may be to assess performance with behavioral exercises. This change would mean that only one or two traits would most likely be measurable in one study, but it would provide more detailed information about that trait(s). As mentioned earlier, a research design of this sort would ask

participants to act out their average level and their highest level on a given trait. While this methodology may provide more pertinent information than a self-report measure, there are a few concerns with its usage. Some of these concerns include issues with 1) how to score performance data, 2) not being able to measure faked performance, 3) the ability or inability for participants to act out their behaviors, and 4) making sure that the exercises encourage realistic reactions from the participants. If these concerns could be adequately addressed in a subsequent study, I believe that gathering performance data would be the best progression to the current study.

A final limitation of this criterion measure was that it consisted of a self-report survey of intended work behaviors. If organization or field data had been available, then a proper addition to this criterion measure would have been supervisor or coworker ratings of job performance. While data from other sources would have been useful in this study, I believe that a major part of the criterion measure must be made up of self-reported behaviors. Mainly, because of the nature of this study (i.e., to study differences among typical, maximal, and faked job performance), the person most in-tune with differences between his or her own average and maximal behavior is the employee. Others may not be able to accurately report behavior of which another person is capable. Therefore, gathering data from other sources would be a good extension of this study, but it seems that self-reports will be necessary in future studies as well.

*The personality measure administration.* A second issue with the design of this study was that participants were asked to answer the personality measure with two sets of instructions. The concern is that the second administration of the survey may have yielded responses that were not as representative of the personality strategy simply because participants had already responded once to the items. The presentation of the instruction sets was all counter-balanced to try and minimize these effects. However, respondents who were administered the maximal survey

second showed significantly higher scores than those respondents administered the survey first. Thus, individuals may see themselves as being more capable after thinking about their average behavior or the behaviors that are most acceptable. This finding that maximal scores may be more easily malleable based on priming effects is an interesting one that should be investigated in future studies. It did not seem to affect the current study, however, as the results and conclusions based on maximal scores were the same whether each group was analyzed individually or together.

Additionally, most participants showed substantial differences between their responses to the two personality surveys that they were administered. However, there were some responses from participants that were identical or nearly identical across their two conditions. It is unclear whether individuals simply copied their responses from one administration to the next or if they truly had similar responses to both sets of items. Regardless, the analyses were conducted again after removing these questionable individuals (i.e., surveys that differed only by 3 or less total points, out of 60), and all of the statistical results were found to be unchanged. Overall, if these two administrations had any effect on the results of this study, it was most likely to understate the differences among these three personality strategies. Greater differences may be found if participants were only given one set of instructions with which to answer the personality survey.

Future studies of these personality strategies could make use of important variations of the current administration technique. Overall, it would be interesting to see the effect of using different types of instructions. Specifically, a future field study could administer the surveys, with the different instructions, to applicants and incumbents in one organization. As such, the instruction sets would move from being “imagined” or induced (as they were in the current study) to being real and meaningful to the respondents. Again, I expect that this modification

would result in greater differences among scores from the response sets, as scores from the current study were most likely understated.

*College student population.* A final limitation of this study may have been that college students (with an average age of about 19 years old) were sampled rather than older working adults. It may be the case that college students could not relate to the job scenarios in the criterion measure or could not adequately represent their trait behavior on the personality measure. However, I again believe that if these issues were real, then they would have the effect of understating the results. Specifically, using a population with more work experience may demonstrate more differences among the personality and performance scores simply because the individuals may be more in-tune with their work behavior. Overall, though, the college sample that was used did seem to be an adequate group of employees: They reported having an average of three years of previous work experience, only 14 percent of them reported not being currently employed, and everyone reported having some previous work experience (i.e., no-one reported never having a job).

### *Summary*

This paper offered both a theoretical discussion and empirical evaluation for the revived concept of a maximal personality response strategy. Of most importance, this response set was found to be a viable one in the field of personality testing: Participants reported intentions to use this strategy in situations of high-stakes testing, and they demonstrated that they know how to use it to increase their personality scores. In some situations and for some traits, this maximal strategy seems to be a reasonable approach to elevating individuals' personality scores above that of their typical scores, but not quite to a level that may indicate faking or artificial responses. Specifically, the present study found that responses from a maximal strategy were similar to

those from a faking approach when examinees were answering questions about their “inconsistent” trait behaviors. For these traits (i.e., Assertiveness, Extroversion, and Stress Tolerance), it may be easier for examinees to choose among the large range of possible behaviors to represent themselves in a positive way. Although these responses look highly similar to those from a faking strategy (i.e., responses at the high end of the scale), examinees are actually representing behavior that they can achieve and are, therefore, providing useful information. More research is needed to gain a more thorough understanding of when and how these maximal scores should be used within the field of personality testing, but this study offers the important initial finding that a response strategy exists that has distinct patterns from that of a typical or faking strategy and that examinees can use it to raise their personality scores without lying.

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Appendix A  
**KeyPoint Job Fit Questionnaire**

***Instructions:*** Please read each statement below and indicate how much you agree with it by marking your answer sheet in accordance with the following scale:

A	B	C	D	E
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

- 1 My personal life is much more important than my work life.
- 2 When I'm given a set of steps to do to complete a task at work, I follow them exactly.
- 3 I am most productive when I work alone.
- 4 I would prefer a simple job where I wouldn't have to work very hard.
- 5 I run a few minutes late.
- 6 I get anxious easily at work.
- 7 I could not do a job that required me to work alone.
- 8 I speak my mind at work.
- 9 I do not interact with my coworkers outside of the job.
- 10 If a coworker angers me, I let him or her know it.
- 11 I will push to have my idea accepted in a meeting.
- 12 I would be satisfied if my job performance was rated "average."
- 13 I am able to easily change my priorities as needed at work.
- 14 I do not challenge the ideas of my coworkers, even if their ideas seem flawed.
- 15 I do not share my real opinions with my coworkers.
- 16 I am shy with people at work that I don't know very well.
- 17 I treat many of my coworkers as friends.
- 18 I do not follow workplace rules and regulations that are too cumbersome.
- 19 I do not attend work-related social functions.
- 20 I react badly when I get negative feedback at work.
- 21 I would not enjoy a job that involved talking with people all day.
- 22 I finish the work that I start.
- 23 I can adapt easily to most work situations in which I find myself.
- 24 I seek out extra training so I can do better at work.
- 25 I accidentally schedule two things for one time.
- 26 I do the work that is required of me and nothing more.

- 27 I would be unhappy at a job where I could not interact with others.
- 28 I can be more outgoing than most people at work.
- 29 I do not get "stressed-out" about things at work.
- 30 I can have a tendency to work too hard.
- 31 I get energized by working with others.
- 32 I can deal with just about anything that comes my way at work.
- 33 I lose focus if there is a lot of pressure on me at work.
- 34 At work, I hesitate to challenge other people's ideas.
- 35 I would rather be bored at work than be too busy.
- 36 I would be unhappy on a job where I had to come in at the same time every day.
- 37 I do not criticize the work done by my coworkers.
- 38 I get upset when people criticize my work.
- 39 I enjoy company parties.
- 40 My boss would consider me to be reliable.
- 41 My main reason for working is to earn a paycheck.
- 42 I emerge as the leader of groups that I work in.
- 43 I arrive at work early.
- 44 I do not get anxious during stressful situations at work.
- 45 I am persuasive with others.
- 46 Conflicts with coworkers or customers do not upset me.
- 47 I could not ask my boss for a raise.
- 48 I am comfortable pushing back timelines when I am unable to complete a project.
- 49 I get upset when I am late for appointments.
- 50 I do everything I can to not miss going to work.
- 51 I am successful when I am challenged at work.
- 52 I do better work more when I participate in a group.
- 53 I give coworkers my honest opinions, even if it may offend them.
- 54 I set challenging work goals for myself.
- 55 I strive to move ahead in my career.
- 56 I cannot give negative feedback to a fellow employee.
- 57 Few things upset me at work.
- 58 I come into meetings after they have started.
- 59 I set high expectations for myself at work.
- 60 I do not adjust when big changes are made at my work.

## Appendix B

### Instructions for Each Condition of the Personality Measurement

#### 1) Honest Instructions

Please read each of the next 60 statements and respond as honestly as you can. The results will be completely anonymous and confidential and will be used for research purposes only. It is very important that you respond to this survey by describing yourself as you typically are. As an example, you may be able to think of situations in which you were really assertive and other situations in which you were rather passive. Try to think of yourself on your typical day or across a long period of time when you answer these questions.

#### 2) Faking Instructions

For this survey, suppose that you have been offered your dream job—you will get paid a really high starting salary, have many attractive benefits, and will be doing the type of work you really love doing. The only problem is that the recruiter told you that you have to “pass” this personality questionnaire before you can be officially hired. He said that this company wants to make sure that you are the type of employee they are looking for, and you will only be hired if you score in the high range for the traits measured on this inventory.

#### 3) Maximal Personality Instructions

For this personality survey, picture yourself as you are at your best (i.e., how you would look during a job interview or the first week on a new job). Please use this mindset as you answer each of the 60 personality statements on this survey. Remember not to think of yourself as perfect, but to think of yourself as what you can possibly do. For example, you may normally run a few minutes late for work, but on your first day at a new job, you may be capable of being on-time or even early. **Think of yourself at that highest level at which you are capable.** Overall, answer how you would look at your own highest possible levels of assertiveness, dependability, achievement, extraversion, and stress tolerance.

(The traits here are made transparent, similar to assessment centers used for selection. With relation to assessment centers, Kleinmann (1993) found that high skill transparency—telling individuals the skills or behaviors on which they will be assessed—promotes more maximal performance than typical performance.)

Appendix C  
Revised Job Fit Personality Items

The following items were revised for use in the current study (words in {brackets} were removed from the personality survey and words in *italics* were added):

- 5 I {always} seem to run a few minutes late.
- 7 I {would hate} *could not do* a job that required me to work alone most of the time
- 9 I {rarely} *do not* interact with my coworkers outside of the job.
- 14 {I would feel uncomfortable disagreeing with my coworkers.} *I do not challenge the ideas of my coworkers, even if their ideas seem flawed.*
- 15 *I do not share my real opinions with my coworkers.* {My coworkers do not know my real opinions.}
- 17 I {consider} *treat* many of my coworkers {to be} *as* friends.
- 18 *I do not follow* Workplace rules and regulations *that* are {often} too cumbersome.
- 19 I {dislike} *do not attend* work-related social functions.
- 20 I {feel defensive} *react badly* when I receive negative feedback at work.
- 22 {The people I work with can count on me to finish what I start.} *I finish the work I start.*
- 24 I {regularly} seek out extra training so I can do better at work.
- 25 I {often find that I have} accidentally schedule two things for one time.
- 27 I would {not like} *be unhappy on* a job that provided few opportunities to interact with others.
- 28 I {am} *can be* more outgoing than most people at work.
- 29 I {rarely} *do not* get "stressed-out" about things at work.
- 30 {Others have told me I work too hard.} *I can have a tendency to work too hard.*
- 31 *I get energized by working with others.* {Working with others energizes me.}
- 36 I would {dislike} *be unhappy on* a job where I had to come in at the same time every day.
- 37 {It is difficult for me to} *I do not* criticize the work of others.
- 38 I {take it personally} *get upset* when people criticize my work
- 42 I {usually} emerge as the leader of groups that I work in.
- 43 I {like to} arrive at work early.
- 44 I {m not bothered} *do not get upset* by stressful situations at work.
- 47 {It would be difficult for me to} *I could not* ask my boss for a raise.
- 50 I {hate to} *do everything I can to not* miss work.
- 51 I {like to be} *am successful when I am* challenged at work.
- 52 I {seem to enjoy my work more} *do better work* when I participate in a group.
- 55 {Moving ahead in my career is very important to me.} *I strive to move ahead in my career.*
- 56 I {would have trouble giving} *cannot give* negative feedback to a fellow employee.
- 58 I {regularly} come into meetings after they have started.
- 60 I {become uncomfortable} *do not adjust* when big changes are made at my work.

## Appendix D Traitedness Survey

Within personality psychology, it has been found that some people act very much the same in every situation they are in, while other people act very differently depending on the situation. For example, one person may be outgoing in every situation he is in, while another person may be outgoing only when she is in familiar situations (i.e., with family and friends) and not in new situations (e.g., around strangers or new classmates). For this survey, please think about how consistently you behave in different situations. *It is not better or worse to be very consistent or inconsistent in your behavior*; it just shows whether you act similarly or differently across many situations.

Below, you will be given a description of various behaviors. Please think about whether you exhibit this behavior *consistently* or *inconsistently* across every situation you are in.

1. Speak my mind when I disagree with others.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always speak up or I almost never speak up whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
  
2. Work really hard to try to be successful.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always work hard or I almost never work hard at activities, including work, hobbies, and relationships.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some activities where I would definitely do this, but others where I definitely would not.*)
  
3. Arrive places on time.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I am almost always early, on time, or late, no matter where I go.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are sometimes when I'm really early, but other times when I'm really late.*)
  
4. Be outgoing and talkative.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I am almost always outgoing or I am almost never outgoing whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)

5. Handle a stressful situation in a calm and cool manner.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always get stressed out or I almost never get stressed out.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some stressful situations I handle calmly and others where I become overly emotional or stressed out.*)
  
6. Express my opinions, even when I know people may argue with me.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always express myself or I almost never express myself whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
  
7. Be motivated to achieve and try to be successful.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I am almost always motivated or I am almost never motivated in activities, including work, hobbies, and relationships.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some activities where I am definitely like this, but others where I am definitely not.*)
  
8. Follow all rules, policies, and regulations that are given to me.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always follow rules or I almost never follow rules.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some times when I follow rules exactly, but other times when I disobey rules.*)
  
9. Be the center of attention in a group of people.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I am almost always the center of attention or I am almost never the center of attention whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
  
10. Adapt quickly and easily to changes or unexpected circumstances.
  - a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always adapt or have a hard time adapting.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*Sometimes I adapt easily and other times I do not.*)

11. Take charge as the leader when working in a group.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always take charge or I almost never take charge whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
12. Strive to have good performance when working on a task.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always strive for this or I almost never strive for this in activities, including work, hobbies, and relationships.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some activities where I would definitely do this, but others where I definitely would not.*)
13. Turn in assignments on time.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I am almost always early, on time, or late, no matter what assignment I'm working on.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are sometimes when I turn them in really early, but other times when I turn them in really late.*)
14. Be friendly and social with other people.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I am almost always social or I am almost never social whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
15. Keep my composure during a conflict or argument.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always keep my composure or I almost always lose my composure in arguments.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some arguments where I keep my composure and others where I lose it.*)

16. Approach other people directly (in-person) when I have a question or problem with something they did.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always approach them or I almost never approach them whether I am with family, my boss, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
17. Set challenging goals for myself when working on a task.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always set goals or I almost never set goals in activities, such as work, hobbies, and relationships.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some activities where I would definitely do this, but others where I definitely would not.*)
18. Follow through with commitments or promises I make.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always follow through or I almost never follow through.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are sometimes when I definitely follow through, but other times when I definitely do not.*)
19. Attend parties or celebrations and stay for awhile.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always do this or I almost never do this, regardless of who the party is for, such as family, work, friends, or strangers.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*There are some situations where I would definitely do this, but other situations where I definitely would not.*)
20. Stay calm and focused even when there is a lot of pressure on me to do well.
- a) **Very consistent** (*I almost always stay calm or I almost always get stressed out.*)
  - b) **Somewhat consistent**
  - c) **Not sure**
  - d) **Somewhat inconsistent**
  - e) **Very inconsistent** (*When there is pressure on me, sometimes I remain very focused and other times I get very stressed out.*)



8. If you really had to, how capable are you of turning assignments in on time?  
*a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could*
9. How appropriate do you think it is to turn assignments in on time?  
*a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate*

**Scenario 2:**

One morning at work, your boss announces that she would like everyone to attend an informal meeting in her office. At this meeting, your boss presents a new employee who will be working in your department. Including this new employee, there are 15 people working in your department. At the end of the meeting, your boss announces that everyone is free to meet the new employee or to get back to work.

10. On an average day, how likely would you be to introduce yourself right away to the new employee?  
*a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely*  
**(I would definitely go back to work)** **(I would definitely introduce myself)**
11. If it was really important to you, how capable are you of introducing yourself to strangers?  
*a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could*
12. How appropriate do you think it is for coworkers to introduce themselves to a new employee?  
*a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate*
13. On an average day, how likely would you be to explain some of the company's rules and procedures to the new employee (within the first few days of his/her employment)?  
*a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely*  
**(I would definitely not explain them)** **(I would definitely explain them)**
14. If you felt that these rules were very important, how possible would it be for you to explain company rules and policies?  
*a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could*
15. How appropriate do you think it is for coworkers to explain company rules and policies to a new employee?  
*a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate*

**Scenario 3:**

Suppose it is the end-of-the-year holiday season (i.e., December 15 to January 5), with many festivities scheduled at work and at home. As you are preparing for the season, you realize that one night is double-scheduled, so that your annual holiday party at work is scheduled for the same time as a party that your close friends are having. Unfortunately, there is no way to attend both parties for some amount of time because they are located at places that are an hour apart from one another. Therefore, if you choose to go to a party, you must pick one or the other.

16. How likely would you be to attend either the work or the friends' party and stay for several hours?  
*a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely*  
**(I would definitely not attend either one)** **(I would definitely attend one of them)**

17. If you really wanted to, how capable are you of attending parties (at work or with friends) and staying most of the time?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*
18. How appropriate do you think it is for people to attend parties when someone they know (either coworkers or friends) is having one?  
 a) *very inappropriate* b) *inappropriate* c) *not sure* d) *appropriate* e) *very appropriate*
19. How likely would you be to attend (only) the party at work, so you could try to make a good impression on your boss?  
 a) *very unlikely* b) *unlikely* c) *not sure* d) *likely* e) *very likely*  
**(I would definitely go to my friends' party)** **(I would definitely go to the work party)**
20. If you truly felt that the work party was more appealing, how capable are you of attending the work party, while declining an invitation from friends?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*
21. How appropriate do you think it is for people to attend a work party instead of a party given by friends?  
 a) *very inappropriate* b) *inappropriate* c) *not sure* d) *appropriate* e) *very appropriate*

**Scenario 4.**

You just found out that a big problem has been found with a very important product from your company. Your supervisor reports that a team has been assigned to look into this problem, and that you are one of the eight team members placed on this assignment. Your team has been asked to forget any other job duties this week, so that the team can offer a list of possible solutions by the end of the week. After the first meeting that the team has, you realize that you have the most experience on this job (you have worked at the company the longest). However, no roles were assigned within the team, so the first meeting was confusing, with many people talking over one another and not getting anything settled. Because of the high pressure placed on the team, some team members were visibly stressed out and even voiced concerns that this assignment could not be completed in the timeframe given.

22. How likely would you be to remain calm during a highly emotional and stressful meeting such as this?  
 a) *very unlikely* b) *unlikely* c) *not sure* d) *likely* e) *very likely*  
**(I would get really stressed out)** **(I would remain really calm)**
23. If you were really trying to remain calm, how capable would you be of maintaining your composure during a chaotic meeting like this?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*
24. How appropriate do you think it is for employees to remain calm during important meetings?  
 a) *very inappropriate* b) *inappropriate* c) *not sure* d) *appropriate* e) *very appropriate*
25. How likely would you be to take on a leadership role in the team (i.e., by taking charge at the next meetings or setting steps that need to be followed by the team)?  
 a) *very unlikely* b) *unlikely* c) *not sure* d) *likely* e) *very likely*  
**(I would definitely not become a leader)** **(I would definitely become a leader)**

26. If you really felt the need to lead a team such as this one, how capable would you be of becoming the leader on your own?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*
27. How acceptable do you think it is for someone to take charge as a leader in a role-less group like the one described above?  
 a) *very unacceptable* b) *unacceptable* c) *not sure* d) *acceptable* e) *very acceptable*
28. How likely would you be to work really hard (i.e., put in more hours than usual, cancel other plans with friends or family) on this assignment?  
 a) *very unlikely* b) *unlikely* c) *not sure* d) *likely* e) *very likely*  
**(I would definitely not work harder than usual)** **(I would definitely work harder than usual)**
29. If you felt that this assignment really called for it, how capable would you be of working extra hours?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*
30. How appropriate do you think it is for someone to work extra hours when a big assignment is on the line?  
 a) *very inappropriate* b) *inappropriate* c) *not sure* d) *appropriate* e) *very appropriate*

**Scenario 5.**

Suppose you work at a local video store. It is your job to check out video rentals to customers and answer any of their questions or concerns. One afternoon, you are confronted by an angry customer who is upset about late fees for a movie on her account. She claims that the three-day late fees are false, and she demands that they be deleted. It is your video store's policy that late fees are only to be cancelled for customers one time (as a warning), but this customer has already used her one warning cancellation. When you explain this to the customer, she becomes even more upset and shouts profanities at you.

31. On an average day, how likely would you be to ask this customer to calm down before you continue to talk with her?  
 a) *very unlikely* b) *unlikely* c) *not sure* d) *likely* e) *very likely*  
**(I would definitely not ask this)** **(I would definitely ask this)**
32. If you feel really strongly about it, how capable would you be of standing up to an upset person like this?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*
33. How appropriate do you think it is for an employee to stand up to a customer in this way?  
 a) *very inappropriate* b) *inappropriate* c) *not sure* d) *appropriate* e) *very appropriate*
34. On an average day, how likely would you be to get upset during a verbally aggressive conversation like this?  
 a) *very unlikely* b) *unlikely* c) *not sure* d) *likely* e) *very likely*  
**(I would remain very calm)** **(I would be quite shaken up and upset)**
35. If you really wanted to, how capable would you be of maintaining your composure during that conversation?  
 a) *definitely could not* b) *probably could not* c) *not sure* d) *probably could* e) *definitely could*

36. How appropriate do you think it is for employees to remain calm when speaking with customers?  
 a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate
37. If you thought the woman made a good point, how likely would you be to compromise the store's rule (just this once) and cancel half of her current late fees?  
 a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely  
**(I would definitely follow the rules)** **(I would definitely help her out)**
38. If you really wanted to, how capable are you of following all company rules?  
 a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could
39. How appropriate do you think it is for employees to follow every company rule?  
 a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate

**Scenario 6.**

Suppose that you have just started dating someone new, and this person does not work with you. So far, you are very excited about the potential in this new relationship. One morning before you have left for work, your new boy/girlfriend calls you to say that he/she has planned something exciting for you that day and would like for you to call in sick to work. You have not yet taken any sick days from work and your boss is away on a business trip today, so you think you could get away with not going in.

40. On a day like this, how likely would you be to call in sick to work?  
 a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely  
**(I would definitely go into work)** **(I would definitely go out with him/her)**
41. If you felt really strongly about not calling in sick unless you really are sick, how capable would you be of going into work every day, without ever falsely calling in sick?  
 a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could
42. How appropriate do you think it is for employees to come to work every day that they can and never call in sick falsely?  
 a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate
43. How likely would you be to delay seeing your new boy/girlfriend until later, just so that you could get work done first?  
 a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely  
**(I would definitely not wait to see him/her)** **(I would definitely wait until later)**
44. If you really wanted to, how capable are you of delaying personal gratification so that you can meet work goals?  
 a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could
45. How acceptable do you think it is when employees delay their desires to work on job tasks?  
 a) very unacceptable b) unacceptable c) not sure d) acceptable e) very acceptable

**Scenario 7.**

When you came into work today, you (along with many of your coworkers) were shocked to find out that ten people in your department had been laid off due to financial problems that the company was having.



54. How appropriate do you think it is when employees confront others after seeing disruptive behavior?  
*a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate*
55. How likely would you be to get stressed out by the bickering and inter-group conflict within the team?  
*a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely*  
**(It would not bother me at all) (It would be very troublesome to me)**
56. If you really wanted to, how capable would you be of remaining calm even in the midst of office bickering and conflict?  
*a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could*
57. How appropriate do you think it is when employees maintain their composure even when faced with conflict?  
*a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate*
- \*Suppose now that your boss gives you the choice of finishing up this project on your own or continuing to work as a five-person team.**
58. How likely would you be to continue working in the team?  
*a) very unlikely b) unlikely c) not sure d) likely e) very likely*  
**(I would definitely work by myself) (I would definitely work with others)**
59. If you really wanted to, how capable would you be of working as a member of the team?  
*a) definitely could not b) probably could not c) not sure d) probably could e) definitely could*
60. How appropriate do you think it is for employees to participate on a team?  
*a) very inappropriate b) inappropriate c) not sure d) appropriate e) very appropriate*

## Appendix F

### Personality Strategy

**Instructions:** You have now answered the previous questions about your job performance while thinking about what you normally do, what you can do, and what is most desirable. Consider now that you were asked all of these questions while applying for a job that you really want. This is a job opportunity that meets all of your specifications (e.g., starting pay level, desired benefits), and you are really motivated to get the job. In that situation, if you were given the previous questions again, which of the following strategies would you most likely use to answer the questions about your performance levels?

***For the trait of Assertiveness (e.g., being a leader, expressing your views openly):***

- a) I would respond with what I normally do.
- b) I would respond with what I'm capable of doing (even if I don't perform that way every day).
- c) I would respond with what is most desirable (regardless of whether I can or do ever perform that way).
- d) I would use some other strategy.

***For the trait of Achievement Striving (e.g., working overtime, sacrificing time with friends):***

- a) I would respond with what I normally do.
- b) I would respond with what I'm capable of doing (even if I don't perform that way every day).
- c) I would respond with what is most desirable (regardless of whether I can or do ever perform that way).
- d) I would use some other strategy.

***For the trait of Dependability (e.g., doing all work on-time, following all rules):***

- a) I would respond with what I normally do.
- b) I would respond with what I'm capable of doing (even if I don't perform that way every day).
- c) I would respond with what is most desirable (regardless of whether I can or do ever perform that way).
- d) I would use some other strategy.

***For the trait of Extroversion (e.g., working in teams, knowing all coworkers):***

- a) I would respond with what I normally do.
- b) I would respond with what I'm capable of doing (even if I don't perform that way every day).
- c) I would respond with what is most desirable (regardless of whether I can or do ever perform that way).
- d) I would use some other strategy.

***For the trait of Stress Tolerance (e.g., not getting stressed-out, adjusting to changes):***

- a) I would respond with what I normally do.
- b) I would respond with what I'm capable of doing (even if I don't perform that way every day).
- c) I would respond with what is most desirable (regardless of whether I can or do ever perform that way).
- d) I would use some other strategy.

Table 1.

*Descriptive Statistics for Order Effects of Personality Scores*

<b>Pairs of Response Sets</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Low 95% CI</b>	<b>High 95% CI</b>
<b>Typical Instructions</b>						
Ach Striv First	24.00	57.00	41.26	6.03	40.01	42.52
Ach Striv Second	28.00	54.00	42.07	6.21	40.63	43.51
Assert First	24.00	51.00	39.43	6.19	38.14	40.72
Assert Second	19.00	55.00	40.84	5.83	39.48	42.19
Depend First	28.00	55.00	44.10	5.44	42.96	45.24
Depend Second	30.00	60.00	43.77	6.16	42.34	45.20
Extrov First	25.00	53.00	39.82	5.53	38.66	40.98
Extrov Second	25.00	55.00	40.86	6.09	39.45	42.28
Stress Tol First	27.00	54.00	40.45	5.64	39.28	41.62
Stress Tol Second	28.00	56.00	40.55	5.30	39.33	41.78
<b>Maximal Instructions</b>						
Ach Striv First	29.00	59.00	43.95	6.64	42.40	45.49
Ach Striv Second	12.00	59.00	46.68	7.63	45.19	48.17
Assert First	24.00	51.00	39.14	7.12	37.48	40.80
Assert Second	18.00	58.00	41.59	7.13	40.20	42.99
Depend First	35.00	59.00	46.22	5.27	44.99	47.45
Depend Second	13.00	60.00	49.32	7.05	47.94	50.70
Extrov First	27.00	54.00	40.75	5.80	39.40	42.11
Extrov Second	23.00	55.00	42.42	6.17	41.21	43.62
Stress Tol First	30.00	60.00	42.26	5.92	40.88	43.64
Stress Tol Second	12.00	60.00	45.55	7.85	44.02	47.09
<b>Faking Instructions</b>						
Ach Striv First	18.00	60.00	45.94	7.55	44.41	47.47
Ach Striv Second	20.00	60.00	49.23	7.22	47.64	50.83
Assert First	17.00	60.00	41.91	5.53	40.79	43.03
Assert Second	15.00	56.00	41.06	6.49	39.63	42.50
Depend First	27.00	60.00	48.18	7.28	46.70	49.65
Depend Second	25.00	60.00	49.90	6.61	48.44	51.36
Extrov First	31.00	54.00	42.40	4.93	41.40	43.39
Extrov Second	25.00	56.00	43.35	5.36	42.16	44.53
Stress Tol First	29.00	60.00	44.21	7.55	42.68	45.74
Stress Tol Second	20.00	60.00	45.65	7.28	44.05	47.26

Table 2.

*Reliability Coefficients for the Predictor, Criterion, and Moderator Measures*

Measure	Instructions		
	Typical	Maximal	Faking
Job Fit Personality Inventory			
Achievement Striving	.79	.84	.88
Assertiveness	.81	.84	.76
Dependability	.74	.79	.85
Extroversion	.71	.74	.73
Stress Tolerance	.75	.85	.87
Candidness	.76	.84	.87
Total Scale	.87	.92	.93
Work-Related Scenarios Survey			
Achievement Striving	.57	.74	.49
Assertiveness	.50	.59	.31
Dependability	.38	.58	.47
Extroversion	.39	.63	.35
Stress Tolerance	.59	.70	.63
Total Scale	.67	.87	.74

Measure	Alpha
Traitedness Survey	
Achievement Striving	.75
Assertiveness	.69
Dependability	.54
Extroversion	.60
Stress Tolerance	.64
Total Scale	.78

Table 3.

*Hypothesis 1a: Correlations among Typical, Maximal, and Faking Personality Scores*

	Achievement Striving			Assertiveness			Dependability			Extroversion			Stress Tolerance		
	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak
<b>Ach Striv</b>															
Typ	1														
Max	.62**	1													
Fak	.33**	.28**	1												
<b>Assert</b>															
Typ	.17*	.14	-.06	1											
Max	.19	.44**	-.07	.63**	1										
Fak	.04	.08	.25**	.47**	.43**	1									
<b>Depend</b>															
Typ	.41**	.26*	.36**	-.02	-.06	.05	1								
Max	.20	.68**	.11	-.01	.28**	.11	.63**	1							
Fak	.34**	-.03	.73**	-.04	-.10	.30**	.61**	.19	1						
<b>Extrov</b>															
Typ	.43**	.32**	.22*	.27**	.06	.21	.22**	.07	.25*	1					
Max	.42**	.54**	.06	.27*	.45**	.05	.09	.37**	-.05	.74**	1				
Fak	.11	.20	.58**	.09	-.05	.35**	.25*	.23*	.52**	.49**	.34**	1			
<b>Stress Tol</b>															
Typ	.31**	.20	.11	.31**	.22	.22*	.30**	.16	.24*	.22**	.22*	.24*	1		
Max	.13	.59**	.09	.19	.40**	.18	.29**	.57**	-.15	.09	.38**	.18	.51**	1	
Fak	.06	.12	.68**	.13	-.09	.36**	.24*	.02	.65**	.14	.04	.59**	.56**	.29**	1

Note: N = 82 (typical & maximal), N = 81 (typical & faking), N = 94 (maximal & faking).

Table 4.

*Descriptive Statistics for Individual Percentile Rank Differences Between Response Sets*

<b>Pairs of Response Sets</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Low 95% CI</b>	<b>High 95% CI</b>
<b>Achievement Striving</b>						
Typ-Max	0.00	59.00	16.61	14.11	13.51	19.71
Typ-Fak	1.00	90.00	26.52	20.91	21.93	31.12
Max-Fak	0.00	93.00	26.23	24.42	21.23	31.24
<b>Assertiveness</b>						
Typ-Max	1.00	64.00	17.87	14.52	14.67	21.06
Typ-Fak	1.00	97.00	16.86	18.39	12.80	20.93
Max-Fak	0.00	84.00	21.00	19.37	17.03	24.97
<b>Dependability</b>						
Typ-Max	0.00	61.00	16.39	14.28	13.25	19.53
Typ-Fak	0.00	80.00	21.37	17.54	17.49	25.25
Max-Fak	1.00	95.00	25.72	23.92	20.82	30.62
<b>Extroversion</b>						
Typ-Max	0.00	71.00	16.05	16.19	12.49	19.61
Typ-Fak	0.00	94.00	20.99	19.17	16.75	25.23
Max-Fak	0.00	87.00	22.90	20.34	18.74	27.07
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>						
Typ-Max	0.00	85.00	17.78	17.59	13.92	21.65
Typ-Fak	0.00	76.00	21.13	17.58	17.27	25.00
Max-Fak	0.00	92.00	25.04	21.82	20.57	29.51
<b>Candidness</b>						
Typ-Max	1.00	60.00	18.37	14.68	15.12	21.62
Typ-Fak	1.00	76.00	25.79	19.26	21.56	30.02
Max-Fak	0.00	84.00	25.41	23.01	20.65	30.18

Table 5.

*Hypothesis 1b: Descriptive Statistics and Paired Samples t-Tests for Typical, Maximal, and Faking Personality Scores*

<b>Personality Condition</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>
<b>Achievement Striving</b>					
Typical	165	24.00	57.00	41.62	6.10
Maximal	176	12.00	59.00	45.55	7.34
Faking	177	18.00	60.00	47.45	7.57
<b>Assertiveness</b>					
Typical	164	19.00	55.00	40.05	6.05
Maximal	176	18.00	58.00	40.57	7.21
Faking	177	15.00	60.00	41.52	5.98
<b>Dependability</b>					
Typical	164	28.00	60.00	43.95	5.76
Maximal	176	13.00	60.00	48.03	6.54
Faking	177	25.00	60.00	48.97	7.01
<b>Extroversion</b>					
Typical	164	25.00	55.00	40.29	5.80
Maximal	176	23.00	55.00	41.73	6.06
Faking	177	25.00	56.00	42.83	5.14
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>					
Typical	165	27.00	56.00	40.50	5.47
Maximal	176	12.00	60.00	44.19	7.28
Faking	177	20.00	60.00	44.87	7.44
<b>Candidness</b>					
Typical	165	34.00	71.00	56.49	6.15
Maximal	176	34.00	75.00	60.63	7.13
Faking	177	27.00	75.00	61.58	7.48

*Note:* Mean values for the traits are out of a possible 60 points. Mean values for the Candidness Index are out of a possible 75 points.

Table 5 (continued)

Pairs of Conditions	Effect Size	t-value	Sig.
Achievement Striving			
Typ-Max	-.64	-5.60	.00
Typ-Fak	-.96	-7.14	.00
Max-Fak	-.26	-1.92	.06
Assertiveness			
Typ-Max	-.09	-.97	.33
Typ-Fak	-.24	-1.74	.09
Max-Fak	-.13	-.78	.44
Dependability			
Typ-Max	-.71	-6.44	.00
Typ-Fak	-.87	-7.35	.00
Max-Fak	-.14	-.99	.33
Extroversion			
Typ-Max	-.25	-2.76	.01
Typ-Fak	-.44	-4.26	.00
Max-Fak	-.18	-2.03	.04
Stress Tolerance			
Typ-Max	-.67	-4.19	.00
Typ-Fak	-.80	-5.76	.00
Max-Fak	-.09	-1.41	.16
Candidness			
Typ-Max	-.67	-7.17	.00
Typ-Fak	-.83	-5.13	.00
Max-Fak	-.13	-1.62	.11

Table 6.

*Correlations among Typical, Maximal, and Faked Criterion Scores*

	Mean	SD	Achievement Striving			Assertiveness			Dependability			Extroversion			Stress Tolerance		
			Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak	Typ	Max	Fak
<b>Ach Striv</b>																	
Typ	13.70	2.40	1														
Max	16.50	2.17	<b>.43**</b>	1													
Fak	15.10	1.87	<b>.51**</b>	<b>.40**</b>	1												
<b>Assert</b>																	
Typ	15.09	2.78	<b>.21**</b>	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.14*</b>	1											
Max	16.41	2.78	<b>.10</b>	<b>.42**</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.67**</b>	1										
Fak	13.83	2.28	<b>.07</b>	<b>.22**</b>	<b>.18**</b>	<b>.36**</b>	<b>.41**</b>	1									
<b>Depend</b>																	
Typ	13.09	2.30	<b>.36**</b>	<b>.13*</b>	<b>.16*</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.04</b>	1								
Max	16.99	2.24	<b>.25**</b>	<b>.51**</b>	<b>.32**</b>	<b>.22**</b>	<b>.42**</b>	<b>.21**</b>	<b>.31**</b>	1							
Fak	16.51	2.19	<b>.39**</b>	<b>.26**</b>	<b>.38**</b>	<b>.17**</b>	<b>.14**</b>	<b>.21**</b>	<b>.39**</b>	<b>.50**</b>	1						
<b>Extrov</b>																	
Typ	15.22	2.19	<b>.19**</b>	<b>.16*</b>	<b>.18**</b>	<b>.31**</b>	<b>.25**</b>	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.16**</b>	<b>.18**</b>	1					
Max	16.99	2.22	<b>.16*</b>	<b>.44**</b>	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.36**</b>	<b>.56**</b>	<b>.28**</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.58**</b>	<b>.29**</b>	<b>.48**</b>	1				
Fak	16.52	1.82	<b>.12</b>	<b>.26**</b>	<b>.19**</b>	<b>.19**</b>	<b>.27**</b>	<b>.22**</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.29**</b>	<b>.30**</b>	<b>.37**</b>	<b>.36**</b>	1			
<b>Stress Tol</b>																	
Typ	13.34	2.81	<b>.06</b>	<b>.19**</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.25**</b>	<b>.31**</b>	<b>.49**</b>	<b>.14*</b>	<b>.24**</b>	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.17**</b>	<b>.24**</b>	<b>.08</b>	1		
Max	16.58	2.25	<b>.11</b>	<b>.50**</b>	<b>.22**</b>	<b>.24**</b>	<b>.50**</b>	<b>.33**</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.47**</b>	<b>.18**</b>	<b>.17**</b>	<b>.47**</b>	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.54**</b>	1	
Fak	17.57	1.90	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.32**</b>	<b>.29**</b>	<b>.17**</b>	<b>.26**</b>	<b>.25**</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.44**</b>	<b>.44**</b>	<b>.23**</b>	<b>.38**</b>	<b>.34**</b>	<b>.30**</b>	<b>.41**</b>	1

Table 7.

*Predicting Typical, Maximal, and Faked Job Performance*

<b>Personality Scores</b>	<b>Typical Job Performance (H2a and H2b)</b>	<b>Maximal Job Performance (H3a and H3b)</b>	<b>Faked Job Performance (H4)</b>
<b>Achievement Striving</b>			
Typical	.37**	.35**	.09
Maximal	.18*	.26**	.09
Faking	.25**	.32**	.23**
<b>Assertiveness</b>			
Typical	.51**	.50**	.18*
Maximal	.49**	.48**	.36**
Faking	.33**	.34**	.17*
<b>Dependability</b>			
Typical	.34**	.43**	.42**
Maximal	.14	.36**	.20**
Faking	.31**	.42**	.36**
<b>Extroversion</b>			
Typical	.31**	.25**	.18*
Maximal	.39**	.35**	.25**
Faking	.14	.24**	.28**
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>			
Typical	.47**	.34**	.26**
Maximal	.46**	.33**	.23**
Faking	.34**	.35**	.28**

Table 8.

*Correlations between Scores from the Traitedness Survey and from the Standard Deviation Method*

<b>Traitedness Survey</b>	<b>Standard Deviation Method</b>					
	Ach Striving	Assertiveness	Dependability	Extroversion	Stress Tolerance	Total Scores
Ach Striving	<b>.06</b>	-.03	-.05	.03	.05	-.01
Assertiveness	.03	<b>-.08</b>	.15	.02	-.12	-.12
Dependability	-.09	-.02	<b>-.29**</b>	-.02	.04	-.04
Extroversion	-.08	-.20*	.10	<b>-.04</b>	-.24*	.02
Stress Tolerance	.04	-.04	.01	.06	<b>-.11</b>	-.13
Total Scores	.05	-.08	-.04	-.17*	-.04	<b>-.10</b>

Notes: \*\* is significant at the .01 level; \* is significant at the .05 level. The Standard Deviation Method estimated

traitedness scores by calculating the standard deviation of examinees' personality scores in the honest condition.

Table 9.

*Correlations between Traitedness and Personality Scores*

Personality Scores	Traitedness Scores				Stress Tolerance	Total Traitedness
	Ach Striving	Assertiveness	Dependability	Extroversion		
Typical Scores						
Ach Striving	<b>.41**</b>	-.03	.21**	.04	.03	.19*
Assertiveness	.15	<b>.56**</b>	.05	.28**	.19*	.43**
Dependability	.35**	-.10	<b>.55**</b>	.10	.04	.27**
Extroversion	.09	.04	.08	<b>.41**</b>	-.08	.17*
Stress Tol	.22**	.15*	.16*	.27**	<b>.41**</b>	.39**
Total Typical	.38**	.20*	.32**	.34**	.18*	<b>.45**</b>
Maximal Scores						
Ach Striving	<b>.32**</b>	-.02	.12	.00	.00	.12
Assertiveness	.29**	<b>.43**</b>	.01	.29**	.14	.39**
Dependability	.23**	-.13	<b>.28**</b>	-.01	-.02	.09
Extroversion	.22**	.10	.05	<b>.34**</b>	.04	.25**
Stress Tol	.19*	.08	.10	.09	<b>.27**</b>	.23**
Total Maximal	.33**	.13	.15	.18*	.12	<b>.29**</b>
Faking Scores						
Ach Striving	<b>.20**</b>	.01	.18*	-.08	.02	.07
Assertiveness	.07	<b>.39**</b>	.01	.23**	.21**	.31**
Dependability	.14	.00	<b>.31**</b>	-.07	-.08	.07
Extroversion	.11	.08	.08	<b>.10</b>	.10	.15*
Stress Tol	.02	.09	.10	.02	<b>.17*</b>	.13
Total Faking	.14	.13	.19*	.03	.09	<b>.18*</b>

Table 10.  
*Correlations between Traitedness and Performance Scores*

Performance Scores	Traitedness Scores					Total Traitedness
	Ach Striving	Assertiveness	Dependability	Extroversion	Stress Tolerance	
<b>Typical Scores</b>						
Ach Striving	<b>.20**</b>	.00	.10	.12	.00	.13*
Assertiveness	.21**	<b>.47**</b>	.00	.33**	.15*	.39**
Dependability	.25**	.07	<b>.23**</b>	.04	.03	.18*
Extroversion	.09	.22**	.00	<b>.30**</b>	.17*	.27**
Stress Tol	.09	.18*	.05	.18*	<b>.44**</b>	.31**
Total Typical	.29**	.33**	.14*	.33**	.28**	<b>.45**</b>
<b>Maximal Scores</b>						
Ach Striving	<b>.21**</b>	.02	.15*	.12	.08	.18*
Assertiveness	.24**	<b>.36**</b>	.04	.29**	.20**	.38**
Dependability	.32**	.10	<b>.35**</b>	.13*	.18*	.33**
Extroversion	.28**	.17*	.14*	<b>.26**</b>	.20**	.34**
Stress Tol	.06	.16*	.11	.13*	<b>.37**</b>	.27**
Total Maximal	.31**	.23**	.22**	.25**	.26**	<b>.40**</b>
<b>Faking Scores</b>						
Ach Striving	<b>.04</b>	.04	.06	.11	.01	.08
Assertiveness	.11	<b>.17**</b>	.05	.11	.18**	.20**
Dependability	.24**	.02	<b>.37**</b>	.12	.06	.24**
Extroversion	.18**	.10	.19**	<b>.15*</b>	.07	.22**
Stress Tol	.13*	.00	.18**	.07	<b>.11</b>	.14*
Total Faking	.24**	.10	.29**	.18**	.10	<b>.28**</b>

Table 11.

*Hypothesis 5a: Traitedness as a Moderator of Typical Personality and Typical Performance*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	$\beta$
<b>Achievement Striving</b>						
Personality	.14	.03	.36**	.57	.16	1.47**
Traitedness	.01	.06	.01	1.08	.40	1.34**
Pers x Traited				-.03	.01	-2.05**
R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.17	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.04	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		12.53**			7.34**	
<b>Assertiveness</b>						
Personality	.18	.04	.39**	.09	.12	.19
Traitedness	.16	.06	.22**	-.12	.36	-.17
Pers x Traited				.01	.01	.53
R <sup>2</sup>		.29			.30	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.29			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		33.46**			.66	
<b>Dependability</b>						
Personality	.14	.04	.35**	-.20	.19	-.48
Traitedness	-.03	.07	-.03	-.85	.45	-1.03 <sup>†</sup>
Pers x Traited				.02	.01	1.61 <sup>†</sup>
R <sup>2</sup>		.11			.13	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.11			.02	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		10.23**			3.47 <sup>†</sup>	
<b>Extroversion</b>						
Personality	.08	.03	.21*	.31	.12	.76*
Traitedness	.17	.06	.24**	.78	.33	1.12*
Pers x Traited				-.02	.01	-1.22 <sup>†</sup>
R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.16	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.02	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		13.07**			3.60 <sup>†</sup>	
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>						
Personality	.18	.04	.36**	.12	.14	.23
Traitedness	.23	.06	.27**	.05	.37	.06
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	.29
R <sup>2</sup>		.28			.28	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.28			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		31.30**			.24	

Note: \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ .

Table 12.

*Hypothesis 5b: Traitedness as a Moderator of Faked Personality and Typical Performance*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	$\beta$
<b>Achievement Striving</b>						
Personality	.06	.02	.20**	.14	.09	.45
Traitedness	.18	.06	.24**	.43	.29	.56
Pers x Traited				-.01	.01	-.45
R <sup>2</sup>		.11			.12	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.11			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		11.27**			.79	
<b>Assertiveness</b>						
Personality	.08	.03	.16*	.00	.12	.01
Traitedness	.30	.05	.42**	.09	.32	.13
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	.37
R <sup>2</sup>		.25			.25	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.25			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		29.48**			.41	
<b>Dependability</b>						
Personality	.09	.03	.25**	.11	.13	.32
Traitedness	.16	.07	.18*	.23	.40	.26
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	-.12
R <sup>2</sup>		.12			.12	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.12			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		12.19**			.03	
<b>Extroversion</b>						
Personality	.05	.03	.11	.07	.13	.18
Traitedness	.17	.04	.27**	.25	.38	.41
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	-.16
R <sup>2</sup>		.09			.09	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.09			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		8.68**			.05	
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>						
Personality	.10	.02	.27**	-.07	.10	-.18
Traitedness	.32	.06	.38**	-.21	.33	-.25
Pers x Traited				.01	.01	.85 <sup>†</sup>
R <sup>2</sup>		.26			.27	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.26			.01	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		30.27**			2.69 <sup>†</sup>	

Note: \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ .

Table 13.

*Hypothesis 6a: Traitedness as a Moderator of Typical Personality and Maximal Performance*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	$\beta$
<b>Achievement Striving</b>						
Personality	.10	.03	.29**	.38	.15	1.06*
Traitedness	.12	.06	.15 <sup>†</sup>	.80	.37	1.07*
Pers x Traited				-.02	.01	-1.41 <sup>†</sup>
R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.16	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.02	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		13.27**			3.42 <sup>†</sup>	
<b>Assertiveness</b>						
Personality	.20	.04	.44**	-.01	.12	-.02
Traitedness	.07	.06	.09	-.60	.37	-.82
Pers x Traited				.02	.01	1.24 <sup>†</sup>
R <sup>2</sup>		.25			.27	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.25			.02	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		26.66**			3.45 <sup>†</sup>	
<b>Dependability</b>						
Personality	.11	.03	.30**	.18	.16	.48
Traitedness	.19	.06	.25**	.36	.40	.47
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	-.36
R <sup>2</sup>		.23			.23	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.23			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		23.99**			.19	
<b>Extroversion</b>						
Personality	.06	.03	.16*	.16	.12	.42
Traitedness	.14	.06	.21*	.42	.33	.61
Pers x Traited				-.01	.01	-.56
R <sup>2</sup>		.10			.10	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.10			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		8.76**			.72	
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>						
Personality	.10	.03	.25**	.10	.11	.26
Traitedness	.14	.05	.22**	.16	.30	.25
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	-.04
R <sup>2</sup>		.15			.15	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.15			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		14.64**			.00	

Note: \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ . <sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ .

Table 14.

*Hypothesis 6b: Traitredness as a Moderator of Faked Personality and Maximal Performance*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	$\beta$
<b>Achievement Striving</b>						
Personality	.08	.02	.29**	.02	.08	.07
Traitedness	.11	.05	.17*	-.08	.25	-.11
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	.39
R <sup>2</sup>		.13			.13	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.13			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		12.69**			.59	
<b>Assertiveness</b>						
Personality	.11	.04	.23**	.18	.12	.39
Traitedness	.19	.05	.27**	.40	.34	.55
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	-.37
R <sup>2</sup>		.18			.18	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.18			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		18.88**			.36	
<b>Dependability</b>						
Personality	.11	.02	.35**	.01	.11	.02
Traitedness	.18	.06	.22**	-.12	.34	-.15
Pers x Traited				.01	.01	.57
R <sup>2</sup>		.22			.22	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.22			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		24.32**			.83	
<b>Extroversion</b>						
Personality	.09	.03	.22**	.20	.13	.49
Traitedness	.14	.04	.23**	.48	.38	.78
Pers x Traited				-.01	.01	-.64
R <sup>2</sup>		.11			.11	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.11			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		10.74**			.80	
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>						
Personality	.09	.02	.29**	.05	.09	.18
Traitedness	.22	.05	.33**	.11	.27	.16
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	.22
R <sup>2</sup>		.23			.23	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.23			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		25.36**			.17	

Note: \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ .

Table 15.

*Hypothesis 7: Traitedness as a Moderator of Faked Personality and Faked Performance*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE B	B	B	SE B	$\beta$
<b>Achievement Striving</b>						
Personality	.05	.02	.22**	.14	.07	.54
Traitedness	.03	.04	.05	.28	.23	.48
Pers x Traited				-.01	.00	-.60
R <sup>2</sup>		.05			.06	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.05			.01	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		4.85**			1.28	
<b>Assertiveness</b>						
Personality	.05	.03	.12	-.04	.11	-.11
Traitedness	.07	.05	.12	-.17	.29	-.29
Pers x Traited				.01	.01	.54
R <sup>2</sup>		.04			.04	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.04			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		3.59*			.67	
<b>Dependability</b>						
Personality	.09	.02	.28**	.34	.12	1.03**
Traitedness	.20	.06	.24**	.94	.36	1.09*
Pers x Traited				-.02	.01	-1.31*
R <sup>2</sup>		.18			.20	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.18			.02	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		18.88**			4.25*	
<b>Extroversion</b>						
Personality	.09	.03	.26**	.05	.11	.16
Traitedness	.05	.04	.10	-.06	.33	-.11
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	.25
R <sup>2</sup>		.09			.09	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.09			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		8.21**			.12	
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>						
Personality	.07	.02	.27**	.06	.08	.26
Traitedness	.03	.04	.06	.02	.25	.04
Pers x Traited				.00	.01	.02
R <sup>2</sup>		.08			.08	
Change in R <sup>2</sup>		.08			.00	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>		7.72**			.00	

Note: \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ .

Table 16.

*Hypothesis 8a: Descriptive Statistics and Paired Samples t-Tests for Traitedness Scores by Trait*

<b>Traitedness Scores</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>
Achievement Striving	6.00	20.00	16.44	3.14
Assertiveness	4.00	20.00	13.67	3.85
Dependability	7.00	20.00	16.41	2.76
Extroversion	5.00	20.00	14.02	3.45
Stress Tolerance	4.00	20.00	14.79	3.27

*Note:*  $N = 260$ ; Lower Traitedness scores indicate more inconsistency (untraitedness); Higher scores indicate more consistency (traitedness).

<b>Pair</b>	<b>Effect Size</b>	<b>t-value</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
Ach Striving—Assertiveness	.88	-9.81	.00
Ach Striving—Dependability	.01	.12	.91
Ach Striving—Extroversion	.77	9.50	.00
Ach Striving—Stress Tolerance	.53	6.72	.00
Assertiveness—Dependability	-.71	-9.59	.00
Assertiveness—Extroversion	-.09	-1.47	.14
Assertiveness—Stress Tolerance	-.29	-4.28	.00
Dependability—Extroversion	.87	9.22	.00
Dependability—Stress Tolerance	.59	6.64	.00
Extroversion—Stress Tolerance	-.22	-2.99	.00

Table 17.

*Hypotheses 8b to 8d: Correlations between Maximal and Faking Personality Scores by Trait*

<b>Maximal Scores</b>	<b>Faking Scores</b>				
	Ach Striving	Assertiveness	Dependability	Extroversion	Stress Tolerance
Ach Striving	<b>.27*</b>	.07	-.03	.20	.12
Assertiveness	-.07	<b>.43**</b>	-.10	-.05	-.09
Dependability	.11	.11	<b>.18</b>	.23*	.02
Extroversion	.06	.05	-.05	<b>.34**</b>	.04
Stress Tolerance	.09	.18	-.15	.18	<b>.29**</b>

*Note: \*\*p < .01. \*p < .05.*

Table 18.  
*Frequency Analysis of Reported Personality Strategies by Trait*

<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Achievement Striving</b>		
Honest	107	41.0
Maximal	110	42.1
Faking	33	12.6
Other	6	2.3
<b>Assertiveness</b>		
Honest	109	41.8
Maximal	126	48.3
Faking	19	7.3
Other	3	1.1
<b>Dependability</b>		
Honest	152	58.2
Maximal	69	26.4
Faking	31	11.9
Other	5	1.9
<b>Extroversion</b>		
Honest	128	49.0
Maximal	96	36.8
Faking	25	9.6
Other	8	3.1
<b>Stress Tolerance</b>		
Honest	143	54.8
Maximal	78	29.9
Faking	26	10.0
Other	4	1.5

*Note: N = 257.*

## Figure Captions

*Figure 1.* Prediction of typical performance.

*Figure 2.* Prediction of maximal performance.

*Figure 3.* Prediction of faked performance.

*Figure 4.* Moderation of typical performance.

*Figure 5.* Moderation of maximal performance.

*Figure 6.* Moderation of faked performance.


*Figures 7a, 7b, & 7c.* Traitiedness as a moderator between typical personality and typical performance variables.

*Figure 8.* Traitiedness as a moderator between faked personality and typical performance variables.

*Figures 9a & 9b.* Traitiedness as a moderator between typical personality and maximal performance variables.


*Figure 10.* Traitiedness as a moderator between faked personality and faked performance variables.

Figure 1.



*Note:* Dashed line indicates the hypothesized smaller relationship.

Figure 2.



*Note:* Dashed line indicates the hypothesized smaller relationship.

Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.




Figure 6.




Figure 7a.




Figure 7b.





Figure 7c.



**Figure 8.**




Figure 9a.




Figure 9b.




Figure 10.

