

THESIS

APPLYING STATIC CODE ANALYSIS TO  
FIREWALL POLICIES FOR THE PURPOSE  
OF ANOMALY DETECTION

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WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER OUR SUPERVISION BY VADIM ZALIVA ENTITLED “APPLYING STATIC CODE ANALYSIS TO FIREWALL POLICIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ANOMALY DETECTION” BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING IN PART REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE.

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS  
APPLYING STATIC CODE ANALYSIS TO FIREWALL POLICIES FOR  
THE PURPOSE OF ANOMALY DETECTION

Treating modern firewall policy languages as imperative, special purpose programming languages, in this thesis we will try to apply *static code analysis* techniques for the purpose of anomaly detection.

We will first abstract a policy in common firewall policy language into an intermediate language, and then we will try to apply anomaly detection algorithms to it.

The contributions made by this thesis are:

1. An analysis of various control flow instructions in popular firewall policy languages
2. Introduction of an intermediate firewall policy language, with emphasis on control flow constructs.
3. Application of *Static Code Analysis* to detect anomalies in firewall policy, expressed in intermediate firewall policy language.
4. Sample implementation of *Static Code Analysis* of firewall policies, expressed in our abstract language using Datalog language.

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# 1 Introduction

Computer firewalls are widely used for security policy enforcement and access control. They are used to block unauthorized network access. This is usually done by partitioning a network into *security domains* and defining access rules on the boundaries of these domains. The simplest case is when just two domains are defined: LAN (Local Area Network) and WAN (Wide Area Network). In more complex cases one might have domains for different departments within an organization as well as different parts of the Internet (for example different geographic regions). A firewall could be implemented either as hardware – a special device – or as software running on top of a general purpose operating system. Usually an organization deploys more than one firewall and their policies must be coordinated to provide a consistent level of security.

Firewall configuration, which mainly consists of writing *policy* (also sometimes referred to as a *rule set*) is an exacting task, usually done by a human. Given the complexity of some policies (hundreds, or even thousands of rules) and human predisposition to err, misconfigurations often occur. In a quantitative study performed by Wool[36], 37 firewall rule sets were examined, collected from organizations in various market segments. He discovered that all of them were misconfigured, most in multiple places. The implications of his study are truly alarming: a firewall misconfiguration could expose private customer information (including medical records), sensitive business information, lead to financial loss and in some cases even impact the life and safety of people relying on the security of the computer system.

An example of misconfiguration is when a firewall could be managed from an insecure location (any machine outside the network perimeter). Usually access to firewall management interfaces is limited to a secure domain inside the organization. The simplest form of this misconfiguration is when a rule



limiting such access is not added to the policy. A novice firewall administrator can easily make such a mistake. Another scenario in which a misconfiguration may occur is when such a rule was added, but was overridden by another, usually more generic rule. This is a mistake that even a more experienced firewall administrator may make. At a cursory examination the policy looks good, as the rule is present. However it will require a deeper examination to discover that the rule does not have any effect.

The task of automatic discovery potential of firewall configuration errors is called *firewall anomaly detection*. There is some existing research in this area summarized in Section 2.1. In this thesis we attempt to advance research in this area by applying *static code analysis* to firewall policies.

*Static code analysis* allows us to analyze and predict program behavior without actually executing it. It is commonly used for performance optimization and error detection.

In this section we will start by introducing basic firewall and *static code analysis* concepts.

## 1.1 Packet Filtering

Packet filtering is a core functionality of network firewalls. The main idea is that the firewall resides on a network *Node* (*Host* or *Router*) and inspects all network traffic. Inspection is performed in accordance with network security policy (which we will discuss in detail later). Based on this policy, the firewall makes a decision regarding what action to perform on a given packet. The most commonly performed actions are:

**ACCEPT** - the packet is permitted to pass through

**DENY** - the packet is silently dropped

Some firewalls allow additional actions, which do not necessarily affect the packet's traversal of the firewall, but are invoked for side effects. Common examples are logging and setting the values of some *variables* (which could be checked later in other policy rules).

Most modern firewalls also support actions, which affect the control flow of packet processing through firewall rules.

Issues related to the low-level implementation of categorizing packets and the algorithms for doing this efficiently are commonly referred to as the *packet classification problem*[\[19\]](#). This problem mostly deals with performance and resource usage constraints.

Here is an example of a simple firewall policy. This policy permits all incoming traffic on interface *dc0* from local network 192.168.0.0/24 to host with IP address 192.168.0.1. It also allows the return traffic to pass.

```
pass in  on dc0 from 192.168.0.0/24 to 192.168.0.1
pass out on dc0 from 192.168.0.1 to 192.168.0.0/24
```

## 1.2 Firewall Policy

The firewall's behavior is controlled by the *Policy*. A policy consists of *Rules* (in the context of packet routing they are also often referred to as *Filters*). Each rule consist of a *condition* and an *action*. Conditions describe the criteria used to match individual packets. Actions describe the activity to be performed if matches have been made.

Basic conditions consist of tests, which match individual fields of the packet such as source address, destination address, packet type, etc. In the case of *stateful inspection*, connection-related variables like connection state (*established*, *related*, or *new*) can be checked. Finally, system state variables such as current time of day, CPU load, or system-wide configuration parameters can be taken

into account.

The sequence of rules processing differs significantly between various firewall implementations. There are two common matching strategies:

*single trigger* processing means that an action of the first matching rule will be performed.

*multi-trigger* processing means that all rules will be matched and an action from the last matching rule will be performed.

Here is a typical example of multi-trigger policy for *pf* firewall platform:

```
block in all
...
pass in on dc0 from any to 192.168.1.0/24 port 22
```

In this example the first rule blocks all incoming traffic. This is sometimes called a *default deny* approach. The next rule allows incoming traffic on port 22 to LAN subnet 192.168.1.0/24. As an incoming packet destined for port 22 passes the firewall, it will match the first rule and will be marked to be dropped. However, since *pf* by default is using multi-trigger strategy, it will continue to try to match the packet to other rules. It will match against the last rule and this time the action will be changed to *pass*. At the end of the policy, this last action will take effect and the packet will be allowed to pass through.

Some firewalls like *ipfilter* support *multi-trigger* strategy by default, but allow individual rules to specify a *quick* option, which signifies that no further processing should be done on a matched packet.

Let us try to express the previous example using single trigger strategy. We will again use *pf* syntax, but now we will use the *quick* keyword on all rules to enforce single trigger processing. The resulting policy would be:

```
pass in quick on dc0 from any to 192.168.1.0/24 port 22
```

...  
block in quick all

Now, the incoming packet destined for port 22 will match the first rule and will be immediately allowed to pass. No other rules will be considered. All incoming packets which have not matched the first rule will match the last one and will be denied.

In addition to the *single trigger* or *multi-trigger* control flow models, most popular modern firewall platforms support more complex control flow models, with statements allowing conditional or unconditional branching, early termination, sub-routine calls, etc.

### 1.3 Static Code Analysis

*Static Code Analysis* is defined as:

“Program analysis offers static compile-time techniques for predicting safe and computable approximations to the set of values or behaviors arising dynamically at run-time when executing a program on a computer.” [25]

We will concentrate on the type of static code analysis termed *data flow analysis*, first introduced in [22].

In data flow analysis, the program is split into elementary blocks which are organized into a directed graph. This is called a *control flow graph (CFG)*. Nodes are elementary blocks, and edges indicate how control can pass between them. For each block we can define a set of equations, describing information at the exit of a node, as related to information upon entry to the node.

Let us consider a simple example of *Reaching Definitions Analysis*, which is defined in [25] as follows:

“For each program point, which assignments *may* have been made and not overwritten, when program execution reaches this point along some path.”

Now for each label  $l$  we can write two sets of reaching definitions (abbreviated as  $RD$ ):  $RD_{entry}(l)$  and  $RD_{exit}(l)$ , each of them defining a list of tuples in the form of  $(variable, label)$  defining what variables were assigned at what labels. The special label  $?$  could be used to indicate the possibility of an uninitialized variable.

For example if at label 2 variable  $z$  is assigned a new value we can write:  $RD_{exit}(2) = (RD_{entry}(2) \setminus \{(z, l) | l \in L\}) \cup (z, 2)$  where  $L$  is set of all program labels.

In general,  $RD_{entry}(l) = RD_{exit}(l_1) \cup \dots \cup RD_{exit}(l_n)$  if  $l_1, \dots, l_n$  are labels from which control may reach  $l$ . For *initial label* all variables are associated with  $?$  label.

Using these equations we can reason about properties of the program at the block boundaries. The standard way to do this is to solve the system until it reaches *fixpoint*.

We must distinguish between two types of data flow analyses. In *forward data flow analysis* values are propagated in a control flow graph in the direction of the control flow. In *backward data flow analysis*, the values are propagated in the opposite direction of control flow.

Another useful type of static code analysis is called *control flow analysis*, which deals with the calculation of control flow graphs (which blocks lead to which).

## Thesis Organization

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:

First, in Section 2 we will briefly discuss the current state of research in Firewall Policy modeling and analysis.

Then, in Section 3 we will review control flow models and control flow statements in several existing firewall platforms, concentrating on the few most popular ones.

In Section 4 we define an *intermediate rule language* for policy rule processing which includes support for all control flow constructs mentioned in previous sections. We will show how all firewall languages described in Section 3 can be converted into this new intermediate language.

In Section 5 we will show how *static code analysis* can be applied to a firewall policy as expressed in *intermediate language*.

And finally, in Section 6 we will present our implementation of policy analyzer using techniques described in Section 5. It will be followed in Section 7 by some usage examples of our analyzer.

## 2 Firewall Policy Modeling

In this section we discuss approaches used in modeling firewall policies and briefly review the current state of research in this area.

Many researchers assign to the policy a declarative semantics, treating it as a set of tuples (e.g. [5], [11], [9], [24]). Each tuple contains conditions used to match various packet fields and actions. For example, Ehab S. Al-Shaer and Hazem H. Hamed [4],[5] use a fixed rule structure, called a “5-tuple filter”:  $(order, protocol, src\_ip, src\_port, dst\_ip, dst\_port, action)$ .

In order to formally model firewall policy, these researchers start by defining pairwise relationship between rules in the policy: “completely disjoint”, “exactly matched”, “inclusively matched”, “partially disjoint”, and “correlated”. Next Al-Shaer and Hamed prove that these relationships are distinct and that their union represents the universal set of relations between any two k-tuple filters in a firewall policy. The policy is represented as a single-rooted tree, where each node represents a field of a filtering rule and each branch at this node represents a possible value of the associated tree. An example of such a tree taken from [4] is shown in Figure 1. Thus each path in the tree (starting from root) represents a policy rule. Each branch has at the end an action leaf, which shows the action which should be taken. The dotted box at the bottom lists rules associated with a given branch. Normally each branch should have only one rule associated with because ideally each packet should be processed by a single rule. If more than one rule is associated it represents an anomaly. For example rule 8, in addition to having its own branch, also appears on branches for rules 2,3,6, and 7. This happens because the rule is a superset of any of these other rules, and packet matching any of them will match rule 8 as well.

Hari et al. [21] considers a much simpler packet filtering model, where each filter is k-tuple  $(F[1], F[2], \dots, F[k])$  and where each field  $F[i]$  is a prefix bit

## Firewall Policy Advisor




Figure 1: Example of a policy representation as a tree

string. This model could be used not only in firewalls, but also for routing. Note that all matching is done only by matching prefix bit strings. However, as shown in [28], it is always possible to represent a sub-range of  $[0, 2^k]$  as at most  $2k$  prefixes. This allows us to convert from range-based policy rule representation to prefix-based. Prefix-based policy rule representation has a useful property, on which Hari et al. base their algorithms:

“If filter fields are prefix fields, then each field of a filter is either a strict subset of, or equal to, or a strict super-set of, or completely disjoint from the corresponding field in any other filter. In other words, it is not possible to have partial overlaps of fields. Partial overlaps can only occur when the fields are arbitrary ranges, not prefixes.” [21]

Using this property, the authors propose to solve a filter conflict problem by



formulating it as a cycle elimination problem in a directed graph.

There are some efforts related to the analysis of firewall policies using machine reasoning techniques. In particular, [16] describes an Expert System built using Constraint Logic Programming (CLP). Considering each rule as 6-tuple or as ranges along with action taken (“permit” or “deny”), the system represents them as constraints on the 6-dimensional packet space. Each rule is a 6-dimensional hypercube.

Capretta et al. in [9] use the Coq[8] proof assistant to detect conflicts in firewall policies. Their “conflict” definition is two rules for which there exists a request to which they give an opposite action (only *ACCEPT* and *DENY* actions are considered). Then they formally prove soundness and completeness to establish the correctness of their algorithm.

Another approach to policy modeling is using geometric interpretation. For example, Eppstein[15] suggests that each rule could be represented as a collection of  $d$ -dimensional ranges  $[l_i^1, r_i^1] \times \dots \times [l_i^d, r_i^d]$ , an action  $A_i$  and priority  $p_i$ . Similarly, each packet can be viewed as a  $d$ -dimensional vector of values  $P = [P_1, \dots, P_d]$ . In IP network terms, each dimension could correspond to an IP packet field. Thus the range  $[l_i^n, r_i^n]$  allows us to check if the value of an IP packet field number  $n$  falls in range  $[l_i, r_i]$ . A filter  $i$  applies to packet  $P$  if  $P_j \in [l_i^j, r_i^j]$ . Eppstein proceeds to formally define *packet classification* and *filter conflict detection* problems using this geometrical abstraction and suggests algorithms for solving them.

The *multidimensional range searching* problem from computational geometry is related to filter conflict detection. Multiple algorithms exist to solve this problem, surveyed in [23]. In particular, as mentioned in [21], Edelsbrunner [14] has proposed an algorithm which, in the worst case, can solve this problem in  $O((\log(N))^{2k-1} + R)$  where  $N$  is the number of  $k$ -dimensional rectangle

boxes and  $R$  is number of boxes intersecting the query box. However as Hari et. al conclude in [21], there are several known problems with the geometric interpretation approach:

The first problem is that this interpretation treats one filter which is fully contained within another filter as the intersection of their rectangles. However this does not indicate a conflict, since the contained filter is more specific. Thus not every detected intersection indicates a conflict (some intersections are false-positives).

The second problem relates to time and space bounds. Quick estimation from [21] concludes:

“... even for modest values of  $N$  and  $k$ , the worst-case time and space bound guaranteed by this data structure are hopelessly bad. For instance, when  $N = 10,000$  and  $k = 4$ , the algorithm guarantees a worst-case search cost of  $13^7 = 62748517$ , meaning that it is no better than a linear search through the filters.”[21]

Guttman[20] et al. describe a group of network security related problems and modeling frameworks that lead to their solutions:

We focus the modeling work on representing behavior as a function of configurations, and predicting the consequences of interactions among differently configured devices.[20]

While Guttman et al. cover both packet filtering firewalls and IPSec gateways, Uribe et al.[31] build upon their work, extending it by including specifications and requirements for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs).

All these approaches are based on declarative interpretation of firewall policy. Another approach is to assume an imperative semantics, treating firewall policy as a set of statements, the execution of which is controlled by a control flow.

In practice, most firewall implementations support imperative rather than declarative semantics, so this second approach has more practical applications. However, most researchers deal with the simplest form of control flow when analyzing firewall policies, where the policy is a list of sequentially applied rules. Most modern popular firewall platforms support more complex control flow models, with statements allowing conditional or unconditional branching, early termination, sub-routine calls, etc.

Yuan et al. in FIREMAN[37] are some of the few researchers who go beyond a simple linear policy model and consider what they call a *Complex Chain Model*, covering a more complex policy organization similar to that implemented in the popular Linux firewall Netfilter. They also introduce the notion of an *ACL Graph*, formed by a combination of multiple ACLs (access control lists) across the trajectory of the packet. Using this graph they provide some analysis of anomalies in distributed firewall configuration. Their approach is similar to ours (they also use a form of static code analysis) but they use a slightly different model of firewall policy. Their model, apparently inspired by *iptables*, is organized around *chains* and the only branching instruction supported is a “calling chain”. Our approach is more generic and allows us to accommodate branching models found in other firewall products, like *pf* or *ipfw*. To reason about rules, they use set operations on ACL. Operations like  $\subseteq$  and  $\cap$  have to be defined for all packet field types could be computationally heavy, compared to our symbolic approach using *MCSI*.

## 2.1 Anomaly Detection

Eppstein et al.[15] define the *filter conflict detection problem* as a way to detect when two or more filters (rules) applied to a packet specify conflicting actions. For example some let a packet pass through while others reject it. The pres-

ence of such rules in a policy could indicate an error and could lead to firewall misconfiguration.

Some studies[18] show that 15% of rules in real-life policies might be redundant. A more formal definition of shadowing and redundancy, quoted from [11] is as follows:

**“Definition 1.1** *Let  $R$  be a set of filtering rules. Then  $R$  has shadowing iff there exists at least one filtering rule,  $R_i$  in  $R$ , which never applies because all the packets that  $R_i$  may match, are previously matched by another rule, or combination of rules, with higher priority in order.*

**Definition 1.2** *Let  $R$  be a set of filtering rules. Then  $R$  has redundancy iff there exists at least one filtering rule,  $R_i$  in  $R$ , such that the following conditions hold: (1)  $R_i$  is not shadowed by any other rule; (2) when removing  $R_i$  from  $R$ , the filtering result does not change.”*

In [11], the authors present (with formal proofs of correctness) algorithms for shadowed and redundant rule detection and removal. However, their algorithms use a simplified firewall model with only a *single trigger* processing strategy and just two possible actions: *ACCEPT* and *DENY*. The authors do not go into exact semantics of rule condition matching, treating them as a conjunctive set of opaque condition attributes such that  $condition_i = A_1 \wedge A_2 \wedge \dots \wedge A_p$   $p$  being the number of condition attributes of the given set of filtering rules.

In [4] the authors identify four firewall policy anomalies:

**Shadowing anomaly** A rule is shadowed when a previous rule matches all the packets that match this rule, such that the shadowed rule will never be activated.

**Correlation anomaly** Two rules are correlated if the first rule in order matches some packets that match the second rule and the second rule matches some packets that match the first rule

**Generalization anomaly** A rule is a generalization of another rule if this general rule can match all the packets that match a specific rule that precedes it.

**Redundancy anomaly** A redundant rule performs the same action on the same packets as another rule such that if the redundant rule is removed, the security policy will not be affected.

Al-Shaer and Hamed proceed to provide some algorithms to detect any of these anomalies.

In [5], they extend their anomaly-detection algorithms to include configuration, consisting of multiple firewalls. They provide format definitions of various *Inter-Firewall Anomalies* and propose algorithms for their detection.

Baboescu [7] suggests an optimized conflict detection algorithm which, while based on a known Bit Vector approach, shows an order of magnitude of improvement compared to previous work.

Qian et al. in [26] introduce a framework which includes algorithms, allowing it to:

“detect and remove redundant rules, discover and repair inconsistent rules, merge overlapping or adjacent rules, map an ACL with complex interleaving permit/deny rules to a more readable form consisting of all permits or denies, and finally compute a meta-ACL profile based on all ACLs along a network path.”[26]

They present a set of formal *rule relation* definitions: “intersect”, “contain”, “overlap”, “disjoint”, “adjacent”, “inconsistent” and “redundant”.

Gouda and Liu in [24] analyze the rule redundancy problem. They introduce the notion of *upward redundant rules* and *downward redundant rules* (with formal definition). They offer algorithms for the identification of redundant rules using a *firewall decision tree*.

## 3 Control flow models in existing firewall platforms

In this section we will review control flow models and control flow statements in existing firewall platforms. We will concentrate on the few most popular ones.

### 3.1 Netfilter

Netfilter<sup>[2]</sup> is a very popular firewall platform, and is the default firewall platform for most Linux distributions. In Netfilter, policy rules are organized into *chains*. There are three built-in chains: *INPUT*, *OUTPUT*, and *FORWARD*. In addition, there exists the possibility for additional user-defined chains.

Built-in chains have a *policy* which determines the default action for this chain – what happens if the packet reached the end of the chain and no action has been taken on it so far. The policy could be either *ACCEPT* or *DROP*. User-defined chains all have an implicit *RETURN* policy which cannot be changed by the user.

Each rule can specify as an action a *JUMP* to another chain. This means that if rule conditions match, the packet will continue its traversal starting from the beginning of the specified chain. If the packet has reached the end of the called chain, or the *RETURN* action was triggered explicitly (by a rule) it will continue processing from the next rule of the caller chain. Upon return from built-in chains, a chain policy action is executed. For user-defined chains control returns to the caller.

Instead of *JUMP*, the user can specify a *GOTO* action in order to branch to another chain. When *RETURN* is encountered in the other chain, the control will return not to this chain, but to the chain which has called this one via *JUMP*.

Both *JUMP* and *GOTO* can call any user-defined chain, except the one which contains this rule.

Loops are not permitted with *JUMP* and *GOTO*. Such loops are detected by an *iptables* command and are reported with the somewhat cryptic message “iptables: Too many levels of symbolic links”. Loops detection in the current version (1.4.0) seems to be very rough: it basically forbids any JUMP/GOTO loops regardless of the conditions under which they occur. For example, the following policy is not accepted, because it is considered to contain a loop:

```
iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -d 38.99.76.17 -g test0
iptables -A test0 -p icmp -d 38.99.76.18 -j test1
iptables -A test1 -p icmp -d 38.99.76.19 -j test2
iptables -A test2 -p icmp -d 38.99.76.20 -g test0
```

The *SET-MARK* action<sup>1</sup> module can be used to associate values (*marks*) with a packet while it is being processed. These marks can be checked later using a *MARK* clause in filtering specification<sup>2</sup>. Only one mark value can be associated with the packet. Setting a new mark value will replace the old one.

Mark checks may be performed with *MARK* filtering specification by comparing its value to a given constant, after applying an optional *mask* using a bitwise *AND* operation.

The following is a simplified grammar of *iptables* policy language:

```
chain ::= (rule)*
rule ::= filtering-spec target
filtering-spec := mark-filtering-spec | ...
mark-filtering-spec := MARK mark-number ["/" mark-mask]
```

---

<sup>1</sup>Implemented in *mark* module

<sup>2</sup>Marks can be set only in the *mangle table* but can be checked in any other tables. Although it is not recommended to use mangling table for filtering, it is possible to do so. For completeness we assume that marks may be set and checked in any chain



```

target ::= ACCEPT | DROP | RETURN |
        JUMP chain | GOTO chain |
        SET-MARK mark-number
mark-number := 0..(2E32-1)
mark-mask := 0..(2E32-1)

```

Here is an example of a simple *netfilter* policy:

```

iptables --policy INPUT DROP
iptables --policy OUTPUT DROP
iptables --policy FORWARD DROP
iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -s 192.168.1.100 --dport 22 -m state \
        --state NEW -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP

```

The processing model is fairly simple. The processing starts from one of the built-in chains, and proceeds sequentially until either an *ACCEPT* or *DROP* action is triggered, or control is passed to another chain. This model is very similar to the execution model of instructions in a CPU. Rules can call other chains (as subroutines) or branch to them (similar to the infamous *GOTO* instruction in programming languages).

## 3.2 PF

PF<sup>[3]</sup> (stands for “packet filter”) is another popular firewall platform, and the default firewall for the OpenBSD system. The main difference between PF and Netfilter is that by default, unless the *quick* option is specified, it is using *multi-trigger* matching strategy. Thus the last matched target will be used to

determine what to do with the packet. The *quick* option causes it use *single-trigger* strategy for current rule.

In PF there is a notion of *anchors*. An *anchor* is a set of rules which could be invoked at any point of the policy using the *anchor* instruction. Anchors could be defined independently or as a part of the main ruleset (inline anchors). Anchors can be nested.

The following is a simplified grammar of the *pf* policy language:

```
ruleset := (rule | anchor)*
rule := filtering-rule | anchor-rule
filtering-rule := filtering-spec target [quick]
anchor-rule := ANCHOR anchor-name(/anchor-name)*
target ::= ACCEPT | DROP | TAG tagname
anchor ::= [anchor-name] ruleset
```

Here is an example of a simple *pf* firewall policy:

```
anchor "goodguys" {
    pass in proto tcp from 192.168.2.3 to port 22
}
...
anchor goodguys
pass in on dc0 from 192.168.0.0/24 to 192.168.0.1
pass out on dc0 from 192.168.0.1 to 192.168.0.0/24
```

The default target for the main ruleset is *PASS*, which will be used if the packet has not matched any rules.

Upon a match, rules can *tag* a packet. Only one tag can be assigned to the packet at a time, and once it is assigned, it cannot be removed. Subsequent rules can check for the tag presence.

When anchors are defined inline (either via curly brackets syntax, or via the *LOAD ANCHOR* command) they are also invoked at the place of definition.

Informally the processing model could be described as follows: the rules are processed one by one. The last matching action is remembered and will be used when the end of the policy is reached (*multi-trigger* strategy). A rule with a quick option will cause its action to take effect immediately (*single-trigger* strategy). Anchors are just named blocks of rules which can be invoked at some points of the policy, either unconditionally or based on the results of the evaluation of a packet matching criteria. Packets can be tagged with a single named tag which is sticky. Rules can check for the presence of a particular tag.

### 3.3 IPFW

IPFW (also known as IPFIREWALL)[29, 6] is a firewall platform sponsored, authored, and maintained by the FreeBSD project. It is also used as a firewall under MacOS. IPFW matches rules sequentially, stopping at the first matching rule. Rules are numbered from 1 to 65535. If no rules are matched, the packet is discarded by the default rule with number 65535. Each rule belongs to exactly one set from 0 to 31 with 0 being default. Some sets could be enabled or disabled at any given time, except set 31 which is always enabled. Sets are just a way for the firewall administrator to organize policy rules. They are not part of the rule language.

A packet can have zero or more *tags* associated with it. Tags are identified by numbers in the range [1..65534]. Tags can be set or unset conditionally (using *tag* or *untag* commands). Rule matching can check for tag presence (using the *tagged* rule option).

One action affecting the rule application sequence is *SKIPTO*. This action makes a firewall skip all rules with numbers less than a specified amount.

The following is a simplified grammar of the *ipfw* policy language:

```
ruleset := (rule)*
rule := rule-number action filtering-spec
rule-number := 0..65535
set-number := 0..31
tag-number := 0..65535
action ::= ALLOW | DENY | TAG tag-number | UNTAG tag-number |
          SKIPTO rule-number
```

Here is an example of a simple *ipfw* policy:

```
501 deny all from any to any frag
502 deny tcp from any to any established
503 allow tcp from any to any 80 out via tun0 setup keep-state
504 allow tcp from any to 192.0.2.11 53 out via tun0 setup keep-state
```

The *set-number* is specified outside of the policy file, as an argument to *ipfw* command when it is loaded.

One interesting type of rules are *probabilistic rules*, a rules which match packets with a given probability. For the purpose of anomaly detection, we will treat them as normal rules (triggered with a probability of 1).

Informally, a processing model can be described as follows: rules are always processed in increasing order of their numbers. Rules can set and check one of 65536 Boolean variables. Additionally, there is a *SKIPTO* instruction, (similar to *GOTO* in programming languages), except it is only allowed to jump in a forward direction.

### 3.4 IPFilter

IPFilter (also known as IPF)[1, 10] is used on many firewall platforms, most notably FreeBSD, NetBSD and SUN Solaris.

IPFilter, like PF, uses the last matched rule to make decisions on how to handle the packet (also known as *multi-trigger* processing). Also, like PF it has a *quick* option to make decisions immediately.

The *SKIP* action skips a given number of rules.

Rules can also be placed in *groups*. The default group is 0. A *HEAD* parameter in the rule indicates that if matched, further execution should proceed with rules within this group, using this rule action as default (if none matched). If the *quick* keyword was specified, after processing a group specified in the *HEAD* parameter, packet processing stops. If it was not specified, the firewall will continue rule processing in the group which was active when *HEAD* was executed. *HEAD* instructions can be used within non-default groups as well, to represent more levels of branching.

The following is a simplified grammar of *IPFilter* policy language:

```
ruleset := (rule)*
rule := target filtering-spec [group-number] [quick]
group-number := 0..65535
target := skip-target | regular-target
skip-target := SKIP number-of-rules
regular-target := [HEAD tag-number] (PASS | BLOCK)
```

Here is an example of a simple *ipfilter* policy:

```
block in all
block out all
pass in from firewall to any
```

```
block in on le0 proto icmp all
pass in on le0 proto 4 all
block in on le0 from localhost to any
block out quick on x11 all head 10
pass out quick proto tcp from any to 20.20.20.64/26 port = 80 group 10
block out on x12 all
```

Group invocation is similar to a subroutine call in programming languages, the main difference being that the invocation rule always specifies a default action. Additionally, in subroutines the *SKIP* instruction provides a conditional jump forward within a group.

## 4 Intermediate Rule Language

We will now try to define a generalized *abstract syntax* for policy rule processing which includes support for all control flow constructs mentioned in the previous sections of this paper. We will show that all firewall languages described above can be converted into this new intermediate language. Having such a unified rule language, we can do policy analysis without being dependent on specific platforms.

This will be a language to express firewall filtering policies. A *policy* consists of *rules*. Each rule consists of two parts: *filtering specification* and *target specification*. The language will have an imperative semantics. The policy, expressed as a program in this language, will be applied to each packet and as a result will produce an outcome – how this packet should be handled.

### 4.1 Filtering specification

A *filtering specification* is a predicate, which is evaluated during rule processing. If it evaluates to *True*, the *target specification* is invoked.

For the purpose of this thesis, we will consider a *filtering specification* to be a *conjunction* of two predicates: a *static check* predicate and a *dynamic check* predicate.

A *static check* predicate deals only with the fields which do not change while an individual packet is matched towards a policy. For example, a static check could examine packet fields, firewall settings, etc. It should be noted that *stateful packet inspection*[\[35\]](#) is done here, because a state cannot change during single packet processing.

In this thesis we will consider simplified static check specification in the 5-tuple form:  $(src\_addr, src\_port, dst\_addr, dst\_port, protocol)$ . All fields are

*intervals*, and the corresponding fields of the packet are checked to see if they belong to the following intervals:

**src\_addr** Source address interval

**src\_port** Source port interval (for TCP and UDP)

**dst\_addr** Destination address interval

**dst\_port** Destination port interval (for TCP and UDP)

**protocol** IP Protocol number interval

Address fields (*src\_addr* and *dst\_addr*) are intervals of IP addresses. For now, we will consider only IPv4 addresses, so the values will be in the range of 0 to  $2^{32} - 1$  (inclusive).

Port ranges for *src\_port* and *dst\_port* are just numeric intervals with values in the range of 0 to  $2^{16} - 1$  (inclusive).

Although a *protocol* will usually be compared to a single specific numeric value, we will represent this as checks towards an interval (0 to  $2^8 - 1$  inclusive), for consistency with other fields.

Real firewalls can match some additional fields, like Data Link Layer address or ICMP protocol type and code. Although we are not considering them in this thesis, our methodology could easily be extended to include more fields in the static check predicate.

**A *dynamic check*** predicate deals with values which could be changed during packet inspection, for example by *target specifications* of previously matched rules. In our language such values are stored in *variables*. So, dynamic checks are limited to testing values of such variables. See Section 4.4 for more details on variables.



## 4.2 Target specification

A *target specification* has an imperative semantics. It can make a decision on how a packet should be processed. It can also affect a sequence of rule executions as well as produce some side-effects, like setting variables (which could be later examined by the *dynamic check* part of filtering specifications of rules, executed after this one.)

Let us define target specifications. We will consider:

***DROP*** denotes that the packet should not be allowed to pass through the firewall. It should be immediately silently dropped. No further rules should be evaluated.

***ACCEPT*** denotes that the packet should be immediately allowed to pass through the firewall. No further rules should be evaluated.

***CALL*** target means that the rule processing should proceed from the specified label until either packet is dropped, accepted, or the *RETURN* action is invoked. *CALL* instructions can be nested.

***RETURN*** target causes rule execution to proceed from instruction, immediately following the last *CALL* instruction. If there was no *CALL* instruction invoked, then the behavior of *RETURN* is undefined.

***JUMP*** target means that rule processing should continue from a specified label.

During rule set processing either the *ACCEPT* or *DROP* action should be triggered. If rule set processing is finished (the last rule has been processed), and neither the *ACCEPT* nor the *DROP* action has encountered the outcome of a packet, processing is undefined.

### 4.3 Labels

The rules are numbered. The label is a rule number. No two rules can have same label. Some labels might not have rules associated with them.

### 4.4 Variables

In our language we will have a set of variables with a name and a value. The name is a positive integer. The value is opaque (we do not make any assumption about value structure or type) and the only operation allowed on it is an equality check, comparing it to a literal or constant arithmetic expression (currently only the bitwise *and* operation between constants is permitted).

Unset variables are assumed to have a special value of *NIL*. Once the variable is set, it could be unset again by assigning *NIL* as a new value. A variable could be checked for *NIL* value comparing it to special *NIL* literal.

### 4.5 Abstract Syntax

An *Abstract Syntax* “specifies the set of trees that are considered abstract representation of well formed documents in the language”[13].

We are using lower case letters for *operators* and capital letters for *phyla* names. The abstract syntax for our intermediate language is as follows:

#### Atomic Operators

true  
false  
int  
octet  
long  
varname

opaquevalue  
nil  
accept\_target  
drop\_target  
return\_target

#### Fixed Arity Operators

policy\_def → POLICY  
interval\_def → PACKETFIELD FLAG PACKETFIELD FLAG  
rule\_def → LABEL STATIC.CHECK DYNAMIC.CHECK TARGET  
static\_check\_def → FLAG INTERVALSET  
FLAG INTERVALSET  
FLAG INTERVALSET  
FLAG INTERVALSET  
FLAG INTERVALSET  
var\_value\_check\_def → FLAG VAR VALUE  
const\_expr → CONST.VALUE  
const\_masked\_expr → CONST.VALUE CONST.MASK  
call\_target → LABEL  
jump\_target → LABEL  
var\_set\_target → VAR OPAQUE.CONST

#### List Operators

ruleset\_def → RULE ...  
intervalset\_def → INTERVAL ...

#### Phyla

POLICY :: ruleset\_def

```

TARGET :: accept_target drop_target
        call_target jump_target return_target
        var_set_target

VAR :: varname

VALUE :: nil opaqvalue const_expr const_masked_expr

OPAQUE.CONST :: opaqvalue

STATIC.CHECK :: static_check_def

DYNAMIC.CHECK :: var_value_check_def

FLAG :: true false

PACKETFIELD :: int

INTERVAL :: interval_def

INTERVALSET :: intervalset_def

CONST.VALUE :: int

CONST.MASK :: int

LABEL: long

```

## 4.6 Sample Concrete Syntax

In this section we will define a simple concrete syntax which we will use for examples in the rest of the document. The very same syntax will be used in our proof of concept implementation.

The following is the syntax, expressed in EBNF notation<sup>[27]</sup>:

Listing 1: Sample Concrete Syntax

```

ruleset = {rule} ;
digit = "0" | "1" | "2" | "3" | "4" | "5" | "6" | "7" | "8" |
        "9" ;
ws = (" " | "\t" ), {" " | "\t" } ;
lf = ("\r" | "\n"), {"\r" | "\n"} ;

```

```

comment = "#", comment-text, lf ;
comment-text = (?Printable ASCII Characters? - ("\r" | "\n"))
;
opaque-value = "\'", (?Printable ASCII Characters? - ("\r" |
"\n" | "\'")),
"\'", ;
number = digit, {digit} ;
var-name = "$", number ;
rule = number "if", filtering-spec, "then", target, ";" ;
filtering-spec = (static-checks, "and", dynamic-check)
| static-checks
| dynamic-check
| "true" ;
dynamic-check = ["!"], var-name, "=", (opaque-value | const-
expr | "nil") ;
addr-octet = digit, [digit [digit]] ;
const-expr = number, [ "&", number ] ;
target = action-target | branching-target | side-effects-
target ;
action-target = "accept" | "drop" ;
branching-target = "call", number | "jump", number | "return"
;
side-effects-target = var-name, '=', "'", opaque-value, "'" ;
intrv-open = "[" | "(" ;
intrv-close = "]" | ")" ;
ipv4addr = addr-octet, ".", addr-octet, ".", addr-octet, ".",
addr-octet ;
ipv4mask = addr-octet, ".", addr-octet, ".", addr-octet, ".",
addr-octet ;
addr-interval = intrv-open, ipv4addr, ",", ipv4addr,

```

```

intrv_close
    | ipv4addr , '/' , number
    | ipv4addr , ':' , ipv4mask;
port_interval = intrv_open , number , "," , number ,
    intrv_close ;
proto_interval = intrv_open , number , "," , number ,
    intrv_close ;
addr_interval_set = "{" , addr_interval , {" , " ,
    } , "}"
port_interval_set = "{" , port_interval , {" , " ,
    port_interval } ,
    "}"
proto_interval_set = "{" , proto_interval , {" , " ,
    proto_interval } , "}"
static_checks = ["!"] , ("saddr" , "in" , (addr_interval |
    addr_interval_set)) ? ,
    ["!"] , ("sport" , "in" , (port_interval |
    port_interval_set)) ? ,
    ["!"] , ("daddr" , "in" , (addr_interval |
    addr_interval_set)) ? ,
    ["!"] , ("dport" , "in" , (port_interval |
    port_interval_set)) ? ,
    ["!"] , ("proto" , "in" , (proto_interval |
    proto_interval_set)) ? ;

```

## 4.7 Mapping policy languages to Intermediate Policy language

In this section we will show how policy languages of the concrete firewalls we reviewed in Section 3 could be represented in our intermediate policy language.

#### 4.7.1 Netfilter

All rules in all chains are assigned non-overlapping ranges of *labels*. All rules within each chain have sequential labels.

*ACCEPT*, *DROP* and *RETURN* are mapped to corresponding intermediate language instructions.

*JUMP* is mapped to *CALL* with the chain name being mapped to the label of it's first rule.

*GOTO* is mapped to *JUMP* with the chain name being mapped to label of it's first rule.

The *default policy* for built-in chains is mapped into an additional rule, added at the end of each built-in chain. In this rule, the filtering specification is a predicate which always evaluates to *True* and the action is one of *ACCEPT* or *DROP* values.

The *SET-MARK* action will be mapped to *SET* instructions, setting the variable with number 1 to *mark* value. Thus, for example: *SET-MARK 12* becomes *\$1=12*.

The *MARK* filtering specification will be mapped to the *VAR* intermediate filtering specification, checking if the variable 1 value matches a given constant. So, for example *MARK 5/0x0F* becomes *\$1 = 5 & 0x0F*.

#### 4.7.2 PF

All rules are assigned non-overlapping ranges of *labels*. Rules within each ruleset have sequential labels.

Since the default action for a ruleset is *PASS* in PF, an additional rule will be added at the end of each ruleset. In this rule, the filtering specification is a predicate which always evaluates to *True* and the target is *ACCEPT*.

Both *ACCEPT* and *DROP* where the *quick* option is present are mapped

to corresponding intermediate language instructions.

To simulate rules without the *quick* option, a special variable with number 0 will be used. The rules without the *quick* option will save their action in this variable. At the end of the policy, two rules will be added to check if this variable holds a *DROP* action and, if it does, to trigger it. We do not need to check for an *ACCEPT* value because it is a default.

For example:

```
{filtering-spec} PASS
```

will be mapped to:

```
10 if {filtering-spec} then $0 = 'ACCEPT' ;
```

```
...
```

```
65534 if $0 = 'DROP' then drop ;
```

```
65535 if true then accept ;
```

*tags* will be stored in a special variable with number 1. Tagging instructions will be translated to:

```
if ... then $1 = tagname
```

Checks for a tag presence will translate to:

```
if $1 = tagname then ...
```

The *inline anchors* definition will be moved from the ruleset they were defined in to a separate block of rules, terminated with an unconditional *RETURN* target. In place of their definition, an unconditional *CALL* statement will be inserted.

Anchor invocation (via *anchor* target) will be replaced with a *CALL* target.



### 4.7.3 IPFW

Rules are mapped, preserving their numbers as labels. A rule with label 65536 is added which unconditionally invokes the *DROP* target.

The *SKIPTO* action is mapped to the *JUMP* target.

*TAG tag-number* is mapped to *\$tag-number = 'TRUE'*; *UNTAG tag-number* is mapped to *\$tag-number = NIL*. The checks for a tag presence are mapped to something like *20 if \$tag-number = NIL then . . .*

*Sets* are just a way to organize policy rules and are not mapped into the intermediate language. We will consider policy resulting from selecting rules from all sets which are enabled at the moment. Enabling different sets will produce multiple different policies, which can be analyzed separately.

### 4.7.4 IPFilter

All rules are first sorted by ascending group number, preserving order within a group. Labels are assigned according to this new rule order.

*quick* option handling will be done in the same manner as in PF, described in Section 4.7.2.

Group invocation (*HEAD* action) is mapped into the *CALL* instruction. Each group uses its own variable, with a name equal to the first rule number in the group to store a resulting action. Thus, a group starting with rule number 10 will store a resulting action in a variable with the number 10<sup>3</sup>.

For example:

```
{filtering-spec} HEAD 10 DROP
```

will be mapped to:

---

<sup>3</sup>Because *GROUP* calls can be nested, the group could indirectly call itself. This should not pose any problems, since in *ipfilter* there are no dynamic checks and the outcome of the group execution is always the same in the context of single packet processing

```

100 if {filtering-spec} then $10 = NIL ;
101 if {filtering-spec} then call 10 ;
102 if {filtering-spec} and $10 = 'ACCEPT' then $0 = 'ACCEPT' ;
103 if {filtering-spec} and ! $10='ACCEPT' then $0 = 'DROP' ;

```

In the example above, the last two lines should really be three:

```

102 if {filtering-spec} and $10 = 'ACCEPT' then $0 = 'ACCEPT' ;
103 if {filtering-spec} and $10 = 'DROP' then $0 = 'DROP' ;
104 if {filtering-spec} and $10 = NIL then $0 = 'DROP' ;

```

But knowing that in this context, the variable 10 could take only three values: *'ACCEPT'*, *'DROP'* or *NIL* we can replace these three rules with the two rule equivalent shown above.

If the *quick* option were specified, our example would look like:

```
{filtering-spec} quick HEAD 10 DROP
```

mapped to:

```

100 if {filtering-spec} then $10 = NIL ;
101 if {filtering-spec} then call 10 ;
102 if {filtering-spec} and $10 = 'ACCEPT' then accept ;
103 if {filtering-spec} and ! $10 = 'ACCEPT' the drop ;

```

The *SKIP* action will be mapped to the *GOTO* target, converting relative offset into an absolute rule label.

## 5 Firewall Policy Analysis

The goal of this section is to discuss how *static code analysis* could be applied to a firewall policy expressed in *intermediate language* as introduced in Section 4. While our immediate goal is *anomaly detection*, these techniques could be extended further for other purposes, such as optimization.

The main premise of our work is that firewall policy is essentially a program in an imperative programming language, which is executed by a firewall. The input of the program is an IP packet (defined by a set of field values) and the outcome is a decision as to how this packet should be handled (passed through or dropped).

The techniques for analyzing relations between individual rules are well understood. Some of them are mentioned in Section 2. The main challenge is dealing with control flow constructs, which could impact the order of execution of individual rules.

The *intermediate language* which we introduced in Section 4 is highly suitable for the application of static code analysis. This is a fairly simple imperative programming language with variables, conditional statements and two simple control flow constructs: (*JUMP* and *CALL/RETURN*).

Although we cannot assume that any program in this language is guaranteed to terminate, the programs generated by converting valid policies from original policy languages will terminate. (due to restrictions like loop prevention and *GOTO* only pointing to the beginning of the chain in *Netfilter*, and forward-only *SKIPTO* in *IPFW*.)

### 5.1 Minimal Combining Set Of Intervals

In this section we will first introduce a notion of a *Minimal Combining Set Of Intervals* (*MCSI*). *MCSI* will be used later on in policy analysis to represent

static checks as an operation on boolean variables instead of an operation on intervals. This substitution will allow us to more easily apply Datalog and BDD for policy analysis.

### 5.1.1 Definition

Let  $O$  be an arbitrary set of *non-empty* intervals. No assumptions are made about intervals in this set: they may overlap, be *open*, *closed*, *half-open*, *degenerate*, *bounded*, *unbounded* or *half-bounded*[32]. What is described below applies to *real* or *integer* intervals, or more generally to intervals defined on totally ordered sets.

We will use upper case letters for *sets*, letters with bar on top for *intervals* and lower case letters for set members.

We call  $Z$  a *Minimal Combining Set (MCSI)* of  $O$  iff 1-4 are all true:

**Same Coverage.** Every point which belongs to any of the intervals in  $O$  also belongs to some interval in *MCSI* and vice versa. More formally:

$$\forall \bar{S} \in O, \forall x \in \bar{S}, \exists \bar{A} \in Z, x \in \bar{A} \quad (1)$$

$$\forall \bar{A} \in Z, \forall x \in \bar{A}, \exists \bar{S} \in O, x \in \bar{S} \quad (2)$$

**Disjoint.** Intervals in *MCSI* are disjoint (non-overlapping):

$$\forall \bar{M}, \bar{N} \in Z, \neg(\exists x \in \bar{M}, \exists y \in \bar{N}, x = y \wedge \bar{M} \neq \bar{N}) \quad (3)$$

**Composite.** Any interval in the original set could be exactly represented by one or more intervals from *MCSI*:

$$\forall \bar{S} \in O, \exists A_s \in \mathcal{P}(Z), \left[ \begin{array}{l} (\forall x \in \bar{S}, \exists \bar{A} \in A_s, x \in \bar{A}) \wedge \\ (\forall \bar{A} \in A_s, \forall x \in \bar{A}, x \in \bar{S}) \end{array} \right] \quad (4)$$

### 5.1.2 Properties

Let us prove the *MCSI uniqueness* property which is useful to us:

**Theorem 1.** *There is a single way to represent each interval from the original set using intervals from MCSI.*

*Proof.* Given the original set  $O$  and it's MCSI  $Z$ , let us assume there is  $\bar{S} \in O$  for which there are two two distinct ways to represent it using intervals from  $Z$ .

Let us call them  $Z_1^s, Z_2^s \subseteq Z$ . Being non-equivalent:

$$Z_1^s \not\equiv Z_1^s \leftrightarrow \quad (5)$$

$$(\exists \bar{A} \in Z_1^s, \bar{A} \notin Z_2^s) \vee (\exists \bar{A} \in Z_2^s, \bar{A} \notin Z_1^s) \leftrightarrow \quad (6)$$

$$(\exists \bar{M} \in Z_1^s, \forall \bar{N} \in Z_2^s, \bar{M} \neq \bar{N}) \vee (\exists \bar{N} \in Z_2^s, \forall \bar{M} \in Z_1^s, \bar{N} \neq \bar{M}) \quad (7)$$

Let us consider  $\bar{M} \in Z_1^s$  and  $x \in \bar{M}$ . According to (2):  $\exists \bar{S} \in O, x \in \bar{S}$ .

Now let us consider  $Z_2^s$ . For  $x \in \bar{S}$  according to (1)  $\exists \bar{N} \in Z_2^s, x \in \bar{N}$ .

This gives us the following system of equations:

$$\exists \bar{M} \in Z_1^s, x \in \bar{M}$$

$$\exists \bar{N} \in Z_2^s, x \in \bar{N}$$

According to (3) this means that  $\bar{M} = \bar{N}$ . Thus (7) will be always false.  $\square$

### 5.1.3 Algorithm

An implementation of the *MCSI* calculation algorithm in Haskell programming language is presented in Appendix A.1. Below is an informal description of the algorithm.

For all intervals in the original set, build a combined set of their *boundaries*. The *interval boundary* is a 3-tuple which consists of:

1. Endpoint
2. Boolean flag indicating whether the endpoint is included in the interval or not
3. Boolean flag, which is *False* if this endpoint represents lower bound or *False* if it represents an upper bound of an interval

For example, the interval  $[4 - 10)$  has two boundaries:  $(4, true, true)$  and  $(10, false, false)$ .

The algorithm is a simple iterative algorithm. It takes a list of intervals and calculates a list of all their boundaries. Then it proceeds by *splitting* each interval by each of its boundaries. If no splits have been performed, the list of intervals is *MCSI*. If splits have been performed, split intervals are replaced with the results of the *split* operation and the algorithm repeats from the beginning.

A *split* operation takes an interval and a *boundary* (3-tuple). If the endpoint is included, the interval is split into two non-overlapping sub-intervals by this point. Only one of them would include the point. The decision which one depends on is whether it was an opening or closing boundary. Example: Splitting  $[0 - 3)$  by  $(2, true, true)$  will produce  $[0 - 2)$ ,  $[2 - 3)$ . Splitting it by  $(2, true, false)$  will produce  $[0 - 2]$ ,  $(2 - 3)$ .

If the boundary endpoint is excluded, the interval will split into three non-overlapping sub-intervals: from the interval's lower bound to the boundary point

(not including it), a degenerate interval which contains the boundary point alone, and finally a third interval, which includes the bound point to the upper bound of an interval. The reason for such a split is to exclude the bound point when combining these sub-intervals to represent some of the original intervals. Example: splitting  $[0 - 3]$  by  $(2, false, true)$  will produce  $[0 - 2), [2 - 2], (2 - 3]$ .

We are trying to produce a *minimal* set of intervals. If this restriction is lifted, it is sufficient to split always into three sub-intervals, as described in a previous paragraph.

## 5.2 Applying MCSI to Static Checks

Most firewall rules perform checks on the fields of an IP packet. There is a limited set of these fields, such as the *source address*, *destination address*, *port*, etc. They all have numeric values which fall into well-defined intervals. For example, an IP (version 4) address that could be represented as a 32-bit integer must be in interval  $[0, 2^{32} - 1]$ . TCP port numbers are in interval  $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$ . These intervals are always totally ordered sets of individual, discrete values.

All *static checks* are operating on an individual value from or on sub-intervals of these intervals. For example, one may check if a port number is in interval  $[0, 1023]$  (a privileged port) or if an IP address belongs to subnet  $192.168.1.0/24$  which could be also converted to an interval  $[192.168.1.1, 192.168.1.255]$ .

In a firewall policy, we treat the values of each field as belonging to a distinct domain. For example, there is a domain of source IP addresses and there is a domain of source TCP port numbers<sup>4</sup>. In our intermediate language, all value checks on these intervals are static. In other words, IP packet fields are only checked whenever they belong to *constant intervals*, hard-coded in a policy. This allows us to find all possible constant intervals used for each domain. Then, for

---

<sup>4</sup>It should be noted that although for example source port numbers and destination port numbers have the same physical type and range they belong to two distinct domains

each domain we can calculate MCSI for this domain.

For example, if we have a domain of TCP port numbers  $[0, 65535]$  and the following checks in a policy:

$$rule1 \leftarrow port = 2$$

$$rule2 \leftarrow (port \geq 2) \wedge (port \leq 3)$$

This allows us to identify the following set intervals for domain of TCP ports:  $[2, 2], [2, 65535], [0, 3]$ . MCSI representation of this set is:  $[[0 - 2), [2 - 2], (2 - 3), [3 - 3], (3 - 65535]]$ . Because TCP port numbers are integers  $(2, 3)$  interval is equivalent to an empty interval and could be omitted.

Thus any TCP port in this policy belongs to one of the intervals:

$$i1 = [1, 2)$$

$$i2 = [2, 2]$$

$$i3 = [3, 3]$$

$$i4 = (3, 65535]$$

Thus, the policy checks could be expressed as:



$$rule1 \leftarrow port \in i2$$

$$rule2 \leftarrow ((port \in i2) \vee (port \in i3) \vee (port \in i4)) \wedge ((port \in i3) \vee (port \in i2) \vee (port \in i1))$$

This allows us to represent all static check expressions as a set of predicates, one per interval from *MCSI*. From this point on we can forget actual interval values, and treat them as Boolean variables, assigned result of evaluation of packet fields towards these intervals. There will be a finite set of these variables.

How could this help us to solve the problem we are tackling? Data and Control flow analysis relies heavily on the *Control Flow Graph*. This is a graph which represents how control can pass between labels of a program. We can build a control flow graph where each node will have a list of static checks associated with it. Since there is a finite number of these checks, if the same condition is checked in multiple nodes of the graph, they will have exact same checks. This allows us to represent the control flow graph as a *Binary Decision Diagram* which is well suitable for analysis using various algorithms.

### 5.3 Unreachable Code Detection

*Unreachable Code Detection* is a kind of *Control Flow Analysis*.

*Unreachable Code* is defined as:

“A code fragment is unreachable if there is no control flow path to it from the rest of the program. Code that is unreachable can never be executed, and can therefore be eliminated without affecting the

behavior of the program.” [12]

We start by building a control flow graph of a firewall policy. Labels act as the nodes of this graph. Edges can be associated with a list of constraints: a static checks which packets must be satisfied for control flow to traverse this edge. The label is reachable if there exists at least one path from one of initial labels to this label. The constraints along the path must not be inconsistent. I.e. it must be possible to have a packet which satisfies all of them.

## 5.4 Live Variable Analysis

*Live Variable Analysis* is a type of *data flow analysis* which could be used to find and eliminate *dead code*. In particular, the code which assigns variables that are always re-assigned later. In other words, rules which are redundant and could be omitted from a policy. More formally:

“A variable is *live* at the exit from a label, if there exists a path from the label to a use of the variable that does not re-define the variable.” [25]

Performing live variable analysis using a monotone framework involves finding a fixed point for a given lattice of finite height and functions  $f$ . There are several algorithms to find the fixpoint. For example Nielson et al. present [25] *Chaotic Iteration algorithm*, *Maximal Fixed Point solution*, and *Meet Over all Paths solution*.

In case of multi-trigger policies, when a policy decision is stored in a (special) variable, we can apply live variable analysis to find all places where variable assignments are always overwritten afterwards. Such places indicate *rule shadowing*.

Example:

Sample policy in a native language (*pf*):

```
block in on en0 from 192.168.1.10/32 to any
pass out on en0 from 192.168.1.0/24 to any
```

Assuming multi-trigger action, the first rule is always shadowed by the second one.

Let us convert this into an intermediate language.

```
1 if saddr in 192.168.1.10/32 then
    $0='drop';
2 if saddr in 192.168.1.00/24 then
    $0='accept';
# epililogue
1000 if $0='accept' then
    accept;
1001 if $0='drop' then
    drop;
```

The variable  $\$0$  is not *live* at the exit from label 1. Label 1 corresponds to the first rule in the original policy, meaning that this rule is redundant and could be omitted.

## 6 Implementation

We have implemented a simple analyzer, analyzing a program in an *Intermediate Rule Language* and detecting some potential anomalies.

The implementation consists of the following modules:

1. *Parser* is responsible for parsing a program in Intermediate Rule Language and representing it as a *parse tree*.
2. *Data Flow and CFG Extractor* is responsible for taking parsed policy and extracting from it some facts, which will be used in further analysis.
3. *Static Analyzer* working with facts produced by previous module implements *live variable analysis* and *unreachable code detection*.

The first two modules are implemented in Haskell. Haskell is an advanced purely functional programming language.

The *Datalog* language is commonly used as an implementation language for program analysis algorithms[30], [33]. Datalog is a query language based on the logic programming paradigm. It is a subset of the *Prolog* logic programming language.

“Analyses expressed in a few lines of Datalog can take hundreds to thousands of lines of code in a traditional language.”[33]

We use Datalog for *Static Analyzer Module* implementation.

Source code for all modules (excluding unit tests and build files) is included in Appendix A. We will discuss each of these modules in more detail below.

### 6.1 Parser Module

This module is parsing concrete syntax of our *Intermediate Policy Language* as defined in Section 4.6 into a *Parse Tree*. Parse tree structure is pretty much

defined by *abstract syntax* as defined in Section 4.5. We are using Haskell data structures to represent it.

Coding a parser by hand is a laborious task, and tools called *parser generators* are commonly used to automate it. These tools usually accept high-level definition of syntax of the input language and generate parser code in the target language. The tool we have chosen for this purpose is called *Happy*, a monadic parser generator for Haskell[17].

Parser grammar specification in annotated BNF syntax for *Happy* is included in Appendix A.2.

The type of parser we have implemented is called a *monadic parser*. We are using a variant of *Exception Monad* (also known as *Error Monad*) for error handling. The monad we use is defined by type constructor  $P$ , bind operation  $thenP$  and return operation  $returnP$ .

We define tokens used in our language using the *%token* directive. The lexical analyzer, responsible for splitting a source file into tokens is pretty trivial and hand-coded in Haskell, and its source is included in *PolicyLang.y* as a *lexer* function. The lexer is also monadic. It is called by the parser to emit new tokens, and is passed a *continuation* as an argument. The new token is read and a continuation is called with it.

The bulk of the grammar consists of *production rules*. Each rule consists of a *non-terminal symbol* on the left side followed by one or more *expansions* on the right side. Expansions have Haskell code associated with them (in curly brackets) which specify the *value* of each expansion. The parser matches a stream of tokens produced by lexer towards productions, and builds a *Parse Tree* from values emitted by productions.

The data types for the parse tree as defined in separate Haskell modules: *NetworkData* and *Policy*, the source of which is also included in Appendix A.2.

The *NetworkData* Haskell module contains definitions of data types for basic network concepts such as *IP address*<sup>5</sup>, *IP Network*, and *Netmask* as well as utility functions for working with them, such as converting between *CIDR* and *netmask* notations. It also contains instances of the *Interval* class for IP addresses and TCP port numbers.

Haskell module *Policy* contains definitions of data types for firewall policies in intermediate language: types such as *PolicyRule*, *StaticCheck*, and *Target*.

## 6.2 Data Flow and CFG Extractor Module

The purpose of this module is for a given program (parser module output) to produce a set of facts for the Datalog analyzer.

The facts it produces are:

1. List of internal and external labels
2. List of initial labels
3. List of final labels
4. List of variables
5. At what labels writes to what variables occur
6. At what labels reads from what variables occur

Additionally, it generates Datalog predicates for the control flow graph. Because of the predicate structure we have chosen for our Datalog analysis (see next section), it also generates analysis predicates with appropriate arity. The arity depends on policy being analyzed.

Let us first look at the notion of *internal* vs *external* labels. In our intermediate policy language all rules have labels. This is what in policy analysis we

---

<sup>5</sup>In the current implementation, we work only with IP version 4 addresses although our algorithms could be extended to work with IP version 6 addresses as well

will refer to as *external* labels. Static code analysis also operates with *labels*. However these labels (which we will call *internal labels*) are more granular, since we should be able to address individual parts of the rule. Each *external label* is corresponding to a rule which hse the following general structure:

```
label 'if' filteringspec 'then' targetspec ';' ;
```

To reflect the fact that control flow might now reach *target spec* if *filteringspec* is not matched, we need to distinguish at least two *internal labels* here: one for filtering spec and one for target spec. Let us call them  $l_{if}$  and  $l_{then}$  and associate them with filtering specification and target specification respectively. After the control flow reaches  $l_{if}$ , if filtering specification is satisfied it would proceed to  $l_{then}$ . Otherwise it would proceed to the next rule.

*Target specification* in our intermediate language can have only 6 possible values:

If it is either *ACCEPT* or *DROP* then  $l_{then}$  is final and control will not proceed past it. The control flow graph for this case is shown on Figure 2.




Figure 2: Control flow graph of of policy statement with *ACCEPT/DROP* target

If it is *JUMP*, it would proceed to the label specified as a parameter of *JUMP*. To be more precise, it will proceed to the internal label which corresponds to the *if* part of the external label specified as the *JUMP* argument. So for *JUMP X* the control flow will proceed to  $X_{if}$ .

The control flow graph for this case is shown on Figure 3.




Figure 3: Control flow graph of of policy statement with *JUMP* target

If it is *SET*, the control will always proceed to the next rule directly if the static check condition is not satisfied, and via the  $L_{then}$  label otherwise.

The control flow graph for this case is shown on Figure 4.




Figure 4: Control flow graph of of policy statement with *SET* target

Now, we come to a more complex case: *CALL/RETURN*. The control flow for this case is shown on Figures 5 and 6. A *CALL* target will cause control first to flow to the label specified as the *CALL* argument, but it could eventually return from it. To describe this we define another internal label  $l_{return}$  which is where control flow would return after the call. After  $l_{return}$  control flow will invariably proceed to the next rule. A *RETURN* target could cause control flow to come back to the appropriate  $l_{return}$ . Determination of which one is a complex problem which is part of *interprocedural analysis*. For imperative, non-functional languages it is hard to solve and one common approach is to make



a conservative assumption that any *RETURN* target could potentially return flow control to any *CALL* statement in the program. This so-called conservative analysis allows us to perform some practical dataflow analysis, which might not be exhaustive (will not detect all possible cases), but will still be useful. For the purpose of this prototype we decided to ignore *CALL* and *RETURN* targets, treating them as empty (doing nothing). Adding support for them could be a direction for future work.




Figure 5: Control flow of of policy statement with *CALL* target




Figure 6: Control flow of of policy statement with *RETURN* target

So each *original* label could be mapped into two (or three if the target is *CALL*) *internal labels*. Internal labels will be used in static code analysis. The analysis will produce some conclusions about internal labels (for instance, that it is unreachable). Based on these conclusions we can try to infer conclusions about policy rules referenced by original labels. For example if all *internal*

labels corresponding to an original label are unreachable we can conclude that the policy rule with this original label is also unreachable and can be safely removed from the policy.

*Initial Labels* are entry points of the program. In our intermediate language, policy processing always starts with the rule which has the external label with the lowest number. Thus there would be only one initial label. Since for code analysis we operate in internal labels, it would be an  $l_{if}$  internal label corresponding to the external label with the lowest number.

*Final Labels* are labels at which program execution stops. According to our definition of an intermediate language, rules processing stops when when the *ACCEPT* or *DROP* target specification is triggered or when control reaches the end of the policy (last rule). So all  $l_{then}$  labels in the rules with an *ACCEPT* or *DROP* target will be treated as finals, plus  $l_{then}$  label of the last policy rule if it has *SET* as an action.

### 6.3 Static Analyzer Module

This module is implemented in Datalog. It takes some facts generated by Data flow and CFG extraction module as described in Section 6.2 and tries to infer some information about the original program. Our analysis is targeting the discovery of “anomalies”: possible inefficiencies or errors in the program. In particular, we perform two analyses: *Unreachable Code Detection* and *Live Variable Analysis*. The theory behind these analyses are described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. In this subsection we will discuss mostly implementation aspects.

As mentioned earlier, we are using the Datalog language to implement this module. The implementation we use is *bddbdb*[34]. It is developed at Stanford University, and written in the Java programming language.

### 6.3.1 Generated Facts

A Datalog program consists of *facts* and *rules*. Both facts and rules are expressed in the form of *Horn clauses* in form:  $L_0 \leftarrow L_1, \dots, L_n$  where  $L_i$  is predicate in form  $p(t_1, \dots, t_n)$  in which  $t_n$  are *terms*. Terms could be *constants* or *variables*.

In *bddb* all terms are mapped to integer values in their respective *domains*.

The domains we define are:

1.  $O$  – a domain of *original* labels
2.  $L$  – a domain of *internal* labels
3.  $V$  – a domain of variables
4.  $B$  – a special domain of Boolean constants

All domains in Datalog have size:

“A domain  $D \in \mathcal{D}$  has size  $size(D) \in \mathbb{N}$ , where  $\mathbb{N}$  is the set of natural numbers. We require that all domains have finite size. The elements of a domain  $D$  is the set of natural numbers  $0 \dots size(D) - 1$ .” [33]

The domain declarations are generated with calculated sizes. To minimize domain size, values in domains  $L$  and  $V$  are generated to be sequential, without gaps.

Sample domains declaration we generate:

```
### Domains
O 1021 olabels.map
L 11 labels.map
V 1000 vars.map
B 2
```

For each domain we specify size and location of the *EDB* file. In Datalog, facts can be stored in external relational storage, called *Extension Database (EDB)* or defined in a Datalog program, referred as *Intensional Database (IDB)*. To simplify our implementation and so as not to deal with IDB data formats we only use IDB for our facts. So, although we specify EDB file names for domains, they are not used.

The facts we operate with are:

1. *olabel* predicate defines the relationship between *internal* and *external* labels. This fact, strictly speaking, is not needed for analysis and is used mostly to provide more user-friendly reporting, using *external* label numbers.
2. *label* predicate defines all known internal labels. (Since these are the labels we work with, we will refer to them just as “labels” from now on).
3. *init* predicate defines entry points (labels)
4. *final* predicate defines exit points (labels)
5. *var* predicate defines dynamic variables used in program.
6. *write* predicate defined on variable number and label pairs, states that at given label value of given variable is changed (written to).
7. *read* predicate defined on variable number and label pairs, states that at given label the value of given variable is accessed (read from).

Here is an example of some generated facts:

```
label(0).  
label(1).  
label(3).
```

```
label(4).
label(6).
label(7).
label(9).
label(10).
olabel(1000,0).
olabel(1000,1).
olabel(1001,3).
olabel(1001,4).
olabel(1010,6).
olabel(1010,7).
olabel(1020,9).
olabel(1020,10).
final(1).
final(10).
var(0).
var(1).
read(3,1).
write(7,0).
init(0).
```

### 6.3.2 Generated Control Flow Predicates

In addition to facts, we also generate some Datalog predicates based on source policy, which represent a control flow graph. These predicates have a variable number of parameters and in their most general form could be defined as:

$$succ( \quad \quad \quad l_0, l_1, \\ \quad \quad \quad saddrvariables, sportvariables, \\ \quad \quad \quad daddrvariables, dportvariables, \\ \quad \quad \quad protocolvariables \\ \quad \quad \quad ).$$

These predicates describe how control could pass from  $l_0$  to  $l_1$ .

In most cases control flow is conditional – it depends on values of packet fields being inspected and values of dynamic variables. At the point of control flow definition it is difficult to reason about the values of dynamic variables, so we will assume the dynamic check, if present, can be evaluated to both *True* and *False*, and that both control flow branches are possible. For a static check we could very well assume that they will evaluate to the same values for all rules in the policy, since packet fields do not change during processing. So applying MCSI algorithm as described in Section 5.2, we represent each part of the static check (source address check, source port check, destination address check, destination port check, and protocol check) as a group of Boolean variables. Each variable could evaluate to *True* if the packet field value belongs to the respective interval or *False* if not. These variables (which we will collectively call *static check variables*) could be grouped as: *saddrvariables*, *sportvariables*, *daddrvariables*, *dportvariables*, *protocolvariables*.

Let us now revisit control flow diagrams at Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. There are two kind of control flow transitions: conditional and unconditional. Representing unconditional parts of a control flow graph is very straightforward: the predicate would not depend on values of static check variables which in Datalog

would be defined as *anonymous variables*, denoted by an underscore character.

For example predicate:

`succ(3,6,_,_,_,_,_,_)`.

denotes that control flow from label 3 could pass to label 6 regardless of the fields values of the examined packet.

Conditional control flow predicates depend on values of *static check variables*.

Static check is satisfied if:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{staticcheck} \leftarrow \\ & \textit{saddrvariables} \wedge \textit{sportvariables} \wedge \\ & \textit{daddrvariables} \wedge \textit{dportvariables} \wedge \\ & \textit{protocolvariables} \end{aligned}$$

Each static check variable group can contain one or more variables (per MCSI split). At least one of them must evaluate to *True*. For example:  $\textit{saddrvariables} = \textit{saddr}_0 \vee \textit{saddr}_n$ . So the full form of static check is:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{staticcheck}(\dots) \leftarrow \\ & (\textit{saddr}_0 \vee \textit{saddr}_1 \dots \vee \textit{saddr}_n) \wedge \\ & (\textit{sport}_0 \vee \textit{sport}_1 \dots \vee \textit{sport}_n) \wedge \\ & (\textit{daddr}_0 \vee \textit{daddr}_1 \dots \vee \textit{daddr}_n) \wedge \\ & (\textit{dport}_0 \vee \textit{dport}_1 \dots \vee \textit{dport}_n) \wedge \\ & (\textit{proto}_0 \vee \textit{proto}_1 \dots \vee \textit{proto}_n) \end{aligned}$$

One way to decompose it into *Horn clauses* is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{staticcheck} \leftarrow & \\
 & \neg \text{none}_n(\text{saddr}_0, \text{saddr}_1 \dots, \text{saddr}_n) \wedge \\
 & \neg \text{none}_n(\text{sport}_0, \text{sport}_1 \dots, \text{sport}_n) \wedge \\
 & \neg \text{none}_n(\text{daddr}_0, \text{daddr}_n \dots, \text{daddr}_n) \wedge \\
 & \neg \text{none}_n(\text{dport}_0, \text{dport}_n \dots, \text{dport}_n) \wedge \\
 & \neg \text{none}_n(\text{proto}_0, \text{proto}_n \dots, \text{proto}_n)
 \end{aligned}$$

where:

$$\text{none}_n(v_0, v_1, \dots, v_n) \leftarrow \neg v_0 \wedge \neg v_1 \dots \neg v_n$$

So for each policy rule, we generate one or more *succ* predicates. For the static check part we generate different flow for cases where static check is satisfied and where it is not.

For example, for rule:

```

1001 if saddr in {[10.10.10.1,10.10.10.10],[20.0.0.0,20.1.1.1]}
      sport in [1,100] and $999=5
      then jump 1020;

```

We will generate following *succ* predicates:

```

# Label 1001
# unconditional:
succ(4,9,_,saddr1,saddr2,_,_,sport0).
# if condition satisfied
succ(3,4,_,saddr1,saddr2,_,_,sport0) :- !none(0,saddr1,saddr2,0,0),

```



```

                                !none(sport0) .

# if condition not satisfied
succ(3,6,_,saddr1,saddr2,_,_,_) :- none(0,saddr1,saddr2,0,0) .
succ(3,6,_,_,_,_,_,sport0) :- none(sport0) .

```

The example above uses internal labels. Mapping between internal and external labels for this example is shown on page 54.

### 6.3.3 Unreachable Code Detection

This is a first, simple analysis of this module implementation. The theory is discussed in Section 5.3. The top level goal for this analysis is an *unreachable/1* predicate which is *true* for labels which are not reachable. A label is deemed *reachable* if there is a path from one *initial label* to it. A path (expressed via *path* predicate) is defined as follows:

```

path(A,B,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- A=B, label(A), label(B) .
path(A,C,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- succ(A,B,x1,x2,x3,x4) ,
                          path(B,C,x1,x2,x3,x4) ,
                          label(A), label(B), label(C) .

```

In this particular example we have four *static check variables* (named  $x1, x2, x3, x4$ ) corresponding to whenever input packet fields belong to various IP address ports or protocol ranges mentioned in the the policy. The number of static check variables may vary depending on the policy being analyzed. The *path* predicates with required arity are generated by Haskell code.

### 6.3.4 Live Variable Analysis

The second analysis we chose to implement is Live Variable Analysis. The theory discussed in Section 5.4.

The Datalog definition of this analysis is just a few lines of code:

```

dead(L) :- write(L,V), !live(L,V).

live(L,V) :- init(Li), path(Li,L,x1,x2,x3,x4), read(Lr,V),
             readonlyPath(L,Lr,V,x1,x2,x3,x4).

path(A,B,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- A=B, label(A), label(B).
path(A,C,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- succ(A,B,x1,x2,x3,x4),
                          path(B,C,x1,x2,x3,x4),
                          label(A), label(B), label(C).

readonlyPath(A,B,_,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- A=B, label(A), label(B).
readonlyPath(A,B,_,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- succ(A,B,x1,x2,x3,x4),
                                     label(A), label(B).
readonlyPath(A,C,V,x1,x2,x3,x4) :- readonlyPath(A,B,V,x1,x2,x3,x4),
                                     succ(B,C,x1,x2,x3,x4),
                                     var(V), label(A), label(B), label(C),
                                     !write(B,V).

```

In this particular example we have four *static check variables* (named  $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4$ ) corresponding to whenever input packet fields belong to various IP address ports or protocol ranges mentioned in the the policy. The number of static check variables may vary depending on the policy being analyzed. The *path* and *readonlyPath* predicates with required arity are generated by Haskell code.

The graphical illustration of our implementation of live analysis can be seen on Figure 7, which shows a simple control flow graph. Variable  $V$  is *live* at exit from label  $L$  because the following holds true:

1. Variable  $V$  is written into at labels  $L$  (also at  $L_1$ )
2. There is a path from one of initial labels ( $L_i$ ) to  $L$ .




Figure 7: Live Variable Analysis example

3. There are labels where it is read ( $L_R, L_{1R}$ )
4. There is at least one *read-only path* (path which does not overwrite variable  $V$ ) from  $L$  to label where it is read ( $L_r$ ).

In this example, the path from  $L$  to  $L_{1R}$  is not read-only, because the variable is overwritten at  $L_1$ .

Strictly speaking our implementation is little more specific than “standard” live variable analysis. In particular we only concern ourselves with places where variables are written and attempt to detect non-live variables at the exit point from labels where they are written. This allows us to detect unnecessary writes.

Additionally, in order to minimize search space, we only analyze labels which are *reachable*, ignoring *unreachable labels*.

Finally, in our analysis we check whether a variable is ever read. We will report as *dead*, all labels at which variables are written but never subsequently read from.

## 7 Examples

Let us apply our analysis to several simple cases:

### 7.1 Example 1

Original policy in *PF* policy language:

```
block in on en0 from 192.168.1.10/32 to any
pass out on en0 from 192.168.1.0/24 to any
```

Since *PF* is using *multi-trigger* actions, we are using special variable *\$0* to store outcome.

The same policy, translated to an *Intermediate Policy Language*:

```
1 if saddr in 192.168.1.10/32 then
    $0='drop';
2 if saddr in 192.168.1.0/24 then
    $0='accept';

# epililogue
1000 if $0='accept' then
    accept;
1001 if $0='drop' then
    drop;
```

The control flow graph for this program is shown in Figure 8.

Analysis detects that the *\$0* assignment in the rule with label 1 is redundant, since it is always overwritten by the rule with label 2. That means that that this rule is redundant and could be removed from the policy without affecting its semantics.




Figure 8: Control flow graph for Example 1

## 7.2 Example 2

Sample policy, already in *Intermediate Policy Language*:

```

1000 if saddr in [192.168.1.10,192.168.1.10]
    then drop;
1001 if saddr in {[10.10.10.1,10.10.10.10],[20.0.0.0,20.1.1.1]}
    sport in [1,100] and $999=5
    then jump 1020;
1010 if saddr in [192.168.1.0,192.168.1.255]
    then $888='1';
1020 if saddr in [192.168.1.0,192.168.1.255]
    then accept;
  
```

The control flow graph for this program is shown in Figure 9.

Analysis detects that the \$888 assignment in the rule with label 1010 has no effect since this variable will never be read afterwards. That means that




Figure 9: Control flow graph for Example 2

this rule is redundant and can be removed from the policy without affecting its semantics.

### 7.3 Example 3

Sample policy, already in *Intermediate Policy Language*:

```
1 if saddr in 192.168.1.10/32 then
    $0='drop' ;
```

```
2 if saddr in 192.168.1.0/24 then
    $1='accept' ;
```

```
# epililogue
```

```
1000 if $0='accept' then
    accept;
```

```
1001 if $0='drop' then
    drop;
```

The control flow graph for this program is shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10: Control flow graph for Example 3

Analysis detects that  $\$1$  assignment in rule with label 2 has no effect since this variable will never be read afterwards. That means that this rule is redundant and could be removed from the policy without affecting its semantics.

## 7.4 Example 4

Sample policy, already in *Intermediate Policy Language*:

```
1 if saddr in 192.168.1.0/24 then
```

```
    jump 1000;
```

```
2 if !saddr in 192.168.1.0/24 then
```

```
    jump 1000;
```

```
3 if sport in (10,100) then
```



```

drop;

# epililogue
1000 if $0='accept' then
    accept;
1001 if $0='drop' then
    drop;

```

The control flow graph for this program is shown of Figure 11.




Figure 11: Control flow graph for Example 4

Analysis detects that label 3 is unreachable. Since labels 1 and 2 check for opposite conditions, control flow will proceed to label 1000 in any case, never reaching label 3.

## 7.5 Example 5

Sample policy, already in *Intermediate Policy Language*:

```
1 if saddr in 192.168.1.0/16 then
    jump 1000;

2 if saddr in {192.168.1.0/24, 192.168.1.0/32,
              (192.168.1.20,192.168.1.23)} then
    jump 1000;

3 if sport in (10,100) then
    drop;

# epililogue
1000 if $0='accept' then
    accept;
1001 if $0='drop' then
    drop;
```

The control flow graph for this program is shown in Figure 12.

Analysis detects that label 2 has no effect. This is because *saddr* range check at label 1 is more general than the check at label 2. Any packet satisfying the check at label 2 will also satisfy the check at label 1 and thus control flow for such packets will proceed to label 1000. The rule with label 2 could be safely removed from the policy.




Figure 12: Control flow graph for Example 5

## 8 Conclusions and Future Work

In this thesis we have demonstrated how static code analysis could be applied to the problem of firewall policy anomaly detection. The overall framework which we have developed could now be used to apply more analyses to policies in our intermediate language.

Our implementation of unreachable code detection and live variable analysis is “conservative”: it is not guaranteed to detect all unreachable codes and all variables which are “dead” right after being assigned. While our analysis is conservative, and might not be able to detect some anomalies, it is “safe” and should not produce false-positives.

We do not detect some anomalies because we do not try to reason about values of dynamic variables, and whenever dynamic check is present as part of the rule, we are assuming that both outcomes are possible. In fact, some of these variables might have values which will make some branches unreachable which would not be detected by our code. Better reasoning about dynamic variable values could be a direction of future research.

In this work we decided not to deal yet with *CALL/RETURN* statements. This could be done using inter-procedural analysis techniques and could be an another direction for future work.

We also plan to develop compilers from actual firewall policy languages to our intermediate language. This would allow us to apply this work to real-life policies and to make quantitative measurements of the number of anomalies detected using this approach.

Another very promising direction of future research is application of these techniques in a distributed firewall environment where we need to analyze a group of firewall policies interacting together. In this case, our approach with intermediate policy language will be especially useful, since policies could be in

different languages.

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# Appendices

## A Source Code

### A.1 Implementation of MCSI calculation algorithm

```
-- | This module implements calculation of Minimal Combining Sets
-- | @author Vadim Zaliva <lord@crocodile.org>
module MCSI where

import Data.List

-- | Interval constructor
data (Ord a, Show a) => Interval a = Interval
    a -- ^ lower bound
    Bool -- ^ left-closed?
    a -- ^ upper bound
    Bool -- ^ right-closed?
    deriving (Eq)

-- | Defines sort order for intervals, so they are sorted
-- | by their endpoints first. For convenience only.
instance (Ord a, Show a) => Ord (Interval a) where
    compare (Interval a0 ai0 b0 bi0) (Interval a1 ai1 b1 bi1) =
        compare (a0, b0, ai0, bi0) (a1, b1, ai1, bi1)

-- | Convenience instance for interval pretty-printing
instance (Ord a, Show a) => Show (Interval a) where
    show (Interval a ai b bi) = (if ai then "[" else "(") ++
        (show a) ++ "-" ++
        ++ (show b) ++
        (if bi then "]" else ")")

-- | Check whenever point belongs to given interval
inInterval :: (Ord a, Show a) => Interval a -> a -> Bool
inInterval (Interval a ai b bi) x = ((ai && (x>=a)) || (not ai && (x>a))) &&
    ((bi && (x<=b)) || (not bi && (x<b)))

splitBy :: (Ord a, Show a) => Interval a -> a -> Bool -> Bool -> [(Interval a)]
splitBy (Interval a ai b bi) x xi xo =
    if not (inInterval (Interval a ai b bi) x) ||
        (xi && ai && x==a && xo) ||
        (xi && bi && x==b && (not xo)) ||
        a == b
    then
        []
    else if xi then
        nub [norm (Interval a ai x (not xo)),
            norm (Interval x xo b bi)]
        else
```

```

nub [norm (Interval a ai x False),
     norm (Interval x True x True),
     norm (Interval x False b bi)]
where
norm (Interval a ai b bi) = if a==b && ai/=bi then (Interval a True b True)
                           else (Interval a ai b bi)

-- | Given set of Intervals calculates MCSI
mcsi :: (Ord a, Show a) => [(Interval a)] -> [(Interval a)]
mcsi il = let splits = map (splitByList (intervalBounds il)) il
           in if all ((==) []) splits then il
              else mcsi (nub (splitOrOrig splits il))

where
intervalBounds intlist = nub (foldr1 (++) [ [(a,ai,True),(b,bi,False)] | (Interval a ai b bi) <- intlist])
splitByList lp i = nub (foldr1 (++) [(splitBy i p pi po) | (p,pi,po)<-lp])
splitOrOrig (s:xs) (o:os) = if s == [] then
                             (o : (splitOrOrig xs os))
                           else
                             s ++ (splitOrOrig xs os)
splitOrOrig [] [] = []

```

## A.2 Parser Module Sources

```

{
module PolicyLang where

import Char
import Maybe
import Text.Regex.Posix.String
import Data.Bits
import Data.Word
import Data.List
import System.IO.Unsafe(unsafePerformIO)

import MCSI
import NetworkData
import Policy
}

%name parse
%tokentype { Token }
%monad { P } { thenP } { returnP }
%lexer { lexer } { TokenEOF }

%token
if { TokenIf }
then { TokenThen }
nil { TokenNil }
accept { TokenAccept }
drop { TokenDrop }
call { TokenCall }
jump { TokenJump }

```

```

return { TokenReturn }
and    { TokenAnd }
true   { TokenTrue }
saddr  { TokenSrcAddr }
sport  { TokenSrcPort }
daddr  { TokenDstAddr }
dport  { TokenDstPort }
in     { TokenIn }
proto  { TokenProto }
'!'    { TokenNeg }
'='    { TokenEq }
'&'    { TokenMask }
'{'    { TokenOCB }
'}'    { TokenOCB }
'('    { TokenORB }
')'    { TokenCRB }
'['    { TokenOSB }
']'    { TokenCSB }
','    { TokenComma }
';'    { TokenSemi }
'/'    { TokenSlash }
':'    { TokenColumn }
int    { TokenInt $$ }
varname { TokenVarName $$ }
ipv4   { TokenIPv4 $$ }
opaque_value { TokenOpaqueValue $$ }

%%

ruleset : { - empty - } { [] }
        | ruleset rule { $2:$1 }

rule : int if filteringspec then targetspec ';' { PolicyRule $1 $3 $5 }

targetspec
: action_target { $1 }
| call_target { $1 }
| jump_target { $1 }
| return_target { $1 }
| set_target { $1 }

action_target:
accept { Accept }
| drop { Drop }

call_target : call int { Call $2 }

jump_target : jump int { Jump $2 }

return_target : return { Return }

set_target : varname '=' opaque_value { Set $1 $3 }

filteringspec

```

```

: staticchecks and dynamicchecks {FilteringSpec $1 $3}
| staticchecks {FilteringSpec $1 DynamicAny}
| dynamicchecks {FilteringSpec staticAny $1}
| true {FilteringSpec staticAny DynamicAny}

dynamicchecks : maybeneg varname '=' valuecheck {VarEQ $1 $2 $4}

valuecheck
: opaque_value { OpaqueValue $1}
| nil {IsNil}
| int { IntValue $1}
| int '&' int { IntAndMask $1 $3}

maybeneg : '!' { True }
| { False}

staticchecks : maybeneg saddr_check
              maybeneg sport_check
              maybeneg daddr_check
              maybeneg dport_check
              maybeneg proto_check { StaticCheck $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10}

saddr_check: {- empty -} { [] }
| saddr in addr_interval_or_set {$3}

sport_check: {- empty -} { [] }
| sport in port_interval_or_set {$3}

daddr_check: {- empty -} { [] }
| daddr in addr_interval_or_set {$3}

dport_check: {- empty -} { [] }
| dport in port_interval_or_set {$3}

proto_check: {- empty -} { [] }
| proto in proto_interval_or_set {$3}

addr_interval_or_set
: addr_interval { [$1] }
| '{' addr_interval_set '}' { $2 }

port_interval_or_set
: port_interval { [$1] }
| '{' port_interval_set '}' { $2 }

proto_interval_or_set
: proto_interval { [$1] }
| '{' proto_interval_set '}' { $2 }

addr_interval:
intrv_open ipv4 ',' ipv4 intrv_close { Interval (readIPv4 $2) $1 (readIPv4 $4) $5 }
| ipv4 '/' int { networkToInterval (CIDR (readIPv4 $1) (read (show $3))) }
| ipv4 ':' ipv4 { networkToInterval (IPMask (readIPv4 $1) (readIPv4 $3)) }

```

```

port_interval: intrv_open int ',' int intrv_close { Interval $2 $1 $4 $5 }

proto_interval: intrv_open int ',' int intrv_close { Interval $2 $1 $4 $5 }

intrv_open
  : '[' {True }
  | '(' { False}

intrv_close
  : ']' {True }
  | ')' { False}

addr_interval_set
  : addr_interval { [$1] }
  | addr_interval_set ',' addr_interval { $3 : $1 }

port_interval_set
  : port_interval { [$1] }
  | port_interval_set ',' port_interval { $3 : $1 }

proto_interval_set
  : proto_interval { [$1] }
  | proto_interval_set ',' proto_interval { $3 : $1 }

{

parse :: P [PolicyRule]

happyError :: P a
happyError = \s i -> error (
  "Parse error in line " ++ show (i::Int) ++ "\n")

data Token
= TokenIf
| TokenThen
| TokenNil
| TokenAccept
| TokenDrop
| TokenCall
| TokenJump
| TokenReturn
| TokenAnd
| TokenTrue
| TokenIn
| TokenSrcAddr
| TokenDstAddr
| TokenSrcPort
| TokenDstPort
| TokenProto
| TokenNeg
| TokenEq
| TokenMask
| TokenORB

```

```

| TokenCRB
| TokenDSB
| TokenCSB
| TokenDCB
| TokenCCB
| TokenComma
| TokenSemi
| TokenSlash
| TokenColumn
| TokenInt Int
| TokenVarName Int
| TokenIPv4 String
| TokenOpaqueValue String
| TokenEOF
deriving (Show,Eq)
data ParseResult a
  = ParseOk a
  | ParseFail String

type P a = String -> Int -> ParseResult a

thenP :: P a -> (a -> P b) -> P b
m 'thenP' k = \s l ->
  case m s l of
    ParseFail s -> ParseFail s
    ParseOk a -> k a s l

returnP :: a -> P a
returnP a = \s l -> ParseOk a

failP :: String -> P a
failP err = \s l -> ParseFail err

lexer :: (Token -> P a) -> P a
lexer cont s = if (length s) == 0 then cont TokenEOF []
  else case skipTokens [skipWS, skipComment] s of
    Just rest -> lexer cont rest
    Nothing -> case applyTokenParsers
      [parseFixedToken,
       parseVarName,
       parseIPv4,
       parseOpaque,
       parseInt] s of
      Just (token, rest) -> cont token rest
      Nothing -> failP "Unknown token" s

applyTokenParsers :: [(String -> Maybe (Token, String))] -> String -> Maybe (Token, String)
applyTokenParsers [] _ = Nothing
applyTokenParsers (p:ps) s = case p s of
  Just (token, rest) -> Just (token, rest)
  Nothing -> applyTokenParsers ps s

```

```

skipTokens :: [(String -> Maybe String)] -> String -> Maybe String
skipTokens [] _ = Nothing
skipTokens (p:ps) s = case p s of
    Just rest -> Just rest
    Nothing -> skipTokens ps s

skipComment :: String -> Maybe String
skipComment "" = Nothing
skipComment (p:ps) = if p == '#' then
    case findIndex (\c -> c=='\r' || c=='\n') ps of
        Nothing -> Just ""
        Just n -> Just (drop n ps)
    else Nothing

skipWS :: String -> Maybe String
skipWS "" = Nothing
skipWS s = case findIndex notWS s of
    Nothing -> Just ""
    Just n -> if n==0 then Nothing else Just (drop n s)
    where
        notWS :: Char -> Bool
        notWS c = c/= ' ' && c/= '\t' && c/= '\r' && c/= '\n'

parseVarName :: String -> Maybe (Token, String)
parseVarName s = case checkPattern s "\\$[0-9]+" of
    ("",_) -> Nothing
    (match,after) ->
        Just (TokenVarName (read (tail match)), after)

parseInt :: String -> Maybe (Token, String)
parseInt s = case checkPattern s "[0-9]+" of
    ("",_) -> Nothing
    (match,after) ->
        Just (TokenInt (read match), after)

parseOpaque :: String -> Maybe (Token, String)
parseOpaque s = case checkPattern s "'[']*" of
    ("",_) -> Nothing
    (match,after) ->
        Just (TokenOpaqueValue (take ((length match)-2)
            (tail match)), after)

parseIPv4 :: String -> Maybe (Token, String)
parseIPv4 s = case checkPattern s "[0-9]{1,3}(\\.[0-9]{1,3}){3}" of
    ("",_) -> Nothing
    (match,after) ->
        Just (TokenIPv4 match, after)

```



```

checkPattern :: String -> String -> (String, String)
checkPattern s p = unsafePerformIO $ do
    r <- compile coptions eoptions ("**+p)
    case r of
        Left _ -> return ("", s)
        Right rc ->
            do m <- regexec rc s
               case m of
                   Left _ -> return ("",s)
                   Right (Just (_, match, after, _)) ->
                       return (match, after)
                   Right Nothing -> return ("", s)

    where
        coptions = compExtended -- IMPORTANT: no compNewline!
        eoptions = execBlank

parseFixedToken :: String -> Maybe (Token, String)
parseFixedToken s = parseFixedToken_ tokenDefs s
    where
        tokenDefs :: [(String, Token)]
        tokenDefs = [("if", TokenIf),
                    ("then", TokenThen),
                    ("nil", TokenNil),
                    ("accept", TokenAccept),
                    ("drop", TokenDrop),
                    ("call", TokenCall),
                    ("jump", TokenJump),
                    ("return", TokenReturn),
                    ("and", TokenAnd),
                    ("true", TokenTrue),
                    ("in", TokenIn),
                    ("saddr", TokenSrcAddr),
                    ("sport", TokenSrcPort),
                    ("daddr", TokenDstAddr),
                    ("dport", TokenDstPort),
                    ("proto", TokenProto),
                    ("!", TokenNeg),
                    ("=", TokenEq),
                   ("&", TokenMask),
                    ("{" , TokenDCB),
                    ("}" , TokenCCB),
                    ("(" , TokenDRB),
                    (")" , TokenCRB),
                    ("[" , TokenDSB),
                    ("]" , TokenCSB),
                    ("," , TokenComma),
                    (";" , TokenSemi),
                    ("/" , TokenSlash),
                    (":" , TokenColumn)
                    ]

parseFixedToken_ :: [(String, Token)] -> String -> Maybe (Token, String)
parseFixedToken_ [] _ = Nothing
parseFixedToken_ _ "" = Nothing

```

```

    parseFixedToken_ ((p,t):ds) s = if isPrefixOf p s then Just (t, drop (length p) s)
                                   else parseFixedToken_ ds s

----- debugging tools -----

runParser :: String -> [PolicyRule]
runParser s = case parse s 1 of
  ParseOk e -> reverse e
  ParseFail s -> error s

testLexer :: String -> [Token]
testLexer s = if (length s) == 0 then []
              else
                case skipWS s of
                  Just rest -> testLexer rest
                  Nothing -> case applyTokenParsers
                              [parseFixedToken,
                               parseVarName,
                               parseIPv4,
                               parseOpaque,
                               parseInt] s of
                                Just (token, rest) -> token:(testLexer rest)
                                Nothing -> [TokenEOF]
                }

{--
  Definition of basic networking data types, IP addresses, networks
  ranges.

  Currently working with IPv4 addresses only.
--}

module NetworkData where

import Data.Bits
import Data.Word
import Data.List
import MCSI

type Octet = Word
data IP = IP Octet Octet Octet Octet
        deriving (Eq)
type IPMask = IP

data Network = IPMask IP IPMask | CIDR IP Word8

instance Bounded IP where
  minBound = IP 0 0 0 0
  maxBound = IP 255 255 255 255

instance Ord IP where
  compare a b =
    compare (ip2word a) (ip2word b)

```

```

instance Show IP where
    show (IP a b c d) = (show a) ++ "."
                      ++ (show b) ++ "."
                      ++ (show c) ++ "."
                      ++ (show d)

ip2word :: IP -> Word32
ip2word (IP a0 b0 c0 d0) = fromInteger (
    (toInteger d0)+(toInteger c0)*256+(toInteger b0)*(256^2)+(toInteger a0)*(256^3))

word2ip :: Word32 -> IP
word2ip x = IP w1 w2 w3 w4
    where
        (o1,o1m) = divMod x (256^3)
        (o2,o2m) = divMod o1m (256^2)
        (o3,o3m) = divMod o2m 256
        o4 = mod x 256
        w1 = fromInteger (toInteger o1)
        w2 = fromInteger (toInteger o2)
        w3 = fromInteger (toInteger o3)
        w4 = fromInteger (toInteger o4)

instance Show Network where
    show (IPMask ip mask) = (show ip) ++ ":" ++ (show mask)
    show (CIDR ip prefix) = (show ip) ++ "/" ++ (show prefix)

type IPInterval = Interval IP

split delim s
| [] <- rest = [token]
| otherwise = token : split delim (tail rest)
    where (token,rest) = span (/=delim) s

readIPv4 :: String -> IP
readIPv4 s = let l = split ',' s in
    IP (read (l!!0)) (read (l!!1)) (read (l!!2)) (read (l!!3))

prefix2mask :: Word8 -> Word32
prefix2mask prefix = prefix2mask_ prefix 0
    where
        prefix2mask_ :: Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32
        prefix2mask_ 0 x = x
        prefix2mask_ p x = prefix2mask_ (p-1) (setBit (shiftR x 1) 31)

networkToInterval :: Network -> IPInterval
networkToInterval (IPMask ip mask) =
    Interval
    (word2ip ((ip2word ip) .&. (ip2word mask)))
    True
    (word2ip ((ip2word ip) .|. (complement (ip2word mask))))
    True
networkToInterval (CIDR ip prefix) =
    networkToInterval (IPMask ip (word2ip (prefix2mask prefix)))

```

```

universalIPInterval:: IPInterval
universalIPInterval = Interval minBound True maxBound True

universalPortInterval:: Interval Int
universalPortInterval = Interval 0 True 65535 True

universalProtoInterval:: Interval Int
universalProtoInterval = Interval 0 True 255 True

{--
  Definition firewall policy related data types
--}

module Policy where
import Data.Word
import MCSI
import NetworkData

type RuleLabel = Int -- Rule #
type VarName = Int -- Variable name/#
type VarValue = String -- Opaque variable value
type Neg = Bool -- Negation flag
type Port = Int -- TCP Port #
type Protocol = Int -- IP Protocol #

data PolicyRule = PolicyRule RuleLabel FilteringSpec Target
                deriving(Show, Eq)

data FilteringSpec = FilteringSpec StaticCheck DynamicCheck
                deriving(Show, Eq)

data DynamicCheck = VarEQ Neg VarName DynamicCheckValue
                  | DynamicAny
                  deriving(Show, Eq)

data DynamicCheckValue =
  OpaqueValue VarValue
  | IntValue Int
  | IntAndMask Int Int
  | IsNil
  deriving(Show, Eq)

data Target = Accept |
            Drop |
            Call RuleLabel |
            Jump RuleLabel |
            Return |
            Set VarName VarValue
            deriving(Show, Eq)

data StaticCheck = StaticCheck Neg [(Interval IP)] Neg [(Interval Port)] Neg [(Interval IP)] Neg [(Interval Port)] Neg [(Interval Protocol)]

```

```
deriving(Show, Eq)
```

```
staticAny :: StaticCheck  
staticAny = StaticCheck False [] False [] False [] False [] False []
```

### A.3 Data Flow and CFG Extractor Module Sources

```
{--  
  Policy transformations  
--}  
  
module PolicyTransform(xmain) where  
  
import System( getArgs )  
import IO  
import Data.List(nub,sort,zip5,elemIndex)  
import Ix(range)  
  
import MCSI  
import Policy  
import PolicyLang  
import NetworkData  
  
type InternalLabel = Int -- Internal Rule label  
  
-- TODO add unit tests.  
combineFromMCSI :: (Ord a, Show a) => [(Interval a)] -> [(Interval a)] -> [(Interval a)]  
combineFromMCSI domain old = filter (\m -> any (inside m) old) domain  
  where  
    inside (Interval x xi y yi) h = inside1 h x xi True && inside1 h y yi False  
    inside1 (Interval a ai b bi) x xi xo = (inInterval (Interval a ai b bi) x )  
      || ((not xi) && (not ai) && x==a && xo)  
      || ((not xi) && (not bi) && x==b && (not xo))  
  
getSAddr (PolicyRule _ (FilteringSpec (StaticCheck n x _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)) _) = (n,x)  
getSport (PolicyRule _ (FilteringSpec (StaticCheck _ _ n x _ _ _ _ _ _)) _) = (n,x)  
getDAddr (PolicyRule _ (FilteringSpec (StaticCheck _ _ _ _ n x _ _ _ _)) _) = (n,x)  
getDport (PolicyRule _ (FilteringSpec (StaticCheck _ _ _ _ _ _ n x _ _)) _) = (n,x)  
getProto (PolicyRule _ (FilteringSpec (StaticCheck _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ n x)) _) = (n,x)  
  
getLabel (PolicyRule x _ _) = x  
  
policyLabels:: [PolicyRule] -> [RuleLabel]  
policyLabels [] = []  
policyLabels ((PolicyRule l _ a):xs) = case a of  
  (Call m) -> [l,m] ++ (policyLabels xs)  
  (Jump m) -> [l,m] ++ (policyLabels xs)  
  _ -> l:(policyLabels xs)
```

```

-- Maps internal to original label
internalToOrig :: [PolicyRule] -> InternalLabel -> RuleLabel
internalToOrig rules l = (nub (sort (policyLabels rules))) !! (floor ((fromIntegral l)/3))

-- Maps policy label from original policy to pair of internal sublabels
-- First one is for condition and the second one is for 'then' branch,
-- and the third one for return from 'call'.
-- The mapping preserves the order.
label2internal :: [PolicyRule] -> RuleLabel -> (InternalLabel,InternalLabel,InternalLabel)
label2internal policy l = case elemIndex l (nub (sort (policyLabels policy))) of
    Nothing -> (-1,-1,-1)
    Just pos -> (pos*3, pos*3+1, pos*3+2)

-- Returns internal label for 'if' part of original label
label2internalIf :: [PolicyRule] -> RuleLabel -> InternalLabel
label2internalIf policy l = let (a,_,_) = label2internal policy l
    in a

-- Returns internal label for 'then' part of original label
label2internalThen :: [PolicyRule] -> RuleLabel -> InternalLabel
label2internalThen policy l = let (_,a,_) = label2internal policy l
    in a

-- Returns internal label for 'return' part of original label
label2internalRet :: [PolicyRule] -> RuleLabel -> InternalLabel
label2internalRet policy l = let (_,_,a) = label2internal policy l
    in a

internalLabels :: [PolicyRule] -> [InternalLabel]
internalLabels rules =
    let all_succ = rules2succ rules
        in
        sort $ nub (
            foldl1 (++) [ [i0,i1] | (i0,i1) <- (foldl1 (++) [ u++++f | (_,u,t,f) <- all_succ])]
                ++
            foldl1 (++) [ [label2internalIf rules l] | (l,_,_,_) <- all_succ]
        )

labelsPredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
labelsPredicate rules = foldl (++) "" [ "label("++(show r)++)".\n" | r<-internalLabels rules ]

oLabelsPredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
oLabelsPredicate rules = foldl (++) "" [ "oLabel("++(show (internalToOrig rules l))++)","++(show l)++)".\n" | l<-internalLabels rules ]

initPredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
initPredicate rules = "init(" ++ show (minimum (internalLabels rules)) ++ ").\n"

policyVariables :: [PolicyRule] -> [VarName]
policyVariables [] = []
policyVariables ((PolicyRule _ (FilteringSpec _ dcheck) tspec):xs) =
    t1 tspec ++ f1 dcheck ++ policyVariables xs

```

```

where
  t1 (Set v _) = [v]
  t1 _ = []
  f1 (VarEQ _ v _) = [v]
  f1 _ = []

renumberVariables :: [PolicyRule] -> [PolicyRule]
renumberVariables rules = map (renumber (sort $ nub $ policyVariables rules)) rules
where
  renumber vars (PolicyRule l (FilteringSpec scheck dcheck) tspec) =
    (PolicyRule l (FilteringSpec scheck (renD vars dcheck)) (renT vars tspec))
  renT vars (Set v x) = (Set (mapvars vars v) x)
  renT _ x = x
  renD vars (VarEQ x v y) = (VarEQ x (mapvars vars v) y)
  renD _ x = x
  mapvars vars v =
    case elemIndex v vars of
      Nothing -> -1
      Just pos -> pos

varPredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
varPredicate rules = foldl (++) "" [ "var(++(show r)++)\n" | r<-(sort $ nub $ policyVariables rules) ]

varReads :: [PolicyRule] -> [(RuleLabel, VarName)]
varReads [] = []
varReads (x:xs) =
  case x of
    (PolicyRule l (FilteringSpec _ (VarEQ _ v _)) _) -> (l,v):(varReads xs)
    _ -> varReads xs

varReadsInternal :: [PolicyRule] -> [(InternalLabel, VarName)]
varReadsInternal rules = [(l2internalIf rules l), n] | (l,n)<-(varReads rules)]

readPredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
readPredicate rules = foldl (++) "" [ "read(++(show l)++", "++ (show v)++)\n" | (l,v)<-(sort $ nub $ varReadsInternal rules) ]

varWrites :: [PolicyRule] -> [(RuleLabel, VarName)]
varWrites [] = []
varWrites (x:xs) =
  case x of
    (PolicyRule l (FilteringSpec _ _) (Set v _)) -> (l,v):(varWrites xs)
    _ -> varWrites xs

varWritesInternal :: [PolicyRule] -> [(InternalLabel, VarName)]
varWritesInternal rules = [(l2internalThen rules l), n] | (l,n)<-(varWrites rules)]

writePredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
writePredicate rules = foldl (++) "" [ "write(++(show l)++", "++ (show v)++)\n" | (l,v)<-(sort $ nub $ varWritesInternal rules) ]

finals :: [PolicyRule] -> [PolicyRule] -> [RuleLabel]
finals rules [] = []
finals rules ((PolicyRule l _ Accept):xs) = (l2internalThen rules l):(finals rules xs)
finals rules ((PolicyRule l _ Drop):xs) = (l2internalThen rules l):(finals rules xs)
finals rules ((PolicyRule l _ (Set _ _)):[]) = [(l2internalThen rules l), (l2internalIf rules l)]

```

```

finals rules ((PolicyRule l _):xs) = finals rules xs

finalsPredicate :: [PolicyRule] -> String
finalsPredicate rules = foldl (++) "" [ "final("++(show r)++)\n" | r<- (finals rules rules)]

buildChecks sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom ruleset =
  [ ("saddr", isNeg (getSaddr x), (mapM (getSaddr x) sadom)),
    ("sport", isNeg (getSport x), (mapM (getSport x) spdom)),
    ("daddr", isNeg (getDaddr x), (mapM (getDaddr x) dadom)),
    ("dport", isNeg (getDport x), (mapM (getDport x) dpdom)),
    ("proto", isNeg (getProto x), (mapM (getProto x) pdom ))]
    | x<-ruleset]
  where
    isNeg (n,_) = n
    mapM (_,ls) dom = [ elem d (combineFromMCSI dom ls) | d<-dom]

noneAriety sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom = maximum [length sadom,
                                                    length spdom,
                                                    length dadom,
                                                    length dpdom,
                                                    length pdom]

nonePredicate sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom =
  let n = noneAriety sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom
      in
      ((noneProto n), (noneDef n))
  where
    noneProto n = "none("++(commaSeparated [ "b"++(show x)++":B" | x<- take n (iterate (1+) 1)]) ++")\n"
    noneDef n = "none("++(commaSeparated [ "x"++(show x) | x<- take n (iterate (1+) 1)]) ++") :- " ++
      (commaSeparated [ "x"++(show x)++"=0" | x<- take n (iterate (1+) 1)]) ++ ".\n"

rule2succ :: [PolicyRule] -> PolicyRule -> (Maybe PolicyRule) ->
  (RuleLabel, [(InternalLabel, InternalLabel)], [(InternalLabel, InternalLabel)], [(InternalLabel, InternalLabel)])
rule2succ allrules r0 r1 =
  let (a0,b0,c0) = part1 allrules r0
      (a1,b1,c1) = part2 allrules r0 r1
      l = getLabel r0
      in
      (l, a0++a1,b0++b1,c0++c1)
  where
    part1 allrules (PolicyRule l0 _ t) =
      let l0if = label2internalIf allrules l0
          l0then = label2internalThen allrules l0
          in
          case t of
            (Jump lx) -> ([ (l0then, (label2internalIf allrules lx)) ],
                          [ (l0if, l0then) ],
                          [ ])
            (Call lx) -> ([ (l0then, (label2internalIf allrules lx)) ],
                          [ ])

```



```

        [(10if, 10then)],
        []
    (Set _ _) -> ([,
        [(10if,10then)],
        []
    (Accept) -> ([,
        [(10if,10then)],
        []
    (Drop) -> ([,
        [(10if,10then)],
        []
    _ -> ([, [], [])

part2 allrules (PolicyRule 10 _ t) r1 =
  case r1 of
    Nothing -> ([, [], [])
    Just (PolicyRule 11 _ _) ->
      let
        10if = label2internalIf allrules 10
        10then = label2internalThen allrules 10
        10ret = label2internalRet allrules 10
        11if = label2internalIf allrules 11
        11then = label2internalThen allrules 11
      in
        case t of
          (Jump lx) -> ([,
            [],
            [(10if, 11if)])
          (Call lx) -> ([10ret, 11if]),
            [],
            [(10if, 11if)])
          (Set _ _) -> ([10then, 11if]),
            [],
            [(10if, 11if)])
          (Accept) -> ([,
            [],
            [(10if, 11if)])
          (Drop) -> ([,
            [],
            [(10if, 11if)])
          _ -> ([, [], [])

rules2succ :: [PolicyRule] -> [(RuleLabel, [(InternalLabel, InternalLabel)], [(InternalLabel, InternalLabel)], [(InternalLabel, InternalLabel)])]
rules2succ rules = rules2succ_rules rules
  where
    rules2succ_rules [] = []
    rules2succ_rules (x:[]) = [rule2succ rules x (Nothing)]
    rules2succ_rules (x:(y:xs)) = (rule2succ rules x (Just y)):(rules2succ_rules (y:xs))

succPediccate sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom rules =
  let all_c = buildChecks sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom rules
      all_succ = rules2succ rules
      narity = noneArity sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom
  in

```

```

    foldl (++) "" [ "# Label " ++ (show l) ++
      foldl (++) "\n# unconditional:\n" (map (bsu c) u) ++
      foldl (++) "# if condition satisfied\n" (map (bs c narity) t) ++
      foldl (++) "# if condition not satisfied\n" (map (bsn c narity) f)
      | ((l,u,t,f),c) <- zip all_succ all_c]

where
-- unconditional clause
bsu c (l, x) = (pproto l x c) ++ ".\n"

-- positive clause
{-- positive clause. if no static variables involved, generates unconditional
succ() preducate in from succ(a,b,...). -}
bs c narity (l, x) = if or [or vflags | (_, _, vflags)<-c] then
  (pproto l x c) ++ " :- " ++ (commaSeparated (pslist c narity)) ++ ".\n"
  else (pproto l x c) ++ ".\n"

-- negative clause
bsn c narity (l, x) = if or [or vflags | (_, _, vflags)<-c] then
  foldl (++) "" [ (bs_ ignoreothers n c) (l, x) | n <- range 0 ,(length c) ]
  else (pproto l x c) ++ ".\n"
  where
    bs_ c (l, x) = if or [or vflags | (_, _, vflags)<-c] then
      (pproto l x c) ++ " :- " ++ (commaSeparated (pslist c narity)) ++ ".\n"
      else ""

-- negates one constraint clause and ignores others
ignoreothers :: Int -> [(String,Bool,[Bool])] -> [(String,Bool,[Bool])]
ignoreothers _ [] = []
ignoreothers n ((vname, vneg, vflags):cs) =
  if n == 0 then (vname, (not vneg), vflags):(ignoreothers (n-1) cs)
  else (vname, vneg, (take (length vflags) (repeat False))):(ignoreothers (n-1) cs)

pslist :: [(String,Bool,[Bool])] -> Int -> [String]
pslist [] _ = []
pslist ((vname, vneg, vflags):xs) narity =
  if or vflags then (callNone vneg (varslst 0 vname vflags) narity):(pslist xs narity)
  else pslist xs narity

callNone neg ls narity = (if neg then "" else "!") ++
  "none(" ++ (commaSeparated (ls ++ (replicate (narity - (length ls)) "0")))
  ) ++ ")"

varslst :: Int -> String -> [Bool] -> [String]
varslst _ _ [] = []
varslst n prefix (x:xs) = if x then (p prefix n x):(varslst (n+1) prefix xs)
  else "0):(varslst (n+1) prefix xs)

pproto :: InternalLabel -> InternalLabel -> [(String, Bool, [Bool])] -> String
pproto l0 l1 c = "succ("++(show l0)++", "++ (show l1)++", "++(plist c)++")"

plist :: [(String, Bool, [Bool])] -> String

```

```

plist c = commaSeparated (foldl1 (++) [] [varlist 0 vname vflags | (vname, _, vflags)<-c])

varlist :: Int -> String -> [Bool] -> [String]
varlist _ _ [] = []
varlist n prefix (x:xs) = (p prefix n x):(varlist (n+1) prefix xs)

p :: String -> Int -> Bool -> String
p name n True = name ++ (show n)
p _ _ False = "_"

commaSeparated :: [String] -> String
commaSeparated [] = ""
commaSeparated l = foldl1 (\a b -> a ++ ", " ++ b) l

stdProto :: String
stdProto =
  "olabel(o0:0,10:L) input\n" ++
  "label(10:L) input\n" ++
  "init(1:L) input\n" ++
  "final(1:L) input\n" ++
  "var(v:V) input\n" ++
  "write(1:L,v:V) input\n" ++
  "read(1:L,v:V) input\n" ++
  "rechable(1:L) outptuples\n" ++
  "unrechable(1:L) outptuples\n" ++
  "suspect(1:L) outptuples\n" ++
  "osuspect(o:0) outptuples\n" ++
  "live(1:L,v:V) outptuples\n" ++
  "dead(1:L) outptuples\n"

dynamic sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom =
  let n = sum [length sadom,
              length spdom,
              length dadom,
              length dpdom,
              length pdom]
      proto = commaSeparated [ "b"++(show x)++":B" | x<- take n (iterate (1+) 1)]
      args = commaSeparated [ "x"++(show x) | x<- take n (iterate (1+) 1)]
  in
    (genproto proto, gendef args)
  where
    genproto p =
      "path(10:L,11:L, " ++ p ++ ") \n" ++
      "readonlyPath(10:L,11:L,v:V, " ++ p ++ ") \n" ++
      "succ(10:L,11:L, " ++ p ++ ") input\n"
    gendef a =
      "rechable(L) :- init(Li), path(Li,L,"++a++").\n"++
      "unrechable(L) :- label(L), !rechable(L).\n" ++
      "live(L,V) :- init(Li), path(Li,L,"++a++"), read(Lr,V), readonlyPath(L,Lr,V,"++a++").\n"++
      "dead(L) :- write(L,V), !live(L,V).\n"++
      "suspect(L) :- dead(L).\n"++
      "osuspect(0) :- olabel(0,X), suspect(X).\n" ++
      "suspect(L) :- unrechable(L).\n"++

```

```

"path(A,B,"+++)" :- A=B, label(A), label(B).\n"++
"path(A,C,"+++)" :- succ(A,B,"+++)", path(B,C,"+++)", label(A), label(B), label(C).\n"++
"readonlyPath(A,B,_, "+++)" :- A=B, label(A), label(B).\n"++
"readonlyPath(A,B,_, "+++)" :- succ(A,B,"+++)", label(A), label(B).\n"++
"readonlyPath(A,C,V,"+++)" :- readonlyPath(A,B,V,"+++)", succ(B,C,"+++)", var(V), label(A), label(B), label(C), !write(B,V).\n"

xmain = do
  args <- getArgs
  file <- readFile (head args)
  let policy = runParser file
      sadom = mcsi (foldl (++) [] [ x | (_, x) <- (map getSaddr policy)])
      spdom = mcsi (foldl (++) [] [ x | (_, x) <- (map getSport policy)])
      dadom = mcsi (foldl (++) [] [ x | (_, x) <- (map getDaddr policy)])
      dpdom = mcsi (foldl (++) [] [ x | (_, x) <- (map getDport policy)])
      pdom = mcsi (foldl (++) [] [ x | (_, x) <- (map getProto policy)])
      predicates = generatePredicates sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom policy
      (noneproto, nonedef) = nonePediccate sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom
      (dproto, ddef) = dynamic sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom
      domains = generateDomains policy
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n### Domains\n"
  hPutStr stdout domains
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n### Relations\n"
  hPutStr stdout noneproto
  hPutStr stdout stdProto
  hPutStr stdout dproto
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n### Data\n"
  hPutStr stdout predicates
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n### Rules\n"
  hPutStr stdout nonedef
  hPutStr stdout ddef
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n### Goals\n"
  hPutStr stdout "osuspect(X)?\n"
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n### EDF\n"

{-
  hPutStr stdout (foldr (\x y -> (show x) ++ "\n" ++ y) "" (buildChecks policy))
  hPutStr stdout (foldr (\x y -> (show x) ++ "\n" ++ y) "" (normalizeIntervals policy))
  hPutStr stdout (foldr (\x y -> (show x) ++ "\n" ++ y) "" (normalizeIntervals policy))
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n"
  hPutStr stdout (foldr (\x y -> (show x) ++ "\n" ++ y) "" (buildAssumptions policy))
  hPutStr stdout "\n\n"
  hPutStr stdout (foldr (\x y -> (show x) ++ "\n" ++ y) "" (buildUnCond policy))
-}

maximumOr0 [] = 0
maximumOr0 x = maximum x

generateDomains :: [PolicyRule] -> String
generateDomains policy = let
  nlabels = (maximumOr0 (internalLabels policy)) + 1

```

```
nvars = (maximumOf0 (sort $ nub $ policyVariables policy)) + 1
in
"0 " ++ (show (1 + (maximumOf0 (policyLabels policy)))) ++ " olabels.map\n" ++
"L " ++ (show nlabels) ++ " labels.map\n" ++
"V " ++ (show nvars) ++ " vars.map\n" ++
"B 2\n"
```

```
generatePredicates sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom policy =
  let
  vpolicy = renumberVariables policy
  in
  (labelsPredicate policy) ++
  (olabelsPredicate policy) ++
  (finalsPredicate policy) ++
  (varPredicate vpolicy) ++
  (readPredicate vpolicy) ++
  (writePredicate vpolicy) ++
  (initPredicate policy) ++
  (succPredicate sadom spdom dadom dpdom pdom policy)
```