DISSERTATION

MANUFACTURING PRECARITY: A CASE STUDY OF THE GRAIN PROCESSING
CORPORATION/UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 86D
LOCKOUT IN MUSCATINE, IOWA

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ABSTRACT

MANUFACTURING PRECARITY: A CASE STUDY OF THE GRAIN PROCESSING CORPORATION/UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 86D LOCKOUT IN MUSCATINE, IOWA

On August 22, 2008, approximately 360 workers were locked out of their jobs at Grain Processing Corporation (GPC) in Muscatine, Iowa, after the company and the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local 86D failed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement at the expiration of their existing agreement. This study examines the GPC/UFCW lockout within the context of the growth of precarious employment in the United States. Using this labor dispute as a case study, it illustrates how lockouts are implicated in the generation of precarious employment and how workers and unions respond when confronted with employment precarity. This study suggests that the steady decline in union membership, density, and collective bargaining power in U.S. manufacturing over the last several decades has placed those manufacturing workers who are still covered by collective bargaining agreements at risk of their employers initiating lockouts as a means to displace and replace them and their jobs with more precarious forms of employment. Indeed, by locking out its bargaining unit employees and replacing them with workers hired through a temporary employment agency, GPC was able to effectively take around 360 relatively well-paid, permanent, unionized manufacturing jobs and turn them into precarious jobs. In doing so, the company also rendered some 360 workers precarious. Thus, in addition to demonstrating how GPC was able to deploy a lockout to achieve
precarious employment relations, this study examines how the locked out workers and their union responded to the precarious position they were placed in as a result of the labor dispute.

This study draws on data gathered primarily through in-depth interviews with a sample consisting of 62 of the approximately 360 locked out workers roughly five and a half years into the GPC/UFCW labor dispute. It summarizes, describes, analyzes, and explains these workers’ experiences both prior to and following the lockout. In doing so, it highlights both the negative and positive effects of the labor dispute from the perspective of those workers who experienced it firsthand. For instance, it reveals a number of difficulties these workers faced as a result of being locked out of their jobs. Yet, it also reveals that most of these workers experienced a rather remarkable “recovery” after ultimately being displaced from their jobs at GPC as a result of the lockout. In fact, the majority of workers in this study who sought reemployment after being locked out by the company were able to secure jobs that were comparable, and in most cases superior, to their jobs at GPC in terms of wages, benefits, and working conditions. I use an inductive approach to analyze and conceptualize the factors that contributed to these workers’ “recovery” from the lockout. This analysis shows that the most important factors in explaining the relatively positive outcome of the labor dispute for a significant number of workers in this study was their social capital and human capital coupled with a favorable local labor market.

Overall, this study contributes a worker-centered account of the changing nature and quality of employment relations in the United States. It also contributes to our understanding and analysis of how employment precarity is being generated and how workers and unions are responding to employers’ efforts aimed at achieving precarious employment relations.
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This dissertation would not have been possible without the help of many people. I would like to begin by thanking the locked out workers who participated in this study. They welcomed me into their homes and lives and shared their time, thoughts, and experiences with me. Because I promised them confidentiality and anonymity, I cannot acknowledge them personally, but I hope each and every one of them knows how essential they were to this study and how grateful I am for their participation and cooperation.

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Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and fellow graduate students who were always there for me in whatever capacity I needed them to be as I made my way through graduate school and completing this dissertation. I am genuinely grateful for their unconditional love, encouragement, and generosity.
DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my family and the other families affected by the GPC/UFCW lockout.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The GPC/UFCW Lockout

Just over a week away from Labor Day 2008, on August 22, Grain Processing Corporation, Inc. (GPC) of Muscatine, Iowa, locked out approximately 360 of its employees. These employees were represented by Local 86D of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW). The company and the union were in the process of negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement as the existing five-year agreement was set to expire.\(^1\) However, several hours before that expiration the company walked its second-shift bargaining unit employees out of the facility and initiated a “lockout.”\(^2\) Five and a half years later, in what has become one of the longest, if not the longest lockouts in U.S. history, these workers remained locked out.\(^3\) In the meantime, they have been replaced at the facility with “temporary” workers.\(^4\) Thus, GPC has

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1 The 2003-2008 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the company and the union was set to expire at midnight on Friday, August 22, 2008.

2 The U.S. Department of Labor defines a lockout as a temporary withholding or denial of employment initiated by the management of an establishment during a labor dispute in order to enforce terms of employment upon a group of employees (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016a). Moreover, Weir (2013:428) explains that a lockout is sometimes referred to as “an employer’s strike” because it is “an aggressive maneuver on the part of an employer aimed at forcing employees to accept management’s work terms.” He explains that lockouts occur when an employer closes a facility or prevents employees from entering and working (Weir 2013:428).

3 Several scholars report the BASF/OCAW lockout in Ascension Parish, Louisiana, which began in 1984 and lasted approximately five and a half years, as the longest lockout in U.S. history (Leonard and Nauth 1990; Minchin 2003; Maher 2004). The GPC/UFCW lockout passed the five-and-a-half-year mark in March of 2014.

4 Under U.S. labor law companies can only hire temporary replacements if workers are locked out (LeRoy 1996:999; Minchin. 2003:36). However, as will be evident in the upcoming chapters, GPC has navigated its way around this legislation by hiring “temporary” replacements on a
effectively taken approximately 360 relatively well-paid, permanent, unionized manufacturing jobs and turned them into temporary, nonunion jobs. In the process, it has also rendered some 360, mostly lifelong, manufacturing workers precarious.5

The principle objective of this dissertation is to examine the GPC/UFCW lockout within the context of growing precarious employment in the United States. Although precarious employment is becoming a more dominant feature of our economy and society it is not very well conceptualized or theorized (Cranford and Vosko 2006). As will be clear in the next chapter, where the concept will be develop more fully, “precarious employment” is an ambiguous term which has assumed a variety of different definitions and meanings (Vosko 2010; Arnold and Bongiovi 2012; Internal Labor Organization 2012; Kalleberg and Hewison 2013, Mosoetsa, Stillerman, and Tilly 2016).6 Despite the lack of agreed-upon definition of what constitutes “precarious employment” there is a growing consensus that the nature and quality of employment relations in this country over the last several decades have been changing in fundamental ways, as demonstrated by former American Sociological Association (ASA)

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5 As Kalleberg (2009:6) notes, not having a job is the ultimate form of work precarity.

6 For example, Kalleberg and Hewison (2013:273) explain, “Precarious work, especially as conceptualized by European social scientists, is often seen as a loss, such as a loss of social protections or of the so-called standard employment relations.” Moreover, these authors suggest that because Europeans have been organizing around the concept of “precarity,” which to them has meant a situation of living and working without a safety net, “the analytical use of ‘precarious work’ carries with it the baggage of a European social movement” (Kalleberg and Hewison 2013:273). For a review of the competing definitions of precarity as it applies to employment see Mosoetsa, Stillerman, and Tilly (2016).
president Arne Kalleberg. In his 2008 Presidential Address to the ASA, Kalleberg pointed out the growth of precarious work in America over the last few decades and the increasing importance of understanding the new workplace arrangements that generate precarious work and worker insecurity (2009:1). More specifically, he stated: “We need to understand the range of new workplace arrangements that have been adopted and their implications for individuals’ well-being” (Kalleberg 2009:18). Moreover, he emphasized the need to better understand “the institutions and structures that generate precarious work and the cultural and individual factors that influence people’s responses to uncertainty” (Kalleberg 2009:1). In addition, Kalleberg (2009:11) pointed out the tendency in sociology, specifically economic sociology, to leave workers out of explanations of work-related phenomena. Therefore, he highlighted the need to better understand the forms and mechanisms of worker agency, both individually and collectively, when confronting precarity. This dissertation aims at addressing some of those needs.

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7 According to Kalleberg (2009) the zenith of the sociology of work, under the label of “industrial sociology,” in the United States was from the 1940s to 1960s. By the end of the 1960s, however, the study of work within sociology became increasingly fragmented as “topics previously subsumed under the rubric of industrial sociology were spread among sociologists of work, occupations, organizations, economy and society, labor and labor markets, labor force demographics, gender social stratification, and so on” (Kalleberg, 2009:10-11). Kalleberg (2009:11) argues that the discipline of sociology needs to return to a unified study of work, which integrates “studies of work, occupations, and organizations along with labor markers, political sociology, and insights from psychology and labor and behavioral economics.” Moreover, he argues, “…a new sociology of work should focus in the challenges posed by central timely issues, such as how and why precarious employment relations are created and maintained” (Kalleberg 2009:16).
The Study’s Contribution to Understanding Precarious Employment

The GPC/UFCW lockout provides a unique opportunity to study previously unexplored and underexplored aspects of contemporary precarious employment. Using the lockout as a case study, this dissertation illustrates not only how lockouts are implicated in the generation of employment precarity, but also workers’ actions and agency when confronting such precarity. It is, to my knowledge, the first empirical study to expressly examine the relationship between lockouts and precarious employment. In doing so, it suggests that the steady decline in union membership, density, and collective bargaining power in the U.S. manufacturing industry over the last several decades has placed those American manufacturing workers who are still covered by collective bargaining agreements at risk of their employers initiating lockouts as a tool to displace and replace them and their jobs with precarious employment. Indeed, a number of scholars and reporters have taken note of the recent increase in lockouts across the county (Chaison 2006; Eidelson 2012; Greenhouse 2012; Holger 2016). As Hogler (2015:6) reports, “Not content with provoking strikes to gain economic concessions, employers began to follow the lead of professional sports owners by initiating lockouts against workers: From the Cooper Tire factory in Findlay, Ohio, to a country club in Southern California and sugar beet processing plants in North Dakota, employers are turning to lockouts to press their unionized workers to grant concessions after contract negotiations deadlock.” Likewise, Greenhouse (2012) reports

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8 There is a lack of statistical data and analysis on lockouts in the United States (LeRoy 1996). One of the problems with measuring the frequency of lockouts is that the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics does not differentiate between “strikes” and “lockouts” in their data collection of “work stoppages” or record data on work stoppages involving less than 1000 workers.
“with many private sector labor unions growing smaller and weaker…some employers think the
time is ideal to use lockouts.”

Relatedly, most of the research on manufacturing and employment precarity has focused
on workers who have become precarious as a result of deindustrialization. As previously
implied, this case differs in that these manufacturing workers were not rendered precarious as a
result of deindustrialization, but, rather a corporate restructuring strategy facilitated by the
industrial relations system in the United States (i.e., a lockout). That is, these workers did not
experience the elimination of their manufacturing jobs, but, rather they were replaced in their
jobs by “temporary” or more “precarious” workers. Rather than their manufacturing jobs being
outsourced to a less industrialized region or country, they were outsourced domestically to a
temporary employment agency. Some have referred to this process – the supplanting of
manufacturing jobs characterized by standard employment relationships by temporary or
precarious employment relationships – as “domestic outsourcing” (Jaffe 2014; Smith and
McKenna 2014; Bernhardt, Batt, Houseman and Appelbaum 2016). Some posit that if the
official manufacturing employment statistics were adjusted to account for the number of “lost”
manufacturing jobs that simply migrated over to temporary employment agencies that the decline
in the level of manufacturing employment in the United States since the 1990s would be
eliminated (Jaffe 2014; Pofeldt 2015). As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter,
the U.S. manufacturing industry’s use of temporary employment agencies has greatly increased
over the last couple of decades. In fact, the largest share of temporary employment agency

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9 Bernhardt, Batt, Houseman and Appelbaum (2016:5) define “domestic outsourcing” as firms or
governmental entities located in the U.S. contracting with other firms or individuals located in
the U.S. for the provision of goods and services.
growth in in recent years in the United States has come from manufacturing (Peck and Theodore 2006; Smith and McKenna 2014; Pofeldt 2015). Thus, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of precarious employment by adding to the discussion and literature at least two understudied dimensions of this phenomenon which are: (1) the jobs that are rendered precarious as a result of lockouts; and (2) the workers who are rendered precarious as the result of lockouts.

This dissertation also contributes a worker-centered account of employment precarity. As stated above, Kalleberg (2009:11) points out the tendency in sociology to leave workers out of explanations of work-related phenomena. This study brings workers into the discussion and analysis of the changing nature and quality of employment relations in America by examining employment precarity from the vantage point of workers who have experienced it firsthand.

Since most of the literature and research on precarious employment has tended to focus on employers’ actions while largely neglecting workers’ actions, by focusing first and foremost on workers’ experiences, actions, and perspectives, this study aims at reducing this disparity. However, by focusing on workers’ actions, this study does not disregard employers’ actions, rather it investigates them from the vantage point of workers who are most affected by them. In other words, in addition to gaining a better understanding of the GPC/UFCW lockout and its aftermath from the locked out workers’ perspectives, we also gain an understanding of the company’s actions before and after the labor dispute lockout from the workers’ perspective.

In addition, and heeding Kalleberg’s call, this study examines different forms and mechanisms of worker agency, both individually and collectively, when confronting precarity. Thus, rather than just assuming workers to be passive victims of structural economic changes and corresponding employer actions, this study considers the interplay between structure and agency and gives greater consideration to the factors that contribute to workers’ agency when
confronted with employment precarity. Moreover, this study goes beyond the existing literature by analyzing what appears to be a counterintuitive outcome of workers’ experience with employment precarity, which is namely a better economic and psychological state of well-being than conventional analyses of precarious employment would have predicted.

I chose to study this particular lockout not only because it provided an opportunity to investigate novel characteristics of contemporary employment precarity, but also because of a personal interest in the case, which I will describe in more detail in chapter three. Suffice it to say the lockout occurred in my hometown and I have family and friends among the locked out workers. Additionally, I felt that the fact that the lockout had dragged on for so many years and was perhaps the longest lockout in U.S. history made it worthy of research.

Overview of this Dissertation

In this study, I examine the experiences of a group of 62 former GPC workers in Muscatine, Iowa approximately five and a half years after they were locked out of their jobs. In the chapters that follow I summarize, describe, analyze, and explain their experiences. To begin to understand these experiences, however, we must first explore the changing nature of employment relations in the United States through the concepts of precarious employment and precarity. Therefore, chapter two provides a review of the emerging body of literature and research on precarious employment in the United States and situates my dissertation within this scholarship. Moreover, it lays out the multiple dimensions of employment precarity and establishes the theoretical framework for my description and analysis of the labor dispute and workers’ experiences.

In chapter three, I describe and explain the research strategy and methods I used to collect and analyze data for this study. In this chapter, I elaborate on my reasons for selecting the
GPC/UFCW lockout for a case study of employment precarity. I also explain how I selected and gained access to the individuals who participated in this study.\textsuperscript{10} The primary data for this study were derived from in-depth interviews with these individuals. In addition, I gathered and analyzed documentary data such as public records, legal documents, media reports, collective bargaining agreements, and so on.

The following three chapters offer an analysis of the labor dispute and locked out workers’ experiences. Chapters four and five offer mostly a descriptive analysis, beginning with a description of Muscatine, Iowa and GPC’s relationship with the community. Chapter four also describes labor relations at GPC’s Muscatine-based facility, focusing on the decade leading up to the 2008 labor dispute. It recounts workers’ experiences of being locked out of the facility and provides an account of the events that unfolded over the course of the first several weeks and then years of the labor dispute. Ultimately, the chapter demonstrates, based primarily on the locked out workers’ firsthand accounts, GPC’s use of a lockout to generate precarious employment.

Chapter five offers a description of locked out workers’ employment trajectories and experiences both before and after the labor dispute. It begins by explaining in more detail who these workers are and how they came to be employed at GPC, which is followed by a brief summary of their experiences working at the Muscatine-based facility. The chapter also presents an account of workers’ pre-lockout employment plans and assesses how these plans were altered as a result of the lockout. It considers other effects the labor dispute has had on their lives, both negative and positive. In doing so, it recounts not only the hardships they encountered as a result

\textsuperscript{10} Chapter three also offers a description of the demographic characteristics of the 62 research participants in this study.
of the lockout, but also the positive outcomes the labor dispute has had for a number of them. Over five and a half years after being locked out of their assumed lifelong jobs, these workers reported, for the most part, a remarkable recovery from the loss of their jobs. In chapter five, I begin to analyze the relatively positive outcome of the lockout for the majority of workers in this study and their recovery from the job loss.

Chapter six goes beyond the existing literature by analyzing what appears to be a counterintuitive outcome of the lockout and workers’ experiences, namely a better economic and psychological state of well-being than conventional analyses of employment precarity has predicted. In doing so, I conceptualize the factors and conditions that helped workers recover from the labor dispute as different dimensions of “recovery capital.” Recovery capital is not an original concept. Rather, it is currently used in social and behavioral psychology to explain how individuals draw on their social capital, and especially their social networks, to recover from addiction. An adaptation of this concept helps explain how workers were able to recover from the loss of their jobs as a result of the lockout. The very notion of “recovery” emerged from workers’ accounts of how they responded to being locked out by their employer. Employing the concept “recovery capital” allows me to emphasize workers’ actions and agency when faced with employers’ precaritization efforts. As will become apparent in chapters four and five, workers who experienced the lockout firsthand describe themselves as not merely passive victims of their employer’s efforts to generate precarious employment, but as agents in their recovery from the lockout and the loss of their jobs. Thus, recovery capital helps bring workers and their agency into the discussion of employment precarity.

Finally, in chapter seven, I conclude with a summary of the results of this study and a discussion of its theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of precarious
employment. I suggest that labor disputes, and specifically lockouts, need to be added to the factors that have been identified in the literature as generating precarious employment in the United States. I also make some suggestions for policy changes and future research.
CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE OF PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT & THE RESHAPING OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS

The key to understanding much of the GPC/UFCW lockout lies in the concept of precarity and the growing discussion and literature on the rise of precarious employment in the United States in recent years. Indeed, the growth of precarious work since the 1970s has emerged as a core contemporary issue in the media, within politics, and among scholars and researchers both within and outside the discipline of sociology (Kalleberg 2009). For instance, on February 9, The New York Times reported that the final budget of President Obama’s term in office reflected a growing recognition that structural changes in the national economy have been underway for several decades which are driving U.S. workers even deeper into a world of precarious employment (Scheiber 2016). While The New York Times argues that this final budget proposal marks a new direction for the President in terms of his policy reforms, the increasingly precarious reality for workers in America that his proposal speaks to have been the focus of an increasingly important literature in sociology. In what follows, I will provide an overview of this literature and the developing body of research on the changing nature of employment relations in this country.

Certainly, over the last several decades we have witnessed changes in U.S. labor relations and specifically a rise of employment precarity. This rise, or perhaps more accurately described as a reemergence, of precarious employment has received growing attention among social scientists. These social scientists, as Steven Vallas and Christopher Prener (2012:332) explain, “have begun to produce a sprawling literature that has documented the spread of involuntary
part-time, temporary, and contract work; studied the spread of downsizing and outsourcing throughout the corporate world; and debated why large corporations have moved to dismantle the centralized or Fordist bureaucratic models on which they once relied.” This growing body of literature goes by many names that are often interchangeable, which include nonstandard employment, atypical employment, precarious employment, informalization, casualization, flexibilization, and contingent employment among others (Arnold and Bongiovi 2012:1).

Nevertheless, Vosko (2006:3-4) explains that precarious employment:

…encompasses forms of work involving limited social benefits and statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low wages, and high risks of ill-health. It is shaped by the employment status (i.e., self-employment or wage work), form of employment (i.e., temporary or permanent, part-time or full-time), and dimensions of labor market insecurity as well as social context (such as occupation, industry, and geography), and social location (the interaction between social relations, such as gender and “race” and political and economic conditions).

However, Kalleberg (2012:315), simply defines “precarious work” as “work that is insecure and uncertain, and in which the worker – rather than the employer or the government – bears most risks associated with employment.” Moreover, Kalleberg (2009:2) describes that “employment precarity results when people lose their jobs or fear losing their jobs, when they lack alternative employment opportunities in the labor market, and when workers experience diminished opportunities to obtain and maintain particular skills.” Alternatively, Rodgers (1989) identifies several dimensions central to establishing whether a job is precarious:

The first dimension is the degree of certainty of continuing employment. The second is control over the labour process linked to the presence or absence of a trade union and hence, control over working conditions, wages, and work intensity. The third is the degree of regulatory protection, or whether the worker has access to an equivalent level of regulatory protections through union representation or the law. The fourth is income level, indicating that a given job may be secure in that it is stable and long-term, but precarious in that the wage is insufficient to maintain the worker and ant dependents. (Vosko 2006:15-16)
Regardless of the ambiguous terminology, definitions, and conceptualizations of precarious employment, Vallas and Prener (2012:322) contend that much of this literature has operated at a broad, theoretical level, far removed from fine-grained empirical research. Perhaps the most notable empirical contribution to this literature, with regard to the United States, is Arne Kalleberg’s Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in the United States, 1970s to 2000s (2011), which provides an array of survey data and official statistics to demonstrate the rise of precarious employment in the U.S. since the 1970s. His empirical analysis demonstrates “the growth and institutionalization of nonstandard employment relations, the decrease in job stability, a decline in firm internal labor markets, growth of long-term unemployment, greater perceptions of insecurity that are unrelated to business cycles, and the shifting of risks from employers to workers” (Kalleberg 2011:82). Taken as a whole, Kalleberg (2011:82) claims that “these objective and subjective indicators suggest strongly that there has been a growth in precarious work in the United States since the 1970s.”

Kalleberg and others (Vosko 2006; Madrick 2012; Marsden 2012; Milkman and Ott 2014) recognize that precarious work is not new to the United States.11 These scholars point out that precarious employment was quite common in this country in the 19th century and remained so until the end of the Great Depression. For instance, Milkman and Ott (2014:2) explains that although there is new terminology emerging in reference to precarious workers, like Guy Standing’s “precariat,” the work arrangements they refer to are hardly without historical precedent and “…in many cases they parallel older forms of labor exploitation that were

11 Vosko (2006:4) suggests that “Precarious employment is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it takes expression in different ways in different periods and different places. It is shaped by historical circumstances, conceptual and theoretical understandings, social norms, and concrete developments in the labor market.”
widespread in the United States prior to the New Deal reforms of the 1930s.” Likewise, Kalleberg (2009:3) claims that most jobs were precarious and most wages were unstable in the United States until the end of the Great Depression, and “pensions and health insurance were almost unheard of among the working class before the 1930s.” Moreover, he contends, “The previous period of precarious work in the United States ended with the establishment of social protections and the social contract between business and labor in the 1930s” (Kalleberg and Marsden 2012:335). In short, Kalleberg and Marsden (2012:316) explain:

The three decades following World War II were marked by sustained growth and prosperity. During this postwar boom, economic compensation generally increased for most people, and job security was relatively high. The establishment of a new social contract between business and labor beginning in the 1930s solidified the growing security and economic gains of this period. The employment relationship became more regulated over time, enforced by labor laws and the diffusion of norms of employer conduct. Combined with the full blooming of Fordist production techniques and U.S. dominance in the world markets, this ushered in an era of relatively full employment, security, and sustained economic growth.

However, precarious employment did not completely disappear during this period of prosperity in the United States. Rather, certain segments of the labor market, the so-called “secondary labor market segment,” remained relatively precarious and have been a persistent feature of the U.S. labor market. The concepts “dual labor market” and “labor market segmentation” have been used to describe the so-called primary and secondary labor market segments within the U.S. economy in which relatively high-wage, stable, and secure jobs are located in the primary labor market and low-wage, unstable, and uncertain jobs are concentrated in the secondary labor market (Doeringer and Piore 1971). As described by Kalleberg (2011:11), “The primary labor market segment was made up of good jobs (that is, well-paying, relatively secure jobs that were

12 It can be argued that employment under capitalism has always featured some degree of precariousness.
associated with job ladders in large firms), and a secondary segment consisted of bad jobs (that is, relatively insecure jobs associated with low-wage employment and the absence of job ladders and opportunities for advancement to better jobs).” In fact, Kalleberg and Marsden (2012:316) explain “the degree of precarity and insecurity was a key characteristic used to distinguish jobs in the primary and secondary labor market segments.”

Although precarious employment is not necessarily new to the United States, Kalleberg claims, “It is generally agreed that the most recent era of precarious work in the United States began in the mid- to late-1970s” and “differs in several fundamental ways from that which characterized precarity in the pre-World War II period” (2009:2-5). He attributes the most recent growth in precarious employment in this country to “macrostructural economic, political, and social forces such as the intensification of global competition, rapid technological innovation and change, deregulation of markets, increased mobility of capital and growing financialization of the economy, the decline in unions and worker power, and the continued rise of the service sector” (Kalleberg 2012a:429). Moreover, he stresses “the role of macrostructural factors (e.g., globalization, technological changes, deregulation) in generating the conditions (e.g., growing price competition and declining union power) that encourage and enable employers to adopt more flexible employment relations (e.g., temporary and other nonstandard work arrangements)” (Kalleberg 2012a:431). Kalleberg (2012a:439) maintains that the emergence of this new era of precarious employment in the United States:

…was shaped primarily by the corporate strategy responses of employers to global and technological pressures for more flexibility. The absence of strong labor market institutions, along with a weak labor movement and a relative lack of government regulation and interference, gave employers relatively free rein to seek employment

\footnote{Other scholars, such as sociologist Charles Post, suggest that today’s precarity represents simply a return to the labor conditions that reigned before the welfare state came into existence or a return to “pre-Fordism” (Benav 2015).}
arrangements that enhanced their flexibility, which in turn encouraged the expansion of polarized [good and bad] and precarious jobs.

Furthermore, he contends that “the growth in precarious employment has occurred just as we’ve abandoned the implicit social contract that bound together government, business, and labor in the United States (Kalleberg 2012b:3). Along the same line, Applebaum (2012:313) highlights the shift in public policy from an emphasis on achieving full employment to an emphasis on maintaining price stability and how this policy shift relates to the increase in precarious employment in the United States:

Following the oil price shocks of the 1970s and the sharp spikes in inflation and interest rates that followed, the commitment to full employment was abandoned as inflationary. Instead, the dominant concern for policy makers shifted to a focus on price stability. In place of policies to maintain full employment, neoliberal policies were adopted that focused on deregulation of industries, the outsourcing of production to low-wage countries, and the undermining of unions – all policies that weakened the bargaining power of workers and unions. Union membership eroded, leaving ever more workers subject to “employment at will.” The increase in precarious work soon followed.

Madrick (2012:324) also associates policy changes with the growth in precarious employment in the United States, arguing that “the job crisis in America” is the result of “deliberate political policy choices.” More specifically, he claims that there has been a low-wage, high-unemployment policy regime in the United States for at least a generation and that this country “has adjusted to growing global competition and rewards from financial speculation by allocating the pain to labor, not capital” (Madrick 2012:324).

Bernhardt (2012) attributes the rise in precarious employment in the United States to a lack of labor market regulation. She argues, “…the key driver of precariousness is the growing evasion and violation by employers of both legal and normative standards, facilitated by the withdrawal of government’s hand in the labor market (Bernhardt 2012:356). Moreover, Bernhardt (2012:356-7) suggests:
…employment and labor laws are the main anchors of the employment relationship in the United States. But for many of those laws – the minimum wage, health and safety regulations, and the right to organize chief among them – standards have either stagnated or weakened over the past thirty years. At the same time, outdated loopholes continue to exclude low-wage workers…from legal protection. And changes in the organization of work have made it more difficult to legally hold employers accountable for their employees. This multidimensional weakening of labor standards has been one of the key shifts opening the door to low-road business strategies to cut labor costs.

Somewhat paradoxically, other scholars (Polivka 1996; Kalleberg 2006; Peck and Theodore 2006; Elcioglu 2010) have suggested that labor market regulations and labor laws may in fact motivate employers to shift away from the so-called “standard employment relationship” to more precarious employment relations in order to avoid the rigidities and costs associated with the former. Kalleberg (2006: 566), for instance, argues that labor laws designed to protect permanent employees have fueled the growth of nonstandard work by encouraging employers to avoid the mandates and costs associated with these laws. Moreover, based on his cross-national analysis of nonstandard employment relations, Kalleberg (2006:568) reports:

Labour market rigidities can lead to the greater use of temporary workers. For example, the proportion of fixed-term contracts more than doubled between 1983 and 1998 in Spain and France…two countries that have strong restrictions on dismissals of regular workers; these highly protective labour laws may have made employers more adept at getting around them by using short-term hires (2006:568).

Although there is not complete consensus in the literature regarding the specific causes and consequences of the growth in precarious employment since the 1970s, there seems to be general agreement that contemporary precarity differs from that of the past in fundamental ways. Again, Kalleberg (2009), who provides the most thorough empirical analysis of contemporary precarity, points out at least five ways in which precarious employment in the United States today differs from that of the past. He explains:

First, there has been a spatial restructuring of work on a global scale, as geography and space have become increasingly important dimensions of labor markets, labor
relations, and work. Greater connectivity among people, organizations, and countries, made possible by advances in technology, has made it relatively easy to move goods, capital, and people within and across borders at an ever-accelerated pace. “Spatialization” freed employers from conventional temporal and spatial constraints and enabled them to locate their business operations optimally and to access cheap sources of labor. Advances in information and communication technologies allow capitalists to exert control over decentralized and spatially dispersed labor processes. (Kalleberg 2009:5)

Second, Kalleberg (2011:29) points out that throughout the post-World War II period there has been a massive shift in employment in the United States from industries that produce goods to those that produce services. He reports:

More than 85 percent of people in the United States worked in the service industries in 2009, up from nearly 70 percent in 1970. Employment among the five hundred largest service companies grew from 9.3 million jobs in 1982 to 11.3 million in 1993, while employment among the top five hundred manufacturing companies dropped from 14.4 to 11.5 million over the same period (Kalleberg 2011:29).

Thus, the service sector has become increasingly central to the U.S. economy. While there is great diversity in the types and quality of service sector jobs, the overall expansion of the service sector in the U.S. economy over the last several decades has fueled the growth of nonstandard employment arrangements since jobs in this sector are often easier to schedule in a flexible way than manufacturing jobs (Kalleberg 2011:29).

A third way in which precarity today is distinctive, according to Kalleberg (2009, 2011) is that layoffs and involuntary terminations from employment have become a basic component of employers’ restructuring strategies as they reflect a way of increasing short-term profits by reducing labor costs, even in good economic times, and a means to undermine workers’ collective power. As he describes in more detail:

Layoffs and involuntary terminations from employment have always occurred and, not surprisingly, have fluctuated with the business cycle. A big change from the past was that layoffs now occurred for reasons of profit maximization rather than survival. Healthy companies laid off workers and justified this as an “unfortunate necessity” – a reflection of the changing norms of the employment relationship. By
1996, laying off workers was regarded as a legitimate corporate tactic and a basic component of the employer strategy of restructuring. Companies have continued to downsize even in good times; while downsizing and layoffs were once legitimate responses to profit pressures, they now have become a way of increasing short-term profits by holding down the wage bill (and the price and quality of labor) and transferring income from labor to capital. (Kalleberg 2011:39)

For Kalleberg, a fourth distinction of contemporary precarity is ideological. He maintains, “In the earlier precarious period, there were strong ideologies (e.g. Marxism) that conceptualized what a world without market domination would look like” and “these older theories are now largely discredited and we are operating in what amounts to an ideological vacuum, without anything close to a consensus theory about the mechanisms fostering precarity and how to deal with its costs” (Kalleberg 2009:5). The “ideological vacuum” he is referring to is the economic and political ideology of neoliberalism, which he claims is supported by a cultural ideological shift toward greater individualism and personal responsibility away from a sense of collective responsibility. He describes these neoliberal and individualistic ideologies as follows:

…the idea that people were themselves responsible for coping with the consequences of economic transformation replaced the New Deal-era belief that the government would provide economic security for all. The notion of “we’re all in this together” was supplanted by the ideology, “you’re on your own.” The individualism that accompanied this ideological shift provided the normative basis for the marketization and deregulation of labor markets set in motion by President Carter and later enhanced by President Reagan. The ideology of individualism buttressed the neoliberal revolution that spread throughout the world, emphasizing the centrality of markets and market-driven solutions, the privatization of government resources, and the removal of government protections in many countries. This “personal responsibility” crusade and the notion of “taking ownership” of one’s own life were fueled by well-financed conservative think tanks…that worked…to reduce the safety net and to foster the role of markets. (Kalleberg 2011:31)

The final way in which today’s precarity is distinct, according to Kalleberg, is that it is much more widespread than in the past. He explains:
Precarious work was often described in the past in terms of a dual labor market, with unstable and uncertain jobs concentrated in a secondary labor market. Indeed, precarity and insecurity were used to differentiate jobs in the primary as opposed to secondary labor market segments. Now, precarious work has spread to all sectors of the economy and has become much more pervasive and generalized: professionals and managerial jobs are also precarious these days. (Kalleberg 2009:5-6)

It is difficult to measure and evaluate the distinctiveness of precarity today as described by Kalleberg for a number of reasons. First of all, as suggested earlier, there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes “precarious employment.” As explained by the International Labor Organization (ILO), while precarity is ubiquitous, “its extent, meaning, and impacts remain subject to much debate as there is no agreed official definitions of what constitutes precarious employment” (2012:29). Additionally, the lack of data on the nature of employment relations and work arrangements in the United States makes it difficult to access just how much change has actually occurred over the last several decades (Kalleberg 2009, 2011; Kalleberg and Mardsen 2012). As Kalleberg and Marsden (2012:318) confirm:

While it is widely agreed that work and employment relations have changed in important ways since the 1970s, less consensus exists on the specifics of these changes. Part of the reason for this is that little systematic longitudinal data on employment relations and organizational practices are available, so it is difficult to evaluate just how much has really changed.

For example, the U.S. government, via the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), did not even collect information on nonstandard work arrangements until 1995. And since then, conceptualization and measurement issues have continued to make it difficult to evaluate changes in employment relations (Osterman 1999; Kalleberg 2009).

Hauser, and Ho (2011), Appelbaum (2012), Kalleberg and Marsden (2012), the International Labor Organization (2012), and Milkman (2014) provide evidence that precarious work is indeed on the rise in the United States. These scholars generally point to the following indicators as evidence of rising precarity: 1) a decline in attachment to employers (i.e., job tenure); 2) an increase in job displacement rates (i.e., involuntary job losses); 3) a rise in long-term unemployment; 4) a growth in perceived job insecurity; 5) an increase in risk-shifting from employers to employees; and 6) an increase in nonstandard work arrangements and the institutionalization of the temporary staffing industry (TSI).

**Employer Tenure**

To begin with, some scholars site the general decline in employee attachment to employers, gaged by the average length of time people spend with their employers (i.e., “employer tenure”), as evidence that precarious employment has increased over the last several decades (Osterman 1999; Farber 2008a, 2010; Kalleberg 2009, 2011, 2012; Kalleberg and Marsden 2012). For instance, Farber (2010:223) claims, “There is ample evidence that long-term employment is on the decline in the United States.” He explains, “The common understanding that, after some turnover early in careers, most workers find a job (relationship with an employer) that lasts for a long period of time (a “lifetime” job), has been challenged in the last fifteen to twenty years [in academic research] …as large corporations have engaged in highly publicized layoffs and the industrial structure of the U.S. economy has shifted in the face of global competitive pressures” (Farber 2010:223). His own research, based on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), “shows clearly that job tenure and the incidence of long-term employment have declined sharply in the U.S. private sector between the 1970s and 2008” (2010:257). His research also indicates that employer tenure has especially declined for men in
the private sector (Farber 2008b, 2010). Mirroring this decline in long-term employment relationships, Farber (2008b) explains, “there has been an increase in ‘churning (defined as the proportion of workers in jobs with less than one year of tenure) for males in the private sector as they enter their thirties and later.” Similarly, Kalleberg (2009:6) notes changes in job tenure and how the average length of time employees spend with their employers varies across groups of workers:

[While] there has been a general decline in the average length of time people spend with their employers. This varies by specific subgroups: women’s employer tenure has increased; while men’s has decreased (although tenure levels for women remain substantially lower than those for men in the private sector). The decline in employer tenure is especially pronounced among older white men, the group traditionally protected by internal labor markets.

Based on the evidence of declining job tenure, Farber (2008b) concludes “that more recent cohorts of workers are less likely than their parents to have a career characterized by a ‘life-time’ job with a single employer.”

**Job Displacement Rates**

Scholars also point to the increase in job displacement rates, or the extent to which workers are involuntarily terminated from their jobs, as indicative of the rise of precarity in the United States (Osterman 1999; Valletta 1999; Kalleberg 2011). However, understanding the prevalence of job displacement, and its growth, is this country is also beset by a number of conceptual and measurement issues. To begin, there is considerable disagreement in the literature regarding how to define and conceptualize “job displacement” and/or “displaced workers.” As Fallick (1996:5) points out, “because of the lack of consensus on the definition of displaced workers, the estimated number of displaced workers varies tremendously.” Moreover, he suggests that “to date, the only good source of estimates of the total number of displaced workers in the United States is the *Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS)*” (Fallick 1996:5). Farber (2005:13)
echoes this assessment stating that, “Perhaps the most comprehensive source of information on
the incidence of job loss in the United States is the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS),
administered every two years since 1984 as a supplement to the Current Population Survey
(CPS).” However, relying on the DWS for estimated job displacement rates and changes in those
rates has limitations. For instance, one of the problems researchers relying on the DWS
encounter is that since it was first administered the definition of “displaced workers” and the
design of the survey have undergone changes rendering measurement problematic. Hamermesh
(1989:52) documents that the federal government first settled on “the admittedly arbitrary
definition of displaced workers as those who lost jobs that they held for three or more years,
owing to slack work, abolition of the job, or closing of the plant.” Currently, the DWS defines
“displaced workers” as “persons 20 years of age and older who lost or left jobs because their
plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position
or shift was abolished” (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). Farber (2005) refers to these as
the “big three” reasons for job displacement and claims that by just exploring these three, the
DSW is missing important aspects of job displacement. Indeed, the standard definition of
“displaced workers” used by the government and most researchers neglect workers that have
been displaced as a result of labor disputes. Thus, locked out workers, such as those in this study,
which have essentially been displaced as a result of a labor dispute and replaced by “temporary”
workers are neglected in government estimates of displaced workers. Consequently, workers
who are displaced and rendered precarious via lockouts are overlocked in evaluating not only
displaced workers but ultimately the rise in precarious employment.

Undeterred by the aforementioned limitations of utilizing the DWS to measure job
displacement, Kalleberg (2011) turns to evidence from panel studies (Boisjoly, Duncan and
Smeeding 1998; Valletta 1999; Bernhart, Morris, Handcock, and Scott 2001) to access whether job displacement rates have in fact increased over the last several decades and finds evidence that they have. He concludes, “Taken as a whole, the quantitative empirical evidence on the trends in involuntary job loss suggests that job stability has declined since the 1970s, especially for previously advantaged groups such as…prime-age males” (Kalleberg 2011:98). Moreover, he reports that the proportion of prime-age males who were permanently displaced from their jobs involuntarily almost doubled between the 1970s and 1990s (Kalleberg 2012b:4). This growth in involuntary job loss over the last several decades relates to another trend which the literature suggests is indicative of rising precarity in the United States: long-term unemployment.

Long-Term Unemployment

According to Kalleberg (2009:6), “not having a job at all is, of course, the ultimate form of work precarity.” He, along with Farber (2008a), Keys and Danziger (2008), Newman (2008) and Marsden (2012) report an increase in the number of unemployed persons who are classified as “long-term unemployed,” which is defined as those who are jobless for six months or more. Scholars, such as Kalleberg (2011, 2012) report a steady upward ascent in long-term unemployment since the 1970s and that this percentage has spiked dramatically since the Great Recession of the late 2000s. He claims:

The percentage of unemployed persons who are classified as long-term unemployed has increased enormously since 2000; this gap is the largest it has been since the 1970s. The gap between unemployment rates and share of long-term unemployment has grown since the 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions; nearly a quarter of the unemployed in the first decade of the 2000s were out of work long-term. Workers are now experiencing more difficulty in getting jobs than in previous periods, and more of them are experiencing the hardships associated with long-term unemployment...The large proportion of unemployed persons who found it difficult to obtain employment after the 2001 and 2007 to 2009 recessions is likely due to low rates of job growth, as well as challenges faced by displaced workers in industries such as manufacturing, whose jobs have been lost. (Kalleberg 2011:98)
Likewise, Newman (2008:2) testifies to the growth in long-term unemployment brought on by the Great Recession stating:

…make no mistake: the proportion of American workers who have to face prolonged unemployment is growing. 250,000 jobs were cut from the national payroll in the first three months of 2008. 80,000 were lost in the month of March alone, the deepest cuts in five years.

Regardless of the spike in prolonged unemployment related to the Great Recession, the overall trend in long-term unemployment has been upward (Kalleberg 2012:4).

**Perceived Job Security/Insecurity**

The rise in precarity is also related to perceptions of job security and insecurity (Vosko 2006; Kalleberg 2009, 2011, 2012; Standing 2011; Kalleberg and Marsden 2012). As Kalleberg and Marsden (2012:319) explain:

The growth of precarious work clearly should have consequences for perceived job insecurity and assessments of one’s economic standing. Precarity is intimately related to perceived job insecurity, which should increase as employer tenure declines, outsourcing and offshoring of jobs rise, and downsizing, restructuring, plant closings, and mass layoffs have become commonplace…we anticipate that over time these phenomena will lead people to be increasingly worried about job loss.

In fact, Kalleberg and Marsden (2012), along with a number of other scholars (Anderson and Pontusson 2006; Fullerton and Wallace 2007; Jacobs and Newman 2008) have found that perceived job security has declined over the last several decades. For instance, based on General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1977–2010, Kalleberg (2012:4) reports “a rising percentage of Americans say that they are insecure in their jobs.” More specifically, his research shows that there is an increasing trend in the percentage of people who say “that they both think it is very or fairly likely that they will lose their current job within the next year and think that it would not be at all easy to find another comparable job” (Kalleberg 2012b:4). Based on this research he concludes, “People in general are increasingly worried about losing their jobs – in large part
because the consequences of job loss have become much more severe in recent years – and less confident about getting comparable new jobs” (Kalleberg 2009:7).

Although Kalleberg and Marsden (2012) and others (Anderson and Pontusson 2006; Fullerton and Wallace 2007; Jacobs and Newman 2008) report an upward trend in perceived job insecurity in recent years, these scholars also have found nuanced differences in perceptions of job security based on a number of worker attributes such as education, income, occupation, age, and union membership. For example, Jacobs and Newman’s (2008) analysis of survey data reveals that education, income, and occupational differences predict varying levels of job insecurity. They explain:

Americans at the bottom of the income distribution are most likely to think that they are vulnerable to employment and financial insecurity…Low income Americans are the most likely to believe they are likely to lose their jobs…As we move up the economic ladder, insecurity over employment and financial well-being diminish steadily. The one area of economic angst that appears to impact all income groups equally is that of finding an equivalent job. (Jacobs and Newman 2008: 78)

In regard to education, Jacobs and Newman (2008:79) found, as one might expect, it is negatively correlated with job insecurity, and that Americans with less than a high school education are most likely to experience significant employment anxiety. They report:

As we travel up the education ladder, employment and financial anxiety steadily diminish. While college educated Americans have always been more secure, on average, than their less-educated peers, they too experience significant levels of anxiety. (Jacobs and Newman 2008:79)

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14 He and Marsden (2012:319) claim that many of the phenomena that increase precarity also increase the negative consequences of losings one’s job (Kalleberg and Marsden 2012:319).

15 Fullerton and Wallace’s (2007:214) analysis of General Social Survey found racial differences in perceived job security (with whites more likely to feel secure than blacks and other races), but found no evidence of a sex differences in perceived job security.
Along with education and income, Jacobs and Newman (2008) found occupational differences in perceptions of job insecurity, with blue-collar workers generally feeling less secure than their white-collar counterparts. They explain:

Given the long, slow erosion of American manufacturing, it is not particularly surprising that “operators and craftsmen” perceive the greatest degree of economic risk. The industries within which they are employed have been hammered by globalization, which shows no signs of abating, and they correctly perceive that these macro conditions have negative consequences for their security. (Jacobs and Newman 2008:80)

Although “workers of greater socioeconomic status (those with higher education, in white-collar occupations, or with greater family income) express less job insecurity,” Kalleberg and Marsden claim that since the 1970s there has been “faster growth in insecurity among more educated workers and/or those in upper-SES occupations” (2012:326-327). Based on their analysis of U.S. workers’ assessments of their own job security from the 1970s to 2006, Kalleberg and Marsden (2012) suggest that job insecurity has been growing more rapidly among white-collar occupations (which had previously been more secure) than among blue-collar occupations (including craftsmen, operators, and laborers). They explain that job insecurity for white-collar workers has always been lower than that of blue-collar workers; however, the growth in job insecurity among white-collar workers has been much more rapid than that of blue-collar workers in recent years (Kalleberg and Marsden 2012:327). They nuance this by explaining:

Blue-collar work has long been precarious, but professional and managerial jobs now experience precarity also. Since those at the top of the labor market have experienced faster recent growth in job and economic precariousness while those at the bottom have long confronted such conditions, we find greater recent growth in job and economic insecurity at the upper socioeconomic levels. (Kalleberg and Marsden 2012: 321)

The so-called “blue-collar workers” in this study would not agree with the statement that their jobs have long been precarious. Prior to being locked out, these workers experienced a number of years, if not decades, and in some cases even generations, of job security.
In short, Kalleberg and Marsden (2012) suggest that over the last few decades, job insecurity has spread to encompass formerly relatively secure occupations within the U.S. labor force.

Age also appears to be related to perceptions of job security. Fullerton and Wallace’s (2007:217) analysis of GSS data reveals “a curvilinear relationship between age and perceptions of job security such that younger and older workers expressed the greatest confidence they would retain their jobs.” In other words, they explain, “workers who were middle-aged, and likely to be in the middle of their careers, expressed the greatest concern about the loss of their jobs” (Fullerton and Wallace 2007:217). Fullerton and Wallace (2007:217) suggest “this is indicative of an emergent feature of the new economy in which middle-aged workers are most vulnerable to economic dislocation as employers opt for younger and cheaper workers.” Moreover, they claim that “mid-career workers are least capable to sustaining bouts of unemployment since they have the most difficulty retooling their skills and finding new employment at comparable wages and benefits” (Fullerton and Wallace 2007:215) Thus, they maintain “that workers in the middle of their careers have the most to lose and thus are the most likely to worry about losing their jobs” (Fullerton and Wallace 2007:215).

Research has revealed mixed results regarding the relationship between union membership and perceptions of job security. For example, Anderson and Pontusson’s (2006) analysis of survey data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), found that union members felt slightly more secure in their current jobs, but more insecurity about alternative employment prospects than unorganized workers. In contrast, Kalleberg and Marsden’s (2012) analysis of GSS data found that union members perceive greater job insecurity than their nonunion member counterparts. Kalleberg and Marsden (2012:333) suggest that their findings “may reflect unions’ weakened ability to exercise collective voice and effectively represent their
members during the last several decades, concessions that unions were forced to make to precarious companies, and unions’ experience with relocations of work sites to unorganized regions of the United States and overseas.”

Although perceptions of job security may vary based on the aforementioned worker attributes, Fullerton and Wallace’s (2007:216) investigation of those attributes and additional sociodemographic and occupational variables found a trend “toward a closing of the gap in perceived job security between workers who were relatively advantaged and those who were disadvantaged.” For instance, they report, “there was a narrowing of the gap in perceived job security between full-time and part-time workers; between higher status white-collar workers and lower status blue-collar workers, between low-income and high-income workers; between the more educated and the less educated; and between blacks and whites” (Fullerton and Wallace 2007:216). Thus, they conclude, “This convergence of workers’ perceptions of job security across several dimensions points to labor market changes in the last several decades that have made the prospects of job loss a more generalized possibility for a broader segment of the labor force” (Fullerton and Wallace 2007:216). This conclusion supports Kalleberg’s (2011:101) argument that the growth in perceived job insecurity appears to be fairly widespread within the labor force, which in turn supports his argument that precarious employment has become more pervasive in the United States in recent decades.

Risk–Shifting from Employer to Employees

An additional indicator of the growth of precarity in the United States, which is related to workers’ insecurity, is the shifting of risks associated with the employment relationship from employers to employees, as employers pursue ways to reduce their labor costs and especially the financial burden of employee benefits (Breen 1997; Jacoby 2001; Hacker 2006; Kalleberg
As Kalleberg (2011: 123) points out, “the United States stands out among the world’s major economies in its distribution of key benefits through employers as part of the employment relationship rather than as a right of citizenship through social legislation.” Perhaps the most prominent of these employer-provided benefits which offer employees security against risk are health insurance and pension plans. These two benefits have come to occupy a central place in workers’ economic compensation packages. In fact, a high proportion of average labor costs, Kalleberg (2011:125) estimates about 37 percent, are nonwage costs including these so-called “fringe benefits.” However, over the past several decades there has been a steady decline in the availability of these employer-provided fringe benefits, while the benefits that remain have increasingly been associated with higher employee costs and risks. According to Hacker (2006:X):

> Private employment-based health plans and pensions have eroded, or have been radically transformed, to shift more and more risk onto workers’ shoulders. Government programs of economic security have been cut, restructured, or simply allowed to grow ever more threadbare. Millions of Americans lack health insurance. Millions more lack guaranteed retirement benefits.

Correspondingly, Kalleberg (2009:8) explains, “Risk-shifting from the employers to the employees is illustrated by the increase in defined contribution pension and health insurance plans (in which employees pay more of the premium and absorb more of the risk than do employers) and the decline in defined benefit plans (in which the employer absorbs more of the risk than the employee by guaranteeing a certain level of benefits).” Indeed, the number of Americans covered by health insurance plans through their employers has declined over the past several decades and for those with employer-sponsored

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17 I will return to the issue of employer-provided health insurance later in this chapter.
health insurance plans, more and more of the cost of those plans has shifted away from employers and onto employees. For instance, most employer-provided health insurance plans today require employees to pay higher premiums, higher deductibles, and higher co-pays. Kalleberg (2011:125) reports:

The share of private-sector workers who received health insurance coverage from their employers fell from 69 percent in 1979 to 55 percent in 2006, a drop of fourteen percentage points. These figures do not take into account the decline in the quality of health insurance coverage during this period, including the rise in the share of health insurance premiums and higher deductibles that employees have been asked to pay as employers increasingly pass onto workers the higher costs of health insurance premiums.

Thus, some employees who are eligible for health insurance plans through their employers are simply unable to obtain them due to higher costs associated with the plans.

Employer-provided pension plans have also declined over the last several decades to the point in which less than half of employed Americans have such plans (Raymo et al. 2011:250). Kalleberg (2011:126) reports, “Pension coverage has declined since the 1970s; in 1979, over half of private sector workers (50.6 percent of workers ages eighteen to sixty-four, who worked at least twenty hours per week and twenty-six weeks per year) received some pension plan coverage from their employers, while in 2006 only 42.8 percent of workers had some employer-provided pension coverage.” Similar to health insurance plans, the employer-provided pension plans that remain have changed. As noted earlier, these plans have moved away from defined benefit plans, in which workers were guaranteed a secure retirement income usually based on seniority and salary with the employer upon retirement, and in which the employer bore the risk of any losses, to defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) accounts, in which employees own the accounts and receive the benefits of investment gains, but also assume the risk of investment losses. Again, Kalleberg (2011:126-127) reports:
In 1980, about 40 percent of these private sector workers [those with pension plan coverage] had defined-benefit plans, in which they were guaranteed a fixed amount of payment based on pre-retirement and years of service, regardless of market conditions. By contrast, less than 10 percent of these workers were in defined-contribution plans in 1980. By 2004, less than 20 percent were in defined-benefit plans, in which employers (and often employees) make contributions, but the post-retirement payouts depend on how well these funds fared in the market. By 2004, a larger proportion of these private sector employees were in defined-contribution plans. These plans reflect deterioration in the quality of pension plans, since they fluctuate with market conditions; in these plans, workers bear more of the risks of market fluctuations than do employers.

Although there has been a steady decline in the availability and quality of employer-provided health insurance and pension plans for most American workers, workers in blue-collar occupations and in so-called “nonstandard work arrangements” have been especially affected by the decline in these fringe benefits (Kalleberg 2011:128). As these benefits have historically been associated with long-term, full-time employment, they typically are unavailable to the growing number of American workers engaged in nonstandard employment arrangements, such as temporary workers. “Estimates suggest that only a quarter of temporaries have access to health plans…but nearly none have pension” (Freeman 1996:187). In fact, some scholars suggest that the fragmenting of the standard employment relationship in recent years and the related growth of nonstandard employment arrangements are the result of employer efforts to reduce their benefit burden and shift their risks to employees (Freedman 1996; Breen 1997; Kalleberg 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012; Arnold and Bongiovi 2012; Kalleberg and Marsden 2012).18

18 Kalleberg further argues that “labor laws designed to protect permanent employees also fueled the growth in nonstandard work by encouraging employers to avoid the mandates and costs associated with these laws” (2000:342).
Nonstandard Work Arrangements & the Temporary Staffing Industry (TSI)

This brings us to the final indicator of the rise of precarious work in the United States in recent decades, according to Kalleberg (2009), which is the growth of so-called “nonstandard employment arrangements” and/or “contingent work.” Kojima (2015:355) explains:

Recent decades have seen a dramatic rise in nonstandard employment relations characterized by job insecurity, low pay, and limited benefits. A good illustration of nonstandard employment with such “bad job” characteristics is temporary work, defined by its triangular employment relationship in which the temporary agency is the *de jure* employer while the worker is dispatched to work under the direction and supervision of the client company.

Those who work under these nonstandard work arrangements, Kalleberg (2009:8) explains “are often called ‘contingent’ workers because their employment is contingent upon an employer’s needs.” The term “contingent work” was first applied to employment relationships at a conference on employment security in 1985 by economist Audrey Freeman. She explains that “it was intended to describe ways in which firms could staff their activities to fit their current needs of business” (Freeman 1996:177). Or in Kalleberg’s words, “it was used to refer to work arrangements that were conditional on employers’ needs for labor and thus lacked an attachment between employer and worker” (2000:354). The term quickly “came to be applied to a wide range of employment practices including part-time work, temporary help service employment, employee leasing, self-employment, contracting out, employment in the business services sector, and home-based work” (Polivka 1996:3). However, Polivka (1996:4) reports that in order “to return the focus to the transitory nature of the employment relationship and to identify common underlining characteristics with which to classify workers, the BLS [Bureau of Labor Statistics] in 1989 developed the following conceptual definition of contingent work: *Contingent work is any job in which an individual does not have an explicit or implicit contract for long-term...*
employment.” More recently, scholars have advanced more detailed characterizations of contingent work, such as Pedulla (2013:693), who suggests:

Contingent employment is distinguished from standard employment by two key characteristics. Contingent work implies that the employment relationship is conditional on some other factor, such as time, and it indicates a lack of attachment between the worker and employer, such as the employee being paid by a separate agency than where he or she works.

In order to fully grasp the growth and pervasiveness of nonstandard employment arrangements in the United States in recent decades, it is helpful to first understand the so-called “standard employment relationship.” As described by Kalleberg and Marsden (2005:391) the “ideal typical ‘standard’ employment relationship” is one “in which work is done full-time for a particular employer, which directs the worker’s activities and makes an implicit promise that employment will continue into the future with open-ended duration.” Vosko (2006:6-7) adds that the standard employment relationships:

…was organized around a particular employment status (i.e., employee status), a particular form of employment (i.e., full-time permanent wage work) and a particular set of work arrangements (i.e., work at a worksite specified by the employer and under his or her direct supervision). It was designed to cushion workers from unemployment, to “incorporate a degree of durability and regularity in employment relationships,” and to enable workers to reproduce themselves and their families via a social wage or a bundle of social benefits and entitlements beyond earnings that shapes the overall standard of living of workers and their households.

Standard employment relationships were the norm in the United States, and many other industrial nations, for much of the twentieth century and were the basis of the framework within which labor law, collective bargaining, and social security systems were developed (Kalleberg 2000:342). Thus, the term “nonstandard employment arrangements” has become somewhat of

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19 Vosko (2006:7) also documents that policies such as unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation and employer-sponsor benefits such as health insurance and pension plans were constructed around this so-called “standard employment relationship.”
a blanket term covering forms of employment relationships and work arrangements that deviate from the prototypical standard employment relationship. Typically, the term refers to part-time work, temporary help agency and contract company employment, short-term and contingent work, and independent contracting (Kalleberg 2000). However, I will confine this discussion primarily to temporary help agency employment given that it is the form of nonstandard employment arrangement most directly related to this case study.

Basically, temporary help agency employment allows companies to “externalize” many of the responsibilities and costs of their workforce by creating so-called “detached workers” or “triangular employment relationships” between workers and their legal (de jure) and actual (de facto) employers. As Kalleberg (2000:346) explains:

Temporary help agencies employ workers and send them out to customers to work on an hourly basis at the client’s premises and direction. These agencies recruit and screen employees, sometimes provide training, and are responsible for hiring and firing, issuing paychecks, withholding payroll taxes, and making required employer contributions to unemployment insurance and Social Security.

Likewise, Peck and Theodore (2006:173) describe:

The temporary employment relationship is “mediated.” Standing between employer and the employee, staffing agencies have assumed important, “third party” roles in screening, recruitment, placement, and reassignment; in job design; in supervision and labour control; and in the structuring of remuneration and incentive systems.

Further, according to Peck and Theodore (2006), is that these temporary staffing agencies shield companies from regulatory costs, such as exposure to unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation claims, while also decoupling workers from workplace benefits, such as health insurance and pension benefits. They argue:

Working with temporary staffing agencies, companies are able to capture the benefits of de facto employment…while shedding many of the costs, risks and longer-term responsibilities that accompany de jure employer status, all courtesy of the agencies’ employer-of-record designation…Not only can temporary
employment be used as a part of a wider strategy of holding down wages and evading “social costs” such as health benefits, pension entitlements, sick pay, and vacation allowances, it also has assumed a major role in reducing employers’ exposure to obligations associated with workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance. (Peck and Theodore 2006:183)


…employment in the U.S. temp industry nearly tripled, accounting for about 10 percent of the nation’s employment growth. The number of people employed as temps on a daily basis also tripled, from less than one million workers a day at the start of the decade to nearly three million by 2000. Industry sales increased even more, quadrupling from $15.6 billion in 1990 to $64.3 billion in 1999.

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20 Sociologist Erin Hatton documents the evolution and expansion of the U.S. temporary staffing industry from the founding of Kelly Girl Service in 1946, widely considered a pioneer in the industry, to so-called “permatemps” in the twenty-first century in her recent book: The Temp Economy: From Kelly Girl to Permatemps in Postwar American.
By the early twenty-first century, Hatton (2011:1) explains, “the U.S. temp industry had become
a behemoth, sending out some three million temps a day and reaching an astonishing 90 percent
of employers each year.” Thus, over the course of just a few decades, Peck and Theodore
(2006:171) report:

…the TSI [temporary staffing industry] has moved from the role of stopgap-staffing
provider, supplying short-term cover for eventualities such as maternity leaves and
seasonal spikes in demand, to a more systematic and continuous function,
mediating between companies’ personnel offices and their preferred labour
supplies across an increasingly broad array of industries and occupations.

Moreover, they describe how “the TSI has evolved from a small-scale service provider, located
in a handful of large industrial and major administrative centres, to a near-ubiquitous and
diversified business sector, offering a variegated package of services in competitive markets
across the country (Peck and Theodore 2006:182). This makes it not only one of the fastest
growing industries in the United States, but also makes “the US the largest temp market in the
world” (Peck and Theodore 2006:186).

The largest share of temporary staffing industry growth in the United States in recent
years has come from manufacturing (Peck and Theodore 2006; Smith and McKenna 2014;
Pofeldt 2015). Citing a recent report by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO), Pofeldt
(2015) reports that the percentage of temporary staffing agency jobs in manufacturing jumped
from 27.8% in 1990 to 41.2% in 2009. In fact, Peck and Theodore (2006:188) explain, “it was
estimated that one-third of the temp placements in the 1990s were in factories, which if added to
manufacturing payrolls would largely cancel out – at least in quantitative terms – aggregate job
losses in the sector during the decade.” Jaffe (2014) reports similar findings:

A 2010 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) found that “while manufacturing’s share of total national employment fell from 16.2 percent in 1990
to 9.8 percent in 2008, manufacturing’s use of temporary workers greatly intensified.” Because the BLS categorizes temp work as service employees
regardless of the kind of work they do, the agency has no good data on how many of those “lost” manufacturing jobs simply migrated over to staffing agencies. But according to a 2004 report from the Council of Economic Advisers, a third of all temp service employees work in the manufacturing sector. “If the official manufacturing employment statistics are adjusted by this amount,” the author’s found, “the decline in the level of manufacturing employment in the 1990s is eliminated.” In other workers, a good number of jobs were simply outsourced right at home, offloaded from company payrolls onto staffing agencies.21

The growth in the U.S. temporary staffing industry has generally been driven by employers’ needs (Kalleberg 2000, 2001, 2006; Kalleberg and Marsden 2005; Peck and Theodore 2006). As previously suggested, this industry provides employers greater flexibility in the labor market and enables them to externalize a number of costs and risks associated with employment relationships. In fact, Kalleberg (2000:347) argues that “temporary help agencies constitute a modern-day ‘reserve labor army’ that helps employers to solve problems associated with understaffing as well as overstaffing positions with expensive full-time, permanent workers who may not be utilized.” Moreover, he suggests that the use of these agencies is increasingly becoming an integral feature of employers’ human resource strategy, stating:

…temporary help agencies are increasingly entering into long-term contracts with firms, suggesting that the use of temporary workers has become a permanent strategy for them. In many cases, the temporary help agency is really an extension of their client firm’s human resources department. (Kalleberg 2000:347)

Along a same line, Peck and Theodore (2006:184) suggest that the explosive growth of the TSI in recent years is the result of employers’ demand for new forms of workplace flexibility and the industry’s ability to meet such demand. They state:

It is important to recognize that the TSI has not simply been a passive beneficiary of broader trends in the US labor market, such as the shift towards contingent work, the erosion of employment protections and benefit coverage, and the restructuring

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21 Vosko (2006:46) refers to this trend – the supplanting of manufacturing jobs characterized by standard employment relationships by temporary or precarious employment relationships – as the “downgrading of manufacturing jobs.” Others, such as Smith and McKenna (2014), refer to practice as “domestic outsourcing.”
of internal labor markets. Rather, the TSI has been an active agent in these changing labour-market circumstances. (Peck and Theodore 2006:181-2)

These scholars clearly implicate the TSI and its agencies in generating precarious employment. As their following statement demonstrates: “While the TSI likes to portray itself as a partner in the process of workforce management, in reality most agencies are engaged in the dirty work of labour market restructuring – suppressing wages, eroding job security, and undermining social benefits” (Peck and Theodore 2006:189).

Temporary help agencies also have been, and continue to be, utilized by employers as a powerful weapon against labor unions (LeRoy 1996; Gonos 1997; Kalleberg, Reskin and Hodson 2000; Kalleberg 2001; Chaison 2006; Elcioglu 2010; Hatton 2011; Jaffe 2014). In fact, the decline is union membership and density in the United States within the last few decades is often attributed to the growth of the temporary help industry (Kalleberg 2001:202). The fact that employers can, and often do, recruit temporary workers to replace – either temporarily or permanently – their employees during labor disputes, undoubtedly contributes to the declining bargaining position of not just those employees directly involved in the dispute but also the bargaining position of unions in general.

There is a long history in the United States of hiring “replacements” for striking workers. However, the temporary help industry, for the most part, was uninvolved in this practice until the mid-1980s; however, since then, it has become increasingly involved in the practice (Hatton 2011). As Hatton (2011:97) explains:

Temp agencies originally played only a minor role in this development [the practice of hiring replacements for striking workers]. Until the mid-1980s, industry leaders had explicitly banned agencies from supplying temporary workers to break strikes; in fact, this had been a provision of the industry’s code of ethics since the 1960s. Although there was ample evidence that the restriction was not always enforced, temp industry executives at least outwardly maintained their respect for picket lines.
This changed though in the mid-1980s when the Federal Trade Commission filed a formal complaint against the industry for its ban on supplying “striker replacements” claiming it was “as illegal restraint of trade” (Hatton 2011:97). As a result, the industry amended its code of ethics to no longer restrict agencies from providing temporary workers to companies involved in labor disputes. Hereafter, companies began to utilize temporary help agencies more aggressively. Throughout the mid- to late-1980s temporary workers were used by companies not just to put pressure on their striking and locked out workers in order to prevail in labor disputes, but also to undermine union organizing campaigns. According to Hatton (2011:99) by the end of the 1980s, these practices had become widespread and temp agencies even began “specializing in strikebreakers.” For example, Hatton (2011:99) describes, “In 1989, Danial Mordecai founded U.S. Corp., a temp agency dedicated to providing temps to hospitals whose employees were on strike.” As a consequence of employers’ increased use of striker replacements, strikes became a less effective collective bargaining strategy for labor unions. In fact, Hatton (2011:99) claims, “because of the ready availability of temps, strikes could even be a boon to employers.” She explains, “…employers no longer needed to make concessions in negotiations with unions. Instead, they could simply let workers go on strike and then hire temps” (Hatton 2011:100). More recently, the temporary staffing industry has launched temp agencies specifically to provide replacement workers to companies anticipating, or engaged in, labor disputes. The industry refers to these provisions as “strike services,” “labor unrest contingency services,” “replacement personnel services,” and so on.22

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22 A quick reach of the internet reveals a number of temp agencies that specialize in providing replacement workers for companies anticipating, or engaged in, labor disputes. For instance, Huffmaster’s website states:

When a work stoppage occurs, locating and managing the skilled and unskilled replacement workers needed to keep your business operational can serve as a
Strikes, however, differ from lockouts with regard to temp agencies and their replacement workers. Employers’ rights, specifically concerning their use of replacement workers, are more limited in the case of lockouts than strikes. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and based on decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (both to be discussed in more detail later in this chapter), an employer may hire permanent replacements for strikers, but may only hire “temporary” replacements during a lockout (LeRoy 1996:999). In other words, based on federal labor law, the NLRB has ruled that it is illegal for employers to permanently replace their locked out workers. However, as you will see in the upcoming chapters, employers have found novel ways around this legislation and have even found ways to use it to their advantage.

An important 1986 ruling by the NLRB in the case of Harter Equipment Inc. (a New Jersey firm that was in the business of repairing farm machines) and the International Union of Operating Engineers (Local 825), has significantly contributed to the use of temporary workers during lockouts. In short, the Harter Equipment Inc. decision allows employers to legally lockout workers and hire temporary replacement workers. LeRoy (1996) refers to this practice as a “replacement lockout.” Recounting the case and its influence on collective bargaining, LeRoy (1996:1013) explains that in December 1981, during contract negotiations, “the company locked out employees ‘to put pressure on the union to agree’ to its terms.” Nearly five years later, the Board (NLRB) ruled that the company did not commit any unfair labor practices by locking out its employees and hiring temporary replacements. The Board’s majority stated that “the use of daunting challenge. Huffmaster’s Alternative Workforce division can help with complete strike staffing services, which encompasses everything from developing your operational plan before a stoppage occurs to transportation, training, supervision and administration of replacement workers. Alternative Workforce, Inc. works directly with our clients to ensure you have everything you need to plan, prepare and respond to crisis and strike staffing situations. (Huffmaster 2006)
temporary employees reasonably serves precisely the same purpose served by the lockout, i.e., bringing economic pressure to bear in support of a legitimate bargaining position” (LeRoy 1996:1013). Alternatively stated by Warren (1986), “the NLRB concluded that ‘using temporary employees after a lawful lockout in order to bring economic pressure to bear in support of legitimate bargaining demands is a measure reasonably adapted to the achievement of legitimate employer interest and has only a comparatively slight adverse effect on protected employee rights’. In short, the Board ruled that the use of temporary replacements during lockouts was a “legitimate employer weapon” (LeRoy 1996:1013). According to LeRoy’s (1996) review of the case, shortly after this ruling, “the company supported efforts by its replacement workers to decertify the union” (1996:1014). Although the Board rejected the decertification petition, finding the temporary replacement workers ineligible to vote, LeRoy (1996:1038-1039) concludes that this case demonstrates that “replacement lockouts” are a tool to break unions. He cites Robert Willis, President of the American Federation of Grain Millers, stating, “What this means is…that an employer can demand any concessions he wants, then lock out his workers and replace them” (LeRoy 1996:1017). What is more is that in these situations temporary replacement workers are not legally defined as “employees” at the firm in which they are working and as a result are disqualified from joining the firm’s existing union. Moreover, they cannot organize a new collective bargaining unit (i.e., union) at the firm because technically there is already an established union and collective bargaining agreement in place at the firm in which where they are working. Hence, there is no threat of temporary replacement workers unionizing. As will become apparent in the upcoming chapters, this case study suggests that manufacturing workers who are covered by collective bargaining agreements may increasingly
be at risk of their employers using “replacement lockouts” as a tool to replace them with more precarious employees.

In the aftermath of the *Harter Equipment Inc.* decision – that an employer who locks out employees after an impasse in collective bargaining can legally hire “temporary replacements” for the locked out employees – the number of so-called “replacement lockouts” has steadily risen (LeRoy 1996). In 1996, LeRoy (1996:1034) predicted that the use of replacement lockouts was likely to continue to rise “simply because the market for replacement workers is growing so rapidly.” Indeed, the number of lockouts has continued to climb over the last couple of decades (Chaison 2006; Eidelson 2012; Greenhouse 2012; Hogler 2015). For instance, Eidelson (2012) reports that lockouts represent a growing percentage of the country’s work stoppages, up from 4.4 percent in 1990 to 11.3 percent in 2011; and that employers were much more likely to lockout workers in 2011 than in any other year in the previous two decades. However, measuring the number, and increase use, of lockouts more precisely is hindered by the fact that the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does not differentiate between strikes and lockouts in their data collection of work stoppages or record data of those work stoppages involving less than 1000 workers.23

In sum, the temp industry alters the dynamics between “employers” and “employees.” Primarily, it poses a powerful weapon which employers can use against labor unions and their members and even those workers who are attempting to unionize. By facilitating employers’

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23 The U.S. government does not collect data on lockouts specifically. The U.S. BLS does provide data and analysis of major work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers, but it does not distinguish between strikes and lockouts in the data (both are included in the term "work stoppages"). And as LeRoy (1996:1017) testifies, “no statistical analysis of lockouts appears to exist.”
ability to replace their unionized workers during labor disputes – both strikes and lockouts – or non-union workers who are attempting to unionize, the temp industry plays a role in shifting the balance of power even more in favor of employers and away from workers and their unions. For instance, if temporary agency workers attempt to form unionize, Kalleberg (2000:349) explains, the NLRA does not prohibit *de facto* employers from terminating their contract with temporary help agency employees in response to their efforts.” Thus, he argues the right to bargain collectively protected by the NLRA, and enforced by the NLRB, “is meaningless for workers whose *de jure* employer is not their *de facto* employer” (Kalleberg et al. 2000:262). In other words, workers who are employed through temporary help agencies are effectively excluded from union representation (Kalleberg et al. 2000:262).

Lastly, while the proportion of temporary workers may remain a relatively small proportion of the overall U.S. labor force, less than 3% according Hatton (2011:2), Kalleberg argues that “the institutionalization of the temporary-help industry increases precarity because it makes us all potentially replaceable” (2009:8).

Precarity is the vehicle for understanding the GPC/UFCW labor dispute and locked out workers’ experiences. Therefore, in what follows, this study will explore the nature of contemporary employment precarity in the United States based on former GPC workers’ experience of and response to being locked out of work. In doing so; however, this study raises some serious questions about precarity, or perhaps about the failure of precarity literature and research to capture the entirety of what is going on in labor’s struggle with capital today. In other

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24 A recent (August 2015) ruling by the NLRB, the *Browning-Ferris Industries* decision, redefined the employee-employer relationship by expanded the definition of “joint employer” under the NLRA and thus granting new bargaining power to workers employed through temporary staffing agencies.
words, after exploring this particular lockout through the lens of precarity and these workers’
responses to being rendered precarious, it will be evident that the discussion regarding the
changing nature of employment relations and the rise of precarious employment in the United
States needs to be expanded to include not only the novel ways in which employers are
generating precarity but also workers’ actions and agency when confronted with precarity.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS

The GPC/UFCW lockout provides a unique opportunity to study previously unexplored and underexplored aspects of contemporary precarious employment. Using the lockout as a case study, this dissertation illustrates not only how lockouts are implicated in the generation of precarious employment, but also workers’ actions when confronting precarity. It is, to my knowledge, the first empirical study to expressly examine the relationship between lockouts and precarious employment. And unlike most research on the growth of precarious employment in the United States, which has focused on employers’ actions and largely neglected workers’ actions and agency, this study emphasizes both employers’ and workers’ actions. While much of the discussion of precarious employment has assumed workers to be passive victims of

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25 Definitions of a “case study” abound. For instance, Yin (2003:13) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Whereas, Schramm (1971:6) suggests “the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of a case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.” My utilization of a case study in this dissertation is in line with Creswell’s view of a case study as “methodology or a comprehensive research strategy” (2007:73). As he explains, “Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (case)...over time, through detailed, in-depth collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes” (Creswell 2007:73).

26 Kalleberg (2009:13) argues that we “need to understand better the forms and mechanisms of worker agency, which generally receive less attention than studies of social structure.” He readily admits, “Worker’s actions did not play a major role in my story of the growth of precarious work in the United States in recent years. I emphasized primarily employers’ actions in response to macroeconomic pressures produced by globalization, price competition, and technological changes” (Kalleberg 2009:13).
structural change, this study hopes to “bring workers back in” to the analysis and discussion of the changing nature of employment relations in America. Thus, it delves into Randy Hodson’s claim that: “Workers are not passive victims of social structure. They are active agents in their own lives” (2001:50). Examining precarious employment from the vantage point of the locked out workers who have first-hand experience with employer generated precarity forces us to consider the interplay between structure and agency and to give greater consideration to the factors that influence workers’ agency.27

I chose this particular lockout as a case study not only because it provides an opportunity to investigate novel characteristics of contemporary precarious employment, but also because it occurred in my hometown and I have family and friends among the locked out workers. I was born and raised in Muscatine but moved out of the community in 1994 at the age of 21. Although I left the community, I have remained tied to it by virtue of my family. My parents and two siblings and their families reside in Muscatine. What is more, my siblings were among the 360 locked out workers. It is quite likely that I would have also been among the locked out workers had I been born male. I say this because it was common for males of working-class background, such as my own, who are from Muscatine or its surrounding rural communities to go to work for GPC, especially if they had fathers and/or grandfathers who had worked for the company. My brothers represent the second generation of GPC workers in my family. My father retired from GPC after 37 years of employment with the company and just three years short of the lockout. Over nearly four decades with the company, he worked his way up the company’s internal job ladder from “an operator” to “a department superintendent.” Had he still been employed at the

27 Kalleberg (1989:591) suggest that the agenda within the sociology of work should be “the linking of macro and micro levels of analysis, the relating of work structures and context to the biographies and experiences of individual workers.” This case study aims to do just that.
time of the lockout, he would not have been among those locked out because he would not have been a member of the bargaining unit. In addition to my family, I have a number of childhood and high school friends who were affected in one way or another by the lockout. Thus, my personal interest played a part in selecting this lockout as an illustrative case study of contemporary precarious employment.\textsuperscript{28}

My interest in the GPC/UFCW lockout and conducting this study stemmed from conversations with family members and friends during my frequent visits to Muscatine. Although I heard about the lockout within hours of it beginning and was genuinely concerned about the affects it was having on workers, their families, and the community, it was not until a number of years into the labor dispute that I decided to conduct this study.\textsuperscript{29} The fact that the lockout dragged on for so long and was the longest lockout in U.S. history was interesting and research-worthy in and of itself.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, as the lockout exceeded five years, and with no end in sight, I felt as though there were a number of important questions that seemed worth investigating, such as: what motivated the company to lockout its long time workers? How was the company able to maintain operations with “temporary workers” for so long? What happened

\textsuperscript{28} As the research “instrument” for this study, it is important that I situate myself within the study. In other words, it is necessary that I make my personal position and interest with regard to the case know rather than invisible. As feminist scholar Gillian Rose (1997:309) argues, “The relationship between the researcher and the researched should be made visible.”

\textsuperscript{29} Since I had worked with the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) and was somewhat familiar with labor laws and collective bargaining, as soon as one of my brothers heard he was lockout out, he called me with legal questions.

\textsuperscript{30} Richard Leonard and Zack Nauth, as well as Neil Maher, report the German-based BASF chemical company’s lockout of Local 4-620 of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers’ International Union (OCAW) in Ascension Parish, Louisiana as representing the longest lockout in U.S. history. This lockout lasted approximately five and one half years, beginning in June 1984 and ending in December of 1989. As of March 2014, the GPC lockout surpassed the BASF-OCAW lockout in duration.
to the union? And perhaps most importantly, what happened to the locked out workers? As I considered my brothers’ post-lockout experiences, I wondered how they compared to those of other locked out workers. Also, as my parent’s relayed stories to me about locked out workers in their neighborhood “moving on” and starting their own businesses, I began to contemplate the degree to which the dire expectations regarding these workers back in 2008 – when they were first locked out and while the nation was experiencing a recession – actually resembled their experiences some five years later. These were some of the various questions that initially motivated this study.

**Gaining Entrée**

Nearly five and a half years into the lockout, I “returned” to my hometown of Muscatine to begin this study. My ties to the community helped me gain entrée to the research setting and secure access to, and acceptance by, those individuals who participated in the study. Frankly, I believe it would have been difficult to recruit participants into this study if they would not have recognized my last name or allowed me to explain who I was and why I was personally interested in the lockout. Mostly, my personal ties to the community and the lockout earned me

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31 For example, a locked out worker who lived directly next door to my parents and another locked out worker started their own moving business, River City Moving and Delivery, about 18 months after GPC locked them out (Potter 2010).

32 Prior to returning to Muscatine, I talked to my family and friends living in the area about the prospects and possible implications of this study. After talking to them and gaining their endorsement, I began planning the study.

33 I graduated high school with a number of the lockout workers. And although I had not been in contact with these individuals for nearly twenty years, once they remembered who I was, largely based on my last name, and I explained to them why I was interested in interviewing them, they usually seemed eager to take part in the study. In addition, the locked out workers that I contacted who did not recognize me personally, often knew one or both of my brothers or my father based on their employment at GPC and that seemed to encourage their participation and earn me their trust.
credibility and trustworthiness with these participants which I might not have otherwise had and which are essential to effective qualitative research. Their interviews comprise the vast majority of data for this study, which I will return to later in this chapter.

**Sampling**

As is usually necessary in qualitative case studies, this study required two levels of sampling. Merriam and Tisdell (2016:99) explain this sampling procedure as follows, “First you select ‘the case’ to be studied. Then, unless you plan to interview, observe, or analyze all of people, activities, or documents within the case, you will need to do some sampling within the case.” The latter is frequently referred to as “embedded sampling” (Yin 2003). I utilized “purposive sampling” for both levels of sampling in this study. As Creswell (2007:125) explains, this means that the research selects cases and individuals “for study because they can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study.” Moreover, Patton (2015:53) argues, “the logic and power of qualitative purposive sampling derives from the emphasis on in-depth understanding of specific cases: information-rich cases. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry, thus the term purposeful sampling.” I previously described the reasons why I purposively selected the GPC/UFCW lockout as “the case” to be studied. Within this case, I also used purposive sampling, following Rubin and Rubin’s (1995:66) suggested guidelines for selecting participants, in which they should be:

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34 Yin (2003:43) would refer to the design of this study as “an embedded, single-case design.”

35 Additionally, Merriam and Tisdell (2016:96) claim, “Purposive sampling is based on the assumption that the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most can been learned.”
knowledgeable about the situation or experience being studied; 2) willing to talk; and 3) representative of a range of points of view.

The specific type of purposeful sampling I utilized for selecting embedded cases was “snowball sampling.”\(^{36}\) This sampling strategy basically involves locating a few knowledgeable individuals who are willing to participate in the study and asking these individuals to refer you to additional prospective participants and then relying on these participants to identify more individuals who might be willing to participate in the study, and so on. Thus, the study’s sample “snowballs” in size. Patton (1990:182) explains that the strategy involves identifying participants or cases of interest from “people who know people who know people who know what cases are information-rich, that is, good examples for your study, good interview subjects.” “By asking a number of people who else to talk with, the snowball gets bigger and bigger as you accumulate new information-rich cases” (Patton 2015:298).

It was not practical or even possible to include all of the individuals involved in the lockout in this study.\(^{37}\) Because my primary interest was the outcome of the lockout for the

\(^{36}\) Snowball sampling is the most common form of purposive sampling, according to Merriam and Tisdell (2016).

\(^{37}\) I did not seek out the company’s participation in this study for several reasons. First, workers (the assumed “casualties” of growth in precarious employment relations) were the focus of this study. Second, I felt the potential benefits of including company representatives in my sample did not outweigh the potential risks of their inclusion. For instance, it would have been difficult for these individuals to remain anonymous in this study. Also, as I have explained, members of my immediate family are tied to the company in various ways. For example, my father worked for the company for nearly forty years and his retirement and health care benefits are directly tied to the company. Thus, I did not directly invite company representatives to participate in this study in an effort to minimize the potential risks associated with their participation, especially for my family members. I did, however, indirectly extend an invitation to participate in this study to GPC representatives as a result of an encounter between a personal acquaintance of mine and a company representative. In short, a personal acquaintance of mine told me she was cornered and interrogated by a GPC representative at a private community event regarding her relationship to me and my investigation into the lockout. I told this acquaintance that she was welcome to share
workers involved, they became the focus of this study. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, most of the research on precarious employment has tended to focus on employers’ actions while largely neglecting workers’ actions and experiences. By focusing first and foremost on workers’ experiences and perspectives this study aimed at reducing this disparity in research and literature on precarious employment. Moreover, by focusing on workers, this study does not disregard employers’ actions, rather it investigates them from the vantage point of the workers most affected by them. In other words, in addition to gaining a better understanding of the lockout and its aftermath from the workers’ perspectives, we also gain an understanding of the company’s actions pre- and post-lockout from the workers’ perspective. The company’s position regarding its actions before and following the lockout can be gathered, for the most part, from its public statements. And, as evident from the previous chapter, it is easy to deduce the company’s perspective given that its actions are analogous to a general trend in the U.S. labor market of employers’ finding novel ways to externalize the costs and risks associated with the standard employment relationship.

Along with the aforementioned reasons for using a purposive sampling strategy, I was unable to obtain or construct a sampling frame of the lockout workers so probability or random sampling was not an option for this study.\(^{38}\) To my knowledge the company alone has a complete list of the locked out workers; however, it has never made this list public. While the local union

\(^{38}\) A *sampling frame* is simply a list of cases in the *population* (or a list that closely approximates all of the cases in the *population*) (Neuman 2012:400).
may have had a list of their locked out members, it is unlikely that locked out non-union members of the bargaining unit would have been on this list.\footnote{This is based on information I received from a former UFCW Local 86D executive board member. With the help of this individual, other former executive board members, additional locked out workers, and local newspaper reports that included locked out workers’ names, I was ultimately able to construct a list of 225 locked out workers. Nearly half this list was comprised of individuals who retired from GPC at some point during the lockout.}

Prior to arriving in Muscatine in January 2014, I sent an email to the address listed on the UFCW Local 86D’s website addressed to the local union president and the other executive board members explaining this study and requesting their participation. I never received a response to this request. However, I was able to obtain a list of names of the union’s executive board members from the website and once I arrived in Muscatine I searched the local phonebook for telephone numbers for these individuals. Not all of their numbers were listed, but for those whose numbers were, I attempted to call and leave messages. Whether with whomever answered the phone or via voice mail, I left messages explaining who I was and why I was calling – which included a brief description of the study and a request for their participation – and asked that they return my call.\footnote{The messages I left generally followed the “verbal recruitment” script which can be found in Appendix A.} I never received a returned call or reply to my request.\footnote{It was later disclosed to me during an interview with one of the union’s executive board members that my email sent to the local’s website was in fact received and that the executive board members were instructed not to respond to my invitation to participate in the study. This interviewee did not divulge to me who specifically instructed them not to respond to me or the reasoning behind this instruction.} Consequently, I decided to try a more direct approach. Unfortunately, I could not simply visit the local’s union hall because it had been vacated over the course of the lockout. However, soon after I arrived in Muscatine, I learned the local union held meetings the first Thursday of each month at The
American Legion Post 27 in Muscatine. So I decided to show up at a meeting. I arrived about ten minutes before the meeting was scheduled to begin and introduced myself to a guy holding a three-ring binder with what appeared to be a UFCW sticker on the front. Once he confirmed that he was in fact a member of the local’s executive board and the one in charge of overseeing the meeting, I briefly described to him my purpose for being there which was to recruit locked out union officials and members to participate in this study. He indicated that it was okay for me to stay for the meeting and try to recruit those in attendance into the study. Just four individuals, including the aforementioned executive board member, ended up attending the meeting. I introduced myself to each one of them, provided them with a description of the study and my contact information, and encouraged them to participate in the study. In addition, I asked the executive board member if he would pass along my invitation to participate in the study and contact information to the local union’s president and other executive board members and any other union members he thought might be interested in participating.42

I did not want to squander my limited time in Muscatine while waiting to hear back from the local union’s executive board members and general members, so I began contacting my personal acquaintances who either I knew were among the locked out workers or I thought might be able to help me locate locked out workers in an effort to recruit them to participate in this study.43 Initial contacts with locked out workers were mostly made based on these personal

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42 I tried this same strategy a few months later as well. The second time around, only one individual showed up for the meeting. This individual was once again an executive board member of the local union who was in charge of managing the meeting. I took the same approach with this individual as I did with the other executive board member a few months earlier.

43 To some extent I also sought public gatherings to reach out to workers and recruit them into this study. When I arrived in Muscatine in January 2014 it was the dead of winter and more or less the only public gathering place in which I was able to “run into” locked out workers was at
acquaintances, though a coincidental encounter at a local store led to my first few interviews with locked out workers. In short, I unexpectedly ran into a former co-worker of mine from twenty-some years earlier while shopping and she asked me what I was doing back in Muscatine. As I explained to her I was in town doing fieldwork for this study, she told me her husband was among the locked out workers and would be willing to be interviewed. She also gave me the names and phone numbers of a few additional workers. I told her I would try to get ahold of them as soon as possible. In the meantime, I suggested it might be a good idea for her to contact them and give them a “heads-up” that she gave me their numbers and that I would be calling them soon. I also gave her my contact information and asked her to share it with other locked out workers she thought might possibly be willing to participate in the study. Within less than a couple of hours of running into her I received a phone call from one of the workers she contacted on my behalf and scheduled my first interview.  

These initial contacts provided me with contact information for additional locked out workers, who in turn provided me contact information for even more workers. Thus, relying on snowball sampling techniques, I eventually contacted over 100 of the 360 locked out workers the local bowling alley. However, as the weather began to warm and the spring months brought families to local ballparks, I attended my nephews’ baseball games at these parks in an effort to interact with locked out workers and enlist them in this study.  

I provide this lengthy description of how I went about recruiting research participants, or generating a sample, in order to demonstrate my attempts to achieve maximum variation in the sample, and in turn minimize the likelihood of sample selection error and bias associated with purposeful and snowball sampling (Merriam and Tisdell 2016). As Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland (2006:93) explain, a “strategy for reducing the prospects of error and bias…is to select informants who are themselves positioned differently within the group or setting studied, who therefore provide access to different kinds of information.” I tried to maximize the variation of locked out workers in my sample by not simply relying on my personal acquaintances for initial contact with these workers but also reaching out to the local union and others in the community to help me recruit participants into the study.
between January 2014 and July 2014 and invited them to participate in the study. Most of the workers I contacted were enthusiastic about the study and their participation. As a result, I ended up enlisting 62 workers in the study. The majority of the 38 additional workers I contacted and invited to participate simply did not respond to the repeated calls I made to their phone numbers, which were provided by interviewees. Each time I called these individuals I left a message that generally followed a recruitment script and asked them to call me back if they were interested in participating in the study. After leaving these individuals at least three messages over a six to eight week period, I assumed they were not interested in participating and I stopped calling them. A handful of these 38 individuals, however, did return my phone calls and indicated that they were interested in participating, but did not follow-through in scheduling an interview. The following scenario, based on my fieldnotes, demonstrates my typical interactions with these individuals:

I called Jason at 3:30pm on February 12, 2014. He did not answer his cell phone number, so I left him a message. February 28, 2014, I interviewed another worker who referred Jason, so I tried calling Jason again a few hours after the interview at 6:30pm. Once again, no answer. I left another message. May 23, 2014, Jason returned my phone call and we tentatively scheduled an interview for May 27, 2014 at 7pm. He is going to call me a couple hours before the scheduled interview to let me know for sure if he can make it. Jason called and cancelled the interview at 5pm on May 27th because he was “stuck at work.” He told me that he would give me a call when his schedule “opened up.” June 9, 2014, I called Jason at 6pm and left him a message explaining that I would only be in Muscatine for another month or so and that I would really like to interview him before I left town. June 28, 2014, I called and left another message on Jason’s voicemail. Just five of individuals I contacted outright declined to participate. Four of these five indicated that the reason they did not want to participate was because they had family members

45 See Appendix A for this “verbal recruitment” script.

46 The name Jason is a pseudonym, which I used to protect the identity of the interviewee. There were actually no individuals in this study by the name of Jason, which is why I chose to use this name over others.
who were still employed by GPC. Even when I assured them that their participation would be confidential and anonymous, they still declined. The other individual who declined to participate stated, “I’d rather not. I’d just as soon forget about it [the lockout]” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 2014).

Throughout this processes I endeavored to obtain a sample as representative as possible based on what I knew about the 360 lockout workers, which mostly came from interviewees’ accounts of their fellow locked out workers. I made an effort to include men and women, younger and older workers, retired workers, union members, and workers who did not belong to the union. Nevertheless, which locked out workers were and were not included in this study was ultimately based on whether I was able to locate them via snowball sampling and whether they decided to participate.

**Demographic Information**

The vast majority of workers who participated in this study were white men. According to workers’ estimates the overwhelming majority, approximately 95 percent, of the locked out workers were white males. Workers estimated that less than two dozen of the locked out workers were women. They explained that most of these women were “lab technicians” or “worked in the lab” which employed an estimated 16 to 18 individuals at the time of the lockout. They also counted just four or five women working “in the plant” or “production”. Fifty-six of the participants in this study were men and 6 were women. Thus, women are slightly overrepresented in the study relative to their estimated numbers among the locked out workers. As for race, workers estimated that less than a dozen minorities were among the locked out workers. Consequently, just one African American participated in this study.

Participants ranged in age from 30 to 66, which means their age range at the beginning of the lockout was between 25 and 61. Their tenure working at GPC ranged from 2 to 41 years.
Sixteen of the participants in this study, which is about one-fourth of the sample, were retired. It is unknown just how many of the lockout workers had retired by early- to mid-2014. Based on the local union’s executive board members’ estimates, by 2014, a third to a half of the locked out union members had retired. This leaves me guessing how many of the locked out nonunion members had retired. Given that the vast majority (over ninety percent) of participants in this study were union members, the available evidence suggests that retired workers are somewhat underrepresented in the study relative to their estimated numbers among the locked out workers.

Lastly, a detail I will return to in the next chapter, most workers who participated in this study were from the local community. Nearly all of them graduated high school in Muscatine or Muscatine County. Although all of the participants indicated graduating high school, only a few had an education beyond high school. For a good number of these individuals, their jobs at GPC represented a shift away from education and part-time employment towards their first and only, full-time, stable, and secure jobs prior to being locked out.

Data Collection

The primary data collection technique for this case study was qualitative interviewing. The main objective in using this technique was to get an understanding the lockout from the workers’ perspective. As Patton (2015:426) describes, “The purpose of interviewing is to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective.” Likewise, Lofland et al. (2006:17) explain that qualitative interviewing seeks to discover the interviewee’s “views of a particular situation or topic or experience in or with a particular situation.” To accomplish this, my interviews with workers resembled “conversations with a purpose” (Kahn and Cannell 1957:149). Although I

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47 Yin (2003:89) maintains that interviewing is one of the most important sources of case study data.
pursued a consistent line of inquiry with all of the workers in this study, the actual direction of questions during these interviews was fluid rather than rigid. This type of interviewing is often referred to as “in-depth” and/or “semi-structured” interviewing. In-depth interviewing allows the researcher to explore in detail an interviewee’s background, experiences, actions, and opinions in his or her own terms; to “listen as they describe how they understand the worlds in which they live and work” (Rubin and Rubin 1995:3). In-depth interviewing also “captures change through retrospective interviews” (Rubin and Rubin 2012:4). And so I relied on retrospective interviews with workers to order events and their experiences pre- and post-lockout.48 Retrospective interviewing allowed me to analyze these individuals’ work histories and trajectories both before and after they were locked out. It also let me compare the lockout’s effect on workers from 2008 to 2014 based on objective criteria such as changes in their wages, hours, income, benefits, retirement, union membership, and so forth. Additionally, it allowed me to explore workers’ subjective experiences of being locked out, without employment, and finding reemployment, as well as their perceptions regarding changes in the nature of employment relationships.49

Besides being in-depth and retrospective, these interviews were semi-structured.50 They involved the use of an interview guide comprised of a series of topics and open-ended questions

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48 According to Schutt (1996:131) retrospective interviewing is appropriate when the researcher believes respondents can provide reliable information about their histories.

49 Based on qualitative research in the context of health care, Janice Morse (2011:411) claims that “retrospective interviews” are not only “beneficial in placing events in sequential order,” but also valuable in that they allow interviewees time to reflect on past events and learn what effect these events have had on their lives. And, “to move from the suppression of emotions in enduring to emotional reflection…making “the interviews of much better quality” (Morse 2011:411).

50 Semi-structured interviews involve “the use of an interview guide consisting of a list of open-ended questions that direct conversation without forcing the interviewee to select pre-established responses” (Lofland et al. 2006:17).
designed to elicit information about the interviewees’ pre- and post-lockout experiences and perceptions. Although I attempted to follow this interview guide – asking similar questions and gathering comparable information across all of the interviewees – the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed the interviewees to dictate to some extent the direction of the interview. As a result, most interviews at some point deviated from interview guide in unanticipated and interesting directions suggested by the interviewee. Moreover, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed interviewees to initiate topics of discussion and to focus the conversation on issues they felt to be most relevant based on their individual experiences. Thus, allowing me to “follow the data where they lead” (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:64).

During the course of this study, I interviewed a total of 62 locked out workers. All but one of these interviews were conducted in-person between January and July 2014. The one exception was the result of coming in contact with a worker about two months after concluding my fieldwork in Muscatine. My interview with this individual was conducted over the phone in September 2014. For the most part, the in-person interviews were conducted in and around Muscatine, usually in workers’ homes, though occasionally interviewees chose to meet in a more public setting such as a local restaurant or café. Just two interviews required me to travel at least an hour and a half outside of Muscatine to where workers had relocated after the lockout. The average interview lasted 2 to 3 hours, with the briefest interview lasting just 45 minutes and

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51 This interview guide is provided in Appendix B.

52 In addition to these in-person interviews, I had a number of less formal telephone and email conversations with a handful of interviewees before and after their formal interviews.

53 Several of the interviewees lived outside of Muscatine in the rural communities scattered throughout Muscatine County and Louisa County. Therefore, some interviews took place in Atalissa, Fruitland, Letts, Wapello, and Wilton.
the longest lasting over 5 and a half hours. In total, I spent approximately 185 hours interviewing locked out workers. Generally, these individuals were interviewed just once, with the exception of a few workers with whom I sustained ongoing contact throughout my fieldwork in Muscatine and after leaving the community. With the permission of interviewees, I tape-recorded all but two interviews.

Most interviews began with somewhat informal introductions and personal conversation. This helped me build rapport and trust with the interviewees prior to beginning the more formal interview process. For the most part, it seemed relatively easy to establish a relationship with the interviewee, which I attribute to our somewhat similar class backgrounds and experiences living in Muscatine. After I felt I had gained their trust, I presented each interviewee with a brief overview of the study and gave him or her an informed consent form to read and sign. Once I obtained their consent, I began tape-recording the interview. I started each interview by asking workers to tell me about the lockout. I wanted to learn about it from their perspective and in their own words. Beyond questions regarding the lockout, I gathered work histories and demographic information from the interviewees, and asked each of them about their current well-being and future expectations. Essentially, these interviews allowed locked out workers an opportunity to tell their “story.” As May and Morrison (2003:268) explain “we construct stories to reflect on the past, to comprehend the present, and to anticipate the future. [These] stories weave the intricate

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54 This estimate is based off of the total number of hours of tape-recorded interviews I have. It is somewhat conservative given that I usually spent at least 10 minutes conversing and building rapport with the interviewees before beginning to tape-record them.

55 Two interviewees indicated they were uncomfortable being tape-recorded, so I took detailed notes during their interviews rather than tape-recording them.

56 Informed consent was procured from all of the workers that were interviewed. See Appendix C for a copy of the consent form.
and sometimes contradictory experiences of our lives into seemingly coherent accounts that often define us.” Indeed, workers’ accounts provided a wealth of first-person data regarding the complex and sometimes contradictory experiences they encountered as a result of the lockout.

**Supplementary Interviews and Data**

Although most of the data for this case study came from interviews with a sample of locked out workers, I also gathered data through less formal interviews and conversations with representatives of the International United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) based in Washington, D.C., staff from the University of Iowa’s Labor Center, and *Muscatine Journal* reporters who covered the lockout. In addition, I gathered and analyzed documentary data ranging from public reports to personal communications. For instance, information relevant to the lockout were gathered from local, regional, and national news reports as well as internet sites and posts. I also collected and analyzed data from legal documents and court transcripts related to the lockout ranging from the union’s various unfair labor practice charges against the company filed with the NLRB to the company’s lawsuit against the Iowa Governor Chet Culver halting his lockout intervention efforts. Furthermore, documentary data was gathered from unpublished union documents and personal communication between union members and their leadership. For example, I obtained drafts of the 2008 collective bargaining agreement between GPC and the UFCW 86D, including the company’s proposals and the union’s counter proposals, as well as previous collective bargaining agreements between the company and the union dating

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57 Bailey (1996:72) describes informal interviews as “reciprocal” in that “both the researcher and the member in the setting engage in dialogue…researchers ask questions, but they also answer them. Both the researcher and the member share feelings, impressions, ideals and information.”

58 According to Yin (2003:85), “documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study.”
back to the 1990s. In addition, interviewees provided me with personal documents they had saved over the years from both the company and the union. These different sources of documentary data were not only used to verify and supplement interviewees’ accounts of events and occurrences leading up to and following the lockout, but were also analyzed to corroborate and augment the interview data in general.  

I used an inductive approach to analyze the aforementioned qualitative data in this case study. This approach includes a combination of descriptive analysis (Wolcott 1994) and grounded theory methods (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Consequently, the next two chapters provide a descriptive analysis of an employer initiated labor dispute used to generate precarious

59 As Yin (2014:107) explains, “for case study research, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence for other sources.”

60 Lofland et al. (2006:195) explain, “Inductive analysis…is data-based in that the analysis is driven by the data themselves.” Moreover, they explain that “when empirical or theoretical observations emerge inductively, they are often said to be ‘grounded’ in the sense of emerging from the ground up rather than being called forth by prior theoretical constructs” (Lofland et al. 2006:195).

61 In his book devoted to qualitative data analysis, Wolcott (1994:12) describes the relationship between “description” and “analysis” as follows:

Description address the question, “What is going on here?” Data consist of observations made by the researcher and/or reported to the researcher by others. Analysis address the identification of essential features and the systematic description of interrelationships among them. Moreover, he explains “the terms are often combined (e.g., descriptive analysis) or used interchangeable” (Wolcott 1994:11).

62 Grounded theory originated with sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss and their book The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research in 1967. Stated simply, “When theory is developed inductively, it is called grounded theory because it is grounded – it has its base in specific observations of social life” (Bailey 1996:27). And as Charmaz (2006:9) suggests, “Grounded theory methods can complement other approaches to qualitative data analysis.”
employment based primarily on the first-hand accounts of workers involved in the dispute. More specifically, chapter four describes GPC and changes in the company’s employment relations in the years and days leading up the labor dispute. It provides a descriptive account of the events that unfolded over the course of the first several weeks and years of the labor dispute and their significance. Chapter five provides a more thorough descriptive analysis of locked out workers’ pre- and post-lockout employment trajectories and experiences. It describes who the locked out workers are and how the labor dispute affected them in the short and long run (or at least five and a half years after being locked out). After five and a half years of being locked out, these workers’ described their “recovery” from the precarious position they were placed in as a result of the lockout. Accordingly, chapter five provides a descriptive analysis of their “recovery” and suggests a number of factors that facilitated and/or hindered it.

Following these two chapters, chapter six extends the analysis of this case study by conceptualizing locked out workers’ “recovery” and its different dimensions and therefore laying the foundation for constructing grounded theory. Indeed, “recovery” is a useful concept which emerged inductively from interview data and workers’ accounts of how they responded to the lockout. By constantly comparing the data and analyzing the patterns and themes that emerged from this comparison, I was able to establish conceptual categories which represent different dimensions of these workers’ so-called “recovery.” These conceptual categories eventually led to the conceptualization of “recovery capital” and my use of it in theorizing about workers’ experiences, actions, and trajectories following the lockout. Recovery capital is not an original concept. I borrowed it from Granfield and Cloud (1999) and adapted it to reflect the empirical

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63 According to Merriam and Tisdell (2016:233), case studies typically devote a greater proportion of the final write-up or case report to “description than other forms of qualitative research in order to convey a holistic understanding of the case.”
evidence in this case study.\textsuperscript{64} I also chose to use it in the context of this case study because it evokes workers’ agency. As I discovered in the interview data, and will become apparent in the upcoming chapters, workers who experienced the lockout described themselves as not merely passive victims of their employer’s efforts to create precarious employment, but as agents in their own recovery.

\textsuperscript{64} Granfield and Cloud (1999) introduced the concept of recovery capital (RC) in their book, \textit{Coming Clean: Overcoming Addiction without Treatment}. As denoted in the title of the book, the concept has been used in reference to recovering from addiction. They define RC as “the breadth and depth of internal and external resources that can be drawn upon to initiate and sustain recovery…” (Granfield and Cloud 2008:22).
CHAPTER FOUR

EMPLOYER GENERATED PRECARITY

On August 22, 2008, just a few days short of Labor Day, approximately 360 workers were locked out of Grain Processing Corporation, Inc. (GPC) in Muscatine, Iowa, after the company and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) Local 86D could not reach an agreement during contract negotiations. The company, a worldwide marketer of corn-based products, has its headquarters in Muscatine and is one of the community’s chief employers.

Muscatine is situated along the banks of the Mississippi river in southeastern Iowa. Given its location along the Mississippi river, the town has a long manufacturing history, dating back to the button industry at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1905, with nearly thirty-seven percent of the world’s buttons coming from Muscatine, the town became the known as “Pearl Button Capital of the World” (Muscatine History and Industry Center, 2015). At its height, the industry employed half the Muscatine workforce (Muscatine History and Industry Center, 2015).

Although just one button company remains in Muscatine (the McKee Button Company), manufacturing is still the leading industrial classification of employment in the community, with over twenty percent of the employed population working manufacturing jobs (Iowa Workforce Development, 2013:1). Although GPC is one of the community’s longtime and chief employers, Muscatine is not a “mono-industrial town.” It is home to a number of other manufacturing companies including: Monsanto, HON Industries (HNI Corporation), H.J. Heinz, Musco Sports Lighting, Bridgestone, SAAB of Iowa, Muscatine Power & Water, and MidAmerican Energy.
There are also a number of smaller agro-industries employers such as Syngenta and Pioneer, in and around Muscatine County.

GPC was established in Muscatine in 1943 by two local businessmen, Gage A. Kent and Simon G. Stein. The company was initially founded to build and operate a government industrial alcohol plant as part of the World War II synthetic rubber program. Nearly a decade later, after the program was terminated, Kent and Stein purchased the facilities from the government and continued to use it to produce ethyl alcohol products. By the 1960s, the company expanded its operations to include corn wet milling and began experimenting with the production of sweeteners. In 1969, GPC introduced hydrolyzed starch products and MALTRIN, which is the registered trademark for maltodextrins and corn syrup solids. According to the company’s account, it is the world’s largest producer of maltodextrins (Grain Processing Corporation, 2013). In 1996, the company announced plans to construct a second production facility in Washington, Indiana. According to the company, its primary objective in building this new facility was:

    to enhance GPC’s ability to serve the needs of customers by providing additional capacity to meet the growing demands for these products. Further, diversifying the physical location of manufacturing assets and capabilities provide even greater reliability and dependability of supply to long-term customers. (Grain Processing Corporation, 2013)

    For nearly six and a half decades GPC remained privately owned by the Kent and Stein/Kautz families; and along with ownership, management of the company has been handed down from one generation to the next. Following Gage A. Kent’s death in 1972, his son, James H. Kent, assumed management of the company until he too handed it over to his son, the founder’s grandson, Gage A. Kent. In 2007, the year preceding the lockout, after three generations of joint ownership by the Kent and Stein/Kautz families, the Kautz family sold their
ownership of GPC to the Kent family and Terry Kautz retired, leaving Gage A. Kent as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the company.65

Declining Labor Relations & Fringe Benefits

Based on workers’ accounts, especially those with longer tenures at GPC, labor relations
between the company, its management, employees, and organized labor were relatively
cooperative and cordial over the years. However, these relations began to deteriorate in the late
1990s and especially during the previous two rounds of collective bargaining leading up to the
2008 contract negotiations. GPC was unionized the entire time these workers were with the
company and none of them had witnessed a labor dispute at the facility prior to this lockout. As
reported by the UFCW, “Grain Processing Corporation had been thought to be among the top
companies in its industry and in over 60 years of a bargaining relationship, there has never been
a strike” (UFCW Local 1167, 2014). Workers and union representatives alike claimed that in the
past both the company and the union bargained in good faith and sooner or later reached an
agreement on a new contract when the previous one expired. As one worker with nearly thirty
years of experience at GPC explained:

A couple members from management and a couple of members from the union board
would get together in the weeks before the contract was set to expire. The board [the
local union’s executive board] would bring the company’s contract proposal to us
union members to discuss and vote on. We’d ask for a few changes and they’d go
back and forth a couple of times until both sides compromised and everyone was
happy. And we’d have a new contract and be solid for several years. (Interview,
February 12, 2014)

Most workers, who had not served on the local union’s executive board or as union
stewards at the facility, indicated that they were relatively hands-off in contract
negotiations, leaving the collective bargaining up to management and the union board.

65 Terry Kautz is the grandson of GPC co-founder Simon G. Stein III.
Older workers and those workers with longer tenures at GPC, who had worked under the management of James H. Kent, or “Jimmy” as they referred to him, and/or had fathers and grandfathers who worked for the company’s founder, Gage A. Kent, claimed noticeable changes in labor relations as soon as the founder’s grandson took over managing the company. One of these changes workers identified was the company began recruiting middle-management from outside the company rather than promoting workers from within the company’s internal labor market, which had been routine since the company was founded. A common theme among the workers in this study was that GPC was increasingly employing college-educated individuals from outside the company and local community rather than investing in, and promoting, its longtime rank-and-file workers. Moreover, these workers suggested that these “new hires” were not accustomed to the established work culture at the plant and had very little appreciation of, and respect for, their hard work and devotion to the company. As a maintenance worker with over thirty years of experience at the plant complained:

They bring these college kids in now and they don’t have a clue how this plant runs. They work here for a few years and get the hell out. It’s a stepping-stone for them. They are not committed to the company like we are. They have no respect for us or what we do to keep this plant running. (Interview, February 18, 2014)

Another change that workers pointed out was that, unlike the previous two plant managers, the newest plant manager, Gage A. Kent, had little respect for them and their hard work. They maintained that the mutual respect and loyalty that characterized employer-employee relations at the plant for decades was not carried over with the most recent change in plant ownership and management. The following comments by a second generation worker with over three decades working for the company represent the sentiment amongst many of the workers in this study:
This plant used to be like a family. Jimmy [second generation manager] cared about his workers and their families. He hired families and took care of them. He appreciated his workers. He knew who we were because he’d be in the plant with us. That all changed when he retired. (Interview, February 9, 2014)

Likewise, a worker who had been with the company for thirty-two years prior to the lockout stated:

When Jimmy left, so did all the loyalty and respect. Unlike the new management, Jimmy knew we were loyal to the company and in return he was loyal to us. He never would have locked us out because he respected us and appreciated how hard we worked for him and the company. (Interview, March 12, 2014)

Workers also described a number of fringe benefits they received over the years working for GPC that they lost around the time the company transitioned from second to third generation management such as “the company boat,” company picnics, holiday parties and bonus, and retirement parties. As one worker described:

They used to reward us for all our hard work and overtime hours with picnics, parties, and bonuses. We always got hams and turkeys for the holidays. Heck, I remember one year, around the holidays, Jimmy was walking around the plant handing out hundred dollar bills. That all stopped when he retired. (Interview, February 11, 2014)

Another worker explained, “Back in the good old days, there was a company boat they would take us out on and it was such a good time…We all looked forward to going out on the company boat and also the summer picnics at the fairgrounds” (Interview, January 25, 2015).

An additional change workers mentioned was in relation to collective bargaining and contract negotiations. Prior to the last two contracts, which were negotiated in 1998 and 2003, bargaining was conducted “in house,” as one union representative referred to it. He explained that management and the local union’s executive board would “get together a few months before the existing contract was set to expire and both parties would list their demands and then hash out the terms of a new contract” (Interview, March 16, 2014). But more recently, a decade or so
leading up to the lockout, according to this union representative’s estimates, the company started “bringing in labor lawyers from Chicago to their handle contract negotiations” (Interview, March 16, 2014). This change in management’s approach to collective bargaining coincided not only with the retirement of James Kent, but also with the retirement of a longtime local union president who was reportedly instrumental over the years in successfully negotiating “decent” collective bargaining agreements with the company. As a union member for almost three decades explained:

I think Cleve retired from the company in the mid-1990s, after being with the company for over thirty years and at least twenty of those years he was our union president. He sure knew how to negotiate with the company and just get things done...He would go back and forth with them at the end of each contract, but somehow he always managed to come through for us. He would always end up getting us a new, and I mean decent, contract. We all trusted him and his ability to negotiating us a new contract. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

Many of the workers perceived this change in GPC’s collective bargaining strategy as indicative of the company’s intent to “bust” the union and bring an end to over sixty years of collective bargaining at its facility prior to ultimately locking out the workers and their union in 2008.

The aforementioned changes in labor relations at the facility also overlapped, coincidently or not, with the company’s construction of a second, state-of-the-art, non-union facility in Washington, Indiana. According to workers’ accounts, the company began pressuring the union and its bargaining unit for concessions around the time it announced it was building a second plant in Indiana. And the union and its members basically acquiesced to these pressures by granting the company a number of concessions in their 1998 collective bargaining agreement. The following year, GPC opened its Indiana facility without union or a collective bargaining agreement.
Both Iowa and Indiana are “right-to-work” states and, as a whole, they have similar unionization and wage rates in manufacturing. However, UFCW representatives and workers estimated that workers’ wages at the non-union Indiana facility were approximately two-thirds that of their unionized counterparts in Muscatine prior to the lockout. It is easy to see how this second facility could be used by the company as leverage in contract negotiations and labor disputes. For instance, having a second facility allows the company to shift production and employees from one facility to another as need to maintain production and gain leverage during labor disputes. Indeed, a number of workers speculated that the company built this second facility with the intention of provoking a labor dispute and ultimately de-unionizing the Muscatine facility. Although this is purely speculation, workers’ accounts of the 2008 lockout lend weight to the claim that the company initiated the labor dispute, or at least failed to bargain with the union in “good faith,” in an effort to pressure the union into concessionary bargaining or, as a number of workers claim, “to rid the company of the union altogether.”

Concessionary Bargaining

The 1998 round of contact negotiations marked the beginning of a decade of concessionary bargaining leading up to the 2008 lockout, according to the workers in this study, some of whom served on the local union’s executive board over the years and therefore participated in these negotiations. These concessions included the introduction of a two-tier wage and benefits system under which the newly hired workers receive significantly less than that of present workers doing the same job. For instance, this two-tier wage scale resulted in newly

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66 A number of labor scholars have documented the ways in which companies pit their workers at different facilities against one another in order to force union concessions. For instance, Milkman (1997:20) refers to this as employer “whipsawing” of local unions in order to achieve “union givebacks” or concessions.
hired employees typically earning ten dollars less per hour than their already employed counterparts. In other words, “new hires” – as the workers in this study referred to them – started off working for approximately $13 per hour and were working alongside individuals making between $22 and $26 per hour (based their seniority). These concessions also included changes in the company’s retirement and pension plans. For instance, the company moved away from its defined benefit plan, in which workers were guaranteed a secure retirement income based on their years of service, to a defined contribution plan (i.e., 401(k) plans). Moreover, the company completely eliminated its contribution to pension plans for those workers hired after September 1, 2003. Additional concessions included changes in the company’s “sick leave policy,” “the company replacing vacation time with paid time off (PTO)”, and changes in the “management’s rights clause” (Interview, April 26, 2014). A few workers, including a former member of the local union’s executive board, rationalized these “union givebacks” by claiming that the collective bargaining agreements at GPC, up until this point (1998), had been the “Cadillac contracts” of the industry. As the former local union executive board member explained:

We [the UFCW 86D] belonged to the corn wet milling council [which is now the Inter-Union Wet/Dry Corn Milling Council]. Twice a year the council, which is made up of unions from grain processing plants across the U.S. and a few from Canada, would get together to discuss what was going on in the industry. We talked about what was going on in the market and at our own plants. At these council meetings, we always compared contracts. Over the years, our contact at GPC was seen as one of the best in the industry. We had what the council considered a “Cadillac contract.” Our wages and benefits were some of the best in the industry. We knew at some point there was going to be pressure on us to get more in-line with industry standards. (Interview, April 26, 2014)

Contract negotiations between GPC and UFCW Local 86D in 2003 and the resulting 2003 – 2008 collective bargaining agreement been the company and the union were points of contention among many of the workers in this study. A number of them mentioned being conflicted over whether they and their union should have agreed to concessionary bargaining
again in 2003, like they had in 1998, or whether they should have voted down the company’s contract offers and gone on strike. Nearly all of these workers agreed that the 2003 collective bargaining agreement was “a bad contract.” The three most common explanations as to why the union and its membership agreed to such a “bad contract” included: 1) assurances that the next contract would make up for any concessions they made this time around, or as a number of workers claimed “they were assured they would get back in 2008 what they gave up in 2003”; 2) fear of a strike and its possible outcome; and 3) older rank-and-file union members campaigning and voting for the union to accept the company’s offer regardless of its content because they just wanted a new contract that they would be able to “ride out until retirement.”

Recovering the Losses in 2008

For those workers who suggested the 2003 contract passed because union members were convinced their concessions were only temporary and would be recovered in 2008, it is unclear whether management or their union representatives convinced them of this. For instance, some workers claimed the company and its management communicated to them that if they made compromises when “times were tough,” the company would make it up to them when “things got better.” As explained by one of the workers: “Management had us convinced that times were tight for the company…with building a new plant in Indiana and with what was going on in the economy. They fooled us into thinking if we worked with them through the hard times they would make it up to us in the next round of contact negotiations” (Interview, March 7, 2014). Conversely, other workers suggested the promise of recovering their losses during the next round of collective bargaining in 2008 came from the union leadership at the time. As exemplified by the following worker’s comments: “They, the union, told us there was a time to fight and a time to back down, and 2003 was a time to back down. They told us we would get back what we lost
and more in the next contract” (Interview, February 4, 2014). An account in the local newspaper a few days after the lockout suggests that it may have been a combination of both parties, the company and the union, promising a better contract in 2008 if the union members agreed to concessions in 2003. Regarding the 2003 collective bargaining agreement, the *Muscatine Journal* reported, “Union representatives say they signed that agreement, even though they knew they were worth more, to help the company get back on its feet” (Regennitter 2008c). Moreover, *Muscatine Journal* reporter Melissa Regennitter (2008c) quotes Terry Grim, UFCW Local 86D Union President during the 2003 contract negotiations, as stating: “We accepted last time in hopes for a better contract next time. Now GPC is boasting record profits and we feel it’s time for them to give back a little.”

**Talk of a Strike**

Workers who were involved in the 2003 contract negotiations also reasoned that the possibility of a strike and the fear of perhaps losing both the strike and their jobs pushed the union and its members into concessionary bargaining and accepting a compromised collective bargaining agreement. As explained by a member of the local union’s executive board:

> The company’s offer wasn’t a good one. They knew it and we [the local union’s executive board and union members] knew it. We also knew if we voted it down and decided to strike, there was a good chance we’d be out of a job. In fact, we voted it down at first and worked without a new contract for a few weeks. It was clear the company wasn’t going to budge and workers were concerned about what would happen to them and their families if they voted to strike, so they eventually voted to ratify the company’s offer. (Interview, March 23, 2014)

Moreover, the following worker’s statement typifies what I heard from a number of the workers in this study with regard to the 2003 contract, “It was a shitty contract but we accepted it because we knew if we didn’t we’d be out on strike and replaced” (Interview, February 19, 2014).

Generally, workers revealed that during the 2003 contact negotiations they were apprehensive
about the potential of a strike and the consequences of a strike defeat if they did not accept the 
company’s contract offer and all the concessions it entailed. However, reflecting back on these 
contact negotiations, a number of workers questioned whether or not the company may have 
been trying to get them to strike back then in an effort to break the union and shift to a non-union 
labor force at the plant. As one of the workers considered, “Given what happened to us in 2008, 
you really have to wonder what the company was up to in 2003 when they handed us a contact 
they thought we would reject. They probably wanted us to strike in 2003, to get rid of us clear 
back then” (Interview, May 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2014). Similarly, another worker questioned, “Why didn’t they do 
this [lockout the workers] in 2003? I guess they would have done this back in 2003 if we 
wouldn’t have agreed to their shitty contract” (Interview, April 10, 2014). Likewise, a worker 
who was also a member of the local union’s executive board in 2003 pondered, “Looking back, 
maybe they [GPC] were ‘testing the water’ with the 2003 contract. Maybe they wanted to know 
what kind of fight we would put up and what kind of strength we had. When we didn’t exercise 
any strength or put up any kind of fight, they knew it was just a matter of time before they could 
break us” (Interview, May 11, 2014).

**Union Members’ Conflicting Interests**

As noted above, an additional and related reason workers gave for the concessionary 
bargaining that occurred in 2003, has to do with the demographics of UFCW Local 86D’s 
membership at the time. Based on union representatives’ and members’ accounts, there was a 
contingent of the union’s membership that was getting close to retirement age when this contract 
was being negotiated. Workers claimed that it was these union members who, for the most part, 
were adamant about accepting the company’s contract offer and agreeing to “union givebacks”
in an effort to reach a new contract agreement, no matter what sort of concessions it entailed for
the rest of the union membership. As a worker in his late-thirties explained:

It wasn’t about union brotherhood or looking out for your fellow workers. It was
about each man for himself and taking care of himself. It was actually pretty selfish
and shitty on the part of the old-timers. They knew they were on their way out, and
with pretty decent retirement packages, so they were just counting down the days
until they were done. They didn’t want any sort of labor dispute or strike that might
jeopardize their retirement. They just wanted to ride it out until retirement. Screw
us younger guys. (Interview, April 6, 2014)

Likewise, a union representative described:

Not all of the [union] members were in the same boat. So, they didn’t all share the
same concerns regarding what was and wasn’t in the contract language. Talk about
a strike when you’ve got over 30 years in at the plant and just a few more to put in
before retirement, would probably convince just about anyone to sign any contract.
(Interview May 19, 2014)

Another worker who had only been working at GPC for a short time before the 2003 contract
negotiations described his experience as follows:

The members seemed really divided on that contract. They were divided mostly
based on how close they were to retirement. See, some of us younger guys had just
started working at the plant and were making a lot less money than they were and
didn’t have the same kind of pension and benefits they had…The [2003] contract
ended the pension funds and other benefits that us younger guys really wanted. It
didn’t seem to matter to the older guys. They were going to accept whatever the
company gave them and get out as soon as they could. Their attitude was like “we
did our time and now we are on our way out, you all are going to have to fend for
yourselves.” (Interview, February 8, 2014)

Union members’ age and tenure with the company seems to have affected not only their
willingness to agree to union concessions in 2003, but also their interests and concerns during the
2008 contract negotiations and their responses to being locked out, which will be discussed later
on.
The Turning Tide

Regardless of the specific details and the somewhat different accounts of what happen during the 1998 and 2003 contract negotiations, most of the workers in this study indicated that these negotiations and the resulting collective bargaining agreements between the company and the union proved to be a turning point in labor relations at the facility. One of the major changes workers perceived was in regard to workplace morale. They noticed changes in their and other workers’ attitudes and behaviors. They also witnessed changes in attitudes and behaviors between workers and among union members, as well between union members and their leaders, and workers and management. For instance, one union member explained, “People were upset with the contract, upset with union, and upset with management for pressuring them to accept the contract” (Interview April 2, 2014). Likewise, a union representative claimed:

Workers were pissed off at the union for the contract they voted in. The union’s hands were tied. Workers didn’t want to strike, so the union was forced to take whatever the company was offering. But, the blame fell on the union and its board members, mainly the union president at the time.” (Interview, February 16, 2014)

Further indication of union members’ dissatisfaction with the way contract negotiations went and disappointment with their union leadership during these negotiations is the fact that shortly after the 2003 contract was ratified, they elected a new union president in a contested election.

Although workers may have gone along with concessionary bargaining in an effort to avoid a strike, a number of them expressed resentment and bitterness following the 2003 contract negotiations. In addition to begrudging their union leadership, workers also expressed disdain for management and the way they were treated by management during and following these negotiations. A number of workers commented on the arrogance they perceived on the part of management and subtle changes in the way management treated them in the months and years.
following these negotiations. As described by a worker with 27 years’ experience at GPC prior to the lockout:

It’s hard to explain exactly how things changed, they just did. There was tension in the plant that wasn’t really there before. It was like they won and we lost and we all knew it, but they were smug about it. (Interview, March 11, 2014)

Another worker who was on the union board during the 2003 contract negotiations explained:

He [Gage Kent] has always been condescending towards us, but it was even worse after we agreed to that [2003] contract. He knew he had us right where he wanted us and he was just so arrogant about it. (Interview, April 20, 2014)

Likewise, a union member at the plant for over twenty-five years stated:

They [management] were cocky because they beat us in negotiations. After we agreed to the contract, they were even more condescending and conceited than before. They went around bragging about how much they were making, even though we agreed to concessions. There was no sense of spreading the company’s profits around or rewarding us for our productivity. (Interview, April 8, 2014)

Some of this resentment played out in how workers approached their work, especially those workers who were perceived as just “biding their time until retirement.” As a worker with 12 years’ experience at GPC explained:

Some of the workers who had been at the plant for a numbers of years and through changes in management were pissed off at how they were being treated by the new management compared to previous generations of management. New management didn’t respect workers and our hard work and loyalty. It was evident during the contract talks…They’d say shit like ‘any monkey can do your job.’ You hear that shit enough and you stop caring. Some workers just stopped caring, stopped respecting their jobs, stopped working so hard, especially those workers that only had a little bit to go before retirement. (Interview, March 3, 2014)

Likewise, another worker reported:

There were a lot of disgruntled workers after what happened in 2003. They didn’t feel appreciated by the company anymore, so they quit giving it their all…They were just putting in their time and waiting it out. (Interview, April 15, 2014)
The Two-Tiered System

The concessionary bargaining that resulted in a two-tiered wage and benefits system at the facility ended up creating divisions among the workers and their collective bargaining unit. Prior to these concessions, the collective bargaining unit at GPC could be divided along the lines of basically three “types of work,” which were production, lab, and maintenance. The production workers could be divided even further based on the different “departments” at the facility, which roughly correspond with the steps in the grain/corn wet milling process. These different “departments” include: “corn handling/elevators,” “wet milling,” “starch,” “dryer house/feed recovery,” “alcohol” “MALTRIN,” and “central stores/purchasing & receiving.” Workers across these different departments were divided by skill, seniority, and gender. For example, the overwhelming majority of production and maintenance workers across all departments at the plant were male at the time of the lockout. The workers in this study indicated that there were only four or five females working in production, all of which were in the “MALTRIN” department, and no women were working maintenance at the facility when they were locked out. In addition to being all male, the maintenance workers generally had more seniority and were considered the most “skilled” workers at the facility. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of lab workers at the time of the lockout were female. Wages and working conditions across these different departments also varied, with maintenance workers generally making the most and lab workers usually making the least. In short, the collective bargaining unit at the facility was divided along a number of lines, but became even more divided as the result of the two-tier system in which employees with short tenures were earning significantly less and had fewer benefits than their counterparts with longer tenures at the facility. Consequently, in the years leading up to the lockout, there were employees at the facility working side-by-side with the
same or similar job descriptions, earning vastly different wages and benefits. This was less common among the maintenance workers at the facility because their positions, for the most part, were filled via the plant’s internal labor market and thus rarely open to “new-hires.”

This two-tier system created some tension and resentment among the workers. As a worker with less than five years’ experience at the plant prior to being locked out explained:

You find yourself pissed off a lot because you know the guy next to you is making way more than you, and for doing the same damn job. You should probably be pissed at the company for that, or maybe the union, but that’s not who you end up pissed at…You’re pissed at the guy next to you. The guy you’re going to spend the next eight to twelve hours with. (Interview, March 3, 2014)

Another worker with a relatively short tenure at the plant lamented:

You’re barely making fifteen dollars an hour and the other guys you’re working with are making around twenty-three or four, plus getting six weeks of vacation [per year]. That shit wears on you. Plus, some of the older guys are pissed off at the company. They hate Gage, so they do as little as possible while they are at work. Meanwhile, you’re working hard even though you know they’re making almost double what you’re making. Eventually, it starts to wear you down, you start doing a half-assed job. Before you know it, you start dreading going to work and working next to them. (Interview, May 8, 2014)

Several workers and union representatives speculated that the company put this two-tier wage and benefit system in place with the intended purpose of driving a wedge between workers at the facility and ultimately undermining solidarity within the collective bargaining unit and its union. For instance, one union member reasoned, “It’s hard to believe they [the company] didn’t put that two-tiered language in the contract with the explicit purpose of dividing us and breaking the union” (Interview, February 21, 2014). Another union member who served on the labor board prior to the 2003 and 2008 contract negotiations stated, “Union leadership and membership should have known if they agreed to a contract that divided the labor force into two very different pay scales it would have a divisive effect on worker solidarity…and, if they [the
company] see they can get the labor at the cheaper end of the scale, what is their incentive to keep paying for the labor at the higher end?” Still, another worker pointed out:

It was really shortsightedness on the part of the union and those members who voted on the contract with a two-tiered pay scale. They didn’t really consider, or care, what the contract looked like for those workers coming into the plant, as long as it looked good for them. They would keep their decent wages and benefits, at least for the next 5 years of the contract. They were only looking out for themselves and didn’t see the long-term effect it would have for newly hired workers or future contract negotiations. (Interview, February 24, 2014)

Not all of the locked out workers who were close to retirement lacked consideration for the situation of the younger generation of GPC workers. As exemplified by locked out worker Ken Hazen’s comments reported in the local newspaper a few months following the lockout:

Ken Hazen has been working at GPC since 1979 and he plans to wait it out so he can go back to work and retire within a few years. “I’m too old not to stick it out. What we (the union) are looking for is what our forefathers fought for and security for our children in the future,” said Hazen, 48. He believes that seniority will be swept under the rug under the new contract language. He also said that new workers will not be compensated fairly. “There’s no benefits for the younger generation of workers. It used to be that after retirement a portion of your healthcare benefits were paid, but they won’t get that,” said Hazen, who has been there long enough to be eligible for that compensation. “There’s no benefits, no future. They’ll work swing shift for years and get nothing.” (Regennitter 2008b)

Regardless, a number of workers suggested that the effects of the two-tiered contract language were ill-considered by the union and its membership in the previous contract negotiations. As typified in the following worker’s statement, “The union should have anticipated that this type of contract language would be its death at GPC” (Interview, March 3, 2014). Without insight into the company’s true intentions regarding labor relations and collective bargaining, it is difficult to determine why they proposed the contract language they did, namely the two-tier wage and benefits system. Regardless of the company’s motives, it is clear that the 2003 contract negotiations and resulting collective bargaining agreement represent a pivotal moment in shifting
labor relations at the plant. Later on I will explore how the previous contract negotiations and the two-tier system played out in the labor dispute in 2008.

**The Weeks Leading Up to the Lockout**

In the weeks leading up to the expiration of the 2003 contract, which was a five-year collective bargaining agreement scheduled to expire at the end of August 2008, the workers in this study claimed that they had no reason to anticipate being locked out. In fact, all 62 interviewees, workers and union representatives alike, claimed to have been blindsided by the lockout on August 22, 2008. Workers explained that production and relations at the plant were “business as usual” in the weeks leading up to the lockout. Union members also indicated that they were assured by the local union’s executive board that contract negotiations between the company and the union were “going well,” as they approached the expiration of their contract. As one union member with twenty-two years at the plant explained, “We’d hear from the union reps that they were in negotiations with the company and things were looking good…they never gave us any indication we’d be locked out or out of our jobs” (Interview, February 15, 2014). Similarly, another union member reported, “You’d see Pogge [William Poggemiller, UFCW Local 86D Union President at the time of the lockout] and he’d tell you everything was going good in their talks with the company, so you trusted that things were going good and focused on doing your job rather than worrying about contract negotiations” (Interview, February 18, 2014). An additional union member described, “Whenever I ask anyone from the Union Board how negotiations were going, I’d get the same thing, which was ‘Things are looking good!’” (Interview, April 25, 2014). These vague responses and assurances workers received when questioning their union representatives regarding contract negotiations led them to believe that negotiations were progressing smoothly and a new collective bargaining agreement would be
reached without incident. At the very least, workers anticipated that if the company and the union could not reach an agreement by the time their contract expired, they would continue to work under the terms of the existing contract as is the standard practice when a contract expires during negotiations.

“Shadowing” the Bargaining Unit

Workers’ accounts of the weeks prior to being locked out indicate that it was typical for their supervisors and other salaried workers at the plant to begin “shadowing” the bargaining unit as they approached the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Basically, this routine involved non-bargaining unit and/or salaried employees following and observing the bargaining unit employees as they performed their daily work routines a few weeks prior to the contract expiration date in anticipation of a possible labor dispute. A union representative elaborated on this preparation:

A few weeks before the contract is set to expire, the company assigns salaried employees to follow us around the plant as we do our jobs. The idea is that in case the union and the company can’t agree on a new contract when the old one expires and the union decides to strike to pressure them [the company] to agree to a new contract, they can keep the plant running with their salaried employees while the union is out on strike. It’s common practice for the company to prepare for a labor dispute, even though we never really had one in the thirty-six plus years I was there…well, until 2008. (Interview, February 18, 2014)

According to longtime workers, who had been at the plant through a series of contracts negotiations, this preparation had not been taken too seriously in the past, nor was it taken very seriously by the workers or the non-bargaining unit employees that were shadowing them in the days leading up to the lockout. As a worker with thirty-two years’ experience at GPC reported:

It was mostly a joke. Not just for workers, but for supervisors too. We’d just joke around and give each other shit…They didn’t want to do our jobs, especially the jobs in the dryer house and feed recovery, you know, the hot, dirty jobs. Some of
the jobs they couldn’t do if they had to, like in maintenance, and they knew it. We’d just joke around as we were being followed and talk about shit other than work. (Interview, May 17, 2014)

Another longtime worker described this routine:

Nothing was really that unusual in the weeks, or even days, before the company locked us out. It was just like every other time the contract was ending and being renegotiated. I mean, we were shadowed on our jobs, but that always happened during contract negotiations. Our supervisors didn’t act any different this time than they did in the past. They weren’t serious about shadowing us. I mean, they didn’t act like they were serious about needing to know how to do our jobs. I think they were just as surprised at the lockout as we were. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

Just one worker in this study mentioned feeling like something “unusual was going to happen” in the hours leading up to the lockout on the evening of August 22, 2008. She recalled:

They [the company] assigned non-bargaining unit and salaried workers to shadow us as we performed our jobs. They did this for a couple of weeks, but it wasn’t until the day before the lockout that the person who was shadowing me started taking it seriously….Hell, it was like a pizza party until the day before the lockout. That Thursday, the day before they locked us out, I didn’t know what was going to going down. I just knew something wasn’t business as usual. (Interview, May 21, 2014)

The Company’s “Final Offer”

According to Local UFCW 86D representatives and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) documents, GPC and members of the local union’s executive board began bargaining for a new contract in July 2008, approximately a month before the company locked out its bargaining unit employees. On August 19, 2008, the union’s executive board and the company “reached an agreement based on the Employer’s ‘last, best, and final’ offer, which would have increased employee pay but also added a management rights clause and increased the work day from 8 to 12 hours” (NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel, Division of Advice, 2009).67 When

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67 Management rights clauses basically reserve certain rights and responsibilities to management and specify that the exercise of these rights and responsibilities shall not be the subject of negotiations, grievances, or arbitrations.
the union’s executive board presented GPC’s “last, best, and final” contract proposal to the union membership, they unanimously rejected it.

Locked out union members including union representatives provided differing accounts of what actually happened when the union’s executive board took the company’s proposal to the membership “for a vote.” First, a number union members claimed that they did not see the company’s offer in-full because members of the union’s executive board removed pages from the offer before providing it to the workers. The following union member’s claim was common among the union members in this study, “It was obvious when they [the union’s executive board] gave us the collective bargaining booklet there were things, pages, missing” (Interview, February 25, 2014). Similarly, another union member reported, “They gave us what they said was the company’s best and final offer, but it wasn’t the entire contract, just the pages the union wanted us to see” (Interview, May 9, 2014). At least two union representatives, who were involved in the contract negotiations, confirmed workers’ claims that pages were missing when “the board” took the company’s initial contract offer to the rank-and-file union members in August 2008. As one of these representatives explained, “I told him [the President of UFCW Local 86D at the time of the lockout, which was William Poggemiller] that we needed to let the members know exactly what the company was offering and not keep them in the dark on anything…I was basically told to ‘keep my mouth shut’ and that the board needed to appear united to the members” (Interview April 16, 2014).

Secondly, workers claimed they were misled by the local union’s executive board and thus denied the opportunity to vote on the company’s initial contract offer in August 2008. Apparently, the board announced an “informational” meeting to discuss the company’s offer, and “out of the blue” the union called for a vote, by show of hands, on the offer. A number of
workers did not attend this meeting since they were told by the board that it was simply an “informational meeting” and therefore they had no reason to believe the contract would be up for vote at the gathering. Additionally, this meeting was held while a number of the union members were working and thus unable to attend and therefore also unable to vote on the company’s offer. Nearly a dozen of the interviewees indicated that they did not attend this meeting because they were working when it took place. These union members were upset with the board for calling for a vote at this meeting and perturbed that they were never given the opportunity to vote on the company’s initial contract offer which led to the lockout. As one of them, who was a member of the union for 32 years, expressed:

I got a call, on my cell, while I was at work and they left a message telling me they voted down the company’s offer. I was like, what do you mean ‘they voted it down’? Who is ‘they’ and when did they vote? I never got my vote! (Interview, February 6, 2014)

Another frustrated union member who was working when this meeting took place stated:

I was so pissed off when I got off work and found out the union held a meeting to vote on the contract. What about all of us union members who were at work when this meeting took place? What about our vote? Well, we didn’t get one. (Interview, February 24, 2014)

Similarly, another upset union member reported:

When I got off work, I got a phone call telling me that we voted the contract down. I was like, “we who”? I never saw the contract or voted for it, one way or another. I was pissed. How do you have a contract vote when members of the union are working and can’t be present for the vote? (Interview, February 22, 2014)

Workers who were able to attend this meeting also had their complaints. The three most common of these complaints were that the local union’s executive board: 1) had a hidden agenda at this meeting and staged the entire thing; 2) had its staunch supporters among the rank-and-file union members intimidate the other union member into voting down the company’s offer and silencing
any dissent; and 3) called for a vote by a show of hands rather than by secret ballot. As a union member of 18 years complained:

The entire meeting was staged. First, we were told it was an informational meeting, when they [the board] planned on taking a vote from the beginning. Second, they had pre-planned questions written down to have their supporters ask at the meeting. They had the questions and answers planned before the meeting even took place. Anyone who tried to ask questions that the board didn’t supply in advance were silenced. It was bullshit…totally staged. (Interview, February 25, 2014)

Several interviewees complained that the dialogue that took place at the meeting was planned and controlled by the local union’s executive board, specifically the local union president at the time. The following comments by a union member of over a decade represent the sentiment among several workers in this study:

Pogge [Union President William Poggemiller] had his followers…with them he ran the meeting exactly how he wanted it to go. He prepared them with what to say and when to say it. Any other questions or comments weren’t allowed. (Interview, May 8, 2014)

A number of workers who attended the aforementioned meeting also indicated that they felt intimidated to vote “no” on the company’s contract offer and that they probably would have voted differently if the vote would have taken place via secret ballot. As one of the union members recollected, “It was a mob mentality…I felt forced to vote no. If the vote would have been by ballot, I probably would have voted differently.” (Interview, February 17, 2014).

Another union member similarly stated:

I voted against the contract because I didn’t really feel like I had much of a choice. It was by a show of hands and it seemed like everyone was voting against it, so I did too. If we would have had a choice to vote by secret ballot, I would probably have voted for the contract the company was offering. (Interview, May 6, 2014)

Likewise, another union member questioned how he might have voted if the circumstances surrounding the initial contract vote would have been different:
When they called for a vote, a vote to reject the company’s offer, and everyone started putting their hands up, well, I did too. It was like I was just caught up in the moment. It was like it just felt like the right thing to do. I wouldn’t say it was peer pressure…it was just like…it must be the right thing to do. It wasn’t until I got home that it really sank in that we voted it down and what that might mean. I am not sure how I would have voted if I would’ve had more time to think about it and if the vote would have happened differently. (Interview, April 24, 2014)

Only one of the interviewees indicated that they voted “yes” on the company’s contract offer at the meeting, they stated:

There was a lot of intimidation to vote the contract down, but I had to go with my gut. I didn’t raise my hand when they voted it down and took a lot of shit for that. But, after the meeting, I had a lot of people come up to me and tell me they wished they wouldn’t have raised their hands either. They told me they wished they wouldn’t have voted it down. They told me I did the right thing and they wished they would have voted differently, but they were caught up in it all. (Interview, March 3, 2014)

According to workers’ accounts, within days of this meeting in which the union members voted to turn down the company’s contract offer, GPC representatives offered the union and its members the opportunity to re-vote on the contract offer in a secret ballot election held at the company’s training center. The local union’s executive board rejected the company’s offer for a re-vote, which upset a few of the union members. One, for instance, lamented:

For the life of me, I don’t understand why the union didn’t let us vote by ballot at the training center when the company gave us the option. They [GPC] gave us a second chance to vote on their offer, but the union turned it down. At least then everyone would have had a chance to vote. Then again, maybe they [the union’s executive board] didn’t want everyone to have the chance to vote. (Interview, February 8, 2014)

This union member’s comments hint at a common opinion among over half of the workers in this study, which was that the president of Local 86D at the time of the lockout was not forthright with the union members during contract negotiations and that he had his own agenda with the company during contract negotiations. As a member of the local union’s executive board who was among the lockout workers described:
It was a pissing match between Pogge and the company, well Gage, and we were all just caught up in it. No matter what would have been in the contract, Pogge would have instructed the members to vote it down. Before the members even had a chance to see and vote on the contract, he had strike signs and t-shirts printed. (Interview, April 16, 2014)

Likewise, a union member claimed:

Pogge and his disciples had a grudge with the company and with Gage Kent personally. They had their minds made up, this contract was going to be a fight, especially after what we agreed to in the last contract. We voted in a shitty contract the last time around and they were determined we weren’t going to do it again…We only got half-truths from Pogge and his followers, it was his fight. (Interview, February 25, 2014)

The overall opinion of many of the workers was stated succinctly by one worker after another in this study: “It was a pissing match between Gage [Kent] and Pogge [Local 86D’s Union President].” Workers also complained that William Poggemiller was either “close to retiring” or “planning on retiring” around the time of the lockout, and therefore “wouldn’t be affected by the outcome of the lockout” and “wasn’t too concerned about how the lockout ended.” In the words of one of these locked workers, “He did not have a log in the fire. He was planning on retiring” (Interview, February 24, 2014).

Reflecting back on the contract vote that preceded the lockout, union members mostly reported “a lack of communication between the union leadership and membership” and “being kept in the dark by the leadership regarding contract negotiations with the company;” however, the most commonly reported theme among these workers was that they in no way anticipated this vote would result in a lockout. Not a single interviewee anticipated their vote and the ensuing labor dispute would result in a lockout which would ultimately cost them their jobs.68 In

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68 Two of the workers interviewed for this study, who did not belong to the union at the time of the lockout indicated that they would have accepted the company’s contract offer if they would have had the opportunity to vote. However, non-union members of the collective bargaining unit
the hours leading up to the lockout, as the company began constructing fence barriers around the facility and bringing in “truckloads of security guards from outside the community,” workers reported feeling blindsided and confused. As a union representative at the time of the lockout recalled:

   It was like the fences and guards came out of nowhere and all of the sudden. How the company was able to pull that off, I have no idea. That kind of stuff takes some advanced planning, so they were either planning to lock us out all along or planning for us to strike. Either way, we were caught completely off guard. (Interview, March 6, 2014)

Moreover, a worker explained:

   I had the day off and I got a phone call from another worker telling me that he just got walked out of the plant by our supervisor. I was like, what the hell for? He said the company was locking us out. I asked him what the hell that meant. Next thing I did was drive down to the plant and saw all the workers outside the gates and a bunch of black security guards surrounding the plant…We all gathered at Brian’s house. He lives across the street from the plant. We were all confused. (Interview April 25, 2014)

   At approximately 7:00pm, Friday, August 22, 2008, GPC’s salaried employees began walking the second shift workers out of the facility. A number of the workers described the surreal feelings they had as their department supervisors and superintendents led them out of the plant. For instance, one of the workers who were escorted out of the facility recalled:

   I remember asking my supervisor what the hell was going on and I just remember him saying to me, “I am sure you’ll be back here in no time.” I asked him if I could get my things out of my locker and he told me “no,” but assured me there was no need to because we’d be back. (Interview, January 25, 2014)

   Another worker who was also led out of the facility by his supervisor described:

   It was the weirdest feeling. You’re being told you needed to leave the plant immediately, like you had been accused of breaking and entering or like you didn’t belong in a place you spent most of your life…I asked my supervisor, who I got along really well with, why we were being escorted out of the plant and all he could

were not allowed to vote on the contract. Local 86D representatives estimated that 300 of the 360 locked out workers belonged to the union at the time of the lockout.
tell me was that the company was locking us out. “Huh?” “Meaning what?”, I asked him. (Interview, March 3, 2014)

When asked about their initial reaction to hearing that they had been locked out, most workers responded that they were confused, shocked, and in disbelief. Most of them had a hard time believing the company would lock them out. As one worker put it, “I never in a million years would have imagined that after three generations and twenty-five of my own years in the plant, they would have kicked me to the curb” (Interview, January 30, 2014).

A number of workers admitted that when they were locked out they were not even sure what “a lockout” was or what it meant to be “locked out.” They claimed they knew it was different than a strike, but were unsure of exactly how. For example, a worker stated:

I knew if we voted down a contract offer, we might have to strike to force another, better, contract offer. But, the union members would have to vote on whether we wanted to strike or not. Well, with a lockout, I guess we have no vote or choice in the matter. (Interview, February 10, 2014)

Another worker who did not belong to the union at the time of the lockout asserted:

I wasn’t in the union, so I wasn’t privy to what all was going on with the contract. I just knew that the contract was going to expire and the union was trying to negotiate a new one, when all the sudden we were told to leave the plant, that we were being locked out. I didn’t know what that meant or that the company could do that. (Interview, May 17, 2014)

Most workers assumed that after GPC’s initial contract offer was voted down by the union membership, the company and the union would continue negotiating in “good faith” and eventually settle on a new collective bargaining agreement. Or, at the very least, GPC would allow the bargaining unit employees to return to work under the old contract until the two sides could agree on a new one. A common theme among interviewees was that they assumed they would be back to work in less than a couple of weeks, once they were locked out. The following
comment was typical of these interviewees, “I thought we’d be out a week or maybe two, but two weeks at the most” (Interview, April 8, 2014). Likewise, one of the workers described:

I thought to myself, “this can’t last long, maybe a week or so.” I figured the company just wanted to show us whose boss, you know. I figured they wanted to flex their muscles to get us to agree to their contract offer, but from what I can tell, they were never really willing to negotiate. (Interview, May 17, 2014)

The week following the lockout, a federal mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) in Washington, D.C. arrived in Muscatine to assist the two parties in their labor dispute. Over the next month, the parties held three bargaining sessions without reaching an agreement. On September 25, GPC sent UFCW Local 86D a letter expressing its disappointment that the union had not agreed to its contract terms and withdrawing its August “last, best, and final offer.” Ron Zitzow, GPC Senior Vice President of Operations, wrote in the letter that the company was “shocked and extremely disappointed…After 14 bargaining sessions, the union’s positions on most of the major issues in the contract – both economic and non-economic – still remained essentially unchanged and unacceptable” (Steinbach 2008). Moreover, Ron Zitzow wrote:

In the period since the lockout began, several things have changed. In addition to the economic uncertainty being experienced by every segment of our society, we have had the benefit of operating our facility – with replacement employees – in an extremely efficient and flexible manner…Productivity and efficiency are high and improving every day. This is due, we believe, to many changes that have freed us from some of the inefficient, unproductive methods required by our present collective-bargaining agreement. (Steinbach 2008)

69 The FMCS is an independent agency of the U.S. government whose mission is to preserve and promote labor-management peace and cooperation. In 1947, along with enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress established this agency “to prevent or minimize the impact of labor-management disputes on the free flow of commerce by providing mediation, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration” (U.S Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 2016). The agency is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has ten regional offices and more than 60 field offices through the country.
Likewise, as NLRB documents reveal, the letter stated:

…the Employer has been able to operate flexibly and efficiently using replacement employees and that productivity was “high and improving every day” because the operational changes it instituted during the lockout had freed it from “inefficient, unproductive methods” required by the collective bargaining agreement. (NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel, Division of Advice, 2009)

**GPC’s In-House Temp Agency and Maintaining Production**

After the company walked workers off the job and locked out the entire bargaining unit of approximately 360 workers, as estimated 290 of which were union members, they were able to continue operations at the facility by utilizing: 1) “temporary” replacements; 2) non-bargaining unit employees, supervisors, and managers from the facility; 3) employees, supervisors, and managers from the company’s non-union facility in Washington, Indiana; and 4) former bargaining unit employees who had retired (NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel, Division of Advice 2009).

The temporary replacements at the facility were supplied mostly workers from TEMP Associates and its affiliated RJK, Inc. of Muscatine. There was speculation among the locked out workers that RJK, Inc. was established in 2008, around the same time as the lockout, with the sole purpose of supplying GPC with long-term “temporary” replacements for the locked out workers. According to the agency’s website:

RJK, Inc. was formed in 2008 for long term contract positions in Muscatine, Iowa. As these are long term positions, there is a unique benefits package available to RJK employees. Most positions within RJK, Inc. are on a 12 hour rotating swing shift schedule. (TEMP Associates 2014)

Although RJK, Inc. does not indicate on its website or in its newspaper advertisements that it is hiring exclusively for GPC, based on the descriptions of the three types of job openings available through the company, it is obvious that these openings are for the jobs previously held by locked
out production, lab, and maintenance workers at GPC. The following descriptions of the three job openings on RJK, Inc.’s website are illustrative:

Process Operator…RJK [is] now taking applications for local manufacturer and marketer of corn-based products. Products including Maltodextrins, corn syrup solids, crude corn oil, beverage industrial and ethyl alcohol and starches for food grade, pharmaceuticals and industrial products. Jobs and responsibilities include process monitoring through computer based application. Other jobs could include manual labor consisting of shoveling, hosing, and cleaning process areas. Warehouse operations, such as forklift operations, palletizing through automated systems and manually. Truck loading is also included. Some jobs may require the operation of motorized equipment such as skid steers, end loaders, dump trucks, and forklifts.

Laboratory Technician…RJK [is] now taking applications for local grain company. Lab tech will conduct chemical and physical laboratory tests to assist in making qualitative and quantitative analysis of solids, liquids, and gaseous materials for purposes, such as research and development of new products or processes, quality control, maintenance of environmental standards, and other work involving experimental, theoretical, or practical application of chemistry and related sciences. Specifically general lab samples in a manufacturing plant with grains and corn within the quality control department.

Electrical & Industrial Technician…This position responds to all electrical and instrumentation work in the plant. Working closely with Production Groups to ensure electrical and control problems are isolated and repaired in an expedient manner. Technicians respond to electrical/control breakdown calls, troubleshoot/repair 480VAC power distribution problems, and troubleshoot/repair issues with different control system platforms.

Moreover, a scan of the local newspaper, the *Muscatine Journal*, which reports “GPC’s new hires and promotions,” reveals a number of the company’s “new hires” were originally hired to work for the company through RJK, Inc. The following “new hires” are just a couple of examples reported in the *Muscatine Journal*:

Michael Anson has been promoted to Sweetener Division Production Planner. He began at GPC as a clerk and assistant production planner through RJK Inc. and then was hired by GPC as a sales administrator in the customer service group. *(Muscatine Journal, May 17, 2014a).*
Ted Miller has been hired as Shift Supervisor for the Sweetener Division. He has worked at GPC through RJK Inc. as a relief supervisor in both the Alcohol and Sweetener Departments. (Muscatine Journal, January 25, 2014b).

More recently a post on RJK, Inc.’s Facebook page states: “What is RJK? RJK, Inc. is a separate company that was formed in 2008 to provide long term contracted positions to GPC in Muscatine, Iowa” (RJK, Inc., 2016). Based on this evidence, it is apparent that the TEMP Associates affiliated RJK, Inc. was formed to supply “temporary” employees to GPC during and following the lockout.

**Maintaining Production During the Lockout**

To maintain operations at the facility, GPC also relied on an estimated 100 non-bargaining unit and salaried employees (Brunson 2009). Over a dozen of the workers in this study reported having family members who worked for the company as non-bargaining unit and/or salaried employees at the facility and therefore helped the company continue operations during the lockout. As one of these workers described:

> My wife is still working down at the plant and hates it. She’s salary so she wasn’t locked out with us. The first few months of the lockout, she could hardly handle it. The company had her doing our jobs and working a ton of hours. Since she is salary, she doesn’t get paid overtime for all the hours she’s working. She talks about quitting all the time, but not as much now as she did in the beginning of the lockout. (Interview, March 5, 2014)

Another worker reported:

> My brother, who is salary at the plant, was working around the clock when they [the company] first locked us out. He would bitch to me about how much he was working and how shitty the conditions were. I was like, “do you know who you are talking to?” I don’t know how much they have him working these days because we don’t really talk. (Interview, March 3rd)

Likewise, a worker who counted at least two or three salaried GPC employees in his family explained:
My uncle would tell me how much they [GPC’s salaried employees] wanted us back in the plant. He complained about the turnover at the plant and said the company couldn’t keep any good workers in there very long because the conditions were so bad. He also complained about safety. He told me the company had salaried workers who didn’t know what they were doing running the plant and overseeing replacement workers who had little to no training on the equipment. Plus, he complained about having to work all the time. (Interview, February 20, 2014)

GPC also shifted workers, supervisors, and managers from the company’s non-union facility in Washington, Indiana to the Muscatine facility to maintain operations during the lockout. Lisa Klopfenstein, Human Resource Manager at the Indiana plant, reported that 18 managers were sent to Muscatine to help the company after the lockout (Brunson 2009). It is unclear how many of these managers, and other workers from the Indiana facility, remain in Muscatine five and a half years into the prolonged labor dispute.

Also aiding GPC’s efforts to keep operations running at the facility with temporary replacement workers was the surplus labor in the local community due in part to the Great Recession and the fact that one of Muscatine’s other large employers was laying off hundreds of its employees in the local community. In October 2008, just over a month after the lockout began, HNI Corporation, the parent company of The HON Company and Allsteel, which jointly employ about 4000 people in Muscatine, laid off 100 employees and indicated that an additional 200 would possibly lose their jobs (Regennitter 2008a). Locked out workers claimed that quite a few of these laid off HNI employees turned to GPC for employment shortly into the lockout.

According to union representatives and members, after the company’s initial contract offer on August 19, 2008, which was withdrawn on September 25, 2008, the company’s offers that followed got progressively worse. As the weeks passed and the company continued operating without its bargaining unit employees, rather than the two sides getting any closer to reaching an agreement, they seemed to drift further apart.
On October 23, GPC presented Local 86D with a revised contract offer, which the union representatives considered to be less favorable than the previous offer. A union representative with over 30 years’ experience working at GPC perceived this contract offer as an indication that the company did not want the lockout to end and wanted the union out of the facility for good.

He explained:

The company didn’t want to negotiate. They weren’t willing to negotiate...What they were doing wasn’t negotiating. They didn’t want us to accept their offer and return to work, so they handed us offers they knew we wouldn’t accept. If we didn’t accept their first offer, why would we accept one that was worse? Maybe they thought we’d be desperate enough to accept a worst offer or maybe they didn’t want us to accept it. Handing us a worse offer almost guarantees we’d vote it down. It was clear that if they could keep the plant running without us, they didn’t want us back. (Interview, February 11, 2014)

The Reality of the Lockout Sets In

Within two months into the lockout, around the end of October 2008, over half of the workers in this study claimed they knew they were not going back to work at GPC. They explained that early into the lockout they realized that the company was able to keep up production without them and did not want them back. As described by a union representative:

It was clear early on in the lockout that the company wasn’t willing to negotiate. They made it appear like they were trying to negotiate in “good faith” to avoid NLRB charges, but it was superficial. There were no negotiations going on. Each contract offer they brought us got progressively worse. Meanwhile, they were able to keep the plant running with workers from the Indiana plant, cheap temp workers and salaried GPC employees, so they didn’t want us back. (Interview, May 23, 2014)

Several workers claimed that once they got locked out “the writing was on the wall” that GPC provoked the lockout to get rid of them and the union. As one locked out worker reported:

In hindsight, I think the company was planning on trying to get rid of the union one way or another. The new contract they were offering was going to allow them to outsource our jobs. Basically, they offered us a contract they knew we would reject, so they would have a reason to get rid of us. They were either hoping we would
strike and then they would replace us or planning on locking us out. (Interview, May 19, 2014)

Another locked out worker with over two decades of experience working for the company claimed:

It was all orchestrated. From the start, he [Gage Kent] had it all planned out. How else do you keep your plant running after locking out over 350 of your workers? You’ve got to have some plan in place. He already subcontracted security guards and had temporary replacement workers lined up…Over the last three contracts, I guess starting with the 1998 one, you got the feeling the company was trying to get rid of the union. Little by little they were whittling away things from our contract. (Interview, February 24, 2014)

Similarly, another locked out worker explained:

Looking back, I don’t know if their motive was to get rid of the union. Sure seems like it. At the very least, I think they wanted to get rid of the union workers that were thorns in their sides. So, if they had to get rid of the entire union to get rid of some bad apples, they figured it was worth it. (Interview, February 15, 2015)

Workers’ statements suggest GPC tried to selectively recall members of the bargaining unit back to work for the company during the locked out. Workers explained that within the first few days and weeks of the lockout, the company began selectively approaching some of the locked out workers with offers to return to work. Out of the 62 interviewees, nearly a dozen indicated that they had received such offers. As one of these workers described:

I got a call from one of the plant superintendents within a week or two of being locked out. It’s been over five years now so I don’t remember his exact words, but basically he was asking me what it would take for me to return to work. He offered me a salaried position, which would have paid more than I was making before I got locked out, but I turned it down. I told him there was no way I was returning to work unless the guys I’ve worked side-by-side with, some for over twenty years, were also going back. (Interview, February 4, 2014)

Another claimed:

I got a call, I won’t say who it was from, but he asked me whether I would consider returning to work. When I asked him what he meant, he offered to make me a supervisor at the plant. I told him to go to hell. It wasn’t just me that was locked out. I had family members out on the picket line. What kind of person would turn their back on their family and friends who were also locked out? I told him he picked the wrong guy. (Interview, June 16, 2014)
Likewise, a worker who decided to retire about a year after being locked out explained how GPC offered him the opportunity to return to work as a supervisor following the lockout:

The plant manager called me at ten o’clock at night and asked me if I wanted to come back to work at the plant as a supervisor. I told him there was no way I was turning my back on the other locked out workers. He told me to just think about it. I told him I would. I didn’t really give it much thought though because I knew I couldn’t live with myself if I went back there while the others were still locked out. I talked to my cousin about it though and he basically said to me, “You still have our side business, don’t you? Well, I wouldn’t plan on having it if you take their offer.” Implying that I would lose all of my customers if I took the company’s return offer. (Interview, February 17, 2014)

By October, the company was successful in recruiting six of the locked out workers to break ranks with the bargaining unit and return to work at the facility, three of these six workers were union members. According to the company, they contacted nine locked out employees regarding their willingness to work as supervisors during the lockout and to remain in those positions afterwards (Regennitter 2009b). Moreover, the company claimed these nine employees were chosen based on rankings of employees compiled by its division and department superintendents (Regennitter 2009b). The company’s claim that it solicited just nine locked out employees to return to work during the lockout does not coincide with workers’ accounts of the company’s attempts to recruit locked out workers back to work. For instance, approximately one-sixth of the total number of locked out workers participated in this study, or 62 of the 360 locked out workers. Over ten percent of these workers (7 of the 62) indicated that company representatives contacted them directly during the lockout and offered them the opportunity return to work. It is probably fair to assume that the company tied to solicit even more locked out workers to return to work from among the nearly 300 locked out employees whom did not participate in this study. Regardless of the exact number of locked out workers the company asked to return to work, workers’ accounts of being contacted by the company and asked to
return to work suggests that the company grossly underestimated the number of locked out
employees it solicited to return to work and therefore violated the NLRA’s prohibition of “direct
dealing” between the company and members of the bargaining unit.

On January 13, 2009, UFCW Local 86D filed unfair labor practice charges against GPC
with the NLRB as a result of these six bargaining unit employees returning to work for the
company. The union argued that the company violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). Basically, Section 8(a) of the NLRA maintains that employers are
prohibited from activities that interfere with their employees’ rights to act collectively. Section
8(a)(3) applies more specifically to employers engaging in discrimination against employees
who take part in union or collective activities. Nearly nine months after the union’s charges were
filed, the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel, Division of Advice, decided that the company
had not violated the law “because (1) there is no evidence that the recall of the six unit
employees was based on Union animus, (2) the Employer’s conduct was not inherently
destructive of employee rights, and (3) the Employer established a legitimate and substantial
business justifications for its conduct” (U.S. Government NLRB Advice Memorandum, 2009).
The company argued, and the Board concurred, it needed: 1) more supervisors to train the
temporary replacements and oversee their work; 2) more employees because the replacements
were unfamiliar with the plant’s operations and there was a high degree of turnover among
replacements; and 3) additional supervisors for safety reasons and because existing supervisors
had to perform bargaining unit work (Regennitter 2009b). Ultimately, the Board decided that
GPC had demonstrated a legitimate and substantial business justification for its recall of these six
members of the locked out bargaining unit, based on the company’s operational needs and safely
concerns. The Board’s decision specifically stated:
…the Employer recalled the six unit employees during the lockout because many of the temporary replacements could not safely perform the work without additional training and oversight. Even some of the replacements who came from the Employer’s more modern Indiana facility required such training and oversight because the Muscatine plant produced different products and used older technology with more complex and labor intensive controls. (U.S. Government NLRB Advice Memorandum, 2009)

Still, based on workers’ accounts, the company attempted to recall more than just these six workers and therefore could have been charged with additional “unfair labor practices” under the NLRA. Under the Act, an employer is not permitted to bypass a union and deal directly with employees in connection with their terms and conditions of employment. Therefore, it is unclear why the union did not file charges alleging “direct dealing” (i.e., alleging that the company committed direct dealing violations by bypassing the union and offering bargaining unit employees an opportunity to return to work during the lockout at higher rates of pay and with improved benefits) in October 2008 when these six individuals and other locked out employees were offered the opportunity to return to work at the facility.70

In addition to seeking out members of the bargaining unit to bring back to work at the facility, the company also tried to recruit former bargaining unit employees who had retired during the lockout to return to work. For example, a worker with over three decades of work experience at GPC, who retired within a year of being locked out, recalled:

I was one of the ones they [the company] came to after the lockout and asked to come back. They [company representatives] came to my door and offered me a lot more money than I was making when they locked us out to come back…See, they came to me very soon after this thing happened. They wanted me to come back, to

70 Though the union previously filed unfair labor practices charges in January 2009 with the Regional NLRB in Peoria, Illinois against the company, alleging that the lockout was unlawful. The Regional NLRB, siding with the company, determined the initial lockout of the bargaining unit employees was lawful because its sole purpose was to pressure the employees into accepting the Employer’s contract proposal (NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel, Division of Advice, 2009).
cross the picket line and become salary. They offered me a lot of money, but I just couldn’t do it because I couldn’t walk on the people I had worked with for thirty years of my life. I just couldn’t do it. I don’t think I could have lived with myself. For me, it was an ethical decision…I kept in touch with a couple of the salaried people and they gave me some time to think it over when they made me the offer. I know that some people went back and I know that some of them did it because they had families to consider. I can’t blame those that went back, you know, your family has to come first. But, I was in a position that I didn’t have to go back. I wasn’t in their same position. Thank God! I would only go back if we all were offered the opportunity to go back. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

By the end of 2008, it was clear to most of the workers that contract negotiations were going nowhere and many felt this was because the company did not want the union back in the plant because it had realized the benefits of operating the facility with temporary (i.e., precarious) workers.

Throughout 2009, the company and the union meet with a federal mediator several times, including February 23-24, March 11-12, May 27, June 4-5 and December 2 (Steinbach 2010). Still, negotiations went nowhere. By the end of 2009, and over a year after the lockout began, members of the local religious community, as well as public officials, tried to facilitate negotiations between the company and the union in an effort to bring an end to the labor dispute.

In December 2009, nearly sixteen months into the lockout, out of concern for those affected by the labor dispute, the Muscatine Ministerial Association sent a letter to the company and the union on behalf of seventeen reverends from the local religious community calling on both parties to renew their collective bargaining efforts and attempt to resolve the lockout. This letter stated in full:

We, of the Muscatine Ministerial Association, as people who look to God in faith, who profess faith in Christ as the Prince of Peace and who bear a concern for all people living in the Muscatine area, address you who represent conflicting sides in the current labor dispute at Grain Processing Corp. We recognize that the dispute at GPC has gone on for an extended period of time. We observe with ongoing concern the difficult circumstances that this places upon all people involved and their families. We also acknowledge that many people in the Muscatine area are
concerned about this issue, people from various faith backgrounds or no faith affiliation. Out of our faith and our common concern, we call on both sides in this dispute to renew efforts to come to a just and equitable resolution of differences and work toward reconciling the parties involved. We understand that conflict is unavoidable in human affairs and that issues can often be difficult to resolve. We profess faith in a God who is the source of true peace and calls us to pursue it. Our faith enables us to see beyond situations that seem unable to be solved, to see new initiatives starting, new possibilities arising and a new day beginning. We believe God is deeply concerned with the well-being of all people and is attuned to all forms of human suffering. Because God is so committed to the world, our faith calls us to be deeply engaged with the world’s problems, not removed or separated from them. Therefore, we offer our support, our encouragement and our prayers for all those involved in the process. During this time of preparation for Christmas in which we claim Christ as the hope of the world, we long for resolution and healing to occur for those impacted directly by the dispute and for our community as a whole. (Muscatine Ministerial Association 2009).

Neither the company nor the union responded to this letter publically.  

Also in December 2009, the Muscatine County Board of Supervisors voted four to one in favor of signing and sending an arbitration and conciliation request to Iowa Governor Chet Culver “in an effort to bring a neutral third-party to assist in negotiations between Grain Processing Corporation and the 350-plus workers locked out over a disputed contract negotiation” (Tiesman 2009). Nearly a month later, Governor Culver announced his intention to invoke Chapter 679B of the Code of Iowa to appoint a board of arbitration and conciliation to resolve the ongoing labor dispute between GPC and UFCW Local 86D. In short, Chapter 679B states is part:

When any dispute arises between any…corporation and their employees…of this state, expect employers or employees having trade relations directly or indirectly based upon interstate trade relations operating through or by state or international boards of conciliation, which has or is likely to cause a strike or lockout, involving ten or more wage earners, and which does or is likely to interfere with the due and

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71 I attempted to interview Reverend Charles Bencken of Trinity Church in Muscatine, the first of signatories to this letter and a member of the Muscatine Ministerial Association several times in the Spring of 2014. However, he did not respond to my queries about this letter and parties’ responses.
ordinary course of business, or which menaces the public peace, or jeopardizes the welfare of the community, and the parties thereto are unable to adjust the same, either or both parties to the dispute,…or the chairperson of the board of supervisors of the county in which said employment is carried on…after investigation, may make written application to the Governor for the appointment of a board of arbitration and conciliation…(U.S. District Court For the Southern District of Iowa 2010)

On January 14, 2010, Governor Culver wrote to Dan Olson of GPC and William Poggemiller and Lorraine Orr of UFCW Local 86D notifying them of his intent to appoint a board of arbitration and conciliation pursuant of Chapter 679B of the Code of Iowa. In the letter, Governor Culver asked both parties to nominate five people to serve on this arbitration board. Following each party’s’ nominations, the Governor indicated that he would select one person from each list to serve on the board, and if either party failed to nominate five people, he would appoint a representative for them. He explained that the two appointed members would then have five days to pick a third person to serve on the board. Once this three-member board was selected, they would have 10 days to visit Muscatine and complete a thorough public investigation of the dispute. Within five days of completing their investigation, the board would report its findings and recommendations to the Governor, GPC, and UFCW Local 86D. Governor Culver concluded the letter stating, “I am hopeful the appointment of this board of arbitration and conciliation will bring this dispute to a close and allow UFCW members to resume work at GPC under amicable terms” (Steinbach 2010). A few days later, on January 20, 2010, GPC issued a public statement indicating that the company would not participate in the Governor’s proposed arbitration and conciliation board. In this statement, the company maintained that federal law does not grant the state or Governor Culver the power to interfere in the labor dispute (Steinbach 2010). Moreover, the company claimed:

The proposed investigation will disrupt lawful bargaining activity and further delay a bargaining process that has already gone on too long…GPC believes the parties
best capable of resolving the outstanding issues remain the parties most directly affected by the outcome of the negotiations – the company, the union and the employees. (Steinbach 2010)

The company also asked the Governor, through Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller’s office, to withdraw his letter (Steinbach 2010). When Governor Culver declined, the company filed a lawsuit against him in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in order to stop his efforts to intervene in the labor dispute. On February 17, 2010, Federal District Court Judge John A. Jarvey ruled in favor of the company and permanently forbid Governor Culver from intervening in the dispute. Judge Jarvey explained in his ruling that the NLRA overrides the state code. Moreover, Judge Jarvey reasoned, “Because the governor’s action is clearly pre-empted by the NLRB, the court grants the relief requested by GPC” (Regennitter 2010).

By 2010, talks between the company and the union were fewer and farther between. According to a union representative, “the only negotiating session between GPC and Local 86D in 2010 was in April.” Although the aforementioned third-parties tried to intervene, the company seemed unwilling to entertain outside intervention in the labor dispute and unwilling to compromise on the key issues of contention in their contract offer, such as “the management rights clause,” which included outsourcing language. Over two years into the lockout, it was clear to most union members and their representatives that negotiations were at an impasse.

It took a lot less time for the majority of the locked out workers to realize that they wouldn’t be returning to their jobs at GPC. About half of the 62 interviewees said that it took them about a year to come to the realization that they were not going back to work at GPC. And just a handful of the workers in this study indicated that they held out hope of going back to work for the company for about two years before deciding they needed to “move on,” “find something new,” and/or “come up with a new plan.”
As the prolonged lockout approached its sixth year, not one of the workers in this study anticipated going back to work for the company. Just three of these 62 individuals indicated that they would be willing to consider returning to work at GPC if given the opportunity. Whether or not they decided to go back or not, they explained, would depend on terms and conditions of their return. As one of these individuals stated:

It’s been so long since we’ve been locked out, I haven’t really thought about what I’d do if the lockout ended. I haven’t really considered returning. Since I am still technically a GPC employee, I guess I’d have to consider going back. It would probably depend on what they offered me to return…I’d have to consider what type of conditions I’d be returning to. (Interview, June 16, 2014)

Although the overwhelming majority of workers in this study were certain they were not returning to work at GPC, regardless of the lockout’s outcome, they remained perplexed by the fact that the lockout had lasted over five and a half years and was still ongoing. They also were curious as to when and how it might eventually end. They questioned, “When will it end? How will it end? Will it ever end?” (Interview, May 8, 2014). And asked, “It can’t go on forever, can it?” (Interview, June 16, 2014). As well as supposed, “The company has no interest in ending it, so it’s never going to end!” (Interview, February 4, 2014). One perplexed worker stated, “The entire thing is a little bizarre to me. The union told us GPC couldn’t hire workers to replace us, but they did. GPC doesn’t want us back, so I guess it’s over and they won” (Interview, April 7, 2014). Likewise, another puzzled worker questioned:

Can we be locked out if there is no longer a union? The [International] union told us they can’t afford us anymore. They said that they support us, but they can no longer support us financially. I’m not even sure if there is a local union anymore. The office is gone and there isn’t a phone number to call. (Interview, June 2, 2014)
In short, these questions and comments revealed workers’ confusion and curiosity regarding the fact that the labor dispute was still ongoing – over five and a half years after they were locked out – and its eventual outcome.

**The International Union Withdraws Its Support for Local 86D**

There was significant turnover in UFCW Local 86D’s leadership between 2008 and 2014, with the majority of the union’s executive board members at the time of the lockout eventually retiring from the company and therefore vacating their union positions. Less than a handful of the workers in this study could name the current local union president even though a number of them are still technically “GPC employees” and “UFCW members” (i.e., they had not retired or terminated their employment with the company and/or withdrawn their membership to the union). The local union no longer occupies its former office which was located at 1401 Oregon Street, just blocks away from the GPC facility, in Muscatine’s so-called “Southend.” The local union’s telephone number (listed on the International UFCW’s website) has been disconnected and its website has been disabled. It has been years since the locked out workers and their supporters have gathered and picketed outside of the company’s facility. Although the local was still holding monthly meetings in 2014, based on workers’ accounts, these meeting were usually attended by less than a handful of workers. There were just four workers, one of which was a union representative, at the local union meeting I attended in early 2014 and just one worker, a union representative, at the second meeting I attended in the summer of 2014.

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72 Although nearly all of the workers in this study claimed that they would not return to work at GPC, regardless of outcome of the lockout, a surprising number of them were still considered GPC employees and UFCW members since they had not terminated their employment with the company or their membership to the union.

73 As indicated in chapter three, as of July 2014, the local union was still holding monthly meetings on the first Thursday of each month at the American Legion Post 27 in Muscatine. The
Just one of the sixty-two workers in this study mentioned still attending the local union’s monthly meetings and the overwhelming majority of the rest of these workers were not even aware that these meetings were still taking place.

The last vote on a contract offer was April 23, 2013. According to Local 86D’s President at the time of the vote, Tony Newton, just 85 or so of the union’s remaining members voted on the contract and the majority rejected it. Newton claimed, “We’ve gone from 40-some issues down to one” (Ferguson 2013a). The one issue that the union and its members were not willing to concede, according to Newton, was the contract language that would allow “the company to employ non-contract production workers” (Ferguson 2013a.). Newman claimed that the consensus among union members was that it was “not about wages and benefits, but about job security” (Ferguson 2013a.). Both workers and union representatives insisted that over the years of contract offers and negotiations they were willing to compromise on a number of company’s demands, but held firm on the issue of outsourcing their jobs. As Tony Newton reported five years into the lockout, “The union has agreed to everything except the outsourcing clause” (Ferguson 2013b).

After the April 23, 2013 vote, the International UFCW essentially “wiped their hands” of the labor dispute. As one of the workers explained:

They came down here from either Chicago or D.C., I’m really not sure which one, and told us that we should accept the company’s offer. It was unbelievable! After being out of work for over five years, they told us to take the offer. We told them to go to hell. But that’s not all, they also told us they were done with us. They said that they would continue to support us, but not financially. What the hell does that mean? (Interview, May 6, 2014)

two meetings I attended in 2014 confirm workers’ accounts of the turnout at these monthly meetings.
According to workers, some of whom served on the local union’s executive board, the International UFCW came to Muscatine to meet with Local 86D for the last time in early-2013. At this meeting, the international union’s representatives basically said they were done providing financial support for the local union, its officers, and its members.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{74} In April 2015, after I had concluded my fieldwork in Muscatine, several of the workers who participated in this study contacted me to let me know they had received a letter in the mail from the local union. This letter, which had no letterhead and was not signed by any particularly local union executive board member, stated:

\begin{quote}
Dear Brothers and Sisters,

The UFCW International has sent a letter to Local 86D stating that since we have dropped to under 50 members and have not given them any money since we got locked out that per the bylaws they are going to decertify the Local. We do not know when this is going to happen but it will be soon. The International has not been too forthcoming with information and in fact told us that there was not a need to inform the membership just yet. With that being said the April 9, 2015 membership meeting will be the last. If you have any questions you are encouraged to attend this meeting to present them.

Sincerely,
Your Board
\end{quote}

I contacted the Regional NLRB in Peoria, Illinois to inquire about the decertification of Local 86D. As of January 2016, the Regional NLRB had not received a petition for decertification, which is required in order to decertify a collective bargaining unit. The Regional NLRB representative, however, indicated that it is possible for a union to voluntarily relinquish its role as bargaining agent without approaching the NLRB. Under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (also known as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute), an incumbent union can file a “disclaimer of interest” with the Federal Labor Relations Authority indicating that it no longer wishes to represent the employees in the bargaining unit for which it was certified. The Federal Labor Relations Authority explains a “disclaimer of interest” as follows:

\begin{quote}
Any labor organization holding exclusive recognition for a union of employees may disclaim any representational interest in those employees at any time. Disclaimers of interest maybe filed by the recognized or certified exclusive representative in the following situations…as a “petitioner,” a labor organization may file a petition seeking to disclaim any representational interest in a union for which it is the exclusive representative… (U.S. Office of General Counsel 2000:192)
\end{quote}
Union Members Disappointed in their Leadership

Workers expressed being disappointed with the UFCW’s leadership, both at the Local and International level. A recurrent theme among the workers in this study was that the union leadership did not anticipate the lockout and was ill-prepared to take on the company in a labor dispute. As one worker stated, “They [union leaders] didn’t anticipate the company would lock us out, and they surely didn’t prepare us for a being locked out” (Interview, April 4, 2014).

Additionally, as previously described, workers accused the local union president at the time of the lockout of having his own agenda with the company and not being forthright regarding contact negotiations. However, workers expressed being even more disappointed with the International UFWC for its role, or lack thereof, in the labor dispute. They understood that Local 86D’s leadership and membership were essentially powerless in their struggle against GPC without the assistance of the International, which they believed was not sufficiently committed to the labor dispute. Generally, workers expressed feeling irrelevant to and abandoned by the International in their struggle at GPC. They made statements such as “what was happening in Muscatine was off the International’s radar,” “we were only a few hundred workers, the International is more concerned with the thousands of Wal-Mart workers,” and “the International was nowhere to be found.” A search of the International’s website lends some credence to these workers’ statements; for instance, over the years of this prolonged labor dispute less than a handful of press releases and/or articles were posted on the website.  

As is customary, within a week of the lockout, the International sent representatives to Muscatine to assist Local 86D in their struggle with GPC. However, the assistance they provided

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75 A search of the International UFCW’s website in the Winter of 2014, including the website’s archives and press releases dating back several years, revealed just three items related to the lockout of Local 86D.
was not sufficient enough to put pressure on the company to end the lockout. And with limited financial and human resources invested by the International, Local 86D’s leadership and members were unable to develop a meaningful campaign against company. The union’s strategy basically consisted of picketing outside the facility, filing a few unfair labor practices charges against the company, issuing a limited number of press releases, soliciting financial assistance from other unions, and broadcasting a handful of advertisements in the local media against the company and on behalf of the workers. Based on these strategies alone, the union was unable to mount enough pressure on the company to get it to end the lockout and/or negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement that would satisfy its membership. With only minimal involvement or assistance from the International, Local 86D was unable to exercise any real leverage against the company to successfully end the lockout. Unlike the high-profile lockouts at BASF Corporation in the 1980s and Ravenswood Aluminum Company in 1990, here the International union offered very little in the way of a “strategic campaign” against the GPC.76

76 “Strategy campaigns,” or what are sometimes referred to by the older nomenclature of “corporate campaigns,” go beyond traditional “bargaining and develop creative and complete processes that pressure firms in multiple ways” (Juravich 2007:17). They defy a simple definition (Jarley and Maranto 1990:506). However, Labor Research Review (1993:11) reports:

Because of experimentation by various unions over the past decade, we can, with some accuracy, define the characteristics of a strategic, or corporate campaign. They are:

(1) an all-out effort to resolve a conflict with management to the benefit of workers;
(2) by exploring the weakness and vulnerabilities of the specific employer;
(3) through tactics dictated by all available information about the employer and the unique situation;
(4) that maximizes the mobilization and participation of a resolute, militant union membership;
(5) and involves the media, public, and customers;
(6) in a powerful struggle that underscores social and economic justice.

In chapter six I will go into more detail about “strategic/corporate campaigns” and how they were utilized in the BASF and Ravenswood lockouts, but not in GPC lockout.
The International UFCW’s lack of greater involvement in the GPC lockout may have been the result of Local 86D and the International disagreeing on how to respond to the lockout. Based on workers’ accounts, the International and Local “were not on the same page” or “didn’t see eye to eye” regarding GPC’s collective bargaining agreement and contract negotiations between the company and the union. Workers claimed that the International did not agree with Local 86D and its membership rejecting the company’s contract offers and refusing to accept a concession-laden collective bargaining agreement like they had done the two previous rounds of contract negotiations. Workers and union representatives alike suggested that the International was urging the Local and its members to accept whatever contract GPC was offering, regardless of its content. As one union representative recalled:

It was clear that the International thought we [Local 86D] should accept the company’s offer. At one point they even told us we should tell our members to take the offer. It’s not our job to tell workers how to vote on a contract offer, but that’s basically what they were telling us we should do. It didn’t matter, workers weren’t going to accept the company’s offer as long as it had outsourcing and subcontracting language in it. (Interview, May 6, 2014)

Based on a renew of relatively recent labor disputes, disparities between International unions and their Local affiliates regarding how to handle collective bargaining appears to be fairly common. For instance, Ashby and Hawking (2009:216) report that in the case of a lockout at A.E. Staley Company in the 1990s, the International leadership of the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW) would have preferred the local “make the necessary compromises to get the Staley workers back in the plant.” They emphasize, “From their [the International AIW] perspective…it was better to negotiate a terrible contract than to launch a fight that risked losing the local altogether” (Ashby and Hawking 2009:216). In fact, as Ashby and Hawking (2009:28)
report, “The AIW International continually advised Local 837 that it should accept whatever contract the company was offering and be grateful for having survived negotiations.”

Somewhat similarly, Paul Johnson (2001:46), documents that in “the mid-1980s strike by Local 9-P of the United Food and Commercial Workers union in the Austin, Minnesota, Hormel plant” and “the six-year-long Caterpillar strike by the United Auto Workers Local 751 in Decatur, Illinois…both local unions resisted the tide of concessionary bargaining…and both were ultimately abandoned by their respective international unions.” These are just a few examples over the last few decades of Local unions and their membership not being backed (or being undermined) by their International unions in their opposition to concessionary bargaining. In 2008, Local 86D decided that after nearly a decade of concessionary bargaining it was not willing to accept another concession-laden contract from GPC, and based on workers’ accounts it is not clear whether the International UFCW was committed to this decision.

Although the majority of workers in this study indicated that they were disappointed in the UFCW and its leadership, those workers who belonged to the union also indicated that they could have, and perhaps should have, played a more active role in their union over their years working at GPC. These workers, with the exception of those who had served on the local union’s

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77 This type of concessionary bargaining, which is also called “give-back bargaining,” in which employers pressure unions into “negotiations that cut or freeze wages and employee benefits, that relax restrictive work rules, and/or impose two-tier wage or benefit systems (under which newly hired workers receive less than that of present workers doing the same job),” has become increasingly common (Chaison 2014:27). As Gary Chaison (2006:123) explains, employers: …increasingly see collective bargaining as a way to reduce labor costs, get back what was given in the past, and dominate the union-management relationship. Currently, for unions, winning in bargaining simply means not losing.

78 Union representatives indicated that Local 86D’s members were not willing to accept more concessions in their 2008 contract since they had agreed to them in both their 1998 and 2003 contracts.
executive board and/or as a union shop stewards over the years, readily admitted that they were mostly passive members of their union. They were generally uninvolved in union matters and mostly “hands-off” during contract negotiation, aside from when it came time to vote on a contract. Basically, they explained that they paid their monthly union dues but rarely attended union meetings other than around the time their contracts were set to expire. As previously explained, for the most part, they were accustomed to leaving union matters such as contract negotiations up to their local union representatives. Their delegation of collective bargaining responsibilities to their elected union representatives is the typical organizational structure and culture within the U.S. labor movement and characteristic of what is commonly referred to as “business unionism” and/or “the service model.” As Russo and Corbin (1999:104) explain, “Business unionism relies heavily on a hierarchal leadership and service structure; members pay their dues and call if they have a problem.” More thoroughly they describe (as cited in Eisenscher 1999: 219-220):

*In the Service Model:* 1) union leaders solve problems for members; 2) the union relies on grievance and arbitration procedures; 3) membership is passive or limited to responses to leader requests for cooperation; 4) members rely on specialists, experts, and union staff; 5) the union develops secretive and closed communication channels; 6) union structures are centralized and top heavy; 7) the unions grown dependent on and is reactive to management.

In short, “business unionism” or “the service model” is based largely on leadership representation rather than genuine membership participation. “Under this model the local chooses to do everything through their staff structure for the individual worker rather than

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79 Ashby and Hawkins (2009:215) explain that with “business unionism,” which they argue is common among international union presidents, “the union is seen as a business, with decisions made at the top, rather than as a democratic, grassroots organization driven by its members. Paid union staff at the national and regional level are the full-time experts whose job is to serve its membership, much as an insurance company or law firm services its clients.”
encouraging the worker to engage in work-site struggles along with other union members” (Fletcher and Ward 1999:193). As a result, workers typically see their unions as “service agencies and stopped going to meetings or otherwise participating except for occasional activism at contract time” (Turner and Hurd 2001:14). Turner and Hurd (2001:12) suggest that a detrimental effect of organized labor’s reliance on business unionism it that it has “left American unions demobilized and to a large extent defenseless in the face of growing employer opposition.”

Most labor unions, however, adhere to business unionism (Weinbaum 1999:50), and the UFCW and its affiliated local unions are no exception. Thus explaining, to some extent, why workers in this study found themselves both oblivious and defenseless when GPC locked them out.

Over the years, the union at GPC developed a type of organizational structure and culture in which there was very little membership involvement, other than voting on and enforcing contracts. The fact that Local 86D’s members became accustomed to being relatively passive members of their union and leaving most of their workplace issues and collective bargaining up to their elected union representatives left them overly reliant on their union leadership and its power vis-à-vis the company in this labor dispute. As Ashby and Hawking (2009:216) warn, in traditional business unionism:

> collective bargaining comes down to one thing: the skill of the union representatives who bargain with management. During strikes and lockouts…the members’ role is simply to walk the picket line and to hold out one day longer than the company.

In the case of the GPC lockout, the company was able to “hold out” for over five and a half years and according to union representatives’ and workers’ accounts showed no interest in genuinely

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80 I will return to the subject of business unionism and how it relates to individual and collective responses to precarity in the upcoming chapters.
bargaining with the union and/or ending the lockout. In fact, within a few weeks of locking out
the bargaining unit, and realizing they could maintain operations at the facility with “temporary”
replacement workers, the company withdrew its contract offer claiming it was benefiting from
operating the facility with replacement workers and without a collective bargaining agreement
(Steinbach 2008). After this point, the company continued to engage in bargaining, but only
superficially – by proposing contract offers which the union members considered less and less
favorable – in order to avoid “unfair labor practice” charges.

In is not entirely clear whether GPC expected the union and its members to accept the
company’s initial, concession-laden, contract or whether the company’s objective was to
provoke a labor dispute, but workers’ recollection of events leading up to and following the
lockout suggests the latter. For instance, it is evident that GPC had laid the groundwork for this
labor dispute by: 1) securing “temporary” replacement workers from a newly established local
temporary employment agency (RJK); 2) having fencing and security guards “on hand” to
construct a barrier around the facility to keep the bargaining unit out; and 3) transferring
company employees from its second facility in Indiana to Muscatine. What is clear, however, is
that the union and its members – as well as workers who were in the bargaining unit but did not
belong to the union – were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to take on the company in this dispute.

Even without knowing GPC’s true intentions leading up to and throughout the course of
the lockout, the outcome as of five and a half years into the labor dispute is that the company has
been able to “replace” relatively secure, well-paid, unionized workers with insecure, cheap, non-
union, “temporary” workers. In other words, GPC has achieved greater flexibility, and
presumably greater profits, by shifting to precarious employment relations as a direct result of
the lockout. There is no need for the company to end the labor dispute because of the
aforementioned benefits that accompany precarious employment relations. And in this case, GPC has the added benefit of knowing that its “temporary” employees cannot unionize given that there is already a union contract in place at its facility and these employees are precluded from it.
CHAPTER FIVE

WORKERS DESCENT INTO AND RECOVERY FROM PRECARITY

This chapter describes locked out workers’ pre- and post-labor dispute experiences and perspectives. It begins by explaining who these workers are and how they came to be GPC employees. It provides an account of why they sought employment at GPC and a brief description of their experiences working for the company. It also describes workers’ pre-lockout intentions and assesses how the labor dispute altered their plans and experiences. For instance, most workers planned on working for the company until they reached retirement age; however, as a result of the lockout, most ended up retiring earlier than they had originally anticipated or terminating their employment at GPC and seeking reemployment elsewhere in the community.

This chapter will also describe workers’ experiences being locked out of their jobs and their reflections on the years leading up to and following the labor dispute. In doing so, it will highlight both the positive and negative outcomes of the lockout from the perspective of the workers who experienced it firsthand. As will be seen, there are a number of difficulties these workers faced, especially early-on in the lockout. However, several years after being locked out and ultimately displaced from their assumed lifelong jobs, these workers described, for the most part, a remarkable “recovery” from the labor dispute and their job loss. Over five and a half years into the lockout, most workers reported a relatively comparable and/or better state of well-being than before they were locked out. This chapter describes and begins to explain this relatively positive outcome for workers.
This chapter begins with a description of the locked out workers because they, in many ways, epitomize those American workers who are generally considered to be most affected by the recent growth in precarious employment in the United States. Recall from chapter two that contemporary precarity in the United States is characterized by a decline in the average length of time employees spend with their employers (i.e., “employer tenure”). This is especially the case for white males in the private sector of the U.S. economy, a group that has traditionally been protected by internal labor markets (Farber 2008; Kalleberg 2009). As Farber (2008b) suggests, more recent cohorts of workers are less likely than their parents to have a career characterized by a “life-long” job with a single employer. As will be described below, this was the case for many of the workers on this study who followed their fathers’, and in some cases their grandfathers’, careers at GPC prior to being locked out.

Another characteristic of increasing precarity in the U.S. economy in recent decades is the proliferation of job insecurity and/or perceived job insecurity, especially among prime-age males in blue-collar occupations with modest levels of education. As highlighted in chapter two, the erosion of American manufacturing has left those who remain employed in manufacturing jobs feeling more insecure about their jobs and/or job prospects. For over two generations prior to the lockout, GPC provided relatively secure, well-paid manufacturing jobs to modestly educated, working-class males within the local community. Thus, exploring the locked out workers’ employment trajectories prior to and after the labor dispute provides a better understanding of the impact of these changes.

81 These workers did not experience precarity as a result of their manufacturing jobs being lost to deindustrialization but, rather, they were rendered precarious as a result of a corporate restructuring strategy aimed at achieving greater flexibility in employment relations. Moreover, these workers had little to no experience with precarious employment prior to being locked out of their jobs at GPC.
understanding of the causes and implications of the rise of precarious employment in the United States.

**Who are the Locked-Out Workers & Why Were They at GPC**

The locked out workers range from first to third generation working-class individuals, mostly men, and generally from Muscatine and its surrounding rural communities. The overwhelming majority of these workers were from the local community, with just four of the sixty-two workers in this study reporting that they were not originally from the local community. All of the workers had high school diplomas, mostly from Muscatine High School or neighboring Louisa-Muscatine and Wilton High Schools. Over half of these individuals explained that they went to work at GPC straight out of high school rather than pursuing higher education or any sort of formal training. Five of the workers spent some time in the military before seeking employment at GPC and a handful attended college, mostly local community colleges, before going to work for the company. For nearly all of these workers, their jobs at GPC represented a shift away from part-time employment to their first, stable, secure, full-time employment. The following worker’s comments are indicative of the experiences of most workers in this study:

> I worked a few part-time, odd jobs while in high school and after graduating, you know, like bagging groceries at the supermarket and pumping gas at a local service station. I also worked a little construction before going down to GPC and putting my name on the list [for employment]. I went down there almost every day one summer and signed my name on the list until they finally hired me. When they hired you, you’d work on a probationary basis for about three months, before they’d decide if they wanted to keep you on permanently. I was one of the lucky ones they hired permanently after my 90 days. I know a bunch of guys who worked that 90-day probation a few times before they finally got on permanently. (Interview, February 25, 2014)

According to workers’ accounts, the traditional hiring process at GPC involved potential workers visiting the plant’s personnel office and filling out the company’s employment application. Once these workers’ applications were on file, they would continue to re-visit the personnel office to
place their names on a list requesting employment. Once hired, workers would go through a 90-day provisional employment period before the company decided whether or not to hire them on a permanent basis. Workers indicated that it was routine for the company to “extend the probationary period” or “stall permanent employment” by terminating the workers just before the expiration of their 90-day probation period and then re-hiring them for another 90-day period. The company’s rational for this hiring practice, according to workers, was so that they could determine whether or not workers were “a good fit for the job” before hiring them. Several of the workers recalled working a few “90-day probation periods” before gaining permanent employment at the facility.

A common route to employment at GPC was through family members employed with the company. Nearly half of the workers explained that they “got on at the plant” because they had family members, mostly fathers, who had worked for GPC and helped them secure employment with the company. Workers explained that it was customary for established GPC employees to assist their children and relatives in getting jobs at the facility. The following remarks were typical of workers who pointed to family ties as not only influencing their decisions to seek employment at GPC, but also being instrumental in securing their jobs with the company:

My father worked down there and told me they were hiring summer help. Well, my summer job ended up lasting 27 years…I probably wouldn’t have worked there if it wasn’t for my father. (Interview, February 24, 2014)

My wife’s parents both worked for GPC, so right out of high school they were pressuring me to get a job there. Back then, it was one of the best jobs in Muscatine and you had to know someone there to get hired. (Interview, February 25, 2015)

Moreover, a worker who counted five family members working at GPC before the lockout stated:

I was never told to go to the plant and apply…I guess I just assumed that’s what I was supposed to do, what was expected of me. That’s where my dad worked and that’s
where my brother worked. I also assumed they’d help me get a job at the plant, which I am sure they did. (Interview, February 20, 2014)

Familial relationships influenced not only the initial hiring of GPC workers, but also job assignments and advancements in the internal labor market at the facility. As a worker with nearly 30 years’ experience at GPC described:

You really needed connections to get hired at GPC, you know, like family or family friends. And where you got placed in the plant and how quickly you moved up the ladder also depended on those connections. (Interview, February 28, 2014)

Those workers who were unable to draw on family connections to get hired at GPC indicated that their decisions to seek employment with the company were based on its reputation in the community and its surrounding rural areas for being a “good place to work.” In the words of several of the workers “it was the best place in town to work.” Nearly all of the workers indicated that at the time they were hired at GPC, the pay and benefits offered by the company were superb relative to other manufacturing companies in Muscatine and the surrounding rural communities. As a worker with 32 years at GPC explained, “There were other places to work, like Power and Water, Bandage, and HON, but none of them paid as much as GPC…GPC was the best money in town” (Interview, March 4, 2014). Similarly, a worker with 28 years’ experience at GPC recalled:

That was the place to work back when I was hired…great pay, great benefits. The conditions in the plant could be pretty shitty, freezing in the winter and scorching in the summer, but that’s why the pay was so good. If you were lucky enough to get hired at GPC, you were set. (Interview, January 25, 2014)

Another worker, who retired shortly after the lockout claimed:

Back when I was hired, it was the best job in the area for those of us who wanted to stay here [in Muscatine] and go to work straight out of high school. I mean…if you didn’t want to or couldn’t afford to go to college or you didn’t want to join the military, you knew you could go down to GPC and make good money. It was a middle-class job, paid enough you could buy a home and retire with a pension. Hell, it was a good job. (Interview, February 17, 2014)
Lured by family members and the company’s reputation for wages and benefits that brought a middle-class lifestyle to its workforce, workers indicated that they quickly became accustomed to their relatively high salaries and benefits at GPC which made it difficult to even contemplate leaving their jobs with the company. As a worker with nearly three decades at GPC described:

You kind of get trapped working down there. I did. I told myself I was going to go down there and work a summer or two as “summer help” while I went to college. Well, the money was too good. I ended up saying “screw college, I can make more at GPC.” (Interview, March 3, 2014)

Likewise, a worker with less than a decade working at the plant prior to the lockout explained:

I went to Scott Community College for a while and enjoyed it, but didn’t enjoy working part-time in Muscatine while driving back and forth to Bettendorf for school. So, I decided to go to work at GPC, where my dad was working, and save up enough money to quit working and go back to school full-time. As you can see, that didn’t happen. The money I was making was just too good. I couldn’t rationalize leaving GPC to go back to school. What was I going to do with a community college degree that would pay more than I was making at GPC? At least that’s what I used to think and why I ended up working there as long as I did. (Interview, April 16, 2014)

Additionally, a worker who retired from GPC shortly after the lockout recalled:

I was from a family of farmers. I was raised on a farm and planned on retiring a farmer, like my father. But, I ended up retiring from GPC and returning to farming. I went to work at GPC to supplement my farming income and also because they offered benefits, you know, like health insurance for me and my family. The money I was making at GPC was more than I was making farming and I was working a lot of overtime, which was even more money. It quickly got to the point where farming was supplementing my GPC income. Farming and everything else took a back seat to the good money I was making at GPC. Before I knew it, I was sucked into GPC. (Interview, April 23, 2014)

Workers also indicated that as they married and had children they became more dependent on the wages and fringe benefits GPC offered its employees and their families. The following second generation GPC worker’s comments were typical of those who claimed they and their families relied on the wages and benefits the company had to offer “…once you have a
family you don’t really have the option of leaving a good paying, secure job with good benefits” (Interview, February 19, 2014). Similarly, another worker stated:

You know how it goes, you get the wife, you have the kids, you buy the house and now you are stuck. You need a steady and good income to provide for your family. And then you need all the overtime you can get to buy you and your family “toys,” like a new truck, a boat, a camper…More toys mean more payments and to make those payments you’ve gotta [sic] kept your good-paying job. (Interview, February 15, 2014) 82

Borrowing form sociologist Andrew Cherlin’s (2014:176) description of working-class family trajectories in America, gaining employment at GPC represented “the first step into adulthood followed by marriage and childbearing for most of the workers.” In other words, most of these workers followed a graduate high school-then-go to work for GPC-then-marry-then-have children life trajectory. The youngest workers in this study, those who were under the age of 30 at the time of the lockout, had somewhat different trajectories in that they were more likely to: 1) not be married or have children, but rather be cohabitating with their girlfriends, which was the case for three of the workers; or 2) have had children prior to marriage and going to work for GPC, which was true for two of the workers. 83 As depicted in the following worker’s comments:

Once I got my girlfriend pregnant, I was pretty much told by her father that I needed to go to GPC and get a job so that I could provide for her and the baby. Her dad works there and probably is the reason I got the job. Well, we had the baby and then we got married, but it [the marriage] didn’t last long. (Interview, April 22, 2014)

82 These workers’ descriptions of how they, and their families, became “dependent” on the wages and benefits their jobs at GPC provided relate to what Ruth Milkman found in her case study of manufacturing workers at a General Motors facility in Linden, New Jersey in the mid-1980s. In her book Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century, which is based on the study, she reports, “Workers who were married and had children became especially dependent on the fringe benefits, making it even harder to leave [their jobs at GM]” (Milkman 1997:42).

83 Just six of the 62 workers in this study were under the age of 30 when they were locked out in August 2008. Only one of these six workers followed the “graduate high school-then-go to work for GPC-then-marry-then-have children life trajectory.”
Regardless of how they ended up working at GPC, the overwhelming majority of workers explained that as their tenure with the company increased and as they worked their way up the internal labor market at the facility, they became less likely to consider leaving the company and/or looking for employment elsewhere. And, they became increasingly committed to staying at GPC until they reached the age of retirement. As described by a second generation GPC worker with 28 years’ experience at the facility before being locked out:

As time goes on, I guess you just become, I don’t really know how to describe it, content. You know your job and do it well. You know what to expect on the job and enjoy most of the guys you work with. You get used to the smell, the heat, the cold, the dirty conditions, and you just do your job. It pays a decent wage. Before you know it, you’ve done the math and figured out how many years you need on the job before you can retire with a decent pension. (Interview, April 16, 2014)

Similarly, another worker with nearly 30 years’ experience at the facility prior to the lockout stated:

You went down there [GPC] knowing it was a good job and if you were a good worker you could work your way up to an even better job at the plant. That’s what my father and uncle did. Back when they worked at the plant and when I started, it was one of the only plants in town that offered promotions and a pension. You knew if you were a hard worker and put your time in at the plant, you’d retire from a good job and with a good pension. (Interview, May 12, 2014)

Likewise, another worker questioned:

Once you’ve committed ten or twenty years to the company, where are you going to go and make the kind of money you’re making and have the kind of benefits you’ve accrued? Shit, I had six weeks paid vacation a year. Where else was I going to go and get that? Once you’ve built up your time and benefits, nowhere else is going to compare. (Interview, February, 18, 2014)

Indeed, only a few of the workers indicated that they had ever considered leaving work at GPC for another job. The overwhelming majority of workers described that once they made it through
their probationary period and were hired on a permanent basis, they never really considered looking for another job and/or leaving work at GPC. For instance, one worker explained:

I might have thought about applying somewhere else in town, like Monsanto, but it was just a fleeting thought. I never followed through on looking for anything else or applying anywhere else while I was there [at GPC]. I guess I never seriously considered leaving GPC until I retired. (Interview, May 28, 2014)

Another stated:

Sure, you’d get pissed off and say to yourself, “I need to find another job,” but that’s far as you got. You didn’t really look for another job or apply for another job. You knew you were lucky to have a job at GPC and just got over whatever pissed you off. (Interview, May 5, 2014)

Several workers explained that they did not seek employment outside of GPC because they knew their jobs well and what to expect on the job. Basically, they described feeling comfortable, confident, and secure working for GPC and therefore never seriously entertained the idea of working someplace other than the company. As one worker described:

I guess I never applied anywhere else before the lockout because I was comfortable at GPC. I was comfortable doing my job and I was comfortable with the guys I worked with. I guess you’d say I am one of those people who doesn’t like change. If you’re conformable, why look for something else? Why change something that’s not broken? (Interview, May 9, 2014)

Similarly, a 25-year veteran at GPC stated:

I knew my job. I knew what to expect every day when I went into work. I knew the equipment and how to make it work. Sure, there were days that things weren’t working like they were supposed to, but you’d figure them out because you knew the equipment and how to maneuver it to get it to work. Plus, you knew which guys to go to for help, if you needed it. (Interview, May 12, 2014)

An additional worker with over two decades’ experience at GPC reported:

I’d say I never looked for another job because I was comfortable at GPC. It’s a comfort thing. There, at GPC, I knew who was who and what to expect from them.

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84 Although most of these workers indicated that they had never considered leaving their jobs at GPC for another job, a number of them were self-employed while working their full-time GPC jobs.
Who you work with has a lot to do with whether you like your job. The job is the easy part. It is your coworkers that can be difficult. I didn’t want to go somewhere else and find out it was worse or I didn’t like my coworkers. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

Still another worker described:

It’s like once you got hired at GPC, you knew you were in it for the long haul. You knew what to expect…you expected to be there ‘til you retired. They offered you decent wages, paid vacations, and a good pension, so you were content there ‘til you could retire. Until you had your 80 points. (Interview, May 9, 2014)

The Point System and Retirement

Workers explained that retirement at GPC was based on “a points system” which was based on a worker’s age and his or her “number of years of service” with the company. Basically, workers earned points based on their age (i.e., each year of age equaled one point) and a point for each year of service with the company. Therefore, a hypothetical 55-year-old worker with 25 years on the job would have earned 80 points towards his or her retirement. Once workers reached their 80 points, they could retire with a pension and also receive a financial supplement to their pension (which averaged around $700 – $800 per month) until they were eligible for their social security retirement benefits. For instance, a worker who chose to retire shortly after being locked out explained the “80 points system” as follows:

I started working there [GPC] in ’79, so I was just a year shy of 30 years of service when they locked us out. I am 56, but was over 50 at the time of the lockout. So, I had just enough points once they locked us out that I could go ahead and take my retirement and not lose the supplement. Now, if I was one of those guys who started in the late ‘80s or when I was in my thirties, I’d be out the supplement. (Interview, February 12, 2014)

Moreover, he spelled out:

Some of them guys [locked out workers] got screwed because they had a lot of years of service, but they weren’t old enough to retire with the supplement. See, the company changed the retirement age to 54 and a half. Let’s say a guy started there when he was 40 and now he’s 60, he only has 20 years of service, but he’s got his 80 points. Well, he is better off than a guy who, let’s say, started there when he was
20 and has 28 years of service. He’s got his 80 points, but he has to wait at least 6 more years [until he is 54½] to retire in order to get the supplement that the older guy gets. (Interview, February 12, 2014)

Another worker clarified:

How the 80 points works is that you must have 80 points and be at least 54½ years old to retire with the supplement. So, you could be 54½ [years old] and have 25½ years of service and retire with the extra $750 a month added to your pension until you reached the age in which you could draw your social security. Basically, GPC added money to your retirement pension if you had the 80 points. It was something the union negotiated into the contract long before the lockout and also before the company switched from offering workers a pension to a 401(k), but, either way, you had to wait until you were at least 54½ years old to retire. (January 14, 2015)

As previously mentioned, nearly every worker in this study claimed that they had either planned on retiring from GPC before they were locked out or ended up retiring from the company as a result of the lockout. Approximately one-fourth of the workers (16 of the 62) indicated that they chose to retire from GPC after being locked out. Which, based on workers’ and union representatives’ estimates, is slightly less than the ratio of post-lockout retirees among the 360 locked out workers. One union representative claimed, “Around a third of the total number of locked out workers retired within the first couple of years of the lockout” (Interview, March 8, 2014). Likewise, another union representative assessed, “By the time I retired in 2013, I’d say about 120 of the 290 to 300 union members had retired” (Interview, February 21, 2014). When asked to explain why he chose to retire after being locked out, one of these workers explained:

Well, after nearly three years of being in limbo, I decided to just be done with it. The company didn’t want us back. The union didn’t have the power to get us back in the plant, so I said to hell with both of them. (Interview, May 23, 2014)

85 There were approximately 60 to 70 workers who belonged to the bargaining unit and were therefore locked out even though they did not belong to the union. The union representatives in this study were not exactly sure how many of these workers retired after the lockout. However, the union tried to keep track of these workers, as well and whether or not they had retired, through word of mouth.
It was typical for workers in this study to frame their decisions to retire around their desire to “move on,” “put it [the lockout] to rest or behind them,” and/or “get on with their lives,” as revealed in the following worker’s statements:

There came a point when we, my wife and I, just wanted to move on with our lives and put the whole thing to rest. It was obvious that the company and the union weren’t moving forward. The whole thing was at a standstill, and had been for years. It was obvious that neither side was going to budge to move negotiations forward. I don’t remember when exactly it was, but at some point my wife and I asked ourselves what the point of holding on was. We decided, I’d just retire and we’d move on. (Interview, April 10, 2014)

“I said to hell with GPC,” another retired worker stated. Moreover, he lamented, “It was obvious the company replaced us with a bunch of scabs and our jobs, at least as we knew them, were gone. I retired and moved on” (Interview, June 28, 2014).

A number of workers also claimed that their decision to retire from GPC after the lockout was based on either wanting or needing access to their pensions and/or 401(k)s. As a worker with 32 years’ experience working for the company recalled:

As time went on, you know, a couple of weeks, then a couple of months, then Christmas and then a new year, you started to get worried about making payments and losing things. I didn’t want to risk getting behind on my payments or losing my house or running up credit card debt, so I decided to retire and take that money to pay stuff off. (Interview, May 17, 2014)

Likewise, another retired worker with over three decades at GPC stated:

It was probably about two years into the lockout, I was sick of worrying about money and how we were going to pay for things, so I decided I should go ahead and retire and get my pension. I figured we could live pretty well off my pension...at least not have to worry so much about money. Well, between my pension and now working part-time, we’re doing just fine. (Interview, May 23, 2014)

Another worker decided to retire in order to get access to her pension and move closer to her family members who lived several hours away. She described her decision as follows:
I held out hope for quite a while that the union and the company would work something out and we’d go back to work, but after a couple of years, that hope just gave out…After I lost hope of ever going back, I decided to go ahead and retire and take my retirement and move closer to my family. (Interview, March 6, 2014)

A retired worker who expressed bitterness toward the company stated:

They [GPC] washed their hands of us, I was damned if I was going to trust them with my pension. I said screw them and screw going back to work for them. I retired, took my pension, and said to hell with them! (Interview, June 28, 2014)

All but three of the 62 workers in this study indicated that they had planned on working for GPC until they reached retirement. These three individuals were under the age of 35 when the lockout began and therefore were among the youngest workers in this study, and their tenure at GPC was relatively short compared to most of the other workers in the study. Moreover, these three workers were unsure what their futures held or where they would turn for employment once they left the company. This is illustrated in the remarks of the following worker, who was under the age of 30 and had only worked for GPC for two and a half years when he was locked out. When asked him if he planned on retiring at GPC, he claimed, “Absolutely not, I was on the 5 to 7-year plan” (Interview, May 5, 2014). He went on to explain:

I was, well, still am, planning on going the college route. I was hoping they [GPC] would help pay for some more of my college. They do that. They help pay for classes at MCC [Muscatine Community College] and other colleges, I think, as long as you maintain a certain grade point average. The problem is that it is hard to take classes when you are working swing shift. I mostly took on-line classes and a couple of night classes. Your teachers would work with you and your work schedule if you told them about your situation, you know, if you explained to them that you worked swing shift and would have to miss some classes. (Interview, May 5, 2014)

When pressed even further regarding his future plans, specifically future plans for employment, he continued:

To be honest, I haven’t applied anywhere else or really thought about where the college route might take me. In all truth, I’d say I am more of “a dreamer” than “a doer.” I say I was on the 5 to 7-year plan before we got locked out, but I know
plenty of other guys down there [at GPC] who were also on the same plan and ended up there for over 20 years. (Interview, May 5, 2014)

In the 5½ years of being locked out, this individual did not continue taking on-line college classes and/or return to the local community college, rather he found another manufacturing job in the local community.

In sum, the overwhelming majority of workers in this study did not plan on leaving their jobs at GPC and certainly did not expect they would be forced out of them prior to being locked out. Rather, they assumed that GPC offered them secure, well-paid, lifelong employment like the company had for at least two generations of workers before them.

**Job Satisfaction & Working Conditions**

Most workers indicated that what motivated them to stay at GPC as long as they did and encouraged them to remain with the company until retirement was the fact that GPC jobs offered non-college educated individuals access to a middle-class income, fringe benefits, a decent retirement, and, at least historically, job stability and security. Moreover, workers’ revealed that they did not search for different jobs while working at GPC and planned on staying with the company until they retired because they not only were content and comfortable at GPC, but many of them also found their jobs to be enjoyable and intrinsically rewarding. A common theme amongst these workers was that most of the time they enjoyed their jobs, even if the hours and physical working conditions were less than ideal; for instance, working swing shift and in areas of the facility that were extremely dirty and/or varied between being dreadfully hot or bitterly cold. According to many of these workers, rather than their jobs at GPC being monotonous, numbingly boring, unfulfilling, dehumanizing, and alienating (as is often assumed of most manufacturing jobs), they found their jobs engaging and requiring thought, judgment,
and skill. Moreover, many of the workers expressed taking pride and even satisfaction in their jobs at GPC. Workers emphasized that at times their jobs could be demanding and challenging; however, such challenges provided them with a sense of accomplishment and pride. Several workers pointed out that they appreciated the autonomy they had on the job, while also indicated they enjoyed their co-workers. In fact, the most common theme among these workers was that they genuinely enjoyed their jobs and their coworkers. So, in addition to the economic and extrinsic rewards of their jobs, such as money and fringe benefits, workers pointed out the importance of the noneconomic, or intrinsic, dimensions of their jobs to explain their long tenures at GPC and plans to retire from the company.

This is not to suggest that the workers did not have complaints about their jobs at GPC, rather it is to point out that despite their complaints, most workers claimed to truly enjoy their jobs. The most common complaints regarding working conditions had to do with: 1) certain departments and areas of the facility being filthy; 2) the temperature at the facility fluctuating from bitterly cold in the winter months to sweltering hot in the summer months; 3) working swing shift; and 4) unpleasant supervisors and superintendents. While a handful of workers claimed GPC was “a shit-hole,” the majority of them indicated that they liked their jobs and enjoyed the people they worked for and with. Moreover, they explained that they tolerated working swing shift and sometimes poor working conditions because they equated these aspects

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86 For example, in her book *Farewell to the Factory*, Ruth Milkman claims, “Factory work…was deeply problematic in its own right. However much it fascinated some left-wing intellectuals, workers themselves never romanticized the assembly line – instead them mostly yearned to escape its relentless and dehumanizing rhythms” (1997:12). Conversely, there are a number of scholars who document the ways in which manufacturing workers find their jobs engaging and rewarding. These scholars include Michele Lamont (2000), author of *The Dignity of Working Men*, Randy Hodson (2001), author of *Dignity at Work*, Mike Rose (2004), author of *The Mind at Work*, and Matthew Crawford (2009), author of *Shop Class as Soulcraft*, to name just a few.
of theirs jobs with the relatively good wages and benefits they were receiving working at GPC.

As one worker rationalized:

Areas of the plant got pretty nasty, like sticky and hot. In the summertime, it wasn’t unusual to be working in areas that were over 130 degrees, but you just got used to it. You would go home from work covered in sweat and starch, but you just dealt with it because the paycheck was worth it. (Interview, June 19, 2014)

Another individual who worked swing shift for nearly three decades justified:

Working 7-day swing, you just learn to adjust. It’s your job and you’re getting paid good money, so you learn to adjust. You end up compromising your sleep and your social life. I mean, you lose friends and lose out on a lot of social activities with your friends and family, but that’s the price you pay for a good-paying job. (Interview, February 18, 2014)

The most common response when asked what they liked least about their jobs at GPC was “working swing shift” and the toll it took on their bodies and relationships. Nearly every worker in this study claimed to have worked swing shift at some point while he or she was employed at GPC and the average number of years working swing shift among these workers was 20 years. Nearly half of these individuals worked swing shift their entire tenure with the company, and a handful of them noted working swing shift at GPC for over thirty years. These workers all mentioned missing out on time and activities with their friends and families, especially their children, as a result of working swing shift over the years. As demonstrated by the following worker:

Your friends would call you on the weekend and you’d tell them you had to be to work that night. They’d call you another time and you’d be at work at eight o’clock on a Friday night. They’d call you sometimes in the morning to go fishing or hunting or something like that and you’d be too tired because you just got off work. After a while, they just stop calling. You’d have to work swing shift to understand it…The worse part though was missing out on family stuff, you know, stuff for the kids, like ballgames, school stuff, holidays, and that sort of stuff…Your wife and kids don’t know whether you’re coming or going. Hell, half the time you don’t know if you’re coming or going so how would you expect your friends and family to know. (Interview, May 7, 2014)
A few of the workers even attributed their marriages ending in divorce to working swing shift. As one of these workers explained:

I don’t think she [his ex-wife] ever got used to me working the different shifts. It was hard to make plans, and when we did make plans, whatever they were, whatever we’d be doing, I’d be half asleep. See, when you are working swing shift, you are tired all the time, no matter what you are doing. Even on your days off you’re tired, you’re recovering from shift work. Well, she eventually got sick of it. She wanted a husband that she could plan and do things with. (Interview, February 11, 2014)

Another worker joked, “I found out the hard way that if you’re working swing shift and not sleeping with your wife from eleven to seven, someone else will be” (Interview, May 4, 2014).

Numerous workers also mentioned having health problems related to working swing shift. The most common health problem they said they had was sleep apnea. Over a dozen workers indicated that they had been diagnosed as having the sleep disorder and nearly all of the workers (56 of the 62) complained of having “sleep problems.” Several workers also said they had cardiovascular and/or gastrointestinal problems which their physicians attributed to working swing shift. Generally, the health problems and conditions these workers mentioned experiencing are consistent with the vast research on the negative health effects of swing shift work. For instance, Boivin, Temblay, and James (2007:578) report that shift work has been

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87 There is a body of research which suggests maintaining a marriage is more difficult for couples which include a spouse who works swing shift. For instance, Lynn White and Bruce Keith’s research suggests that “shift work has a modest but very general negative effect on marital quality” and is positively correlated with the probability of divorce (1990:453). Likewise, Harriet Presser (2003) has shown in her book Working in a 24/7 Economy that American couples which include a spouse who works swing shift experienced a higher divorce rate than those with spouses who only work fixed daytime jobs.

88 For instance, Akerstedt, Knutsson, Alfred, and Theorell’s (1984) research links shift work to an increase in cardiovascular disease. And more generally, Costa (1996:9) reports: “Shift work, in particular night work, can have a negative impact on health and well-being of workers as it can cause: (a) disturbances of the normal circadian rhythms of the psychophysiological functions, beginning with the sleep/wake cycle; (b) interferences with work performance and
associated with a number of health problems including coronary heart disease, impaired glucose and lipid metabolism, gastrointestinal discomfort, peptic ulcer disease, certain cancers, reproductive difficulties as well as increasing the likelihood of aggravating an existing medical condition. Moreover, they report “several studies have shown that shift work and high variability of working hours negatively affect health, well-being, life satisfaction, and happiness” (Boivin, Temblay, and James 2007:578). Yet, most of the workers in this study rationalized the fact that they compromised their social relationships and health as “the price they had to pay for a good-paying job.”

Regardless of the working conditions at GPC, as previously mentioned, most workers indicated that they enjoyed their jobs and would not have left them if they had not been forced out by the company. As revealed in the following worker’s comments:

As much as I bitched about swing shift, I actually enjoyed my job. I enjoyed going to work and the people I worked with. I had a bunch of good guys on my crew and we had a good time working with each other. That’s probably what I miss most about my job, the guys I worked with and the good time we had working together (Interview, April 30, 2014)

On the same note, another worker stated:

Most of the time, I looked forward to going to work. Maybe not every day, but overall, I looked forward to my job and the people I worked with. You spent so much time with them, both at work and outside of work, that they became like your extended family…You worked together, you ran together, you enjoyed each other. (Interview, April 29, 2014)
In addition to enjoying their jobs, most workers claimed that rather than being monotonous and uninteresting, their jobs were challenging and rewarding, as illustrated in the following worker’s comments:

The job could be challenging, but I liked that. I liked the challenge and the reward that comes along with the challenge. We were working with a lot of old equipment, but we knew how to handle it, how to work with it, what tricks it took to get it working, that sort of thing. It was frustrating as hell, but fun at the same time. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

Likewise, a worker with over twenty-five years’ experience working maintenance at GPC recounted:

Some days you’d go to work and wonder what the day had in store for you. See, being on maintenance, you never knew what was going to break down or what you were going to need to take care of from day to day. It was something different nearly every day. The job never got boring, not in all those years. It could be challenging, but not boring. And, with every challenge you learn something new…I sure did learn a lot over the years working there. (Interview, February 6, 2014)

Another maintenance worker described:

We’d joke and bitch about how old and shitty the machines were, but that’s what made them fun. You had to use your head and your skills to fix them and it wasn’t always a quick and easy fix. It’s not like something you can read in a manual. It’s something you learn on the job, something you learn working with the same machines and equipment over the years. You felt a little bit of pride, I guess is what it is, when you’d fixed an old, shitty machine. (Interview, April 12, 2014)

**Workers’ Post-Lockout Experiences with Precarity**

As previously described in chapter four, being locked out of their jobs in the summer of 2008 came as a big surprise to workers. Although none of them anticipated it, this prolonged labor dispute would come to represent the longest lockout in U.S. history. Workers’ initial shock and disbelief of being locked out was briefly followed by an optimistic view among most of them that their union and the company would continue negotiating their differences and quickly come to an agreement on a new collective bargaining agreement. The majority of the workers
felt as though the lockout would be settled in a matter of days and they would be back to work as normal and their lives would resume as usual. Some of this confidence regarding ending the labor dispute and returning to work was rooted in their belief that “they were irreplaceable,” and “the company needed them to maintain production.” The following worker’s comments were typical of those who held such beliefs:

I truly thought that we were irreplaceable. I said to myself: “Let’s see them run that place without us.” All our years of experience, our knowledge of the plant and the equipment, how were they going to run it without us? I thought they [the company] would want to settle this thing and get us back in the place as soon as possible so it [the lockout] didn’t slow down production and lose them [the company] any money. (Interview, April 25, 2014)

Similarly, a worker with nearly two decades’ experience in the starch department at the facility recalled:

I didn’t think they would be able to run the place without us. Hell, we all pretty much thought that…Production was up when they locked us out, even us guys with years of experience were having a hard time keeping up with it. So, I guess we thought how the hell were a bunch of scabs going to keep up with it. (Interview, May 6, 2014)

Many workers also believed GPC valued their loyalty to the company and their commitment to its success as well as their years of hard work at the facility. Basically, they felt the labor dispute would be short-lived because the company needed and valued them. However, it quickly became apparent – as truckloads of replacement workers crossed the union’s picket line and entered the facility – that the company was going to be able to maintain production without them and continue its operations unabated during the lockout.

As the days of being locked out turned into weeks, and then months, workers’ optimism of the labor dispute being resolved in a timely manner began to wane. They began questioning whether or not the company needed, or even wanted, them back in the facility. They also started
to doubt not only the union’s ability to pressure the company into negotiating a new contract, but also the likelihood of returning to their jobs. As indicated in the following worker’s comments:

I’d go down to the plant gates daily to picket and I’d watch management and our replacements coming and going from the plant. After a few weeks of watching others coming and going from the plant, while you’re stuck outside, you start to get the feeling that you weren’t going back in the plant…that they [GPC] don’t want you back in the plant. They [the company] didn’t even seem to flinch at us locked out workers and the union outside the plant gates picketing. (Interview, April 10, 2014)

Within just a few months of being locked out, most workers in this study indicated that they felt as though “the writing was on the wall” that they would not be returning to their jobs at GPC. In fact, the majority of them claimed that within the first 3 to 6 months of being locked out they started to seriously doubt “the company wanted them back in the plant” and “the union’s ability to get them back in the plant.” Yet, some still held out hope of returning to their jobs, as the following worker’s comments highlight:

It became pretty clear by the end of the year [2008] the union wasn’t going to be able to get us back to work. They [the local union’s executive board] kept telling us that we needed to stick together and remain firm on our contract demands, but they weren’t putting any pressure on the company to get us back to work. And the company was doing just fine without us...After a few months, we all started to get the feeling things weren’t going to end the way we wanted them to. We knew we weren’t going back to work, but we didn’t lose all hope. We hoped that there was still some chance of returning to work. (Interview, June 16, 2014)

Likewise, another union member recounted:

After they [GPC] locked us out, their offers were getting worse and further from the union’s demands. You’d hear that contact negotiations weren’t getting the union anywhere and you’d hear the company was doing fine without us. It started to sink in about November [2008], or maybe December, after about three of four months of being locked out, that we weren’t going back to work. But, we still held on to a little bit of hope that something would turn around, that something would happen and we’d get back to work. (Interview, February 19, 2014)
Within a Year Workers Began Terminating their GPC Employment

Within a year of being locked out, over three-fourths of the workers in this study claimed to have known they were not going back to their jobs at GPC. Within this time, as previously mentioned, a significant number of the workers choose to retire from the company. Some of them made this choice based on their need or desire to gain access to their pensions and/or 401(k) accounts. A number of workers who were not yet eligible to retire also indicated that they needed and/or wanted access to their 401(k) accounts with the company, which led to their decision to terminate their employment with the company within the first year of the lockout. As one of these workers explained:

As the lockout dragged on we burnt through what little savings we had and started getting behind on our payments. When we finally got so far behind on our house payments that we were looking at losing our house, we decided I needed to quit GPC and use my 401(k) to save the house. (Interview, February 12, 2014)

Another worker, who explained that he terminated his employment with the company in order to pay off his house, recalled:

I was getting unemployment and money from the union, but it wasn’t enough to keep up with all my bills. So, I decided to just quit GPC and take my 401(k) with the company to pay off my house, which was my biggest bill and biggest concern. I knew if I could pay off my house and reduce my bills, I’d be okay financially until I found another job. (Interview, April 28, 2014)

Similarly, a worker who was not yet in bad shape financially, but had begun to anticipate future financial hardships as a result of the lockout described his decision to terminate his employment at GPC as follows:

About a year after being locked out it became pretty clear to me that I needed to quit GPC and look for something else. I mean, I was doing okay financially because we were getting unemployment and $100 a week from the union. I also was picking up some work under the table. But, I knew at some point the unemployment and union money was going to run out and I was pretty sure we weren’t going back to work. So, I decided to quit GPC and took my 401(k) to pay off my house and other bills while I looked for another full-time job. (Interview, February 24, 2014)
Likewise, a younger worker with just a few thousand dollars in his 401(k) at GPC stated:

As soon as I realized the company wanted us out of there and we weren’t going back, regardless of what the union wanted us to believe, which I’d estimate was around the first of the year [2009], I decided to quit and take my 401(k) and live off of that for a while and while I looked for another job. (Interview, May 5, 2014)

In addition to feeling that the lockout had reached an impasse and therefore they were not likely to ever return to work at GPC, several workers claimed their decision to quit working for the company was ultimately a financial decision.

**Finding Reemployment after GPC**

A significant number of workers who decided to terminate their GPC employment within the first year of the lockout indicated they did so in order to secure reemployment. According to workers, once they began their search for new jobs they encountered problems related to the fact that they were still GPC employees. For instance, workers who applied for work at Archer Daniels Midland’s (ADM) corn processing facility in Clinton, Iowa, which is located approximately seventy miles northeast of Muscatine along the Mississippi river, claimed that they were questioned about both their employment and union status at GPC during their job application process. As a locked out worker who secured reemployment at ADM explained:

Shortly after I filled out the application, I was called in for an interview. During the interview, they asked me if I was still employed at GPC or whether I had quit my job. I explained that we got locked out and that I was technically still a GPC employee. I wouldn’t say they offered me the job contingent on me terminating my employment at GPC, but that is sort of what it was like. They didn’t come right out and say to me that I had to quit GPC before they would hire me, but basically that’s what they were getting at during my interview, or at least what I got out of our conversation. I told them I planned on quitting GPC as soon as I got another job. I also told them I didn’t belong to the UFCW, or that I wasn’t a union member at GPC, and I could tell that is what sealed the deal. (Interview, May 17, 2014)
Another worker who was hired by ADM after the lockout and did the daily 3-hour commute between Muscatine and Clinton for a few months before quitting ADM described a similar process:

They [ADM] knew the situation down here in Muscatine and were more than happy to hire us because of our GPC experience, as long as we were not still employed by GPC and were not sympathetic to the union. They [ADM] process corn just like GPC, so basically everything we learned working at GPC, our job experience at GPC, meant we were already trained and had the skills and experience we needed to work for ADM. They also liked the fact that we had years of experiences working swing shift…During the interview process they let it be known that the job was ours as long as we quit GPC and the union. (Interview, March 3, 2014)

Another locked out worker who went to work at ADM corroborated:

Hell, they knew all about our lockout. I am sure they were watching how the whole thing played out here in Muscatine, just like the other corn processing companies here in Iowa and probably across the country were. You know, after we got locked out, Roquette [a corn processing company] just down the river about 80 miles in Keokuk, took a page straight from Gage Kent’s playbook and locked their workers out. ADM isn’t union like GPC and Roquette, but you know they were watching what was going on with the other corn processing companies just down the river. See, back in late-70s or early-80s Clinton Corn, which is now ADM, had a labor dispute and their union went out on strike. They [the striking workers] all lost their jobs to their replacements and the union was decertified. Well, where do you think

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89 Nearly two years after GPC locked out its bargaining unit employees, approximately 90 miles southwest of Muscatine, in Keokuk, Iowa, the French firm Roquette America, which is a corn milling and refining facility, locked out 240 its bargaining unit employees who were represented by the Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers (BCTGM) Local 48G. The lockout began on September 28, 2010 and ended approximately ten months later, on July 23, 2011, when the company and BCTGM Local 48G settled on a collective bargaining agreement covering the company’s maintenance and production workers.

90 ADM, which was formerly Clinton Corn Processing Company and commonly referred to as “Clinton Corn,” is located in Clinton, Iowa nearly 70 miles northeast of Muscatine. In August 1979, American Federation of Grain Millers (AFGM) Local 6 went on strike at Clinton Corn, a subsidiary of Nabisco and a Division of Standard Brands Incorporated. AFGM Local 6 was defeated in the eleven-month strike, after the company hired 450 workers to permanently replace the striking workers and about one-fifth of the 750 striking workers crossed the picket line to return to work at the facility (Fantasia, 1988). AFGM Local 6 was eventually decertified at the facility. A few years after the strike defeat, in early 1980, ADM entered into an agreement with Clinton Corn, or Nabisco, to lease the facility for production. Nearly a decade later, the agribusiness giant ADM acquired Clinton Corn and since then has continued production as a non-union facility.
those striking workers ended up? Here in Muscatine, working for GPC. Not all of
them, but some of them. So, they [ADM] will hire locked out GPC workers as long
as they know they’re not going back to work at GPC and don’t want to bring the
union with them to ADM. (Interview, May 23, 2014)

When asked how ADM ensured the locked out workers would not return to GPC if given the
opportunity, he explained:

They made sure you quit GPC before they would offer you the job at ADM. And
they wouldn’t take your word for it. They’d call down to GPC and make sure your
employment had been terminated. (Interview, May 23, 2014)

Locked out workers who went to Nestle Purina – a pet products manufacturing company,
located in Davenport, Iowa, just 30 miles northeast of Muscatine – seeking reemployment also
reported being questioned about their employment status at GPC during the application and
hiring process. For example, one of these workers explained:

I heard Purina was hiring because a few of the locked out guys had interviews up
there. I thought what the hell, what do I have to lose? They [Purina] knew about the
lockout, as did most companies around here, and since they had guys from GPC
applying for work up there. During my interview they asked me what was going on
with the lockout and whether I planned on returning to GPC. I told them I didn’t
plan on ever going back to work there and then they explained to me how they got
burnt a few times by hiring out-of-work [laid-off] Alcoa workers. See, Alcoa is just
down the road from Purina and when they’d [Alcoa] lay off workers those workers
would go to Purina for work and as soon as Alcoa called them back to work, they
would quit Purina. Purina didn’t want to hire a bunch of GPC workers and have
them do them same thing. You know, quit and go back to GPC if the lockout ended.
(Interview, January 25, 2014)

A significant number of workers in this study went to Monsanto’s Muscatine facility
seeking employment after they were locked out and they also reported encountering inquiries
during the application process about their employment status at GPC. Monsanto, which is a
global agricultural company, has had a facility in Muscatine for over fifty years and – with an
estimated 450 workers – represents another one of the community’s chief employers. Workers

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indicated that they turned to Monsanto for work after being locked out because, like GPC, it is one of the community’s major employers and, even though it is not a union facility, it has gained a reputation over the years for being “a good place to work” with great pay and benefits as well as job security. And, similar to GPC, it is an agriculture company. Therefore, workers felt their years of experience and on the job training at GPC would benefit them in the job application process at Monsanto and make them desirable employees. They assumed, and had heard, that jobs at Monsanto were similar to the kinds of jobs they performed at GPC and were also swing shift, so they had some confidence in applying for employment there. Moreover, they heard Monsanto had recently lifted its long-term “hiring freeze” and was looking to hire a significant number of workers to replace its employees who were reaching the age of retirement.

Workers described Monsanto’s application and hiring process as extensive and protracted. As described by a worker who went to Monsanto almost immediately after being locked out of his job at GPC and who has been working for the company for about five years:

> Oh man, was it long and drawn out. After filling out the application and waiting over a month to hear back from them, I finally got an interview. After the first interview, I’d say I waited another month or so for a second interview. In addition to the interviews, they tested you. It seemed to take forever to finally get offered the job, but that was probably because I was out of work and really wanted the job. (Interview, April 13, 2014)

He went on to explain Monsanto’s inquiry into this employment status at GPC as follows:

> At some point in the process, I believe after they offered me the job, they confronted me about the fact that I was still a GPC employee. See, I hadn’t quit GPC since they locked us out. They [Monsanto] talked to me about their “non-competition agreement.” Basically, they considered GPC to be one of their competitors, so they wanted me to sign the agreement. They didn’t come right out and say I had to quit my job at GPC, but I didn’t mind quitting as long as I had a job at Monsanto. So, once they hired me, I went to GPC’s human resources and did the paperwork to quit my job. (Interview, April 13, 2014)
He continued to explain that he knew of other locked out workers who were in his “hiring pool” at Monsanto who were also hired by the company around the same time he was, but did not terminate their employment at GPC. He stated:

I guess I didn’t have to quit. They weren’t making us quit GPC, but I didn’t want to risk anything. I mean, I didn’t want to sign the “anti-competitor agreement” and then have them find out I was still working at GPC and fire me. I knew I wasn’t going back to GPC, so it wasn’t worth risking my new job at Monsanto. I know at least a couple of guys at work [Monsanto] that are still in the union [UFCW Local 86D] and still technically employed at GPC. (Interview, April 13, 2014)

Fourteen of the 62 workers in this study secured reemployment at Monsanto after being locked out. Most of these workers mentioned the company’s “non-competitor/competition” or “conflict of interest” agreement. They explained that during the hiring process, they were questioned about GPC and their employment status with the company and informed about Monsanto’s “non-competitor agreement,” which basically stated that the company would not hire employees that were simultaneously employed by a competitor. While all of these workers claimed to have signed the agreement, not all of them terminated their GPC employment when they were hired at Monsanto. In fact, at least a half a dozen of the fourteen workers indicated that they had not quit their GPC jobs and were therefore still technically GPC employees. For the most part, these workers claimed that they did not feel their employment at Monsanto was contingent on quitting GPC and/or they did not feel pressured by Monsanto to terminate their GPC employment. As the following worker’s comments reveal:

They [Monsanto] didn’t make a big deal about the fact that we were still employed at GPC. They told us they had a conflict of interest clause in their employment contract and we signed it, but that’s as far as it went. I think they make everyone who works for them sign it, so we weren’t singled out because we were employed at GPC or because GPC was seriously considered a competitor. I don’t think it really mattered to them what our status at GPC was as long as we wanted to work for them. It was a better company to work for so why would we leave and go back to GPC? Monsanto paid better and had better benefits. They knew we wouldn’t leave to go back to GPC. (Interview, February 4, 2014)
Likewise, another worker recalled:

> When I got hired at Monsanto, there were four or five other guys from the lockout in the group I trained with. We discussed the conflict of interest agreement. I don’t remember how exactly it came up or why we ended up talking about it. I just remember that three, or maybe it was four, of us hadn’t quit GPC or the union yet, so we were discussing whether or not to quit. One guy said he wasn’t quitting because he was still getting money from the union and he was so pissed off at them that he was going to get every cent they offered him. Another one said that he wasn’t going to quit because the company was still paying into his pension…None of us planned on going back to work for GPC and Monsanto wasn’t telling us we had to quit GPC, so what the hell, we figured. (Interview, April 30, 2014)

Another worker Monsanto hired stated:

> I don’t really have a reason to not quit GPC. I’m not going back there. No matter what happens, I’m not going back there. I’m happy where I’m at [Monsanto] and hope to stay there ‘til I retire. It’s a good place to work. The pay is good and the benefits are better than what I had at GPC…Maybe I haven’t quit because I’m still bitter about what happened. Maybe it’s because I can’t even bring myself to go down there and fill out the paperwork to quit. Hell, who knows? Monsanto couldn’t care one way or the other, so who knows when I will ever get around to quitting down there [GPC]. (Interview, April 28, 2014)

Yet, most of the workers who secured employment at Monsanto during the lockout indicated that they terminated their employment at GPC as soon as they made it through their “probationary period” at Monsanto and became “permanent employees” for the company. For the most part, they claimed that they made the decision to terminate their employment at GPC because they did not want to return to work there, regardless of the outcome of the lockout, because they liked their new jobs better than their previous jobs and believed they were better off working for Monsanto than GPC. As the following worker’s comments illustrate:

> Once Monsanto hired me, I said to hell with the lockout and GPC. Yeah, I quit GPC. I never would have left the place and now that I’m out of there and at Monsanto I see what a shithole the place really was. It’s dirty and dangerous and they don’t give a shit about workers’ health and safety. It’s like night and day, GPC compared to Monsanto. Monsanto is so much cleaner, it’s really unbelievable. And, Monsanto puts so much emphasis on workers’ safety. There [GPC], they didn’t give a shit about our safety, all they cared about is that we kept the place running. (Interview, June 22, 2014)
Similarly, another worker described:

I’d say I worked for Monsanto for about a month or two before I went into GPC and quit. No one told me I had to quit, but after a few weeks at Monsanto, I knew I never wanted to return to GPC. Why would I? Monsanto is a way better place to work than GPC. It’s still swing shift, but it’s not 7-day swing and the pay and benefits are way better. Monsanto also pays more into my 401(k), so when I quit GPC I transferred my 401(k) over to Monsanto. (Interview, April 29, 2014)

Another worker who also indicated that he was better off working at Monsanto than he was at GPC stated:

If I would have thought I could have got on at Monsanto, I would have quit GPC long before he [Gage Kent] locked us out. I always heard Monsanto was a great place to work, but I also heard they were never hiring and you couldn’t get on there unless you had connections. There was also a rumor that they had some sort of “hiring freeze,” so I never tried until after he [Gage Kent] locked us out. I guess I owe him a “thank you” because I never would have applied and got a job at Monsanto if he wouldn’t have of locked us out…I am better off now, making more money and liking where I am at. (Interview, April 28, 2014)

Monsanto ended up being one of the most significant companies in the reemployment of workers in this study, with nearly one-fourth of the workers securing employment with the company during the lockout. Most of these workers reported seeking employment at Monsanto within the first few months of the labor dispute, when they realized the company and the union were at an impasse and they probability would not be returning to work at GPC. These workers also explained that the first few locked out workers Monsanto hired were instrumental in facilitating the employment of additional locked out workers with the company. Basically, workers explained that within the first few months of the lockout several workers turned to Monsanto for employment and once they were hired by the company, they began notifying their fellow locked out workers when additional jobs at the facility became available and encouraged them to apply. Workers described how their personal connections and social networks, which developed over their years of working at GPC, played an important role in securing
reemployment at Monsanto after being locked out. Another factor that facilitated these workers’ reemployment at Monsanto, based on their own accounts, was the company’s eagerness to hire former GPC employees because the company felt they would be dependable, hard-working, and loyal manufacturing employees, like they were for GPC for so many years prior to being locked out. As one worker described:

Monsanto wanted us. They wanted workers with a track record. They wanted us because we had years of experience working at GPC, working swing shift and long hours. They knew the twenty years we put in at GPC meant we were loyal and hard workers. (Interview, March 3, 2014)

Similarly, another worker stated:

We were relatively young employees, you know, in our thirties and forties, and we already had over a decade’s experience working manufacturing. Plus, Monsanto is swing shift work, like GPC, so they knew we could handle the job and working swing shift. (Interview, May 2, 2014)

Likewise, another worker claimed, “they knew if they were hiring a former GPC worker, they’d get a good one” (Interview, March 6, 2014).

Over five and a half years after being locked out, although not all of the 62 workers in this study had quit their GPC jobs, a significant proportion of them had retired from GPC and all but two of the rest of them had found reemployment. The two who were not reemployed explained that they had spent the years since being locked out moving in and out of jobs or in the words of one of them “job hopping trying to find something comparable to GPC as far as pay, benefits, and job security” (Interview, April 23, 2014). This “job hopper” explained:

It took me awhile to look for a job and once I started to I realized it was going to be a lot harder than I had anticipated to find something that paid as much as I was making at GPC and also offered benefits. I found a few part-time jobs here and there, but none of them offered insurance or any other benefits like I had at GPC. Also, the pay was nowhere close to the $20-plus an hour I was making at GPC when they locked us out. (Interview, April 23, 2014)

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91 I will return to this topic in chapter six.
The other worker without reemployment described finding a job after being locked out that he especially enjoyed and which offered wages and benefits equivalent to GPC; however, this job was eliminated during the 2007-2009 great recession and consequential cutbacks in government spending. In his own words:

I loved my new job! I couldn’t have asked for a better job. It was like it was too good to be true. Well, it was, I guess, because it didn’t last long. Remember we were locked out at the beginning of the Great Recession. Well, because of the national recession, the government was cutting spending and the place where I got a new job was funded by the government. Essentially, because of the recession, they lost their government contract and most of their funding so they had to lay off workers. Since I was one of the newer workers, I was one of the first to be laid off. (Interview, February 11, 2014)

Since being laid off, he went on to explain:

I’ve done some work to my resume and I’ve been sending it out and taking it to job fairs. I am optimistic that something will come along. I will just keep at it and something is bound to come along sooner or later. I just hope it’s something I enjoy half as much as the last job. (Interview, February 11, 2014)

In sum, when asked what influenced their decision to quit GPC, most workers indicated that it was either to gain access to their pensions and/or 401(k)s or because they had secured comparable reemployment elsewhere and therefore did not plan on returning to GPC.

**Workers Who Have Not Severed their Ties to the Company**

Somewhat surprisingly, as previously mentioned, several workers who found reemployment, which they considered superior to their former employment at GPC, and who also indicated that they would not return to work at GPC regardless of the outcome of the lockout, were still employed by the company. In other words, a number of workers in this study have chosen to remain employed by GPC, despite of the fact that they do not intend on returning to work for the company. When asked why they have not terminated their GPC employment, these workers provided a wide-range of reasons. For instance, one workers stated:
Why give him [Gage Kent] the satisfaction of getting rid of me. I haven’t quit because I want to remain a thorn in his side. Why should I make it so easy for him to get rid of me? He locked me, well, all of us, out but that doesn’t mean we have to fold-up and go away. (Interview, March 10, 2014)

Similarly, another worker asserted:

The union told us he [Gage Kent] couldn’t hire permanent replacements as long as we were locked out. Well, you’d think at some point he’d want to be able to replace us on a more permanent basis. Why should I make it easy for him to do so? I mean, you’d think at some point he’d want to end it and be done with it. He’s the one that started it and he’s the one that is going to have to decide when and how he wants to end it. So, I guess I’d say I am just holding on to see what he decides, to see how he decides to end it. I’m not going back [to work at GPC], but I want to see what he’s going to have to do to end it and finally be done with it and us. (Interview, February 20, 2014)

Some of these workers indicated that their decision to remain employed at GPC was simply a pragmatic decision. For instance, one worker pointed out:

As far as I know they [GPC] are still adding points towards my pension for every year that goes by that we are still locked out and I am still employed. They aren’t adding any points based on years of service while we are locked out, but they are still adding points based on my age. So, for every year that goes by and I get another year older, that’s another year closer to earning my 80 points. (Interview, March 18, 2014)

Another explained:

You never know how this thing is going to end. I’ve heard all sorts of scenarios. Like they [GPC] are going to owe us back-wages for an illegal lockout. Or, they are going to have to buy us out to end the lockout. Like they might have to offer us a severance package to get us to terminate our employment to end the lockout. Since no one seems to know the answer to how the whole thing is going to end and since I don’t see any benefit in quitting, I figure I’m better off just waiting to see how it ends and what they decide to do to end it. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

Given that this is the longest lockout in U.S. history, there really is no precedent for knowing how, or even if, the lockout might end. And since there is no way of determining the outcome of the lockout, it seems as though these workers have made a sensible decision to remain GPC
employees while awaiting the final outcome, especially those workers who are edging closer every year to their “80 points” and thus their “pension supplement.”

**Becoming Precarious: The Consequences of Being Locked Out**

Immediately after being locked out in August 2008, workers faced a number of problems and concerns. Several of them explained that their most immediate concern after being locked out was the loss of their and their families’ GPC-based health care coverage. This was especially troubling for workers whose spouses and/or children were covered by the company’s health care plan. One worker described the events that unfolded within the first hour of being escorted out of the GPC facility by his supervisor:

> By the time I was out of the plant and got to my phone, my wife had called me several times worried about what was going on. There is a pharmacy where she works and they were getting bombarded with phone calls from workers and their spouses trying to fill prescriptions before the company cut off their health insurance. Hell, she knew something was going on before I did. I guess everyone was panicking about losing their health insurance and so they were calling out to the pharmacy trying to get their prescriptions filled before their health insurance was cut off. (Interview, January 25, 2014)

Likewise, another worker recalled:

> The union told us that the company couldn’t terminate us after they locked us out, but they would stop providing company benefits, like health insurance, until we got this thing [the lockout] settled. That was the first thing I remember my wife and I worrying about, health insurance. We have three kids and we were all covered by my insurance at GPC. You can’t go without health insurance when you’ve got three kids. (Interview, March 10, 2014)

When asked about what he and his family did about the loss of their GPC-based health care coverage, he went on to explain:

> Within a week or two, I can’t remember exactly but it was shorty after we got locked out, my wife was able to put all of us on her insurance [insurance offered through her employer]. I know a lot of guys that did the same thing, switched their families over to their wives’ insurance. I guess we were the luckier ones, since we had that option. Not all of us had wives or had wives that were working. (Interview, March 10, 2014)
A number of workers who did not have the option of obtaining health insurance through their spouse’s employer indicated that they either went without it or were able to enroll their children in IowaCare, which at the time was a state-based health care program that provided coverage for uninsured children of working families across the state. By the time they were interviewed for this study in 2014, all of the workers with dependent children reported that they were covered by either their new employer’s or their spouse’s employer’s health insurance plans. Early on in the lockout, however, knowing their children had some health care coverage either through IowaCare or their spouse’s employer offered some sense of relief to workers whose lost their and their family’s GPC-based health care coverage.

Related to workers’ concerns regarding finding affordable health care coverage for themselves and their families, was their anxiety concerning finances in general. When asked what they were most concerned about following the lockout, the majority of workers emphasized their financial concerns. As the following worker described:

I’ve never been out of work. Straight out of high school, I went to GPC and worked there ever since. That’s thirty years of getting a GPC paycheck. I mean, I’ve lived thirty years based on GPC paychecks. I’ve never worried about coming home without one. I didn’t know how to live without those paychecks. That’s what I worried about, how I am going to live without those paychecks. (Interview, February, 19, 2014)

Another worker recalled:

I worried about money. How were we going to make the house payments? How were we going to make the car payments? How much money did we have in savings? How long could we go without my income? Those are the sorts of questions and concerns that were constantly running through my mind, especially when I was lying in bed at night. (Interview, February 26, 2014)

92 The IowaCare program ended in December of 2013; however, it has been replaced by Iowa Health and Wellness Plan, or what is commonly referred to as the “hawk-I” plan.
Likewise, a relatively young worker with a shorter tenure at GPC than most of the locked out workers in this study explained:

I was scared shitless. I just built a new house and my wife was pregnant with our first child, and I just lost a good paying job with insurance and all that. Oh, I was scared shitless. I was worried about how I was going to make all of our payments. How was I going to pay for our new house? How was I going to support our child? What were we going to do for money? I’ve never taken a handout in my life. I’ve always prided myself on being a hard worker and taking care of myself and then I was without a job. (Interview, June 22, 2014)

Most of the immediate concerns workers pointed out were financial in nature. They worried how they would get by financially without an income and how they were going to be able to support themselves and, in most cases, their families without their income and benefits from GPC. All of the workers in this study indicated that they had been employed their entire adult lives and a lot of them were the sole income earners in their households. The very idea of “being out of work” or “not bringing home a paycheck” was foreign to them. The following worker’s comments were typical:

My first thought was: “What am I going to do without a paycheck?”. For over 20 years, I brought home a decent paycheck. Never gave a thought to not bringing one home. I think my second thought was about how much money I had in my checking account and I wondered how long that would last without earning a paycheck. It was an awful feeling. I had gone decades, basically my entire adult life, without ever asking myself those sorts of questions. Shit, I didn’t even know how unemployment worked before he [Gage Kent] locked us out. (Interview, February 18, 2014)

The fact that the company “locked out” the workers, rather than the workers and their union choosing to “strike” the company, meant that they were eligible for twenty-six weeks of unemployment benefits. So, within the first few days of being locked out, workers began applying for these benefits. Most of them pointed out that this was the first time in their lives that they had filed for such benefits. As one worker recalled:
I remember being outside the plant right after they locked us out and asking the union what the hell was going on and what it meant to be “locked out.” I just remember they [the union’s executive board members] told us the good thing about the company locking us out instead of us going out on strike was that we could draw unemployment until we figured out a new contract. I thought to myself, “Unemployment, I’m not going on unemployment!” I’ve never been without a job or on unemployment. They encouraged all of us to start drawing unemployment and helped us figure out how to get on it. I’d say I was on it for three months until I started my new job. (Interview, April 8, 2014)

Likewise, a union representative stated, “We knew workers would be worried about money and would probably face financial hardships as a result of the lockout, so we encouraged them to apply for unemployment benefits and actually helped some of them apply since it was the first time most our members had ever needed to these benefits” (Interview March 21, 2014). All of the workers in this study utilized these benefits and almost all of them claimed it was their first time. The workers who used these benefits claimed that they were essential to maintaining their financial viability until they were able to either retire and/or secure reemployment. Moreover, as a consequence of the 2007-2009 Great Recession, unemployment benefits were extended by President Obama, which also assisted these workers’ financial situation. According to Iowa Workforce Development Center’s Muscatine office advisor Brian Anson, these workers received between $361 and $440 per week (depending on the number of their dependent children) in unemployment benefits for up to 26 weeks, and then were eligible to receive a 26-week extension and an additional 13-week extension (Steinbach 2009). Workers explained that having this extension helped “hold them over” until they were able to secure full-time reemployment comparable to GPC. According to workers and union representatives alike, it is likely that without these benefits, workers would have faced more financial hardships.
Union Benefits

In addition to unemployment benefits, most of the workers, with the exception of those who were not union members at the time of the lockout, received financial help from their union. As international unions typically do in the case of strikes and lockouts, the International UFCW, based in Washington, D.C., provided the union members weekly funds, in the account of one hundred dollars per week. UFCW Local 86D also set up a “hardship fund” and “food pantry” for union members that were in need of additional financial support and were facing the greatest financial hardships as a result of the lockout. As a union representative described:

When the word got out, especially to other unions, that we were locked out, we started receiving donations, mostly cash and food donations. So, we [members of local union’s executive board] set up a “hardship fund” with the cash donations so that we could help those workers who couldn’t afford to make their payments. The funds were distributed to those workers who needed the help the most. You know, like workers who came to us for help with paying their utility bills, that sort of stuff. We also set up a food pantry with the food donations we received so that workers and their families could come get stuff if they needed it. We even set up a Christmas toy drive for their kids. (Interview, March 19, 2014)

The local union also sent a delegation of locked out union members to other facilities represented by the UFCW in the region to conduct “gate collections” to raise money for their hardship fund. As one of the workers who traveled throughout Iowa and also to Nebraska and South Dakota as a member of this delegation described:

We traveled to UFCW plants in Council Bluffs, Iowa, Omaha and South Sioux City, Nebraska, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota to get support for the hardship fund. See, we would go to the plants and ask workers as they were either getting off work or going to work if they could contribute any money to help support us during the lockout. They were so generous. I don’t know how much money we ended up with, but I remember when we would leave a plant our donation buckets would be full. It was pretty hard for me, I guess emotional is the word I am looking for, because some of the workers who were giving us handfuls of cash were working in meatpacking plants and you know that’s hard work and doesn’t pay shit. They were making maybe twelve or thirteen dollars an hour and were still willing to help us out. (Interview, February 5, 2014)
UFCW locals as far away as California also helped raise money for Local 86D by soliciting donations from their members via union newsletters, bulletins, and website news releases, such as the following which was posted on UFCW Local 1167’s website:

Over 300 members of UFCW Local No. 86D in Muscatine, Iowa, were locked out without warning by their employer, Grain Processing Corporation, on August 22, 2008. Grain Processing Corporation had been thought to be among the top companies in its industry and in over 60 years of a bargaining relationship, there has never been a strike...The members of Local 86D are now approaching one year of this lockout which has placed an incredible amount of stress and burden on our members due to the loss of their income and benefits. This prolonged lockout has affected the entire city of Muscatine. International President Joe Hansen, along with International Vice President George Orlando, have advised us that the membership remains 100 percent unified in their resolve to reach a fair and equitable settlement and is extremely grateful for all the support from the International and many of its locals. The economic pressure on the members has increased significantly and Local 86D is concerned that it’s Hardship Fund will soon be exhausted. Financial relief efforts are being coordinated through UFCW Local 86D’s Hardship Fund. UFCW 1167 and our International Union will continue to support this effort, but more help is greatly needed. Help give Local 86D members the support and assistance they need to sustain their lives until they return to work with a fair contract. Anyone interested in joining the fight and willing to make a contribution please contact… (UFCW Local 1167, 2014)

All of the union members in this study reported receiving financial support from the UFCW. Specifically, they claimed that they received $100 per week for “picket pay” during the first couple of years of the lockout. A member of the Local 86D’s executive board explained this “picket pay” as follows: “The locked out workers that came down to the union office outside the plant and picketed with the union received $100 a week. When workers retired or found other jobs they stopped coming down and getting the funds” (Interview, March 3, 2014). The total amount of union funds received by the union members varied based on whether they picketed outside the company and/or whether they visited the union office to claim their weekly funds. It also varied based on whether and when they chose to retire from GPC and/or terminate their employment with the company. Most of the union members in this study estimated that they
received $100 per week from the union for one to two years. In addition to their unemployment benefits, these union funds help alleviate some of the financial hardships and concerns workers faced as a result of the lockout.93

**Dual-Earning Households**

An additional factor that contributed to the financial stability of the workers during the lockout was the fact that a number of them reported having spouses that made substantial contributions to their household revenues. Although a number of these workers reported becoming accustomed to a relatively high standard of living, which their dual-earning households provided before the lockout, they were able to cut back on their expenses after being locked out and manage on just one income until they either retired or found reemployment comparable to GPC. Over one-third of the workers in this study (23 of the 62) indicated that their spouses were working when they were locked out. About one-third of these workers (7 of the 23) reported that their spouses earned similar or more money than they were earning at GPC prior to the lockout. As one of these workers explained:

> My wife and I were both making pretty good money before the lockout. In fact, she was making more than me, still is. Together, we were bringing in well over a hundred thousand [annually] when I got locked out. I don’t know where it all went, what the hell we were spending it on. But after I got locked out we had to figure out how to make it on just her income for a while, until I found a new job. It was tight. I mean we didn’t buy a bunch of the shit we were buying before, but we were doing okay, better than those guys that didn’t have wives working. I guess you’d say we started paying attention to where our money went. (Interview, April 12, 2014)

Another worker whose spouse was a salaried employee at GPC and therefore remained working for the company after he and the rest of the bargaining unit employees were locked out recalled:

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93 The locked out workers who did not belong to the union did not receive the weekly “picket pay” or “hardship funds” from the UFCW.
When I got locked out, she was still in the plant making decent money. It was hard watching her go to work when I wasn’t going in, but at least one of us was getting a paycheck. We were able to manage on just one paycheck, with just her working, for a while. I was getting unemployment and money from the union, with that and her paycheck we made ends meet. (Interview, March 5, 2014)

As a side note, this individual was one of ten workers in this study who reported having a spouse/partner or ex-spouse/partner employed at GPC during the lockout.

A handful of workers mentioned that their spouses/partners either picked up more hours where they were working or obtained a second job early on in the lockout to help support their households. As one worker’s spouse explained:

As soon as he [her husband] got locked out I asked my boss if he could make me full-time. At first all he could do was bump me up a few hours per week, but by the end of the year [2008], I was working full-time. I wasn’t making as much money as he [her husband] was at GPC, but it was enough to get by until he found something else. (Interview, April 16, 2014)

Alternatively, another worker’s wife explained:

After a few months and it didn’t look like he was going back to work, I applied for a part-time job at_______. I was already working full-time at ________, but I heard ________ was hiring, so I decided to apply. I ended up liking it [her part-time job] better than my full-time job. The pay isn’t as much as I am making at my full-time job, or anything close to what he was making at GPC, but I love it! (Interview, January 25, 2014)

Overall, workers in dual-earning households, which tended to be those workers under the age of fifty-five, seemed to have fared better financially during the lockout than workers whose spouses were not employed.

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94 Revealing the location of this individual’s full-time and part-time jobs would violate her anonymity.
The Role of Secondary Employment

Another factor that contributed to workers’ financial viability during the lockout was the fact that a number of them had supplemental work or “side jobs” while they were employed at GPC. Over a dozen of the interviewees indicated they had “work on the side,” as they referred to it, while employed at GPC. In most cases, these workers were self-employed. After GPC locked them out, they turned to these “side jobs” and/or self-employment on a more full-time basis. One of these workers revealed that he is making four-fold the income he was making at GPC being self-employed. He claimed the lockout was a “blessing in disguise” because it pushed him to invest more time and money into his own business, which he was not able to do while “working swing shift and lots of overtime” at GPC (Interview, March 10, 2014). The “side jobs” and/or self-employment these workers performed included primarily farming, construction, carpentry, mechanics and trucking. The most common type of self-employment workers described was farming. A number of them explained that they came from “farming families” and went to work at GPC to supplement their farming income and over the years this farming-GPC employment relationship flipped. In other words, they went from being primarily farmers to being primarily GPC employees, with farming supplementing their GPC employment. As one such worker described:

My parents were farmers and their parents were farmers. I grew up farming and consider myself a farmer. Well, somewhere about twenty-five or twenty-six years ago I went down to GPC and applied for a job because I figured it provided insurance and benefits I didn’t have as a farmer. I also figured a steady paycheck would be nice. See, GPC offered some security that you don’t necessarily have as a farmer. Well, over the years, farming took a backseat to my job at GPC. (Interview, April 23, 2014)

This individual also described employing a number of his fellow locked out workers during the first few years of the labor dispute and until they were able to secure full-time reemployment comparable to their jobs at GPC.
He continued to explain:

I never quit farming, I just scaled back. Like I said, it took a backseat to my job at GPC. When they locked us out, I thought to myself: “Well, at least I have something to fall back on.” I went back to farming on a more full-time basis and that’s where I choose to remain, farming, regardless of the lockout. I’m older now and more secure. I can retire from GPC and live off my pension and farming. (Interview, April 23, 2014)

He insisted on sharing an ironic twist of being locked out and a farmer:

It’s the damnedest thing, being a corn farmer locked out of a job at corn processing plant. Would you believe they [GPC] are still paying me a premium for my corn down at the plant? See, GPC employees get a premium on the corn they produce for the company and even though they locked me out, they are still purchasing my corn and paying me a premium for it. (Interview, April 23, 2014)

An article in the local newspaper, the Muscatine Journal, described how two other workers shifted from their “side jobs” to full-time self-employment as a result of the lockout:

Two Muscatine men who found themselves on the outside looking in because of the lockout at Grain Processing Corp. have decided to move on - literally. Brad Nau, 46, and Jeff Hartley, 42, have started River City Moving and Delivery, specializing in smaller moves such as apartments, offices and other residences. “We just decided to move on,” says Nau, with no pun intended. The lockout “gave us a good excuse to try something different.” The two men, who have been friends for around 15 years, are not strangers to the moving and delivery business. They have a history of working part time to deliver appliances and freight. They had been delivering appliances for the past year, Nau said, and had been delivering fruit to Des Moines and Ames for a Quad-Cities company. They say they saw a need for a local smaller moving company and decided to go out on their own. The partners started their business in October 2009 after acquiring the proper licenses, insurance, and a 24-foot truck that’s equipped with a box and a hydraulic lift (Potter 2010).96

Social Networks and Reemployment

Perhaps one the most important factors in explaining workers’ financial resilience and recovery from being locked at GPC is their social capital, including their social networks in the

96 These two individuals were not among the 62 workers who participated in this study.
community and the relationships, as well as the skills, they developed while working at GPC. These networks, including family, friendship, and coworker connections, became apparent when asking workers how they found reemployment after the lockout, and in some cases within days of being locked out. Workers described using their family and friendship ties in Muscatine and the surrounding rural communities to find work. In the early days of the labor dispute, these connections were utilized to find mostly informal, part-time, and short-term work. However, as the lockout dragged on, these connections were also used to secure more formal, full-time reemployment. The following worker’s description of the process was typical among the workers:

My brother-in-law is a general contractor and when he heard we were locked out, he gave me a call and a few of us [locked out workers] went to work for him. It wasn’t full-time work, but it was cash. While we were working for him we heard from another locked out worker’s brother that Monsanto was hiring, so a bunch of us went over there and applied. (Interview, February 21, 2014)

Similarly, another worker explained:

My dad was a carpenter, so I learned it as I was growing up. I’ve always done a little bit of it on the side, you know, while I was working at GPC. The guys [locked out workers] knew I like doing it, so when we were [locked] out and they’d hear of someone who needed some work done, they’d call me up and I’d do it. The guys also called me up when they heard Monsanto was hiring and that’s how I got my job I’m working now. (Interview, May 5, 2014).

Another worker recalled:

Quite a few of the [locked out] workers have farms or have family and friends that are farmers, and they put us to work. Remember, we got locked out at the end of August and that’s when they [the farmers] needed the help. They needed the help and we need the work, but we only helped them out ‘til we found permanent work. (Interview, April 8, 2014)

There is a vast literature the role work plays in shaping individuals’ social network and relationships (Granovetter 1975; Milkman 1997; Bamberger and Davidson 1999; Hart and K’Meyer 2003; and Russo and Linkon 2003).
When asked how he “found permanent work,” he stated, “The same way.” When asked to elaborate, he stated, “They [his fellow locked out workers] let me know that the energy company down in Louisa [MidAmerican Energy Company] was hiring, so I got on down there” (Interview, April 8, 2014).

All but a few of the workers who secured full-time reemployment within the local and surrounding communities mentioned relying on their social networks and personal connections for employment leads and recommendations.⁹⁸ Workers explained that what generally happened was when one of the locked out workers would get hired at another major employer in the community, such as Monsanto, Muscatine Power & Water, or MidAmerican Energy, they would “keep an ear out” for additional job openings at their new place of employment and notify their fellow locked out workers to come apply. As one worker explained, “We have our eyes and ears open for each other…As soon as we hear some place in town is hiring, we get out our phones to call and let other locked out workers know” (Interview, March 6, 2014).

Although most of the existing literature and research suggests that when displaced manufacturing workers find reemployment, their new jobs are likely to pay less, provide fewer benefits, and offer less job security that their former jobs (Moore 1996; Wilson and Leach 2002; and Kalleberg 2011), this was not the experience the majority of workers in this study reported. Somewhat surprisingly, nearly five and a half years into the lockout and after essentially being

⁹⁸ These findings are consistent with a body of literature and research in economic sociology (Lin and Dumin 1986; Granovetter 1975, 1995; Lin 2001; Heinz 2001; Mouw 2003) which demonstrates the importance of social networks and personal contacts in acquiring information about jobs and securing them. Granovetter (1975, 1995) for instance, claims that personal contacts are the predominant means by which people find jobs. His research suggests that formal mechanisms for getting a job, which include job advertisements, public and private employment agencies, and placement services of professional associations, account for less than 20 percent of job placements; while the overwhelming majority of jobs are found through informal mechanisms, principally through friends and relatives (Granovetter 1995:11).
displaced from what they assumed were “jobs for life,” most workers claimed to have secured reemployment that is comparable, and even superior, in terms of pay, benefits, working conditions, and job security to their employment at GPC. After taking into account the workers who retired (16) or turned to full-time self-employment (4) after being locked out, the majority of the remaining 42 workers in this study reported reemployment that was either comparable or superior to their employment at GPC. In fact, while 8 workers reported their new employment was comparable to their employment at GPC in terms of wages and benefits, 29 workers reported that their new employment was superior to their former employment in terms of wages, benefits, and working conditions. Just 5 of the 42 workers indicated that their new jobs did not pay as much as their former jobs at GPC; however, three of these workers reported that their new jobs offered better hours and working conditions than GPC. For example, one of these workers described:

I went from making about $23 [per hour] to only making $15 an hour, but I am no longer working swing shift, which makes a huge difference. It’s harder to make ends meet on $15 [per hour], but I sure do enjoy having a set schedule and a social life again. I could probably try to get a job at Monsanto which pays more than where I am working, but I’d be back to working swing shift and 12-hours shifts. I’m not sure it’s worth it. (Interview, May 3, 2014)

Again, the majority of the workers claimed that their new jobs paid more and provided better benefits than their jobs at GPC prior to the lockout. The following are a few examples of what these workers reported: “When I got locked out, I was making about $24 an hour, and with overtime, I was making about 45 to 55 grand a year. Last year, I made 65 grand” (Interview, April 22, 2014); “I would say the most I ever made at GPC, with overtime, was about $50,000. I made about $83,000 last year at…” (Interview, February 11, 2014); “About $3 an hour more. That’s how much more I am making at my new job than I was making at GPC” (Interview, May,
28, 2014); and “I’m on track this year to make almost double what I made at GPC” (Interview, June 6, 2014).

The local labor market appears to be a factor in helping to explain these seemingly anomalous results. As previously mentioned, Muscatine, situated along the banks of the Mississippi river, has long been an industrial community. The leading industrial classification of employment in the community is manufacturing, with over twenty percent of the community’s employed population working manufacturing jobs (Iowa Workforce Development 2013:1). Muscatine, however, is not a “mono-industrial town.” In addition to Grain Processing Corporation, the second largest office furniture manufacturer in the world, HNI Corporation (formerly HON Industries), is headquartered in Muscatine (HNI Corporation 2012). There are also a number of other manufacturing companies located in and around the community, including Monsanto, H.J. Heinz, Musco Sports Lighting, Bridgestone, SAAB of Iowa, and MidAmerican Energy. A number of smaller agro-industries are also located in and around the community. The workers were able to turn to these companies for reemployment after they were locked out rather than having to relocate in order to find new jobs. And according to workers’ accounts, most these companies offer wages and benefits comparable or better than GPC. As Kalleberg (2009:5) suggests, geography in an important dimension of precarity, labor markets, and labor relations.

**Job Displacement & the Role of Education and (Re)Training**

A common theme in the literature and research on the changing nature of work and employment relations in the United States is the importance of enhancing workers’ human capital through job training or retraining and education (Leigh 1997; LaLonde 2003; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005a, and Kalleberg 2011). After being locked out, only a handful of
workers in this study indicated that they went “back to school” or “sought training or retraining.” Nearly all of these individuals ended up back in manufacturing jobs similar to their jobs at GPC (mostly at Monsanto), regardless of their investment in additional education and/or training.

When asked to explain this process, one of this individuals describe the following:

After the lockout, while I was receiving unemployment, I decided that I should probably go to a trade school or community college or something to help me find a new, and hopefully better-paying, job. So, I went back to school to learn how to be a welder. Once I got my certification, I got a job welding and hated it! Next thing you know, one of the guys from GPC [a locked out worker] was calling me to tell me to come apply at Monsanto. That’s where I am working now, not welding. (Interview, April 28, 2014)

Similarly, another worker explained:

After the lockout, I heard some guys [other locked out workers] talking about taking classes at the community college. So, I looked up some classes and programs online and decided to get an associate’s degree in welding, which was one of the programs the community college offered. I did that, but it didn’t matter much because I got another manufacturing job and it doesn’t involve welding…You never know, I might find myself welding someday if this job doesn’t work out. (Interview, May 19, 2014).

When questioned why he took his current manufacturing job rather than trying to find job welding, he explained that his current job has great pay and benefits and is very similar to the work he was doing at GPC (Interview, May 19, 2014). Another worker who “went back to school” after being locked out described returning to school to earn a teaching degree. He explained that he had all of his degree requirements fulfilled, except for a few hours of student-teaching, when he was hired by a local manufacturing company. When questioned why he chose to go to work for this company rather than finishing his student-teaching and finding a job teaching he stated:

It wasn’t really a matter of choice. You don’t get paid to student-teach. Plus, it’s hard to take care of a family with what teachers make. My new job was paying about fifty grand more a year than I would’ve been making teaching. Plus, I had
student loans to pay off because I went back to school. (Interview, February 4, 1014)

One of the workers who sought “retaining” after the lockout, however, became self-employed as a result of this retaining. He explained:

I learned a lot of maintenance working for GPC and thought a lot about getting HVAC [Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning] training. Well, after the lockout I went ahead and got the training. Now I am self-employed as a contractor and am really glad I went that route. (Interview, May 7, 2014)

In short, investing their time and their own financial resources in job training/retraining and/or education was not a common response to being locked out and displaced from their jobs for most of the workers in this study. Moreover, it did not seem to affect their post-lockout reemployment.

**Retirement Rather Than Precarity**

As previously indicated, over the course of the lockout, a significant number of the workers were able to retire from GPC with a pension, which put them in a less precarious position than their fellow locked out workers who were too young to retire and/or needed to find reemployment or an alternative source of income. Over one-fourth of the workers in this study indicated that they retired as a result of the lockout. Some of them described retiring earlier than they had planned as a result of the labor dispute. Generally, however, these workers claimed that they were pleased that they were “forced” to retire earlier than they had originally planned. As the following worker’s comments reveal:

Well hell, they [GPC] did me a favor by locking me out. No more swing shift, no more working nights, no more working overtime. Hell, for the first time in almost four decades I am able to sleep in. (Interview, May 11, 2014)

Likewise, another worker who retired shortly after the lockout stated:

I ought to thank Gage Kent. He did me a favor by locking me out. I am able to enjoy my retirement. If I would’ve stayed in there [GPC] until I was planning on retiring who knows what kind of shape my body would’ve been in by then. I probably wouldn’t have been able to enjoy anything. (Interview, February, 12, 2014)
A few of the workers who retired because of the lockout estimated that they took somewhat of a financial hit by retiring earlier than they had planned. Yet, most of these individuals found part-time employment or “odd jobs,” as they referred to them, to supplement their retirement income and maintain their standard of living. They all reported that their new jobs paid less than what they were making at GPC; however, they claimed to enjoy these jobs. Some of them even indicated that they considered their new jobs “recreation” or “something to occupy their time” since retiring. These “odd jobs” mostly included farming, auto repair, maintenance work, carpentry, and construction.

Overall, most of the workers who retired after being locked out reported a the rather smooth financial transition from earning a relatively good income at GPC to being locked out of their longtime jobs to living off their retirement and pensions plans. In other words, the lockout did not result in their precarity.

In fact, the precarious position most of the workers were placed in as a result of the lockout was transitory. Five and a half years after the labor dispute began all but three of the 62 workers in this study reported that they were “better off” or doing “about the same” as they were prior to the lockout. While some of the workers indicated they had suffered somewhat of a financial setback, they also stated that their quality of life was better than before the lockout and that they were recovering financially. For instance, one of the workers put it in these terms:

I spent a lot of our [his family’s] savings the first year of the lockout. I also worried a lot the first year or so because I wasn’t making money to put into our savings like I’d done the previous twenty or so years. But, I’m making up for it now. I’m making good money now and getting our savings back up there. Plus, I am a lot happier now and my family tells me they notice the difference. I’m not sure exactly why. I mean, I can’t pinpoint exactly why I’m happier now, I just am. Maybe I wasn’t happy at GPC and just didn’t notice…Plus, when I look back to the first year of the lockout, I got to spend a lot of time with my family and I’m happy for that. (Interview, February 24, 2014)
Even a worker who described enduring perhaps the most devastating circumstances of all
the workers in this study during the lockout, which included the foreclosure of his home, the
break-up of his twenty-plus year marriage, severe depression, and contemplating suicide, stated
that he was “better off” in 2014 than he was before the lockout. He reasoned:

I was living a lie. My life was a lie. I wasn’t happy in my marriage. I wasn’t happy
at my job. I wasn’t happy how and where I was living. I was just on autopilot.
Things needed to change, but I wasn’t going to change them. The lockout forced
me to change my life. (Interview, February 15, 2014)

When asked to assess whether their lives were better or worse five and a half years after losing
their jobs, the most common response was “better” followed by “about the same” and just three
individuals replied “worse.”99 Yet, this is not to suggest that the locked out workers (and their
families) did not face hardships as a result of the lockout. Several of them face a number of
hardships after the lockout.100 Rather, it is call attention to the remarkable resilience and recovery

99 The tendency of workers in this study to focus on the positive outcomes of the lockout and to
assess their post-lockout positions as “better off” is similar what Hart and K’Meyer (2003) and
May and Morrison (2003) found when studying workers displaced by plant closures in the
1990s. For instance, based on their oral history interviews with displaced workers, Hart and
K’Meyer (2003:295) report that most “argued that the closing had had a positive impact on their
lives…While acknowledging that the loss was a financial blow, several simply saw it, for one
reason or another, as a ‘blessing in disguise’.” Hart and K’Meyer (2003:295) conclude that, “In
part, this was a result of their determination to ‘look at the positive things that could happen out
of this.’” Overall, these authors found that workers were satisfied with their positions post-plant
closure. In addition, Milkman’s (1997) book *Farewell to the Factory*, which investigates the
downsizing of approximately 1000 manufacturing jobs at General Motors (GM) in Linden, New
Jersey in the mid-1980s, documents workers’ positive assessment of leaving GM. In short, as
part of the company’s restructuring strategy, which was negotiated with the United Auto
Workers, GM offered a buyout to its workers who agreed to leave their jobs. Milkman tracked
the trajectories of a number of workers who accepted the buyout offer and found that a year after
they left GM the vast majority had “easily found new employment” (1997:115). Four years after
leaving GM, the vast majority of these workers reported being glad they took the buyout. Even
most of the “buyout takers” who earned less after leaving GM reported that they were happier at
their new jobs and did not regret their decision to take the buyout.

100 In addition to the positive lockout outcomes workers reported, they also described
experiencing a number of difficult situations as a result of the lockout. For instance, nearly all of
the workers recalled experiencing some anxiety and/or stress associated with not knowing when
of the overwhelming majority of these workers in the face of such hardships nearly five and a half years after the lockout.

**What the Future Holds in Terms of Job Security**

It is impossible for workers to know for sure how secure their new employment is or to accurately predict their tenure with their new employers. However, most of them reported feeling confident that they had found a “secure job” that they would be at “for the long-haul.” Yet, for some, this confidence was laced with hints of uncertainty. As the following worker’s comments demonstrate:

> I feel pretty safe at my new job. They aren’t union and Iowa’s a “right to work,” but I think I’ve proven to them I’m good at my job, that I’m a good, reliable worker. I don’t plan on leaving this job, but then again, I didn’t plan on leaving GPC and look what happened. I guess it’s hard to say whether any job is really secure anymore. (Interview, April 6, 2014)

Likewise, when asked about job security with his new employer, another worker stated:

> You want to think you’re safe. That as long as you do your job well and don’t screw up or cause any trouble, you’ll have a job. But I’ve learned from GPC that’s not always the case. I hope to stay at this job until I retire, but we’ll just have to see how it goes. (Interview, May 3, 2014)

Comments like these, and others, suggest that workers consider the implicit social contract that previous generations of workers had with GPC and other employers – in which job stability and security were exchanged for loyalty and hard work – to be a thing of the past. And some workers or if they would be returning to work at GPC. This uncertainty was more difficult for some than others, but it was a common theme among all of the workers when I asked them to recall the difficulties they experienced as a result of the lockout. A dozen workers described experiencing depression, although just two of them indicated seeking profession help or treatment. Nearly one-fourth of the workers (15 of the 62) reported either withdrawing their 401(k)s or draining their savings accounts. Nearly one-fourth of the workers also reported going into debt, with one worker reporting over $30,000 in credit card debt. Four of the workers indicated having to declare bankruptcy and three others said they lost their homes as a result of the lockout. Lastly, between September 2008 and September 2014, five of the workers divorced and four of them felt as though the lockout played some role in the breakup of their marriages.
have responded to this perceived deterioration of a social contract between employers and employees by lessening their own loyalty and attachment to their new employers. For example, a worker with over two decades’ experience at GPC explained that he has switched employers three times since being locked out, each time leaving a relatively well-paid “permanent” job for a better-paying one. He justified:

I’ve learned loyalty is a two-way street. Employers aren’t loyal to their workers anymore, so there is no need for us to be loyal to them either. If my employer found someone better to replace me, I’d be gone. So, I am constantly looking for a better job to replace theirs. And so far it’s worked. My income has nearly doubled in less than six years. (Interview, January 18, 2014)

Relatedly, another worker stated:

After what happened at GPC, it is really hard to trust any employer’s loyalty to their workers. I think workers are still loyal to their employers, but I am not sure why. I’ve learned not to get complacent, like I was at GPC, because you never know what’s going to happen. You can’t trust your employer to be loyal to you, so you better have a backup plan. (Interview, March 10, 2014)

It appears that most workers’ perceptions and assumptions regarding job security have been somewhat affected by their experience of being locked out and replaced by precarious workers at GPC. Yet, their responses to what they perceived to be a declined in job security vary. For instance, while it might seem naïve, some workers are optimistic regarding their new employers and job security. The described being hopefully that their new employers value them more than they were valued at GPC. Meanwhile, others seem to be less attached to their new employers and their new jobs than they were during their tenure at GPC. Still, others appear to be “job hopping” in search of employers and jobs that offer better pay and benefits and greater opportunities for upward mobility.
Some Conclusions

One of the conclusions to be drawn from these workers’ experiences of being locked out by their employer is that those workers who realized early on in the labor dispute that their union did not have the power and/or was not investing the resources necessary to effectively resist the company’s efforts to generate precarious employment and therefore started searching for alternative employment within the first few months of the lockout, were the ones who sustained the least amount of financial hardships and were the quickest to recover from the lockout.

Another conclusion to be drawn from these workers’ experiences is the importance of their social capital and agency in securing reemployment after they were locked out. Over their years of working at GPC, they developed personal connections and gained experience, skills, and knowledge that proved to be valuable in securing relatively well-paid manufacturing jobs within the local community once they were locked out. Although their personal connections were crucial in finding reemployment after the lockout, their own skills and knowledge as well as their demonstrated tenure at GPC made them optimal employees for other local manufacturing companies, such as Monsanto, and helped them secure reemployment not just comparable, but in many cases superior, to GPC. The next chapter will provide a more nuanced explanation of these workers’ social capital and how it and other factor played a role in their recovery from the labor dispute.
CHAPTER SIX

EXPLAINING WORKERS’ RECOVERY

This chapter steps back from the mostly ethnographic description of the previous two chapters to analyze the resources upon which workers drew to “recover” from the lockout. As suggested in previous chapters, there are a number of factors and/or resources that facilitated workers’ resilience and “recovery” after being locked out of their stable and in most cases lifelong jobs at GPC and that help explain the surprisingly positive outcome of the labor dispute for a significant proportion of these workers five and a half years after being displaced from their jobs. These factors will be referred to as “recovery capital,” borrowing from Granfield and Cloud (1999) who introduced the concept in their book *Coming Clean: Overcoming Addiction without Treatment*. As title of the book denotes, the concept has been used in reference to recovering from addiction. The authors define recovery capital as “the breadth and depth of internal and external resources that can be drawn upon to initiate and sustain recovery…” (Granfield and Cloud 2008:22). An adaptation of this concept is helpful in explaining the factors that contributed to workers’ “recovery” from being locked out by their employer and essentially rendered precarious. In fact, over five and a half years after being locked out, most workers talked about the labor dispute as something which they had either recovered from or were in the processes of recovering from. They articulated factors that assisted in their recovery and pointed out things they felt hindered their recovery. I considered these factors and resources as different dimensions of what I am referring to as “recovery capital,” which include: 1) workers’ social and human capital; 2) the role of the state; and 3) the role of organized labor.
Workers’ Social and Human Capital

The most important factor in explaining workers’ remarkable recovery from being locked out of their jobs at GPC is their social capital and human capital. As will be evident in what follows, these two concepts (i.e., social capital and human capital) are interrelated and corresponding dimensions of locked out workers’ “recovery capital.” In fact, together they represent the most important dimensions of recovery capital.

Admittedly, social capital is a broad term that has assumed a variety of different meanings and definitions.101 Despite these differences, as Alejandro Portes explains, there is a growing consensus in the literature “that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (1998:6). Moreover, he describes: “the concept focuses attention on the positive consequences of sociability” and “places those positive consequences in the framework of a broader discussion of capital” (Portes 1998:2) Human capital, on the other hand, is defined as “investments in education, training, and other skills and knowledge by individuals and firms” (Becker 1993:255).

In understanding the relationship between these two concepts, Roland Burt (1997:339) states, “While human capital refers to individual ability, social capital refers to opportunity.” Moreover, he proposes that “social capital is the contextual complement to human capital” (Burt 1997:339). For instance, Burt sees social capital as “friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your…human capital” (1992:9). In terms of the labor market, he argues “while human capital is surely necessary to success, it is useless without the social capital of opportunities in which to apply it” (Burt 1997:339). For instance, workers’ social capital plays a part in facilitating the returns on their human capital in that their social

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101 See Adler and Kwon (2002) for a review of the different definitions of social capital.
connectedness influences the opportunities they are provided to use their human capital. In the case of locked out GPC workers, most of the reemployment opportunities these workers encountered were based on their social capital; however, taking advantage of these opportunities would not have been possible if workers themselves did not possess the human capital necessary for their reemployment. Thus, following Burt’s argument, these workers’ social capital and human capital are two sides of the same coin and a significant dimension of what I am calling “recovery capital.”

**Workers’ Social Networks and Reemployment**

As indicated, there is broad agreement among scholars on the general premise that social capital is network-based. Lin (2001:25) explains that social capital is essentially the resources embedded in one’s social networks, which can be accessed through social relations and ties within the networks. Thus, social capital can broadly be understood in terms of the pool of resources embedded in one’s social networks and connectedness (Lin 2001). These social networks were of central importance in workers’ recovery from the lockout. More specifically, workers’ social networks were the primary path to reemployment for non-retired and/or non-self-employed workers following their loss of employment at GPC. Following the lockout, these networks were initially used to locate short-term, part-time, informal jobs (i.e., precarious employment), and as the lockout dragged on they were utilized to find and secure more formal, stable, full-time, permanent employment at least comparable to their GPC jobs in terms of wages and benefits.

Since Granovetter’s (1974) benchmark study *Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers*, “the question of how individuals find jobs and what effect social contacts have on the labour market has emerged to be one of the most interesting and controversial research questions
in labor market research” (Franzen and Hangartner 2006:353). In short, Granovetter (1974) proposed that most employees find their jobs through social contacts rather than through formal channels of obtaining employment such as direct applications, employment agencies, or job advertisements. Furthermore, as Franzen and Hangartner (2006:354) describe, Granovetter’s research suggests:

…the use of social networks allows job seekers to gather better information about the availability of jobs as well as job characteristics. This informational advantage should enable job seekers to select better jobs. Hence a job found through the network should result in a better match, that is, higher wages and higher job satisfaction.

In fact, most empirical research shows that a substantial proportion of individuals find their jobs via their social contacts with friends, relatives, neighbors, colleagues, and/or acquaintances. For example, Mouw (2003:868) reports that approximately half of all jobs in the United States are found through help or information from friends or relatives. Franken and Hangartner (2006), however, suggest that this figure might be underestimated if we consider the evidence regarding social contacts and job matches between employees and employers in which employees received an offer from an employer when they were not actively searching for employment. They explain, “studies that also pay attention to the ‘non-seekers’ show that in about 80 percent of these cases, a friend or relative was involved” (Franken and Hangartner 2006:354). Indeed, over 80 percent of the workers in this study indicated that they secured reemployment after they were locked out through their personal contacts, which included friends, relatives, neighbors, and/or former coworkers at GPC. Some of these workers were actively seeking reemployment while others were still somewhat “holding out” for GPC and the union to end the lockout and therefore were not necessarily seeking reemployment when they learned of an employment opportunity. When asked specifically how they found their present jobs all but five of the 62 workers in this study
indicated that they found them through personal connections, or, in other words, their social networks. In fact, one of the most frequent reemployment sources for these workers was their fellow locked out workers. As previously described, workers who secured reemployment kept tabs on their fellow locked out workers and would notify them when they learned of additional job opportunities with their new employers or elsewhere in the community. Thus, the personal connections and relationships these workers developed over their years at GPC were instrumental in obtaining information about job opportunities and securing reemployment once they were lockout. These workplace relationships were, for the most part, produced and maintained on a one-to-one basis and largely outside of any union involvement and/or activities.

In addition to the workplace, locked out GPC workers’ social networks were cultivated over their years, even generations, of living within the local community. As mentioned in chapter four, most of the workers in this study were born and raised in Muscatine and its surrounding rural communities. Most of them were not only second and third generation Muscatine and Louisa County residents, but also second and, in some cases, third generation GPC employees. Given their longtime residency and extended familial ties in Muscatine (a community of just over twenty thousand people) and its surrounding rural communities, most workers had quite extensive social networks and ties within the local area and its labor market. These networks

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102 Portes (1998:7-8) claims that another source of social capital is a type of “bounded solidarity” which emerges as a result of individuals “being thrown together in a common situation” or experiencing a “common fate.” For instance, he suggests that when this occurs, “workers learn to identify with each other and support each other’s initiatives” (Portes 1998:7). To some extent, the lockout produced this type of “bounded solidarity” or social capital which facilitated workers’ ability to secure reemployment.

103 Louisa County is adjacent to Muscatine County and is part of the Muscatine Micropolitan Statistical Area. It has a population of approximately eleven thousand and is comprised the following cities: Columbus City, Columbus Junction, Cotter, Fredonia, Grandview, Letts, Morning Sun, Oakville and Wapello.
were essential in providing workers with information regarding employment opportunities and helping them secure reemployment. As Alder and Kwon (2002:29) report, “The first of social capital’s direct benefits is information…social capital facilitates access to broader sources of information and improves information’s quality, reliability and timeliness.” Locked out GPC workers were able to rely on their social capital, in the form or their social networks, not only for information regarding job opportunities, but also for greater access to those opportunities via personal recommendations and influence.

Workers who expressed that they were initially concerned about finding reemployment after being locked out because they had limited labor market experience and/or had not applied for a job in quite some time (in most cases it had been over a decade and in some cases it had been over three decades) were surprised at how readily they were able to secure alternative employment using their personal connections and informal contacts. The fact that they were able to take advantage of their social networks and the informal mechanism they offered in securing reemployment, substantiates the research findings of Granovetter (1993), Zippay (2001), Mouw (2003), and others.

For most workers in this study who secured new jobs comparable to, or better than, their former jobs at GPC – rather than retiring and/or turning to self-employment – the general path to reemployment began with a “wait and see approach” which was quickly followed by informal work and eventually formal reemployment. These workers described that once they were locked out by GPC they began picketing outside the facility and waiting for the company and the union to negotiate a new contract. As they waited to see what would happen in negotiations, the days of being without work quickly turned into weeks and being idle made them uneasy. So, most of them started doing informal work or, as they referred to them, “odd jobs here and there,” which
they found mostly through their friends and relatives. However, as the lockout dragged on and
they began to realize the improbability of returning to work at GPC, they started turning to their
friends and family and their broader social networks to locate and secure more formal
reemployment. Thus, these workers’ social capital, in the form of social networks, were the
primary means by which they obtained both informal and formal employment after being locked
out of their assumed lifelong jobs at GPC.

Employers as “Social Capitalists”

As previously described, workers’ accounts and experiences of securing reemployment
after the lockout also suggest that local employers were similarly tapping into these workers’
social networks within the community to recruit new employees among the locked out workers
which played a role in their reemployment and recovery. Indeed, research on employers’
recruitment methods attest to the importance of workers’ social capital, or social networks, in
both workers securing employment and employers securing quality employees (Fernandez,
Castilla, and Moore 2000; Lin 2001). The practice of employers or companies recruiting new
employees by means of referrals from their current employees is common in the U.S. labor
representative sample of employers, shows that 36.7% of employers frequently use employee
referrals as a recruitment method.” Yet, Fernandez et al. argue the social capital literature and
research largely ignores this “demand side of the labor market” (2000:1288). They state:

There is by now a rich empirical literature on the role of social networks in labor
markets. Almost all of these studies have focused exclusively on the supply side of
the labor market, adopting a point of view of job seekers and their social contacts...While the supply-side focus has yielded important theoretical and
substantial insights, this line of research is incomplete because it largely ignores the demand side of the labor market. (Fernandez et al. 2000:1288) Moreover, Fernandez et al. (2000:1288) contend that those employers who hire “new workers via employee referrals are quintessential ‘social capitalists,’ viewing workers’ social connection as resources in which they can invest in order to gain economic returns in the form of better hiring outcomes.”

Recruiting new employees by means of referrals from current employees, or what is commonly referred to as “referral hiring,” offers employers a number of advantages, such as reducing the costs associated with recruiting and hiring new employees. As Montgomery (1991) explains, since time and resources are spent in the process of recruiting and screening new employees, referral hiring is more efficient and ultimately less expensive than relying on more formal hiring practices. He further explains that employee referrals serve as a useful screening device in that workers tend to refer other workers who are similar to themselves and therefore employers are inclined to “solicit referrals form high-ability employees” (Montgomery 1991:1409). Also “an employee will refer only well-qualified applicants, since his reputation is at stake” (Montgomery 1991:1410). Likewise, Fernandez et al. (2000:1291) infer that “to the extent that employees think their reputations within the company will be affected by the qualities of the person they refer, they should only refer qualified applicants.” Additional cost-saving advantages of referral hiring, which Montgomery (1991:1413) documents, include: 1) the tendency of referred workers to be a better match for the jobs in which they are hired; and 2) the propensity of referred workers to have lower rates of quitting and thus lower rates of turnover.

Lin (2001:96) similarly claims, “So far, research literature has primarily concentrated on the supply side...The demand side of the model – the recruitment process from the organization’s perspective – has only begun to emerge.”

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Given that the process of referral hiring has the potential of yielding significant economic returns to employers, it is not surprising that companies tap into their employees’ social capital in an effort to secure new employees.\textsuperscript{105} Workers in this study reported that their new employers in and around the Muscatine area made use of their personal connections with other locked out workers to obtain new employees. Several of these workers indicated that once they were reemployed, their new employers and managers asked them to refer additional locked out workers for employment. A few of these workers who secured reemployment within the first few months of the lockout claimed that as soon as they were hired at their new jobs their new managers and supervisors asked them to contact other locked out workers and encourage them to leave GPC and come to work for their company.

Overall, the experience of workers in this study reveals that their social capital was utilized on both the supply side and demand side of labor market. While workers relied on their social networks in the local community to secure reemployment, local employers were also trying to harness their social capital for their own ends. Moreover, the aforementioned tendency of employers to solicit referrals from their high-quality employees suggests that the locked out workers possessed human capital and/or other attributes that were valued in the local labor market.

Also noteworthy in regard to locked out workers’ social capital is the fact that those workers who turned to self-employment following the lockout also relied on their social networks for business referrals. These individuals were able to draw on their personal connections and reputations in the community to generate business and build their customer

\textsuperscript{105} My own research on immigrants working in the American meatpacking industry documents how employers exploit the cohesive social networks characteristic of many immigrant Latino communities in referral hiring (Gabriel 2006).
base. Thus, in this case, workers’ social capital was utilized not just to secure reemployment and to solicit new employees, but also to support self-employed.

**Familial Social Capital**

Social capital is also constituted in families. Clearly, an individual’s social capital is related to their family composition and connections. In fact, there is considerable empirical literature on social capital and the family. However, beginning with Coleman (1988), this literature has tended to focus on relations between parents and their children and how social capital, in the form of parental support, shapes children. Portes (1998:11), for instance, points out that this literature, bearing Coleman’s influence, suggests “Intact families and those where one parent has the primary task of rearing children possess more of this form of social capital than do single-parent families or those where both parents work.” Conversely, the family composition of workers in this study and their experiences of being locked out of work suggests that there is social capital and resources embedded in dual-earner families. For example, having an employed spouse contributing an income to the household helped lessen the financial hardships of the lockout. Nearly half of the workers in this study indicated having a spouse that was working when they were locked out, and most of these individuals claimed that their spouse’s income played an important role in maintaining their household’s financial stability after losing their GPC paychecks. Additionally, as pointed out earlier, having an employed spouse allowed a number of the workers and their children to maintain health insurance coverage during the lockout by switching from GPC-provided insurance to their spouse’s employer-provided insurance. These workers claimed that having access to spousal health insurance cushioned the loss of their GPC-provided health insurance coverage immediately following the lockout and relieved the stress of their families going without health insurance, especially for those workers.
with dependent children. Thus, for a number of workers, having an employed spouse and access to his or her employer-provided health insurance coverage helped protect them and their families from being uninsured during the lockout and helped sustain them and their households until they were able to obtain full-time reemployment with benefits. As Simon (2005:6) explains, the availability of health insurance through a spouse serves as “subsidy” during periods of unemployment following job loss and allows workers to search longer than otherwise thus enabling them to find better paying jobs. Additionally, having a spouse employed and engaged in the local labor market helped workers gain information regarding local employment opportunities. In short, these workers’ families represented a form of social capital which contributed to their post-lockout recovery.

To reiterate, the workers in this study possessed social capital in the form of social networks comprised of their families, friends, coworkers, neighbors, and acquaintances. This social capital provided workers the opportunity to realize their human capital. Both of these forms of capital were essential in workers’ recovery from the lockout and their descent into precarity as a result of the labor dispute. Thus, both workers’ social and human capital represent important and complimentary dimensions of their “recovery capital.”

**Human Capital as Recovery Capital**

The extraordinary reemployment of locked out GPC workers can be attributed to their human capital. The fact that the majority of these workers, with the exception of those who retired or became self-employed, found reemployment comparable or superior to GPC suggests that they possessed the experience, skills, knowledge, abilities, and/or qualities sought by other local employers. These attributes embodied in individuals constitute what is commonly referred to as “human capital.”
The concept “human capital” can be traced to the early 1960s and economist Theodore Schultz, who used the term to refer to the value of human capacities in the labor market. In short, Schultz (1961) argued that human capital was like other types of capital, in that it could be invested and acquired through education and training and would lead to an improvement in the quality and level of production. As Jacob Mincer (1989:27) explains:

Human capital theory is the economist’s approach to the analysis of skills or labor “quality.” The central idea is that human capacities are in large part acquired and developed through informal and formal education…and through training, experience, and mobility in the labor market.

Although early human capital theory recognized the relevance of workplace experience, it was mostly focused on the acquisition of skills and knowledge through formal education and training. However, as Gary Becker (1993:20) notes, “learning and training also occur outside of schools, especially on jobs.” Likewise, Jacob Mincer (1962:50) contends:

In the context of the economist’s concern with education as a process of investment in manpower, it is important to be reminded that formal school instruction is neither an exclusive nor sufficient method of training the labor force…training on the job, ranges from formerly organized activities such as apprenticeships and other training programs to the informal processes of learning from experience. Indeed, historically, skills have been acquired mainly on the job.

Both Mincer (1962) and Becker (1964) were among the early human capital theorists to call attention to the importance of on the job training in the development of human capital. Yet, as a vast literature accumulated over the years on the effects of formal education on earnings and productivity, corresponding research on the effects of on the job training has been limited. Nevertheless, Becker (1993:20) reports:

The limited information available indicates that on-the-job training is an important source of the very large increase in earnings as workers gain greater experiences at work. And recent bold estimates by Jacob Mincer suggest that the total investment in on-the-job training may be almost as large as the investment in education.
While human capital theories and the policies they influence have continued to emphasize the importance of education and formal training, they have tended to neglect the importance of on the job training and informal learning in the workplace in the development of human capital. Yet, based on recent research, De Grip (2015:5) claims “informal learning in the workplace is far more important for the human capital development of the working population than formal learning.” De Grip (2015:2) defines informal learning in the workplace “as the acquisition of skills through learning by doing as well as by watching other workers, taking instructions, and receiving supervision or feedback from supervisors or co-workers.” Moreover, De Grip (2015) maintains that workers, especially new employees, benefit from what he calls “knowledge spillovers” from their more experienced peers in the workplace. A number of additional scholars, including Fuller and Unwin (2005), Billett (2004), Beckett and Hager (2002), Eraut, Alderton, Cole, and Senker (2000), reject the notion that learning which takes place in formal educational institutions is inherently superior to learning that takes place in the workplace and/or on the job. However, Fuller and Unwin (2005:22) explain “whilst the literature making theoretical connections between work and learning is growing, the empirical literature is still under-developed.” These scholars suggest “an important starting point for thinking about workplace learning is the recognition that learning is not the primary goal of the workplace but a by-product of engagement in the activities and relationships involved in the production of goods” (Fuller and Unwin 2005:22).

The experience of locked out GPC workers confirms the importance of the workplace as a site of learning and investing in human capital. As pointed out earlier, with the exception of a handful of individuals, the workers in this study turned to full-time employment at GPC after graduating from high school rather than pursuing higher education and/or formal training. For
non-college-bound young men, and a small number of women, GPC offered not only an opportunity to achieve a middle-class lifestyle, but it also afforded opportunities to invest in human capital on the job. By going to work at GPC, these workers were investing their time and efforts into a workplace that historically provided on the job training and learning, opportunities for advancement within the company and therefore some degree of upward mobility, and lifelong employment. In fact, a number of workers in this study had witnessed their fathers, and in some cases their grandfathers, progress from entry level positions into management position at GPC during their lifelong careers with the company. This progression of upward mobility within the company, in which relatively unskilled workers are hired into entry level positions and then move upward on job ladders within the company while acquiring increasingly greater skills and knowledge, is commonly referred to as a firm’s “internal labor market” (Kalleberg 2011:23). As Kalleberg (2011: 94) explains, these firm internal labor markets are:

…useful for transmitting skills by having workers climb job ladders, a practice within firms that is associated with the progressive development of skills and knowledge. The opportunity to participate in firm internal labor markets was a hallmark of long-term, standard employment relations that exemplified the three decades of economic growth following World War II.

By gaining employment at GPC and working for the company for a number of years, even decades, the workers in this study were investing in their own human capital. For the most part, these workers reported learning their jobs at GPC and developing the skills and knowledge necessarily to perform them while they were on the job. In other words, they learned their jobs by actually performing them and with the help and guidance of their coworkers and

106 As I explained in chapter three, my father worked nearly four decades at the GPC facility in Muscatine. He began his lifelong career with the company in 1968 as an “operator trainee” and over the years he worked his way up to “superintendent of the starch department” (a position he retired from in 2005).
supervisors. They also indicated that GPC provided on-the-job training and, depending on the department and/or position within the company, offered training and certification programs. In addition, the company offered tuition reimbursement plans to their employees, but given most of the workers’ schedules—which included swing shift and obligatory overtime—taking college courses and advantage of these plans was not really feasible. Thus, most of these workers’ human capital investments were directly related to their employment at GPC and what is usually considered in the literature to be “firm-specific human capital investments” (Becker 1964).

Basically, firm-specific human capital theory suggests that through on-the-job training and experience, workers gain skills and knowledge which increases with their tenure at a specific firm, and that these skills and knowledge (i.e., human capital) only apply to that particular firm and are thus lost when workers switch firms. In other words, firm-specific human capital theory assumes that workers’ human capital in the form of training, experience, skills, knowledge, tenure, etc. at a specific firm or with a specific employer is largely nontransferable to other firms or employers (Kletzer 1996). However, the reemployment experiences of the workers in this study suggests otherwise. The fact that these workers were able to secure reemployment within the local community after being locked out at GPC suggests that the human capital they gained while on the job at GPC was transferable to other local firms, especially firms within the agro-industry, such as Monsanto. Moreover, given that the reemployment most of these workers obtained was comparable to, or better than, their employment at GPC, especially during and following a recession, demonstrates not only the value of their human capital, but also the mobility of this human capital within certain industries and/or sectors of the labor market. In

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107 Lave and Wegner (1991) refer to this process as “situated learning.”
short, their reemployment experiences suggest the importance of “industry-specific human
capital.”

**Industry-Specific Human Capital**

A number of scholars including Neal (1995), Kletzer (1996), Kim (1998), and Elliott and
Lindley (2006) point out the importance of considering industry-specific human capital in the
reemployment of displaced workers. However, Neal (1995:653-4) maintains:

> Previous empirical work on human capital has focused almost exclusively on skills
> that are either specific to a given firm or completely general. Few studies have
> explored the importance of skills that are specific to firms in a given industry or
> sector of the economy, but, in many firms, industry-specific skills may constitute
> an important component of the typical worker’s human capital stock. For example,
> all firms in a given manufacturing industry may value a common set of skills that
> are vital to the production process in that industry.

Likewise, Kletzer (1996:476) reports, “To date, there are only a small number of studies
estimating models of industry mobility following displacement.” In her review of these studies,
Kletzer (1996) cites evidence from California administrative data which suggests the importance
of industry-specific skills. She reports that Ong and Mar (1992) found that “workers displaced
from Silicon Valley semiconductor firms and rehired in the same industry suffered no losses in
annual earnings on average” (Kletzer 1996:475). She also reports findings from Neal (1995) that
“industry stayers” (workers who become reemployed in the same industry as the one in which
they were displacement) earn significantly greater returns on their previous job tenure and
experiences than “industry switchers” (workers who switched industries following their
displacement) (Kletzer 1996:476). She states, “Among industry stayers the level of
postdisplacement earnings increases more with previous job tenure and experience than it does
concludes that the research on industry-specific human capital suggests that “specific skills may
retain their value if an individual becomes reemployed in a similar sector where those skills are in demand.” Moreover, she offers that if human capital is transferable within an industry, earnings should be higher for workers reemployed in the same industry as the one from which they were displaced than workers who changed industries (Kletzer 1996:474).

Most of the workers in this study reported reemployment earnings comparable to or higher than their earnings at GPC regardless of whether or not they were “industry stayers” or “industry switchers.” A significant number of these workers, like those who secured reemployment at Monsanto, Syngenta, and other local companies in the agro-industry, would be considered “industry stayers” and almost all of these workers reported higher earnings at their new jobs than what they would have been earning at GPC. However, workers who secured reemployment outside the same or similar industry (i.e., “industry switchers”) – for example, those workers who obtained jobs at MidAmerican Energy and Muscatine Power and Water – also reported higher wages and better benefits at their new jobs than they were receiving at GPC before the lockout and/or would have been receiving if the company had not locked them out. This implies that the human capital these workers acquired while on the job at GPC was not only transferable to other local agro-industry firms but also to firms in other industries within the local economy. For instance, these workers’ tenure and experience at GPC may have been valued by local employers regardless of the industry. In fact, Neal’s (1995:666) research among both industry “stayers” and “switchers,” found that for both groups, their reemployment wages were positively correlated with their pre-displacement tenure. Moreover, Neal (1995) claims that displaced workers’ tenure and experience at any given firm is highly valued by other firms. Likewise, the reemployment experiences of workers in this study suggests that the fact that most of them had over two decades of experience working at GPC prior to being locked out likely
facilitated their reemployment because this tenure and experience was probably valued by local employers regardless of the industry. Workers, for example, claimed that their decades of manufacturing experience at GPC and the fact that they had years of experience working swing shift was appreciated by local employers and was especially valued by those local employers that operate swing shift, such as Monsanto and MidAmerican Energy.\(^{108}\) It is safe to speculate that employers in Muscatine and its surrounding rural communities benefitted from the lockout in that they were able to obtain relatively well-trained, skilled, experienced, devoted employees once these individuals were locked out and displaced by GPC. In short, the locked out workers’ on-the-job learning and training, their acquisition of skills, knowledge, and experience while working at GPC, as well as their tenure with the company and their ability to sustain swing shift work enhanced their human capital which was valued in the local labor market. This helps explain their noteworthy post-lockout experiences and recovery.

Also of note in regard to locked out workers’ human capital and reemployment is the context of the local labor market, which too helps explain these workers’ remarkable recovery. As previously described, Muscatine has long been and continues to be a manufacturing community. Recall from chapter four, manufacturing is leading industrial classification of employment in the community. Although GPC is one of the community’s chief manufacturing employers, as workers pointed out, “it is not the only game in town.” There are a number of

\(^{108}\) While interviewing locked out GPC workers who secured reemployment at MidAmerican Energy, several of them estimated that anywhere form ten percent to over thirty percent of the local energy company’s workforce consisted of locked out GPC workers. For example, one interviewee claimed that at least one-tenth of the company’s one hundred or so employees were locked out GPC workers (Interview, February 6, 2014). Whereas another interviewee estimated that over thirty percent of the workers at MidAmerican Energy’s local facility were locked out GPC workers (Interview, June 10, 2015).
manufacturing companies in addition to GPC located in and around Muscatine which workers were able to turn to for reemployment after being locked out. The fact they these companies took in these workers, especially during a recession, speaks to their human capital.

Also noteworthy with regard to these workers’ human capital is how they spent their “leisure time” or “free time” when they were not working at their jobs at GPC. As Schultz’s (1961:1) maintains, “the use of leisure time to improve skills and knowledge” constitutes investment in human capital. Nearly one in five of the workers in this study indicated that before they were locked out, they spent their “leisure time” or “time off the clock at GPC” engaged in some other type of work. For the most part, these workers were self-employed as farmers, carpenters, mechanics, construction workers, etc. Thus, they spent much of their leisure time investing in other types of work and thus furthering the development of their skills, knowledge, and experience (i.e., human capital). This human capital investment facilitated in their recovery from the lockout in that they were able turn to these “other jobs” for income and financial security after being displaced from their jobs at GPC. For some workers, as previously described, these “other jobs” became full-time self-employment after the lockout, while for others, they simply provided a safety net until the workers were able to secure full-time reemployment. Thus, how the locked out workers’ utilized their “leisure time” while working at GPC suggests that in addition to investing in their human capital while at work at GPC, they were also investing in it outside of work and on their own.

**Education and Training/Retaining**

For the most part, the workers in this study did not invest in formal education or formal training/retaining as a way to enhance their human capital before or after the lockout. Thus, formal education and training or retaining did not play a significant role in their reemployment
and recovery from the lockout. In other words, generally, these workers’ recovery capital did not include formal education and training/retaining. As previously described, only a handful of locked out GPC workers indicated obtaining some post-secondary education and/or formal training before going to work at GPC. A similar number described going “back to school” after being displaced from their jobs at GPC as a consequence of the lockout. Nearly all of the workers who described going back to school or pursuing formal training/retraining after the lockout ended up back in manufacturing jobs, regardless of their additional education and/or training. Basically, once these workers were locked out, investing their resources, financial and otherwise, in formal education and training/retraining was not a common, or necessarily an effective, response to the loss of their jobs. Thus, their experiences raise questions regarding the practicality and effectiveness of policies prescribing investments in formal education and retraining for displaced manufacturing workers. Indeed, the value of retaining programs for displaced manufacturing workers is commonly questioned, and as Elliot and Lindley (2006) report, the evidence on the success of such programs is ambiguous.\footnote{Likewise, Mazerolle and Singh (2004:720) note:}

\begin{quote}
The relationship between reemployment following job loss and retraining is highly debated. Retraining, it can be argued, improves one’s human capital, and this in turn should open employment opportunities. Yet empirical evidence has shown that the potential positive impacts of retraining are largely unobserved.
\end{quote}

As a case in point, Zippay’s (2001) examination of the effects of job training, education, and social network contacts on reemployment and income over a 10-year period among displaced steelworkers in Western Pennsylvania found that few displaced workers obtained jobs related to

\footnote{See Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s (2005a, 2000b) research for an assessment of public subsidies for community college schooling and retaining for displaced workers and, specifically, the impact of such schooling and retaining on displaced workers’ earnings.}
their training. More specifically, she found that short-term training was not effective in providing training-related employment or in advancing hourly wages for the workers in her study. Instead, the most salient factor associated with reemployment and job upgrading among the displaced workers she studied was their social network contacts. She explains, “Social network contacts were the primary means by which these workers secured manufacturing work and other skilled positions” (Zippay 2001:99). Her findings are very much in line with the experiences of locked out GPC workers in this study. These workers’ social capital, in the form of social networks, coupled with their human capital, was the primary way in which they obtained reemployment comparable to, or better than, their employment at GPC.

**The Role of the State as Recovery Capital**

Another dimension of what I am referring to as workers’ “recovery capital” is the role of the state. I have included the role of the state in workers’ recovery capital because every worker in this study indicated that they received unemployment benefits after being locked out of their jobs and that these benefits were essential in recovering from the loss of their jobs as a result of the labor dispute between GPC and the UFCW. As touched upon in the last chapter, the fact that this particular labor dispute was a “lockout” as opposed to a “strike” meant that the workers were eligible for unemployment benefits. In order to explain the importance of these benefits and the role the state played in locked out workers’ recovery from the loss of their jobs, a brief description of both our nation’s labor legislation and unemployment insurance system in needed, along with how these two are related in this particular case.

I will begin with our nation’s labor legislation which dates back to the 1930s and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. In response to the economic collapse of the Great Depression, Roosevelt passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. Section 7(a)
of this Act provided the basis for the establishment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935, also known as the Wagner Act, and provided the foundation for contemporary U.S. labor relations and legislation. As Professor of Labor Law Raymond Hogler (2015:80) explains:

The NIRA included protections for labor and laid the foundation of our national labor policy. Section 7(a) of the NIRA contained three separate clauses dealing with workers. First, it gave employees “the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” Second, it stated that no one should be “required as a condition of employment to join a company union or refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing.” Third, the statute required employers to comply with any applicable minimum wage and hour laws. For the first time in national history, a broad segment of American workers enjoyed collective bargaining rights as a matter of federal legislation.

Section 7(a) of the Wagner Act echoed “workers’ rights under the NIRA: ‘Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representation of their own choosing’” (Chaison 2006:14). The Wagner Act also authorized workers and their representative labor organizations to take “concerted action” such as striking and picketing for these purposes. The Wagner Act also prohibited, as “unfair labor practices,” “employers’ conduct that interfered with the exercise of workers’ rights, for example, discharging or otherwise discriminating against workers who support unions, refusing to bargain in good faith with unions selected by employees, and setting up company-dominated unions” (Chaison 2006:14). In short, among a number of provisions, Hunter (1999) explains:

The NLRA [the Wagner Act] made it illegal for employers to interfere with three significant areas of employee activity: organization into labor unions; collective

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110 The NLRA is also known as “the Wagner Act” because it was introduced and authored by Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner from New York. In August 1933, President Roosevelt created the National Labor Board (NLB) to bring about compliance with labor provisions of the NIRA and appointed Senator Wagner to chair the NLB. The NLB lacked any real power to enforce compliance with the NIRA and was therefore replaced in July 1934, by the first National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (Jacoby 1985:224). This “First NLRB” (commonly referred to as the “Old NLRB”) was replaced in 1935 with the passage of the NLRA.
bargaining through labor unions; and concerted activities such as striking and picketing. The NLRA outlawed as “unfair labor practices” any employer attempts to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees engaged in these protected activities. The NLRA also forced employers to bargain in “good faith” with unions that represented their employees; failure to do so was considered an “unfair labor practice.”

In addition, the Wagner Act established a new federal agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), to administer and enforce this legislation, thus making the federal government the arbiter of employer-employee relations in the United States. The Wagner Act and its recognition of the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively with their employers is considered to be the most important piece of labor legislation enacted in U.S. history (Zieger 1986). Even though this legislation was established over eighty years ago “it remains the basic law governing U.S. labor relations today” (Beik 2005:197).111

The Wagner Act led to unparalleled expansion of unionism in the United States. From 1935 to 1940 alone, “union membership shot up 143 percent, a gain of 5 million members,” “and collective bargaining became firmly entrenched in American industry” (Chaison 2006:14). However, both before and after its enactment, it has faced vehement opposition from employers who have continuously attempted to amend the Act to restrict the power of organized labor (Jacoby 1985; Beik 2005; Lynd and Gross 2011; Holger 2015). Their efforts were finally successful in 1947 with the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. This amendment to the Wagner Act established new parameters for labor relations and collective bargaining by imposing a number of stringent new restrictions on organized labor. Former union strategist Rich Yeselson (2013:73) explains that amendment as follows:

The NLRA [the Wagner Act] had been passed with the explicit goal of increasing unionization and with the understanding that unions were democratic institutions of working-class self-organization. Taft-Harley conceived of unions much differently, as merely a large special interest, dangerous to prosperity and stability if left unchecked. Taft-Hartley thus stands as a benchmark for labor’s inability to gain the respectful acceptance of the nation’s cultural, economic, and political elite. There is a general consensus among labor scholars that Taft-Hartley has had a detrimental effect on organized labor by shifting the balance of power decidedly away from unions and their members and in favor of employers (Beik 2005; Lynd and Gross 2011; Yeselson 2013). There are many provisions of Taft Hartley, and debate regarding what the most significant ones are. However, there seems to be agreement that among its most antiunion provisions, Taft-Hartley established “Right-to-Work Laws” which essentially outlaw the “union shop.” The union shop, Lynd and Gross (2011:30) explain, “…is the provision in many collective bargaining agreements that any new employee at a workplace where there is an existing union must join that union, or at

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least pay dues.” By prohibiting the “union shop,” Taft-Hartley essentially gave workers the right to avoid paying union dues or an equivalent fee but still receive union services and representation and the benefits of a union contract. Another of Taft-Hartley’s antiunion provisions is the prohibition of “sympathy strikes” and “secondary boycotts.” Basically, this provision prevents workers who are engaged in a labor dispute, such as a strike or lockout, from asking workers from another company for support in their dispute. As Lynd and Gross (2011:30) explain, “When the workers of a “primary” employer go on strike, this provision is intended to prevent them from asking the employees of other companies for support.” Moreover, Yeselson (2013:74) describes, “secondary boycotts were an especially effective tactic by which workers at a company not directly involved in a labor dispute could refuse to handle goods from another firm embroiled in a union fight.” An addition provision of Taft-Hartley which has had a detrimental impact on organized labor is its ban on foreman and supervisor unionism (Lichtenstein 2002). Yeselson (2013:74) argues that the banishment of supervisors’ organization flipped midlevel employees to the side of the employer and ensured that millions of employees in emerging white-collar segments of the economy would be statutorily denied the right to unionize. Another Taft-Harley revision of the Wagner Act which is considered antiunion is the provision granting employers the right to “free speech,” which has resulted in employers investing heavily in antiunion campaigns. As Yeselson (2013:74) argues:

Initially, the NLRA sought to make union organizing a “neutral” process, whereby workers could choose, without employer coercion, whether to have a collective bargaining agent (the union) or not…The right of employers’ free speech ensured that the party that signs employees’ checks – the employer – would have the most influence. From this spawned a billion-dollar a year industry of “union avoidance” consultants and law firms.

Ultimately, the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act have had a detrimental effect on organized labor. Some labor scholars even argue that the legal restrictions on organized labor under “Taft-Hartley are one of the key drivers of the decades-long decline in union density and power” (Milkman and Ott 2014:4). Labor scholars also blame this legislation for the bureaucratization of labor unions and the rise of “business unionism.” For instance, Yeselson (2013:75) claims:

Unions require more and more lawyers – and more and more union stewards adept at labor law – to untangle the welter of laws, board decisions, and contractual obligations that now ensnare the modern labor organization. This pervasive legalistic framework made the labor titans increasingly cautious, and it drained the energy and creativity out of the members and their rank-and-file-leadership – the idea was to wait for the lawyers to tell them what would fly before the NLRB or the courts.

Over the years, there have been sporadic efforts on the part of organized labor to repeal this legislation but they have failed. Through the years there have also been additional amendments to the Wagner Act, such as the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which is also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. However, these amendments have not fundamentally changed the nature of the Wagner Act the way Taft-Harley has.
The Wagner Act does not specifically mention lockouts and therefore has no explicit provisions for this type of labor dispute. Consequently, the NLRB and federal courts have defined the legal contours of lockouts (LeRoy 1996:998). According to LeRoy (1996), “Even though courts occasionally confuse the terms [strike and lockout] these terms differ in that the employer’s rights are more limited during a lockout [than a strike]” (LeRoy 1996:999). For instance, an employer may hire permanent replacements for strikers, but may only hire temporary replacements for locked out workers (LeRoy 1996:999). However, as described in chapter four, employers can navigate their way around this limitation by utilizing temporary employment agencies to employ “temporary replacements” for locked out workers on a relatively permanent basis. Another important legal distinction between strikes and lockouts is that if the labor dispute is characterized as a lockout rather than a strike, or ruled a lockout by the NLRB, employees may be eligible for unemployment insurance depending on their State’s legislation. In Iowa, locked out workers are eligible for unemployment insurance.\textsuperscript{112} This leads to

\textsuperscript{112} Under Iowa Code Section 96.5(4) and 871 IAC 24.33, locked out workers are eligible for unemployment insurance. As outlined in a “Workers’ Right Manual” produced by The Labor Center at the University of Iowa:

If you are not working because of a labor dispute at your place of employment, you are not eligible for unemployment benefits, with a few exceptions. If you meet one of these exceptions, you will be eligible for benefits:

- You are not part of the bargaining unit that is directly affected by the labor dispute and you are not personally participating in the labor dispute, e.g., you are unemployed because there is no work for you to do during the strike, even though you are not on strike and your unemployment is not the result of your own refusal to cross the picket line.
- The union that represents you has made an offer to continue working under the terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement for a reasonable period of time and the employer refuses that offer and locks out the workers instead. (The Labor Center 2013:57-58)
the importance of another social provision to come out of Roosevelt’s New Deal which is the nation’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) program.\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{Unemployment Insurance}

In 1935, in addition to passing the Wagner Act, President Roosevelt signed into law the Social Security Act, which contained provisions for unemployment insurance.\textsuperscript{114} These provisions were created to both stabilize the economy and ease personal hardships caused by involuntary job loss. Since its inception, the nation’s UI program has undergone a number of changes, such as changes in the duration of benefits, methods of delivering benefits, and coverage requirements.\textsuperscript{115} However, the original objective of the program continues today, which is to provide temporary financial assistance to unemployed workers. Basically, the program provides partial income replacement to regularly employed members of the labor force who become unemployed through no fault of their own, so that they can meet their basic financial needs while searching for reemployment. The UI program is a joint federal-state program, in

\textsuperscript{113} Senator Robert Wagner was also instrumental in the creation of the UI program. He, along with Representatives David J. Lewis (D-MD), introduced the Wagner-Lewis bill, which called for a federal tax-offset system to require all states to enact some system of unemployment insurance (Quadagno 1984; Blaustein 1993). Provisions of the Wagner-Lewis bill “directly foreshadowed the unemployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act” (Skocpol and Amenta 1985:573).

\textsuperscript{114} Title III and Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935 initiated unemployment insurance on a national basis. However, the State of Wisconsin established the first unemployment insurance law in the United States in 1932 “in response to the Great Depression, when more than 25 percent of the adult workforce was unemployed” (Social Welfare History Project 2014).

\textsuperscript{115} Originally, unemployment insurance coverage was limited to mostly industrial and commercial employees in private industry. However, amendments to federal law, such as the Employment Security Amendments of 1970 and the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, have increased the types and number of employees covered under the State UI programs.
which each state administers its own program within the guidelines established under federal law. For the most part, the program is financed by employer payroll taxes.  

Eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits, benefit amounts, and the duration of benefits are determined by State law. Generally, all full-time and some part-time workers who meet basic criteria – for example, they must be unemployed through no fault of their own, able to work, available for work, and actively seeking employment – are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The benefit amounts vary according to a formula used by each state which is typically based on the beneficiaries’ past earnings and number of dependents. The duration of benefits also varies by state, but typically ranges from 1 to 39 weeks. Most states provide a maximum of 26 weeks. Over the years, however, the federal government has taken action during times of national economic downturns or recessions to provide additional weeks of benefits to individuals who have exhausted their initial weeks of state benefits. For example, “in every recession since 1957, the Federal government has stepped in to provide additional support for unemployed workers” (Executive Office of the President 2011:1). In the 1970s, a permanent federal-state program, the Extended Benefits (EB) program, was established to extended benefits.

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116 In all but three states unemployment benefit funding is based solely on a tax imposed on employers. Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania require employee contributions. In Iowa, employers are required to contribute to the fund through payroll taxes, and the tax rate is based on the number of hours worked, wages paid, and claims experienced (Labor Center 2013:57).

117 To be eligible for unemployment benefits an individual must have a prescribed amount of employment and earnings during a specified “base period.” This “base period,” in most states, is the first four quarters of the last five completed calendar quarters preceding the claim for unemployment insurance benefits.

118 In most states, the amount of unemployment insurance benefits an individual is eligible to receive is based on a percentage of his or her earnings over a recent 52-week period. Moreover, all States establish a ceiling on the maximum amount of unemployment insurance benefits an individual may receive.
for workers who exhaust their entitlements to regular state benefits during periods of high unemployment. These benefits are triggered when a state’s unemployment rate reaches a specific threshold, which is usually 5% or more over a 13-week period. “The EB program allows states to provide 13 to 20 weeks of additional benefits with the federal government paying one-half the cost (Executive Office of the President 2011:1).” More specifically, the basic EB program provides up to 13 additional weeks of benefits when a state is experiencing high unemployment; however, some states have also enacted a voluntary program to pay up to 7 additional weeks (for a maximum of 20 weeks) of extended benefits during times of extremely high unemployment.

During the most recent recession, the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the federal government allocated temporary relief programs for those most affected by the downturn in the national economy. For example, in June 2008 Congress created the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program. “At its start, EUC provided an additional 13 weeks of federally-financed compensation in all states to eligible individuals who had exhausted their UI benefits. As the labor market weakened, in February 2009 Congress extended and expanded the program to provide up to 53 weeks of additional benefits. Although the costs of extended benefits have historically been split between states and the federal government, from 2009 through 2013, the federal government picked up 100 percent of these costs. The EUC program expired at the end of 2013.

**The Wagner Act and the UI Program**

The fact that GPC “locked out” its bargaining unit employees, rather than the UFCW Local 86D and its members choosing to strike the company, meant that these employees were eligible for twenty-six weeks of unemployment insurance benefits. Given the lockout occurred in the midst of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, these benefits were extended by President
Obama and Congress under the aforementioned EUC program.\textsuperscript{119} According to Iowa Workforce Development Center’s Muscatine Office, locked out GPC workers received between $361 and $440 per week in unemployment insurance benefits for up to 26 weeks, and then were eligible to receive extended benefits for an additional 39 weeks (Steinbach 2009). In other words, the locked out workers were eligible for unemployment insurance benefits for well over a year. And during this timeframe, most, but not all, of the workers in this study found reemployment. All of these workers indicated receiving unemployment insurance benefits after being locked out and nearly all of them claimed that having access to these benefits helped stave off some of the financial hardships caused by the lockout and helped keep them and their families afloat during the first year and a half of the labor dispute and until they were able to either retire from GPC or secure reemployment comparable, and in many cases superior, to their employment at GPC. Similar to previous research (Moore 1996), this study shows that having access to unemployment insurance relieves some of the financial hardships associated with losing a job and helps workers “buy time” to secure comparable reemployment. Locked out GPC workers’ experiences demonstrate that unemployment insurance plays an importance role in helping workers recover from job loss as a result of employer generated precarity.

**The Wagner Act & Health Insurance Coverage in the United States**

The Wagner Act has also had an effect on health care coverage in the United States by promoting the nation’s employer-centered social welfare state. As labor historian Lane Windham (2015) describes:

> Millions of workers joined unions in the decade after Wagner’s inception, and in its early years, workers’ unions and employers mostly bargained over wages and working conditions. After World War II, when the U.S. eschewed the European social welfare model for an employer-provided one, however, our government did

\textsuperscript{119} Just a few months before GPC locked out its workers, Congress enacted the EUC program.
not require employers to provide these benefits. Rather, the government turned to unions to bargain with employers for much of U.S. citizens’ new social wage. The 1948 Inland Steel NLRB decision opened the door for unions to bargain on health care and retirement plans, and a 1949 Truman fact-finding board on a major steel strike ordered the company to bargain on issues of benefits. Soon, collective bargaining became a centerpiece of the nation’s employer-centered social welfare state.\textsuperscript{120}

Likewise, Kalleberg (2011:123-124) describes the role collective bargaining played in coupling health insurance coverage to employment in the United States as follows:

The United States stands out among the world’s major economies in its distribution of key benefits through employers as part of the employment relationship rather than as a right of citizenship through social legislation. The most prominent of these employee benefits are health insurance and retirement pensions…The imposition of wage and price controls during WWII prevented employers from raising wages, so instead they offered additional economic “fringe benefits,” such as health insurance, to attract workers. These fringe benefits became institutionalized after WWII, particularly in large, unionized companies, as unions came to regard them as a central goal of collective bargaining. A likely unintended consequence of this employer-centered system has been to contribute to the lack of a national health insurance scheme in the United States, as the government became accustomed to the idea of the employer-centered system.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{120} In its Inland Steel decision, the NLRB ruled that fringe benefits were a condition of employment subject to collective bargaining, therefore paving the way for unions to negotiate for health insurance benefits on behalf of their members (Giaimo 2016:38).

\textsuperscript{121} Brigitte Madrian (2007:140) suggests that a number of market forces explain the institutionalization of employer-provided health insurance coverage in America, stating: Even though there were some limited examples of U.S. companies’ providing health insurance coverage before World War II, employer-provided health insurance, as an institution, really came into being during the two decades following the war. In the absence of universal government-provided health insurance coverage, market forces pushed employers into their role as primary providers of insurance. These market forces are several, and include: a substantial price advantage given to employers through the tax code, since firms’ health insurance expenditures on behalf of their employees are not counted as taxable income to either the firm or the employees; significant economies of scale that derive from providing health insurance to a large group of individuals; and the ability to pool individuals into insurance groups in a way that largely overcomes the problem of adverse selection, which plagues the individual market for health insurance.
Indeed, in the United States, in contrast to most other industrialized nations, the principle source of health insurance is employer-provided health insurance coverage, at least for those under the age of 65. Madrian (2007:137) reports that employers collectively insure sixty-three percent of the U.S population under the age of sixty-five. About half of the individuals covered by employer-provided health insurance receive this type of insurance by virtue of their own employment, while the rest receive it as dependents of a spouse or parent who is employed (Madrian 2007:138). Given this employer-provided health insurance system, when individuals leave or are displaced from their jobs, they and their dependents face the loss of their health insurance coverage. The state has established “continuation of coverage” laws to help these types of individuals and their families maintain their health insurance coverage as they transition to a new employer and/or into retirement. In other words, the state has designed legislation to increase the portability of employer-provided health insurance coverage, such as the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985. COBRA mandates that employers with twenty or more employees must allow their employees and their dependents the option to continue purchasing health insurance coverage through the employer’s health plan for up to eighteen months after their employment ends. Although COBRA provides health insurance coverage that is cheaper for workers and their dependents than privately purchased health insurance coverage, researchers have shown that it is still unaffordable for most unemployed workers (Gruber and Madrain 1997; Simon and Schroeder 2006). As for locked out GPC workers, not a single one of them in this study mentioned utilizing COBRA to maintain health insurance coverage while they were out of work. Although these workers were not specifically questioned about their post-lockout health insurance coverage, a considerable number of them
indicated that the loss of their GPC-provided health insurance coverage for themselves and their families was a significant and urgent concern after being locked out. As one worker described:

One of the first things my wife and I talked about was health insurance. When you’ve got three kids and they are playing sports and all that, you’ve got to have health insurance. The union told us that we could purchase insurance, the same insurance we had with GPC before the lockout, through COBRA. My wife looked into it and there was no way we could afford it without me bringing home a paycheck. Hell, even with a paycheck, I don’t know if we could’ve afforded it. (Interview, January 28, 2014)

This is just one example from a handful of workers who claimed the cost of health insurance coverage through COBRA was too expensive for them to afford, especially since they were no longer receiving a paycheck from GPC. Given the prohibitive cost of health insurance coverage through COBRA, a number of workers indicated that they simply went without health insurance coverage during the lockout and until they were reemployed and therefore eligible to obtain coverage through their new employers. As the following worker’s comments reveal, “I couldn’t afford to buy a private insurance policy or a COBRA policy, so I just went without insurance until I was able to get insurance through Monsanto [his new employer]” (Interview, March 10, 2014). Likewise, in reference to the locked out GPC workers, the Quad City Federation of Labor (2009) reported, “Though eligible for COBRA benefits, at $350 a month, these benefits remain unaffordable for many families whose sole source of income is unemployment benefits.” Thus, similar to previous research on displaced workers and continuing coverage laws (Gruber and Madrain 1997; Berger, Black, Scott and Chandra 1999; Simon 2005; Madrian 2007), the experiences of workers in this study suggest that even if COBRA and similar state-level continuation of coverage laws offer a less expensive health insurance option than purchasing individual health insurance policies from private companies such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, they
are still unaffordable for most displaced workers and their families (Gruber and Madrain 1997; Simon and Schroeder 2006).

Also similar to previous research, this study finds that one of the most important avenues to health insurance for displaced workers is through their spouse’s employer-provided health insurance. For instance, Berger et al. (1999) found that while COBRA eligibility raises the probability of health insurance coverage very little among displaced workers, eligibility for spousal health insurance raises it significantly. As describe in the previous chapter, several workers in dual-earner families were able to regain health insurance for themselves and their dependents through their spouse’s employer after being locked out. Somewhat paradoxically, a few workers in this study who lost their GPC-provided health insurance coverage as a consequence of the lockout where able to regain access to it post-lockout through their spouse’s employment with the company. As the following worker revealed:

My wife works there [GPC], but she wasn’t locked out because she wasn’t part of the bargaining unit. So when he [Gage Kent] locked us out, she went over to the personnel office and put me on her insurance. Problem solved! (Interview, March 12, 2014).

Most of the workers with access to spousal health insurance indicated that once they secured reemployment and were eligible for insurance through their new employers, they switched their and their families’ health insurance coverage to their new employer rather than remaining covered by their spouse’s employer. Their experiences suggest one of the benefits of belonging to a dual-earner family was the ability to access spousal health insurance during the intervening period of being locked out of work and gaining reemployment. And as Simon (2005:6) suggests,
having a working spouse may allow displaced workers to search longer than otherwise for
reemployment and therefore enable them to find better paying jobs.\textsuperscript{122}

In addition to “continuation of coverage” laws, like COBRA, there are various types of
government insurance programs which help provide a safety-net for individuals who are not
covered by employer-provided health insurance. In fact, Madrian (2007:137) claims that
governments, following employers, are the second most significant source of health care
coverage in the United States, collectively covering nearly 17 percent of the non-elderly
population. Even at the government level, however, there is no single unified health insurance
program. Rather, there exists a patchwork of programs which cover different subgroups of the
population. By far the largest government health insurance program is Medicare. It was
established in 1965 to provide health care coverage for retirees (or individuals 65 and older),
who find themselves uninsured or underinsured upon retirement when coverage through their
former employers ends. Medicaid was also established in 1965; however, it was created to
provide health care coverage for mostly low income individuals and families and some elderly

\textsuperscript{122} Another significant path to maintaining health insurance coverage for workers in this study
who were not able to rely on spousal health insurance that is worth mentioning is their company-
provided “retiree” health insurance coverage. At the time of the lockout, GPC was among the
few and declining number of U.S. employers who provided workers who retired from the
company so-called “retiree” health insurance. As Madrian (2007:138-9) explains, “…about 29
percent of firms employing more than 500 workers offer health insurance to current retirees; the
fraction of firms offering this coverage, however, has been declining quite substantially over
time, and is likely to continue to decline.” The fact that GPC was among these firms played
somewhat of a role in the decision to retire after the lockout for a few workers in this study. As
previously mentioned, quite a few of the locked out workers decided to retire as a result of the
labor dispute. Some of these individuals indicated that gaining access to their retiree health
insurance coverage was a factor in this decision. As the following individual explained:
I had my eighty points in, so I was able to retire, but I really wasn’t planning on it
for a few more years. Shit, I was still able-bodied and enjoyed my job and the
money. But when they locked us out and it was obvious we weren’t going back, I
decided the safest bet was to retire so I could get my pension and my health
insurance. (Interview, March 10, 2014)
Americans. It is jointly funded by the federal government and states, but managed by the states. Since it was established, the program has expanded and today represents the largest source of funding for health care services for low income Americans. Madrian (2007:139) points out:

> Historically, this was a health insurance program for public assistance recipients, primarily low-income single mothers and their children, and also a source of supplemental insurance for the low-income elderly. In recent years, it has expanded to provide coverage to non-welfare-eligible families with modest incomes, particularly those with children.

Although none of the workers in this study mentioned enrolling in Medicaid following the loss of their employer-provided health insurance coverage, several indicated that they turned to IowaCare to acquire health insurance for their dependent children. The IowaCare program was an extension of Medicaid, implemented in 2005, to increase access to health care coverage for uninsured, low-income individuals and families in the state of Iowa who were not eligible for Medicaid. Although several workers indicated that turned to the state, specifically to IowaCare, early on in the lockout to secure health care coverage for their children, by 2014, these workers reported that their children were once again covered through employer-provided health insurance either through their new employer or through their spouse’s employer.

While the state has an UI program which replaced a portion of worker’s lost earnings during the lockout, no such program exists to replace worker’s employer-provided benefits, specifically worker’s health insurance coverage which was lost as a result of the labor dispute. Rather, workers, who had the option, either turned to their spouse’s employer-provided health insurance or retired to gain access to their employer-provided “retiree” health insurance. However, those workers who did not have spouses or employed spouses and/or were not eligible

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123 The program was replaced in 2013 by the Iowa Health and Wellness Plan, or what is commonly referred to as the hawk-I plan.
to retire were confronted with the following choices: 1) unaffordable individual health insurance policies from private insurance companies; 2) unaffordable health insurance assistance through COBRA and/or similar “continuation of coverage” policies, 3) a patchwork of public assistance programs in which they and their dependents may or may not be eligible for some form of health care coverage; and 4) being without health insurance coverage.

Access to health care has become center-stage in American politics in recent years, with proposals ranging from universal health care to portable health care coverage to uncoupling employers/employment and health insurance coverage (Kalleberg 2011; Windman 2015). Historically, the United States has resisted attempts to “socialize” the provision of both medical care and health insurance coverage (Madrian 2007:139). The most recent initiative in the direction of making access to affordable health care more universal is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 or what is commonly referred to as “Obamacare.” Kalleberg (2011:188) suggests, “This law was an important step in the direction of universal health care, though a number of its reforms will not be effective for a number of years, and there is considerable uncertainty about how well the various parts will hold together, as a large number of details remain to be worked out.” Moreover, Kalleberg (2011:187-188) proposes “building a better safety net outside of the labor market.” He states:

The most basic element of a safety net is the provision of affordable health insurance for all. Employment-based health insurance is now the only real source of health coverage for Americans who are not yet eligible for Medicare and not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid; we thus need to protect those who do not receive health insurance from their employers. The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act…attempted to expand health insurance to most U.S. citizens and legal residents. This law was an important step in the direction of universal health care. (Kalleberg 2011:187-188)

In addition, the number of workers who receive health insurance coverage through their employers has been declining in recent years. According to a relatively recent report by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the percentage of Americans who receive health insurance through employers has fallen significantly over the last decade – from 69.7 percent nationwide in 1999/2000 to just 59.5 percent in 2010/11 (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:3). The report finds that 11.5 million fewer Americans receive health insurance coverage through their employers, or a family member’s employer, than did at the start of the century. In 2000, approximately 170.5 million Americans were enrolled in employer-sponsored insurance compared to 159 million in 2011 (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:4). The report postulates, “This decrease was partially offset by an increase in public coverage; however, the uninsured rate still increased overall, from 14.7% in 1999/2000 to 17.8% in 2010/2011” (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:4).

A major factor contributing to the decline in employer-provided health insurance coverage in recent decades, according to the report, is that fewer employers are offering health insurance coverage and fewer employees are accepting the coverage their employers offer. From 2000 to 2010 the percentage of private sector employers offering coverage fell from 58.9 percent to 52.4 percent, while the percent of employees who were offered such coverage and accepted it declined form 81.8 percent to 76.3 percent (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:4). The report finds that employees are declining employer-provided coverage because the costs of their annual premium contributions have more than doubled from 2000 to 2010. The average dollar amount of employee annual premium contributions jumped from $435 to $1,056 for single coverage and from $1,526 to $3,842 for family coverage (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:11). The overall costs of insurance premiums have also rise dramatically in recent years. “Nationally, the average total annual premium for single coverage more than doubled from 1999/2000 to 2010/2011, increasing from $2,490 to $5,081…The average total premium
for family coverage increased even more dramatically, jumping 125 percent from $6,415 to $14,447” (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:3).

As health insurance becomes more expensive to provide, employers have an incentive to reduce their health care costs by replacing their regular full-time employees with more precarious employees such as temporary workers (Lichtenstein 2002; Baicker and Chandra 2006; Madrian 2007; Windham 2015). Thus, the coupling of health insurance and employers/employment in the United States through collective bargaining and other employment agreements has given employers an incentive to avoid both unionization and the so-called “standard employment relationship” in favor of precarious employment relationships in order to avoid the burden of raising health care costs. In sum, the incorporation of health insurance coverage into collective bargaining, which paved the way for employer-provided health care coverage as an institution in the United States has led to incomplete, insecure, and unstable health care coverage for a large number of Americans. Such coverage leaves American workers and their dependents vulnerable to becoming uninsured in the event of job loss, as the experiences of locked out GPC workers demonstrates.

The Role of Organized Labor as Recovery Capital

The final dimension of locked out workers’ recovery capital is the role played by organized labor. Based on the workers’ experiences described in the previous two chapters, it could easily be argued that organized labor did not really help these workers recover from the lockout and their descent into precarity as a result of the labor dispute. In fact, it could be argued

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124 Various economists and labor market scholars have suggested that coupling health insurance and employers/employment also has detrimental effects on labor market efficiency; specifically, employer-provided health insurance has “locked” individuals into jobs, thereby interfering with the efficient matching of employers and employees (Mitchell 1982; Holtz-Eakin 1993; Madrian 1993).
that organized labor actually hindered these worker’s recovery in that a number of workers postponed their search for reemployment after being locked out in the hope that the UFCW would successfully negotiate a new contract with GPC and their return to work for the company. Generally, the workers in this study who realized early on in the lockout that they would probably not be returning to work at GPC and therefore began the processes of searching for reemployment rather than waiting for the UFCW and GPC to negotiate their employment were the ones who sustained the least amount of adversity as a result of the lockout. Nevertheless, I have included the role of organized labor as a dimension of these workers’ recovery capital because workers themselves claimed that the UFCW played a role in helping them recover from the lockout.

As described in chapter four, the UFCW was ultimately unable to mount enough pressure on GPC to end the lockout and return the bargaining unit employees to work; however, the union did provide resources, mostly financial, to their members which played a role in their recovery from the lockout. As international unions customarily do in the case of strikes and lockouts, the International UFCW provided Local 86D’s members with what is commonly referred to as “strike pay” to help them meet their basic needs during the lockout.\(^\text{125}\) This money usually comes out of the international union’s “strike fund,” which is basically a financial reserve set up by the international union in preparation for labor disputes and largely financed through membership

\(^{125}\) So-called “International Unions” are basically national labor unions that represent workers in several locations across the United States and Canada. As Chaison (2006:32) explains: “Many unions use the term international in their title to show that they have members outside of the United States. This is really a misnomer; continental would be better. The international unions’ members are in the United States and Canada.” Local unions are the lowest-level branches of international/national unions. They are created by international unions and the degree of autonomy they have from their international union varies largely based on the tradition of the particular union.
dues. Strike pay varies by international and local unions, but is typically equivalent to four times members’ monthly dues per week. Say, for instance, a union member’s monthly dues payment is $25; he or she would receive $100 per week in strike pay. Local 86D’s members’ monthly dues varied based on their hourly wages, with members paying one hour’s wages in monthly dues. However, their strike pay during the lockout was $100 per week across-the-board. As previously described, Local 86D also set up a “hardship fund” and “food pantry” for workers who were in need of additional relief and facing the greatest financial hardships as a result of the lockout. These donations came mostly from other unions and labor federations which solicited contributions from their members via their organization’s newsletters, bulletins, and websites.\(^{126}\) In addition, UFCW Local 86D received donations directly through a website it established following the lockout.

All of the union members in this study reported receiving some assistance from the UFCW after being locked out, while those workers who were not dues-paying UFCW members did not receive union assistance. Although all of the union members were eligible to receive a hundred dollars per week in “strike pay,” or what they referred to as “picket pay,” the overall amount of support they received from the UFCW depended on a number of factors, including: 1) whether, and how often, they picketed outside the GPC facility; 2) whether they applied for, and

\(^{126}\) A “labor federation” is basically a group of labor organizations or unions that are in some way affiliated. The principle labor federation in the United States is the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). It is a voluntary association of 56 national unions which represent approximately 13 million members (Chaison 2006:38). It has four regional offices, 51 state federations, and 570 “labor councils,” which are local and regional organizations that coordinate branches of affiliated unions on a geographical basis. For a more detailed descriptions of the structure, composition, and activities of labor federations see Chaison (2006:38-41).
received, “hardship funds”; 3) if, and when, they either retired from GPC or terminated their employment with the company; and 4) if, and when, they found reemployment. 127

Most of workers estimated that they collected a hundred dollars per week from the UFCW for one to two years. Thus, most reported receiving somewhere in the range of five to ten thousand dollars from the union during the lockout. 128 Only three of the workers in this study reported receiving strike pay for more than two years. However, union representatives reported that there were some union members who received strike pay for nearly five years and until the International UFCW stopped providing these funds to Local 86D.

Regardless of the amount they received, most union members claimed that these funds helped alleviate some of the financial hardships brought on by lockout and helped them recover from the lockout and losing their jobs. They explained that these funds helped supplement the unemployment insurance benefits they were receiving, and between the two sources of income, most, but not all, of the workers were able to remain financially viable until they were either able to retire from GPC with a pension or secure reemployment. Although these funds are designed to help sustain striking and/or locked out workers until their union has successfully negotiated an end to their labor dispute and their return to work, in this case, the funds were used to “buy” workers time until they could retire from GPC with an employer-provided pension or buy them time to search for new employment comparable to GPC. Therefore, workers suggested that the

127 Union members explained that as number of workers outside the facility picketing started to decline, Local 86D’s Executive Board stipulated that members had to devoted a certain number of hours picketing outside the facility in order to receive their weekly “picket pay” stipend from the union.

128 Although the International UFCW would not disclose how much they spent on the lockout at GPC, based on the information I gathered from Local 86D representatives and members, I estimate that the UFCW spent over $3 million on strike pay alone. I talk more about this estimate later on in the chapter.
financial support the union provided them, which was mostly in the form of “strike pay,” played a role in their recover from the lockout and the loss of their jobs. This implies that when unions are unable to defeat an employer in a labor dispute, at the very least, they can play a part in helping to sustain their members financially until they are able to secure a new source of income or employment.

Worker Representation and the Decline of American Labor Unions

Labor unions obviously play a role in labor disputes by representing workers and pursuing and protecting workers’ interests in such disputes. There is a vast literature on the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges associated with the U.S. labor movement and labor unions. There are also contentious debates within our society and especially within the U.S. labor movement regarding its structure, policies, strategies, tactics, leadership, membership, decline, relevance, influence, etc. Despite the conflicting literature and debates, one thing that most can agree on is that the power and influence of organized labor in the United States has been declining for decades to the point in which the U.S. labor movement is in crisis. As Milkman explains, “Obituaries for the U.S. labor movement have been perennial in both academic and journalistic commentary since the 1970s, when declining union membership first attracted widespread attention” (2014:3). A recent example is Raymond Hogler’s book The End of American Labor Unions: The Right-to-Work Movement and the Erosion of Collective Bargaining, which reports: “Union density in 2013 was at its lowest point in six decades, and some observers wondered whether unions had a meaningful future in this country or even whether it mattered very much” (Hogler 2015:vii). Even the leader of U.S. labor movement, Richard Trumka (2013), president of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), acknowledged this crisis stating: “To be blunt, our basic system of
workplace representation is failing to meet the needs of America’s workers by every critical measure.”

In 2014, the nation’s union membership rate, which is the percentage of workers who are union members, continued to decline, reaching a 100-year low in which just 11.1 percent of American workers belong to unions (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). The union membership rate among private sector workers is about half that rate at just 6.6 percent, which is an estimated 7.4 million workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). This decline has weakened organized labor as an institution and its ability to represent workers’ rights and interests in society and its power relative to employers in the workplace. As David Moberg (1999:21) reports, “Since the early 1970s…the balance of power in American society has shifted in favor of business and away from workers…the decline in American unions is both a major cause and major effect of this shift.” The weakening of organized labor’s power relative to employers in recent decades has resulted in declining wages, benefits, and working conditions for many American workers as well as an increase in employers demanding concessions from their unionized workers and/or provoking labor disputes in an effort to eliminate unionization altogether. As Milkman (2014:4) explain so succinctly, she is worth quoting at length:

In the 1950s and 1960s many nonunion private-sector employers routinely matched union wages and working conditions, hoping to preempt unionization; in recent years that dynamic has been reversed, as nonunion competition drives down compensation and standards among the few remaining unionized firms. As a result, unions that won improvements in pay and working conditions for their members in the past increasingly have been forced to surrender them in contract “givebacks.” Since the 1970s, moreover, large-scale strikes – historically the most effective

129 Union density in Iowa is very similar to the national union membership rate with 10.7 percent of Iowa’s workers belonging to unions and 12 percent covered by union contracts.

130 The private sector employs more people than the public sector in the Union States.

131 However, this balance of power in American society has always generally favored business over organized labor (Chaison 2006).
expression of union power and leverage – have become conspicuous mainly by
their absence... In contrast, lockouts have become more common, and the few large
strikes that do occur are often defensive actions provoked by employers seeking to
win concessions from once-powerful unions, typically leaving workers defeated
and demoralized.

Moreover, she argues, “By the late twentieth century, for most private-sector employers in the
United States, unionization was simply anathema, viewed as a source of economic inefficiency
and ‘adversarialism’” (Milkman 2014:5). A number of additional scholars and commentators
have also documented employers increasing use of lockouts in recent years as a weapon against
unions (LeRoy 1996; Ashby and Hawking 2009; Greenhouse 2012; Eidelson 2012; Holger
2015). For instance, Ashby and Hawking (2009: 76) report, “In the first three decades after
World War II American corporations rarely used lockouts as a weapon against unions. Since the
1980’s, however, they have increasingly used them.” Moreover, Industrial Relations Professor
Gary Chaison suggests:

This is a sign of increased employer militancy... Lockouts were once so rare they
were almost unheard of. Now, not only are employers increasingly on the offensive
and trying to call the shots in bargaining, but they’re backing that up with action –
in the form of lockouts (Greenhouse 2012).

Likewise, LeRoy (1996:1038) documents the rising use of lockouts by employers as a “tool to
break unions.” The GPC lockout is a case in point. By locking out its unionized workers at its
Muscatine facility in August of 2008, GPC has effectively eliminated UFCW Local 86D and its
members and replaced its unionized workforce at the facility with “temporary” (i.e., precarious)
workers. And while the majority of workers have recovered from the loss of their jobs, the
lockout’s outcome is much more precarious for the union at that facility.

**Considering the UFCW’s and Organized Labor’s Response to Lockouts**

So how do unions respond to lockouts and employer efforts to generate precarious labor
relations? If we consider the GPC lockout, the UFCW was unable to resist the company’s efforts
to lockout its bargaining unit employees and replace them with “temporary” replacement workers. Five and a half years into the labor dispute, it was clear that the union and its members had been defeated in the dispute. Nearly a decade and a half earlier, grain processing workers and their union – the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW) Local 837 – in Decatur, Illinois experienced a similar defeat after their employer, A.S. Staley Manufacturing Company, locked out its bargaining unit employees for twenty-two months. Although the lockout ended with a majority of AIW Local 837’s members voting to accept the company’s contract offer, the union’s executive board, bargaining committee, and activists denounced the contract agreement as a complete defeat. Steven Ashby and C.J. Hawking (2009:290), who provide a detailed analysis of the lockout in their book *Stanley: The Fight for A New Labor Movement,* claim:

> A clear lesson of Decatur is that corporations are becoming more aggressive in crippling and destroying unions and that U.S. labor law – the weakest in the industrial world – makes a mockery of worker’s rights. Nevertheless, the Staley workers did not have to lose. If ever there was a struggle that should have been won, this was it. The Staley workers lost because of the weakness of the American labor movement.\(^{132}\)

Moreover, in their assessment of the Staley lockout, Ashby and Hawking (2009:299-300) state:

> …the experience of the Staley workers prompts nagging questions: Does the AFL-CIO leadership have a plan to win strikes and lockouts when a big corporation has declared all-out war on a union? Does it have the strategy and will to do whatever is necessary to win a major labor battle?

The GPC lockout offers a similar lesson regarding employers’ aggressive actions aimed at eliminating unionization and raises similar questions concerning organized labor’s ability to respond to these actions. To begin to answers to these questions we can consider the events that

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\(^{132}\) In short, these authors suggest that AIW Local 837 and its members lost their battle with Staley because of a lack of investment on the part of the International AIW and the AFL-CIO in the labor dispute. There are parallels between this case and the GPC lockout regarding the lack of investment by the international union in the dispute.
occurred following the GPC lockout. We can start by looking at the UFCW and its members’ responses to the lockout and why the UFCW was unable to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with the company and end the labor dispute. First, the union and its members did not anticipate the lockout and therefore were ill-prepared to respond to being locked out by the company. As previously described, for the most part, workers in the bargaining unit, regardless of their union membership status, assumed that when their 2003-2008 collective bargaining agreement expired, contract negotiations between the union and the company would happen as they had in the past.\footnote{Not all of the 360 workers who were locked out by GPC belonged to UFCW Local 86D. “Union shops” – or what is also commonly referred to as “closed shops” – in which every employee at a workplace where there is a union must join that union or at least pay union dues was outlawed by the Taft-Harley Act. Therefore, there were individuals among the bargaining unit employees who did not belong to the union but were nevertheless locked out by the company.} Recall from chapter four, GPC was unionized the entire time they worked for the company and they had never encountered a labor dispute with the company prior to being locked out in 2008. Workers reported that past contract negotiations were relatively cooperative and cordial and that the union and the company, for the most part, bargained in “good faith” and negotiated “fair” contracts at the expiration of the previous contracts. So, they assumed this would be the case at the expiration of their contract in the summer of 2008.

As discussed in more detail in chapter five, GPC and Local 86D’s Executive Board (i.e., “the Board”) began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement about a month before the lockout began. And in that months’ time workers were assured by members of the Board that contract negotiations were progressing well and therefore presumed a new collective bargaining agreement would be reached without any problems. However, on August 19, 2008, the Board presented the company’s “last, best, and final” offer to the union members and they rejected it.
Within 72 hours, the company constructed a fence barrier around the facility and produced security guards to manage the barrier, escorted the bargaining unit employees out of the facility, and hired “temporary” replacement workers to maintain operations at the facility. Workers claimed they were blindsided by the lockout and that they had no indication that their vote on the company’s initial contract offer would result in a labor dispute, let alone being locked out. Most assumed that after the initial contract offer was rejected, GPC and the Board would continue contact negotiations and bargaining for a new contract and workers would continue working under the previous contract until the two parties agreed on a new one.

Part of the reason workers were caught off-guard or felt they were “blindsided” by the lockout has to do with the structure and culture of their union which is considered “service model unionism” or “business unionism.” The workers who were members of Local 86D described being mostly passive members of their union. With the exception of those who had acted as shop stewards at the GPC facility and those who had been elected to serve on Local 86D’s Executive Board, most workers indicated that they had minimal involvement in union matters and activities. They explained that they paid their union dues but rarely attended union meetings other than around the time of contract negotiations. Yet, even when it came time for contract negotiations, they left most of the negotiating up to the Board. So when they were caught off-guard by the lockout they were not only ill-prepared, but also ill-equipped to respond to the company.

Local 86D’s response to the company locking out its members and the rest of the bargaining unit employees basically consisted of picketing outside the facility, filing “unfair

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134 So-called “service model unionism” or “business unionism” is described in greater detail in chapter four.
labor practices” charges against the company, issuing press releases, broadcasting a handful of advertisements in the local media, and soliciting assistance and backing from other labor organizations. In addition, the International UFCW (i.e., the International) responded by providing financial assistance to Local 86D and its members and sending a few of its International and Regional UFCW representatives to Muscatine to assist Local 86D in the labor dispute. According to Local 86D union representatives and workers’ accounts, the International was not especially involved in the labor dispute other than providing financial assistance to the Local and its members and occasionally sending representatives to Muscatine to assist the Local’s Executive Board in its campaign against the GPC. The International offered very little in the way of a comprehensive or “strategic campaign” or even a public relations campaign against the company (which I will discuss in more detail below). Thus, with only minimal involvement or assistance from its international union, Local 86D and its members were unable to exercise any real leverage against GPC to successfully end the lockout and negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with the company.

The International UFCW’s lack of contribution to the GPC lockout becomes even more apparent when comparing this particular case to other fairly recent high-profile lockouts in which organized labor launched campaigns that were successfully in bringing an end to their lockouts and returning their members to work under new collective bargaining agreements, such as the 1984-1989 lockout between BASF Corporation and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers’ International Union (OCAW) (i.e., the BASF lockout) and the 1990-1992 lockout involving Ravenswood Aluminum Company and United Steelworkers of America (USWA) (i.e., the Ravenswood lockout). Moreover, comparing the lockout at GPC to these others lockouts reveals
to some extent organized labor’s ability to resist employers’ efforts to eliminate unions and generate precarious employment.

In comparing these three lockouts what stands out most is the important role international unions play in their affiliated local unions’ ability to fight back against anti-union employers and effectively resist these employers’ deunionization efforts. What also stands out as contributing to organized labor’s success in both the BASF and Ravenswood lockouts, and what was lacking among the UFCW’s efforts at GPC, is: 1) the utilization of a broad-based “corporate campaign,” rather than simply relying on traditional union strategies like picketing outside of the company; and 2) an effort to build alliances with community and environmental groups to apply pressure on the company to end the labor dispute and negotiate a fair collective bargaining agreement.\(^{135}\)

Beginning with the role of international unions in labor disputes, it is clear that there needs to be unity between local unions and their international unions in order for union members and workers to have any hope of defeating their employers in such disputes. In addition, international unions also must be willing to devote significant financial and human resources to assist their affiliated local unions in such disputes. Most local unions and their members lack not only the financial resources necessary to effectively take on their employers in a labor dispute, such as a strike or a lockout, but they also typically lack the human resources and the expertise their international unions have to offer. In both the BASF and Ravenswood lockouts, the international unions, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers’ International Union (OCAW) and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) respectively, devoted substantial financial and

\(^{135}\) As noted in chapter four, the terminology regarding “corporate campaigns” has changed over time and more recently these type of union campaigns are referred to as “strategy campaigns” (Juravich 2007:17). I use the term “corporate campaigns” here because at the time of both the BASF lockout and the Ravenswood lockout, this was the term that was most commonly used.
human resources to support their affiliated local unions in their struggle to end the lockout and return to their members to work with a collective bargaining agreement (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999; Minchin 2003). Regarding the BASF lockout, historian Timothy Minchin, author of the book *Forging a Common Bond: Labor and Environmental Activism during the BASF Lockout*, explains: “The OCAW’s leaders recognized the importance of the BASF fight and devoted a great deal of resources to the struggle” (2003:173).136 And in case of the Ravenswood lockout, Ashby and Hawking (2009:296) claim, “the locked-out Ravenswood workers won in 1992 when the United Steelworkers of America dedicated its resources to their fight. In addition to disbursing picket pay, the union spent over $5 million on the campaign.” Correspondingly, Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999: 200) report, “the Steelworkers…spent millions on the campaign.” Moreover, based on their in-depth assessment of the lockout, Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999: 203) claim, “Ravenswood shows that such struggles cannot be won on a local level.”137

Neither Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999) nor Minchin (2003) specify just how much each international union spent on their respective lockout. Similarly, the International UFCW has not publically disclosed an estimate of how much they spent of the GPC lockout. However, based on an estimation that most Local 86D’s members received strike pay from the International for an average of two years, the International spent at least three million dollars on

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136 In *Forging a Common Bond*, Minchin chronicles the story of a landmark labor dispute and the unusual alliance between a small local union (Local 4-620 of the OCAW) and environmental groups, included the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and the German Green Party, against a large corporation, Badische Anilin Soda Fabrik (BASF), which in English is Baden Aniline and Soda Factory.

137 Juravich and Bronfenbrenner’s book *Ravenswood: The Steelworkers’ Victory and the Renewal of American Labor* chronicles the twenty-month labor dispute between the Steelworkers (USWA) and Ravenswood Ravenswood Aluminum Company (RAC).
Regardless of the amount of financial support the International provided Local 86D and its members during the lockout, workers in this study felt the International should have devoted more financial and human resources to their struggle against GPC in order for them to even stand a chance of defeating the company and ending the lockout. Since, Ashby and Hawking (2009:296) proclaim: “Today when international unions resolutely support their workers, the union is often victorious.”

Lockouts and “Corporate Campaigns”

The BASF and the Ravenswood lockouts also have in common the utilization of some type of “corporate campaign,” which again was largely missing in the case of GPC lockout.

Brown and Bass (1990:976) describe these type of campaigns as follows:

While corporate campaigns can involve a myriad of actions, they generally consist of applying pressure on several fronts in order to attack both the pocketbook and the public image of a corporation, its directors, its suppliers, customers, and any other entity that can pressure the target employer to behave in a manner desired by the union. Such acts can include:

- pressuring a company’s bank and creditors, especially with the help of religious and community groups;
- challenging a company’s applications for industrial revenue bonds, zoning variances, etc.;
- embarrassing directors and officers by picketing their homes, mounting unusually strong personal attacks, opposing management in proxy battles, and communicating directly with stockholders;
- suing the company or individual officers for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, or racketeering; and
- lobbying Congress or state legislatures.

Or, more simply described by Judge Patricia Wald in *Food Lion v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union*:

A corporate campaign includes a wide and indefinite range of legal and potentially illegal tactics used by unions to exert pressure on an employer. These tactics may

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138 Local 86D union representatives estimated that about 300 of the 360 locked out GPC workers were union members. If these 300 members received $100/per week for two years in strike pay, the amount paid out by the International is strike pay would total $3,120,000.
include, but are not limited to, litigation, political appeals, request that regulatory agencies investigate and pursue employer violations of state and federal law, and negative publicity campaigns aimed at reducing the employer’s goodwill with employees, investors, or the general public. (Manheim 2001:v)

The origins of the so-called “corporate campaign” are usually traced to Ray Rogers and his contribution to the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union’s (ACTWU) successful struggle in the 1970s against the notoriously anti-union J. P. Stevens Company. As Minchin (2003:58-59) explains:

Facing an employer who had successfully resisted traditional organizing techniques, ACTWU staffer Ray Rogers pioneered new tactics. Rogers highlighted the fact that several J. P. Stevens board members also sat on the board of other companies, successfully connecting executives such as the chairman of Avon cosmetics, David W. Mitchell, with the textile giant. Targeting women who used Avon products, Roger publicized Stevens’ opposition to the unionization of its women employees and helped pressure Mitchell into resigning from Stevens board. ACTWU also urged the public to boycott J. P. Stevens products as part of its campaign. The campaign attracted a great deal of negative publicity for J. P. Stevens, influencing the firm to sign its first contract with the union in 1980.

Furthermore, Juravich (2007:23) elaborates, “By targeting key board members, Rogers brought Stevens to the bargaining table, doing in a matter of months what on-the-ground organizing had been unable to accomplish for years.” Ray Roger’s himself defines corporate campaigns as a “mechanism to confront power with power” (Corporate Campaign Inc. 2015). However, he has more thoroughly defined corporate campaigns stating:

Here is the definition that I always gave in the Stevens case. The corporate campaign focused primarily on Stevens’ corporate headquarters and on those institutions heavily tied to Stevens’ financial interests through interlocking directors, large stock holding, and multi-million dollar loans. The goal of the campaign was to cause those institutions tied to Steven to exert their influence on the company to recognize the rights and dignity of the workers and sit down and bargain. (Jarley and Maranto 1990:506)

Ray Rogers is the now the director New York-based Corporate Campaign Inc. (CCI), which he founded in 1981 to assist labor unions and other organizations develop strategic campaigns against corporations.
Following ACTWU’s victory at J. P. Stevens, leaders and activists within the U.S. labor movement began adopting some of the techniques pioneered by Ray Rogers and over the years have developed campaigns similar to his “corporate campaigns” which rely heavily on strategic corporate research and a number of different strategies and tactics designed to put pressures on companies and employers. As Juravich (2007:16) explains:

One of the fundamental ways that the labor movement in the United States is rising to this challenge [unprecedented employer opposition to unions] is through strategic corporate research and the development of comprehensive strategic campaigns in both organizing and collective bargaining. Sometimes referred to as simply strategic or coordinated campaigns, or by the older nomenclature of corporate campaigns, this approach recognizes that to be successful, unions need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the firm and the industry in which it is situated. Only as a product of this kind of research and analysis can unions then design the appropriate strategies and tactics to be successful, taking into account both how power flows through the firm and how vulnerabilities can be exploited. The comprehensive strategic campaigns that result go far beyond traditional organizing and bargaining and develop creative and complex processes that pressure firms in a multitude of ways.

There is much debate among labor scholars, leaders, and activists regaining the utility of corporate campaigns; however, if we again consider organized labor’s successful lockout defeats in the case of both BASF and Ravenswood, we find that both of these lockouts involved corporate campaigns. As Minchin (2003:3) points out:

OCAW Local 4-620 was able to fight back effectively against the company [BASF] and resist many of their concessionary demands. The OCAW’s corporate campaign secured nationwide press attention. The union bypassed the traditional forums of labor disputes – the negotiating table and the company gates – to take its cause directly to the public. In the process, the workers mobilized a broad coalition of civic and community groups to help them fight the company. The union subjected BASF’s environmental record to particular scrutiny, which made the company uncomfortable and finally brought it back to the bargaining table.

Moreover, Minchin (2003:171-172) explains:

…by adopting many of the same tactics that were used against BASF. In 1992…a local union of the United Steelworkers of America in Ravenswood, West Virginia, also secured a contract after enduring a lengthy lockout. The Ravenswood story,
which a recent study has held up as a model for the “revival of American labor,” relied on many of the same elements that had ensured the earlier success of the OCAW workers, particularly a broad-based corporate campaign.

Likewise, in reference to the Ravenswood lockout, Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999:202-203) affirm:

Ravenswood showed, once and for all, the poverty of the traditional labor strategy of standing on the picket line and waiting for the courts to act…The Ravenswood victory conclusively demonstrated the necessity of using a number of different tactics in sophisticated, multifaceted campaigns… There were no magic bullets. Ravenswood worked because the strategies and tactics grew out of careful research, understanding, and continuous analysis and re-analysis of the particulars of the situation at hand. Success depended on being familiar with all the players and their interlocking connections, and diligently tracing the tangle threads of power and money…But success also depended on carefully and creatively selecting where and how to apply the escalating pressure, to make sure to focus the leverage on those individuals and organizations who were both vulnerable to pressure and had the power to end the lockout.

Moreover, Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999:203) suggest that in addition to having a comprehensive and corporate campaign, unions also need an effective leadership structure and a commitment and passion to win from the national and regional union leadership to be successful in labor disputes.

These key ingredients were largely missing on the part of the UFCW in the GPC lockout. The UFCW did not seem to have much in the way of a “corporate campaign” or even much of a public relations campaign. Rather, the union tended to rely mostly on the traditional labor union strategies and tactics of picketing the GPC facility and filing “unfair labor practices” charges against the company. As for as the union’s public relations campaign, it mostly consisted of announcements and press releases in union newsletters and on different union websites as well as a handful of advertisements and broadcasts in the local media on behalf of the workers and their struggle against GPC.
Building Community Support and Alliances

An additional consideration in comparing lockout successes and defeats, which relates to corporate campaigns, is the ability of organized labor to mobilize community support and to build alliances with other groups, such as religious and environmental groups, in their struggle against anti-union employers. In both the BASF and Ravenswood lockouts, organized labor was able to garner the support of the local communities and this community-based support was crucial in pressuring the companies to end their lockouts. Both lockouts also involved organized labor building alliances with environmental groups. For instance, the BASF lockout resulted in an unprecedented campaign involving what Michael Goldfield (2004:307) has referred to as “an improbable series of alliances among the local [Local 4-620] and environmental groups concerned about industrial waste and illnesses – female family members, anti-apartheid activists and Jesse Jackson, the Louisiana Roman Catholic Church, some elected officials, Oprah Winfrey, the German Green Party, and assorted other groups and individuals.” Moreover, Minchin (2003:1) explains organized labor’s victory at BASF as follows:

…[it] took more than five and a half years and involved both union and environmental groups working to put pressure on the giant German chemical-maker. This environmental alliance was the central feature of the BASF dispute and the main reason for its eventual resolution.

Organized labor’s success in both the BASF and Ravenswood lockouts demonstrates the need for unions to reach out to environmental groups and to forge alliances with these groups in an effort to connect workplace issues and workers’ health and safety to the health and safety of the surrounding communities and environment. The two lockouts show that building coalitions between labor unions and environmental groups and using these coalitions to draw public attention to the dismal environmental records of companies can sway public opinion in favor of organized labor. In labor disputes, Juravich (2007:31) claims, “Environmental issues can be
incredibly powerful in developing a critique of the company and in building community
campaigns.” Likewise, Ashby and Hawking (2009:38) note, “If a corporation has damaged the
environment, then neighborhood groups, civic leaders, and environmental organizations may be
natural allies” in labor disputes.

Given the importance of community support and alliances in determining the outcome of
labor disputes, the question of why such support and alliances were largely absent in the GPC
lockout is raised. According to the locked out workers’ accounts, for the most part, the
community of Muscatine seemed unsympathetic toward the union and its members. This lack of
sympathy and support on the part of the community may partially be explained by the fact that
lockouts are not commonplace – or at least they have not been very common until more recently
– and therefore many people in the local community mistook the lockout for a “strike” and thus
assumed it was initiated by the union and its members and that they had the power to end the
labor dispute and return to work whenever they wanted. The local media also frequently referred
to the labor dispute as a “strike” rather than a lockout which probably contributed to local
community members’ misunderstanding of the situation between the union and the company.
According to union representatives and workers, the local media generally took an anti-union
stance with regard to the lockout which also probably had an effect on community members’
perceptions of the labor dispute and their antipathy towards the locked out workers. Nonetheless,
the onus of responsibility for building community support and alliances ultimately falls on
organized labor. It is not evident that the UFCW made a concerted effort in this regard. At the
very least one would expect the union to call public attention to the fact that the overwhelming
majority of locked out workers were based in the local community and therefore emphasize the
connection between the fate of these workers and that of the community. Then again, as previously described, the UFCW’s public relations campaign was minimal at best.

There seem to be at least a few situations the UFCW could have taken advantage of during the lockout to build public support for its struggle at GPC and, at the very least, to bring negative publicity to the company. One such situation was when a number of religious leaders, unified under the Muscatine Ministerial Association, drafted a letter on behalf of those affected by the labor dispute and sent it to GPC asking the company to renew its negotiations with the union and to settle the labor dispute. The company did not respond to this letter, at least not publically. Yet, the UFCW failed to use this opportunity to build any sort of alliance with the religious leaders and community in Muscatine or to demonstrate to the broader community that GPC was unwilling to negotiate in “good faith” with the union and its members. In other words, the union did not use this situation to bring any negative publicity to GPC in an effort to diminish the company’s standing in the community or to build any sort of public support for its struggle with the company. With this letter and the help of the religious leaders who signed it, the union might have been able to mount some pressure on the company to resolve the lockout.

Another situation the UFCW might have been able used to its advantage and to mobilize community support for its struggle against GPC, but did not, was the Governor of Iowa’s efforts to intervene in the labor dispute and facilitate negotiations between the company and the union to bring an end to the lockout. As previously explained in chapter four, GPC was not willing to entertain the Governor’s efforts aimed at resolving the lockout. Rather, the company responded by suing the Governor and permanently forbidding him from intervening in the labor dispute. The UFCW could have used GPC’s refusal to participate in the Governor’s proposed efforts to resolve the lockout to subject the company to public scrutiny by demonstrating the company’s
utter refusal to negotiate with the union and bring an end the lockout. In short, GPC’s lawsuit against the Governor could have garnered quite a bit of publicity, which the UFCW could have spun to its advantage in the labor dispute.

Ultimately, the UFCW did not use either of the attempts by local religious leaders or the Governor of Iowa to intervene in the labor dispute to sway public opinion in its direction. In fact, neither of these situations seemed to factor into the union’s public relations efforts. Instead, the union’s public relations campaign seemed to be limited to a few advisements and broadcasts in the local media drawing attention to the fact that the owner of GPC was traveling around in the company’s private jet while the workers he locked out were experiencing unemployment and hard economic times. For instance, one of these ads stated:

Everyday people would drive…just up the road to Ames. But not if you’re a leader of Muscatine’s own Grain Processing Corporation. You wouldn’t drive to Waterloo either. The multi-million dollar corporate jet belonging to GPC has flown to both places twice since the beginning of this year. These are tough economic times for all of us – especially the more than 300 experienced local workers that GPC has put on the unemployment rolls since locking out its workforce. Shouldn’t our community’s corporate leaders be setting an example of frugality, rather than jet-setting to places that are just an easy drive away? It’s time for GPC to put Muscatine first.

Another potential source of leverage the UFCW could have used against GPC during the lockout, but did not, is the company’s poor environmental record.\textsuperscript{140} For a number of years leading up to the lockout in 2008, GPC established a poor environmental record in the both community and the state. For instance, in 2006 the company was sued by the Iowa Attorney General for exceeding its pollution limits and failing to take measures to prevent significant

\textsuperscript{140} According to Department of Natural Resource (DNR) data, GPC’s Muscatine-based facility emits more lead – a toxic metal that can damage the nervous system – into the air than any other company in the state of Iowa, and is one of the biggest emitters of acetaldehyde – a substance the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers a probable carcinogen – in the entire United States (Hamby 2011).
deterioration of Muscatine’s air quality. As a result of the lawsuit GPC was ordered to pay a $538,000 civil penalty for air pollution control violations. However, this fine did not seem to deter the company from continuing to violate environmental regulations. In 2011, the Iowa Attorney General once again sued GPC, but this time for both air pollution violations and numerous water pollution violations. According to the Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, the company was sued because it “emitted excess particulate matter and sulfur dioxide; failed to maintain and repair equipment to prevent and remedy excess emissions; failed to obtain a construction permit to prevent significant deterioration of the air quality; failed to comply with notification, reporting and emission reduction requirements for hazardous air pollutants; and failed to obtain a construction permit for a 1.9 million gallon anaerobic settler for the facility’s wastewater treatment system” (Iowa Office of Attorney General 2011). As a result of this lawsuit, GPC was ordered to pay a $1.5 million civil penalty, the largest ever paid to the state of Iowa for environmental regulation violations. In addition to this penalty, District Court Judge ordered the company to reduce air pollutant emissions at its Muscatine facility and to improve air quality around the facility (Iowa Office of Attorney General 2014). Moreover, the court order included “an unprecedented provision requiring GPC to convert its boilers from coal-fired to natural gas-fired” (Iowa Office of Attorney General 2014).141

GPC’s poor environmental record has also generated national attention.142 For example, the company’s repeated air pollution violations have landed the company a spot on the federal

141 In the decade leading up to 2013, the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued 38 notices of violation related to air pollution, including failing to notify the DNR of factory modifications and failing to keep monitors in operation at all times (Regenitter 2009).

142 In March 2012, “the EPA sent GPC a notice of violation, accusing the company of repeatedly violated air pollution rules between 2007 and 2011 and failing to report episodes when pollution exceeded allowed limits” (Hamby 2012). And in April 2013, EPA Region 7 announced that GPC
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) “Watch List,” which includes serious and/or chronic Clean Air Act violators. In addition, GPC’s air pollution violations and the company’s role in Muscatine’s poor air quality have been broadcast nationally as part of National Public Radio’s investigative series *Poisoned Places: Toxic Air, Neglected Communities* (Berkes 2011). The series, which was produced in collaboration with the Center for Public Integrity, focuses on communities across the country most effected by pollution from industrial operations.

As a result of the poor air quality in Muscatine, within the first year and a half of the lockout, a number of Muscatine residents began organizing to challenge local polluters, especially GPC. In 2010, what later came to be Clean Air Muscatine (CLAM), held its first public forum about air quality in the community. As Muscatine residents continued organizing and gaining support in their efforts to reduce pollution in the community, they decided to create a Non-Profit Organization (NPO) to obtain grants to help fund their efforts. Subsequently, in early 2011, Clean Air Muscatine (CLAM) was officially established as a NPO and its mission was “to improve air quality in the Muscatine area which will enhance the community’s health, economy, and quality of life” (CLAM 2015). CLAM played a key role in the Iowa Attorney General’s

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143 According to the EPA, the agency maintains a “Watch List” to facilitate dialogue between EPA, state and local agencies on enforcement matters relating to facilities with alleged violations identified as either significant or high priority. GPC’s Muscatine facility was one of facilities on the EPA’s “Active February 2013 CAA Watch List.”

144 They choose the acronym CLAM because of the community’s historical connection to the clamming industry.
successful lawsuit against GPC dating back to 2011. Yet, the UFCW, in its struggle against GPC made no effort to create an alliance with CLAM.

All told, the UFCW could have used GPC’s poor environment record and the company’s numerous environmental regulation violations as a source of leverage against the company during the labor dispute. Moreover, the company’s poor environmental practices could have been used to build alliances with organizations in the community, like CLAM, and with groups beyond the local community, such as the Iowa Chapter of the Sierra Club.145 Both of these measures would have gone a long way in helping the union build a more effective campaign against the company to end the lockout. Given the demonstrated importance of organized labor’s need to reach out to community groups and create alliances in their campaigns against unscrupulous employers, it seems as though CLAM and other environmental organizations would have been likely allies in the UFCW’s struggle against GPC. However, according to union representatives, there was no effort on the part of the UFCW to reach out to CLAM or any other environmental organization. Perhaps one explanation for the lack of alliance between the UFCW and CLAM is that Local 86D, lacking sufficient support from the International UFCW in their struggle against the GPC, resigned to defeat early on in the lockout before CLAM was a truly established organization.146

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145 Within the past few years, the Iowa Chapter of the Sierra Club has been pressuring the EPA and the Iowa DRN to closely monitor GPC’s Muscatine-based facility’s emissions and aggressively enforce environmental regulations at the facility (Winterwood 2013).

146 One of the workers in this study, who was active in CLAM, indicated that shortly after the lockout began, UFCW Local 86D’s President told workers not to get involved with CLAM because it would cause problems when the lockout ended and they returned to work (Interview, February 13, 2014).
The experiences of locked out GPC workers suggest that when labor organizations do not invest in so-called “corporate campaigns” to support their members engaged in labor disputes, or have some other strategy to challenge employers who lockout their bargaining unit employees, these workers are likely to lose their jobs. And, if and when they do, they will have to rely on their own initiative and agency to recover from being without a job. Without greater support from the International UFCW, locked out GPC workers lacked an effective collective response to their labor dispute. With the exception of picketing outside the GPC facility, they were mostly on their own to respond to being lockout and ultimately displaced from their jobs. Thus, having to react on a more individual basis, these workers were compelled to rely on their own agency to secure reemployment and/or obtain another source of financial stability after they lost their jobs at GPC. In doing so, most workers demonstrated a remarkable recovery from the lockout and the loss of their jobs. As explained, by the time their unemployment insurance benefits ended, the majority of the workers in this study, with the exception of those who retired or went to work for themselves, had secured reemployment. And contrary to the conventional wisdom regarding the fate of most displaced manufacturing workers, their reemployment wages and benefits, for the most part, were comparable or superior to GPC. Overall, the experience of these workers suggests that their social capital, in the form of social networks, human capital, and a favorable local labor market served in combination to promote their reemployment. Yet, workers felt the unemployment insurance benefits the state provided them during the lockout and the strike pay they received from their union played a role in their recovery from losing their jobs. Mostly, they felt these financial resources kept them and their families afloat while they searched for reemployment at least comparable to their employment at GPC. However, it could be argued that the role of both the state and organized labor mostly just eased their descent into
precarity and that it was actually the workers’ social and human capital coupled with a favorable local labor market that explains their recovery after being rendered precarious by GPC. Nevertheless, what is certain, is the important role workers social and human capital played in their recovery from the lockout. Moreover, their experiences draw attention to the workplace as an important site for training and learning, as well as developing skills and experience, and thus as an important site for workers to invest in their own human capital. These workers’ pre- and post-lockout experiences reveal the extent to which workers themselves are active agents who invest in their own human capital while on the job. Employers may choose to, or not to, invest in the human capital of their workforce, and the evidence suggests that more recently employers are choosing the latter of the two options; however, workers make similar choices. In the case of these locked out workers, we find individuals who invested in their own human capital as well as social capital while working for GPC. Over their years working for the company, they established personal relationships and friendships, developed social ties and networks, and gained embodied skills, knowledge, and experience that proved to be valuable in securing relatively well-paid, and even better-paid, reemployment once they were displaced by the lockout. In sum, this study demonstrates the efficacy of workers’ social capital and human capital in finding reemployment once they are rendered precarious by unscrupulous employers.
Precarious employment has recently emerged as an increasingly important issue in the United States. Precarious employment basically refers to “the uncertainty, instability, and insecurity of work in which employees bear the risks of work (as opposed to businesses or the government) and receive limited social benefits and statutory entitlements” (Kallebég and Hewison 2013:271). This sort of employment is not a new phenomenon in the United States. In fact, it was quite common in this country prior to President Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms of the 1930s (Kalleberg 2009; Milkman and Ott 2014). Moreover, certain segments of this country’s labor market have always been precarious. However, it is generally agreed that since the 1970s, the U.S. has been experiencing a new era of precarity (Kalleberg, 2009).

Although it is difficult to measure the actual extent to which precarious employment has risen in recent decades, scholars generally cite the following as evidence of its growth: a decline in job tenures; an increase in involuntary job losses; a rise in long-term unemployment; a decline in actual and perceived job security; an increase in risk-shifting from employers to employees; a rise in “nonstandard work arrangements”; and the institutionalization of the temporary staffing industry.¹⁴⁷ They also describe a number of interrelated social, economic, political, and cultural factors associated with its growth, such as the intensification of global competition, greater mobility of capital and labor, technological advances especially in information and communication technologies, neoliberalism and the deregulation of markets, growing

¹⁴⁷ Chapter two describes some of the difficulties in measuring precarious employment.
“financialization” of the economy, the rise of the service sector, demographic changes in the labor market, greater individualism, and the decline in unionization.148

Related to the weakening of organized labor, this study suggests that labor disputes, and specifically lockouts, should be added to the list of factors that have been identified in the literature as generating precarity. Moreover, it suggests that the steady decline in union membership and power in American manufacturing over the last several decades has left those manufacturing workers who remain covered by collective bargaining agreements at greater risk of their employers initiating labor disputes in an effort to displace and replace them and their jobs with more precarious forms of employment. In other words, their jobs are increasingly in jeopardy of being outsourced domestically to precarious workers.

The GPC/UFCW lockout represents an example of an employer initiating a labor dispute with the intention of generating precarious employment relations at his facility. By locking out the company’s bargaining unit employees and replacing them with workers hired through a temporary employment agency, RJK, Inc., GPC was able to shift from so-called “standard employment” to “precarious employment” relations at its Muscatine-based facility. Indeed, five and a half years into the labor dispute, the company has effectively taken approximately 360 relatively well-paid, permanent, unionized manufacturing jobs and turned them into temporary, precarious jobs.

148 Batt and Appelbaum (2013) describe “financialization” as the rise of “financial capitalism.” More specifically, they explain, “Financialization refers to a shift from managerial capitalism, in which the returns on investments derive from the value created by productive enterprises, to a new form of financial capitalism, where companies are viewed as assets to be bought and sold and as vehicles for maximizing profits through financial strategies” (Batt and Appelbaum 2013:2)
From the perspective of the locked out union representatives and workers – and coupled with the company’s rejection of third-party assistance in settling the labor dispute – GPC was never actually interested in “good-faith” collective bargaining or reaching a new collective bargaining agreement with the UFCW and its members.\footnote{Regarding collective bargaining, Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires both parties, the employer and the union, to bargain in good faith with the intent of reaching an agreement.} UFCW representatives and members claimed they were willing to compromise on a number of the company’s demands during contract negotiations except for the company’s proposed contract language which would have allowed GPC to outsource its bargaining unit employees’ jobs through subcontracting. One way or another, either by locking out the unionized workers or eventually replacing them with nonunion subcontracted workers, GPC appeared determined to shift to more flexible (i.e., precarious) employment relations at its Muscatine-based facility.

In addition to converting hundreds of union jobs into precarious employment, GPC also rendered some 360, mostly lifelong, unionized manufacturing workers precarious. The fate of manufacturing workers who are rendered precarious as a result of labor disputes is a previously underexplored dimension of contemporary employment precarity in the United States. Although there is substantial research on manufacturing workers who have been displaced from their jobs and who face precarity as a result of deindustrialization, relatively little scholarship has focused on workers who have been displaced and rendered precarious as a result of employer initiated labor disputes such as the GPC/UFCW lockout.\footnote{With the exception of the following books which focus on three high-profile lockouts in the 1980s and 1990s: 1) Forging a Common Bond: Labor and Environmental Activism during the BASF Lockout (Minchin 2003); 2) Ravenswood: The Steelworkers’ Victory and the Renewal of American Labor (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999); and 3) Staley: The Fight for a New American Labor Movement (Ashby and Hawking 2009).}
Moreover, the locked out GPC workers’ experience with precarity was different than that documented in most of the existing research on displaced manufacturing workers, which suggests that these workers have quite a difficult time obtaining reemployment, and if and when they do their new jobs are likely to pay less, provide fewer benefits, and offer less job security (Moore 1996; Wilson and Leach 2002; Kalleberg 2011). Somewhat surprisingly, nearly five and a half years after being locked out and essentially losing what they assumed were lifelong jobs, the majority of the locked out workers who sought reemployment were able to secure jobs that were comparable, and in most cases superior, to their jobs at GPC in terms of wages, benefits, and working conditions.

For most workers in this study, the precarious position they were placed in as a result of GPC locking them out was temporary. For instance, within the first couple of years of the lockout, over one-fourth of these workers were able to retire from the company with a decent pension. Generally, these workers reported a rather smooth transition from earning a relatively good income at GPC, being locked out, and then living comfortably off of their pensions and retirement plans. In short, being able to retire with a company-provided pension plan situated these workers in less of a precarious position than their fellow locked out GPC workers who needed to find reemployment or an alternative source of income. However, the situation these workers encountered after being locked out is becoming increasingly less likely for workers in the U.S. labor market to encounter given that over the last several decades, employer-provided pension plans have been declining to the point where less than half of working Americans have such plans today (Raymo et al. 2011). Moreover, the employer-provided pension plans that remain have changed from so-called “defined benefit plans” to “defined contribution plans” which tend to fluctuate with the market and thus put workers at greater risk of losing their
retirement funds. The declining number of workers who have employer-provided pension plans and/or adequate retirement funds suggest the need for federal government provision of social insurance outside the labor market to protect retiring workers. Moreover, the decline in pension plans suggests the need to strengthen and expand federal Social Security benefits, as recent Democratic presidential candidates Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Hillary Clinton have been advocating. And given the rise in precarious employment it suggests that sources of retirement funds that supplement federal Social Security benefits, such as 401(k)s, need to be portable across employers (Kalleberg 2011).

Returning to the precarious position of the locked out GPC workers who were unable to retire after the labor dispute, the vast majority of these workers also reported that their descent into precarity was short-lived. Five and a half years after being locked out and displaced from their jobs, nearly all of these workers reported securing reemployment, and in a few cases self-employment, that was either comparable or superior to their employment at GPC. When asked to assess whether their lives were better or worse in 2014 than they were prior to the lockout in 2008, the most common response among both these workers and those who had retired was “better,” followed by “about the same,” while just three of them replied “worse.” While some workers indicated that they had suffered financially as a result of the lockout, they maintained that their quality of life was better in 2014 than before the labor dispute, and that they were recovering financially.

Yet, this is not to suggest that the locked out workers in this study, and their families, did not face hardships as a result of GPC rendering them precarious. Indeed, several of these workers mentioned facing a range of psychological and emotional difficulties and a number of financial problems, from the anxiety associated with not knowing whether or when they would be
returning to work at GPC to clinical depression and dwindling savings and even housing insecurity. Thus, the point here is not to downplay the importance of the hardships these workers endured as a result of being locked out by their employer, rather, is to call attention to the brevity of these workers’ experience with precarity as a result of the lockout and to highlight their remarkable resilience and recovery when faced with precarity and such hardships.

**Factors and Conditions Facilitating Locked Out Workers Ascent from Precarity**

This study suggests that a number of factors and conditions help explain not only manufacturing workers’ vulnerability, but also their resilience, in the face of increasingly precarious employment. It finds that the most important factors in explaining locked out GPC workers’ remarkable resilience and recovery after being rendered precarious by their former employer was their social capital, in the form of social networks, and human capital. These workers’ social networks, which include their families, relatives, friends, former coworkers, neighbors, and acquaintances within the local area, were instrumental in their ability to secure reemployment with relative ease following the loss of their jobs at GPC.

The majority of these workers were born and raised in Muscatine and its surrounding rural communities, and in most cases, they were second and third generation residents of these communities. Given their longtime residency and extended familial and friendship ties in Muscatine, which is a community of just over twenty thousand people, and its surrounding rural communities, most workers had quite extensive social networks within the local area and its labor market. These social networks were essential in providing workers with information regarding employment opportunities and helping them secure reemployment after the lockout.\(^{151}\)

\(^{151}\) The social networks and relationships the locked out workers cultivated over their years of working at GPC were also instrumental in their ability to obtain reemployment following the labor dispute.
Workers explained that almost immediately after they were locked out, their family and friendship ties in the local area were used to find work. In the beginning days of the lockout, this work was mostly informal, part-time, and short-term. However, as the labor dispute dragged on, these same social ties were utilized to secure more formal, full-time, permanent reemployment. In fact, over eighty percent of the workers in this study indicated that they secured reemployment after losing their jobs at GPC through their social networks. This finding is consistent with previous research which suggests between fifty and eighty percent of workers find their jobs via their social connections (Granovetter 1974; Mouw 2003; Franzen and Hangartner 2006).

While the vast majority of reemployment opportunities the locked out workers found were based on their social networks, taking advantage of these opportunities would not have been possible if the workers themselves did not possess the human capital necessary for reemployment. Becker (1993:255) defines human capital as “investments in education, training, and other skills and knowledge by individuals and firms.” Most of the human capital the workers in this study possessed was acquired while working at GPC. Rather than pursuing postsecondary education and/or formal training after graduating high school, for the most part, these workers turned to full-time employment at GPC. Over the years, even decades, working for the company, they gained on the job training, skills, knowledge, expertise, experience, and job tenure (i.e., human capital). The fact that most of them found reemployment comparable or superior to their employment at GPC after being locked out (and during a recession) speaks to their human capital and the degree to which it was valued in the local labor market.

Also noteworthy regarding locked out workers’ human capital and reemployment is the context of the local labor market. Muscatine, situated along the banks of the Mississippi river in Southeastern Iowa, has long been and remains a manufacturing community. GPC is
headquartered in Muscatine and is one of the community’s chief manufacturing employers. However, it is not the only manufacturing company located in the community. For instance, the second largest office furniture manufacturer in the world, HNI Corporation, is also headquartered in Muscatine. And, there are a number of additional manufacturing companies located in and around the community, including Monsanto, H.J. Heinz, Musco Sports Lighting, Bridgestone, SAAB of Iowa, and MidAmerican Energy. Workers reported that most of these companies offer wages, benefits, and working conditions comparable or superior to GPC. Based on the reemployment experiences and accounts of workers in this study, these local manufacturing companies readily adsorbed the workers who were displaced by GPC during the lockout. For instance, workers reported that their decades of manufacturing experience at GPC and the fact that they had years of experience working swing shift was appreciated by local companies and was especially valued by those local employers who operate swing shift, such as Monsanto and MidAmerican Energy. Indeed, these workers’ on the job learning and training, their acquisition of skills, knowledge, and experience while working at GPC, their tenure with GPC, and their ability to sustain swing shift work certainly enhanced their employability in the local labor market. Thus, the human capital they acquired at GPC over the years made them optimal employees for other local manufacturing companies and helped them secure reemployment not just comparable, but in many cases superior, to GPC.

Also of note with regard to workers’ human capital is the assumed role of formal education and training or retraining in enhancing these individuals’ human capital. In fact, a common theme in the literature on employment precarity in the United States is the importance of enhancing workers’ human capital through education and job training (Kalleberg 2009, 2011). Moreover, education and training/retraining programs have been standard policy for addressing
worker displacement and have become popular policy proposals for employment precarity (Kalleberg 2009, 2011). While there may be benefits to education and training/retraining in a range of situations, this study suggests workers’ investments in additional education and/or training after being locked out had little or no effect on their reemployment and recovery from the labor dispute. Other studies on displaced workers and reemployment have come to similar conclusions (Corson, Decker, Gleason, and Nicholson 1993; Decker and Corson 1995; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Heckman 2000; LaLonde 2003; Jacobson et al. 2005a, 2005b).

With few the exceptions, most workers in this study did not seek additional education or training after being locked out and displaced from their jobs by GPC. And for the few workers who did, this additional education and training did not have a significant effect on their post-lockout reemployment, as they ended up returning to jobs in manufacturing, which were very similar to their jobs at GPC. Basically, once these workers were locked out, investing their resources, financial and otherwise, in additional education and training was not a common (or necessarily an effective) response to the loss of their jobs. Rather, the most salient factors associated with their reemployment, and even job upgrading, were their social networks and

152 To provide assistance to the growing number of displaced workers since the 1970s, Congress passed Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 and the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act of 1988. Based on evaluations of these and other government employment and training programs, Heckman (2000:43-44) reports, “The overall pattern for programmes [sic] aimed at displaced workers is one of weak impacts for most groups.” For instance, he cites a recent evaluation by Mathematica of training provided under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act to workers displaced as a result of foreign trade which found “no evidence of any effect of this long-term training programme [sic] on the earnings and employment of recipients” (Heckman 2000:43-44).

153 These studies do not address locked out workers specifically. To my knowledge, there is no empirical research that addresses the reemployment outcomes of workers who have been displaced as a result of lockouts.
human capital combined with the local manufacturing labor market. Overall, the locked out workers’ experiences raise questions regarding the practicality and effectiveness of policies prescribing investments in formal education and training/retraining for displaced manufacturing workers. However, since just a handful of the 62 workers in this study sought additional education or training after they were locked out, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding the importance of enhancing manufacturing workers’ human capital through education and job training/retaining as an effective response to an increasingly precarious employment environment in the United States.

A number of scholars reject the idea that learning in formal educational institutions is inherently superior to learning that takes place on the job (Eraut et al. 2000; Beckett and Hager 2002; Billett 2004; Fuller and Unwin 2005). However, human capital theories and the policies these theories influence still tend to emphasize the importance of formal education and training, while largely neglecting the importance of learning that occurs on the job and informally in the workplace in the development of human capital. Thus, future research and policies should pay greater attention to the human capital manufacturing workers acquire on the job and the degree to which this human capital is portable across employers and industries. This case study demonstrates the importance of on the job learning and training in the acquisition of human capital. It also suggests that manufacturing workers’ human capital is more transferable across employers and even industries than is commonly assumed. For instance, this study shows that the

154 Zippay (2001) found similar results when studying the effects of education, job training, and social networks on reemployment outcomes among displaced steelworkers in Western Pennsylvania. She found that short-term job training was not effective in providing workers in her study with training-related employment or in advancing their reemployment wages. Instead, she found that the most salient factor associated with these workers’ reemployment and job upgrading was their social networks.
human capital locked out workers acquired while on the job at GPC was not only transferable to other local agro-industry employers like Monsanto, but was also transferable to other industries within the local economy, such as MidAmerican Energy and Muscatine Power and Water.

Overall, this case study calls attention not only to manufacturing workers’ human capital, but also to their social capital and social networks. It suggests that in trying to gain a better understanding of the cultural and individual forces that influence people’s responses to precarity, as Kalleberg calls on sociologists to do, greater appreciation needs to be paid to workers’ social capital, social networks, and human capital (i.e., agency).

Another factor that contributed to workers’ recovery from precarity following the lockout was the unemployment insurance (UI) benefits they received from the state. Workers insisted that these benefits helped maintain them, financially, until they were able to either retire from GPC with their employer-provided pensions or obtain reemployment comparable to their employment at GPC. UI benefits are a product of FDR’s New Deal, specifically the Social Security Act of 1935, and are designed to provide temporary financial assistance to workers in the case of involuntary job loss. That is precisely what they did in the case of locked out GPC workers. Unlike when workers “strike” their employers, when employers “lockout” their workers, the workers may be eligible for UI benefits (depending on the state in which the labor dispute occurs).^{155} Locked out workers in the state of Iowa are typically eligible for twenty-six weeks of UI benefits, but in this case the locked out GPC workers could receive an additional 39

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^{155} Generally, employees who go on “strike” to protest their working conditions or to put pressure on their employer during contract negotiations are not eligible for UI benefits. However, in some states, employees are eligible for UI benefits if they “strike” as a result of their employer violating their collective bargaining agreement or labor legislation. In addition, some states, like Iowa, allow workers to collect UI benefits if the labor dispute is a result of an employer-initiated lockout.
weeks of UI benefits because the federal government extended benefits under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program during the 2007-2008 Recession. So, these locked out workers were eligible to receive benefits for up to 65 weeks, or, for approximately the first a year and a half of the lockout. All 62 workers in this study indicated that they received these benefits, which averaged about $400 per week. However, how long each worker collected UI benefits varied based on whether they terminated their employment at GPC and/or when they either retired from the company or obtained new employment. By the time they had exhausted their UI benefits, most of the locked out workers in this study had either retired or secured reemployment comparable to their employment at GPC.

In addition to providing UI benefits to the locked out GPC workers, the state also provided limited health care benefits to some workers’ families. Immediately after GPC locked out its workers, the company also terminated their employer-provided health insurance coverage. This loss of coverage was a concern for all of the workers and was especially concerning for those with spouses and/or children covered by the company’s health insurance plan. Some of the workers, however, were able to access health care coverage through their spouse’s employment. In other words, they were able to replace the health insurance they had been receiving from GPC with their spouse’s employer-provided health insurance, thereby keeping coverage for themselves and their dependents during the lockout. But not all locked out workers had a spouse, or a spouse who was employed and eligible for health insurance coverage through his or her employer. For the most part, these workers, and in some cases their spouses, went without health

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156 In June 2008, Congress created the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program to provide an additional 13 weeks of UI benefits. The following February, Congress extended and expanded the program to provide up to an additional 53 weeks of benefits.
care coverage. However, they were able to enroll their children in a state-based health care program, IowaCare. Thus, these workers were able to turn to the state to obtain health care coverage for at least their dependent children during the lockout and until they were able to secure reemployment and were once again eligible for health insurance coverage through their employers.

In short, when employees are locked out of their jobs, they and their families face the loss of their employer-provided health insurance coverage. And, while the state has an unemployment insurance program which replaces a portion of workers’ lost earnings during lockouts, no such program exists to replace workers’ employer-provided health insurance coverage during labor disputes. Under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, the locked out GPC workers had the option of continuing to purchase coverage for themselves, their spouses, and their dependents under the company’s health insurance plan for up to eighteen months. However, this option required them to pay the full premium themselves. Paying the full premium when their income was virtually eliminated as a result of the lockout

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157 At the time of the lockout, GPC was among a limited number of U.S. employers who provided their retirees with so-called “retiree” health insurance (Madrian 2007). Thus, some of the locked out workers in this study were able to maintain health insurance coverage through their GPC-provided “retiree” health insurance.

158 The IowaCare program was an extension of Medicaid, which was implemented in 2005 and terminated in 2013. The program was aimed at providing uninsured low-income families in the state of Iowa, who were not eligible for Medicaid, access to health care coverage.

159 COBRA mandates that employers with twenty or more employees have to allow their employees and their dependents the option to continue purchasing health insurance coverage through the employer’s health insurance plan for up to eighteen months after their employment ends. This and other state-based “continuation of coverage” laws were intended to help workers transition between employers and into retirement. However, the cost of health care coverage under COBRA is out of reach for most unemployed workers (Gruber and Madrain 1997; Simon and Schroeder 2006).
was not a feasible option for these workers. So although COBRA offered these workers and their dependents a health care coverage option that was less expensive than purchasing their own individual coverage from private insurance companies, it was still too expensive for them to afford given that they were unemployed. \(^{160}\) Accordingly, none of the workers in this study acquired health insurance coverage under COBRA during the lockout.

Over a year and a half into the lockout, in March 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which is more commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or simply “Obamacare.” Under this legislation, locked out workers can purchase coverage through the “Health Insurance Marketplace” (i.e., the Marketplace) or “State Health Insurance Exchanges.” Typically, individuals can only buy coverage through the Marketplace during the annual open-enrollment period, which runs from November through February. However, the loss of employer-provided health insurance coverage during a labor dispute, such as a strike or lockout, triggers a 60-day special enrollment period in which workers can purchase coverage. \(^{161}\) Although the ACA may offer workers involved in labor disputes lower health insurance premiums than those available under COBRA, the cost of health care coverage through the Marketplace may still be prohibitive for workers who are

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\(^{160}\) The findings of this study are consistent with previous research which suggests that the cost of health care coverage under COBRA is prohibitive for most out-of-work Americans (Gruber and Madrain 1997; Simon and Schroeder 2006; Hilzik 2015).

\(^{161}\) As Hilzik (2015) explains “the loss of health care coverage is a qualifying event under the Affordable Care Act allowing locked-out or striking workers to go on their state or federal exchange and buy coverage.” Moreover, he suggests that “it might not be as good as what they were receiving from their employers, but as a stopgap it’s almost certain to have lower premiums than COBRA coverage” (Hilzik 2015).
unemployed as a result of such disputes (Hilzik 2015). Indeed, none of the workers in this study obtained health insurance coverage through the ACA.\textsuperscript{162}

While the ACA has expanded health insurance coverage to millions of Americans and may be an important step in the direction of universal health care coverage in the United States, as is claimed by Kalleberg (2011), workers and their families in this country still find themselves without affordable and/or sufficient health care coverage, especially when they are suddenly displaced from their jobs, like the workers in this study.\textsuperscript{163} Although ACA was a major step toward comprehensive health care reform, it did not change the country’s employer-provided health insurance system. In fact, the principle source of health care coverage in this country, unlike other industrialized nations, remains employment-based health insurance, at least for those under the age of sixty-five.\textsuperscript{164}

The coupling of health insurance coverage and employment in the United States is problematic for a number of reasons. To begin with, it has led to incomplete, insecure, and unstable health care coverage for a large number of Americans. For instance, it leaves many kinds of people vulnerable to being uninsured, such as those who leave their jobs, are displaced from their jobs, are between jobs, have jobs without benefits, and those who are without jobs. In addition, as our nation has come to rely on employers to provide health insurance coverage, fewer employers are offering it, and fewer workers who are offered coverage through employers

\textsuperscript{162} One reason for this may be that most of the locked out GPC workers in this study were able to secure new jobs with fringe benefits, including employer-provided health insurance coverage, by the time the ACA was enacted.

\textsuperscript{163} Blumenthal and Collins (2014:280) estimate that 20 million Americans have gained coverage under the ACA between March 2010 and May 2014.

\textsuperscript{164} The United States remains the only industrialized nation that does not provide universal health insurance (Giaimo 2016).
are accepting the coverage due to the rising costs of premiums, deductibles, and co-pays. According to a recent report by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the dollar amount of employee annual premium contributions to employer-sponsored health insurance plans more than doubled from 2000 to 2010 (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2013:3). What is more is that as health insurance has become more expensive in the United States and, therefore, costlier to provide, employers have an incentive to reduce their health care costs by replacing their permanent employees with temporary employees and other types of precarious employment arrangements (Madrian 2007; Windham 2015). In other words, the linking of health insurance coverage to employment has given employers a reason to avoid the so-called “standard employment relationship” in favor of precarious employment relationships in order to avoid the burden of raising health care costs. Thus, de-linking health insurance coverage and employment could possibly stymie the growth of employment precarity.

All of these reasons suggest the need to move away from employer-provided health care coverage as an institution in the United States and toward some form of universal health care coverage. Health care reform has become center-stage in 2016 presidential campaign. For instance, in their contest for the Democratic presidential nomination, both Senator Hillary Clinton and Senator Bernie Sanders are proposing measures to expand publically funded health care coverage. Their proposals range from expanding Medicare to creating a federally financed and administered single-payer health care system. This study suggests that policies should consider ways to provide locked out workers and other displaced workers health insurance coverage as they search for reemployment. Policies requiring employers to continue covering employees during labor disputes and after displacement as a result of such disputes would allow

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165 Senator Clinton recommends the former while Senator Sanders proposes the latter.
such workers to remain insured as they search for reemployment. Another possibility would be
to publicly fund programs that provide health care coverage to workers as they transition
between employers. These programs could be modeled off of unemployment insurance programs
or “continuation of coverage” laws, and in the case of the latter, the government would be
responsible for paying premiums. In addition, policies should consider ways to make health care
coverage more portable across employers.

To reiterate, the workers in this study felt the state played a role in helping them recover
from the loss of their jobs as a result of the lockout (i.e., their precarity) by providing
unemployment insurance benefits and some, although limited, health care coverage for their
dependent children during the labor dispute and until they were able to find reemployment. The
state, however, could play an even greater role in dealing with employment precarity, as
Kalleberg (2011) suggests, by providing workers and their families a better safety net outside of
the labor market and by moving away from what Windham (2015) refers to as “the employer-
centered social welfare state.”

The UFCW and Recovering from Precarity

The role that organized labor, specifically the UFCW, played in workers’ recovery from
the lockout was contradictory. From the perspective of most workers in this study, the
International UFCW (i.e., the International) should have done more to help its affiliate Local
86D and its members in their labor dispute with GPC. However, workers also expressed that the
financial support the International provided the Local and its members, mostly in the form of
“strike pay,” helped alleviate some of the financial hardships brought on by the lockout and
helped them recovery from the loss of their jobs as a result of the labor dispute. In short, they
maintained that the strike pay they received from the International helped supplement the
unemployment insurance benefits they were receiving during the lockout, and that between the two sources of income, most, but not all, of them were able to remain financially viable until they either secured reemployment or retired from GPC with a pension. Although strike pay is designed to help sustain striking and/or locked out workers until their union has successfully negotiated an end to their labor dispute and their return to work, in this case, the funds were used to “buy” workers time to search for new employment comparable to GPC or to reach the point in which they were able to retire with their employer-provided pension.

It is unclear why the International did not do more to assist Local 86D and its members in their struggle with GPC. Locked out workers suggested that the International wanted them to accept whatever contract the company was offering and return to work. However, Local 86D’s members were not willing to accept a collective bargaining agreement that would essentially allow the company to outsource their jobs through subcontracting. Clearly, if workers are to stand a chance of successfully defeating their employers in labor disputes, such as this one, there needs to be unity between the International and the Local and its members.

Local 86D and its members were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to take on GPC on their own in this labor dispute. Without greater support from the International, they were largely defenseless against the company’s precarization efforts. First of all, they did not expect the company to lock them out. GPC’s Muscatine-based facility was unionized for over six decades prior to the lockout in 2008, and in that time, the facility had not experienced a major labor dispute. Thus, the entire time these workers were employed at GPC, the company was unionized, and they had never encountered a labor dispute. Moreover, over their years of working at the facility, each time their collective bargaining agreement was set to expire, the company and the
union would bargain in “good faith” until they settled on a new agreement. Therefore, these workers assumed the same would happen at the expiration of their 2003-2008 contact.

Workers were also caught off-guard by the lockout because of the organizational structure and culture of their union, which is commonly referred to in the labor literature as “business unionism.” In short, Ashby and Hawkins (2009:215) explain that with business unionism: “The union is seen as a business, with decisions made at the top, rather than as a democratic, grassroots organization driven by its members. Paid union staff at the national and regional level are the full-time experts whose job is to serve its membership, much as an insurance company or law firm services its clients.” Most workers in this study reported being passive members of their union. They explained that they paid their union dues, but rarely attended union meetings other than around the time of contract negotiations. Yet, even when it came time for contract negotiations, they indicated leaving most of the collective bargaining up to their union leadership and representatives. As a result, they found themselves overly reliant on their union leaders and representatives and their power vis-à-vis the company once they were locked out to end the labor dispute. And as Ashby and Hawking explain, in business unionism, “collective bargaining comes down to one thing: the skill of the union representatives who bargain with management. During strikes and lockouts...the members’ role is simply to walk the picket line and to hold out one day longer than the company” (2009:216).

Indeed, after being locked out, workers were left relying on the leadership and representatives of the UFCW and their ability to bargain with the company. In trying to pressure the company into negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement and to end the lockout, the UFCW primarily used the following strategies: picketing the company’s Muscatine-based

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166 “Business unionism” is described in greater detail in chapter four.
facility, issuing press releases, broadcasting a handful of advertisements in the local media against the company and on behalf of the workers, and filing “unfair labor practices” charges against the company. Based on these strategies alone, the UFCW was unable to mount any real pressure on the company to reach an agreement and end the lockout, especially since GPC was not genuinely interested in reaching a new collective bargaining agreement with the UFCW and its members. According to UFCW representatives and members alike, the company continued to engage in negotiations after locking out the bargaining unit employees, but only superficially – by proposing contract offers which the union members considered less and less favorable – in order to avoid “unfair labor practice” charges.

With only minimal assistance from the International, Local 86D’s leaders and members were unable to develop a successful campaign to pressure the company into meaningful negotiations. With the exception of providing strike pay for the locked out workers, the International did not devote significant financial or human resources to assist Local 86D and its members in their struggle with the company. In fact, when comparing the GPC/UFCW lockout to organized labor’s successful lockout defeats, it is clear that in order to have even stood a chance of successfully defeating GPC in this labor dispute, the International world have had to commit more substantially to the Local’s struggle with the company. As Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999:203) claim, with regard to lockouts, “such struggles cannot be won on a local level.”

On their own, Local 86D and its members were unable to mobilize significant community support or build community-based alliance, as well as broader political alliances, in their struggle against the company, and all of these factors have proven to be critical in pressuring companies to end their lockouts. Also compared to other lockouts, the International offered Local 86D very
little help in the way of a strategic campaign or even a public relations campaign against the company. With more help from the International, Local 86D might have been able to use GPCs poor environmental record and the company’s numerous environmental regulation violations to build a so-called “corporate campaign” against the company during the labor dispute.

Overall, this study suggests that when international labor unions do not invest in so-called “corporate campaigns” to support their affiliated local unions and members engaged in labor disputes, or when unions do not have other effective strategies to challenge employers who lockout their bargaining unit employees, these workers are more than likely to lose their jobs. And when they do, they will have to rely on their own agency to recover from job loss. Locked out GPC workers and their union lacked an effective collective response to their labor dispute. So these workers were mostly on their own to respond to being lockout and without a job. Having to respond on a more individual basis, the workers in this study who were able to retire did so, while those seeking reemployment were able to find jobs relatively easily by relying on their social networks and job experience. Taken as a whole, these workers’ experiences suggest that when unions are either unwilling to devote the resources necessary to challenge an employer in a labor dispute or unable to defeat an employer in a such a dispute, at the very least they can play a part in helping to sustain their members financially until they able to secure a new source of employment or income.

Also in regard to the contradictory role the union played in workers’ recovery from precarity as a result of the labor dispute is the fact that a number of workers postponed their search for reemployment after being locked out in the hope that the union would successfully negotiate a new contract with company and their return to work. These workers were the ones who encountered the most financial difficulties as a result of being locked out and without
employment. In other words, the workers who realized early on in the labor dispute that their union did not have the power, and/or was not investing the resources necessary, to effectively resist the company’s efforts to generate precarious employment and therefore started searching for reemployment, were generally the ones who sustained the least amount of adversity as a result of the lockout.

The Precarious Position of Local 86D and the American Labor Movement

Five and a half years into the lockout, Local 86D was in much more of a precarious position than most of its members. By 2014, it had been years since the union and its members gathered outside GPC’s facility to picket the company. The Local no longer had a union hall, telephone number, or website. Although the International’s directory still listed Local 86D, it included just a post office box address for the union. Furthermore, it had been over four years since the International had posted anything on its website about the Local or its lockout. The Local was still holding monthly meetings, but only a few, if any, members showed up for these meetings other than the union representatives who were in charge of managing the meetings.\textsuperscript{167} There had been significant turnover in the Local’s leadership over the course of the lockout and as a number of the union’s executive board members retired over the years. Moreover, the Local’s membership had dropped over seventy percent from an estimated 300 workers to about 85 workers (Ferguson 2013a).\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{167} Since Local 86D no longer had a union hall, the union held its monthly meetings at the American Legion Post 27 in Muscatine.

\textsuperscript{168} Although Local 86D’s President estimated that 85 workers still belonged to the union in 2013, a significant number of these workers had obtained reemployment outside of GPC and were not planning on returning to work for the company. Because these workers had not terminated their employment at GPC, they were still considered members of the company’s bargaining unit. Therefore, if the lockout were to end, these workers would more than likely terminate their
The GPC/UFCW lockout demonstrates the complex relationship between employment precarity and organized labor in the United States. It reveals not only the precarious position of UFCW Local 86D, but also the increasing precariousness of organized labor in this country, which has become undeniable.\(^\text{169}\) In 2014, with just 11.1 percent of American workers belonging to unions, which is an estimated 14.6 million people, the nation’s union membership rate reached its lowest point in over 100 years (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). In the nation’s private sector, which employs more people than the public sector, the union membership rate is just 6.6 percent, which is an estimated 7.4 million Americans (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015).\(^\text{170}\) This decline has weakened organized labor as an American institution and its ability to represent workers’ rights and interests in society, as well as its power relative to employers in the labor market. Moreover, the weakening of organized labor’s power relative to employers has resulted in declining wages, benefits, and working conditions for many American workers as well as an increase in employers demanding concessions from their unionized workers and/or provoking labor disputes, such as the GPC/UFCW lockout, in an effort to eliminate unions altogether.

Recognizing declining union membership and power and the crisis this presented, the U.S. labor movement, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

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\(^{169}\) The titles of a number of recent publications are telling in this regards; they include: *Save Our Unions: Dispatches for a Movement in Distress* (Early 2013); *The Death and Life of American Labor: Toward a New Workers’ Movement* (Aronowitz 2014); and *The End of American Labor Unions: The Right to Work Movement and the Erosion of Collective Bargaining* (Hogler 2015).

Organizations (AFL-CIO), began to make organizing new members its top priority.\textsuperscript{171} Beginning in 1995, with the election of John Sweeney and the so-called “New Voice” slate to the top leadership positions of the AFL-CIO, the federation launched an ambitious program to “organize the unorganized.”\textsuperscript{172} In short, this program, which came to be referred to as the “New Voice Program,” included: expanding the federation’s Organizing Institute; creating a new Organizing Department to train union organizers and to provide support for organizing campaigns; and the federation actively encouraging its affiliated international and local unions to commit at least thirty percent of their budgets to organizing new members, which meant shifting their financial resources into organizing and away from other union activities.\textsuperscript{173} As Fletcher and Hurd (2001:182) describe, the mantra of the America labor movement became “Changing to Organize, Organizing for Change.”

Despite twenty years of the AFL-CIO’s emphasis on organizing, union membership has continued its downward trend. Obviously, the federation needs to organize new members and especially needs to try to organize the growing number of precarious workers. However, this study suggests that while trying to organizing new members, organized labor should not neglect

\textsuperscript{171} The AFL-CIO is considered the U.S.’s national labor federation. It is a voluntary association of 56 national unions with more than 13 million members and is the largest labor federation in the country (Chaison 2006:38).

\textsuperscript{172} In addition to John Sweeney, who was elected President of the AFL-CIO in 1995, the federation’s “New Voice” slate include Richard Trumka as Secretary-Treasurer and Linda Chavez Executive as Vice President.

\textsuperscript{173} In its contest for leadership of the AFL-CIO, the Sweeney campaign dubbed itself “A New Voice of American Labor” (Brecher and Costello 1996:7). This titled was based on the campaign’s agenda which Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson (1995) laid out in their publication: A New Voice for American Workers: Rebuilding the American Movement – A Summary of Proposals from the Unions Supporting John J. Sweeney, Richard Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson. Hence the references to the “New Voice Program” and the “New Voice” slate.
its existing union members, like the locked out GPC workers. As a result of their experiences during the GPC/UFCW labor dispute, several of the workers in this study went from being avid union supporters to feeling indifferent towards unions and, in some cases, have converted to union critics.

Organizing the unorganized, and especially precarious workers, is essential to revitalizing organized labor in the United States. Yet, strengthen exiting unions should also be part of the AFL-CIO’s agenda. As Rich Yeselson (2013:80), who worked as a strategic campaign researcher for 23 years in the U.S. labor movement, recommends:

Strengthen existing union locals. Many locals have atrophied. Staff and a cohort of committed members often run local unions on behalf of a large silent majority of members, who view union membership as something like an insurance policy, paid for by their union dues, rather than a rank-and-file driven activist organization. Train more workers and hire more staff to enforce contracts and teach workers their rights. Invest heavily in worker education programs, everything from knowledge about occupational safety and health to labor history courses. Workers who feel connected and engaged with their local union will someday help organize new members.

It is clear that organized labor must adapt to changes in the structure of the economy and the nature of employment relations if it is going to be a meaningful institution in American society. However, in doing so, rather than abandoning its traditional membership base, organized labor should acknowledge how these changes affect this membership base and take measures to continue to represent these workers.¹⁷⁴ For instance, as the employment relationship becomes increasingly more precarious in industries that have traditional offered a standard employment relationship and lifelong employment, such as manufacturing, unions should develop new strategies and approaches to represent workers in these industries whose careers are likely to

¹⁷⁴ Part of the problem is that organized labor has mostly chalked up the decline in manufacturing union membership to deindustrialization rather than devoting attention to the domestic outsourcing of these union jobs.
remain within the industry but span a range of employers. Additionally, given the importance of workers’ social and human capital in responding to employment precarity, organized labor should consider what role it can play in helping workers develop and expand their social networks and human capital.

Lastly, organized labor helped pass the legislation that reduced the precarious and oppressive employment conditions of the Depression era in the United States (Kalleberg 2011:189). Organized labor and its affiliates should once again be pressing for legislative reforms to create more of a balance of power between employers and employees.

**Labor Law Reform**

Not only does organized labor need to adjust to changes in the U.S. labor market and the nature of employment relations, but our nation’s labor laws also need to be revisited and adjusted in response to these changes. For the most part, the labor laws that exist today were enacted over eighty years ago as part of FDR’s New Deal reforms. These laws were based on what was once the normative “standard employment relationship.” The fragmenting of this relationship and the related growth in so-called “nonstandard” or “precarious” employment relationships over the last several decades suggests the need to reform these laws. At the very least, the federal government could play an important role in helping to level the playing field between employers and employees by enforcing the existing labor laws that protect workers’ right to collective bargaining. One way to do this would be for the state to provide sufficient funding for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which is charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (i.e., the Wagner Act). Which, as (Kalleberg 2011:33) explains, “has been underfunded since the Reagan administration” and “has thus been ineffective
in enforcing labor laws and Wagner Act standards, as well as protecting the rights of private sector workers to organize into unions and bargain collectively with employers.”

In conclusion, by examining the GPC/UFCW lockout within the context of growing precarious employment in the United States, this case study reveals previously unexplored and underexplored aspects of contemporary employment precarity. Namely, it demonstrates how employers are able to deploy lockouts to achieve precarious employment relations. Additionally, it explains how locked out workers and their union responded to the precarious position they were placed in as a result of the labor dispute. Several years after the lockout, while UFCW Local 86D showed no prospect of recovering from the labor dispute, most of its members and other locked out GPC workers reported quite a remarkable recovery. Future research should continue to explore how labor disputes, and especially lockouts, are implicated in the generation of employment precarity in the United States and how workers are able to respond.
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Hello, my name is Jackie Gabriel and I am a doctoral graduate student and researcher from Colorado State University (CSU) in the Sociology department. We are conducting a research study on the labor lockout at Grain Processing Corporation, Inc. (GPC) in Muscatine, Iowa. The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the conditions workers encounter as a result of being locked out of their jobs and having to find alternative financial security and/or employment. We hope to learn more about workers’ experiences of being locked out of work and their current situations.

This study is being conducted to fulfill the requirements for my Doctoral of Philosophy degree. The title of the study is *Labor Displacement and Working-Class Resilience: A Case Study of Locked Out Grain Processing Workers in America’s Heartland*. The Principal Investigators are Dr. Michael Carolan and I, both from the Sociology Department at CSU.

You have been selected to participate in this research because you have been identified as one of the 360 workers affected by the lockout. We would like you to answer a few questions about your experiences both before and after the Lockout at GPC. Participation will take approximately one to two hours of your time. The initial interview will take approximately one hour. At a later date, and with your permission, a second interview may be scheduled to add clarity to my understanding of your experiences. The second interview will take no more than an hour of your time. Therefore, your total time commitment for this research is approximately two hours. Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participation at any time without penalty. Would you like to participate?

All information you provide will be keep confidential. With your permission, the interview will be auto recorded. All records and audio recordings will be kept strictly confidential; only Dr. Carolan and I will have access to them. Your name will not appear in any presentation of this research. There are no known risks or direct benefits to you for your participation in this research, but we hope to gain more knowledge about how workers are affected by and respond to being locked out of their workplace.

You can contact me at (970) 305-1756 or jgabriel@colostate.edu or Dr. Michael Carolan at (970) 491-5797 or Michael.Carolan@ColoState.Edu. Moreover, you have questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research you can contact Janell Barker, Human Research Administrator, 970-491-1655.
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Work History

1. How long did you work for GPC?
2. How did you end up working at the plant?
3. Do you have relatives or friends at the plant when you started working there?
4. Where else did you work before going to work at GPC?
5. What did you do before the lockout (i.e., job description)?
6. How would you describe working at GPC?
7. Describe the pay and fringe benefits, and how they compared to your previous employment.
8. What was your role in and relationship with the union at GPC (pre- and post-lockout)?

Demographic Information

9. Hometown?
10. Age?
11. Level of Education?
12. Formal & Informal Training?
13. On-the-job Training at GPC?
14. Family Composition?
15. How many dependents did you have at the time of the lockout?
16. Were there any other members of your family contributing financially to the household?

Experience at GPC

17. Did you enjoy working at GPC?
18. What aspects of the job did you enjoy the most?
19. What aspects of your job did you find most rewarding?
20. What did you like least about your job?
21. Did you apply anywhere else while working at GPC?
22. Did you experience upward mobility while working for the company?
23. Any regrets regarding working at GPC?
24. Did you plan on retiring with the company?
25. Reflecting back to before the lockout, is there anything you miss about the job?
26. What is your status with the company now?
27. Have you terminated your employment with the company? If not, do you plan on it?
The Lockout

28. What are your thoughts and feelings regarding the lockout?
29. Who is responsible?
30. Were there changes in working conditions/relations at the plant leading up to the lockout?
31. How would you rather have had the labor dispute handled?
32. Did you vote on the 2008 contact? If so, how?
33. Would you have preferred the union to have accepted the contract that the company proposed?
34. Looking back to August 22, 2008, where were you when you were told that you were locked out?
35. What were your initial thoughts and feelings regarding the lockout and its assumed outcome?
36. When did you get the sense that you weren’t going back to work at GPC?
37. How do you feel about the fact that it still isn’t resolved?
38. Would you go back to work there if given the opportunity?
39. What did the union do for you and other workers pre- and post-lockout?
40. Are their additional things you feel the union should have done?
41. How do you feel about unionization now? Not just UFCW Local 86D, but organized labor in general?

Post-Lockout Experience

42. Were you concerned about being lockout? What were you most concerned about?
43. Did you join the union and workers outside the plant on the picket line?
44. What did you do to occupy your time during the first few weeks/months of the lockout?
45. What did you do after the lockout? How did you decide what to do?
46. How long did you go without work?
47. Were you able to maintain your standard of living? If so, how?
48. What help did you have? What kind of support, financial and otherwise, did you have?
49. Did you receive unemployment insurance? If so, how long or how much?
50. Did you receive money from the union (i.e., the “hardship funds”)? If so, how long and/or how much?
51. And of forms of assistance and/or support?
52. If married, was your spouse working?
53. Did you go back to school after the lockout?
54. Were you offered or did you seek out any training or re-training programs?
55. Did you have savings? If so, were they utilized?
56. Did you go into debt (i.e., credit card, second mortgage)?
57. Did you have a 401K at GPC? If so, did you withdraw it?
58. Did you and your family experience finance issues as a result of the lockout?
59. Did you or your family experience any physical and/or emotional issues as a result of the lockout?
60. Are there other economic, social and/or psychological consequences of the lockout that you would like to comment on?
Contemporary Work Experience

61. Are you working now? If so, where?
62. If working, how did you find your current employment?
63. How does your current work compare to working at GPC?
64. How do the wages and benefits compare?
65. Does your previous work experience at GPC help in your new job?
66. Do you think the fact that you worked at GPC and/or that you were one of the “locked out GPC workers” had an impact on your re-employment?
67. Is there a union at your new workplace? If so, are you a member? If not, would you support one there?

Current Well-Being and Future Expectations

68. Is your life better or worse today? Explain.
69. How are you worse off and/or better off than pre-lockout?
70. How do you see the future?
71. If you are currently working, do you feel you have job security at your new job?
72. How do you think your lockout experience compares to other locked out workers?
73. Are you still in contact w/some of your co-workers?
74. What do you feel is the most important lesson to be learned regarding the lockout?
APPENDIX C

Consent to Participate in a Research Study
Colorado State University

Title of Study: Labor Displacement and Working-Class Resilience: A Case Study of Locked Out Grain Processing Workers in America’s Heartland

Principal Investigator: Jacqulyn (Jackie) Gabriel, Ph.D. Candidate; jgabriel@colostate.edu; Department of Sociology; (970) 305-1756

Director of Dissertation Committee: Douglas Murray, Ph.D; douglas.murray@colostate.edu; Department of Sociology; (970) 491-6492

You are invited to participate in a research study about the lockout at Grain Processing Corporation, Inc. (GPC) in Muscatine, Iowa conducted through the Sociology Department at Colorado State University. This study is being conducted to fulfill the requirements for a Doctoral of Philosophy degree. The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the conditions workers encounter as a result of being locked out of their jobs and having to find alternative financial security and/or employment. I hope to learn more about workers’ experiences of being locked out of work and their current situations. You have been selected to participate in this research because you have been identified as one of the 360 workers affected by the lockout.

If you decide to participate, I will be asking you some questions about your employment at GPC, your involvement with the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union, the social and economic affects you and your family have experienced as a result of the lockout, your current employment situation, and how it compares to your work at GPC. Locations of interviews will be determined on an individual basis and will be conducted at an agreed upon meeting place and at your convenience. The interview will be auto recorded and will take approximately one hour. At a later date, and with your permission, a second interview may be scheduled to add clarity to my understanding or your experiences.

Initial here is you consent to the use of a tape recorder: ___________

Some of the questions in this interview may involve topics that are uncomfortable to talk about, for example, some questions will require that you recall and describe the experience of being locked out of your job and without a paycheck. If there are questions or topics that arise during the course of this interview that you do not feel comfortable answering or talking about, you are more than welcome to decline to answer these questions or discuss these topics. It is not possible to identify all potential risks in research procedures, but I have taken reasonable safeguards to minimize any known and potential, but unknown, risks. Moreover, I will take steps to keep your identity confidential. All records and audio recordings that identify you will be kept strictly confidential; only I will have access to them. Your name will not appear in any presentation of
this research. While the results of the study may be published, I will keep your name and other identifying information confidential. There is no compensation (payment) for taking part in this study. Moreover, I cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any direct benefits from your participation in this research. However, a potential benefit to you may include the satisfaction in knowing you are contributing to a greater awareness of how workers are affected by and respond to being locked out of their workplace.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participating at any time without prejudice. Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in this research, please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions about the study, you can contact me, Jackie Gabriel at (970) 305-1756 or jgabriel@colostate.edu or the Director of my Dissertation Committee, Douglas Murray at (970) 491-6492 or douglas.murray@colostate.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant you may contact Janell Barker, Human Research Administrator at 970-491-1655. I will give you a copy of this consent form to take with you.

Your signature acknowledges that you have read the information stated and willingly sign this consent form. Your signature also acknowledges that you have received, on the date signed, a copy of this document containing two pages.

_________________________________________    _____________________
Signature of Participant                  Date

_________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

_________________________________________    _____________________
Signature of Principle Investigator                Date

This consent form was approved by the CSU Institutional Review Board for the protection of human subjects in research on (Approval Date).
## LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Affordable Care Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTWU</td>
<td>Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Archer Daniels Midland Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGM</td>
<td>American Federation of Grain Millers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIW</td>
<td>Allied Industrial Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>American Sociological Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASF</td>
<td>Badische Anilin Soda Fabrik</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCTGM</td>
<td>Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers, and Grain Millers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Bureau of Labor Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLAM</td>
<td>Clean Air Muscatine</td>
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<tr>
<td>COBRA</td>
<td>Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Current Population Survey</td>
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<td>DNR</td>
<td>Department of Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWS</td>
<td>Displaced Worker Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>Extended Benefits Program</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>EUC</td>
<td>Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program</td>
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<td>FMCS</td>
<td>Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPC</td>
<td>Grain Procession Corporation, Inc.</td>
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<td>GSS</td>
<td>General Social Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALTRIN</td>
<td>Maltodextrin</td>
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<td>NIRA</td>
<td>National Industrial Recovery Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLB</td>
<td>National Labor Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLRA</td>
<td>National Labor Relations Act</td>
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<td>NLRB</td>
<td>National Labor Relations Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>Non-Profit Organization</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAW</td>
<td>Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Recovery Capital</td>
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<td>TSI</td>
<td>Temporary Staffing Industry</td>
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<td>UFCW</td>
<td>United Food and Commercial Workers Union</td>
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<td>UI</td>
<td>Unemployment Insurance</td>
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<td>USWA</td>
<td>United Steelworkers of America</td>
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