June 1, 1931.

Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I have written Clarence Ireland twice, in an effort to get a copy of the opinion in the Arizona case, but to date I have learned nothing except what has appeared in newspaper articles.

If Clarence happens to have one of these opinions and you can prevail on him to forward the same to me, I will appreciate it, as I will not be in Denver in the very near future.

After eating and sleeping with this woman for about three weeks, I would like to see what she looks like after Justice Brandeis dressed her up in court language.

With kindest personal regards to yourself and Mrs. Carpenter, I remain

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

RLS/M
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I received the copy of the Supreme Court opinion enclosed in your favor of June 4th. Just prior, I received from Clarence Ireland a copy of the opinion, but I have not had an opportunity to go over the same carefully, and will be busy in Holyoke the fore-part of this week. I have, however, gone through the opinion so that I am acquainted with its contents.

I am not at all satisfied with the pronouncements of the court. There is no question about the Boulder Dam, but I regret that the court did not specifically uphold the compact. Also, I do not like the apparent finding of the court with respect to the navigability of the river and the jurisdiction of the United States with reference thereto.

Long before I was able to see a copy of the opinion, I had a short note from Mr. Gibson, in which he stated that he had a copy of the decision; that he had read the same, and that we had won a sweeping victory. If that is his idea of a sweeping victory, it does not coincide with mine. Of course, we are all very well satisfied with the outcome, but I had hoped that the decision would be sufficiently broad and definite to settle the status of the compact, once and for all. It seems to me that the court adopted the view of the secretary almost in its entirety, and paid very little attention to other matters.

Will write you more fully in the near future, and if I have an opportunity to come to Greeley I will do so and talk this matter over with you in detail.

In connection with the matter of receipt of copies of the decision, you know, of course, that I wrote the Clerk, asking that copies be sent to yourself and to Mr. Ireland. I did not ask for any for myself, and if Mr. Gibson received a copy it was through some effort of his own.

Sincerely yours,

Sauter
June 16, 1931.

Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I was very sorry that I did not have a chance to see you yesterday afternoon when I stopped on my way home from Denver, as I wished to discuss the recent opinion by the Supreme Court.

Inasmuch as the date of my next trip to Denver is rather uncertain, I thought I would give you my opinion of the decision. As I said before, I am not very well satisfied with the pronouncements of the court. The result itself is satisfactory, but the decision could have been, and should have been, much more enlightening.

So far as the compact is concerned, there is little in the opinion that would serve as a definite guide for the future. The court, I believe, has unquestionably upheld the constitutionality of the compact, though it does not do so in express terms. I base this upon the following things appearing in the decision:

On page 2, the court in its recital of facts, making mention of the allegations contained in the bill, says:

"... and that the Act thus attempts to enforce against Arizona, and to its irreparable injury, the compact which it has refused to ratify. The bill prays that the compact and the Act 'and each and every part thereof, be decreed to be unconstitutional, void and of no effect';"

In making that statement, the court certainly warrants our assuming that they have considered in this opinion whether or not the compact which Arizona failed to ratify is being forced upon her.

Again, on page 3, the court says:

"The latter invasion, it is alleged, will consist in the exercise, under the Act and the compact, of a claimed superior right to store, divert, and use such water."

Again, at the bottom of page 10, there is specific reference to the compact where the court makes mention of Arizona's contention, saying:

"... that under the terms of the compact they will not be entitled to appropriate any water in excess of that to which there are now perfected rights in Arizona; ..."
It would seem that all of these specific references to the compact would most certainly warrant the assumption that the court has recognized the validity of the compact itself. This must be true for the reason that Arizona directed its attack not only on the Boulder Canon Project Act, but on the compact as well.

All of the necessary parties were before the court, and a decision with respect to the validity of the compact would have been binding on all. I cannot understand why such an important question should be left with any uncertainty, but I believe a careful reading of the opinion and the references the court makes to the compact must compel the conclusion that its constitutionality has been sustained.

Rather a peculiar situation exists in connection with the question of navigation. The court makes specific mention of the fact that the compact states the navigation is subservient to all other purposes; that the Boulder Canon Project Act and the authority conferred thereunder is subservient or subject to the Colorado River compact. Such a situation, it would seem, would impel the court to make some definite statement which would indicate clearly what their opinion was with reference to these somewhat conflicting statements about the Colorado River. The court, however, contents itself with the statement that “the specific statement of primary purpose in the Act governs the general references to the compact.” Does not this mean that the court has decided the question purely from a standpoint of legal construction?

Congress has declared a primary purpose for a piece of legislation; it has incorporated in this legislation a document that contains some statements at variance with the declared purpose of the legislation. It would appear to me that the legislation amounts, in effect, to a legislative determination of the fact in controversy, and would be final.

I do not know that I have made myself entirely clear, but I do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to hold that the Act amounted to a failure on the part of Congress to approve the navigation clause in the compact. The language used is not altogether clear, but in spite of this condition, I think we must assume that the compact has been validated by the Supreme Court, and that Congress has unconditionally approved the compact. Congress, for the purpose of accomplishing its own ends, has made a certain declaration. That declaration, however, was made not with a view of bringing into question any statements contained in the compact, but to make possible the accomplishment of the purpose Congress set out to attain.
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter
3
June 16, 1931.

The question of navigability, so far as Federal control is concerned, I conceive has been settled. If Congress determines that certain obstructions in the river are an improvement to navigation, when in fact they are a detriment, I think, under the decisions, no one can complain and no one can question the decisions of Congress on the subject.

The result, of course, will be a continuation of the project along the lines first contemplated.

What appeared to me to be the strongest argument of Arizona was that navigation could not be improved by a diversion of water from the river. The Supreme Court, in its opinion, takes cognizance of this argument, but apparently does not consider that the facts stated entitle the complainant to relief.

I think you will find my statements herein about as unsatisfactory as the opinion of the court. I regret that I did not have an opportunity to talk this over with you personally.

I have never been able to understand why courts refuse to speak in language that lawyers can understand. The defendant states were entitled to have the court make a pronouncement which would settle their status and not leave the matter open to speculation or the compact open to attack. I think it was the intention of the court to uphold the compact, but they did so in a very indirect manner.

On my next trip to Denver I will endeavor to stop, and at that time I expect to hear that my statement concerning the decision was about as ambiguous as the decision itself.

With kind personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

RLS/M
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I did not know until I saw last evening's paper that the Supreme Court had dismissed Arizona's bill of complaint. The reported facts in connection with the compact were very meager, and I am anxious to learn what comprised the exact holding of the court.

For your sake, I am more than overjoyed at the outcome, and I trust that the Supreme Court left no doubt as to the validity of the Colorado River compact.

When you receive the decision and after it has served your present purpose, I will appreciate it very much if you will forward the same to me, so that I can make a copy to retain in my files.

It seems that the Supreme Court, in substance, told Arizona that she was suffering from a case of hysteria, and advised her to go home and wait until something really happened before announcing to the world that she was about to suffer irreparable injury and damage.

Sincerely yours,

RLS/M
OFFICE OF THE CLERK,
Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

March 26, 1931.

R. L. Sauter, Esq.,
Sterling, Colorado.

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to your request of the 23d instant I have memorandums to notify Mr. Ireland and Mr. Carpenter as to any decisions in the case of State of Arizona v. State of California et al, No. 19 Original, October Term, 1930.

Yours truly,

CHARLES ELMORE CROPLEY, Clerk,

By

Assistant.

HBW/MHP
March 30, 1931.

Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I herewith enclose a letter I received today from the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court.

Respectfully yours,

RLS/M
Encl.

[Signature]
March 23, 1931.

Honorable Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

This is to advise that I wrote the Clerk of the Supreme Court at Washington this morning, asking that notice of the decision in the case involving Colorado be forwarded to Attorney General Ireland and to yourself. I also advised that other counsel for Colorado would receive their notice from either the Attorney General or yourself.

I regret very much that I did not have more time in Greeley Saturday, but I assure you that at the first opportunity I will again stop, for there are other matters in connection with this case which I would like to discuss with you.

With kindest personal regards to yourself and Mrs. Carpenter, I remain

Sincerely yours,

RLS/M
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

Your letter of March 3, 1931 received and I hasten to report our present condition.

The brief is now in the hands of the printer and has received the approval of Wyoming and Utah. There is every indication that the brief will also be approved by the other defendant States with the possible exception of California. California and the Solicitor General seem to be more or less wedded and for that reason I personally doubt if California joins in our presentation.

In my judgement Mr. Gibson has done a very remarkable job for the time was short and the field to cover was unusually large, as you know. The more I see of him the more I am convinced that the interest of Colorado will be well protected by him.

As this matter unfolds I am continuously discovering new features in the case which were not apparent at the start. I realize the danger of emphasizing the navigability of the river - we have attempted in the brief to guard against any finding of fact by the Court on this proposition by stating, 'it is not necessary and that we do not ask the Court to find as a matter of fact that the Colorado River is a navigable stream.' We have put it entirely on the basis of a finding in law.

Wyoming shares our anxiety in this matter but Mr. Greenwood feels that the brief has made the matter
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,

continued,

-2-

clear and made no suggestion on this point.

The compact has been treated somewhat at length and this phase of the matter presented to the Court on the basis of establishing the presence of all of the elements requisite to make a valid agreement. The conclusion, as expressed in the brief, being that we have present a subject matter concerning which the states can enter into a compact and agreement between states, approved by the government, with certain restrictions and conditions; which restrictions and conditions were accepted by the states furnishing a consideration for the agreement.

It has always impressed me that the compact was separate and extinct even though it is referred to and validated by the Act.

You suggested that every effort should be made to persuade the Court that the compact is valid and constitutional regardless of the balance of the Act, and this suggestion most certainly will be followed.

I understand your anxiety in this matter and I sincerely trust we will do everything possible, and that it will all be done in a manner which will meet with your approval. The years of work you have given to this matter is an inspiration to all of us.

I will advise you further before the argument, concerning any new developments.

With kindest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Hon. Clarence L. Ireland  
Attorney General  
Capitol Building  
Denver, Colorado

Dear Clarence:

This is just a supplemental report.

We have received the approval of Wyoming, Utah and Nevada on the brief. New Mexico has not arrived but we will doubtless have them with us; also California will not report until tomorrow, but as I said before, I doubt very much if they will subscribe to the sentiments we have expressed.

We all thought the Argument in this case would be concluded Monday, but present indications are it cannot be concluded until adjournment of Court on Tuesday afternoon. Six hours has been allowed for this Argument and inasmuch as the Court is in session only four hours each day, and will have some preliminary matters preceding the Argument Monday- I think it will be about all we can do to finish Tuesday afternoon.

We have been working not only in the day-time, but a good part of the night since our arrival. We should be in good shape when the case is called- everything to date has been very peaceful and the States appear to be impressed with the idea that concerted action is necessary.

There is nothing further to report at this time but I will advise you tomorrow concerning the attitude of California.

If we do not win this suit and have the Motion to Dismiss sustained, it will be a great surprise to me. The more I analyze Arizona's proposition, the more I am convinced that she has no standing in Court.

With kindest personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

SAUTER
TELEGRAMS

HON. C. L. IRELAND
ATTORNEY GENERAL CAPITOL BLDG.

ALL STATES INCLUDING CALIFORNIA HAVE SIGNED AND ADOPTED OUR BRIEF.

R. L. SAUTER

Washington, D.C.
March 7, 1931

HON. CLARENCE L. IRELAND
DENVER COLORADO

NO INDICATION OF ATTITUDE OF COURT STOP ARGUMENT PRESENTED ALL CONTENTIONS OF STATES STOP ARIZONA PRESENTED NOTHING NEW STOP NOTIFY CARPENTER THAT DIAMOND CREEK MATTER WILL BE HELD UP UNTIL DECISION IN THIS CASE

R. L. SAUTER

Washington, D.C.
March 10, 1931
DA- WASHINGTON D.C MAR 7TH
DELPH E CARPENTER, ATTY AT LAW,
GREELEY COLO.

ALL STATES HAVE APPROVED AND SIGNED OUR BRIEF STOP DECISION REQUESTED CANNOT BE OBTAINED UNTIL MONDAY STOP INSTRUCTIONS IN WIRE WILL BE FOLLOWED STOP STATES IN ACCORD ON COMPACT THOUGHT CALIFORNIA DID NOT GIVE FINAL APPROVAL ON BRIEF UNTIL LATE TODAY.

R L SAUTER 6:53PM
Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

Mar. 7, 1931

R. L. Saniter
Attn. Const. Law Hamilton Hotel Washington D.C.

How progressing stop. Please obtain from civic and forward at mail recent decision Supreme Court, Massachusetts, Connecticut case stop. Urge Greenwood and Gibson to preferred oral argument to defend section thirteen. Impressing compact upon public land see page twenty two. Colorado brief stop, act Congress more dignity than withdrawals by federal officials.

Delphi E. Carpenter

[Handwritten notes: Christ to assert]
Western Union

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to:

Ray E. Sauter

J. Hamilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

Re: Diamond Creek Project, Arizona. Engineer Demand representing water interests has sought license since before contract. But resisted by Upper States as account project in State not party to contract. Also, because project requires construction of dam for diversion to Upper States unless project

Constitutional especially Section Thirteen stop show this to Greenwood, stop stop 1st stop. Show this to Greenwood

Representative stop Confer 1st stop. Never stop. Taylor stop Belford & Co., stop stop

The quickest, surest and safest way to send money is by Telegraph or Cable.
DA WASHINGTON DC 854AM 3-10-31

DELPH E CARPENTER
ATTY AT LAW GREELEY COLO

ONLY QUESTION IN COURTS MIND YESTERDAY WAS DIVERSION TO CALIFORNIA
STOP WORKED WITH GREEWOOD LAST AND HAVE SATISFACTORY REPLY STOP
A
ALL OTHER MATTERS SATISFACTORY STOP DIIVOND CREEK PROJECT WILL

BECEIVE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION

R L SAUTER

745A
Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

Newcomb Carlton, President
J. C. Willever, First Vice-President

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to.

Ray L. Painter

Hamilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

California diversion answered by term beneficial consumption send in compact see page thirty nine & our brief.

Dalph E. Carpenter

Chas. H. Crichton

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE
Honorable Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I just returned to Sterling this afternoon, but want to make a preliminary report to you regarding the matters considered and disposed of in Washington.

Under separate cover, I am forwarding you a copy of the Reply Brief which we filed. The Reply Brief states that California joined in the same, but this is not true. They were included at the suggestion of Mr. Mathews after he had gone over our first draft of the brief. Late Sunday, he called me and stated that, while he personally was in favor of associating with the other states, Mr. Webb felt that they should adopt the position taken by the Solicitor General and file a reply brief of their own. Of course, I advised him that that was his privilege, and therefore California was not associated with us in the reply brief.

The brief itself contains many things which can be commended. All of these were supplied by Mr. Gibson. Attorney General Greenwood and myself went over the brief as carefully as we could in the short time we had, but I am not satisfied that we have it in proper form. There are some repetitions and a few errors, but the time was so short that we did not have an opportunity to carefully assemble the matters presented. As far as the brief is concerned, a reading will enable you to judge whether or not it meets with your approval.

The argument before the Supreme Court, on the whole, was satisfactory. The Solicitor General began by taking an hour and a half, during which time he confined himself mostly to the facts. He discussed the law only rather generally, and was continually put to some pains in his effort to defend the diversion of water to the City of Los Angeles. At this stage of the proceeding, the court appeared not to have caught the full significance of this diversion proposition, but questions were asked the Solicitor General by Mr. Justice Brandeis and by Mr. Justice Butler regarding this matter.

Following the Solicitor General, Attorney General Webb of California spoke half an hour. Webb presented nothing of value. His talk was merely a general discourse, and the only question asked him by the court related to the navigability of the stream. In answer to this question, he stated that he would reply in the terms of Arizona's former requests concerning the river, and referring to the brief of the Solicitor General he read excerpts from all the various memorials and statements by the State of Arizona on the matter of the navigability of the Colorado River. These statements consumed his entire half hour.
Honorable Delph E. Carpenter
2
March 13, 1931.

Following Mr. Webb, Mr. Gibson spoke for half an hour, confining himself almost exclusively to a discussion of the political rights theory. He was asked by Mr. Justice Van Devanter concerning the diversion of water to Los Angeles, but failed to make any reply to the question.

Attorney General Parker of Utah followed Mr. Gibson. Parker began with merely a general statement of the position of his state, and was interrupted by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who asked him if Utah approved the diversion of 1,050,000 acre feet of water to the City of Los Angeles. Mr. Parker replied that he did not, and consumed the balance of his time explaining to the court that he did not think this diversion should be made.

It was because we closed with Parker's statement on Monday, that I wired you to the effect that the only question which seemed to be troubling the court was this diversion to California. I felt that we had a complete and adequate answer in this case, which had been carefully discussed and concurred in by all, but the answer had not been given to the court, and I was worried for fear the court would get the wrong impression of the materiality of this diversion.

During Monday night we talked with Attorney General Greenwood of Wyoming and discussed the matter with him in detail, deciding that in his fifteen minutes of time next day he should deal with the compact and with this diversion only. The result was that the next morning, Mr. Greenwood, in a very clear and effective way, gave a brief history of the compact and its relation to the Act, setting forth the facts that apparently had not been clear in the minds of the court up until that time, and he closed by presenting an argument to the effect that the diversion to Los Angeles was made by the Secretary of the Interior and was not embodied in the Act, nor was it included in the compact; that if this act on the part of the Secretary was to be subjected to criticism, it was something that had nothing to do with the constitutionality of the Act or with the validity or constitutionality of the compact. In the short time which he had at his disposal, I felt he made a wonderfully effective argument.

The Solicitor General had seven minutes in which to close in rebuttal. He adopted the line of argument pursued by Greenwood, and when he closed I felt the court was convinced that the question of the California diversion was not material. Up until that time I was worried for fear they might not see the distinction, for all efforts to justify the diversion to the City of Los Angeles, on any basis of fact, seemed to be futile. Of
course, I say this in view of the type of motion we were arguing. We were determining whether or not Arizona had stated a cause of action, and the court felt that if this diversion was prejudicial and was in any manner involved in the constitutionality of the legislature, that it might be material.

It is rather hard to express this matter by letter, but I think you can understand what I am trying to say.

There was no indication as to what the decision might be, and we left with the understanding that the Solicitor General would get additional time in which to answer if the motion was overruled.

I did not receive your wire regarding the Diamond Creek matter until too late for me to do anything regarding the same until the close of the case being heard. I then immediately took the matter up with Attorney General Greenwood, and then ascertained that the Power Commission assured him that no action would be taken regarding this permit until the Supreme Court had acted in the Arizona case. I trust that this handling of the matter meets with your approval. I was a little bit at sea, as I did not know much about this particular controversy.

In the very near future, I want to come to Greeley and discuss in detail the trip to Washington. It will be impossible for me to do this, however, until some time after next week. We have a term of court on in Logan County at the present time, and I have two cases set for next week. In addition, I must appeal a case to the Supreme Court. However, as soon as I have these matters off my hands I want to come to Greeley, if it meets with your approval, and give you a personal report on all that was said and done.

For your information, I am also sending you the Reply Brief of the Secretary, and the Reply Brief of California. These documents complete the reply briefs filed.

With kindest personal regards to yourself and Mrs. Carpenter, I remain

Sincerely yours,

RLS/M

[Signature]
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter,
Attorney at Law,
Greeley, Colorado.

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I had hoped to have another conference with you before leaving for Washington, but on my return to Sterling I had a number of matters that required my attention. This condition, coupled with the fact that I found it necessary to take a lot of time in acquainting myself with some of the fundamentals of the litigation in which we are interested, made it impossible for me to make another trip to Greeley.

I want to give you, generally, some of my ideas, in order that you can analyze the same and determine whether or not I am fundamentally sound on the proposition.

A good many of the interested parties seem to me to be wandering around without any definite idea as to the direction they are taking. I will state in confidence at the outset - for I do not care to take the position of criticizing anyone's position - that I have very little faith in the first proposition advanced in the Colorado brief; namely, the allegation that the question under consideration involves a determination of political rights and, therefore, cannot be considered by our Supreme Court.

I have gone over Arizona's brief in detail. It is very evident that it has been written by a capable lawyer. It is also evident to me that he is overlooking some of the matters and things that eventually must determine this controversy.

As I view the proposition, everything resolves itself down to a determination of whether or not the stream in question is navigable. (This, of course, with reference to the Boulder Dam Act). I cannot see how the court can allow the matter to go to a hearing on this point.

The allegations contained in Arizona's complaint are not consistent with her former declarations on this proposition, as is demonstrated by the Solicitor General. However, another proposition that impresses me strongly, and which is not without law to support it, is the fact that by declaring one of the purposes of the legislation to be the improvement of navigation, Congress has virtually determined that this is a navigable stream. No other construction of the language used in the Act is possible. In the face of this condition, I do not believe the court can even allow testimony to be taken on the question of the navigability or non-navigability of these waters.
Acting upon the suggestion you made at the time of our conference, I have been investigating the law on the regulatory powers of Congress over navigable waters. I do not wish to burden you with citations, but I found the law generally very satisfactory. I did not find anything directly on the proposition that Congress, in the exercise of its regulatory powers over navigable waters, could make navigation subservient to another use in general, but I did find cases where navigation at particular points was interfered with to some extent by other uses, and this interference was upheld, on the ground that Congress had the right to determine the manner of use to which navigable waters would be put.

Of course, Arizona is attempting to go much further and declare in their argument that the present contemplated uses not only are not conducive to navigation, but if pursued to the extent now contemplated, eventually will make navigation an impossibility. So far as I have been able to discover, this raises a question of first impression before our Supreme Court. However, the allegations with reference to the creation of this condition are contained not in the bill of complaint, but in the argument.

I am impressed with the idea that the Solicitor General is correct in his statement that the United States is a necessary party to this litigation. In all the cases cited by Arizona I can see a fundamental distinction. In the case under consideration, Arizona has alleged as a fact that the United States government has taken possession of property through the Secretary of the Interior; that they are constructing a dam and have entered into contractual relations. Certainly this creates a condition which would make the United States government a necessary party, for the government has acquired rights and liabilities of a definite and specific nature, easily distinguishable from cases involving the enactment of laws imposing taxes and things of a similar nature. I cannot see how the controversy could be settled without the United States government being made a party.

On reading the brief of Utah and Wyoming, I was somewhat surprised to discover that these states virtually admitted the non-navigability of the stream in question. It is going to be my purpose to get concerted action out of all the interested states at the forthcoming conference. I believe we should present a solid and united front. Our endeavor should be to sustain both the compact and the act, and I will certainly use my best efforts along these lines.

I want you to feel free to make any suggestions that may occur to you, with the assurance that I will do everything I can to see that your wishes are carried out.
Mr. Delph E. Carpenter
3
March 2, 1931.

If I am not correct in any of my conceptions of the
general aspects of this problem, please feel free to so state.
You realize that I am rather new in this matter and am having
considerable difficulty in catching up with the procession.
However, I hope after this visit to Washington to understand the
matter in a way that is impossible until I have an opportunity
to listen to a discussion from all angles.

With kindest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

RLS/M

[Signature]