



Towards Synthesis of Application-Specific Forward Error Correction (FEC) Codes

Jedidiah McClurg
Colorado State University
USA

Ronaldo Canizales*
Colorado State University
USA

Lauren Zoe Baker*
Colorado School of Mines
USA

Dilochan Karki*
Colorado State University
USA

ABSTRACT

Forward error correction (FEC) is a key component of modern high-bandwidth networks. Typically implemented at the physical layer, FEC attaches error-correcting codes to blocks of transmitted data, allowing some corrupted blocks to be repaired without retransmission. We outline a synthesis-based approach for automatic exploration of the FEC-code design space, focusing on Hamming codes. We formally verify the correctness of a Hamming (128, 120) code used for FEC in the recent 802.3df Ethernet standard, and provide preliminary evidence that our prototype synthesizer can leverage user-provided formal properties to generate FEC codes that are highly robust, efficiently implementable, and tuned to support specific data formats such as IEEE floating points.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Networks** → **Error detection and error correction; Programmable networks.**

KEYWORDS

forward error correction, program synthesis

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*Equal contribution



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1 INTRODUCTION

Block codes such as Hamming [13], Reed-Solomon [33], low-density parity check (LDPC) [10], etc. have been used for error detection and correction in communication and data storage since the advent of digital computing. Recently, these types of block codes are making a strong resurgence in the form of *forward error correction (FEC)*, which has become a key component of modern networks as speeds increase in optical and cellular links. For example, a (128, 120) Hamming code (120-bit data plus 8-bit check) has been extensively analyzed [3, 29, 31] and adopted alongside KP4 (a Reed-Solomon code) in the recent 802.3df standard (400- and 800-Gb/s Ethernet). A huge amount of manual design went into constructing this Hamming FEC code, including low-level analysis related to hardware implementation [4, 40], but detailed arguments were also made in favor of an alternative Reed-Solomon FEC code [39]. The questions that motivated this paper were twofold: (1) *How can we provide formal guarantees about the “right” FEC code?* (2) *How can we help to automate the FEC design process?*




Figure 1: Avg. magnitude of num. error vs. bit position

A key observation is that the “right” code is heavily dependent on the type of data being transmitted. Consider Figure 1, which shows the (normalized) average magnitude of numeric error across all possible numeric 32-bit integers and floating points when a bit at each index is flipped. This suggests that a floating-point-specific FEC code may be able to better balance between robustness and computation/transmission overhead by focusing primarily on the upper 8 bits,

especially since many distributed applications have some degree of tolerance to low-magnitude numeric error, e.g., certain scientific computing simulations [19], distributed machine learning (ML) training [27], etc. Conceivably, we could use one FEC code for integers and another for floating points, tuned to their per-bit characteristics, and existing work could allow us to dynamically exchange codes [18].

In this paper, we outline a prototype system which is the first to use counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS) to automatically explore the FEC design space, focusing specifically on Hamming codes. Our tool supports user-specifiable properties, allowing application-specific design of FECs, and can function as both a verifier and synthesizer. For example, we can efficiently verify that the 802.3df (128,120) Hamming code has minimum distance 3. We show that our tool can automatically extend the standard Hamming (7,4) code to much higher robustness, while minimizing the necessary additional check bits. We synthesize a standard Hamming code with minimum distance 3 that is usable for 32-bit data, and synthesize an alternative floating-point-specific code with increased overall error rate, but drastically decreased average magnitude of error, as well as significantly fewer check bits. Finally, we show how our tool can *optimize* codes by reducing the number of used bits, and demonstrate the encode/check performance improvement and compressibility advantages of this optimization.

2 BACKGROUND

Many codes have been proposed for FEC (see [37] for an overview of FEC and survey of specific codes). In this paper, we focus on Hamming codes, but the techniques developed here could be readily applied to other types of block codes.

2.1 Hamming Codes

The following error detection and correction method was first described by Hamming [13]. Although the coding scheme can be applied in arbitrary finite fields, the 2-element finite field GF(2) is most commonly used, due to the prevalence of binary data. An (n, k) Hamming code encodes each k -bit data word \vec{d} into an n -bit codeword \vec{w} . This computation is performed via matrix multiplication $\vec{w} = \vec{d}G$. The $k \times n$ generator matrix G is of the form $G = (I_k | P)$, where I_k is the $k \times k$ identity matrix, and P is a $k \times (n-k)$ coefficient matrix that determines the $(n-k)$ check bits within the codeword. In this paper, we will denote a generator matrix as G_c^k , where k is the data length, and $c = (n-k)$ is the number of check bits. To determine whether a codeword \vec{w} has been corrupted, we perform matrix multiplication $\vec{b} = (H \vec{w}^T)^T$, where $H = (-P^T | I_{(n-k)})$ is a $(n-k) \times n$ check matrix. In the finite field GF(2), $-P^T = P^T$, i.e., simply the transpose of the coefficient matrix P . If $\vec{b} = \vec{0}$, the codeword is *valid* (no

$$(0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1) \left(\begin{array}{cccc|cccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & \end{array} \right) = (0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 | 1 \ 0 \ 0)$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{cccc|cccc} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & \end{array} \right) \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 2: Hamming encode ($\vec{d}G = \vec{w}$) and check ($H \vec{w}^T = \vec{b}^T$) example calculations

error detected). If \vec{b}^T equals a column j of H , this indicates a single error at position j of the codeword, allowing error correction. Multi-bit errors can be detected but not corrected.

Fig. 2 shows how Hamming (7, 4) encoding works. Here, 4-bit data word \vec{d} is multiplied by generator G_3^4 to form 7-bit codeword \vec{w} . Note that in GF(2), *addition* behaves as xor, and *multiplication* behaves as and, so to produce the first bit of the codeword, we bitwise-and data 0011 with the first generator column 1000 to get 0000, then xor across these bits to get $((0 \oplus 0) \oplus 0) \oplus 0 = 0$ (this xor operation produces 1 when an *odd* number of bits are set). To check codeword \vec{w} , we multiply $H \vec{w}^T$ to get 3-bit check bits \vec{b}^T .

2.2 Hamming Code Robustness

An *undetectable error* occurs when bit-errors have altered a valid codeword into another valid codeword. The *minimum distance* $md(G)$ of a generator G is the smallest number of bit-errors needed to transform any valid codeword into another valid codeword, i.e., the smallest number of bit errors needed to produce an undetectable error. For example, the Figure 2 generator G_3^4 has minimum distance 3. The probability P_u of an undetected error is given by the formula

$$P_u(G_c^k) = \sum_{j=m}^n \binom{n}{j} \cdot p^j \cdot (1-p)^{n-j} \approx \binom{n}{m} \cdot p^m,$$

where $n = k + c$ is the codeword length, $m = md(G)$ is the minimum distance, and p is the channel bit-error probability. Altering characteristics of the generator such as the number of check bits and minimum distance can change its *robustness*, i.e., its likelihood of detecting errors. In Section 3, we describe an automated approach for producing robust generators, and provide preliminary experimental evidence demonstrating the utility of this approach in Section 4.

$n \in \mathbb{Z}$	(integer constant)
$r \in \mathbb{R}$	(real constant)
$f ::= \text{len}_d \mid \text{len}_c \mid \text{len}_1 \mid \text{md}$	(function)
$\phi ::= \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid c \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \vee \phi$ $\mid \phi \Rightarrow \phi \mid \text{minimal}(e) \mid \text{maximal}(e)$	(property)
$e ::= n \mid r \mid e + e \mid e - e \mid e * e \mid -e$ $\mid G_e(e, e) \mid \text{len}_G \mid \text{len}_w \mid w(e) \mid \text{sum}_w \mid f(G_e)$	(expression)
$c ::= e \neq e \mid e = e \mid e > e \mid e < e$	(condition)

Figure 3: Property language for Hamming generators

3 SPECIFYING AND SYNTHESIZING GENERATORS

We outline a program synthesis approach to automate the construction of application-specific Hamming codes.

3.1 Property Language

Figure 3 details our specification language for properties of generators. Numeric expressions e include value at a specific location within a specific generator $G_e(e, e)$, number of generators len_G (we use G to represent the set of all generators), number of weights len_w (discussed in §3.2), value of a specific weight $w(e)$, weighted sum of bit-error probabilities sum_w , minimum distance of generator $\text{md}(G_e)$, data length of generator $\text{len}_d(G_e)$, check length of generator $\text{len}_c(G_e)$, and number of set bits (ones) in the generator's coefficient matrix $\text{len}_1(G_e)$. The two pseudo-properties $\text{minimal}(e)$ and $\text{maximal}(e)$ indicate that numeric expression e should be minimized/maximized during synthesis. As an example,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{len}_G = 1 \wedge \text{len}_d(G_0) = 4 \wedge \text{len}_c(G_0) \leq 4 \\ \wedge \text{md}(G_0) = 3 \wedge \text{minimal}(\text{len}_c(G_0)), \end{aligned}$$

instructs the synthesizer to produce a single G_0 having 4-bit data length, at most 4 check bits, and minimum distance 3, while also minimizing the number of check bits.

3.2 SMT-Based Property Checking

Satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) [11] extends Boolean satisfiability checking with the ability to efficiently handle various theories such as arithmetic. All properties specified via the Figure 3 property language can be translated into formulas within the decidable SMT theory *quantifier-free uninterpreted functions and linear real arithmetic* (QF_UFLRA). We begin by declaring function symbols

$$\begin{aligned} \text{len}_G \in \mathbb{Z}, g : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, h : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \\ \text{len}_d : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}, \text{len}_c : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}, \text{md} : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}, \text{len}_1 : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}, \\ \text{data}_0 : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \text{enc}_0 : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \text{check}_0 : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \\ \text{data}_1 : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \text{enc}_1 : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \text{check}_1 : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{len}_w \in \mathbb{Z}, \text{sum}_w \in \mathbb{R}, w : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, \text{map} : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}.$$

The $g, h, \text{data}_k, \text{enc}_k, \text{check}_k$ symbols represent matrices/vectors associated with the generators, with the first parameter identifying a specific generator. For example, $g(0, 2, 5)$ represents the Boolean value at position (2, 5) of generator G_0 .

Given user-defined upper-bound constants L_G, L_d, L_c , and L_w , we assert well-formedness constraints. For example, (1) ensures that the identity matrix of each G_i is set properly, and (2) ensures that the coefficient matrix of each H_i is set to properly match G_i . These formulas are implicitly existentially-quantified – the SMT solver will search for a *satisfying assignment*, giving a concrete function for each symbol.

$$\begin{aligned} \bigwedge_{i=0}^{L_G} \bigwedge_{y=0}^{L_d} \bigwedge_{x=0}^{L_d} ((x < \text{len}_d(i) \wedge y < \text{len}_d(i)) \Rightarrow \\ g(i, y, x) = (x = y)) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \bigwedge_{i=0}^{L_G} \bigwedge_{y=0}^{L_d} \bigwedge_{x=0}^{L_d+L_c} ((y < \text{len}_c(i) \wedge x < \text{len}_d(i)) \Rightarrow \\ h(i, y, x) = g(i, x, y + \text{len}_d(i))) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

There are various other straightforward well-formedness constraints, including ensuring that $\text{enc}_k = \text{data}_k G$ and that $\text{check}_k = (H \text{enc}_k^T)^T$. Due to space limitations, we elide these. Constraint (3) ensures that len_1 properly counts the number of set bits (ones) in the coefficient portion of each generator.

$$\begin{aligned} \bigwedge_{i=0}^{L_G} \left(\sum_{y=0}^{L_d} \sum_{x=0}^{L_d+L_c} \text{ite}(i < \text{len}_G \wedge g(i, y, x) \wedge y < \text{len}_d(i) \wedge \right. \\ \left. \text{len}_d(i) \leq x < \text{len}_d(i) + \text{len}_c(i), 1, 0) \right) = \text{len}_1(i) \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The user can specify len_w weights w . In this case, the data words of the generators are considered to be permutations of bits from a larger len_w -bit word where real-valued weights determine the relative criticality level of each bit (further details in §4.3). Constraints (4) and (5) allow map to assign each of the len_w bits to a specific generator. In constraint (6), $\text{chooseTimesPow}(n, m)$ represents the approximation for undetected error probability from §2.2, i.e., $\binom{n}{m} \cdot p^m$ (we pre-compute this for the possible values of n, m, p , with p being a user-specifiable constant), and this ensures that sum_w tracks the weighted sum of the undetected error probabilities resulting from the mapping of bits to generators.

$$\bigwedge_{j=0}^{L_w} 0 \leq \text{map}(j) < \text{len}_G \quad (4)$$

$$\bigwedge_{i=0}^{L_G} (i < \text{len}_G \Rightarrow \text{len}_d(i) = \sum_{j=0}^{L_w} \text{ite}(\text{map}(j) = i, 1, 0)) \quad (5)$$

$$\left(\sum_{j=0}^{L_w} w(j) \cdot \text{chooseTimesPow}(\text{len}_d(\text{map}(j)) + \text{len}_c(\text{map}(j)), \text{md}(\text{map}(j))) \right) = \text{sum}_w \quad (6)$$

Constraint (7) ensures that the check bits are set to zero for the two codewords corresponding to each generator. This is used in combination with constraint (8) to ensure that the verifier can check constraints related to minimum distance.

$$\bigwedge_{i=0}^{L_G} \bigwedge_{k=0}^1 (i < \text{len}_G \Rightarrow \neg \bigvee_{j=0}^{L_c} j < \text{len}_c(i) \wedge \text{check}_k(i, j)) \quad (7)$$

Formula ϕ_{md} states that there are two distinct codewords that differ by fewer bits than the minimum distance.

$$\phi_{md} = \bigvee_{i=0}^{L_G} (i < \text{len}_G \wedge (0 < \left(\sum_{x=0}^{L_d+L_c} \text{ite}(x \geq \text{len}_d(i) + \text{len}_c(i) \vee \text{enc}_0(i, x) = \text{enc}_1(i, x), 0, 1) \right) < \text{md}(i))) \quad (8)$$

As we will see in Section 3.3, the SMT solver can be used as either a *synthesizer*, in which case we assert a conjunction of constraints and ask for a satisfying assignment that solves them, or as a *verifier*, in which case we assert the *negation* of a conjunction of properties, and ask for a satisfying assignment corresponding to a property violation (*counterexample*). When we are given a list of properties $\text{props} = \psi_0, \dots, \psi_k$ to verify, if one of them refers to the minimum distance, we append $\neg\phi_{md}$ to props , and the verifier then checks the assertion $\neg(\psi_0 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_k \wedge \neg\phi_{md})$, which is equivalent to $\neg\psi_0 \vee \dots \vee \neg\psi_k \vee \phi_{md}$. In other words, the verifier will search for a satisfying assignment that either causes one of the properties to be violated, or satisfies ϕ_{md} .

3.3 Checking Quantified Properties

We have seen how existentially-quantified properties can be efficiently checked using an SMT solver. In general, checking more complex quantifier alternations is undecidable, but we will consider how to efficiently check arbitrary properties of the form $\exists k \in \mathcal{K}. \forall i \in \mathcal{I}. \phi(i, k)$ utilizing an approach known as counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS) [36, 35]. In this approach, we utilize two SMT solvers operating in a loop. The first solver functions as a synthesizer, trying to satisfy the property

$$\exists k \in \mathcal{K}. \bigwedge_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \phi(i, k)$$

for an initially-empty finite set \mathcal{I} . If the property is satisfiable, the k from the satisfying assignment is provided to the other solver, which functions as a verifier, handling the property $\forall i \in \mathcal{I}. \phi(i, k)$ by checking that its negation $\exists i \in \mathcal{I}. \neg\phi(i, k)$ is unsatisfiable. If this negation is instead *satisfiable*, the i

Algorithm 1: Synthesis Algorithm

Input: list of properties props ; list of optimization constraints opts ; solver timeout timeout
Result: generator G satisfying props , or \perp on failure
// initialize SMT solvers (§3.2)
 $(\text{syn}, \text{ver}) \leftarrow \text{initSolvers}(\text{props}, \text{opts})$; $G \leftarrow \perp$

```

1 for  $o \in \text{opts}$  do
2   while  $o.\text{canBeFurtherOptimized}()$  do
3      $\text{syn.push}()$ 
4      $\text{syn.assert}(o.\text{getNextBound}())$ 
5      $G' \leftarrow \perp$ ;  $t \leftarrow \text{time}()$ 
6     while  $\text{time}() - t < \text{timeout}$  do
7        $G'' \leftarrow \perp$ ;  $\text{syn.push}()$ 
8        $\text{status} \leftarrow \text{syn.checkSat}(\text{timeout})$ 
9       if  $\text{status} = \text{SAT}$  then  $G'' \leftarrow \text{syn.model}()$ 
10      else break // synthesizer failed
11       $\text{syn.pop}()$ ;  $\text{ver.push}()$ 
12       $\text{ver.assert}(\text{makeAssertion}(G''))$ 
13       $\text{status} \leftarrow \text{ver.checkSat}(\text{timeout})$ 
14      if  $\text{status} \neq \text{SAT}$  then
15         $G' \leftarrow G''$ 
16        break // verifier succeeded
17      else  $\text{syn.assert}(\text{makeCex}(G''))$ 
18       $\text{ver.pop}()$ 
19      if  $G' \neq \perp$  then
20         $o.\text{success}()$ ;  $G \leftarrow G'$ 
21      else  $o.\text{failure}()$ 
22       $\text{syn.pop}()$ 
23 return  $G$ 

```

from the satisfying assignment (counterexample) is added to the set \mathcal{I} , and the synthesize-verify loop repeats.

3.4 Synthesis Algorithm

Algorithm 1 shows pseudocode for our synthesis approach. The initSolvers function asserts well-formedness constraints such as (1)-(2) into both solvers, asserts (3)-(6) into syn , and asserts (7) into ver . All properties in props except those referring to minimum distance are asserted into syn , and the remaining ones are asserted into ver as mentioned in the discussion of ϕ_{md} in Section 3.2. The function makeAssertion produces an assertion matching the synthesizer's current candidate G'' , and makeCex produces an assertion ensuring that the synthesizer will not synthesize this G'' again.

4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS

We built a prototype implementation of the synthesis framework outlined in Section 3. Our implementation contains

min_dist	$check_len$	iterations	time (s)	RAM (GB)
8	12	11,395	151.80	1.52
7	12	9,046	121.65	1.53
6	8	15,109	183.86	1.56
5	7	12,334	121.77	1.57
4	5	15,662	126.02	1.55
3	3	682	5.16	0.81
2	2	637	4.72	0.81

Table 1: Generators with given minimum distance

around 2,500 lines of Java code, and utilizes two instances of the Z3 [7] SMT solver (version 4.8.11) for the *synthesizer* and *verifier* components. Our code compiles and runs on Ubuntu 22.04.4 Linux using OpenJDK 11.0.23.

For all experiments, we used a Dell OptiPlex 7080 workstation with the following hardware configuration: 10-core (20-thread) Intel i9-10900K CPU at 3.70GHz, 128 GB DDR4 RAM, and a 2TB PCIe NVME Class 40 SSD.

4.1 Verifying Real-World Generators

Algorithm 1 can also be used as a stand-alone verifier, in which case, optimization constraints are ignored, the synthesizer steps are skipped, and all *props* are provided to the verifier. We used our tool to formally verify that the 802.3df Hamming (128, 120) code generator provided in [4] has minimum distance 3. Runtime was 14.40 s, and maximum RAM used was 1.38 GB. To demonstrate *negations* of properties, we also verified that the (128, 120) code does *not* have minimum distance 4. This runtime was 122.58 s, and maximum RAM used was 1.37 GB.

4.2 Synthesizing Robust Generators

In this experiment, we measured the ability of our synthesizer to produce generators with higher levels of robustness. We fixed a data length of 4, as in the commonly-used Hamming (7, 4) code, but explored other minimum distances from 8 down to 2, minimizing the check length for each value m of minimum distance via the following property:

$$\text{len}_d(G_0) = m \wedge 2 \leq \text{len}_c(G_0) \leq 14 \wedge \text{minimal}(\text{len}_c(G_0)).$$

We used a solver timeout of 120 s. Table 1 shows results and synthesizer performance. For example, for minimum distance 4, we synthesized the following generator G_5^4 :

$$G_5^4 = \left(\begin{array}{cccc|cccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \right)$$

To test the robustness of each of our synthesized generators, we produced a sequence of random 10,000,000 four-bit data words. For each of these data words, we used a given




Figure 4: Generator robustness

generator G to encode it, and then randomly flipped each bit in the codeword with channel bit-error probability $p = 0.1$. Figure 4 shows the results. The upper line shows the number of codewords that had more bit-flips than the generator’s minimum distance, and this closely matches the theoretical undetected error count, $P_u(G) \cdot 10,000,000$ (Section 2.2). The lower line shows the actual undetected codeword errors — codewords transformed into *other codewords* by bit errors.

As seen in the figure, our synthesized generator G_{12}^4 having minimum distance 8 reduced the number of undetected corrupted codewords to zero.

4.3 Synthesizing a Floating-Point-Specific Generator

As we saw in Figure 1, different types of data can be affected in different ways by bit errors. In this experiment, we leveraged the characteristics of IEEE floating-point data to synthesize a floating-point-specific generator which reduced the average numeric magnitude of undetected errors, and utilized only a small number of added check bits.

We considered a 32-bit data word as two 16-bit words. For 16-bit data, we first synthesized a generator with a single check bit and minimum distance of 2. After 479 iterations (6.09 s), our synthesizer produced the following generator G_1^{16} , which functions in exactly the same way as an *even-parity bit*, allowing detection of all single-bit errors.

$$G_1^{16} = \left(\begin{array}{cccc|cccc} 1 & \cdots & 0 & 1 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & 1 & 1 \end{array} \right) \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{cccc|cccc} 1 & \cdots & 0 & 1 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & 1 & 1 \end{array}} \right\} 16 \text{ rows}$$

We then synthesized a generator G_6^{16} with 6 check bits and minimum distance 3, which took 210 iterations (6.66 s). Finally, we used the data from Figure 1 to produce *weights* for each of the upper 16 bits of a 32-bit IEEE floating point, representing the relative average magnitude of numeric errors resulting from each bit being flipped:

$$w_i = 100, 100, 100, 100, 99, 98, 82, 45, 17, 17, 8, 4, 2, 1, 1, 1.$$

We increased the number of generators to *two* (one with 5 check bits and min. dist. 3, and the other with 1 check bit and min. dist. 2), and allowed mapping $map: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of each bit i within the 16-bit data to a generator. Starting with an

generators	check	undetected.	avg. err.	non-num.
$G_1^{16} G_1^{16}$	2	2,333,996	$2.14 \cdot 10^{36}$	5744
$G_6^{16} G_6^{16}$	12	12,383	$1.59 \cdot 10^{36}$	21
$G_5^8 G_1^8 G_1^{16}$	7	585,979	$0.24 \cdot 10^{36}$	248

Table 2: Float32-specific generator robustness

initial bound of 1000, we asked the synthesizer to minimize sum_w (§3.2), where $\text{md}(\text{map}(i))$ is the minimum distance of the generator that bit i is currently mapped to:

$$\text{sum}_w = \sum_{i=0}^{15} w_i \cdot \left(\frac{\text{len}_d(\text{map}(i)) + \text{len}_c(\text{map}(i))}{\text{md}(\text{map}(i))} \right) \cdot p^{\text{md}(\text{map}(i))}.$$

After 997 iterations (355.48 s), the synthesizer produced G_5^8 and G_1^8 , and a mapping where the upper 8 bits of the data are mapped to G_5^8 and lower 8 were mapped to G_1^8 .

Similar to our approach in Section 4.2, we randomly generated 10,000,000 32-bit data words, making sure that each represented a *numeric* floating point value. For each combinations of generators listed in Table 2, we encoded the data and flipped each bit of the resulting codewords with probability $p = 0.1$. Table 2 shows that our Float32-specific combination $G_5^8 G_1^8 G_1^{16}$ containing the generators synthesized using per-bit weights had more undetected errors than the approach having solely minimum distance 3, but less than the simple parity-bit approach. Additionally, it has 7 check bits, more than the 2 for the parity approach, but fewer than the 12 for the minimum distance 3 approach. Most importantly, when considering the *magnitude* of the numeric error caused by bit flips within the floating-point values, our Float32-specific combination had the lowest average magnitude, while also providing a number of *non-numeric* errors (numeric data being corrupted into *not-a-number* or *infinite* values) between the other two approaches.



4.4 Synthesizing High-Performance Generators

In this experiment, we optimized generators by minimizing the number of set bits in their coefficient matrix:

$$\text{md}(G_k) = m \wedge \text{minimal} \left(\sum_{j=0}^d \sum_{i=d}^{d+c} G_k(j, i) \right).$$

Specifically, we synthesized a generator G_{17}^{32} with minimum distance $m = 3$, and minimized the number of set bits in the coefficient matrix from 200 down to 100. At 1210 iterations (419.06 s), the synthesizer timed out on a sum equal to 118, resulting in 82 generators having sums between 119 and 200.

For each of these generators, we automatically emitted a C implementation that could perform efficient encoding and

**Figure 5: Encode/check performance of generators****Figure 6: Compressability of generators**

checking for that specific generator using and and xor bitwise operators. Each C program cycled through all possible 32-bit words in increments of 21, resulting in 204,522,253 total data words – the program performed encode/check for each. We used GCC 11.4.0 to compile each program, using both the `-O0` and `-O3` compiler optimization levels. Performance results are shown in Figure 5 – each runtime data point is an average across 5 runs of the program. Note that minimizing the number of ones can also have benefits at the hardware level by decreasing the gate count [34].

Besides affecting performance, the sum of bits in the permutation matrix also influences *compressibility*. For each of the 82 generators, we iterated through each column of the permutation matrix, writing the bits into a file. As a basic demonstration regarding compressibility, we created a GZIP-compressed TAR archive from each of these binary files, and measured the resulting archive sizes (see Figure 6).

5 RELATED WORK

Program Synthesis for Networks. Network programming languages [2, 26, 22] and associated program synthesis techniques have been used to solve a variety of orthogonal problems, such as synthesis of network updates [25, 23, 17] and synthesis of control-plane operations [5]. Our work on synthesis of FEC codes is complementary to these approaches.

Application-Specific FEC Codes. There are various projects that have manually designed application-specific codes, e.g., for 100G Ethernet [6], low-delay 5G [15], and repair of 802.11 packets [14]. Our work seeks to automate such design.

Verification of FEC Codes. There are works on verification of error-correction codes (ECCs) at the hardware level [8], including approaches using BDDs [12], computational geometry [20], and first-order logic (via the ACL2 theorem

prover) [28]. In contrast, our approach uses an SMT-based verification/synthesis technique.

Synthesis of FEC Codes. There are works on synthesis of Trellis codes [9] and Reed-Solomon codes [21], but these do not benefit from an efficient counterexample-guided implementation and user-specifiable properties. There is also work on exhaustive exploration of CRC polynomials [16], but this does not provide formal guarantees. Work on synthesis of Hamming-based DRAM ECCs [30] uses repeated calls to a SAT solver, but does not allow the customizability and flexibility of our SMT-based CEGIS approach.

Alternative Uses for Hamming Codes. Hamming codes have seen other uses in networking. For example, recent works have used Hamming codes for synthesis of congestion control algorithms [1] and in-network compression [38].

6 FUTURE WORK

There are many potential lines of work that can build on our prototype approach. We outline two potential directions.

Scaling Synthesis to Other Codes

There are many ways the CEGIS approach used in our prototype tool could be optimized. For example, we could seek to produce *smaller (more general)* counterexamples, rather than using the entire candidate generator matrix, to speed up the synthesize-verify loop. Additionally, we are exploring integration with other approaches for scaling up synthesis, such as using rewrite rules [24], and synthesizing *merge functions* [32] to combine multiple codes together.

Synthesizing Codes with Multi-Bit Error Correction.

As mentioned in Sec. 2.1, a single-bit error in a Hamming codeword can be detected by obtaining the check bits \vec{b} , and observing whether \vec{b} matches a column in the check matrix. If there are *multiple* bit-errors, \vec{b} will be the sum of multiple columns, meaning the bit-error positions can no longer be uniquely identified. Consider the Figure 2 example, but assume the highlighted bits of the codeword are flipped.

$$(0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1) \left(\begin{array}{ccc|ccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{array} \right) = (0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 | 1 \ 0 \ 0)$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{ccc|ccc} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right) \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

In this case, we cannot discern this two-bit error from a single-bit error, since the sum of the corresponding check matrix columns matches another column. For this reason, Hamming codes are typically only used to detect single-bit errors. However, by increasing the number of check bits and carefully adjusting the generator, we can ensure that *each pair of columns in the check matrix has a unique sum*. The following extends the previous example with 8 additional check bits to exhibit this property. This new generator still has minimum distance 3 (verified by our tool), but can now be used to detect both 1-bit and 2-bit errors.

$$H = \left(\begin{array}{cccc|cccccccc} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right)$$

Based on this observation, we are working to add *number of correctable bit errors* as a property in our synthesizer, which may allow us to correct multi-bit errors using fewer check bits than the above manually-crafted check matrix.

7 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we present a novel approach for constructing FEC codes automatically via program synthesis. Our tool allows the user to tune Hamming codes for specific applications, through the use of customizable formal specifications.

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