THESIS

BUILDING LOCAL CONFIDENCE:
THE SOCIOECONOMIC TASKS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Submitted by
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WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER OUR SUPERVISION BY MEREDITH L. MCKEE ENTITLED BUILDING LOCAL CONFIDENCE: THE SOCIOECONOMIC TASKS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING IN PART REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS.

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

BUILDING LOCAL CONFIDENCE:

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In the post-Cold War period, intrastate peacekeeping missions evolved from an explicit focus on force to the adoption of multidimensional strategies. These newer techniques include tasks such as infrastructure reconstruction, rebuilding institutions of law and order, and economic development. However, no consensus exists on the extent to which these complex strategies contribute to post-conflict peace and a successful peacekeeping operation. This study evaluates the effects of socioeconomic tasks on the local population during peacekeeping operations. More specifically, this paper argues that in order to achieve lasting peace in the immediate post-civil war period, peacekeeping missions must include substantial socioeconomic elements within their mandate. This study evaluates the relationship between socioeconomic components of peacekeeping operations and the mission’s successful outcome in a comparative case study of the peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, UNAMSIL and ECOMOG-UNOMIL.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACS  American Colonization Society
AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC  All People’s Congress
ECOMIL ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EO  Executive Outcomes
HDI Human Development Index
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs  International Financial Institutions
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IGNU  Interim Government of National Unity
INPFL  Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LPC Liberia Peace Council
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MNCs Multinational Corporations
MODEL  Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council
PKO Peacekeeping Operation
PRC People’s Redemption Council
RSLMF  Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force
RUF  Revolutionary United Front
SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party
ULIMO United Liberian Movement for Democracy
UN  United Nations
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNAMSIL United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
Part I

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. (Kaplan 1994, 44)

Journalist Robert Kaplan’s (1994) essay “The Coming Anarchy” explains the spread of civil war in Africa by resource scarcities, population pressure, and the profiteering of criminals in anarchic societies. Kaplan’s Atlantic Monthly article was sent to every United States embassy in Africa and has been influential among policy practitioners (Richards 1996, xv). The article describes young insurgents in West Africa, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, as roguish criminals. They were “loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid” (Kaplan 1994, 1). Theories that depicted conflict in Africa as “‘resource wars’ driven by the logic of predation and greed” proliferated in the 1990s and early 2000s (Omeje 2009, 9). Can civil war in Africa be explained by opportunism and greed? Were the rebels in West Africa enticed to perpetuate conflict in order to
pillage state resources? An understanding of the motivations behind rebellion is vital to end civil conflicts and to prevent war’s reoccurrence.

During Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s civil wars, both the rebel soldiers and government forces became infamous for appalling brutality and human rights abuses.¹ War profiteers appeared to employ indiscriminate violence to pillage villages and gain control over natural resources. This violence included murder, rape, torture, burning and looting, and cutting the limbs off civilians (Baksh 2005; Gleditsch et al. 2002). The atrocities committed during the war attracted the attention of the international community and led the United Nations (UN) to send in peacekeepers.² As civil wars raged across Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, and other states, Africa had become “the hopeless continent” in the eyes of many in the international community (Omeje 2009, 3).³

There is an urgent need to understand the causes of civil war. Civil war is “far more common than international conflict” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563). In the second half of the 20th century alone, 16.2 million people died as a direct result of civil wars. This is five times the number that died in interstate wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). The Sub-Saharan region of the African continent, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, has endured extensive devastation due to civil conflict in the post-colonial period. The majority of civil conflicts occur on this continent (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Due to

¹ Civil war (or civil conflict) is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

² Peacekeepers are defined as the military or civilian personnel deployed during peacekeeping who predominantly work under the UN flag, but they may also work under the auspices of a regional organization, a unilateral state, or a multilateral coalition. Today, civilian components of peacekeeping have come to encompass “units that specialize in political affairs, legal advice, child affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, gender, child protection, electoral, disarmament and demobilization, and public information” (Gueli and Liebenberg 2007, 78).

³ “The Hopeless Continent” was the headline of The Economist in March 2000 (Omeje 2009).
its instability, Africa has been a central focus of the UN’s efforts in development, human rights, and security (Hayford 2007, 14). Research on civil war cessation, particularly the role of the UN and African regional organizations in conflict resolution, is thus vital for the stability of Africa and for future world peace.

It is imperative for researchers to analyze the ability of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to prevent the reemergence of civil war because there is robust empirical evidence of a “conflict trap.” The longer a state has been immersed in civil war, the more likely it is that conflict will reoccur (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre et al. 2001). The World Bank estimates that half of all countries that have experienced civil war will face renewed conflict within five years (McGowan 2005). Once civil war has engulfed a country, the increase in poverty levels, accumulation of weapons, and militarization of the economy increase the risk for further conflict (Collier 2003). This “conflict trap” strengthens the urgency to investigate the most efficient methods for peacekeepers to prevent conflict recidivism. The essential element in determining how to prevent the resurgence of war is to investigate why the war occurred in the first place (the root cause of the war). If a peacekeeping mission does not attend to the initial causes of civil war effectively, civil conflict will likely resume.

UN missions are primarily designed and funded according to the will of Western powers, while regional organizations have often allowed national interests of the regional hegemonic state to take precedence over the needs of the host country’s population.

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4 Peacekeeping refers to deployment of international personnel who help maintain peace following conflict (Fortna and Howard 2008). Peacebuilding is the process of building local capacity for peace and conflict resolution (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779). Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) encompass both peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

5 The term host country refers to the country where the PKO takes place.
Policy-makers make their decisions in offices far removed from local realities. Pouligny (2006) contends that “at any time there is a possibility to influence the course of events to ensure better conditions for interaction, or at least to manage them…[those] thinking about problems of international security too often remain detached from the social, political, economic, and fundamental human realities on the ground” (35). Post-conflict analysis is often disengaged from local socioeconomic and political conditions. This research evaluates post-conflict socioeconomic circumstances for local populations and the possibility for enhanced human security through the programs of UN missions. To properly identify methods for civil war cessation, the UN and regional intervening bodies must consider the complex history of political marginalization, state repression, corruption, and social welfare in the host country. An analysis of the political economy of the pre- and post-war state is necessary in order to answer fundamental questions about conflict resolution.

This paper examines the interconnected social and economic factors that shape individuals’ and groups’ aspirations for peace in post-conflict societies. The failure of peacekeeping missions in Africa can be partially attributed to the concentration of PKOs on physical security, whereas the focus should be on human security (Gueli and Liebenberg 2006). Human security is a situation free of threats “to an individual’s, group’s, or community’s well-being” (Conteh-Morgan 2004, 232). Human security encompasses both the physical and socioeconomic well-being—social rights, access to a livelihood, and economic opportunity—of community members. This dimension of security is a vital component of post-conflict reconstruction because it incorporates the stability that protects economic actors and growth. Furthermore, it also refers to the
support for individuals as they reconstruct sustainable livelihoods. If initial security is not achieved, it will be impossible to amend socioeconomic conditions. However, following the initial provision of post-conflict security, local interests turn to social welfare. “The primary focus of the average citizen in the first year [following conflict] is on everyday concerns for material survival, such as jobs, pensions, schooling, and healthcare” (Woodward 2002, 187). These are fundamental issues of human security.

My central expectation in this research is that peacekeepers’ implementation of robust economic packages for the local community and ex-combatants leads to successful PKOs. At the heart of the study is the notion that the underlying causes of the outbreak of conflict must be addressed for peace to endure following a PKO. Therefore, substantial attention will be paid to the reasons for the outbreak of civil war and to variables contributing to the reemergence of conflict in a previously warring state. Two hypotheses help explain the rationale behind my central expectation.

Rational choice theory (RCT) provides the logic behind the study’s first hypothesis, which is that a significant number of individuals choose war over peace if the opportunities for economic productivity in society are limited. In other words, civil wars are explained in terms of opportunities for conflict, which are a function of the availability of finance for conflict, prospects for illicit trade in natural resources, and the cost of rebellion as measured against the opportunities in one’s civilian livelihood (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). “[T]he incidence of rebellion is not explained by motive, but by the atypical circumstances that generate profitable opportunities” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 564). In the literature, this is known as the “greed” or “predation” explanation for civil war (ibid.).
“Grievance” explanations for civil conflict have been advanced by scholars in opposition to proponents of the “greed” argument (see Pouligny 2006 or Berdal 2005). The case for grievance as a contributing factor to civil war explains rebellion by referring to individuals’ motives. This argument helps inform my second hypothesis, which is that when grievances are pervasive because of economic inequality, socioeconomic exclusion, or marginalization, a consequential number of people will rebel against the state.

The case studies in this thesis will evaluate the explanatory value of the greed and grievance arguments in two civil wars. My objective is to relate these arguments to the need for socioeconomic elements in PKOs. If greed or grievance are significant contributing factors to the outbreak of civil war, then the PKO must concentrate on these issues or civil conflict will likely reemerge following the peacekeepers’ exit.

The Economic Community of West African State’s Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG), in coordination with the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (ECOMOG-UNOMIL) functions as the project’s first study. The second case is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). These PKOs are ideal-type cases to test the greed arguments outlined in the first hypothesis because of the host countries’ vast natural resources and low per capita income (variables identified as proxies for opportunity according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004)). Furthermore, Liberia and Sierra Leone share histories of patrimonialism, corrupt governance, and socioeconomic inequality. This historical context allows me to evaluate grievance arguments outlined in the second hypothesis.

The two aforementioned hypotheses are each explanatory pathways to my central expectation, which is that a PKO will be better able to instill long-term peace if it
provides economic welfare programs for the local population in the host country. Economic priorities should be delivered in an interrelated package: First, the war-torn economy must be revitalized through the provision of basic services and projects that produce immediate socioeconomic benefit, including the reconstruction of infrastructure. Second, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for former combatants must be robustly funded, particularly the reintegration component. The economic package provided by peacekeepers functions as the study’s independent variable. This paper evaluates the consequences of including, or excluding, a significant economic component during peacekeeping. Qualitative methods are used to compare a PKO where the peacekeepers’ mandate did not contain a substantial economic element (the ECOMOG-UNOMIL joint mission in Liberia) to a PKO that did include a robust economic package as part of its mandate (UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone). I will empirically evaluate the relation of the independent variable to the outcome of the peacekeeping mission in terms of success or failure, the dependent variable.

To measure the dependent variable, peacekeeping success, I will calculate the number of years the country has been at peace since the exit of the PKO. Missions are considered failures if violence levels reach the threshold of twenty-five battle-related deaths. The UN defines missions as short-term successes if the Security Council mandate was fulfilled, such as maintaining a cease fire (UN 2006). The UN (2006) suggests that long-term success may be judged by the absence of ongoing violence between political groups. Many empirical studies calculate the number of years a country has been at peace following the implementation of a peace agreement or the completion of a peacekeeping mission (see Woodward 2002). It is perhaps too simplistic to refer to success as the absence of a certain number of conflict-related deaths. Alternatively, success could be measured by analyzing the extent to which the PKO addressed inequality, political exclusion, or other factors that lead to a more equitable and just society. However, for the purposes of this study, the simplifying assumption that success is the absence of conflict allows me to provide a more parsimonious explanation of the relation of the PKO’s economic package to the dependent variable. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to expand the dependent variable to allow for greater variation in the measure of success.

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deaths in any year following the conclusion of the PKO (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I consider PKOs a success if the conflict threshold is not reached within five years of the PKO’s completion.

Policymakers who design peacekeeping missions generally assume that security is the first priority, but this tends to mean reconstruction takes a backseat in the mission planning process (Gueli and Liebenberg 2007). While the security components of missions are often sufficiently financed, the socioeconomic components are usually weakly funded. The peacekeepers’ concentration on security leaves a gap between the defense operation and later developmental activities of peacebuilders (ibid.). I argue that it is crucial for missions to focus on creating real signs of progress in the local community concurrently with the peacekeeping element of the mission, rather than leaving all development tasks to peacebuilders.

This thesis is organized as follows. The first section provides a review of the literature on peacekeeping effectiveness. The next section discusses the role of economic policy in effective peace implementation. I will then discuss the project methodology. The subsequent section presents the comparative case study, which examines the results of PKOs in two countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone. I conclude with a discussion of findings from the cases.

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7 Battle-related deaths occur because of conflict between the main warring parties. The deaths may occur because of traditional warfare, guerrilla tactics, or other bombardments of both military and civilian targets. Military and civilian deaths are counted as battle-related deaths (UCDP 2008).

8 Although peacekeepers participate in peacebuilding activities during PKOs, I restrict use of the term peacebuilders to refer to actors who are not affiliated with the PKO and who are involved in post-conflict reconstruction. These actors may include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, state-sponsored development agencies, and others. For example, following UNAMSIL, the main organizations involved in peacebuilding were the World Bank, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the German aid organization “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische” (Leff 2008).
Chapter 2

STATE OF THE LITERATURE
ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping gained increasing public attention during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, peacekeeping evolved from interstate intervention to intrastate involvement (Fortna and Howard 2008). Research on peacekeeping experienced an “explosion of interest” in the 1990s, at which point it truly became a literature (Fortna and Howard 2008, 284). Since the 1990s, there have been marked shifts in the literature and distinct thematic strands can be identified. Early studies challenged the effectiveness of peacekeeping, while more recent studies have begun to systematically show that peacekeeping can in fact succeed in establishing peace. Within this newer research, the focus is on determining which components of peacekeeping make missions successful.

The earliest peacekeeping missions did not utilize force, thus an important change in UN strategy came with the increasingly common authorization to employ force. As a result of changing practices of peacekeeping on the ground, the literature on PKO effectiveness can be traced from early work that looks particularly at the use of force, to more recent literature that recognizes the need to address economic conditions in “multidimensional” peacekeeping missions. Finally, the most recent literature asserts the
necessity to evaluate how peacekeeping missions affect socioeconomic conditions for local populations. While it is impossible to provide a comprehensive review because the peacekeeping literature is vast, I will explore the maturation of key academic works as they relate to my own research on peacekeeping effectiveness.

Early scholarship in the 1990s was quite pessimistic about the usefulness of PKOs, especially after the mission failures or international paralysis that accompanied Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola (Fortna and Howard 2008). The United States, in particular, became reluctant to deploy troops to Africa after the death of U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia in October 1993 (Bah and Aning 2008). Following these early failures, the UN launched only one PKO between 1993 and 1998 (Fortna and Howard 2008, 288). Under the leadership of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who had previously served as head of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN entered a new era in peacekeeping in which it sent forces to numerous countries. By the end of 2007, more than 83,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed around the world (ibid., 289).

More systematic, methodologically rigorous, and theoretically descriptive work studying the effectiveness of peacekeeping has emerged only recently. Recent studies have shown that peacekeeping has at times been successful, thus refuting some of the early literature’s pessimism. The consensus among many of the newer studies is that “peacekeeping does indeed help keep peace” (Fortna and Howard 2008, 284). Peacekeeping scholarship now considers more systematically “why some missions are more successful than others” (Fortna and Howard 2008, 289). The recent quantitative literature has produced robust findings showing that peacekeeping increases the
likelihood of durable peace following civil war (Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Walter 1997).

The literature on PKO effectiveness has primarily focused on peacekeepers’ ability to provide security through peace enforcement.⁹ This body of work focuses on how the number of deployable troops and logistical capabilities influence the success of PKOs. Another concern within this literature is the contrast in abilities among the UN, regional organizations, and single states to engage in peacekeeping. Findlay (2002) analyzes the increasing capabilities of UN operations to utilize force and suggests that no other actor possesses the will and the legitimacy of the UN in undertaking PKOs. Feldman’s (2008) analysis of African Union (AU) peacekeeping also focuses on military capacity to use force. He points out many weaknesses of the AU forces, such as insufficient equipment, limited intelligence capabilities, and a lack of funding. Feldman recommends that the AU military force be strengthened. Otherwise, he claims, African conflicts will remain unresolved. Michael O’Hanlon (2003) proposes that the major barrier to ending civil conflict is the worldwide lack of deployable troops with effective military capability. He contends that only the United States has the military and logistical capacity to carry out effective PKOs, yet it often lacks the political will to intervene.¹⁰

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⁹ Peace enforcement is an intervention by the international community under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN 2006). Chapter VII authorizes the use of coercion (Chapter VI only allows diplomatic measures) and can be authorized without the consent of a host government (Pouligny 2006).

¹⁰ See Dobbins et al. (2003) for further scholarship on U.S. forceful efforts to promote peace.
In 2000, the “Brahimi Report” recommended new multidimensional strategies for the management of PKOs.\textsuperscript{11} This report led to a conversion in UN strategy from “traditional peacekeeping” to more complex “multidimensional peacekeeping” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) describe how multidimensional peacekeeping involves implementation of a more comprehensive peace agreement than simply instituting a ceasefire (781). Its strategies to promote durable peace go much further than traditional peacekeeping through economic, political, and institutional development. More recent PKOs, such as the mission in Sierra Leone, have attempted to rebuild institutions of law and order and provide substantial reconstruction tasks, in addition to utilizing force (Pouligny 2006).\textsuperscript{12}

The most recent research on peacekeeping concentrates on evaluating the effectiveness of strategies utilized in multidimensional peacekeeping. My own research fits within this thematic strand. Although the use of force is still recognized by most authors as a prerequisite to other initiatives during PKOs, recent work puts broader emphasis on political and economic development. Von Hippel (2000) finds that force may provide the initial conditions for peace, but the development of local institutions ultimately determines success. Collier (2007) suggests that the way to ensure conflict will not resurface is to provide continuous security provision and substantial economic

\textsuperscript{11} The “Brahimi Report” is the common name for the \textit{Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations} (2000).

\textsuperscript{12} In 2003, following the Brahimi Report, the UN Secretary-General appointed a “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change” to gauge major security threats (Olonisakin 2008, 125). Recognizing that around 50% of countries emerging from civil war face renewed conflict within five years, the panel claimed that international support is often too short-term and insufficiently focused on reconstructing institutions (ibid.). The panel’s report resulted in a reinvigorated focus on peacebuilding and the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental body mandated to engage with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on post-conflict reconstruction (Olonisakin 2008, 129). There is a vast literature on peacebuilding that details post-conflict economic development. Although my expectations relate to development tasks, my argument is limited to the initiatives implemented by peacekeepers during missions. Therefore, I primarily focus on the peacekeeping literature.
“Economic reconstruction and external peacekeeping are complementary: the economy needs the confidence that security forces create, while the governments that supply those forces need the credible exit strategy that economic recovery provides” (Collier 2007, 60).

Gueli and Liebenberg (2006) discuss the implementation of “developmental peace missions” (1). These scholars challenge the dichotomy between short-term armed security and long-term economic development in post-conflict societies. Developmental peacekeeping proposes that the military components of peacekeeping be more closely interlinked with the civilian elements of peacebuilding (ibid.). Gueli and Liebenberg maintain that there is much to learn about how to achieve this civil-military synergy in practice. Developmental peace missions are premised on the idea that long-term security is dependent on the immediate provision of humanitarian aid and reconstruction following armed operations, “so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development” (ibid.). “The first few months—if not weeks—following an intervention are perhaps the more critical period for laying the groundwork for peace and establishing the credibility of foreign intervention forces” (Gueli and Liebenberg 2006, 1). This groundwork challenges conflict recidivism by promptly rebuilding infrastructure and delivering basic services such as power, sanitation, communications, and transportation. Timely reconstruction creates the bridge to “long-term development and democratization” (Gueli and Liebenberg 2006, 2).

In line with Collier’s (2007) and Gueli and Liebenberg’s (2006) emphasis on economic development, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find that diplomatic efforts by peacekeepers, without economic resources, are insufficient to implement a truce during a
violent conflict. “[T]he greater the social and economic devastation, the larger the multidimensional international role must be” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 782). Although the use of force may aid in the termination of violence, the authors find that force is not sufficient to ensure long-term peace. “Enforcement operations can end the violence, but alone they cannot promote durable, democratic peace” (ibid., 795). Furthermore, they show that multidimensional PKOs are more likely to lead to long-term peace. “Multidimensional PKOs—missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight…” are strongly associated with long-term peace (ibid., 791).

In line with this argument, I also evaluate how economic components of missions may contribute to peace. Doyle and Sambanis were able to evaluate a large universe of cases (124 civil war events since 1944) through quantitative evaluation (ibid., 783). My research builds on their findings through the use of qualitative inquiry, which can provide in-depth analysis of how economic priorities contribute to durable peace in specific cases. Although their theoretical framework successfully argues that the “local sources of hostility” should be addressed through a PKO’s attention to socioeconomic reform, the variables Doyle and Sambanis measure are limited (ibid., 781). First, the authors evaluate socioeconomic elements of societies through proxies including per capita GDP, energy consumption, and natural resource dependence. These variables fail to illustrate the broader historical context of ethnic exclusion, marginalization, economic inequality, and patrimonialism of the state in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The article also fails to address variables such as unemployment, urban to rural disparities, the Gini index, and poverty levels; these are all elements that illustrate the dismal existence faced by the local
populations in my case studies. Finally, Doyle and Sambanis proxy development tasks using per-capita consumption of electricity as their central indicator. Although this proxy is appropriate for a quantitative study, it is an inadequate simplification of the multiplicity of development tasks that peacekeepers should engage in. These tasks—involving extensive DDR programs, provision of basic services, and construction of infrastructure—will be elaborated throughout this study in extensive detail. My study employs a similar framework to these authors, yet it provides a more comprehensive historical account of the root causes of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and then engages in a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic tasks of peacekeepers. Therefore, I see my project as both complementing and expanding on Doyle and Sambanis’ piece.

Woodward’s (2002) argument is also related to my contention that the social welfare of the local population should be improved during PKOs. She advises that economic conditions be addressed by peacekeepers, as they are a root cause of war. She asserts that although reconstruction obviously involves economic aspects, “to move from the obvious to hard conclusions about the role of economic factors in the success of implementation and to policy recommendations supported by evidence from actual cases is very difficult” (Woodward 2002, 183). This is perhaps surprising, because in the last two decades scholars, research institutes, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) have increasingly focused on the causes of civil war and the need for post-conflict reconstruction in war-torn societies (ibid.). “Nonetheless, there has been no systematic analysis of the contribution of economic factors to the success or failure in the implementation of peace agreements”
(ibid.). The reason for this lack of focus on economic concerns is that security takes precedence over economic interests during conflict resolution (Woodward 2002). If missions could “plan for peace” as competently as they plan for war, lasting peace might more commonly follow conflict.

The focus on socioeconomic conditions for local communities directs this literature review to the experience of local citizens during conflict. A gap still exists in the literature concerning the way “missions have been experienced by the different elements of the societies concerned” (Pouligny 2006). In fact, the majority of the PKO literature focuses on the peacekeepers, rather than the local populations that are affected by the missions (Fortna and Howard 2008). The failure of missions to sufficiently recognize the roles of local populations throughout PKOs results in a significant functional deficiency; PKOs fail to address the longer-term sources of hostility, including the economic grievances that exacerbated the violence.

Talentino (2007) examines the variety of perspectives that exist at the local level. Perceptions of peacekeepers are developed based on how the PKO affects an individual’s concerns within the larger society. Elites’ interests may revolve around retaining or gaining access to political and economic power. Spoilers are those who want to continue to cheat and amass personal wealth. Citizens are those in the local population that do not participate in government, and are most concerned with day-to-day activity such as economic issues and basic needs. A robust economic package should be implemented by peacekeepers with attention to the different units within a society. This effort should include strategies to limit cheating and illicit trade by spoilers and elites.

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13 The scope of this project does not include enough cases to evaluate the effects of economic priorities that favor certain groups within society over others. It would be an interesting avenue for future
Much of the scholarship on the economic tasks of peacekeeping is based on assumptions in rational choice theory (RCT). This theory contends that conflict occurs if its utility is greater than the estimated utility of peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Studies using this theoretical framework assume that conflicting parties rationally choose war over peace because war appears to provide greater utility. Furthermore, war often generates private gains while the losses are experienced by others. This explains why conflict may be rational for certain individuals, even though it will collectively harm the population (ibid.). Collier (2000) and his colleagues at the World Bank are commonly associated with predation and greed theories, which purport that an understanding of civil war is found in opportunism. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that grievance-based explanations for civil war hold limited explanatory power as compared to greed. Other scholars use similar underlying assumptions to explain conflict and its resolution.

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argue that post-conflict societies are “impoverished by war,” no matter the level of development that existed prior to war (782). Economic aid and employment are the “first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to disarm and take a chance on peaceful politics” (ibid.). Doyle and Sambanis assert that there is an inverse relationship between levels of hostility and the extent of economic development. RCT may be able to explain this relationship.

Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000) study also shows high correlation with the failure of PKOs in states that are dependent on primary commodities, such as natural resources.
Due to the lack of developed industry and infrastructure, the state’s ability to provide social services is subject to fluctuating prices on the world market (ibid.). RCT predicts war may be more profitable than peace in situations such as this. Without access to state services or business enterprise, illicit trade becomes an attractive option. Illegal networks, such as the illicit trade of diamonds or timber, offer profitable endeavors for combatants. Furthermore, the illegal sale of natural resources is used by combatants to finance their struggle, thus the cost of rebellion is low (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that low per capita income makes it easier to recruit rebel fighters because the economic incentives are more attractive than the financial opportunities of their daily lives. A key factor in the onset of civil war is whether economic life is so dire that “the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2000 young men” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 88). Gates (2002) also indicates that rebel groups must compensate recruits more than traditional financial sectors otherwise would. Less compensation will be needed when leaders are able to build a common identity among group members such that actual financial compensation is replaced by the functional utility of fighting for an ideology (Gates 2002). In this case, conflict continues to have a greater utility than peace, but the utility calculation is based on ideology rather than monetary gain.14

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14 Gates’ (2002) article highlights an important point. RCT makes assumptions about the preferences of actors, and I argue that economic opportunities and motivations are salient explanations for the choices individuals make. However, the use of RCT and its simplifying assumptions does not rule out the argument that a significant amount of irrationality exists during conflict. It would be misguided to ignore the psychological effect conflict may have on fighters, particularly impressionable youth. Furthermore, there was a significant amount of drug use by combatants during both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars, which certainly affected the minds of many fighters. Nevertheless, the perception that some actors are irrational during conflict does not negate the argument that generally, individuals make choices concerning economic incentives in predictable patterns.
Furthermore, in order to secure their own private gain, leaders may manipulate youth and others’ fears and exacerbate identity divisions to motivate violence (Rothschild 1986, Gurr 2000; as cited in Sambanis 2002). Sambanis (2002) describes how identity conflicts may be the result of elites or leaders taking advantage of pre-existing identities, such as ethnicity or religion, to instigate violence. Leaders capitalize on these differences to further their own purposes, such as retaining political power or pursuing economic gain. Fearon and Laitin (2000) add that other actors besides top leaders may provoke violence between social groups for private gains. Violent mobilization occurs because warring groups and their leaders want to assert their ideology, profit from government control, or abuse public resources for their own benefit (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). This is consistent with rational explanations of individuals’ self-interested behavior.

The previous discussion presented the key proponents of the predation and greed theories. However, a danger for supporters of the greed-based explanation is to reduce the conflict to a struggle over resources, which has been extensively criticized (Berdal 2005; Omeje 2009). The opposing side of the debate highlights “objective or genuine grievances” including political exclusion, social injustice, and state marginalization and repression (Omeje 2009, 3). Yet the dichotomy between greed and grievance is perhaps misguided (see Berdal 2005). “The conceptual distinction between greed and grievance is not in fact terribly useful, either in explaining the motivation or persistence of civil wars” (Berdal 2005, 689). Watts (2008) claims that predation theorists employ simple binaries and fail to grasp the complexity of societal dynamics (as cited in Omeje 2009). Mkandawire (2002) also points out that no rebel movement in Africa possesses the same features as a crime syndicate (ibid.). To understand the underlying causes of civil war
requires further explanation than solely greed or grievance, yet the explanations yield enhanced descriptive power as a pair. Berdal (2005) explains that the debate between greed and grievance has encouraged more extensive qualitative and historically-informed research.

Pouligny (2006) provides one example of such research in her attempt to understand how local populations, especially the non-government masses, explain “subjectively and empirically, their interaction with the United Nations missions” (xii). Pouligny finds that many locals feel peacekeepers have done little to improve their daily lives. These citizens face socioeconomic conditions no better than what they experienced during the war, thus they feel the peacekeepers have not made tangible changes in their lives. Pouligny points out that in conflict, youth are cut off from family authority and they “sell” their services to rebel groups (62). “While it continues, violence can become an opportunity itself. It creates new values, makes it possible to attain new sorts of status and overturns hierarchies, while more or less controlled disorder can be a cover for some to pursue their own economic interests” (ibid.). Broadly, however, rebellion is often a response to “a state that has constantly marginalized the people” (ibid.). In Pouligny’s argument, she hints that the dichotomy between greed and grievance is misplaced. Economic opportunity creates an attractive choice compared to a life of poverty, while state marginalization exacerbates grievances of the populace towards a state which has failed to provide them with the basic components of human security—a livelihood, food, shelter, and socioeconomic welfare—that should be provided by the state.

I recognize the enormous importance of military strength for a successful PKO. Without security, there will not be an opportunity to address socioeconomic conditions.
Yet while physical security is a necessary condition to establish immediate peace, it is not sufficient to maintain the peace. It is well documented that the likelihood of civil war is inversely related to economic growth. For example, Collier (2003) explains that “once a country has reached a per capita income rivaling that of the world’s richest nations, its risk of civil war is negligible” (40). The theory that overall economic development is a precursor to peace is now accepted by most of the world’s governments: “Increasingly, the world’s political leaders are coming to comprehend the vital link between development and security—the lynchpin of sustainable peace—and the dramatic consequences that can manifest as a result of the chronic poverty produced by underdevelopment” (McGowan 2005, 17). The recognition that failed states are more likely to face conflict has not resulted in sufficient systematic analysis of PKOs’ economic tasks. Long-term economic development may be implemented in the decades following conflict, but peacekeepers must first carry out immediate socioeconomic programs to influence stability following civil war. The peacekeeping literature has not put enough emphasis on immediate economic priorities. Moreover, policy-makers have often inadequately designed the implementation of these tasks. There is a genuine “absence of agreement on appropriate economic strategy specifically addressed to the tasks of implementing peace…” (Woodward 2002, 185). This research attempts to address this gap in the literature.
Chapter 3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section I develop the conceptual framework within which my research is situated. Consistent with research on peacekeeping, I expect that the security environment is particularly fragile in the first few years following civil war. For this reason, economic tasks should be implemented by peacekeepers, rather than leaving all socioeconomic tasks to development organizations. Implementing economic tasks is important not because it can immediately create macroeconomic growth, but because it prevents the reoccurrence of armed conflict. The PKO must address socioeconomic conditions in order to ensure peace during the mission and after the peacekeepers exit. My central expectation, therefore, is that a PKO’s comprehensive economic package leads to a greater likelihood that would-be combatants, recruited both from the local population and former fighters, will choose a peaceful civilian life over re-engaging in conflict. The absence of conflict ultimately determines the success of the PKO.

The first expectation developed here is that greed can lead to rebellion if conflict is more profitable than peace for a large enough number of individuals. RCT provides the theoretical grounding for this argument since it helps explain how economic incentives can be used to make peace more attractive than violence. Using RCT allows
for consideration of the human security needs of locals in post-conflict societies, especially the need to address socioeconomic conditions such as poverty. Peacekeepers may initially focus on the physical component of human security, providing security with force and monitoring cease-fires. However, to produce durable peace, their roles must evolve to address the numerous socioeconomic needs of the local population. Following the initial provision of physical security, the broader concept of human security needs to be addressed.

Peacekeeping planners should address states’ structural deficits which contributed to civil war. If a PKO is to establish long-term peace, it must enable citizens to rebuild their livelihoods. A basic improvement in socioeconomic conditions is thus imperative for warring factions to disarm and “take a chance on peaceful politics” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 782). When unemployment and poverty are rampant, a person’s situation in post-conflict society is bleak. In such cases, disaffected locals and the leaders that mobilize them will see the economic incentives of conflict as preferable to peace. Hoffman (1998) argues that job availability is particularly important to this calculation, because frustration with unemployment fuels violence (as cited in Talentino 2007, 159). However unconventional “employment” as an insurgent may be, it offers the opportunity to develop skills for an alternative livelihood. Reasons to join a rebel group may range from the opportunity to profit from illicit trade markets in natural resources or other commodities, to the prospect of obtaining a wage, education, or basic rations. The failure of state bodies to deliver basic services is a root cause of conflict, as civilians seek paths away from poverty by increasing their income through violence (Gueli and Liebenberg 2007). Ultimately, a PKO’s socioeconomic policies will “create jobs and tap local
expertise, but also provide local populations with concrete alternatives other than relying on violence and crime for sustenance” (ibid., 83).

The previous discussion of economic opportunity highlights the importance of greed as a contributing factor to conflict, yet RCT is more limited in its ability to explain the second part of the argument, which is how grievances lead to conflict. Reaction to marginalization and economic inequality feeds into disillusionment with the state, however, RCT does not provide a framework to predict when individual feelings of estrangement and bitterness will result in violence against that state. However, when grievances are pervasive and conflict offers economic opportunity, a powerful combination of motivating factors for conflict exists. Certainly disaffection with the state’s inability to protect its people’s social welfare would factor into an individual’s rational calculation of whether to fight.

Whether caused by socioeconomic inequality or other forms of state exclusion, such as exclusion from social services, business enterprise, or accessible education, grievances can provide individual motivations for insurgency. While political marginalization may contribute to grievances that are not economic, this paper focuses on the economic dimensions of state exclusion. Those who control political power in a patrimonial state also control wealth through the monopolization of access to natural resources and the means of production. Political marginalization creates a dual economy in which elites control businesses and consumption in the society while the masses struggle to meet their basic needs.

Economic inequality contributes to a propensity for conflict because it hampers economic growth and perpetuates grievances among the population. In 2006, in its
“World Development Report,” which concentrated on equity and development, the World Bank recognized that inequality can hinder growth (Harsch 2006). Moreover, overall economic growth does not necessarily make a country more peaceful if average growth masks a large gap between the rich and poor. “Ignoring inequality in the pursuit of development is perilous…focusing exclusively on economic growth and income generation as a development strategy is ineffective, as it leads to the accumulation of wealth by a few and deepens the poverty of the many,” argues UN Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs José Antonio Ocampo (Harsch 2006, 3). Ocampo indicates that a failure to address inequality leads to “communities, countries and regions remain[ing] vulnerable to social, political and economic upheaval” (ibid.). Political exclusion and patrimonialism contribute to socioeconomic inequality because they ensure that marginalized groups have limited access to patronage or other sources of wealth in an underdeveloped economy. Economic inequality was pervasive in pre-civil war Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Although greed is a motivating factor in rebellion, grievance is also a salient factor given that the citizens-at-large have little faith in the state to provide them with their socioeconomic needs. Both economic opportunity and economic grievances thus function as root causes of conflict, which leads to the expectation that addressing these factors during a PKO lowers the propensity for renewed violence.

In the past, peacekeepers have often played roles restricted to the security arena, leaving economic tasks to IGOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and government development agencies. Short-term provision of force has been empirically shown to lessen violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, if peace enforcement
must forcibly keep hostilities from erupting, then peace will be precarious. Once peacekeepers withdraw force, violence will likely return. The argument presented here maintains that the peacekeepers’ roles need to involve amplified involvement in economic duties. The members of the PKO are the first to arrive, whether to negotiate a peace agreement or to help enforce it. As the most immediate and direct link with former combatants, it is imperative for the success of the mission that peacekeepers not only provide physical security, but that they initiate the foundations for socioeconomic well-being to influence long-term durable peace. My argument therefore rests on the assumption that socioeconomic tasks must immediately follow the prerequisite requirement of ending the extended violence by force.

In the following section, I elaborate on the specific economic priorities that peacekeepers should implement during PKOs. The first priority includes the provision of basic services and infrastructure. Equally important is the inclusion of an extensive DDR program. Although other policies might have socioeconomic elements, these tasks form the bulk of a comprehensive economic package during PKOs.

**Economic Tasks for Peacekeeping Operations**

The creation of effective economic policies for peacekeeping begins with a complete analysis of the post-conflict society. The economic environment has been destroyed by war. The actions that take place in the immediate months and years of the PKO are the most crucial indicators of whether peace will endure. The ex-combatants are beginning to disarm, and it is this early period which will determine whether they will be able to reintegrate into society, rather than taking up arms once again. Furthermore,
while weapons continue to float around the state, the original sources of conflict may remain unresolved, and rebel groups can easily recruit from the local community. The economic initiatives implemented by the PKO should be designed specifically to prevent societal actors from viewing conflict as a more attractive option than the status quo. “The first steps taken by people themselves towards peace are physical repair and reconstruction as they struggle to put their lives back together and reorient to peaceful pursuits. The best indicator of success [for the PKO] in the first stages of implementation will in fact be the level of such activity, which is a calculated risk that will not be taken if the environment has not begun to change in the direction of greater physical and psychological security” (Woodward 2002, 183). Locals will make rational calculations during this time concerning whether they will try their hand at peace. Furthermore, the PKO’s provision of social welfare is an important step towards addressing individuals’ grievances against the state. As the peacekeepers restore roads, schools, and distribute supplies and provisions, marginalized individuals begin to gain confidence in the state.

Peacekeeping mandates, with a few exceptions such as the ones adopted in Sierra Leone and Mozambique, often do not include policies for economic reconstruction. “Economic objectives are often included in a list of concerns, but with little and vague discussion, particularly when compared with the attention given to security and justice” (Woodward 2002, 184). While there is widespread acceptance of the idea that economic development is necessary in the long-term to enhance international stability, it is frequently carried out by external donors and agencies in the decades following the
conflict, after the first vital years of security stabilization, the years during which the PKO is present.15

Most experts agree that conflict risk is greater in states without development projects in the long-term. However, peacebuilding projects often take place several years after the conflict has officially ended. While these projects will ultimately contribute to economic growth, they often come after the critical window for stabilization has passed. Peacekeepers are the first personnel on the ground and it is imperative that they address socioeconomic conditions immediately if the peace is to hold.

I recognize that it is vitally important that long-term development occurs in the decades after civil war. However, my research addresses a separate issue. I am not asserting that PKO’s economic priorities create macroeconomic growth. Rather, I argue that economic incentives in PKOs influence the outcome of the mission because of their immediate effect on the local population’s decision to embrace peace over continued violence. The influence of the PKO’s economic tasks on macroeconomic conditions of a country in the decades following civil war is outside of the scope of this research. The activities carried out by NGOs and other development bodies during post-conflict reconstruction may ultimately contribute to economic growth. However, my research focuses on the stability of a country in the years immediately following conflict, not the country’s long-term economic forecast. The immediate post-civil war period is the most precarious time during which conflict can easily resurge. In light of this reality,

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15 PKOs normally last several years or more, but this study does not include time as a variable. I make the assumption that a PKO will be on the ground from the earliest stages of conflict resolution and that it will remain in the host country for several years after a secure environment has been established. After the prerequisite establishment of physical security, my argument specifically refers to the few years following the cessation of active hostilities between rebel groups.
peacekeepers should concentrate on the socioeconomic tasks that lessen the risk for violence.

There are two major economic tasks that PKOs should address which will be elaborated in the following two sections. The first part of the economic package I consider crucial is basic service provision and the interrelated creation of basic infrastructure. The second major task is the provision of a DDR program for ex-combatants. The reintegration element of DDR, furthermore, involves the community-at-large. My expectation is that the socioeconomic component of PKOs influences peaceful relations among the local population, which leads to the success of the PKO.

**REVITALIZING THE WAR-TORN ECONOMY WITH BASIC SERVICES**

Post-conflict states face severe destruction of the infrastructure that existed prior to the civil war. The most immediate need for peacekeepers is to provide basic services such as garbage pickup, sewage systems, power and plants to generate it, and clean water. This is essentially a set of priorities that addresses grievances, as these tasks are precisely the public services which a state characterized by personal rule fails to provide. Woodward (2002) observes that the most immediate economic tasks are not enormously costly, nor complicated, yet their funding is often difficult to obtain. Service provision is an initial method of rebuilding confidence within the local population, “that elusive ingredient called ‘social capital’ that is considered essential to a successful transition and collective action of any kind” (Woodward 2002, 185). If the infrastructure of the country has been destroyed, provision of these services will require new institutions. This creates
a requirement for PKOs to address service provision and the infrastructure necessary to provide it.

Unfortunately, provision of these basic needs is often not addressed during PKOs. Often elites dominate conflict resolution negotiations, yet it is the local population that must also be convinced to commit to peace. “Some signal that there will be a ‘peace dividend’—that the benefits will outweigh the costs---must be palpable for people to make even the minimal investment in rebuilding their lives and supporting politically those promoting peace” (Woodward 2002, 186). Coercion cannot create peace if “ordinary citizens have limited access to essential services—water, electricity, health—and little prospect of formal employment” (Gueli and Liebenberg 2006, 4).

Furthermore, because the PKO is attempting to rectify grievances, the economic benefits must not amplify inequalities. To avoid perpetuating inequality calls for careful attention to the groups that will benefit from particular economic policies. There is the possibility that biased distribution policies could refuel anger at the inequalities that instigated the war. Increasing inequalities during a PKO provide easy tender for politicians not satisfied with the peace agreement and can result in the use of “populist rhetoric” to instigate further violence (Woodward 2002, 186). It is perhaps impossible to avoid some differences in the distribution of resources because some areas are likely to be more or less affected by the war. However, it is imperative that the differences be seen as just so that grievances due to inequitable distribution do not fuel further conflict (ibid.). Immediate development projects such as the provision of basic services and construction of infrastructure should benefit entire communities.
Equally important for the PKO is the implementation of DDR programs for former combatants. This is vital to the success of the mission and should include resources and programs to reintegrate ex-fighters into a peaceful civilian society. DDR is seen by the UN as fundamental to the dissolution of warring factions, so this task is not a novel idea in itself. However, in line with the emphasis on force, the demilitarization aspects of DDR are often emphasized over the community reintegration component. As such, funds have often disappeared by the time the reintegration program begins. Furthermore, the UN has an established budget for the disarmament and demobilization components of DDR, but relies on voluntary funds for reintegration (Leff 2008). More formal funds for reintegration will need to be established to ensure that the “R” in DDR is thoroughly implemented. It is also important to secure the resources for reintegrating refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who wish to return to their homes. This requires substantial funds for housing, transportation to the individuals’ home villages, and social welfare (Woodward 2002).

To develop the importance of DDR programs in more detail, each component should be explained. “The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian, and socioeconomic dimensions. It aims to address the post-conflict security challenges that arise from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks…” (UNDP 2005, 11). In other words, the main goal of DDR is to enhance security by facilitating social and economic reintegration of combatants into productive livelihoods within the community. Disarmament is the collection of weapons, arms, and ammunition from combatants and civilians.
Demobilization is the formal discharge of combatants from their militant groups and networks. In this stage, support packages may be offered to combatants to begin their reinsertion into society (UNDP 2005). Finally, reintegration is the process of transition from combatant to civilian, including acquiring a sustainable livelihood. This progression is the most essential component of DDR for the purposes of this project because it addresses the socioeconomic facet of human security, while also involving the community-at-large within its framework. However, reintegration is often the most difficult process to carry out. “For many, giving up their guns was an easy step. So was leaving their military faction. Successfully reentering civilian life—in countries still suffering war’s political, economic and social after-effects—may not be so simple” (Harsch 2005, 1).

Since inequities may have fueled the war, it is important that reintegration programs involve whole communities in addition to target groups. Otherwise, local resentment may develop and contribute to an unstable peace. Ex-combatants are likely to face social stigmatization as they return to their former neighborhoods and they may be viewed as burdens on the community. “Activities specifically targeting ex-combatants, without clear benefits for the rest of the community, can reinforce local animosities” (UNDP 2005, 51).

During the implementation of reintegration programs, basic institutional structure is necessary so that vocational training will lead to employment. Post-conflict societies generally have limited opportunities for income generation and few openings in the job market. “In this context, activating local economies through public works programmes that both help to rebuild war damaged infrastructure and create employment is
particularly appropriate for ex-combatants, their families and their communities” (UNDP 2005, 51). For the power grid, schools, hospitals, and services to be rebuilt, there must be jobs created and salaries for the people that construct and work in them (Woodward 2002). Another area for job creation is within the national government. Peace agreements usually involve the creation of some form of transitional or power-sharing government along with other state institutions. However, without a sufficient national revenue apparatus, the PKO may need to fund the initial jobs created within the state. A functioning government requires salaries and training for civil servants (Woodward 2002).

Sustainability of peace requires that the local population believes better times will come (Woodward 2002). Citizens will often not support reform programs if there is no economic development; there must be “some steady if incremental improvement in order to give citizens a reason to believe” (Talentino 2007, 159). For example, in Sierra Leone there were many examples of peacekeepers working alongside locals in development activities, such as building health centers, schools, churches, water wells, and restoring prisons (Curran and Woodhouse 2007). These activities contributed to the positive feelings Sierra Leoneans had towards UN peacekeepers at the end of the UNAMSIL mission (Krasno 2005). In contrast, it was the rebel leader Charles Taylor who began development in the Liberian case. He, not ECOMOG-UNOMIL, began development activities such as rebuilding schools and public buildings following the signing of the peace agreement (Means 1997). The following sections present my research methodology and the comparative case study of the PKOs that followed Sierra Leone’s and Liberia’s civil wars.
Chapter 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

This research employs qualitative methods to study the economic tasks undertaken by PKOs in the western region of Sub-Saharan Africa. I expect to find that PKOs that address economic conditions have a greater likelihood for success. Success, as mentioned earlier, will be measured as the absence of renewed conflict following the completion of the PKO. The primary research method used is comparative case study analysis. I will compare the ECOMOG-UNOMIL PKO in Liberia and the UNAMSIL PKO that followed the civil war in Sierra Leone. By testing generalizable questions against particular cases, I intend to offer a framework for understanding the role of economic policy in PKOs and to conduct an analysis of the argument that adequate economic priorities in PKOs contribute to the durability of peace. The tools for data gathering throughout the research include historical analysis, document analysis, and interpretation of statistical data.

The independent variable in my comparative case study is the extent to which economic tasks are implemented throughout a PKO. The main initiatives I examine are the provision of basic services, development of infrastructure, and an inclusive DDR
program. I do not measure each task’s impact on the success of the PKO independently, but instead consider them to be necessary components of a comprehensive socioeconomic program during PKOs. The cases were selected because of variation on the key independent variable. In UNAMSIL, the mission included a robust economic package, whereas economic tasks were weak to nonexistent in ECOMOG-UNOMIL.

The dependent variable is the success of the PKO. The Uppsala Conflict Database is utilized for the dates of conflict and violence indicators throughout the study. Besides providing thorough descriptions of each conflict, the Uppsala dataset gives the dates of first and last violence between warring factions, records yearly totals of battle-related deaths, notes the content and year of each peace and ceasefire agreement, and specifically states when the conflict ended based on violence levels (UCDP 2008).\(^\text{16}\)

My first case study examines ECOMOG-UNOMIL. ECOWAS was the first to deploy a PKO in Liberia, called ECOMOG. UNOMIL joined ECOMOG to create a joint PKO in 1993 (Olonisakin 2003, 119). Neither PKO had substantial economic tasks prescribed into its mandate. Furthermore, the missions provided little in the way of basic services and infrastructure, and their joint implementation of DDR programs is often considered a failure. Because economic policies were limited compared to those of the PKO in Sierra Leone, I am able to explore whether the expected relationship between conflict recidivism and socioeconomic well-being holds for this case. As expected in my theoretical argument, conflict reoccurred in Liberia in 2000. The second civil war in Liberia was the result, meaning the ECOMOG-UNOMIL PKO constitutes a failed mission. I use process tracing to search for evidence that the peacekeepers’ policies

\(^{16}\) The preciseness of these dates and statistical figures adds precision to my own discussion of the durability of the peace and success of a PKO.
directly harmed or benefited the socioeconomic status of the local population prior to the outbreak of the second civil war.

UNAMSIL was selected as the second case study based on the inclusion of a comprehensive economic package in its PKO. UNAMSIL is an ideal case to test the influence of economic variables because the UN recognizes it as a mission with robust reconstruction capabilities. The UN Security Resolution mandate that created UNAMSIL provided for a comprehensive set of socioeconomic tasks, such as DDR programs and the creation of basic infrastructure. Qualitative analysis of a case that included economic initiatives allows me to trace the effects of these priorities within the local societal fabric in the years following the intervention of the PKO.\textsuperscript{17}

ECOMOG-UNOMIL and UNAMSIL also suggest an interesting comparative case study because of similarities in the host countries in which these operations took place. First, Liberia shares a border with Sierra Leone and a history of political exclusion, economic inequality, and minority rule. Accordingly, the socioeconomic conditions, chieftain systems, ethnic groups, geographical circumstances, patrimonial structure, and availability of natural resources in each state prior to the wars share similarities. Holding these other variables constant allows me to more effectively isolate the independent variable of economic policies for each state during its respective PKO. It is difficult to eliminate all potential explanatory variables, such as pre-war conditions, as alternative explanations for the effectiveness of PKOs. However, by isolating the

\textsuperscript{17} Selecting cases on the dependent variable creates the danger of “jumping to the conclusion that any characteristic that the selected cases share[d] [was] a cause” for the outcome (Geddes 1990, 132-133). For example, if I selected two instances where the PKO was a success, it would be easy to make the mistake of assuming that any shared characteristics—either robust force or economic components—were the causes for the success. However, this would be a false assumption because the universe of cases might not produce the same outcome. Selecting two cases based on their independent variable allows me to examine how the cases differed, thus I avoided assuming that shared characteristics resulted in equal outcomes.
independent variables and holding contextual factors as constant as possible, I have more confidence in the correlation shown between my independent and dependent variables.\textsuperscript{18} The conclusion provides more in-depth discussion of alternative explanations that merit recognition because of the possibility that additional variables influenced the outcome of the PKO.

A qualitative comparative case study is the most appropriate method for my research question because an examination of complex socioeconomic and political histories that lead up to war, and a detailed assessment of multifaceted PKOs provides more detailed description than a quantitative study can provide. I aim to link the causal processes that relate PKOs’ economic tasks to successful missions. Process tracing allows me to evaluate if peacekeepers’ economic policies result in a more effective PKO.

The first part of my analysis consists of a review of primary and secondary documents, media sources, and historical archives.\textsuperscript{19} There is a large body of scholarly work concerning the different aspects of the PKOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia. These sources informed much of the background research I use to support my theoretical argument. I pay particular attention to the programs and policies that affect the socioeconomic conditions of local communities.

\textsuperscript{18} Liberia has had two civil wars and thus two peacekeeping missions. While the first PKO in Liberia, as argued in this paper, failed to address socioeconomic circumstances, the second mission incorporated economic tasks and furthermore resulted in long-term peace. Although it is outside the scope of the current paper, identifying the variance in policies that contributed to varying levels of success in UNAMSIL and the second PKO in Liberia would provide for further elaboration on the role of economic policy in PKOs. This would be a promising avenue for future research.

\textsuperscript{19} To limit bias, I will use a mix of both primary and secondary sources, and I also aim for regional diversity in the sources to obtain both Western and non-Western perspectives on the cases. Pan-African news sources such as the “BBC news Africa,” “AfricaNews.com,” and “AllAfrica.com” offer extensive coverage. My analysis incorporates a range of sources, including research completed by NGOs, IGOs, governments, universities, and private organizations.
Primary sources from the UN provide extensive coverage of the PKOs explored in the comparative case study. UN documents and publications available on the organization’s website are useful to evaluate the organization’s goals in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Official documents on PKOs in Africa include UN Security Council resolutions, UN “Lessons Learned” articles, and UN archived updates on the status of past PKOs.

In addition to the sources that provide day-to-day information on the events that occurred during the PKOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia, there are several sources that provide useful statistical data and analysis concerning socioeconomic conditions in West Africa. For instance, the UN Human Development Reports, the UN Millennium Development Goals, and the World Bank provide both statistical data and qualitative descriptions of the economic context in these countries. However, comparable statistics for the two countries in the study was limited due to a lack of available data.

It is important to recognize that Africa is incredibly diverse and covers extensive land mass. The continent has an enormous diversity of religions, cultures and more than two thousand languages (Feldman 2008, 268). However, a desire for human security seems to cross societal boundaries, although its exact parameters may vary by context. I


21 One obstacle I face is finding comparable statistics for each country. For instance, a detailed Integrated Household Survey on Sierra Leone was conducted in 2003. This source contains many household level statistics that would be useful for local level comparisons. However, there is no similar data for Liberia, so comparison between the two countries based on household indicators is limited. Furthermore, many of the sources that publish country data, such as the UNDP and the World Bank, are missing key indicators for a majority of the household level data for these two countries. For example, statistics such as unemployment levels and the percentage of the population living below the poverty line are often missing for certain years, or they may not be provided at all.
expect that PKOs that pay attention to the local socioeconomic structure can empower locals. Peacekeepers are better able to address conflict reoccurrence if they attend to the social and economic insecurities that exist.
Part II

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Civil conflict contributes to deep-seated poverty by creating conditions of insecurity that constrict economic growth. Human security deteriorates when there is damage to the socioeconomic fabric of a society. The human capital critically needed to stabilize the country is severely affected through the damage to institutions and infrastructure, public services, the education system, and employment sector. Countries that have experienced civil war face a vicious cycle: low economic development leads to conflict, while conflict perpetuates poverty. The case studies in the following sections aim to elucidate the role economic variables played in the onsets of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. I then link these elements to civil war termination through PKOs.

In the most recent UN Human Development Report, Liberia and Sierra Leone ranked at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI), which is indicative of the years of devastation each country faced (UNDP 2009). However, these countries also

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22 The HDI measures life expectancy at birth as a proxy for population health. It also measures knowledge and education through both the literacy rate and school enrollment. Finally, it measures standard of living based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (UNDP 2009).
ranked at the bottom of the index prior to their civil conflicts, which suggests that the poverty of the local population also contributed to events leading up to the violence.

There is substantial research that correlates underdeveloped economies with civil war onset (see for example Collier 2003; Collier 2007). Therefore, it can convincingly be argued that weak economies in Sierra Leone and Liberia were at least contributing factors to the states’ civil wars. Consequently, it can be reasonably claimed that long-term economic growth in either country will contribute to that state’s future prospects for peace. However, what is less understood and is the central focus of this thesis is how effective short-term economic priorities can be at preventing conflict reoccurrence if they are instituted during the PKO.

This focus will be highlighted throughout the case studies in this thesis. Two hypotheses form the central argument that economic tasks during PKOs contribute to the success of missions in instilling peace. The first expectation is based on rational choice assumptions and predicts that if enough individuals in a society find conflict a better economic option than peace, then civil war is more likely to occur. Hypothesis two states that when grievances are pervasive—as they are within states that marginalize the masses and fail to provide them with public services—then conflict is more probable due to the increase in motivation for conflict.

The following section is an in-depth case study of the PKO that followed Liberia’s first civil war. However, a full account of the root causes of the war and the major events throughout the conflict are integral to understanding why the PKO was ineffective at creating peace in Liberia. A discussion of the PKO that followed Sierra Leone’s civil war is presented after the section on Liberia.
Chapter 5

THE FIRST LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ECOMOG-UNOMIL

Background to the Conflict

The Liberian conflict cannot effectively be understood without first detailing the corrupt governance, political marginalization, and socioeconomic inequality that characterizes Liberian history. As this topic has been covered in a vast literature, I do not attempt to present a complete discussion of the causes of Liberia’s civil war. However, since recognition of the root causes of the war is integral to the success of PKOs, I present a substantial amount of detail on the underlying causes of civil war in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Liberia was founded in 1847 by freed African American slaves from the United States (UCDP 2008). In 1821, the American Colonization Society (ACS) began to repatriate former slaves in present-day Monrovia, the capital of Liberia. The ACS governed Liberia until 1847 when the settlers declared the state’s independence and it became the first independent republic on the African continent (Guannu 2009, 21; UNDP 2002). Some writers argue that Liberia was never colonized and thus its civil war does

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23 The ACS was a private philanthropic association made up of slave masters and religious figures in the United States. The tract of land purchased by the ACS, now the capital of Liberia, was named
not fit the label of a collapsed, post-colonial state (Omeje 2009, 8). However, Liberia experienced twenty-five years of rule by Western authorities under which all but the mulatto settler class was excluded from power (Guannu 2009). This is reminiscent of colonial administrators’ exclusionary policies in post-colonial states such as Sierra Leone. Thus, the ensuing civil war had “its roots in the unusual creation of the state of Liberia” in the form of a “neo-patrimonial and post-colonial” African state (Olonisakin 2003, 112-113; Omeje 2009, 8). Inequalities in wealth, marginalization, and corruption in the government proliferated during the decades preceding outbreak of civil war.

The people of Liberia have historically been categorized as either Americo-Liberians or indigenous Liberians (Guannu 2009). The freed slaves from America constitute the former, while the latter group is composed of native Liberians of around fifteen various ethnicities (Karnga 1926, as cited in Guannu 2009). The Americo-Liberian settlers made up less than 5% of the total population of Liberia, yet they were able to systematically dominate the indigenous population of the country after the ACS relinquished authority. The settler elite controlled all social and political institutions of the state, and the settler-dominated True Whig Party won all elections from 1877 to 1980 (Olonisakin 2003, 113). Limitations on political representation until 1980 took the form of violence, election rigging, and the banning of opposition parties (Guannu 2009, 20).24 While the constitution had been modeled on that of the United States, the country became a one-party state under the control of the True Whig Party (UCDP 2008). Furthermore,

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24 Monrovia to honor President James Monroe, who had been instrumental in establishing Liberia during his term as governor of Virginia (Guannu 2009).

24 For example, in 1885, there was an assassination attempt on Edward Blyden, the opposition candidate for the presidency. In 1927, Americo-Liberian Charles King apparently received 240,000 votes, yet there were only 15,000 eligible voters in the country. In 1951, the opposition leader, Didhwo Twe, did not even appear on the ballot (Guannu 2009, 24-25).
the state’s military, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), were utilized to maintain control over the indigenous population (Olonisakin 2003). The Americo-Liberians justified their consolidation of power with the “Western opinion of the spiritual bankruptcy and cultural depravity of their race” (Guannu 2009, 21). They saw it as their duty to civilize and Christianize the native population. “In the name of this Christianizing and civilizing mission, the indigenous population who outnumbered [the Americo-Liberians] by twenty to one, were subjected to waves of abuse…and exclusion from the coastal, enclave economy, all of which led to their impoverishment and cultural alienation while the ruling class prospered” (Deng Deng 2001).

The Liberian state historically operated under a system of patronage where leaders funneled government funds and jobs to relatives and friends (UCDP 2008). Political leaders accumulated personal wealth by plundering the country’s wealth of resources in rubber, timber, and diamonds. The Liberian economy was essentially a dual economy that heavily concentrated on primary product exports (Claassen and Salin 1991). The government allowed foreign-owned firms to control the extraction of natural resources, thus the profits were reaped by foreigners and the ruling class of Liberia, rather than the local population (ibid.). At the same time, the majority of the population lived in destitution and the state’s budget for public services was deprived of revenue from the otherwise rich endowment in resources (UCDP 2008).

Protest and reaction to exclusion broke out periodically. In the 1930s, a group of indigenous Liberians presented a complaint to the League of Nations against the Liberian government’s political marginalization and violation of the rights of native Liberians (Guannu 2009, 25). The Sasstown Wars (1915 and 1931-1936) are examples of violent
reaction to socioeconomic marginalization. The Kru community rebelled due to “the payment of taxes to a government not responsive to their basic social needs and one that marginalized them in the decision-making process” (Guannu 2009, 27).

During William Tolbert’s presidency in the 1970s, the oil crisis and drop in primary commodity prices exposed extensive state corruption and Liberia’s dependence on an export-driven economy. An increase of 50% in the price of rice led to riots which were violently put down by Tolbert (Harris 1999, 432). The “once unassailable power structure” began to be attacked as disaffected Liberians, often foreign educated, voiced their demands for reform (Deng Deng 2001). Thus, the indigenous people’s resentment against exclusion became increasingly violent as a direct reaction to economic conditions.

In the words of the famed “King George” (Dei King Bah Gwogro) of Liberia, “…the Americans [Americo-Liberians] were strangers who had forgot their attachment to the land of their fathers”(Huberich 1947, 283; as cited in Guannu 2009, 30).

In April 1980, the military staged a coup led by Samuel Doe, an indigenous Liberian, and overthrew the former head of state, William Tolbert (Olonisakin 2003, 113; Guannu 2009, 31). He then declared himself the new president of Liberia, “now bearing the titles of Commander-in-Chief of the AFL, Head of State, and Chairman of the People’s Redemption Council (PRC)” (Guannu 2009, 31). At first, the native population was elated that the exclusive minority-rule of the Americo-Liberians had come to an end (Guannu 2009). The high hopes of the indigenous populace were quickly vanquished as Doe set about creating a militarized and repressive Liberian society. Doe surrounded himself with members of his own Krahn ethnic group (who composed only 5% of the population) and ensured the AFL was controlled by the same (Harris 1999, 433). Doe
then used the AFL to conduct gross human rights violations against Liberian civilians, such as looting, rape, and summary executions (Olonisakin 2003). Just weeks after the coup, the PRC began arresting and imprisoning any activist who criticized the military junta for corruption (Guannu 2009). “Given the culture of marginalization...it came as no surprise that the “redeemers” [Doe and his supporters] would walk in the footsteps of those they removed from power for the crime of marginalization” (Guannu 2009, 32).

Doe’s military junta carried on the historical ruling class’s tradition of contracting loans to fund conspicuous consumption for himself and his supporting coalition. By 1985, external debt had risen to 1.2 billion U.S. dollars (Kieh, Jr. 2008, 96). In the shadow of a deteriorating economy and high inflation, the military junta turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance with the debt (Kieh, Jr. 2008; Claassen and Salin 1991). In 1981 and 1985, the IMF characteristically instituted “shock therapy” on Liberia, which was based on downscaling the public sector resulting in “decimation of the limited social safety net” (Kieh, Jr. 2008, 96). The IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program failed to alleviate Liberia’s economic crisis, evidenced “by the continued deterioration in the standard of living of the majority of Liberians—the reduction of earning power, growing unemployment, and increasing levels of abject poverty” (ibid.).

In 1985, due to Liberia’s refusal to meet all of the conditions of IMF stabilization programs, the IMF and World Bank withdrew from Monrovia (Claassen and Salin 1991, 136). Liberia’s debt stood at 1.4 billion (U.S. dollars) or 170% of GDP (ibid.).

Following five years of authoritarian rule and a shrinking economy, presidential elections were scheduled for 1985. Prior to the election, several of the opposition parties were banned for “socialist behavior” (Guannu 2009, 33). According to all sources other
than the government itself, Jackson Doe (no relation to Samuel Doe), the Liberian People’s Party candidate, won the 1985 election. However, Samuel Doe was declared President. Less than a month after the election, Thomas Quiwonkpa, the former General of the AFL, staged a coup against Doe with less than one hundred ill-armed men. Doe suppressed the coup and then spread a “reign of terror” over Monrovia and other parts of the country as he executed many people thought to support his overthrow (ibid.). Thus the stage was set for a certain amount of public support for the invasion of Charles Taylor to overthrow Doe. The discussion has emphasized the fact that Taylor’s instigation of violence against minority rule in the Liberian state was not the first episode of violence against socioeconomic marginalization; however, it was the most successful.

The First Liberian Civil War (1989-1996)

Charles Taylor was an Americo-Liberian accused of government fund embezzlement during Doe’s regime (Harris 1999). Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in a rebellion against Doe, which began Christmas Eve of 1989 in Nimba County, in northeastern Liberia, after Taylor’s forces crossed over the border from Cote d’Ivoire (UCDP 2008; Olonisakin 2003, 113; Richards 1996, 3). This invasion began the “protracted armed conflict” which would take thousands of lives in Liberia (Guannu 2009, 33). The goal of the NPFL was to get Samuel Doe “off the back of the Liberian people” (ibid.).

Following the incursion into Nimba County, Doe’s men fought back against the NPFL and wantonly raped and murdered civilians in the county, assuming that they were involved in the rebellion (UCDP 2008). “As an Americo-Liberian with little connection
to the hinterland, Taylor was substantially aided by Doe’s overreaction and targeting of Gio and Mano civilians” (Harris 1999, 434). Doe’s brutality reinforced civilian support for the NPFL and the youth of Nimba County began to join the NPFL in large numbers as their parents were massacred and their homes burnt (Richards 1996).

The first civil war in Liberia engulfed the country from 1989 to 1996 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Bitterness generated by years of marginalization, repressed opposition and protest, and socioeconomic exclusion was reflected in the brutality of the war and struggle for power (Olonisakin 2003, 113). Rules of war and international humanitarian law were flagrantly violated as civilians became the main targets of the violence (Olonisakin 2003).

Taylor’s rebels overran much of the Liberian country killing mainly Krahn and Mandingo civilians, and the humanitarian crisis escalated (UCDP 2008; Cleaver 1998). While the targeting of the Krahn was due to their power under Doe’s government, the targeting of Mandingos had an economic dimension. Mandingos in Liberia had come to dominate commerce and form the bulk of the merchant or business class, including controlling 90% of the transportation infrastructure (Konneh 1996, 128, as cited in Harris 1999, 433). Control over certain public services meant that Mandingos had close ties with Doe’s government. Warren d’Azevedo (1970) describes how ethnicity is often used as “an instrument of opportunistic manipulation” (8-9, as cited in Harris 1999, 434). This is apparent in the Liberian case, which leads to the suggestion that ethnic targeting during the war had socioeconomic underpinnings.

Taylor was able to attract multi-ethnic support for his war effort, largely due to the enmity held for Doe. “Beyond the brutality of the Doe regime, many had lived with
unemployment and a huge wealth gap, particularly visible around the foreign-controlled concession areas” (Harris 1999, 434). A correlation is beginning to emerge between economic marginalization and public support for the rebellion.

The Government of Liberia and the NPFL were the initial players in Liberia’s first civil war. By January 1990, Prince Johnson had formed a breakaway faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). The INPFL was responsible for the removal from power and murder of Samuel Doe on September 10, 1990 (Guannu 2009, 34). By 1991, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) joined the conflict composed of mainly ethnic Mandingoes and Krahn, primarily as a reaction to their targeting by the NPFL (ibid.). By 1993, ULIMO had split into Mandingo and Krahn factions, ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J. The fifth party to join the conflict in 1993 was the Southeasterners’ Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and in 1994, Lormas, Kissis, and Bandis founded the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) (Guannu 2009, 34). The proliferation of warring factions throughout the war can be explained both by the economic opportunities the conflict offered and the ability to gain recognition at peace conferences (Harris 1999).

Human rights abuses were committed by all sides during the war. Some authors argue that the extent of the violence calls for explanations other than economic motivations. Indeed, there is a large body of work that concentrates on the psychological effects of war on traumatized youth that commit atrocities. While there is surely a psychological component to the extent of violence and the manner in which it was executed, economic explanations and grievance arguments still hold explanatory power as the violence was carried out for specific purposes. Most significantly, goals were to
overthrow Doe’s regime because of its personal rule and neglect of the socioeconomic welfare of the mass public and to gain greater control over economic resources. Both greed and grievance contributed to the outbreak of civil war.

**ECOMOG (1990-1997) and UNOMIL (1993-1997)**

I present the PKO in Liberia by treating the country’s conflicts as two wars and focusing on the PKO that followed the first war. I also argue that an effective peace process following the first war might have prevented the reoccurrence of violence. The first PKO in Liberia is a relevant case, independently of the PKO that followed the second war. First, a significant number of troops deployed during the PKO (at its peak ECOMOG had 20,000 soldiers) and the PKO implemented a peace agreement (Olonisakin 2008, 111). Second, the comprehensive peace agreement was adhered to for several years and the PKO completed a DDR process. Third, competitive, multi-party elections typically signify the culmination of a peace process and follow the disarmament and demobilization programs (Harris 1999). In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected to the presidency in an election considered free and fair by international observers, including the UN, thus completing the transition to a new government (Harris 1999, 437).

The regional community initially decided to become involved in the Liberian conflict because of the perceived threat to regional stability. As the Liberian military unsuccessfully attempted to defeat the rebel groups, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched the ECOWAS Monitoring Group to Liberia (ECOMOG) in May 1990 (Olonisakin 2003, 114). In August, West African troops began to arrive (Guannu 2009, 35). ECOMOG’s mandate was to instill a cease-fire, enforce
Doe’s resignation, create an interim government, and hold elections within twelve months (Cleaver 1998). ECOMOG remained in Liberia until elections took place in July 1997 (ibid.). The initial deployment of ECOMOG was a mere 3,000 troops, which proved inadequate to maintain stable peace. Throughout the PKO, the ECOMOG contingent fluctuated in size, achieving its peak in 1993 with 20,000 troops, 16,000 of which came from Nigeria (Cleaver 1998, 227; Bruthus 2004, 5). At its largest, ECOMOG had a similar number of troops deployed as the UNAMSIL mission at its peak with 17,000 troops (Olonisakin 2008, 111). From 1993 to 1996, as violence decreased, the troops were gradually reduced to 8,000 men who were primarily concentrated in Monrovia to deal with factional fighting (Cleaver 1998, 227). In 1993, the UN deployed a small observer mission to Liberia, but ECOMOG maintained its central role in security provision. Although the case analyzes both ECOMOG’s and UNOMIL’s roles during the PKO, security provision was relegated primarily to ECOMOG because of UNOMIL’s limited ability to use force.

ECOMOG sought to establish an immediate peace agreement. From August to September of 1990, ECOWAS held a conference in Banjul with the goal of forming an interim government until free and fair elections could be held (Guannu 2009). The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer, was the outcome (ibid.). Taylor was displeased with the requirement that leaders of the warring factions could not lead the IGNU, and he declined to participate (UCDP 2008). He then led the NPFL to attack ECOMOG. ULIMO joined the ECOMOG and interim government’s fight against the NPFL in 1991 (UCDP 2008).
Discord between the West African states involved in ECOWAS meant that while Nigeria took an active role in fighting the NPFL, states such as Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast supported the NPFL and provided weapons and safe havens (Cleaver 1998). As ECOMOG fought back, it was able to drive the NPFL out of Monrovia, setting the stage for the first cease-fire agreement in November 1990 (Olonisakin 2003, 116).

Blocked from Monrovia, Taylor set up his own territory called “Greater Liberia.” In the area, Taylor created an enormous “war economy empire” through illicit trade in timber, gold, rubber, ore, and diamonds (UCDP 2008). By 1991, Taylor’s commercial market had become the third-largest supplier of France’s tropical hardwood (Reno 1993, 180, as cited in Harris 1999, 435). “Taylor’s ‘state’ boasted its own currency, TV, radio, newspaper, international airport, and deepwater port” (Harris 1999, 434-435). The capital of Greater Liberia, called Gbarnga, was the seat of Taylor’s self-designed “National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government,” along with its networks of ministries and banks (ibid.). It was from “Greater Liberia” that Taylor expanded into Sierra Leone’s diamond-rich areas, and he aided Foday Sankoh in the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) incursion against the Government of Sierra Leone (UCDP 2008).

In 1990, peace negotiations began between the Liberian government, the NPFL, the INPFL, and ECOWAS (UCDP 2008). The INPFL entered into negotiations in good faith and disbanded in 1991 (ibid.). Despite several peace agreements and conferences, the conflict re-erupted in October 1992 when the NPFL launched an attack to gain control of Monrovia (Olonisakin 2003, 117). However, ECOMOG was able to keep the NPFL from taking over the capital, and it then launched a counteroffensive in which it seized strategic locations back from the NPFL, including several port cities. (Olonisakin 2003).
This enabled the signing of the Cotonou Peace Agreement in July 1993, which consisted of ULIMO, the NPFL, and the Government of Liberia agreeing to a power-sharing interim government (Olonisakin 2003, 117). However, the NPFL failed to disarm and negotiations continued (UCDP 2008).

Following the Cotonou agreement, the UN, which had previously only worked in Liberia in a humanitarian capacity, stepped up its engagement in the conflict (Olonisakin 2003). The major task was to build the confidence of the NPFL by expanding the ECOMOG force to work jointly with a UN force which was seen as more impartial (Olonisakin 2003). The NPFL wanted control of the government, and it believed that ECOMOG would not give it the political clout they wanted, thus they continued to instigate conflict.

The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was created in September 1993 (Olonisakin 2003, 119). ECOMOG’s collaboration with UNOMIL was intended to confer an image of impartiality on the PKO and boost the confidence of the warring parties to disarm (Olonisakin and Alao 2005). UNOMIL was mandated to remain in Liberia from September 1993 to September 1997 (UN 2001). Jointly, UNOMIL and ECOWAS began the disarmament component of the Cotonou Agreement. UNOMIL personnel were given no authority to use force, yet ECOMOG retained capacity for peace enforcement (Olonisakin 2003). Because of increased fighting and attacks on UN personnel in 1995, the UN Security Council reduced UNOMIL’s size to only five to ten observers for the remainder of the PKO leading up to elections in July 1997 (Olonisakin 2003, 120). Liberians saw UNOMIL as subordinate to ECOMOG (Olonisakin 2003).
The Akosombo agreement was signed in September 1994, but the power struggle and illicit war economy continued. Finally, in 1995 the first Abuja agreement was signed by all of the warring factions’ leaders, who subsequently each became members of the new Council of State (UCDP 2008). The IGNU turned authority over to the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), with Taylor and other factions’ leaders in its ranks (Guannu 2009).

As ECOMOG scaled down its mission, Taylor attacked the NPFL’s most powerful opposition force, ULIMO-J. This time the international community threatened punitive measures if an agreement did not prevail, and the warlords signed the second Abuja Accord in August 1996 (Abuja II) (UCDP 2008). The agreement held and it signaled the end of the first Liberian Civil War. Abuja II laid out the timetable for disarmament and demobilization of the combatants, establishing January 1997 for the completion of the process (Harris 1999, 436). Taylor converted the NPFL into a political party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), in order to run in the elections to be held in 1997 (UCDP 2008).

It can be argued that a major factor in the success of Abuja II was the turnover of the Nigerian presidency from Ibrahim Babangida to Sani Abacha (Harris 1999). Because Nigeria essentially controlled the entire ECOMOG operation, its actions were essential for Taylor’s willingness to negotiate. Taylor and the NPFL were unwilling to end the civil war without political representation in the new government. While Babangida and Taylor were hostile towards one another, Abacha signaled his willingness to engage in business deals with Taylor and allow him to pursue the presidency (Harris 1999). These
economic incentives and the opportunity for political representation encouraged the NPFL to lay down their arms.

**ECOMOG-UNOMIL’s Socioeconomic Development Tasks**

ECOMOG peacekeepers were not popular with many Liberians. They were accused of looting and profiteering during the mission. “Pilfering and looting [went] on to such an extent that among many Liberians ECOMOG [was] said to stand for Every Car or Movable Object Gone” (Cleaver 1998, 232). Some of the smaller scale looting may have been due to a lack of discipline and lamentable pay, however, the evidence of “large scale and systematic criminal activity” revealed that even leaders of the contingents were involved in utilizing the PKO as a “lucrative opportunity to enhance their personal wealth” (ibid.). In fact, all factions in the Liberian conflict have been implicated in using the war for economic gain, seizing rubber, diamonds, or timber from occupied territory (UCDP 2008). Instead of addressing the socioeconomic needs of local communities, the PKO in Liberia further degraded the socioeconomic environment. The impact of ECOMOG’s diversion of resources on Liberia’s economy and infrastructure was “pernicious, exacerbating an already difficult situation and boding ill for any attempts at post-war reconstruction” (Cleaver 1998, 233). Thus, the socioeconomic development tasks of the ECOMOG mission were inadequate and the UN’s involvement in the PKO was limited to an observer capacity.
ECOMOG-UNOMIL Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDR must be approached not only within the context of security, but also by acknowledging the social and economic dimensions of the process (Bruthus 2004). DDR should be developed so that it assists in revitalizing economic activity, which is essential for successful reintegration and the creation of employment for ex-combatants (ibid.). Liberia’s DDR programs were implemented by the peacekeepers in conjunction with aid agencies but had serious flaws, particularly in terms of financial resource shortages (Cleaver 1998; ICG 2004; Olonisakin and Alao 2005). In an International Crisis Group (ICG) (2004) interview, a DDR specialist from Liberia commented that “Liberian combatants still talk about the failed process in 1997, when they were given vouchers for reintegration that were never honored. They remind us that promises were not kept in 1997, and that we have seen what results” (12). Combatants themselves also blame failed reintegration policies on the resurgence of war. The Cotonou agreement had the most comprehensive framework for DDR during the Liberian conflict, yet because of the large number of factions and their leaders’ unwillingness to negotiate, successive attempts to implement DDR failed. Disarmament was attempted in 1994 and 1996 but failed because of inter-factional fighting (Kabia 2009, 96). Abuja II marked the most successful attempt at DDR. This accord was effective in forcing compliance from the warring parties because of its threat of sanctions and a war crimes tribunal (ibid.). The comprehensive DDR process outlined by Abuja II lasted from November 1996 to February 1997 (Kabia 2009, 96). ECOMOG was responsible for the disarmament of an estimated 60,000 combatants, and UNOMIL was in charge of supervising the process. The National Disarmament and Demobilization Committee coordinated the overall program. Teams
visited communities ahead of the DDR program to prepare them for reconciliation (Olonisakin and Alao 2005). The program was designed so that there were 18 designated collection points where ex-combatants could hand in their weapons to ECOMOG in exchange for benefits and a reintegration card (Kabia 2009, 96). Ex-combatants were given clothing, provisions, and digging tools before they were transported to their receiving communities (Olonisakin and Alao 2005). The following elements were intended to be distributed as part of a resettlement package for ex-combatants: “a plastic cup and plate, a spoon, a bucket, two cooking pots, soap, a towel, a hoe or a cutlass for those settling in the rural areas and an education package for those under the age of 15” (Olonisakin and Alao 2005, 6). However, at times the assistance was not immediately available and this delayed the peace process. During this time period around 20,332 combatants were disarmed (Kabia 2009, 96).

ECOMOG-UNOMIL relied on the rebel factions’ commanders to disseminate information about the DDR process, but this meant that ex-combatants were not always properly informed about the process. This undermined the DDR process because ex-combatants often felt they did not receive the economic package they expected. The “weapons-buy-back-scheme” was a source of controversy because ex-combatants felt the economic incentives were not attractive enough (Kabia 2009, 97). Furthermore, many former combatants were ordered to give their weapons to their commanders, which meant they could not receive reintegration benefits (Kabia 2009).

Poor infrastructure further hampered the DDR effort in Liberia. Communication and transportation networks were grossly inadequate and made it difficult to access disarmament assembly points (Kabia 2009). If former rebels did reach these points, they
found that eligibility criteria were often inconsistent (criteria ranged from possessing a serviceable weapon, to any weapon, to 100 rounds of ammunition, to any individual who came forward) (see Kabia 2009).

The age of former combatants is another important dimension to DDR. Of the 1.4 million children in Liberia, as many as 15,000 had served as child soldiers (Deng Deng 2001, 2).\footnote{Children are defined as any individual under 17 years of age in Liberia (Deng Deng 2001, 2).} Child soldiers comprised at least 20% of the demobilized combatants. Furthermore, the vast majority of ex-combatants were youth between the ages of 15 and 28 at the time of demobilization. 69% of the child fighters who disarmed were between ages 15 and 17, meaning that they were around age 10 to 12 when they joined the conflict (ibid.). This is important within the context of DDR because it results in a large group of youth in the post-war context who have little education. The only training they may possess is in warfare and they can offer few skills to the civilian workforce. “The meager absorption capacity of the economy coupled with the low educational level and lack of experience of the majority of the ex-combatants severely weakens their prospects for employment” (Bruthus 2004, 3).

Abuja II failed to successfully institute reintegration programs. The only available reintegration program for ex-combatants was a three-month building project which began in January 1997. Former combatants were employed in road clearing and bridge building, yet the program was only implemented on a small scale (Olonisakin and Alao 2005, 7).

In the end, the “limited opportunities for economic reintegration of former fighters further served to undermine the peace process. Such opportunities would have revived the livelihood of thousands of young combatants and provided them with a
suitable alternative to life with the gun” (Kabia 2009, 151). The PKO failed to work towards the creation of a professional state military force, a police force, or an immigrations and customs service. These opportunities would have provided alternative vocations for ex-combatants in a context where there were few jobs in the communities they could return to (Olonisakin and Alao 2005). “The thousands of disarmed youth were simply wished away in the absence of a full demobilization and reintegration exercise” (Olonisakin and Alao 2005, 2). ECOMOG achieved “qualified success in disarming thousands of combatants,” yet the reintegration phase failed to successfully train and re-employ these former fighters who had little to offer in terms of skills for the civilian workforce (Kabia 2009, 189).

The Election of Charles Taylor

The failure of the ECOMOG-UNOMIL operation to institute reconstruction contributed to Taylor’s victory with 75% of the vote in the June 1997 elections (Harris 1999, 437). ECOMOG, now 10,000 soldiers strong, oversaw the elections (ibid.). UN and international election observers, including the UN, the Carter Center, the European Union, the Organization of African Unity, and ECOWAS, deemed the elections free and fair, but the mass media suggested that Taylor received the votes because the population feared he would wage war against the country if he lost (Means 1997; UCDP 2008). However, the media’s portrayal of Taylor as an enemy of the entire Liberian people does not present the complete picture. As Harris (1999) states, “the voting was a reasoned ploy by the electorate to maximise the possibility of improved living conditions” (431). The vote indicates that the public thought Taylor could provide security, but it cannot entirely
be relegated to an indication of fear. The UN reported no incidents of violence, threats, or intimidation during polling in the time frame prior to the election (Harris 1999). Furthermore, the population saw Taylor as the candidate most able to improve their socioeconomic conditions and institute reconstruction. The electorate deemed that Taylor could best provide for their human security, including their physical security, livelihoods, and socioeconomic well-being. “Liberians, in all probability, were looking for a betterment of their economic status in a stable environment” (Harris 1999, 453).

Thus, the PKO’s failure to incorporate economic policies into their mission had multiple consequences. First, it contributed to the election of Taylor. As the ICG (2004) points out, Taylor’s election allowed him to “continu[e] pillage and abuse of the population, and ultimately [this led to] a resumption of civil war” (1). Second, the failure to institute a proper DDR program led disillusioned youth to take up arms again, causing the second civil war. Had these youth been fully demobilized and reintegrated into a functioning workforce, it can be argued that they might have bypassed the opportunity to reinitiate war.

Taylor’s campaign messages carried populist undertones, as he described himself as the “Father of the Liberian Revolution” (Harris 1999, 446). In Liberia, the imperative was to cope with hunger, unemployment, and poverty (ibid.). Not only did Taylor offer the provision of security, but he promised reconstruction, which ECOMOG-UNOMIL had failed to implement. He campaigned on the promise that he would repair the damage caused by the war. This invoked a common slogan in the electorate, “He who spoil it, let him fix it” (ibid.).

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26 The argument that Taylor’s electoral promises factored into his election is by no means meant to dismiss the gross violations of human rights committed by Taylor and the NPFL, nor is it meant to argue that he was forgiven or admired by the thousands of families whose lives he tore apart during the civil war.
Furthermore, economic incentives for the population were readily promised during Taylor’s campaign. He distributed many gifts to the people, particularly rice, which was welcomed over the UN’s distribution of detested bulgur wheat (Harris 1999). He also made massive “unrealistic promises” (ibid., 446):

Taylor also used his money to give cash and other gifts in the manner of bread and circuses once provided by Roman emperors. He promised to restore electricity in Monrovia -- where it had been off since his troops destroyed generators and substations that supplied the electricity before their wartime attempt to take the capital. He distributed bags of rice, Liberia's staple food, and made donations for school construction and other desperately needed public buildings. (Means 1997, 1)

As will be seen in the case study on UNAMSIL, it was the PKO itself that provided electricity, food staples, and infrastructure reconstruction in Sierra Leone. In Liberia, Taylor promised these tasks in the absence of their provision by the PKO.

At the end of the first civil war, Liberians “voted for the candidate who was most likely to enforce security and offer the best chance of improving their living conditions” (Harris 1999, 452). They were taking a gamble on their uncertainty for the future: “Would Taylor become yet another oppressive, undemocratic leader…or might he begin a peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation to bring the refugees home, put the children back in school and achieve some modicum of economic improvement?” (Means 1997, 2).

Ultimately, Taylor’s presidency would prove to be “intensely personalized” (Harris 1999, 448). His term in office failed to meet his campaign promises and continued the historical practice of rule through corrupt leadership, marginalization of the masses, economic exclusion, and a lack of social welfare policies. The socioeconomic conditions for Liberians were terrible during Taylor’s presidency. Unemployment rose to 85% and 75% of the population lived below the poverty line (Kabia 2009, 153). “The patron-client structures and, particularly, the preference for foreign partners in the
exploitation of resources highlights the continuity in political practices from the Americo-Liberians to Doe to Taylor” (Harris 1999, 448). The country was deemed “Liberia, Inc.” by a population who saw the state as the private enterprise of Taylor and his inner circle (Kabia 2009, 153). This eventually led to a resumption of conflict with rebels targeting Taylor for many of the same reasons he had targeted Doe, to remove a corrupt and exclusionary president from power.

Taylor’s integral role as an opportunist throughout the conflict is significant in this discussion. Taylor’s profit-seeking throughout the insurgency and his term as president lend support to the theorists who argue that greed is a significant factor in causing conflict. Indeed, one of Taylor’s first acts in office was to pass the Strategic Commodity Act, which declared that all “strategic resources in air, on land, or in the sea are within the right of the President to administer personally” (quoted in ICG 2002, as cited in Kabia 2009, 153). Taylor and his inner circle continued to profit from the illicit trade of natural resources, as they had during the civil war. There were no doubt opportunists throughout the conflict who joined Taylor or other factions to maximize their own chances for wealth-generation from a war economy. This argument is strengthened by the fact that Liberia is well-endowed with natural resources and thus is enticing to individuals with no viable economic alternative. However, given the context of inequality and failure of the state to provide for its citizens’ socioeconomic welfare in Liberia, it would be too simplistic to relegate the root cause of the war entirely to greed. Grievances clearly were deeply rooted in Liberia, and this motivation for conflict cannot be summarily dismissed.
Conclusion to ECOMOG-UNOMIL Case

As proposed in the first hypothesis, the failure of the mission to reintegrate former combatants into a productive civilian livelihood contributed to the recurrence of violence in Liberia. ECOMOG-UNOMIL was able to establish security during the mission. In the first full year of its operation, ECOMOG kept battle-related deaths below 50. Although 1992 saw a resurgence of violence with an estimated 1000 battle-related deaths, ECOMOG reestablished security by 1993 (UCDP 2008). For the remainder of the PKO there were less than 25 deaths per year. Following the July 1997 exit of ECOMOG, this low threshold for conflict-related deaths only held until 2000. Liberians experienced a resumption of civil war with more than 60 battle-related deaths in the first year and thousands more died during Liberia’s second civil war (UCDP 2008). Based on the definition of my dependent variable, ECOMOG-UNOMIL was a failure.

In fact, many insurgents who participated in the second conflict had also fought in the first. The failure of the Liberian PKO to create an environment that protected human security, particularly in terms of socioeconomic well-being, led to renewed outbreak of violence. In addition, ECOMOG-UNOMIL’s failure to initiate economic reconstruction contributed to the election of a warlord who promised precisely the tasks neglected in the PKO, which contributed to the resumption of civil war. 27

However, the Liberian case also contains aspects that are potentially problematic for my argument. First, ECOMOG was a regional peacekeeping force. While the

27 The robust peacekeeping force to Liberia following the second civil war (the United Nations Mission in Liberia or UNMIL), modeled after the multidimensional mission in Sierra Leone, was a significant factor in the peace that endures in Liberia today (UN 2001). Based on the conclusions drawn from this paper, the inclusion of significant economic priorities during UNMIL likely contributed to the success of the mission. A case study of the UNMIL mission in comparison with UNAMSIL would be an interesting avenue for future research.
comparison of regional versus UN peacekeeping forces would be an interesting topic for future research, the UN certainly has a reputation for being more impartial than regional organizations. Indeed, Nigeria, the West African hegemon, played an instrumental role in directing ECOMOG’s agenda in Liberia. Regional peacekeeping forces may be only minimally funded and they may be seen as less legitimate than UN peacekeepers. A further potential weakness in the case relates to security provision. Did ECOMOG establish a secure enough environment that reconstruction was able to take place following the prerequisite requirement of physical security? ECOMOG certainly did not have a large budget compared to later multidimensional missions. The question of force provision is debatable, but it should be recognized that ECOMOG contained as many as 20,000 troops at its peak, which is more than the PKO in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the major warring factions disbanded following the first Liberian war.\(^{28}\) The fact that some of the demobilized combatants rejoined new rebel groups in the second conflict can be attributed more to the failure of the ECOMOG-UNOMIL DDR program than to an absence of security provision by ECOMOG. Without vocational training and jobs, many individuals joined factions during the onset of the second war for the same economic incentives that had led them to join rebel groups in the first war. Third, the assertion that a single state, Nigeria, was able to provide security in the Liberian PKO does not make the case irrelevant to the UN mission in Sierra Leone. The UN mission in Sierra Leone also failed to achieve security. Great Britain sent in the number of troops and amount of resources needed to end the violence. My paper does not debate whether the UN, regional peacekeepers, or unilateral states are able to establish security. Rather, my

\(^{28}\) However, because Taylor was elected president and the NPFL gained significant control over the government in the 1997 elections, Taylor’s former rebel group took on the role of the government forces in the second war.
argument focuses on the tasks that are necessary after security has already been established.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that some authors argue that the conflict is perhaps more appropriately viewed as two phases of one war, because of the interlinkages of issues and the fact that many of the members of the new rebel groups had fought with factions in the first war (see for example, Omeje 2009; UCDP 2008). However, many sources, including the UN, categorize the first (1989-1995) and second (2000-2003) Liberian civil wars as two separate wars. A common practice is to categorize a civil conflict as a new war if fighting reoccurs without one of the former main parties (Fearon 2004). Consistent with this categorization, at the outbreak of the second civil war in Liberia, the main factions from the first conflict had demobilized and new rebel groups emerged. Furthermore, the fact that many of the rebels in the second war had also fought in the first war with different factions does not negate my argument. Rather, this realization lends support to my expectations, because it is precisely the failure to reintegrate ex-combatants into productive civilian jobs that I argue contributes to the reemergence of conflict. Finally, whether the conflict is assumed to consist of two phases or two wars does not diminish my argument because a PKO did in fact take place after the first war, and it is the PKO that is the focus of my case.

To conclude, I do not believe that these weaknesses contradict the basic argument of this paper, which is that socioeconomic tasks contribute to post-conflict stability. While I do not argue that the failure of the PKO to institute robust economic programs was the only factor resulting in the second civil war, the discussion certainly suggests that it was a contributing factor. The discussion shows that rebels took up arms again because
of continued neglect by the state and the lack of viable reintegration of former combatants into civilian livelihoods. This lends support to my central expectation that economic initiatives during the PKO would have prevented a significant number of individuals from reengaging in conflict. I will now contrast the failed PKO in Liberia with the UNAMSIL mission.
Chapter 6

THE SIERRA LEONEAN CIVIL WAR AND UNAMSIL

Background to the Conflict

In 1787, British abolitionists established a settlement in Freetown, the present-day capital of Sierra Leone, to provide refuge for liberated slaves (BBC News 2010). Freetown became a British Colony in 1807 and continued to function as a base for British anti-slavery squadrons operating off the coast of West Africa (Richards 1996, 37). By 1896, Great Britain had established a protectorate over Sierra Leone’s hinterland (BBC News 2010). Freetown and the surrounding region became populated by “recaptives,” who were recently enslaved Africans that were freed before the slave ships escaped the western African waters. The “recaptives” brought rich culture and ideas from the western coast and soon fostered a “creolized” intellectual society (ibid.). During colonial administration, the British had ruled using indigenous power structures. Local leaders received patronage from the colonial administrators in exchange for controlling the population (UCDP 2008). Consequently, as in other post-colonial states, Sierra Leone failed to develop an efficient state structure. Patrimonialism became the dominant state system (ibid.). “Perched on top of this ethno-social system [were] the Creoles, a comparatively tiny exogenous group” (about 2% of the population) (Ofuatey-Kodjo...
The Creoles mimicked British society, ran the colonial bureaucracy, and controlled main commerce channels. In resemblance of the Americo-Liberians, the Sierra Leonean Creoles treated the indigenous population as inferior and directed a “civilizing mission” ideology towards other ethnic groups (ibid., 129). Colonial rule faced widespread discontent throughout the 19th century, and violence was often directed at Creoles, who were seen as enablers and representatives of colonial rule (UCDP 2008).

Since the first diamond was found in Sierra Leone in 1930, international economic interests in Sierra Leone have been pronounced (Smillie et al. 2000, 4). By 1935, the diamond industry was exporting considerable quantities of the gem (ibid.). Throughout the history of diamond production in Sierra Leone, the profits were reaped by foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and the ruling class, rather than the local population. From 1935 to 1955, De Beers’ Sierra Leone Selection Trust controlled exclusive mining and prospecting rights over the entire country. In 1955, the De Beers’ monopoly was repealed and mining licenses became dominated by ethnic Mandingos and foreign Lebanese traders (ibid.). In this period there were an estimated 75,000 illicit miners in Kono district, the center of the diamond trade. Antwerp, De Beers’, and Israeli-based diamond traders continued to operate in the country (ibid.).

Sierra Leone gained independence from Great Britain in 1961, during a decade of similar transitions to independence by other African colonies (Labonte 2004, 16). Following Sierra Leone’s independence, the political arena opened up to the indigenous population and politics became a contest to monopolize the state’s resources for one’s own ethnic group (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). Corruption and patronage fueled ethnic tensions between economic and political elites in the capital city of Freetown and the
ethnicities that lived in the hinterland throughout the early decades of Sierra Leone’s independence (UCDP 2008). The country was ruled by a string of repressive and corrupt dictators in its post-independence period. Although attempts were made at civilian rule, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed several military coups and in 1978, Siaka Stevens and his All People’s Congress (APC) turned the country into a one-party state under the new constitution (Richards 1996, 41; BBC News 2010). Stevens’ term in office was characterized by corruption, repression, massive scandals, and mismanagement of the economy. During his regime, illicit mining occurred on a large-scale and Stevens engaged in criminal activities associated with the trade himself (Smillie et al. 2000). In 1971, Stevens effectively nationalized the diamond industry (ibid., 5). Although production had peaked at 2 million carats in 1970, by 1980 legitimate diamond exports accounted for only 595,000 carats, and by 1988 this number dropped to 48,000 carats (ibid.). The population’s reaction was manifested in bloody demonstrations and strikes, as well as attempted coups (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). In 1985, the elderly Stevens handed power to his “hand-picked successor,” General Joseph Saidu Momoh (Richards 1996, 41). At this point, the government had lost all credibility and had garnered a reputation for its corrupt trade in natural resources with foreigners (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003).

Sierra Leone experienced haphazard involvement by the international community after independence. As part of its neoliberal growth strategy, the World Bank and IMF had emphasized market liberalization as the key to economic development in the 1980s (prior to the outbreak of war in Sierra Leone) (Harsch 2006, 8). These market liberalization policies led to drastic cuts in the government’s spending on public services, already an agenda low on budget priorities. The policies failed to improve the state’s
socioeconomic situation and actually enhanced corruption and patronage within the
government (ibid.). The education, agriculture, and social security networks deteriorated
as public spending was downscaled (UCDP 2008).

Under a system of patrimonialism, the political elite bolstered its support by
doling out resources to its cohorts (Richards 1996). While Sierra Leone had an
abundance of natural resources, the profits financed personal rule rather than state
programs that should have provided public services (ibid.). Politicians and businessmen
in Sierra Leone sought to aggrandize their own wealth by engaging in international
commerce using the country’s natural wealth in gold, diamonds, and forest products
(Richards 1996). Patronage in Sierra Leone meant that prime jobs were distributed to
leaders’ families and personal networks, while individual credentials and education gave
no guarantee of employment. Sierra Leone lacked developed industrial and agricultural
sectors, and a functioning and legitimate bureaucracy (UCDP 2008). This lack of
development meant that employment was scarce for youth in Sierra Leone. Young men
and women entering the workforce for the first time often had no viable option to support
themselves, much less a family (Richards 1996). Thus, students were at the forefront of
protests against the government. They were joined by day workers, teachers, and lower-
ranked civil servants and members of the military (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003).

The state structure perpetuated inequality. “Inequality in Sierra Leone has, since
its independence from Britain in 1961, fed directly into disaffection and violence…”
(Labonte 2004, 16). Income inequality was a significant problem in Sierra Leone before
the outbreak of civil war. In 1989, immediately prior to the war, Sierra Leone had the
highest level of inequality in a survey of 25 African countries (Harsch 2006, 8). The Gini
Index in Sierra Leone was the fifth-worst in the world at 62.9 in 1989 (0 indicates perfect equality in wealth and 100 indicates perfect inequality) (see CIA 2009a). At that time, the poorest 20% of the population controlled only 1% of the income, while the richest 20% received 63.4% of all income (World Bank 2007; World Bank 2002).

Polarization is defined as “the extent to which a small number of influential groups dominate a society” (World Bank 2006, 118). In other words, it was exemplified by Sierra Leone before its civil war. A small number of wealthy individuals in Freetown, the capital city, controlled both economic and political power within the country. The World Bank contends that polarization frequently leads to conflict. This is illustrated by the fact that nine of the ten most polarized countries in the world have experienced civil conflict, including Sierra Leone (World Bank 2006).

Sierra Leone also experienced regional gaps in the access to resources between Freetown and rural areas. This contributed to an urban-rural divide where welfare, living standards, and economic opportunity varied by geographic location within the country (Labonte 2004). For example, the rural-to-urban disparity for access to services in 1988 shows that on average less than 10% of the rural population had access to water and sanitation, while 64% of the urban population had this access (UNDP 1990). Furthermore, these regional disparities in income and class were manifested in political concentration monopolized by the South pre-conflict. Other inequalities included ethnicity, which was closely interlinked with regional disparity. The Creole ethnic group, concentrated in the capital, enjoyed elevated status through greater control of resources and an inordinate amount of political representation. The Temne ethnic group in the North and Mende in the South comprised the majority of the population in the poor rural
areas (Özerdem 2009). “[T]he differential access of ethnic groups to political, social, and economic opportunities during the colonial period, created a mind-set in which ethnic animosities continued to be part of the collective memories of many groups, so that even though they are sometimes overlaid by other identities and grievances, ethnic grievances are never too far from the surface, and, therefore, they are always there for political entrepreneurs to exploit” (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003, 129). Ethnic inequalities perpetuated economic grievances.

Regional disparities in Sierra Leone—such as the urban-rural divide, ethnic inequalities, and income disparities—were closely related to gender discrimination in Sierra Leone. Kabeer (2003) mapped out a “geography of gender” in Sierra Leone. She found that “the regions with the lower social and economic indicators [were] predominantly those where women [were] least economically active and [had] least access to education and training opportunities, credit, ownership of land and political leadership” (as cited in Baksh 2005, 83). Gender inequality contributed to women’s poverty and consequently to the impoverishment of children. It is important to realize that marginalization affected many individuals—women, youth, specific ethnic groups—and contributed to an environment that bred grievances about the lack of economic prospects in Sierra Leone.

Surveys of ex-combatants conducted after the civil war confirmed that “young people in Sierra Leone felt a sense of hopelessness, worsened by visible signs of elite wealth and power, that had contributed to their decision to take up arms” (Harsch 2006, 8). Ethnographic studies of the border towns where the insurgency gained its foothold in Sierra Leone identify young families’ future ambitions: to build a primary school and
roads to the rest of the state (Richards 1996). The IMF encouraged the Sierra Leonean state to keep these forested and diamond-rich border towns remote for conservation purposes. At the same time, political elites sent their families to expensive schools in Europe. “The rebels stepped into the breach. RUF [Revolutionary United Front] bush schools, with only scraps and torn pages for readers, may not seem like much, but they are more than could be found in [any] village on the border before the war began” (Richards 1996, xxvii).

Accordingly, the “stage was set” for civil strife to emerge in the 1990s, with a weak state military, a corrupt dictator controlling the government, opportunities abound for illicit natural resource extraction, and “hordes of unemployed and frustrated youth” (UCDP 2008). After the civil war broke out in 1991, the people of Sierra Leone would endure conflict for nine years (Harbom et al. 2006).

Sierra Leone’s Civil War (1991-2000)

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the rebel movement in Sierra Leone, was formed by political and economic refugees in Liberia. Some had fought with the NPFL in Liberia, whereas others preferred to return to Sierra Leone with the RUF rather than remain as refugees outside of their country (Richards 1996). The Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor helped fund the insurgency in Sierra Leone as a retaliation against the Sierra Leone government’s support for the first PKO in Liberia (ibid.).

The RUF’s invasion of Sierra Leone was launched into eastern Sierra Leone’s Kailahun District from NPFL-controlled territory in Liberia in March 1991 (Richards 1996, 4). At this early stage of the conflict, the RUF consisted of only around 100
fighters, including Sierra Leonean exiles and Burkinabe and Liberian mercenaries. The leader of the movement was Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal who had trained for insurgency with Charles Taylor in Libya during the 1980s (UCDP 2008). Similar to Taylor’s stated aims in Liberia, the RUF announced its goal to oust the one-party regime in power, liberate the impoverished peasantry, and restore democracy to the country (ibid.). In Sierra Leone, this meant the overthrow of the ruling APC and the patrimonial rule of President Momoh (Richards 1996).

Similar to the NPFL, the RUF also engaged in youth recruitment to bolster its strength. Some youth joined the movement voluntarily and others became members through forced conscription (Richards 1996). One frequently used technique was to force youth to commit violence against their own communities and local leaders in order to deter the conscripts from trying to return to their home villages for fear of retaliation (Richards 1996). In addition to instilling fear of desertion, the RUF indoctrinated combatants with the movement’s goals. Despite their use of forced conscription, the RUF leadership provided combatants with monetary and material incentives, and thus they obtained many conscripts’ allegiance (ibid.).

The rebels funded their rebellion through diamond mining and by stealing food and weapons. Within the first year of the incursion, the RUF controlled more than half of the country and the majority of the diamond mines (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). Liberia functioned as a center for large-scale illicit trade in diamonds and received weapons from the RUF in exchange for providing an outlet for illegal diamond exports (Smillie et al. 2000). By January 1995, the RUF had gained control of the three most important centers for diamond mining in the country, including foreign-owned sites in the Kono and
Kenema diamond districts (Francis 1999, 325). This dealt a major strike against the government’s principal foreign commerce income and additionally attracted further interest from Western governments with economic interests in the diamond trade (ibid.). Funded by the exploitation of natural resources, the insurgency ravaged the country. The rebels continued to fight in the forested regions of southern and eastern Sierra Leone for a year before a group of officers ousted Momoh’s government (Richards 1996).

In April 1992, a group of officers from Sierra Leone’s military under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew the APC, which left the RUF without its original motive for the insurgency (Richards 1996, 5; Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). Attempts at a peace agreement led nowhere and the Sierra Leonean military went on the offensive against the RUF. The RUF later insisted that it made genuine attempts at amnesty due to this turn of events, but military leaders in Nigeria and Ghana encouraged the new ruling government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to destroy the rebel movement (Richards 1996). After the fall of the APC, “the rebels justified further extension of the long-drawn-out bush war with the claim that the NPRC regime, after a bright start, had reverted to the patrimonial politics of the APC” (Richards 1996, xix). Indeed, Captain Strasser suspended the constitution, political parties and elections in order to form a military regime that could end the war rapidly (Richards 1996). The NPRC was supported by ECOWAS troops (UCDP 2008). Strasser quickly consolidated power by bolstering the military with new recruits, many of whom were children (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003). However, the military was undisciplined and poorly trained and thus incapable of defeating the RUF. This led the NPRC to seek out private security companies for assistance (Francis 1999). In 1995, Strasser hired Executive Outcomes
(EO), a South African-based private security firm, to fight the RUF (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003, 132). EO cost the government 1.225 million (U.S. dollars) a month and as part of the arrangement, enormous mining concessions in the Kono district were granted to an EO-affiliate, United Kingdom (UK) mining company Branch Energy (Francis 1999, 326). EO’s possession of superior military equipment, such as helicopters and armored vehicles, enabled the firm to evict the RUF from the peripheral districts of Freetown and to destroy RUF headquarters. For the first time since the beginning of the civil war, the military balance tipped in favor of the government (ibid., 327).

In 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Julius Maada Bio (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003, 132). Bio invited the RUF to negotiate, and he scheduled national elections, which were held in February 1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president. The success of the elections and EO’s military gains against the RUF inspired the Abidjan Accords to be signed by Kabbah’s government and the RUF in November 1996 (Ofuatey-Kodjoe 2003; Francis 1999, 327). However, the RUF’s condition for signing the agreement was the EO’s departure from Sierra Leone. The security situation reverted to instability following the security company’s exit in January 1997 (Francis 1999, 327). Then, in May, Major Johnny Paul Koroma seized power of the government and formed a military junta called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The coup was the result of long-standing collaborations between the RUF and disloyal members of Sierra Leone’s military (UCDP 2008). Furthermore, the coup can be traced to the army’s marginalization from economic and political processes under Kabbah’s leadership. The Kamajors militia had become the main group of combatants to reap the economic benefits of the war and it had surpassed the military in political dominance
Although he had been forced into exile, Kabbah garnered armed support from Nigeria, and he also financed the Kamajors to fight against the joint rule of the AFRC and RUF (UCDP 2008). Kabbah additionally hired UK-based Sandline International (a private security company) to provide arms and train the civil militia. Sandline had the covert approval of the British Foreign Office, despite a UN embargo against arms shipments to Sierra Leone (Francis 1999; Smillie et al. 2000). Furthermore, the contract awarded enormous diamond concessions to the financier of the Sandline operation, who additionally had a large stake in the UK-based Branch Energy and Diamond Works. The deal resulted in extensive political embarrassment for Tony Blair’s government (ibid.).

In October 1997, ECOWAS sent in a peacekeeping force to attempt to reinstate President Kabbah (UCDP 2008). By the beginning of 1998, 10,000 troops were stationed in Sierra Leone and fought alongside the Kamajors. In March, Kabbah was reinstated and Sankoh was put on trial for treason (ibid.). The UN deployed 70 military observers in 1998 (the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone or UNOMSIL). Following a brutal onslaught by the RUF on the capital in 1999, the international community increased its involvement and enabled the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement (ibid.).

The brutal RUF attack on the capital drew the UN’s attention and UNAMSIL was mandated to replace the UNOMSIL mission (UCDP 2008). However, the security situation was not yet secure, as the RUF attacked UNAMSIL troops following departure of the ECOWAS troops. Several hundred UN troops were abducted in April 2000 (BBC

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29 The Kamajors were traditional hunter-warrior groups of the Mende ethnicity that were organized for self-defense in the eastern and southern regions of Sierra Leone.
News 2010). The next month, 800 British paratroopers were deployed to Sierra Leone to release the captives and evacuate British citizens (ibid.). UNAMSIL’s mandate was bolstered to allow greater use of force and its troop numbers were enhanced. The Abuja agreement was signed in November 2000 to reaffirm the earlier Lomé agreement (ibid.). By March 2001, UN peacekeepers were able to deploy peacefully into rebel-controlled territory for the first time since the beginning of the mission. British troops remained until July 2002 to assist UNAMSIL in ensuring an end to the civil war (BBC News 2010). With security established, UNAMSIL was able to move forward with its economic agenda.

To conclude the discussion of the events during the civil war, it is necessary to discuss the evidence for greed and grievance-based explanations for the RUF’s rebellion. Supporters of the greed explanation for civil war argue that the rebels were bandits, rather than revolutionaries with any political message. The mass atrocities committed by the rebels against the civilian population seem to provide evidence for their claims. In fact, the violent acts of the RUF drastically compromised any support they might have had from the civilian population for their stated goals. However, it is insufficient to dismiss the rebels as bandits, following the lead of Kaplan (1994) and urban elites during the war (Richards 1996). These viewpoints fail to acknowledge that ex-combatants specifically pinpoint marginalization as a main cause of the war (ibid.).

In a country with minimal infrastructure, the RUF had little opportunity for external communication. In fact, in the first few years of the war the group demanded an international press conference to promote its cause. It also demanded an international satellite phone link, yet had to settle for TV coverage by capturing international hostages.
(Richards 1996). The hostage-takings were conducted in a dramatic fashion, as the RUF leader Sankoh proclaimed they were captured for their own protection. The rebellion was framed “in siege-like terms, to bring out the extent to which ‘reasonable people’ had turned to desperate measures, faced with the social dereliction caused by the extensive engagement, over many years, of patrimonial politicians and business elites in international commerce” (Richards 1996, xxiii). The rebels’ own justification for the rebellion was to fight against state corruption (ibid.). The war in Sierra Leone involved appalling brutality, but this unfortunate reality should not be used to support claims that the rebels lacked any purpose:

Terror is supposed to unsettle its victims. The confused accounts of terrorized victims of violence do not constitute evidence of the irrationality of violence. Rather they show the opposite—that the tactics have been fully effective in disorienting, traumatizing and demoralizing victims of violence. In short, they are devilishly well-calculated...the belligerents have perfectly rational political aims, however difficult it may be to justify the levels of violence they employ in pursuit of these aims. The rebel leadership has a clear political vision of a reformed and accountable state.

(Richards 1996, xvi-xvii)

The rationality of extreme violence for the combatants is found in the realization that the rebel troops had fewer weapons and men than the government forces. The rebels relied on misinformation and acts of terror to demoralize their opponents and achieve tactical outcomes (Richards 1996). As Richards (1996) points out, there is little value “in distinguishing between cheap war based on killing with knives and cutlasses, and expensive wars in which civilians are maimed or destroyed with sophisticated laser-guided weapons. All war is terrible. It makes no sense to call one kind of war ‘barbaric’ when all that is meant is that it is cheap” (xx). Richards’ message is poignant. The atrocities committed by the rebel soldiers should not divert attention from the motivations behind their insurgency.
At the heart of the political agenda is the fact that a patrimonial state not only excludes the masses from power, it excludes them from wealth-generating activities. Blatant extravagance by the elite in control of the government contributed to grievances against the state’s neglect of the socioeconomic welfare of the masses, while conflict offered the opportunity for profiteering and a chance to oust a government that failed to provide for its people’s basic needs. Economic opportunity continues to explain rational motivations behind insurgents’ desires for enhanced socioeconomic well-being, yet it does not tell the whole story. One must also look at the grievances of a population neglected by the state for decades and it is here that additional motivations for insurgency are found.

**UNAMSIL (1999-2005)**

In order to entice the rebels to enter into the peace process, conflict negotiators followed a policy of offering both amnesty and rehabilitation programs to the young ex-combatants that had fought in the civil war (Richards 1996). Sierra Leone’s comprehensive Lôme Peace Agreement was signed in July 1999 (Harbom et al. 2006). The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) deployed in October 1999. The UNAMSIL mission remained in Sierra Leone until the end of 2005. Following the return of the RUF to the battlefield after the signing of the Lôme Peace Agreement, the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed in November 2000 (Harbom et al. 2006). In January 2002, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah declared disarmament complete and the Sierra Leone Civil War over (Olonisakin 2008, 111).
Following the Abuja cease-fire, UNAMSIL was able to operate at its maximum capacity. In 2002, at its peak, UNAMSIL was the largest and most expensive UN mission to date. It had more than 17,000 troops, a large civilian unit, and its cost was some 700 million (U.S. dollars) per year (Olonisakin 2008, 111). UNAMSIL was successful in creating an environment in which elections could be held in May 2002. The elections were deemed free and fair by international observers (ibid., 112-113). The rebel group’s political party, the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) did not win a single parliamentary seat, while President Kabbah was re-elected with 70% of the vote.

UNAMSIL was able to register 2.3 million voters “with military, civilian police, military observers, and civilian staff engaged, it was truly a joint effort…” (Olonisakin 2008, 113). UNAMSIL had become a “fashionable mission, with a reputation for innovation and genuine impact” (ibid., 115). As the mission’s capacity grew, it was able to concentrate on issues such as poverty reduction, “youth vulnerability and exclusion,” and “long-term reintegration of demobilized combatants” (ibid.).

Furthermore, the illicit diamond mining that had allowed the rebels to finance their war was beginning to be cut off through the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (Olonisakin 2008, 115). Steps to design a process to certify the origin of diamonds were taken in May 2000. The certificate plan was approved in March 2002 and ensured that participating countries would be required to certify that diamonds for export did not finance rebel groups (ibid.). With rebel finances curtailed and the security situation secure, UNAMSIL was able to focus on the socioeconomic tasks of its mission.

Coordination between UNAMSIL and development agencies was substantial. Alan Doss, Deputy Special Representative for Governance and Stabilization, was
considered a critical player in “improving interaction with the rest of the UN family and Sierra Leonean Civil Society” (Olonisakin 2008, 116). “There [was] a spillover of the mission’s huge amount of resources into the development and humanitarians and therefore there [was] a spillover of good relations and a lot of convergence” noted Mohamed Farah, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) country representative in Sierra Leone (ibid.). UNAMSIL participated closely with the UN country team, the Sierra Leonean government, and the World Bank in preparing the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sierra Leone. “The key message in the framework was an overwhelming shift from emergency and relief operations to longer-term initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of the Sierra Leone war, with particular emphasis on poverty reduction and reintegration” as the foundation of economic recovery (ibid.).

During the drawdown of the UNAMSIL mission, political uncertainties threatened stability. A 2002 International Crisis Group (ICG) report pin-pointed a “strong north-south divide exposed by the elections, a failure by President Kabbah to form a cabinet sufficiently broad-based to promote national reconciliation,” and corruption remained widespread (Olonisakin 2008, 124). In the political environment of continuing concentration of power, policies that enhanced economic livelihoods became even more important (Olonisakin 2008). Moreover, the socioeconomic situation was dire. Sierra Leone ranked last out of 175 countries on the UNDP’s 2003 Human Development Index (Olonisakin 2008, 124). An enormous number of unemployed youth roamed the streets. “Meanwhile, the infrastructure of the country and institutions of central government had effectively collapsed during the conflict, such that the
government lacked the proper capacity to address even basic needs like health and education” (ibid.). The international community increasingly recognized that a failure to address the root causes of the conflict in terms of economic malaise risked reigniting the conflict. It was within this context that development tasks began to be implemented.

**UNAMSIL’s Socioeconomic Development Tasks**

Citizens often will not support reform programs without economic development and social programs that enhance their well-being. “Peacebuilding need not solve all problems but it must demonstrate some steady if incremental improvement in order to give citizens a reason to believe [in the peace process].” “Perceptions of what one has and what one should have are the deciding factor” (Talentino 2007, 159). In Sierra Leone, peacekeepers frequently worked alongside locals in development activities, such as the building of health centers, schools, churches, water wells, and prisons (Curran and Woodhouse 2007). Activities such as these contributed to the positive feelings Sierra Leoneans felt for UN peacekeepers at the end of the UNAMSIL mission (Krasno 2005). Sustainability of peace requires that locals believe better times will come, and current hardships are temporary (Woodward 2002).

Krasno (2005) completed an independent public opinion survey of UNAMSIL’s efforts in Sierra Leone in the final year of the mission. The survey results support the idea that the human security needs of the population were met by the PKO. 97.7% of respondents believed UNAMSIL improved the country’s security (Krasno 2005, 10). 83.8% of the participants thought the disarmament process for former combatants was “good” or “very good,” while 75.7% said that UNAMSIL had done a “good” or “very
good” job of retraining and employing former combatants (ibid., 11-12). Most importantly to this research, 76.6% of respondents believed that the UN peacekeepers had gone above and beyond providing security by engaging in development tasks (ibid., 23). Krasno observes that the examples of local-level development described by the study participants were “extraordinary” (24):

Sierra Leoneans explained that UN peacekeepers had built roads and bridges, road networks, shelters, health centers, radio stations, schools, mosques, churches, and market structures. They gave out free medical care and medicine, free school supplies, food, and clothing. They built quality water wells, rehabilitated prisons, carried out night patrols, and built town clock towers.

(Krasno 2005, 24)

Furthermore, the peacekeepers involved the community in their development initiatives. While locals tend to rate the protection of their own physical security as the most important task the peacekeepers provide, development work completed by the peacekeepers ranks second (Krasno 2005). One respondent declared that UNAMSIL had been enormously beneficial “by bringing peace to our land, promoting education, and creating job opportunities for us, as this will improve our life status and also improve our land” (ibid., 25). As shown in the public opinion survey, UNAMSIL met the multiple needs of human security of the local population by starting with physical security, and then creating the economic conditions for individuals to reconstruct their lives.

In addition, Sierra Leone’s stop-gap programs were successful. Infrastructure construction and service provision created jobs for former combatants, refugees, and local citizens disillusioned by years of war. Stop-gap projects are short-term programs that address the difficulty combatants may have in transitioning from a military to civilian lifestyle. They are implemented through community-based projects that create short-term jobs while combatants wait for longer term reintegration (UNDP 2005).
Although stop-gap projects are not a substitute for an overall reintegration program, they appear to be extremely beneficial in ensuring short-term security, allowing combatants to feel secure enough to transition towards reintegration into regular society. In Sierra Leone, thousands of combatants were employed by the stop-gap program in short-term work. Around 6,000 ex-combatants and 1,500 local community members were employed in the “labor intensive, quick impact community infrastructure and agricultural development projects” (UNDP 2005, 49). Each project lasted two to three months (Özerdem 2009, 137).

The stop-gap projects created a communal atmosphere in which participants shared meals and participated in group sports (UNDP 2005). In fact, even members of previously warring factions worked together. Part of the reason that stop-gap programs were so successful was that they focused on the community reintegration component of DDR. The programs were beneficial for social reintegration, as they allowed ex-fighters and members of their receiving communities to work together (Özerdem 2009). DDR programs tend to focus too heavily on disarmament, which neglects the task of addressing community reintegration. Particularly, if the mission hopes to avoid favoritism for certain groups, an emphasis on projects for the community at-large is beneficial. Funds were specifically set aside to employ both ex-combatants and civilians. Most importantly, “potential spoilers were given work, a way to burn off potentially destructive energy and together with civilians invest in the long-term reconstruction of their communities by building schools and health centres and clearing roadways” (ICG 2004, 12). These programs kept youth engaged in productive and meaningful reconstruction of the community, which had two positive benefits for peace. First, it kept youth out of
armed factions because it made peace an economically profitable and attractive option. Second, it began to repair relationships between ex-combatants and community members so that human security was enhanced.

**UNAMSIL Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration**

DDR programs were coordinated in Sierra Leone under the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) (Özerdem 2009). Although the UNDP, UNICEF, the Sierra Leone government, and other partners were involved in DDR, the steering of the process was conducted by UNAMSIL (ibid.). Disarmament and demobilization were considered overall successes. However, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the reintegration phase because of my emphasis on social welfare programs, rather than disbandment of fighting forces.

The major issue UNAMSIL faced in moving into its socioeconomic tasks was funding. The mission was funded for its military operation, but money for humanitarian and development work came from agencies and programs within the UN system. These programs had no funds of their own, relying instead on voluntary donations (Olonisakin 2008). Indeed, Özerdem (2009) observes:

> If there was one particular challenge [that] put huge strains on the implementation of reintegration projects, that was the lack of consistent funding”…“It was clear that once former combatants were demobilized and returned to their communities, they would be in a critical situation without any means of employment or livelihoods. Having [been] removed from their current means of livelihood through disarmament, it was an integral part of the new social contract that they should receive rapid economic reintegration assistance.

*(Özerdem 2009, 136-137)*

During reintegration, the Reintegration Opportunities Program (ROP) provided ex-combatants with educational, vocational, or agricultural courses (Özerdem 2009). Other
options included support for entrepreneurship through the provision of subsistence allowances for up to six months and vocational tool kits (ibid.).

One of the most successful components of the DDR process was UNAMSIL’s ability to involve governmental organizations and NGOs. For example, the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) played a significant role by expanding its reintegration activities to both former combatants and receiving communities. “In addition to a wide range of peacebuilding programmes from education to economic empowerment, GTZ with its 650 staff, conducted three-month training programmes in micro-project management” (Özerdem 2009, 129).

While disarmament and demobilization proceeded relatively smoothly, reintegration suffered serious shortfalls in funding as early as September 2002 (Olonisakin 2008, 128). “For the long-term sustainability of reintegration the provision of training opportunities was no doubt, critical, but without follow-up employment opportunities it was difficult to ensure that former combatants would start to earn a living from their new skills and would not return to previous means of livelihood through the barrel of a gun” (Özerdem 2009, 138). Many ex-combatants ended up investing their reinsertion assistance money in diamond mining equipment because of the lack of employment opportunities (ibid.). However, this did provide them with a livelihood.

Perhaps the gravest flaw of the DDR process was that it was “ill suited to the economic realities of the country” (Özerdem 2009, 138). Freeman (2001) states that few studies “have demonstrated the importance of an engagement between macrostructural analyses and the flesh and blood of people’s lives as they are bound up within ever-changing localities and cultural and political configurations” (1009). The DDR process
in Sierra Leone was no exception, as it used socioeconomic policies that were more consistent with macroeconomic analyses, rather than an appropriate assessment of the local context. For example, the majority of former combatants came from farming communities and would have benefited from agricultural assistance. Yet financial incentives were not provided to entice former combatants to choose this type of training (Özerdem 2009). Most ex-combatants chose vocational training because it provided stipends. “The vocational training provided was rather opportunistic as it managed to keep former combatants busy for awhile in a particular type of activity without asking how many carpenters, auto mechanics or electricians Sierra Leone’s economy could absorb (ibid.).

Nevertheless, vocational training resulted in meaningful employment for some. Comninos (2002) found that 50% of vocational trainees found jobs and earned an average income of 52,625 leones (13.60 U.S. dollars) per month (Özerdem 2009, 138). Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) found that “42% of those that had completed training had found jobs since finishing. Of those that found work, 72% did so in the first three months after training…Importantly, 74% believe that their current job is directly related to the skills they received in training” (36, as cited in Özerdem 2009, 139). In both studies, around half of those that received training were able to find employment. This is perhaps a low attrition rate overall, however, UNAMSIL was working to provide employment in an economy that had been completely destroyed during the civil war.

UNAMSIL was unable to access much of the rural hinterland, as the Sierra Leonean government had little authority or infrastructure outside of the capital (Olonisakin 2008). Although reintegration was supposed to provide economic
livelihoods for ex-combatants throughout the country, this concentration in the capital was extremely problematic for inequality. Much of the economic wealth was already concentrated within the capital and this was perpetuated by DDR concentration in Freetown. A 2002 Security Council resolution urged the Sierra Leonean government to provide the additional resources needed for an insufficiently funded reintegration program, yet the government itself was barely able to function (ibid., 128). “[T]he task of supporting the reinstatement of state authority throughout Sierra Leone proved very difficult, given the sheer magnitude of the collapse of institutional and physical infrastructure. There was an obvious lack of progress, for example, in the development of a system for domestic revenue collection, let alone the bigger tasks of poverty reduction and development” (ibid.). Thus, enabling the government of Sierra Leone to successfully create jobs and employ former insurgents proved to be a daunting task. “[T]he poorest and most marginalized lack the resources or political voice to influence the distribution of goods and services. Markets most benefit those with the greatest wealth and power. Therefore, the main means for overcoming inequality lie with state institutions that operate in the interests of the general public” (Harsch 2006, 8).

UNAMSIL’s aid to the Sierra Leonean government was beginning to make this reform of the government in the public’s interest more possible, yet the Sierra Leone government still had much further to go. State economic policies still needed to effectively emphasize activities that stimulated job creation (Harsch 2006).

Overall however, the DDR program in Sierra Leone is considered successful. One Sierra Leone DDR expert commented that “successful DDR is not only about the number of weapons collected: since January 2001, when Pa Kabbah declared the war
‘done done’ there has not been one coordinated armed incident. This suggests that weapons have been ‘put beyond use’, which is the objective of DDR” (ICG 2004, 11). One factor that likely contributed to ex-combatants putting their militarized lives behind them is that UNAMSIL was able to provide enough socioeconomic opportunity to persuade combatants against returning to the battlefield.

**International Dimensions to Intervention**

The UNAMSIL mission was the most expensive African peacekeeping mission to that point in history. This fact necessitates a discussion on European interests in conflict intervention in Sierra Leone. More specifically, questions should be posed regarding the larger geopolitical framework in which the UK chose to assist in the resolution of Sierra Leone’s civil war. The neo-colonial school of thought suggests that the UK’s interest in Sierra Leone was less benign than a moral foreign policy interest in assisting a former colony (see Francis 1999). Francis (1999) argues that private security firm interests in Sierra Leone were framed as providing national security, when in fact they were a pathway for further international exploitation of mineral resources. He goes on to explain that security privatization provided “viable foreign policy proxies for Western governments in the pursuit of national interests” (319). A short discussion on international private security involvement in Sierra Leone’s conflict will elucidate the UK’s interest in the civil war.

The increasing involvement of private mercenary firms in civil wars can be partially attributed to the post-Cold War reluctance of Western powers to unilaterally

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30 “Pa Kabbah” refers to President Kabbah of Sierra Leone.
intervene in civil conflicts (Francis 1999). Private military firms that operated in Sierra Leone, including EO and Sandline International, are multimillion dollar legal business establishments that function as MNCs (ibid., 322). For example, the parent MNC Strategic Resources Corporation controls EO and the Branch-Heritage Group, which is a mining and exploration company that owns the UK’s Branch Energy (a mining firm), Diamond Works, and UK-based Sandline International (a security and military support firm). Senior directors in the Branch-Heritage Group negotiated contracts in Sierra Leone for EO and Sandline in exchange for mineral concessions. Both the EO and Sandline International contracts with Sierra Leone’s government awarded diamond mining concessions to Branch Energy. In addition, Francis (1999) asserts that Sandline’s involvement in restoring Kabbah’s civilian government was a foreign policy objective of the UK. The British Foreign Office followed Sandline through military intelligence and the British High Commissioner was the main conduit for negotiations. This illustrates the intricate linkages between international economic and security interests in the conflict. Western governments have “strong covert links” with private military companies and privately allow them to operate because they “supposedly make Africa safe for investment” (ibid., 333; 323). The security firms allow Western governments to protect their geopolitical interests, in this context diamonds, without using their own militaries. The UK stood to gain lucrative economic deals in iron ore and mineral extraction through their intervention in Sierra Leone (Francis 1999).

Given the international interest in establishing a secure environment for international commercial operations in Sierra Leone, doubts may be raised as to the future possibility of replicating a robust mission such as UNAMSIL in countries which
offer fewer economic incentives to external governments. However, it should be noted that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which followed the second Liberian civil war, is as expensive as UNAMSIL and reformed many of its DDR and socioeconomic development programs in line with the Sierra Leonean example (UN 2001). Furthermore, the UN peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo surpassed UNAMSIL as the most expensive mission and deployed 17,000 troops (BBC News 2007). More recently, the UN mission to Darfur has mandated the deployment of 26,000 troops and it promises to be the most expensive peacekeeping mission in history (BBC News 2008). The lack of significant economic interests or extractive possibilities in these regions casts doubt on the argument that the international community only becomes involved in conflicts that offer economic incentives. This leads to a more promising outlook on the possibility that robust multidimensional missions, such as UNAMSIL, can be replicated in the future.31

**Conclusion to UNAMSIL Case**

UNAMSIL clearly is a success as measured by this study’s dependent variable. UNAMSIL arrived in Sierra Leone in 1999, a year with 1500 to 7000 estimated battle deaths. By the following year, battle-deaths had dropped to only 150. From 2001 to the present, the country has not reached the conflict threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in any year (UPDP 2008). Security was established in the mission, which enabled the peacekeepers to engage in economic tasks that supported and reinforced the security environment.

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31 Ultimately, however, my framework does not attempt to model where the UN will decide to intervene or what amount of resources it will invest.
Conflict risk drops by about half if a country’s per capita income doubles (Collier 2003, 41). As Collier (2003) indicates, socioeconomic opportunities within society must be preferable to violence for the youth who would otherwise be recruited to fight. Although there will be variance in individuals’ calculations of utility, the majority of youth are expected to make a rational calculation to choose peace over violence if the economic opportunities are better in the former. Since the 1999 implementation of UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone’s per capita income in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) has risen from 350 dollars per person (U.S. dollars) to 750 dollars per person. In other words, it has more than doubled (World Bank 2007). This is considerable progress at the individual level in a post-conflict environment.

UNAMSIL’s mandate formally ended in December 2005 (Olonisakin 2008, 126). The mission had been successful in disarming and demobilizing more than 75,000 combatants (ibid.). As UNAMSIL began to exit the country, Sierra Leoneans raised objections, as poverty was still widespread and they had benefited from UNAMSIL’s efforts. But UNAMSIL’s leadership argued that the establishment of security was completed. “The UN Country Team, IFIs, and international donors would stay on to address the root causes and put the country on a more normal development track” (Olonisakin 2008, 129). To preserve some continuity, the Security Council established the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) as a successor mission to aid in peacebuilding. UNAMSIL was replaced by UNIOSIL on January 1, 2006 (ibid.). Sierra Leoneans had been given the opportunity to participate in elections and the physical element of their human security had been addressed. Yet to what extent was their access to sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunities improved?
There were certainly flaws within the DDR process. Reintegration faced serious shortages of funds. It also was not always appropriate for the local context. Agricultural training would have been more beneficial to many ex-combatants than other modes of training, yet UNAMSIL failed to make it an attractive option. However, UNAMSIL’s DDR process also achieved many of its objectives. At least half of the former fighters who received training were able to find meaningful employment. Others were able to use their stipends to fund alternate modes of subsistence, such as diamond mining.

Furthermore, UNAMSIL’s socioeconomic development tasks within the Sierra Leonean community proved to be both beneficial and popular with the locals. The economy was partially revitalized through the provision of projects that produced immediate socioeconomic benefit. Krasno’s (2005) public opinion survey of Sierra Leoneans identifies their approval of the development projects UNAMSIL initiated. Furthermore, stop-gap projects were extremely successful and well-received.

While inequality is still evident in Sierra Leone, economic indicators show some improvement. Deep-rooted inequalities will not easily be eliminated, particularly not within the short time-span within which a UN mission operates. UNAMSIL was able to spread its efforts throughout the country in some cases, but it did face a challenge to displaying impartiality through its preponderance of personnel and programs in the capital, Freetown.

To conclude, while the case study identifies some flaws in the socioeconomic tasks of UNAMSIL, the mission’s overall impact was positive. The peacekeepers were successful in disarming combatants, providing many with alternate livelihoods, as well as spurring socioeconomic growth within the local context, which persuaded the population
to take a chance on peace. To this date, Sierra Leone is peaceful and rebuilding. Nonetheless, my analysis provides a picture of elements within the UNAMSIL mission that could improve future missions.
Chapter 7

SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS
FOR LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

In this section, economic indicators will be analyzed to provide statistical support for my case findings. The total expenditure of each PKO is a beneficial starting point for examining the resources each possessed for economic reconstruction. Total expenditure for UNOMIL was 103.7 million (U.S. dollars), bolstered with ECOMOG’s expenditure of around 3.36 million (UN 2001; Osaghae 1998, 269). Some estimates indicate that Nigeria alone spent 18.8 million (U.S. dollars) during ECOMOG, higher than this PKO’s overall budget (Osaghae 1998, 269). In contrast, the total expenditure

32 Even macroeconomic data are frequently missing for low-income countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia. Data are provided for the years with available data that are closest to the start dates of the civil wars, as compared to the closest year with available data for the end date of the PKO. The utilization of these particular years allows me to analyze statistical indicators that represent the pre-war environment and therefore may have contributed to the outbreak of the war. I also discuss indicators that describe the environment following (or towards the end) of the PKO, which is an indication of the success of economic reconstruction efforts.

33 The monetary contribution of Nigeria to the Liberian PKO presents a possible weakness in my case study of ECOMOG-UNOMIL since Nigeria clearly controlled the resources of the PKO. However, I argue that the Nigerian domination of the mission does not inherently harm the validity of my findings; it merely suggests that the impartiality of the PKO should be questioned. While a lack of impartiality certainly contributed to the failure of factions to come to the bargaining table at various points throughout the war, once the peace process was agreed to by all factions, the hegemonic status of Nigeria would no longer be an issue for peace in terms of post-conflict economic development. Reconstruction efforts could have been spearheaded by the Nigerian contingent of the PKO, which furthermore would have enhanced
for UNAMSIL is estimated at 2.8 billion (U.S. dollars) (UN 2005). The higher budget in UNAMSIL is indicative of a robust reconstruction and development component to the mission. How did this expenditure contribute to the economic well-being of individuals in each state?

While a regional breakdown of the data and micro-level indicators would add the most support to my argument, these data sets are incomplete for Sierra Leone and unavailable for Liberia. I therefore present macroeconomic indicators in Table 1. These statistics illustrate the broad socioeconomic environments in pre- and post-war Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The statistical data in Table 1 show an overall trend of progress in Sierra Leone from the pre-war environment to the end of UNAMSIL. In contrast, it is apparent from the table that Liberia did not see substantial improvement after ECOMOG-UNOMIL in many indicators, and in fact deteriorated in certain sectors. Certainly the PKOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone cannot be held solely responsible for the macroeconomic environment in the host country. The changes in the economic indicators are a result of the interrelated presence of many international actors. Also, years furthest from the end date of the PKO will be more attributable to the projects initiated during the influx of NGOs and development agencies that arrive for post-conflict reconstruction. However, ECOMOG-UNOMIL and UNAMSIL were the most visible and highest level coordinating bodies for reconstruction in the years 1999-2005 and 1990-1997, respectively. Therefore, the changes in the socioeconomic environment in these time periods can be at least partially attributed to the PKOs and their direct partners.

their image in the eyes of the local population (although this is an argument outside the scope of the current research).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Pre-War</th>
<th>Post-War</th>
<th>Pre-War</th>
<th>Post-War</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy Rate</td>
<td>30%¹²</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>35%¹</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, etc. value-added</td>
<td>34%¹</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30%¹</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population with access to services (water and sanitation)</td>
<td>7-10%¹²</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>46%¹³</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population with access to services (water and sanitation)</td>
<td>60-68%¹²</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>75%¹³</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>25%¹⁴</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>65%⁸</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income share held by bottom 10%</td>
<td>0.5%³</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2.6%²</td>
<td>1992-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income share held by richest 10%</td>
<td>43.6%³</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>33.6%²</td>
<td>1992-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income share held by bottom 20%</td>
<td>1%¹</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6%¹</td>
<td>2003-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income share held by richest 20%</td>
<td>64.4%⁹</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>50%¹⁰</td>
<td>2003-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td>62.9³</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>42.5²</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living below poverty line</td>
<td>82.8%⁵</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>70.2%²</td>
<td>2003-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 World Bank 2007  6 U.S. Department of State 2010  11 UNDP 2000
2 UNDP 2009    7 Kieh, Jr. 2008    12 UNDP 1990
3 CIA 2009a, 2009b  8 Kandeh 2008    13 UNDP 2004
5 World Bank 2005  10 Government of Sierra Leone
Moreover, the PKO’s failure to improve the local population’s welfare, particularly in Liberia, is one of the fundamental arguments of this thesis. If ECOMOG-UNOMIL had provided robust programs for economic development during their mission, short-term gains would have been seen in many of the socioeconomic sectors. This would have led to a more successful operation in terms of preventing future conflict.\footnote{While micro-level indicators are difficult to obtain, I have attempted to provide indicators that are most representative of the local populations’ socioeconomic status. For example, macroeconomic indicators such as GDP are not included because they fail to provide a picture of local-level issues. Rather, the table provides statistical information about unemployment, poverty, GNI, and urban versus rural access to services. While I was not able to break these indicators into their regional distribution, they are illustrative of the basic welfare of a society. Furthermore, the inclusion of rural versus urban data, and the breakdown of income distribution is beneficial in determining whether improvement in socioeconomic welfare was widespread or restricted to certain groups.}

Life expectancy at birth and the adult literacy rate are widely-accepted indicators for the health and education levels of a society. Sierra Leone and Liberia have two of the lowest life expectancies worldwide and this situation has only improved somewhat in the post-war context. The national literacy rate has also remained extremely low for both countries, hovering around 30 to 35% before the wars began (UNDP 1990). Before the Sierra Leone Civil War, 82.8% of the population lived below the poverty line (World Bank 2005). In the final years of UNAMSIL this value was decreased to 70.2% of the population (UNDP 2009). This indicates that poverty was slowly being addressed. While the level of poverty in Liberia was extremely high at 80% in 2000, the absence of pre-war poverty levels makes it difficult to ascertain a trend (CIA 2009b).

To proxy the provision of basic services in the post-conflict period (a measure of socioeconomic development tasks), a beneficial indicator is value-added services. These services include development in wholesale and retail trade, transport, and services such as education, welfare, health care, and real estate, whether financed privately or by the
government (World Bank 2007). Most of the PKOs’ activities were either financed by the UN, or financed jointly with the government of the host country, thus their socioeconomic development programs would be accounted for in this figure. In each country the value-added services were between 30 and 40% before the war. This can likely be attributed largely to the NGOs operating in the countries before the civil war since it has already been established that the state services were limited in each country. Yet following the wars (during which both countries had experienced a drop in service provision), Sierra Leone rebounded to a rate of 30% in value-added services in the final year of UNAMSIL, while Liberia remained rather stagnant at the end of ECOMOG-UNOMIL at a rate of only 13%, just a fraction of where the state had been before the war (World Bank 2007).

Unemployment statistics provide a window into the socioeconomic status of the individuals that make up a society. At first glance, the statistical indicators seem problematic for my argument. Sierra Leone’s unemployment rate pre-conflict was surprisingly low at 25%, while it rose to 65% following UNAMSIL, in 2006 (Kandeh 2008). Liberia’s rate of unemployment was 50% in 1980 and 75% in 1997 (the final year of ECOMOG-UNOMIL) (U.S. Department of State 2010). My argument would predict that unemployment should have fallen after the PKO. However, there are several points that in effect make the unemployment trend—as shown by the indicators—unproblematic for my findings.

First, it is important to recognize who collected the data. The pre-conflict unemployment rate in Sierra Leone was reported by the Government of Sierra Leone, and no international data is available for this period. The post-war statistic was reported by
the international community, specifically the UN (Kandeh 2008). There is a substantial bias in government self-reporting (particularly when the report is commissioned by a dictator who would like the country to appear better off than it actually is). Thus, the 25% rate reported for unemployment is questionable.

In addition, one must ask how unemployment is measured. As Richards (1996) suggests, “Once a methodologically satisfactory definition of ‘work’ is employed there is very little, if any, unemployment in the countryside. People are too busy surviving, or washing gravel” (emphasis added, 126). In a country where 82.8% of the population lived below the poverty line from 1988 to 1989, it is certainly questionable if the high employment rate is any indication that the 75% of the population who were supposedly employed actually possessed livelihoods that met even their basic needs prior to the conflict (World Bank 2005; LeVert 2007, 45).

Finally, one might ask who employment was provided for in the post-war context. Based on the discussion of the DDR program in Sierra Leone, my findings indicate that many ex-combatants found work following vocational training. According to the arguments of this paper, these former fighters would be the most essential target group to re-employ. Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) found that around half of the ex-combatants they surveyed had found employment following training and the majority of these fighters directly attributed their success to the training provided by the PKO (36, as cited in Özerdem 2009, 139).35

The table furthermore illustrates the urban-rural divide in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the pre-war period, rural access to services (water and sanitation) was

35 This argument is not meant to assert that unemployment is not an enormous problem in Sierra Leone, as well as in Liberia, today. It is certainly a sector which needs to be addressed in the coming years, particularly because of the argument made in this thesis that unemployment contributes to conflict risk.
significantly lower than the urban access in both countries. Only around 8% of the rural population in Sierra Leone had access to services in the late 1980s and only 23% of the rural Liberian population had this access (UNDP 1990). The sharp inequality between the rural and urban populations—particularly the urban elite in the capital cities—has been argued to be a contributing factor to the civil wars. Following UNAMSIL, rural access to services has more than quadrupled in Sierra Leone, leading a full 46% of the rural population to service access (UNDP 2004). Urban access to services also increased from around 64% of the population possessing access to 75% with access in 2004 (UNDP 1990; UNDP 2004). In contrast, the rural population’s access to services doubled to 52% in 2004 in Liberia, which shows improvement, but not as significant a change as Sierra Leone experienced (UNDP 2004). Furthermore, the Liberian urban population’s access to services actually decreased in this same time frame, going from 85% in the late 1980s to 72% in 2004 (ibid.).

Gross national income (GNI in PPP, international dollars) provides another snapshot of the individual welfare of a state’s population. In Sierra Leone, GNI was 430 dollars (international dollars) in 1990 and it increased to 610 dollars in 2005, the final year of UNAMSIL (World Bank 2007). However, in Liberia GNI was 710 dollars prior to the war and it actually decreased to a mere 230 dollars per capita by 1997, the final year of ECOMOG-UNOMIL (ibid.). This shows a stark contrast since per capita income actually decreased during the PKO in Liberia.

The next step is to ask how uniform the increase in income was. This question is approached by examining measures of inequality. Table 1 illustrates the inequality in income distribution that was prevalent in pre-war Sierra Leone and Liberia. Income
inequality was grave in 1989. As shown by the Gini index, income inequality was worse in Sierra Leone than in Liberia pre-war. Furthermore, income equality has improved in Sierra Leone, but actually deteriorated in Liberia. The Gini index is valued at 62.9 (in 1989) for Sierra Leone pre-war and at 42.2 (in 1977) for Liberia pre-war (0 indicates perfect equality and 100 indicates perfect inequality) (CIA 2009a; Akpa 1981). At that time, Sierra Leone had the fifth worst equality in the world, while Liberia was substantially more equal (CIA 2009a). 2009 marks the year closest to the end of the PKOs with available data on the Gini index. In this period, Sierra Leone had an index of 42.5 while Liberia showed an index of 52.6 (UNDP 2009). Sierra Leone became more equal, while Liberia is more unequal. The statistics, therefore, show support for the greed and grievance-explanations for civil war. Financial incentives were provided to community members and former combatants in Sierra Leone, while the PKO collaborated with the government to reform the state’s structure and address grievances held by the marginalized groups in society. For example, rural families were no longer excluded from access to services to the same extent as before the war. Contrastingly, ECOMOG offered neither monetary assistance nor reform to the population of Liberia. ECOMOG’s failure to implement programs that would have social benefit contributed to the country’s experience with conflict recidivism.
Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis has analyzed the consequences of failing to include an economic package within the scope of peacekeepers’ formal duties in two cases, ECOMOG-UNOMIL following Liberia’s civil war and UNAMSIL after the Sierra Leonean civil war. Doyle and Sambanis’s (2000) quantitative study finds that multidimensional PKOs with extensive economic components are strongly associated with long-term peace. My qualitative research suggests similar conclusions. I argue that peacekeepers should carry out key economic tasks in order to secure the success of their mission and the stability of peace. This suggests important policy implications. Peacekeepers must effectively implement key socioeconomic tasks to ensure that the local population will take a chance on peace. Basic service provision, minimal infrastructure creation, and a robust DDR program are all key components of the economic package that should be initiated immediately if it is to contribute to a lasting peace and effective PKO. Whether or not these tasks influence the long-term macroeconomic picture is outside the scope of this research. However, my research has shown a correlation between post-conflict peace and significant economic tasks during PKOs in the two cases. If communities begin to
rebuild through development, reintegration of combatants, refugees, IDPs, and everyday citizens, stable peace can ensue.

The root causes of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia point to both greed and grievances playing a role in the outbreak of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that the opportunity for remuneration is the most significant cause of civil war. The cases certainly show evidence that resources were readily available to the rebels and contributed to the decision to fight. Furthermore, the rich resources of Liberia and Sierra Leone were pervasively exploited to finance the insurgencies. It is thus reasonable to argue that opportunity for rebellion, as explicated by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), played some role in initiating the civil wars.

Despite evidence that greed contributed to the conflicts, it seems that low per capita income, social and economic inequalities, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunities in civilian life also contributed to civil war. The motive for rebellion, therefore, also lies in a lack of faith in the dilapidated state. “As in any war opportunist individuals and groups muddy the waters with atrocities and looting. But these opportunist acts by themselves are insufficient to explain the continuation of the conflict” (Richards 1996, xvii). The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were crises of underdevelopment of the state both socially and economically (Kieh, Jr. 2008). Consequently, I argue that both greed and grievance factored into the outbreaks of the first Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. The insurgencies were responses to the corruption and exclusion of patrimonial elites (Richards 1996). To stipulate that either economic opportunities (greed) or grievances were the sole cause for outbreak of war would thus be to oversimplify the cases.
Economic marginalization, corrupt minority rule, and the polarization of the lower classes by a small, dominant elite are prevalent in the histories of both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Decades of exclusion from the government, distrust in the state to provide social services, and poor living conditions were intertwined variables that contributed to the civil wars. The case study of UNAMSIL illustrates the mission’s success with short-term economic policies in reintegrating former insurgents and providing many with employment and work in public services. Furthermore, the community development projects and provision of public services led the populace to have increased confidence in the state’s capacity to enhance their human security. In Sierra Leone, a robust PKO provided both physical security and reconstruction for the population. The case study certainly points out weaknesses in UNAMSIL. Although it was able to make dents in the large equality gap in the country, it by no means had the ability to completely abate inequalities. However, UNAMSIL was able to assist in the reform of the government and improve the living standards of Sierra Leoneans sufficiently so that they gained more confidence in the state’s future ability to continue to enhance their human security.

On the other hand, in Liberia, the people felt neither secure nor did they benefit from economic reconstruction during the PKO. Their most immediate needs were related to human security, physical security, and socioeconomic well-being. The inability of the PKO to fulfill these needs contributed to the election of Charles Taylor. Voters based their decision on the desire for human security, not the perception of Taylor’s proclivity to lead the country in an inclusive, power-sharing government. Because the population took this gamble, they ultimately elected a president who continued policies of patronage and exclusion in the fashion of former oppressive leaders such as Samuel Doe.
Continued economic marginalization, along with a large number of impoverished, unemployed youth led the country to re-erupt into civil war in 2000, for many of the same reasons that had caused the first civil war.

There are many theories that seek to explain civil war and although greed and grievance arguments contribute to the bulk of this discourse, there are certainly explanations for civil war that fall outside of the “greed versus grievance” literature. Before closing, a short discussion is in order concerning the failure of these alternative theories to capture the essence of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil conflicts. The first set of arguments could be loosely labeled “Strongmen and Warlord Politics” approaches (Omeje 2009, 5). This literature depicts conflicts as the result of self-interested strongmen who act to enhance their private interests at the expense of state institutions. Conflicts emerge when rival strongmen contest for power, reducing the mass population to “pawns” in the struggle (ibid.). Although the strongman element was certainly evident with Charles Taylor’s role in Liberia, it was less apparent with Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone because of the decentralized command structure of the RUF. Ultimately, it is too simplistic to argue that strongmen are able to manipulate thousands of local citizens to act on the leaders’ private interests. The cases studies illustrated the individual opportunities for locals to become involved in the conflict, but also elucidated the grievances felt due to the historical socioeconomic exclusion of the masses. The strongman argument fails to capture this characteristic of combatants’ grievances against the state.

The second set of theories that should be addressed is the most prominent opposing argument to the greed and grievance discourse. This school of thought analyzes
ethnicity and cultural factors in civil war onset. Primordialist theorists contend that irreconcilable cultural attributes and irresolvable differences between groups cause violence (Sambanis 2002). Constructivists also theorize within this discourse, but they dispute the primordialist view and argue that identities are not inherently conflictual, but are molded by leaders, society, and historical circumstances (ibid.). Ethnicity creates trust and enables cooperation between members of the group. Therefore, ethnic fragmentation in a society poses difficulties in reaching conflict resolution because of the complexity of reaching peace agreements that satisfy all the groups involved in the conflict. Furthermore, groups in conflict “define their identity in opposition to other groups, so once the group becomes involved in violent conflict, participation in the conflict is difficult to avoid when the conflict threatens the survival of the group’s identity” (Sambanis 2002, 229).

Although there were ethnic dimensions to the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, these wars cannot be classified as ethnic conflicts because the rebel factions did not primarily organize along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the case studies illustrated the extent to which ethnic animosities were rooted in societal domination by certain ethnic groups over others. Because the ethnic grievances were not inherent, but rooted in historical circumstance, the primordialist argument on ethnic factors in civil war onset should be rejected in favor of the constructivist viewpoint. However, the role that ethnic animosities played in the conflict does not negate my argument on greed and grievance factors since the ethnic incompatibilities were largely based on economic inequalities. Nevertheless, it does point to a need for further research on the distribution policies of peacekeepers; these policies should attempt to rectify group inequalities rather than
exacerbate them. To summarize, both strongmen politics and ethnic or cultural differences may have been apparent to some extent in the case studies in this thesis, yet these theories fail to grasp the broader scope of economic marginalization which contributed to the conflict, as well as the economic opportunities offered by violence.

The case studies in this thesis illustrate that economic motivations are significant contributing factors to the onset of civil war. To prevent the reoccurrence of civil war, therefore, peacekeepers must address the root causes of the war. Economic motivations should be addressed during the PKO to allow for success of the mission and prevent future civil wars in that state. In a continent where armed conflict is inordinately prevalent, the UN should not underestimate the transformative power of the inclusion of socioeconomic policies during peacekeeping. The implications of this research, therefore, are seen as crucial for the future stability of Africa.
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